Pecson v.

Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 115814, May 26, 1995, 244 SCRA 407
Davide, Jr. J.

FACTS: Pedro Pecson owned a commercial lot situated in Kamias street, Quezon City,
on which he built a a four-door, two-storey apartment building. But because of failure to
pay realty taxes amounting to P12,000.00, the commercial lot owned was sold at a public
auction. It was purchased by Nepomuceno, which later sold the same to the Nuguid
spouses for P103,000 on October 12, 1983. Pecson then challenged the sale, alleging
that the apartment building, contrary to the claim of the Nuguid spouses, was not included
in the sale. The lower court judged in favor of Pecson, declaring that the apartment
building was indeed not included in the subject sale. The Court of Appeals affirmed the
same. The Spouses Nuguid then filed a motion for delivery of possession of the lot and
the apartment building. The lower court ruled in favor of the private respondents, but
subject to the reimbursement to Pecson of the cost of constructing the apartment building
minus the rents due to the spouses (calculated at P21,000 from June 23, 1993 to
September 23, 1993). With the said decision at hand, the spouses then made a move to
eject Pecson and as well as the tenants residing therein. However, the spouses have yet
to pay Pecson for the construction costs.

ISSUE: Whether the Nuguid Spouses can eject Pecson even if reimbursement hasnt
been given for the construction costs.

HELD: No. The Court ruled that since the spouses still havent reimbursed Pecson for the
cost of construction of the building, the latter has the right to retain the property, and along
with it, the fruits of which during such possession.

The court ruled that though Article 448 do not apply in the case at bar. By its clear
language, Article 448 refers to a land whose ownership is claimed by two or more parties,
one of whom has built some works, or sown or planted something. The building, sowing
or planting may have been made in good faith or in bad faith. As in this case, since the
owner himself was the one who constructed the improvement, good faith and bad faith
becomes irrelevant. However, by analogy, the indemnity may be applied, considering that
the primary intent of Article 448 is to avoid a state of forced co-ownership and that the
parties agree that Articles 448 and 546 of the Civil Code are applicable and indemnity for
the improvements may be paid, although they differ as to the basis of the indemnity. Since
the spouses have opted to appropriate the apartment building, Pecson is thus entitled to
the possession and enjoyment of the apartment building, until he is paid the proper
indemnity, as well as of the portion of the lot where the building has been constructed.
This is so because the right to retain the improvements while the corresponding indemnity
is not paid implies the tenancy or possession in fact of the land on which it is built, planted
or sown. The petitioner not having been so paid, he was entitled to retain ownership of
the building and, necessarily, the income therefrom.
Adlawan vs. Adlawan
G.R. No. 161916, January 20, 2006
Ynares Santiago, J.

FACTS: Petitioner Arnelito Adlawan, the acknowledged illegitimate child of Dominador

Adlawan filed an ejejctment suit against the siblings of his father, respondents Narcisa
and Emeterio Adlawan. Being the sole heir of Dominador, he executed an affidavit
adjudicating the house and lot owned by his father. However, he alleged that out of
respect and generosity to respondents, he granted their plea to occupy the subject
property provided they would vacate the same should his need for the property arise.
Later, when he verbally requested respondents to vacate the house and lot, they refused
and filed instead an action for quieting of title. He then also filed a complaint for ejectment.
In answer, the respondents, 70 and 59 years of age respectively denied that they begged
petitioner to allow them to say on the property since they have been staying there since
birth. They claimed that the said lot was originally registered in the name of their deceased
parents, Ramon and Oligia Adlawan. Spouses Ramon and Oligia needed money to
finance the renovation of their house. Since they were not qualified to obtain a loan, they
transferred ownership of the lot to Dominador who was the only one in the family who had
a college education. Dominador and his wife, Graciana did not disturb respondents
possession of the property until they died. They also argued that even if petitioner is
indeed Dominadors acknowledged illegitimate son, his right to succeed is doubtful
because Dominador was survived by his wife, Graciana.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner can validly maintain the instant case of ejectment.

HELD: No. Petitioner averred that he is an acknowledged illegitimate son and the sole
heir of Dominador. However, the RTC lost sight of the fact that the theory of succession
invoked by petitioner would end up proving that he is not the sole owner of the subject
lot. This so because Dominador was survived not only by petitioner but also by his legal
wife, Graciana, who died 10 years after the death of Dominador. By intestate succession,
Graciana and petitioner became co-owners of the subject lot and house. Petitioner then
contended that even granting that he is a co-owner, he can file the instant case pursuant
to Article 487 of the Civil Code. This article covers all kinds of actions for the recovery of
possession. It includes forcible entry and unlawful detainer (accion interdictal), recovery
of possession (accion publiciana) and recovery of ownership (accion de reinvindicacion).
A co-owner may bring such action without the necessity of joining all the other co-owners
as co-plaintiffs because the suit is presumed to have been filed to benefit his co-owners.
It should be stressed, however, that where the suit is for the benefit of the petitioner alone
who claims to be the sole owner and entitled to the possession of the litigated property,
the action should be dismissed.

According to the renowned civilest, Professor Arturo M. Tolentino, he explained that a

co-owner may bring such an action, without the necessity of joining all the other co-
owners as co-plaintiffs, because the suit is deemed to be instituted for the benefit of all.
If the action is for the benefit of the plaintiff alone, such that he claims possession for
himself and not for the co-ownership, the action will not prosper. In this case, it is not
disputed that petitioner brought the suit for unlawful detainer in his name alone and for
his own benefit to the exclusion of the heirs of Graciana as he even executed an affidavit
of self-adjudication over the disputed property. It is clear therefore that petitioner cannot
validly maintain the instant action considering that he does not recognize the co-
ownership that necessarily flows from his theory of succession to the property of his
father, Dominador.
Galvez vs. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 157954, March 24, 2006
Chico Nazario, J.

FACTS: Timotea F. Galvez died intestate and left a parcel of land in La Union. She left
behind her children Ulpiano and petitioner Paz Galvez. Ulpiano who died before Timotea
was survived by his son, private respondent, Porfirio Galvez. With regards to the property
of Timotea, it is supposed to pass to Paz and Porfirio. However, Porifirio was surprised
to discover that Paz executed an affidavit of adjudication stating that she is the true and
lawful owner of the said property. Moreover, without the knowledge and consent of
Porfirio, Paz sold the property to petitioner Carlos Tam for P10,000.00. Tam thereafter
filed an application for registration for said parcel of land. Subsequently, Tam sold the
property to Tycoon Properties, Inc. Having knowledge of such sale, Porfirio filed a
complaint for Legal Redemption with Damages and Cancellation of documents against
petitioner which was affirmed by the lower court and the Court of Appeals.

ISSUES:
1.) Whether or not the claim of Porfirio Galvez which is based on an implied trust has
already prescribed because the action was filed 24 years after Paz Galvez repudiated
the said trust?
2.) Whether or not the claim of Porfirio Galvez which is based on an implied trust is
already banned by laches because he failed to assert his alleged right for almost 24
years?
3.) Whether or not Carlos Tam and Tycoon Properties are buyers in good faith and for
value and has the right to rely on the face of the title?

HELD: 1.) No. Article 494 of the Civil Code provides that "a prescription shall not run in
favor of a co-owner or co-heir against his co-owners or co-heirs as long as he expressly
or impliedly recognizes the co-ownership." It is a fundamental principle that a co-owner
cannot acquire by prescription the share of the other co-owners, absent any clear
repudiation of the co-ownership. Prescription, as a mode of terminating a relation of co-
ownership, must have been preceded by repudiation (of the co-ownership). The act of
repudiation, in turn, is subject to certain conditions: (1) a co-owner repudiates the co-
ownership; (2) such an act of repudiation is clearly made known to the other co-owners;
(3) the evidence thereon is clear and conclusive; and (4) he has been in possession
through open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession of the property for the
period required by law. In this case, we find that Paz Galvez effected no clear and evident
repudiation of the co-ownership. The execution of the affidavit of self-adjudication does
not constitute such sufficient act of repudiation as contemplated under the law as to
effectively exclude Porfirio Galvez from the property. This Court has repeatedly
expressed its disapproval over the obvious bad faith of a co-heir feigning sole ownership
of the property to the exclusion of the other heirs essentially stating that one who acts in
bad faith should not be permitted to profit from it to the detriment of others.

2.) No. On the matter of laches, it is hornbook doctrine that laches is a creation of equity
and its application is controlled by equitable considerations. Laches cannot be used to
defeat justice or perpetrate fraud and injustice. Neither should its application be used to
prevent the rightful owners of a property from recovering what has been fraudulently
registered in the name of another. The equitable remedy of laches is, therefore, unavailing
in this case.

3.) No. As to petitioners Carlos Tam and Tycoon Properties, Inc.s claim that they are
buyers in good faith, same fails to persuade. A purchaser in good faith and for value is
one who buys the property without notice that some other person has a right to or interest
in such property and pays its fair price before he has notice of the adverse claims and
interest of another person in the same property. So it is that the "honesty of intention"
which constitutes good faith implies a freedom from knowledge of circumstances which
ought to put a person on inquiry. "Tam did not exert efforts to determine the previous
ownership of the property in question" and relied only on the tax declarations in the name
of Paz Galvez. It must be noted that Carlos Tam received a copy of the summons and
the complaint on 22 September 1994. This notwithstanding, he sold the property to
Tycoon Properties, Inc. on 27 September 1994. Significantly, Carlos Tam is also an owner
of Tycoon Properties, Inc. to the extent of 45%. A notice of lis pendens dated 8 July 1997
filed with the Registry of Deeds of the Province of La Union was inscribed on TCT No. T-
40390. Despite the inscription, Tycoon Properties, Inc. mortgaged the land to Far East
Bank and Trust Company for the sum of P11,172,600. All these attendant circumstances
negate petitioners claim of good faith.
Bailon Casilao v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 78178, April 15, 1988, 160 SCRA 738
Cortes, J.

FACTS: The Roman Catholic Archbishop [sic] of Manila was the owner of a parcel of land
(Lot No. 1272, Balanga Cadastre) situated in the Barrio of Puerto Rivas, Municipality of
Balanga, Bataan, having an area of 3,368 sq. m., more or less covered by OCT No. 14379
of de Registry of Deeds for the province of Bataan. With respect to its rights over its
properties in Bataan (inclusive of Lot No. 1272), the said church was succeeded by the
Roman Catholic Bishop of San Fernando, Pampanga which was, likewise, succeeded by
Catholic Bishop of Balanga registered as a corporation on 15 December 1975.Prior
thereto, or on 23 August 1936, by virtue of the authority given him by the Roman Catholic
Archbishop of Manila to donate a portion of Lot No. 1272, the then parish priest and
administrator of all the properties of the said church in the Municipality of Balanga Bataan,
Rev. Fr. Mariano Sarili, executed an Escritura De Donacion donating an area of 12.40
meters by 21.40 meters or 265.36 sq. m (the subject property) of Lot No. 1272 to Ana de
los Reyes and her heirs, as a reward for her long and satisfactory service to the church.
Her acceptance of the donation, as well as her possession of the subject property, is
indicated in the deed of donation, which deed, for unknown reasons, was refused
registration by the Register of Deeds. Six (6) years later, or in 1939, Ana de los Reyes
died without issue. Nevertheless, before her death, she had given the subject property to
her nephew who had been living with her, the herein defendant-appellant [private
respondent]. The latter immediately took possession of the property in the concept of
owner, built his house thereon and, through the years, declared the land for taxation
purposes as well as paid the taxes due thereon. His possession of the subject property
was never disturbed by anybody until plaintiff-appellee [petitioner] filed the instant
complaint against him on 5 November 1985, or more than 49 years after the deed of
donation was executed.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner is barred to recover the property by the doctrine of
laches.

HELD: Yes. Laches means the failure or neglect for an unreasonable and unexplained
length of time, to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been
done earlier; it is negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time,
warranting the presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned or
declined to assert it. It has also been defined as such neglect or omission to assert a right
taken in conjunction with the lapse of time and other circumstances causing prejudice to
an adverse party, as will operate as a bar in equity. The following are the essential
elements of laches: (1) Conduct on the part of the defendant, or of one under whom he
claims, giving rise to the situation complained of; (2) Delay in asserting complainant's right
after he had knowledge of the defendant's conduct and after he has an opportunity to
sue; (3) Lack of knowledge or notice on the part of the defendant that the complainant
would assert the right on which he bases his suit; and (4) Injury or prejudice to the
defendant in the event relief is accorded to the complainant. 32 Under the present
circumstances, all of the aforegoing elements are attendant in this case.

Finally, we agree with the respondent Court of Appeals that, while petitioner is admittedly
still the registered owner of the donated property, and jurisprudence is settled as to the
imprescriptibility and indefeasibility of a Torrens Title, there is equally an abundance of
cases in the annals of our jurisprudence where we categorically ruled that a registered
landowner may lose his right to recover the possession of his registered property by
reason of laches.
Del Banco v. Intermediate Appellate Court
G.R. No. 72694, December 1, 1987, 156 SCRA 55
Paras, J.

FACTS: In a document executed in the Municipality of San Rafael, Bulacan, on February

11, 1859, three brothers, Benedicto Pansacola, Jose Pansacola and Manuel Pansacola
(known as Fr. Manuel Pena) entered into an agreement which provided, among others:
(1) That they will purchase from the Spanish Government the lands comprising the Island
of Cagbalite which is located within the boundaries of the Municipality of Mauban,
Province of Tayabas (now Quezon) and has an approximate area of 1,600 hectares; (2)
That the lands shall be considered after the purchase as their common property; (3) That
the co-ownership includes Domingo Arce and Baldomera Angulo, minors at that time
represented by their father, Manuel Pansacola (Fr. Manuel Pena) who will contribute for
them in the proposed purchase of the Cagbalite Island; (4) That whatever benefits may
be derived from the Island shall be shared equally by the co-owners in the following
proportion: Benedicto Pansacola-1/4 share; Jose Pansacola-1/4 share; and, Domingo
Arce and Baldomera Angulo-2/4 shares which shall be placed under the care of their
father, Manuel Pansacola (Fr. Manuel Pena). On August 14, 1866, co-owners entered
into the actual possession and enjoyment of the Island purchased by them from the
Spanish Government. On April 11, 1868 they agreed to modify the terms and conditions
of the agreement entered into by them on February 11, 1859.

About one hundred years later, on November 18, 1968, private respondents brought a
special action for partition in the Court of First Instance of Quezon, under the provisions
of Rule 69 of the Rules of Court, including as parties the heirs and successors-in-interest
of the co-owners of the Cagbalite Island in the second contract of co-ownership dated
April 11, 1968. In their answer some of the defendants, petitioners herein, interposed
such defenses as prescription, res judicata, exclusive ownership, estoppel and laches.

After trial on the merits, the trial court rendered a decision dated November 6, 1981
dismissing the complaint. The motion for reconsideration filed by the plaintiffs, private
respondents herein, was denied by the trial court in an order dated February 25, 1982.
On appeal, respondent Court reversed and set aside the decision of the lower court .It
also denied the motion for reconsideration and the supplement to motion for
reconsideration filed by private respondents, in its resolution dated October 15, 1983.

ISSUES:
1.) Whether or not Cagbalite Island is still undivided property owned in common by the
heirs and successors-in-interest of the brothers, Benedicto, Jose and Manuel Pansacola.
2.) Whether or not a prescription may run in favor of a co-owner against his co- owners
or co-heirs.

HELD: 1.) On the first issue, there is nothing in all four agreements that suggests that
actual or physical partition of the Island had really been made by either the original owners
or their heirs or successors-in-interest. The agreement entered into in 1859 simply
provides for the sharing of whatever benefits can be derived from the island. The
agreement, in fact, states that the Island to be purchased shall be considered as their
common property. In the second agreement entered in 1868 the co-owners agreed not
only on the sharing proportion of the benefits derived from the Island but also on the
distribution of the Island each of the brothers was allocated a 1/4 portion of the Island with
the children of the deceased brother, Eustaquio Pansacola allocated a 1/4 portion and
the children of Manuel Pansacola (Fr. Manuel Pena) also allocated a 1/4 portion of the
Island. With the distribution agreed upon each of the co-owner is a co-owner of the whole,
and in this sense, over the whole he exercises the right of dominion, but he is at the same
time the sole owner of a portion, in the instant case, a 1/4 portion (for each group of co-
owners) of the Island which is truly abstract, because until physical division is effected
such portion is merely an Ideal share, not concretely determined (3 Manresa, Codigo
Civil, 3rd Ed., page 486, cited in Lopez vs. Cuaycong, 74 Phil. 601; De la Cruz vs. Cruz,
32 SCRA 307 [1970]; Felices vs. Colegado, 35 SCRA 173 [1970],; Dultra vs. CFl 70
SCRA 465 [1976]; Gatchalian vs. Arlegui, 75 SCRA 234 [1977].)

In the agreement of January 20, 1907, the heirs that were represented agreed on how
the Island was to be partitioned. The agreement of April 18, 1908 which supplements that
of January 20, 1907 reveals that as of the signing of the 1908 agreement no actual
partition of the Island had as yet been done. The second and fourth paragraphs of the
agreement speaks of a survey yet to be conducted by a certain Amadeo and a plan and
description yet to be made. Virgilio Pansacola, a son of the surveyor named Amadeo who
is referred to in the contract dated April 18, 1908 as the surveyor to whom the task of
surveying Cagbalite Island pursuant to said agreement was entrusted, however, testified
that said contracts were never implemented because nobody defrayed the expenses for
surveying the same.

It is not enough that the co-owners agree to subdivide the property. They must have a
subdivision plan drawn in accordance with which they take actual and exclusive
possession of their respective portions in the plan and titles issued to each of them
accordingly (Caro vs. Court of Appeals, 113 SCRA 10 [1982]). The mechanics of actual
partition should follow the procedure laid down in Rule 69 of the Rules of Court. Maganon
vs. Montejo, 146 SCRA 282 [1986]).

Neither can such actual possession and enjoyment of some portions of the Island by
some of the petitioners herein be considered a repudiation of the co-ownership. It is
undisputed that the Cagbalite Island was purchased by the original co-owners as a
common property and it has not been proven that the Island had been partitioned among
them or among their heirs. While there is co-ownership, a co-owner's possession of his
share is co-possession which is linked to the possession of the other co-owners
(Gatchalian vs. Arlegui, 75 SCRA 234 [1977]).

2.) On the second issue, no prescription shall run in favor of a co-owner against his co-
owners or co-heirs so long as he expressly or impliedly recognizes the co-ownership
(Valdez vs. Olonga, 51 SCRA 71 [1973], Tero vs. Tero, 131 SCRA 100 [1984]). Co-
owners cannot acquire by prescription the share of the other co-owners, absent a clear
repudiation of the co-ownership clearly communicated to the other co-owners. An action
for partition does not prescribe. Article 403 of the Old Civil Code, now Article 497, provides
that the assignees of the co-owners may take part in the partition of the common property,
and Article 400 of the Old Code, now Article 494 provides that each co-owner may
demand at any time the partition of the common property, a provision which implies that
the action to demand partition is imprescriptible or cannot be barred by laches (Budlong
vs. Pondoc, 79 SCRA 24 [1977]). An action for partition does not lie except when the co-
ownership is properly repudiated by the co- owner.

Robles v. Court of Appeals

GR. No. 123509, March 14, 2000, 328 SCRA 97
Panganiban, J.
FACTS: Leon Robles originally owned the land which was inherited by his son Silvino
Robles. The latter then took possession of the land and declared it in his name for taxation
purposes. Upon his death, the same was inherited by his widow Maria dela Cruz and his
children. The plaintiffs entrusted the payment of the land taxes to their co-heir and half-
brother, Hilario Tobles. For unknown reasons, the tax declaration of the parcel of land in
the name of Silvino Robles was cancelled and transferred to one Exequiel Ballena, father
of Andres Robles who is the wife of the defendant Hilario Robles. He secured a loan from
the Cardona Rural Bank, Inc. which was foreclosed for failure to pay the mortgage debt
wherein the defendant bank emerged as the highest bidder during the auction sale.
Defendant Rural Bank sold the same to the Spouses Santos. A n action for quieting of
title was filed by respondent Santos. The plaintiffs alleged that they had been in
possession of the land since 1942 and it was only in 1987 that they knew about the
foreclosure of the mortgage. The Court of Appeals ruled that because of the plaintiffs
inaction for more than 20 years, prescription had already set in.

ISSUE: Whether or not the action has prescribed in favour of Hilario Robles.

HELD: Yes. Hilario effected no clear and evident repudiation of the co-ownership. It is a
fundamental principle that a co-owner cannot acquire by prescription the share of the
other co-owners, absent any clear repudiation of the co-ownership. In order that the title
may prescribe in favor of a co-owner, the following requisites must concur: (1) the co-
owner has performed unequivocal acts of repudiation amounting to an ouster of the other
co-owners; (2) such positive acts of repudiation have been made known to the other co-
owner; and (3) the evidence thereof is clear and convincing. In the present case, Hilario
did not have possession of the subject property; neither did he exclude the petitioners
from the use and the enjoyment thereof, as they had indisputably shared in its fruits.
Likewise, his act of entering into a mortgage contract with the bank cannot be construed
to be a repudiation of the co-ownership. As absolute owner of his undivided interest in the
land, he had the right to alienate his share, as he in fact did. Neither should his payment
of land taxes in his name, as agreed upon by the co-owners, be construed as a
repudiation of the co-ownership. The assertion that the declaration of ownership was
tantamount to repudiation was belied by the continued occupation and possession of the
disputed property by the petitioners as owners.