Ginsberg1978 Elections

Elections and the Mobilization of Popular Support
Author(s): Benjamin Ginsberg and Robert Weissberg

Source: American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 22, No. 1 (Feb., 1978), pp. 31-55
Published by: Midwest Political Science Association
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Elections and the Mobilization
of Popular Support*
Benjamin Ginsberg, Cornell University

Robert Weissberg, University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign
While elections are normally seen as means by which citizens influence leaders,
elections can also be viewed as mechanisms which serve to increase elite con-
trol over citizens. The opportunity for citizens to participate in leadership selec-
tion may also be an opportunity for leaders to coopt citizens by implicating
them in the government's creation. This possibility is tested with data from the
1968 and 1972 American presidential elections by comparing citizens' pre- and
post-election attitudes toward the regime, leaders, and policy. The elections'
largest impact appeared to occur in attitudes toward the regime. Changes in
citizen response are discussed in terms of three mechanisms of attitude change,
each of which has different implications for leaders and the regime.
The idea that elections are intended to facilitate citizen control over
leaders and public policy is among the most deeply entrenched Amer-
ican political beliefs. From childhood, Americans appear to develop
a commitment to the electoral process and come to view voting as
the principal vehicle for popular influence in government (Hess and
Torney, 1962). The image of citizen control via the ballot box is
shared by virtually all strata of American society. Even scholars aware
of the actual weakness of the links between voting and policy im-
plicitly assume that a relationship ought to exist (Berelson, Lazars-
feld, and McPhee, 1954).
Despite its pervasiveness, the democratic ideal of elections as
instruments of popular control is not the only way in which elections
may be viewed. There exists an alternative perspective which places
greater emphasis on the role of elections as mechanisms for the gen-
eration of popular support for the government and its policies. In
this view the opportunity for citizens to actively participate in the
* This paper was jointly authored; the names of the authors appear in
alphabetical order. The authors wish to thank Charles M. Honart for his re-
search assistance, and the Jonathan R. Meigs Fund, Cornell University for
funding. Data were made available through the Inter-University Consortium for
Political and Social Research.
American Journal of Political Science, VoL 22, No. 1, February 1978 / ?) 1978 by the University
of Texas Press.
0026-3397/78/2201-0031 $02.00
32 Benjamin Ginsberg and Robert Weissberg
selection of leaders is, at the same time, an opportunity for leaders

to coopt citizens by implicating them in the government's creation. By
contrast to the more democratic image, from this perspective elections
serve primarily to help increase leaders' ability to influence citizens.'
This second conception of the electoral process is usually asso-
ciated with elections in totalitarian systems. As one Soviet writer
stated, "Elections raise the consciousness of the masses, heighten the
activity of the people, and attract millions of workers to participate in
state construction and direction" (Swearer, 1961, p. 147) .2 Similar
arguments were made by conservatives such as Bismarck and Disraeli
who saw voting as a way of rallying less privileged classes to a tradi-
tional, conservative regime (Rokkan, 1970). Arguments of this kind,
however, have not been made only in relation to authoritarian regimes.
James Wilson, one of the most democratic delegates to the American
Constitutional Convention, endorsed a similar form of reasoning when
he claimed that a strong national government required popular con-
fidence, and that the best way to assure this confidence was through
popular participation in the election of representatives (Farrand, 1966,
V. 1, p. 49).
Contemporary writers, too, have recognized the potential role
of electoral participation as a technique for the manipulation of mass
sentiment (Shils, 1962, p. 38; Zolberg, 1966; Rose, 1967). Mac-
Kenzie, for example, characterizes elections as "rituals of choice"
whose binding character derives from individual participation in a
social act to legitimize political authority (MacKenzie, 1968, p. 6).
Edelman depicts electoral politics as a means of creating the image
of popular rule while insulating actual decision makers from mass
intrusion. Elections, Edelman claims, offer relatively harmless ways
for popular discontent to be voiced while also serving to reemphasize
common social ties (Edelman, 1964, 1971).
1 Of course, this second perspective does not inherently contradict the

more democratic image of the electoral process since any given election could
simultaneously provide citizens and leaders a degree of influence over one
another.
2 This point of view is not unique to Communist nations. Amir Abbas
Hoveida, Premier of Iran, recently argued that single party elections with com-
pulsory voting give Iranians a sense of participation and representation in the
affairs of the government even if those for whom they vote have little political
power. Hoveida saw such voting as a "political coming of age" for apolitical
citizens. "Iran's Sole Party Girds for Election This Week," New York Times,
June 16, 1975, p. 19.
ELECTIONS AND MOBILIZATION OF SUPPORT 33
The purpose of our analysis will be to determine whether and

how elections affect citizens' political beliefs. While most studies of
elections have at least implicitly sought a flow of influence from citi-
zens to leaders, our interest is in the possibility that elections can
operate to produce the opposite effects. Our focus will be on changes
in citizens' political attitudes during presidential elections. Three types
of attitudes will be considered: (1) mass beliefs about the responsive-
ness and virtues of the regime; (2) feelings towards both winning and
losing presidential candidates; and (3) levels of support for leaders'
policies. We shall then discuss some of the possible mechanisms by
which elections can affect citizen attitudes as well as the costs and
benefits to leaders of these different mechanisms for the generation of
support.
The Data
Our analysis of election-related attitude change is based on the 1968

and 1972 SRC election data. The effect of the election is measured
by comparing preelection responses with postelection responses for
the same individual on precisely the same questions (with one excep-
tion discussed below). We acknowledge, of course, that a number of
factors besides elections could produce differences between pre- and
post-election responses, but for purposes of analysis we assume that
these nonelectoral factors are randomly distributed and thus cancel
one another out from the net changes. Analysis of attitudes towards
the regime will use data from both elections. Questions on leaders and
policies, however, were not asked both pre- and post-election in 1968
so these analyses will be based solely on the 1972 data. One further
limitation is that the 1972 policy questions were not asked of the
same individuals before and after the election, so change at the indi-
vidual level cannot be measured. Nevertheless, since the number of
respondents in each instance is large, we shall make our comparisons
on the basis of aggregate differences (and use statistics assuming sep-
arate subsamples).
Though our analysis speaks of elections, it is clear that we are
empirically dealing with only two national elections which may or
may not be typical. We thus can make no claims about the conse-
quences of elections beyond the 1968 and 1972 contests. One could
certainly imagine characteristics of particular elections, e.g., the policy
differences among candidates, amount of psychological involvement
among citizens, the division of the vote, and the incumbency status of
candidates, that could very well affect the results of our analyses.
Eventually, perhaps, we shall possess a sufficient number of election
surveys to control for such factors, but for the present we can only
acknowledge the fact that our conclusions may be influenced by the
peculiar nature of the elections under investigation.
Changes in Beliefs about the Regime
Every election of leaders represents a test, and potentially a threat to

popular support for the political regime. Electoral conflicts may strain
public acceptance of legal and institutional processes. Groups dis-
satisfied with the election's outcome may come to question or re-
nounce the procedures by which that outcome was achieved. The
results of an election may contribute to public doubt about the ac-
countability of national authorities and the responsiveness of govern-
mental institutions. It is not difficult to find cases of elections which
have exacerbated the estrangement of large segments of society from
a regime. The election of Salvador Allende in Chile, for example,
appeared to leave many middle-class Chileans ready to support insur-
rection. In the United States, fear of the destabilizing consequences of
elections was often expressed at the time of the nation's founding.
Alexander Hamilton, for example, was concerned that, "at the period
which terminates the duration of the Executive, there will always be
an awful crisis in the national situation" (Farrand, 1966, V. 1, p.
145).
To assess the effects of elections on citizens' attitudes toward
the regime, we have analyzed the patterns of change in popular per-
ceptions of the government's responsiveness following both the 1968
and 1972 presidential elections.3 In addition, we have examined
changes in citizens' trust and confidence in government immediately
after the 1972 election. While the impact of the two elections differs,
the results of both seem far removed from the "awful crisis" feared
by Hamilton.
The Impact of the 1968 Election

Table 1 reports the patterns of changes among respondents asked
whether people like themselves have "much say" about what the gov-
3Because responsiveness is an important norm of all democratic regimes,

citizens' perceptions of governmental responsiveness are an important com-
ponent of popular attitudes about the regime. A very similar argument is made
by Easton and Dennis (1967).
emnment does, before and after the 1968 presidential election.4 The
amount of positive postelection change in response to this question
is quite striking. Among those respondents who indicated prior to the
election that people like themselves had no influence on the govern-
ment, almost half (49.4 percent) had come to believe that they did
have quite a lot of "say" following the election. A much smaller pro-
portion of those who thought initially that they did have considerable
influence on the government, shifted in a negative direction after the
election. It is quite apparent that positive changes are concentrated
primarily among those who actually voted in the election. Among
nonvoters by contrast, positive changes barely outstrip negative shifts.
A similar pattern of postelection changes occurs in response
to the question of whether or not public officials care what people like
the respondent think. Here the difference between voters and non-
voters is even more marked. Among voters, a sizable proportion of
those who thought prior to the election that officials did not care,
offered a more positive appraisal after the election. Among those
who did not vote, however, the proportion shifting in a negative di-
rection greatly surpasses the percentage of respondents who came to
believe after the election that public officials did care.
Electoral participation seems to be strongly associated with
4 In 1968 the pre- and post-election forms of this question differed. Prior
to the election respondents were asked, "Would you say that people like you
have quite a lot of say about what the government does, or that you don't have
much say at all?" After the election respondents were asked whether they agreed
or disagreed with the statement, "People like me don't have any say about what
the government does." Similar pre- and post-differences in wording affect the
"do public officials care?" item. Prior to the election respondents were asked,
"Would you say that most public officials care quite a lot what people like you
think or that they don't care much at all?" After the election respondents were
asked to agree or disagree with the statement, "I don't think public officials
care much what people like me think." Because of these changes in wording, it
is possible that pre- and post-election differences in responses to the questions are
merely artifacts of changes in the questions themselves rather than actual
changes in respondents' attitudes. This possibility, however, seems somewhat
remote. First, the 1968 results are quite similar to the results obtained in 1972
when the wording of the questions was not altered between waves of the survey.
Second, the very striking differences between the patterns of postelection
change exhibited by voters and nonvoters, both responding to the same ques-
tions, cannot be explained in terms of changes in wording. It should also be
mentioned that too few respondents answered "no opinion" or "don't know" to
these questions to be taken into account in our analysis.
TABLE 1
Changes in Popular Perceptions of "Say" in Government

Following the 1968 Presidential Election*
Voters Nonvoters Total
% of respondents with
negative preelection
perceptions who became
positive following the 55% 34.6% 49.4%
election (N =700)** (N =263) (N =963)
positive preelection
negative following the 15.5% 21.2% 16.6%
election (N =278) (N =52) (N =330)
* The question asked prior to the election: "Would you say that people
like you have quite a lot of say about what the government does, or that you
don't have much say at all?" The postelection form of the question asks re-
spondents to agree or disagree with the assertion that, "People like me don't
have any say about what the government does." -
** The number in parentheses is the base on which the proportion of
changes is calculated. For example, 700 voters had negative perceptions prior
to the election. Fifty-five percent of them became positive after the election;
the other 45 percent remained negative.
changes in citizens' attitudes about the responsiveness of govern-

mental authorities and institutions in 1968.5 At the same time, at
least among the supporters of major party candidates, patterns of atti-
tudinal change do not appear to be related to the defeat or victory of
respondents' candidate preferences. If elections were sufficiently di-
visive that supporters of the losing candidate began to doubt the gov-
ernment's responsiveness to their own needs, electoral contests might,
in fact, precipitate "awful crises." As Table 2 indicates, though, among
both Nixon and Humphrey voters in virtually equal proportions, the
direction of attitude change following the election is overwhelmingly
15 Among those who participated in campaign activities in addition to

voting, positive changes were even more marked.
TABLE 2
Changes in Popular Perceptions of Whether or Not

Public Officials Care Following the 1968 Presidential Electio
Nonvoters
Voters Preferred Prefer
Humphrey Nixon Humphrey Nixon All Vo
perceptions who became 45.4% 45.5% 24.6% 22.4% 41
positive following the (N = 130) (N = 132) (N = 57) (N = 49) (N = 3
election
perceptions who became 24.5% 21.8% 62.3% 45.6% 25
negative following the (N = 261) (N = 316) (N = 53) (N = 57) (N =
election
* The question asked prior to the election: "Would you say that most public officials ca
like you think, or that they don't care at all?" The postelection form of the question asks r
with the assertion that, "I don't think public officials care much what people like me think.
positive. Among nonvoters, by contrast, negative changes predomi-

nate among the supporters of both major party candidates.
Only among Wallace supporters do we find a divergence from
the pattern of association between electoral participation and positive
postelection attitude changes. (See Table 3) A large segment of both
Wallace voters and nonvoters who favored Wallace came to believe
after the election that the government was not responsive to them.
These attitudinal changes among Wallace voters suggest that the
potential for electoral conflicts to alienate portions of the electorate
from the political regime. Wallace voters, to a greater extent than
other segments of the national electorate, apparently conceived the
defeat of their candidate to be an indication of some far-reaching
defect in the political process.
Despite the divisive potential of the Wallace candidacy, negative
changes among the relative handful of Wallace voters are more than
offset by positive shifts among those who voted for the two major
party candidates. If the Wallace voters suggest the divisive potential
of elections, the great majority of the electorate suggests that the
simple act of voting in 1968 was associated with increases in citizen
affinity for national authorities.
TABLE 3
Changes in Perception of Whether or Not Public Officials Care

Among Wallace Supporters Following the 1968 Presidential Election
Voted for Preferred Wallace

Wallace but did not vote
positive following the 27.1 % 25%
election (N = 59) (N 20)
negative following the 50.0% 42.9%
election (N =38) (Nz 14)
Attitudinal Changes in 1972
The 1972 presidential election generated considerably more conffict

and controversy than any electoral contest in recent American history.
Throughout the campaign unusually sharp policy divisions were mani-
fested between the two candidates as well as between their supporters.
We might have expected that in this climate of electoral division, Mc-
Govern's defeat could easily have repercussions for his supporters'
beliefs about the political regime itself.
However, as the figures in Table 4 indicate, attitude changes in
1972 follow the same patterns that we observed in 1968. Despite the
bitterness of the contest, belief in the government's responsiveness in-
creased among voters for both candidates.
TABLE 4
Changes in Popular Perceptions of "Say" in Government

Following the 1972 Presidential Election*
Voted for Voted for Total Total

Nixon McGovern Voters Nonvoters
positive following the 48.3% 26.5% 39.6% 27.4%
election (N = 145) (N = 98) (N = 255) (N = 175)
negative following the 10.9% 17.1% 13.1% 28.7%
election (N = 329) (N = 152) (N = 504) (N = 129)
* Both pre- and post-election respondents were asked to agree or disagree with
the statement, "People like me don't have any say about what the government does."
It is apparent, though, that positive changes in citizens' attitudes in

1972, particularly among voters for the losing candidate, did not
occur with the same frequency as in 1968. On the question, "Do
public officials care?" positive postelection changes among Nixon
voters only slightly outstrip negative shifts, while among McGovern
voters just the opposite is true (see Table 5). The difference between
voters and nonvoters generally, however, remains quite marked.
A sharp difference emerges in Table 6 between the patterns of
change exhibited by Nixon and McGovern voters on several questions
TABLE 5
Changes in Popular Perceptions of Whether or Not

Public Officials Care Following the 1972 Presidential Election*
Voted for Voted for Total Total

Nixon McGovern Voters Nonvoters
positive following the 28.7% 23.6% 26.2% 16.8%
election (N = 171) (N = 123) (N = 309) (N = 190)
negative following the 21.7% 24% 22.2% 39.4%
election (N = 290) (N = 121) (N = 427) (N = 109)
* Both pre- and post-election respondents were asked to agree or disagree with
the statement, "I don't think public officials care much about what people like me
think."
designed to measure popular confidence in government before and

after the 1972 election. On these questions, Nixon voters tend to
become positive after the election in much greater proportion than
McGovern voters. Of course, these results are not directly comparable
to any questions asked in 1968. When placed alongside our previous
1972 findings however, they begin to suggest that the outcome of the
election had a more significant impact on citizens' beliefs about the
regime in 1972 than in 1968, with supporters of the losing candidate
somewhat less likely to manifest positive postelection attitude changes
then in 1972 than supporters of the winning candidate.
Despite this potentially important difference between the two
elections, though, the crucial fact remains that like their 1968 counter-
parts, voters in 1972 tended in significant proportions to become
more positive about the regime after the election.
Elections and the Mobilization of Support for Leaders
It has often been argued that a victorious presidential candidate

receives a surge of popular support upon his election. Studies of
several presidential contests using a before-after interview design have
found evidence of increased popular confidence in a newly elected
ELECTIONS AND MOBILIZATION OF SUPPORT 4I
TABLE 6
Changes in Popular Trust and Confidence in

Government Following the 1972 Presidential Election
Trust Govt. Is Govt. run Are Govt. Honesty

to do what for benefit people in
is right* of all** capable*** Govt.****
NIXON VOTERS
positive following the 49% 27% 41% 41.1%
election (N = 159) (N = 193) (N = 179) (N = 136)
negative following the 20.6% 20.9% 19.1% 16.6%
election (N = 320) (N = 225) (N = 274) (N = 332)
McGOVERN VOTERS
% of negative respondents
who became positive after 21.3% 14.8% 32.1% 30.3%
the election (N = 145) (N = 156) (N= 112) (N = 102)
% of positive respondents
who became negative after 34.4% 42.7% 29.6% 26.8%
the election (N = 116) (N = 81) (N = 141) (N = 153)
* How much of the time do you think you can trust the government in Washing-
ton to do what is right-just about always, most of the time, or only some of the
time?
** Would you say the government is pretty much run by a few big interests
looking out for themselves or that it is run for the benefit of all the people?
*** Do you feel that almost all of the people running the government are smart
people who usually know what they are doing, or do you think that quite a few of
them don't seem to know what they are doing?
**** Do you think that quite a few of the people running the government are a
little crooked, not very many are, or do you think hardly any of them are crooked
at all?
president (Anderson, 1967; Paul, 1956; Raven, 1965; Stucker,

1964). Thompson, for example, in an analysis of the 1936 election,
found evidence of a pro-Roosevelt surge one day after the election
(Thompson, 1938).
To test for changes in citizen attitudes in 1972, we compared
TABLE 7
Changes in Ratings of McGovern and Nixon,

By Voting Preference, 1972
Feelings towards McGovern Feelings t
How Voted Ho
Mc- No Mc- N
Nixon Govern Vote Total Nixon Go
Became more
positive 27.2 30.3 27.0 28.0 28.8 28
No change 32.3 31.0 27.3 30.9 45.1 26
Became more
negative 40.5 38.7 45.8 41.0 26.1 44
Net change-%
of respondents -13.3 - 8.4 -18.8 -12.9 2.7 -1
- 11.6 -3.7
Net change-
x shift in
ratings - 3.7** - 0.7 - 4-4** - 3.0** 0.8 -
- 2.5 -0.7
N = 951 513 531 971 518 5
* *P = .001 2 tailed t- test of significance

Source: SRC, University of Michigan
Analysis of Variance: F-Ratio Sig.
Attitude towards McGovern
Voting vs. Nonvoting 2.811 .09
Nixon vs. McGovern vote 6.545 .01
Attitude towards Nixon
Voting vs. Nonvoting .01 .57
Nixon vs. McGovern vote 20.170 .00
individual ratings of Nixon and McGovern on pre- and post-election

"feeling thermometers." In both instances, respondents were asked to
rate candidates on a 0 to 100 scale in terms of their "warmness" or
"coolness" of feeling. Table 7 reports the aggregate patterns of
changes in feeling thermometer ratings of the two candidates.
While sizeable numbers of citizens become more positive to-
ward both, it is clear that both candidates suffer net losses in popular
support after the election. The only evidence of a net increase in sup-
port occurs among Nixon voters' pre- and post-election ratings of
Nixon. Support for McGovern declined after the election even among
a large number of McGovern voters.
Masked by these aggregate patterns of change, however, is a far
more complex and significant picture of the impact of the 1972 elec-
tion on popular support for leaders. When we examine in Table 8,
attitude shifts among respondents classified according to their pre-
election positions, there emerges an intriguing view of the mobilization
of citizen support in democratic politics. First, in the case of citizen
attitudes toward Nixon, marked positive postelection changes occur
among those respondents who began with very negative or negative
evaluations of Nixon. Increases in support for Nixon are most sub-
stantial among Nixon voters, though initially negative nonvoters and
McGovern voters, as well, become more positive. Among those re-
spondents who reported very positive preelection feelings toward
Nixon, on the other hand, support declined somewhat after the elec-
tion. Even among Nixon voters with very positive initial evaluations
of Nixon, there occurred a slight (x 3.5 points) negative shift.6
The small number of McGovern voters who began with highly posi-
6 This pattern of moderation of extremes may initially appear to be a re-

gression towards the mean effect rather than an election-related change. Given
the nature of our data, it is probably impossible to measure precisely how much
of this shift is due to a purely statistical artifact. Nevertheless, further analysis
suggests that these patterns are not a result of simple regression to the mean.
Specifically, if regression to the mean were occurring, we would predict that:
(1) variances would remain unchanged regardless of changes in the mean; and
(2) opinion changes would be equally distributed about the mean. Tests of
these hypotheses suggest that a regression towards the mean explanation is not
very plausible. Postelection attitude variances for Nixon voters, McGovern
voters, and nonvoters were consistently (and statistically significantly) smaller,
and the change patterns were highly asymmetrical. No doubt some regression
towards the mean occurs, but this phenomenon cannot account for all the atti-
tude changes observed.
TABLE 8
Mean Pre- Post-Election Changes, By Initial Feeling and Vote,
Change Towards McGovern (mean) Change Towards

Initial Feelings Toward Initial Feeling
McGovern* Nixon
very very very
negative negative neutral positive positive negative negative
Voted for 48.4 16.2 10.3 3.2 -9.1 12.2 0.5 -2

McGovern (16) (13) (45) (178) (261) (130) (109)
Voted for 9.5 -3.8 -12.3 -16.9 -31.7 44.4 29
Nixon (338) (257) (158) (166) (32) (9) (21) (3
Nonvoter 18.2 -0.3 -2.4 -12.2 -21.9 24.3 10
(97) (86) (121) (123) (104) (46) (58) (7
Total 13.0 -2.0 5.2 -8.2 -14.3 16.8 7.1
N = 467 372 342 479 401 194 200 2
* Categorizations of initial feelings were defined as follows: 0-25 "very negativ

tral"; 51-7 "positive"; and 76-100 "very positive."
Source: SRC, University of Michigan
tive images of Nixon, on the whole became less positive though still
not negative toward him.
A similar set of findings emerges from changes in McGovern
ratings. Among respondents who were initially highly positive toward
McGovern, there is a pronounced decline in support after the election.
This decline occurs even among those who voted for McGovern.
Among respondents with initially very negative opinions of McGov-
em, however, postelection ratings are an average of 13 points higher
than before the election. Even Nixon voters who were initially very
negative toward McGovern became more positive after the election.
In short, it is clear that the 1972 election did help to mobilize
popular support for leaders.7 This mobilization of support, however,
did not take the simple form of increases in positive attitudes among
most citizens. Overall, negative shifts outnumbered positive post-
election changes. What is significant, however, both in terms of the
newly elected president's capacity to govern and the continuing via-
bility of legitimate opposition, is that the segments of the electorate
initially most opposed to both candidates became markedly more
positive after the election. The bulk of negative change amounted to
positive evaluations becoming slightly less positive. In a sense, these
patterns of change result in an electorate which gives moderate sup-
port to both the newly elected president and his defeated opponent.
Changes in Policy Differences between Citizens and Leaders
In addition to providing leaders an opportunity to enhance their

popular standing, elections also offer leaders the possibility of mobil-
izing public opinion for their policies. Increased policy support could
occur for several different reasons. First, the act of voting for a candi-
date might, through psychological balancing mechanisms, lead the
voter to shift his own preferences toward the candidate's position.
7 Some partial and limited data on the 1976 election show a similar pat-
tern. A Gallup poll done for Newsweek after the election, reports that 49 per-
cent of those voting for Ford have become more favorable towards Carter (19
percent became less favorable). "Great Expectations," Newsweek, January 24,
1977, p. 20. Similarly, a preelection/postelection telephone poll in the Cham-
paign-Urbana area with approximately 90 respondents found that 51.9 percent
of the Ford voters became more positive towards Carter while 20.9 percent
became more negative (this change was somewhat less noticeable among non-
voters). This study was supervised by Professor Susan Hansen of the University
of Illinois and is contained in Miller et al. (1977).
Rather than support a candidate with an unacceptable policy position,

the voter might either distort the candidate's "true position" or modify
his own stand. The existence of such policy distortion would thus
guarantee the victorious candidate a following which endorsed his
policies. A second possible reason for change would be the impact of
the campaign, since the election provides candidates an opportunity
to publicize and defend their issue positions. During the campaign
many citizens not normally exposed to policy pronouncements are
unable to escape them, and given the power of leaders to mold mass
opinion, opinion shifts towards leaders might occur. Finally, it is
conceivable that many voters might interpret electoral victory as a
popular endorsement of a leader's policies. This process would appear
to be most likely among those voting for the loser or not voting, e.g.,
McGovern voters who strongly opposed Nixon on Vietnam might
decide that anyone getting that many votes might not be completely
wrong on issues.
To examine election-related shifts in policy preferences we have
used a series of questions in which respondents indicate their own
policy preferences on a seven-point scale and then place candidates on
the same scale. As we previously mentioned, pre- and post-election
respondents are not identical so our analysis must treat the data as
two independent random samples. Our basic measure of policy shift
will be the mean difference between respondents' positions and their
perception of candidates' position pre- and post-election. Four policy
areas will be examined: Vietnam, government intervention against
inflation, government guarantee of jobs, and the progressiveness of
the federal income tax. The Vietnam issue in particular seems impor-
tant, for here the campaign debate was both intense and clear-cut.
Table 9, which presents the data on American involvement in
Vietnam, inflation, government guarantee of jobs, and tax policy does
not offer clear evidence of policy convergence following the 1972
elections. As expected, McGovern voters showed the largest distance
between themselves and Nixon, but even Nixon's landslide victory
did not reduce this policy difference. Indeed, McGovemites were even
further from Nixon on Vietnam following the election than before.
Among Nixon voters and nonvoters, however, policy distances are
reduced after the election, though the distances are not statistically
significant. The interesting question, of course, is whether McGovern
voters moved even further towards the extreme "dove" position fol-
lowing the defeat of their candidate or whether perceptions of Nixon

changed. Evidence of the former phenomenon would suggest that
elections involving bitter issue conflict may exacerbate rather than
smooth major political divisions. Unfortunately, the lack of individ-
ual level data precludes such analysis.
Table 9 also presents similar data on the issues of fighting infla-
TABLE 9
Net Policy Differences Between Citizens and Nixon,*

By Issue Area, By Vote, 1972 (Differences in Mean Scores)
Policy Area
Vietnam Inflation
How Voted How Voted
All Non- All Non-

N M Voters voters Total N M Voters voters Total
Net shift .14 -.23 .02 .18 .11 .08 .02 .09 .21 .18
towards
Nixon
N = 1119 preelection N = 1044 preelection

990 postelection 869 postelection
Govt. Guarantee of Jobs Tax Policy
How Voted How Voted
All Non- All Non-

N M Voters votersTotal N M Voters voters Total
Net shift .16 .57** .28** .38 .31** -.05 .32*** .11 .24 .22***
towards
Nixon
N = 987 preelection N = 872 preelection

860 postelection 729 postelection
* On each issue area respondents were given seven-point scales to place

themselves and where they believed President Nixon to be on the same issue.
Hence, the maximum issue distance is 6. Positive scores indicate a movement
towards Nixon's perceived position following the election.
** Difference significant at .01 level
*** Difference significant at .05 level
tion, government guarantees of jobs, and federal income tax policy.

As in the data on Vietnam, the instances of a reduced postelection
citizen-Nixon difference outnumber increased policy differences, but
the overall evidence is weak at best. The strongest evidence for elec-
tions as mechanisms to reduce policy disagreements is found among
McGovern voters on the issues of government guarantees of jobs and
federal income tax rates, but on inflation the shift among McGovern-
ites was trivial. On all three issues Nixon supporters evidence much
the same issue distance before and after the election. Comparisons of
voters in general vs. nonvoters also does not yield large and syste-
matic differences. In short, Nixon did not emerge from the election
with significantly greater support for his policies.
A related question concerns changes in policy agreement be-
tween citizens and McGovern. Did McGovern's overwhelming elec-
toral defeat lead citizens to disassociate themselves even further from
McGovern's policies? Or, on the other hand, did the postelection
period smooth over policy disagreements? Pre- and post-election dif-
ferences, though not large, consistently point towards the second
process. Even Nixon voters are less prone to disagree with McGovern's
policies after than before the election, though in the case of Vietnam
the gap is still substantial (a mean of 3.11 on a seven-point scale).
Comparisons of voters vs. nonvoters, or McGovern voters vs. Nixon
voters, show no consistent pattern-on same issues nonvoters show
the largest shift towards McGovern but on a different issue they show
the least shift, while voting choice also shows an irregular pattern.
Given all the plausible reasons for policy shifts, why are they
not larger? One possible reason is that preelection policy differences
for many citizens on many issues were already so small that a signifi-
cant postelection increase in agreement was, statistically speaking,
very difficult. This was especially true for Nixon voters on Vietnam
and inflation, where close policy agreement existed before the election.
This reasoning does not hold, however, in the case of McGovern
voters who show high initial disagreement with Nixon on all four
issues. It is also conceivable that many citizens are simply not aware
of candidate policy pronouncements and are thus not swayed in the
predicted direction. To test for this possibility we stratified respondents
according to the amount of attention they claimed to give the cam-
paign. On the whole, the data are inconsistent with this argument. In
some instances, those most aware shifted more; in other instances the
reverse was true, but no overall pattern emerged. We can only sur-
mise then that at least in 1972 the election did not significantly and
systematically contribute to greater leader-citizen policy agreement.
Discussion
In our examination of changes in citizen perceptions of the regime,

leaders, and leaders' policy stands, we have seen several different pat-
terns of attitudinal response to elections. Though various election-
specific reasons for these changes have been suggested, e.g., the divi-
sive nature of a particular election, and many additional explanations
are plausible, it is obviously impossible to offer a general theory of
election-related attitude change on the basis of our limited and time-
bound data. We can, however, delineate some of the mechanisms
which might account for the attitude changes we observed in 1968
and 1972.
Three distinct mechanisms can be formulated that may explain
elections' impact on citizen support. First, active participation in the
electoral process, regardless of which candidates the voter supports,
may strengthen ties to leaders and the regime by making citizens
partially responsible for electoral outcomes and their consequences.
Participation may serve as a form of cooptation in which citizens, in
some sense, become "accomplices" of leaders and of the regime. This
form of reasoning is probably behind the compulsory voting require-
ments of some totalitarian regimes where apathetic citizens are viewed
as potentially dangerous politically. Comparable arguments have also
been made in the study of industrial and group psychology where in-
volvement in decision making appears to increase workers' commit-
ment and acceptance of decisions even where outcomes are not par-
ticularly satisfactory (Gamson, 1968, p. 139). Interestingly enough,
such participation in group decisions is justified as "democratic" al-
though its purpose, like voting in the Soviet Union, is to increase
acquiescence to leadership. Let us refer to this increase in support
through participation as the participation effect.
A second mechanism by which elections may generate support
can be called democratic coronation. The simple occurrence of an
election in a nation whose citizens have been socialized to believe that
the electoral process legitimizes political authority might, in and of
itself, act to increase citizen affinity for leaders and the regime. Early
in life citizens learn that the process of election imbues leaders and
governments with certain virtues, so that when an individual is elected
to office these virtues come almost automatically to be imputed.
(Obviously, elections per se are not responsible here, since the cueing
agent could just as well be a religious ceremony, trial by combat, or an
act of God.) So long as some acceptable portion of the population
participates in the selection process, support might increase among all
those who had been properly socialized regardless of individual polit-
ical activity. Elections would merely trigger previously acquired posi-
tive evaluations.
A third possible mechanism emphasizes the psychological con-
sequences of choosing among alternatives. Several studies by psychol-
ogists have shown that acts of choice like voting can lead to strong
psychological pressures for cognitive balance which result in atti-
tudinal changes consistent with the decision made (Cohen, 1964,
Ch. 5-6). Hence, the winning candidate might marshall increased
citizen support simply because those who voted for him would feel
compelled to rationalize their action. This might take the form of
exaggeration of the candidate's virtues, minimization of policy dif-
ferences between themselves and the candidate, and the like. On the
other hand, those endorsing defeated candidates would be free to con-
tinue their opposition. In contrast to the other two mechanisms, let us
refer to this third mechanism as the winning effect.
These three effects may not, of course, be mutually exclusive or
readily distinguishable empirically. It would not be surprising to find
the three effects occuring simultaneously during any given election.
At the operational level it is evident that distinguishing between the
winning effect and the participation effect may be difficult in one-
sided elections where most participants are also supporters of the
winner. Nevertheless, from the perspective of political stability and
the management of divisive conflict, the differences between these
modes of generating support are clear aiad important. For example, it
is evident that the participation and democratic coronation effects are
to be preferred by leaders since the winning effect can extend only to
those citizens who voted for the winner, rather than all citizens. More-
over, where extensive citizen mobilization may endanger regime sta-
bility the democratic coronation effect is more efficient than forced
activism (though creating the proper socialization for this effect also
has its costs). It is not implied that leaders necessarily have a choice
in this matter, but clearly the existence of one particular effect as op-
posed to another has major implications for leadership strategies,
levels of opposition, and political stability more generally.
Our data on attitude change in 1968 and 1972 suggest that the
ELECTIONS AND MOBILIZATION OF SUPPORT 5 I
first of these three models-the participation effect-occurs in the

case of regime beliefs, while the winning effect seems more pro-
nounced in changes towards particular presidential candidates. In
both 1968 and 1972 voters were much more likely to shift positively
on the regime question than nonvoters even if they voted for the de-
feated candidate. In the case of attitudes toward leaders, on the other
hand, those voting for the loser did not generally increase their sup-
port for the winner (or the loser) following the election. Here, who
one voted for mattered more than participation per se. We should
note, however, that our data also suggest that when conflict becomes
more extreme, the winning effect appears to become more pro-
nounced in changes of regime related beliefs. Recall that Wallace
supporters (voters and nonvoters alike) showed more negative than
positive change following the 1968 election and that the net positive
change among McGovern voters was not nearly as great as the shift
among Nixon voters. In short, where conflict is intense, participation
per se may be less important for generating regime support than hav-
ing one's candidate win the election. Under conditions of intense
conflict, elections may create or exacerbate antipathy toward the
regime on the part of supporters of the losing candidate.
Though our data do not show evidence of a democratic corona-
tion effect, i.e. a marshalling of positive support among all citizens
simply as a result of the election's occurrence, this does not necessarily
mean that electoral ritual plays no role in mass support for the regime,
leaders, and policies. The election may merely reinforce positive be-
liefs rather than change negative beliefs. Or, it is conceivable that the
marginal impact of one single election in a long series of elections may
be quite small. Perhaps the only way to test for the existence of a
democratic coronation effect would be to suspend all elections and
then compare regime, leader, and policy support generated by non-
electoral succession with support following an election. Such an occur-
rence is, of course, highly unlikely in the United States.
From the perspective of political stability, the presence of the
participation effect on regime beliefs and the winning effect on candi-
date evaluation is of considerable importance. As we suggest in our
discussions of attitudes about the regime, each election can represent
a test of the very rules of government themselves. It is thus important
that whatever hostility there is among losing participants be chan-
neled away from the regime and towards safer objects, such as the
particular individuals involved. Only among Wallace supporters in
1968 (and to a lesser extent McGovemites in 1972) do we find evi-

dence of a winning effect at the level of attitudes about the regime.
We should add that this pattern is quite consistent with data from
studies of young children showing an age-related separation of the
person from the institutional role so that the role occupant can be
disliked while support for the position he or she occupies remains high
(Easton and Dennis, 1969, Ch. 5).
Thus, the differential consequences of our three hypothetical
mechanisms of attitude change are, in principle, quite important, and
our data offer tantalizing hints about the operations of at least two of
these mechanisms. However, our data base of only two elections does
not permit the tests necessary to determine whether or under what
conditions each of these electoral mechanisms operates.
Conclusion
Though elections are usually conceived as instruments of popular

control, we have seen that American elections can also serve to mobil-
ize citizen support for leaders and the regime itself. It is in the area
of regime support that we find the clearest impact of elections. In
both 1968 and 1972 a sizeable proportion of those citizens who ex-
pressed doubt about the government's responsiveness in the preelection
period changed their minds following the election. A considerably
smaller proportion of citizens became more negative to the regime
after the election. Of course, such opinion shifts could by no means be
permanent, for if they were we would eventually have no citizens
doubting the regime's virtues. Nevertheless, at least during the period
when divisive conflict is most prominent, pro-regime attitude changes
predominate.
The use of elections to mobilize support for leaders is an old
device. Dictators like Napoleon III and Hitler employed the mass
plebiscite to generate popular enthusiasm and to discredit their op-
ponents. In democratic politics the question of the impact of elections
on citizens' attitudes toward leaders is a critical one. If, on the one
hand, the hostilities engendered during preelection conflicts persist,
and supporters of the losing candidate cannot accept the verdict of
the polls, then elected leaders' ability to govern is endangered. But,
on the other hand, if elections lead to massive increases in support for
newly elected leaders, the danger exists that their power to govern
will be too great to be compatible with a democratic political process.
Equally significant is the fate of defeated candidates. If losers are

completely discredited and become objects of public abhorrence, then
the potential for legitimate opposition to those in power is under-
mined. Yet, if losers maintain undiminished support and become
martyrs in the eyes of their adherents, the stage is set for division and
chaos. The question of elections' impact on support for leaders is,
thus, complex. Can democratic elections rally support among those
initially alienated from the winning candidate without giving him an
overwhelming mandate? In turn, can the loser avoid being discredited
without at the same time becoming a martyr to his supporters? The
answer suggested by our analysis of the 1972 election is, quite strik-
ingly, yes. For, as we saw, at the same time that support for both the
winner and loser increased among initially alienated citizens, the
ardor of both candidates' originally most positive supporters cooled
somewhat. Thus, following the election opposition to the winner and
loser, both, had been reduced. But in turn, excesses of enthusiasm
among the supporters of both had also been curbed.
It is in the area of policy that we find the least evidence of atti-
tude change associated with an election. Unfortunately we are not
yet in a position to determine whether this is a peculiarity of the 1972
election, a result of the negligible preelection differences found es-
pecially between Nixon and his supporters, or perhaps, even, a reflec-
tion of the discouragingly minor role of policy questions in American
elections.
While it may appear that the mobilization of citizen support
through elections is completely incompatible with the democratic
image of elections as means by which citizens influence their govern-
ment, this is not entirely the case. To a degree, building citizen
support behind elected leaders and the regime is a vital element of a
democratic electoral process. Without this, elections could become so
divisive that no electoral settlement could be reached and no popular
choice implemented without force and violence. Yet, we cannot be
entirely sanguine about the potential for citizen mobilization in Ameri-
can elections. Though it can defuse conflicts, this capacity of elections
to build consensus and support carries its own dangers. For, elections
can and have been used as mere rituals of popular mobilization. The
history of elections in much of the world can be viewed in terms of
these two extremes. On the one extreme, so evident in totalitarian
societies, the electoral process is only a ritual designed to rally mass
support. On the other extreme, however, sometimes exemplified by
elections in the developing world, the electoral process can stimulate

conflicts that help to destroy the existing social fabric by exacerbating
social and political differences.
Because the extremes of all-out conffict and totalitarian con-
sensus have so often characterized the electoral process, our findings
offer some reason for optimism about American elections. For, they
suggest that while American elections do help to build popular con-
sensus and support, this process stops far short of the kind of mass
mobilization that seems to occur in totalitarian societies. Nevertheless,
this alternative view of elections suggests that despite the peaceful
democratic image of citizens voicing their opinions via the ballot box,
the electoral process has a "dark side" which is fraught with treacher-
ous twists and hidden dangers.
Manuscript submitted 20 August 1976

Final manuscript received 17 February 1977
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Elections and the Mobilization of Popular Support

Author(s): Benjamin Ginsberg and Robert Weissberg

Benjamin Ginsberg, Cornell University

selection of leaders is, at the same time, an opportunity for leaders

1 Of course, this second perspective does not inherently contradict the

The purpose of our analysis will be to determine whether and

Our analysis of election-related attitude change is based on the 1968

Changes in Beliefs about the Regime

Every election of leaders represents a test, and potentially a threat to

The Impact of the 1968 Election

3Because responsiveness is an important norm of all democratic regimes,

Changes in Popular Perceptions of "Say" in Government

Voters Nonvoters Total

changes in citizens' attitudes about the responsiveness of govern-

15 Among those who participated in campaign activities in addition to

Changes in Popular Perceptions of Whether or Not

positive. Among nonvoters, by contrast, negative changes predomi-

Changes in Perception of Whether or Not Public Officials Care

Voted for Preferred Wallace

Attitudinal Changes in 1972

The 1972 presidential election generated considerably more conffict

Changes in Popular Perceptions of "Say" in Government

Voted for Voted for Total Total

It is apparent, though, that positive changes in citizens' attitudes in

Changes in Popular Perceptions of Whether or Not

Voted for Voted for Total Total

designed to measure popular confidence in government before and

Elections and the Mobilization of Support for Leaders

It has often been argued that a victorious presidential candidate

Changes in Popular Trust and Confidence in

Trust Govt. Is Govt. run Are Govt. Honesty

president (Anderson, 1967; Paul, 1956; Raven, 1965; Stucker,

Changes in Ratings of McGovern and Nixon,

* *P = .001 2 tailed t- test of significance

individual ratings of Nixon and McGovern on pre- and post-election

6 This pattern of moderation of extremes may initially appear to be a re-

Mean Pre- Post-Election Changes, By Initial Feeling and Vote,

Change Towards McGovern (mean) Change Towards

Voted for 48.4 16.2 10.3 3.2 -9.1 12.2 0.5 -2

* Categorizations of initial feelings were defined as follows: 0-25 "very negativ

Changes in Policy Differences between Citizens and Leaders

In addition to providing leaders an opportunity to enhance their

Rather than support a candidate with an unacceptable policy position,

lowing the defeat of their candidate or whether perceptions of Nixon

Net Policy Differences Between Citizens and Nixon,*

How Voted How Voted

All Non- All Non-

N = 1119 preelection N = 1044 preelection

Govt. Guarantee of Jobs Tax Policy

How Voted How Voted

All Non- All Non-

N = 987 preelection N = 872 preelection

* On each issue area respondents were given seven-point scales to place

tion, government guarantees of jobs, and federal income tax policy.

In our examination of changes in citizen perceptions of the regime,

first of these three models-the participation effect-occurs in the

1968 (and to a lesser extent McGovemites in 1972) do we find evi-

Though elections are usually conceived as instruments of popular

Equally significant is the fate of defeated candidates. If losers are

elections in the developing world, the electoral process can stimulate

Manuscript submitted 20 August 1976

Paul, J. H. 1956. Impressions of personality, authoritarianism and the fait

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