CALUAG V PECSON 82 PHIL 12

DOCTRINE: It is not enough that a court has power in abstract to try and decide the class of
litigations to which a case belongs; it is necessary that said power be properly invoked, or called
into activity, by the filing of a petition, complaint or other appropriate pleading.

FACTS: This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition filed by the petitioners on the ground that the
respondent judge acted without or in excess of the jurisdiction of the court in rendering the resolution,
which declares the petitioners guilty of contempt of court for not complying or performing the order of
the court. From the record it appears that no charge for contempt was filed against the petitioners nor was
a trial held. The only proceeding had in this case which led to the conviction of the defendants are: the
order of January 7, 1947, issued by the lower court requiring the defendants to execute the deed of
conveyance as direct in the judgment within ten days from the receipt of the copy of said order, with the
admonition that upon failure to do so said petitioners will be dealt with for contempt of court.

RULING: The respondent Judge Angel Mojica acted not only without jurisdiction in proceeding against
and declaring the petitioners guilty of contempt, but also in excess of jurisdiction in ordering the
confinement of the petitioners.

It is well settled that jurisdiction of the subject matter of a particular case is something more than
the general power conferred by law upon a court to take cognizance of cases of the general class to which
the particular case belongs. It is not enough that a court has power in abstract to try and decide the
class of litigations to which a case belongs; it is necessary that said power be properly invoked, or
called into activity, by the filing of a petition, complaint or other appropriate pleading.

So, although the Court of First Instance of Bulacan has power conferred by law to punish as
guilty of indirect contempt a party who disobeys its order or judgment, it did not have or acquire
jurisdiction of the particular case under consideration to declare the petitioners guilty of indirect
contempt, and order their confinement until they have executed the deed of conveyance in question,
because neither a charge has been filed against them nor a hearing thereof held as required by law.

NAVALE V CA 253 SCRA 705

DOCTRINE: Defects of summons are cured by voluntary appearance and by the filing of an answer to the
complaint. A defendant can not be permitted to speculate upon the judgment of the court by objecting to
the courts jurisdiction over its person if the judgment is adverse to it, and acceding to jurisdiction over its
person if and when the judgment sustains its defense. [Republic v. Ker & Company, Ltd., No. L-
21609, September 29, 1966, 18 SCRA 208]. Any form of appearance in court by the defendant, his
authorized agent or attorney, is equivalent to service except where such appearance is precisely to object
to the jurisdiction of the court over his person.[Carballo v. Encarnacion, 49 O.G. 1383]

FACTS: In one case, petitioners Petitioners argue that summonses were never validly served on them and
that they did not appear voluntarily in the action. They contend that it was only Eligio Valdehueza who
received a copy of the summonses and answered the same and that they never authorized him to represent
them. Thus, they conclude, the MTCC never acquired jurisdiction over them.

RULING: In the present case, the record shows that summonses were duly served on petitioners but
that they, not only refused to receive the same, but that they also declined to give their names.
 Jurisdiction cannot be acquired over the defendant without service of summons. However, Section
23 of the Rules provides that the defendants voluntary appearance in the action shall be equivalent to
service. Instances of actions amounting to voluntary appearance have been held by this Court to be: when
his counsel files the corresponding pleading thereon;2 when a defendant files a motion for reconsideration
of the judgment by default, 3 when he files a petition to set aside the judgment of default;4 when he and
the plaintiff jointly submit a compromise agreement for approval of the trial court.

Defects of summons are cured by voluntary appearance and by the filing of an answer to the
complaint. A defendant can not be permitted to speculate upon the judgment of the court by objecting to
the courts jurisdiction over its person if the judgment is adverse to it, and acceding to jurisdiction over its
person if and when the judgment sustains its defense. [Republic v. Ker & Company, Ltd., No. L-
21609, September 29, 1966, 18 SCRA 208]. Any form of appearance in court by the defendant, his
authorized agent or attorney, is equivalent to service except where such appearance is precisely to
object to the jurisdiction of the court over his person.[Carballo v. Encarnacion, 49 O.G. 1383]

DE JESUS V GARCIA 19 SCRA 554

FACTS: Petitioner filed a complaint for specific performance of contract before the City Court of Manila.
Defendants averred that the Court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter by a clear reading of its
complaint.

RULING: Jurisprudence teaches that the averments of the complaint, taken as a whole, are what
determine the nature of the action, and therefore, the court's jurisdiction.13

A careful and considerate examination of the complaint below as a whole brings to the fore the fact that
plaintiff Maxima de Jesus asks that these defendants comply faithfully with their respective commitments.
Implicit, too, in the complaint is the demand that her said co-owners recognize her as administratrix. It is
in the context just recited that plaintiff's action below comes within the concept of specific performance
of contract. And in this posture, we express the view that jurisdiction resides in the court of first instance.
For, specific performance the subject of the litigation "is not capable of pecuniary estimation".

IMPORTANT READING:

1. As starting point, we have the rule-long in standing and frequent in application that jurisdiction over
the subject matter is conferred only by the Constitution or law. It cannot be fixed by the will of the
parties; it cannot be acquired through, or waived, enlarged or diminished by, any act or omission of the
parties. Neither is it conferred by acquiescence of the court.4 Constitutionally viewed, apportionment of
jurisdiction is vested in Congress.5 Congress may not delegate that power.6 We may not even look to the
Rules of Court in search of jurisdiction jurisdictional boundaries. For indeed, the constitutional authority
of the Supreme Court on this point is circumscribed in the zone properly denominated as the
promulgation of "rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts and the admission to the
practice of law";7 and, consequently to determine the "means, ways or manner in which said jurisdiction,
as fixed by the Constitution and acts of Congress, shall be exercised".8 Rules of Court must yield to
substantive laws9 of which jurisdiction is a segment. A mistake in statutory jurisdiction may not be
corrected by executive fiat, "but by legislation".10
Well may we profit from the wise pronouncement in Manila Railroad Co. vs. Attorney-General, supra, at
pages 529-530, thus: "Certain statutes confer jurisdiction, power, or authority. Others provide for the
procedure by which that power or authority is projected into judgment. The one class deals with the
powers of the court in the real and substantive sense; the other with the procedure by which such powers
are put into action. The one is the thing itself ; the other is the vehicle by which the thing is transferred
from the court to the parties. The whole purpose and object of procedure is to make the powers of the
court fully and completely available for justice. ... The purpose of such a procedure is not to restrict the
jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter, but to give it effective facility in righteous action. ..."

2. And now we come to the jurisdictional area allocated to inferior courts. A rule, the validity of which is
recognized, is that jurisdiction of an inferior court will not be presumed; "it must appear clearly from
statute or it will not be held to exist."11 Such jurisdiction cannot be broadened upon "doubtful inferences"
drawn from statutes. Absent a statutory grant, neither convenience nor assumed justice or propriety of the
exercise thereof in a particular class of cases "can justify the assumption of jurisdiction" by said courts. 12

3. Jurisprudence teaches that the averments of the complaint, taken as a whole, are what determine the
nature of the action, and therefore, the court's jurisdiction.

ARRANZA V B.F. HOMES 333 SCRA 799

FACTS: petitioners filed with the HLURB a class suit "for and in behalf of the more than 7,000
homeowners in the subdivision" against respondent BFHI, BF Citiland Corporation, PWCC and A.C.
Aguirre Management Corporation "to enforce the rights of purchasers of lots" in BF Homes Paraaque. [3]
Respondent thus filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari and prohibition docketed as
CA~G.R. SP No. 39685. It contended in the main that the HLURB acted "completely without
jurisdiction" in issuing the Order granting the writ of preliminary injunction considering that inasmuch as
respondent is under receivership, the "subject matter of the case is one exclusively within the jurisdiction
of the SEC.

RULING:

Jurisdiction is the authority to hear and determine a cause the right to act in a case.[12] It is
conferred by law and not by mere administrative policy of any court or tribunal. [13] It is determined
by the averments of the complaint and not by the defense contained in the answer. [14] Hence, the
jurisdictional issue involved here shall be determined upon an examination of the applicable laws and the
allegations of petitioners complaint before the HLURB.

It should be stressed that the main concern in this case is the issue of jurisdiction over petitioners
complaint against respondent for specific performance. P.D. No. 902~A, as amended, defines the
jurisdiction of the SEC; while P.D. No. 957, as amended, delineates that of the HLURB. These two
quasi~judicial agencies exercise functions that are distinct from each other. The SEC has authority over
the operation of all kinds of corporations, partnerships or associations with the end in view of protecting
the interests of the investing public and creditors. On the other hand, the HLURB has jurisdiction over
matters relating to observance of laws governing corporations engaged in the specific business of
development of subdivisions and condominiums. The HLURB and the SEC being bestowed with
distinct powers and functions, the exercise of those functions by one shall not abate the
performance by the other of its own functions. As respondent puts it, "there is no contradiction
between P.D. No. 902~A and P.D. No. 957."[30]
CABRERA V LAPID 510 SCRA 55

FACTS: The petitioner filed a complaints against several public officials with regard to the fish pond that
was destructed by the local government where she has a lease agreement with. However the Ombudsman
issued a resolution dismissing the petition. The dismissal was based on the declaration that the fishpond
was a nuisance per se and, thus, may be abated by respondents in the exercise of the police power of the
State. Petitioner elevated the matter to this Court via a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court and later on joined the Ombudsman in her amended complaint questioning the errors
of the Ombudsman resolution.

RULING: Petitioner has taken the position that the Ombudsman has decided questions of substance
contrary to law and the applicable decisions of the Supreme Court. That is a ground under a Rule 45
petition. Indeed, from a reading of the assignment of errors, it is clear that petitioner does not impute
grave abuse of discretion to the Ombudsman in issuing the assailed Resolution and Order. Rather, she
merely questions his findings and conclusions. As stated earlier, direct appeal to the Supreme Court via a
petition for review on certiorari is not sanctioned by any rule of procedure. By availing of a wrong
remedy, the petition should be dismissed outright.

By grave abuse of discretion is meant capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is

equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. Mere abuse of discretion is not enough. It must be grave abuse of
discretion as when the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion
or personal hostility, and must be so patent and so gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive
duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law. 24

Grave abuse of discretion should be differentiated from an error in judgment. An error of

judgment is one which the court may commit in the exercise of its jurisdiction, and which error is
reversible only by an appeal. As long as the court acts within its jurisdiction, any alleged errors
committed in the exercise of its discretion will amount to nothing more than mere errors of
judgment, correctible by an appeal or a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. An
error of jurisdiction is one where the act complained of was issued by the court without or in excess
of jurisdiction and which error is correctible only by the extraordinary writ of certiorari

PADRE V BADILLO GR. NO. 165423

DOCTRINE: "[W]hat determines the nature of the action and which court has jurisdiction over it
are the allegations in the complaint and the character of the relief sought."

FACTS: RTC rendered a decision with regard to the petition of the petitioner, the MTC however seeks
to revive the RTCs decision. Nilo seeks to reconsider. The MTC denied the motion for
reconsideration.15 It held that the case is an action for revival of judgment and not an action for ownership
and possession, which had already long been settled. To the MTC, the former is a personal action under
Section 2, Rule 4 of the Rules of Court which may be filed, at the election of plaintiffs, either at the court
of the place where they reside or where the defendants reside.

RULING: "[W]hat determines the nature of the action and which court has jurisdiction over it are
the allegations in the complaint and the character of the relief sought."

Under paragraph 6 of their complaint, the Badillos alleged that judgment in Civil Case No. A-514 had
become final and had been executed. Further, in paragraph 7, they alleged that in 1990, the defendants re-
entered the property and despite repeated demands they refused to vacate the same. Thus, the Badillos
were not at all seeking a revival of the judgment. In reality, they were asking the MTC to legally oust the
occupants from their lots. As the assessed value of the property subject matter of this case is P26,940.00,
and since more than one year had expired after the dispossession, jurisdiction properly belongs to the
RTC.34 Hence, the MTC has no judicial authority at all to try the case in the first place