Scots Philosophical Association

University of St. Andrews

A Note on Entailment
Author(s): G. H. von Wright
Source: The Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 9, No. 37 (Oct., 1959), pp. 363-365
Published by: Oxford University Press on behalf of the Scots Philosophical Association and the
University of St. Andrews
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2216370
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 363

A NOTE ON ENTAILMENT

In his interesting and thoughtful discussion in the October 1958 issue

of The Philosophical Quarterly of two of the essays in my book Logical
Studies, Mr. Strawson criticizes my account of the concept of entailment.
I shall here try to show that Mr. Strawson's criticism rests on an unduly
narrow interpretation of my position.
The view of entailment put forward in my essay can be briefly expressed
as follows : p entails q, if an only if p Dq is demonstrable independently of
demonstrating the falsehood of p or the truth of q. The account given in
the paper of the notions of demonstrability, demonstration, and independent
demonstrability is, admittedly, very insufficient and may require, not only
further elaboration, but also some amendments.
One of the aims of the suggested definition of entailment was to rule
out the " paradoxes " that any arbitrary contradiction entails every pro-
position and that every proposition entails any arbitrary tautology. Mr.
Strawson purports to give an example which shows that the definition fails
(at least) of the second of its objects mentioned.
The counter-example starts from the tautology p D{(p.q)V(p.~q)}. Mr.
Strawson says that it can be demonstrated by means of a truth-table in-
dependently of demonstrating the (falsity of p and the) truth of qv,q.1
Three more tautologies are adduced. I shall not reproduce the formulae
here. Mr. Strawson says that they " still more obviously " can be demon-
strated independently of demonstrating the truth of qV' q. By the use
of substitution and by repeated applications of Modus Ponens Mr. Strawson
deduces, from his four tautologies, the tautology p )(qv? q).
Before proceeding to an examination of Mr. Strawson's argument, I
should like to supplement it with the following, much simpler, reasoning
which might be used, with an equal force, to show that my definition of
entailment fails also of the first of its above mentioned objects:
Consider the tautology (1) p D3(p Dq). Its truth-table proof is inde-
pendent of a truth-table demonstration of the falsity of p. p in the same
sense in which I understand the proof of Mr. Strawson's first tautology to
be independent of a demonstration of the truth of qv\q. Now add (2)
{p D(r Z)q)}3D(p.r) Dq). It is, to use Mr. Strawson's phrase, "still more
obvious " that the truth-table demonstration of (2) is independent of a
truth-table demonstration of the falsity of p.'p. From (2) we obtain by
substitution (3) {p )('p Dq)} {(p. p) Dq}. From (1) and (3) we obtain
by Modus Ponens (4) (p.'p) Dq. If it is true that (4) has been proved
1There is a slip of the pen in Mr. Strawson's paper which may have bewildered some
of his readers. Mr. Strawson consistently speaks of demonstrating the falsity of qV-q
and the truth of p, when he should say, and obviously means, " the truth of qV-q "
and " the falsity of p ".

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364 G. H. VON WRIGHT

independently of proving the falsity of p. p, then, on my definition of

entailment, (4) would show that a contradiction entails an arbitrary pro-
position. This is another of the " paradoxes " which my definition was
designed to avoid.
* * *

It is significant that Mr. Strawson should say that his second, third,
and fourth tautology are demonstrable independently of demonstrating
the truth of qv q " still more obviously " than his first tautology. For,
whereas I can see no sense in which a demonstration of his second, third,
and fourth tautology could not be given independently of a demonstration
of qv -q, I-and I hope Mr. Strawson too-can see quite clearly one sense
in which the truth-table demonstration of his first tautology is dependent
on a demonstration of the truth of qV .q. Similarly, I can see no sense
in which it would be true to say that the truth-table proof of p D(rDq)}
D ((p.r)Dq} was not independent of the proof of the falsity of p. p, and
also no sense in which the proof by substitution of {pD (~pDq)}3 {(p.-p)
D q} was not independent of the proof of the falsity of p. p. But I can
see a sense in which the truth-table proof of PD ('pD q) is not independent
of a proof of the falsity of p. p.
I shall assume that the reader is familiar with the notion of a well-formed
formula of the sentential calculus and with the notion of a constituent (part)
of a well-formed formula. Now consider the following truth-table:
p q p.q p.
-q 1-q (p.q)v(p.r.q)
T T T F F T
T F F T T T
F T F F F F
F F F T F F
Which tautology could this truth-table be said to demonstrate, "show
forth " ?
One answer could be: The table does not demonstrate any tautology
at all. As a demonstration it is still incomplete. It has to be completed
by adding on to it at least one " unmixed " column containing only Ts and
headed by some tautology, all the constituent formulae of which occur
at the head of some of the preceding columns in the table.
Another answer to the question could be : The table demonstrates the
truth of every tautology (and the falsity of every contradiction), all the
constituents of which may be identified as headings of some column in the
table. For example : The table demonstrates the truth of pD (P.q)V(P-.q)}
but also the truth of, say, (p.-.q)Dp or (p.-q)D{ (p.q)v(p.q)} or -
qv .q. A person who asks for a proof of any of these tautologies could be
given in reply a tablet on which is engraved the above truth-table. A person
who asks for a proof of qv q could also be offered a smaller tablet, on which
is engraved only the table

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 A NOTE ON ENTAILMENT 365

q q
T F
F T
But a person who asks for a proof of the truth of pj {(p.q)v(p.q)} could
not be given this second table in reply. (It may here be well to remind our-
selves of the fact that the understanding and use of truth-table proofs pre-
supposes knowledge of the definitions of the various truth-functions; other-
wise the distribution of Ts and Fs in columns headed by molecular formulae
would appear arbitrary or unintelligible.)
The second answer seems to me to be a perfectly legitimate reply to
the question, what the above bigger truth-table can be said to prove. A
proof is that which convinces us of the truth (or falsity) of something. A
truth-table is not made more convincing, more of a proof, by adding to it
an " unmixed " column headed by a tautology or a contradiction. The
table must, by itself, convince us of the possibility of this addition.
Mr. Strawson may disagree with me about the legitimacy of the second
reply. If he does, I shall not try to argue against him. For I think we can
both agree that there is a sense in which a truth-table demonstration of
the truth of pD{(p.q)v(p. q)} " contains" and is thus not independent
of a demonstration of the truth of qv q, whereas there is no sense in which
the substitution-proofs of Mr. Strawson's second, third, and fourth taut-
ologies (or the truth-table proofs of the tautologies of which they are substi-
tution-instances) can be said to " contain " and thus not to be independent
of a demonstration of the truth of qV q. And similarly, there is a sense
in which a truth-table demonstration of the truth of pD (-pD q) " contains '
and is thus not independent of a demonstration of the falsity of p. p,
whereas there is no sense in which a truth-table demonstration of (2) and
the substitution-proof of (3) are not independent of a demonstration of
the falsity of p.,p.2
I would therefore maintain that the difficulty which Mr. Strawson has
pointed out can be overcome without amending the proposed definition of
entailment. But it is a justified criticism of my paper (and of my definition)
that it needs to be supplemented by an account of what is meant by calling
the demonstration of the truth or falsity of a formula " independent of"
(or " dependent upon ") the demonstration of the truth or falsity of another.
An account of what this means in the sentential calculus should be implicit
in this note. But I cannot claim to have given or to be able to give a general
account of the notion of independent provability.
University of Helsingfors. G. H. VON WRIGHT
2Mr. P. Geach (Proc. Aris. Soc., supp. voi. 32, 1958, p. 164) has suggested the following
modified version of my original definition of entailment: "p entails q if and only if
there is an a priori way of getting to know that pD q which is not a way of getting to
know whether p, or whether q ". Even if one objects to calling the above bigger truth-
table a proof of a certain tautology unless it is completed by adding an " unmixed "
column, one must, I think, admit that it provides us with " a way of getting to know "
the various tautologies which may be formed (entirely) out of constituents listed at
the head of the columns of the table.

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