Advantage 3 is CCP

Economic decline is the SINGLE LARGEST CAUSE of CCP instability

Theyll say it is a myth, EMPIRICS PROVE that its not
Symonds '15 (Peter Symonds, Asia specialist for the global economy, "Chinas Economic
Downturn Raises Concerns about Political Instability", Global Research,
www.globalresearch.ca/chinas-economic-downturn-raises-concerns-about-political-
instability/5472407, CL)
Amid continuing global share market volatility, the financial elites around the world have been intently focussed on the movement of Chinese stock markets and more broadly
on the state of the Chinese economy. Yesterdays rise of the benchmark Shanghai Composite Index, after falls in six successive trading sessions, produced an almost audible sigh
of relief as share prices responded by rising on major markets internationally. The deluge of media commentary on the Chinese economy reflects the degree to which the world
economy as a whole is dependent on continued growth in China. Speaking on the Australian Broadcasting Corporations Lateline program last night, Ken Courtis, chairman of
Starfort Holdings, pointed out that this year were expecting 35 to 40 percent of all the worlds growth to come from China. If that did not happen, then we have a real

Chinas economic slowdown will lead to political

problem. Concerns in ruling circles that

instability were evident in an article published in the Financial Times (FT) on Tuesday entitled, Questions over Li Keqiangs future amid China market turmoil.
Analysts and party insiders who spoke to the FT suggested that the Chinese premier was fighting for his political future after the Shanghai Composite Index plunged by 8.5
percent on Mondayits largest decline since early 2007. Analyst Willy Lam from the Chinese University of Hong Kong told the newspaper: Premier Lis position has certainly
become more precarious as a result of the current crisis. If the situation worsens and if there comes a point where [President Xi Jinping] really needs a scapegoat, then Li fits the
bill. Li and Vice Premier Ma Kai were closely associated with efforts in early July to stem the falling share markets, including a ban on short selling and new stock offerings and
state-owned institutions pumped an estimated $200 billion into the
share sales by large investors. According to the FT,

share market, only to see it plummet over the past week. The Chinese leadership is more broadly
under fire. A lengthy article in the New York Times last weekend reported that Xi had been told by powerful party elders to focus more on restoring economic
growth and less on his anti-corruption drive. Xi, however, has exploited high-profile anti-corruption cases to consolidate his grip on power, jail potential rivals or challengers,
A shrinking economy will
and intimidate factions critical of his governments accelerating pro-market reform and further opening up to investment.

only fuel tensions within the isolated and sclerotic Chinese Communist Party (CCP) regime and
open up the prospect of renewed factional infighting. Having all but abandoned its socialistic posturing, the
CCPs legitimacy has depended on continued high levels of economic growth. The fear
in Beijing and major financial centres around the globe is that rising unemployment and deepening social
inequality will lead to social unrest, particularly in the working class, which is now estimated
to number 400 million. The official growth figures have fallen this year to 7 percentwell below the 8 percent level that the
CCP long regarded as the minimum required for social stability. Many analysts, however, regard even 7 percent as significantly
overstating actual growth. A recent Bloomberg survey of 11 economists put the median estimate of Chinese growth at 6.3 percent.
Others put the figure far lower. Analyst Gordon Chang told the Diplomatwebsite that influential people in Beijing were privately
saying that the Chinese economy was growing at a 2.2 percent rate. He pointed to other indicators of declining
economic activity: rail freight (down 10.1 percent in the first two quarters of 2015), trade volume (down 6.9 percent),
construction starts by area (down 15.8 percent) and electricity usage (up by just 1.3 percent). While the Beijing leadership is under
pressure to boost the economy, the slowdown in China is bound up with the broader global crisis of capitalism. The restoration of capitalism in China over the past three decades
has transformed the country into a vast cheap labour manufacturing platform that is heavily reliant on exports to the major economies. In highlighting Chinas contribution to
world growth, Ken Courtis noted on Lateline yesterday that Japan is contracting or in great difficulty still, the US is growing at 2, 2.5 percent, [and] Europe is slugging around
at 1.5, 1 percent. These economies, however, are precisely the markets on which China depends. The latest figures for July showed that exports slumped by 8.3 percent year-on-
year, with exports to Europe and Japan down 4 percent, partially compensated by a rise of 7 percent to the US. Following the 2008 global financial crisis, the CCP leadership
only maintained economic growth through a massive stimulus package and the expansion of credit. However, with exports and industrial production stagnating, the money
flowed into infrastructure spending, property speculation and, more recently, stock market speculation. Notwithstanding occasional rallies in response to government measures
The
to ease credit, falling property prices over the past year, and now plunging share prices, underscore the fact that these speculative bubbles are unsustainable.

Chinese regime is under international pressure to accelerate its pro-market

reform agenda, including privatisation of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and the further liberalisation of the financial
sector to open up new profit opportunities for foreign investors. Such measures, however, will only heighten the
social gulf between rich and poor and provoke wider social unrest. The last round of privatisations in
China resulted in the destruction of tens of millions of jobs. The Beijing regime, which represents the interests of the tiny layer of
Chinese millionaires and billionaires, is deeply fearful of the emergence of a movement of the working class. The fact that questions are being
existing sharp tensions that will only intensify as
raised about the future of Prime Minister Li Keqiang is an indicator of the

financial and economic turmoil worsens and impacts on the lives of hundreds of millions of
people.

Healthcare infrastructure improvements in China cause sustainable

economic growth for both countries
Huang 16 (Yanzhong Huang, Senior Fellow for Global Health, Council on Foreign Relations,
and professor of Diplomacy and International Relations at Seton Hall University, Chinas
Healthcare Sector and U.S.-China Health Cooperation, April 16, Council on Foreign Relations,
CL)
Transformation in both countries healthcare sectors are generating extra business
opportunities. In the JCCT healthcare event, Dr. Michael Lu of U.S. Department of Health and Human Services identified five
changes in the U.S. healthcare system: improved access through the Affordable Care Act, payment reforms, delivery systems transformation,
health information technologies, and quality improvement and innovation . Similar dynamics can also be found in China. With the

government targeting healthcare as a social and strategic priority, the healthcare market is
rapidly expanding. China now trails the United States as the second largest market of health industry in the world. It is
estimated that five years from now the size of Chinas health service industrywhich covers medical care,
pharmaceutical products, healthcare products, medical devices, and health managementwould reach $1.3 trillion, up
from less than 1.7 trillion RMB in 2012. This would mean an annual growth rate of 21 percent between 2012 and 2020. But U.S.-China cooperation in healthcare is not just about
market opportunities. It is also about how to improve health and well-being of the people in both countries. The two objectives are not necessarily mutually exclusive, but
without proper regulation and balance of interests, single-minded pursuit of business opportunities may exacerbate the problem of affordability, thereby defeating the very
purpose of the healthcare reform. Already, demographic and epidemiological transitions against the background of moving toward universal health coverage have raised
concerns regarding financing and cost control in both countries. The growing cost of healthcare highlights the importance of cooperation in preventive care. Over the past years,
the areas of cooperation can be
both countries have been collaborating over tobacco control research and tobacco surveillance. But

further expanded to include health management, environmental health, healthy life style
promotion, and encouraging the private sector and social forces in health education and risk reduction.
Meanwhile, in seeking cooperation with China we have to keep in mind the inherent dilemmas and contraditions in Chinas health policy processes. While the 13th Five Year
Plan suggests that China is willing to allow the market to play a more decive role, it continues to rely on heavy-handed industrial policy in pursuit of the growth of its healthcare
and pharmaceutical industires. While the government welcomes the entry of foreign business and investment, it has increased information and ideological control while
sustaining its devotion to bolstering domestic industrial competiveness. Against this background, the U.S. Congress is advised to work more deligently and closely with the
executive branch to pressure Beijing to improve the operating environment of U.S. businesses in China.

Reduced legitimacy causes the CCP to embrace nationalism---that

causes existing territorial disputes to escalate to armed conflict and
goes nuclear
McKnight 13 (Tyler McKnight, M.A. student in International Relations at the University of
San Diego, B.A. in Political Science from Villanova University, Regime Legitimacy and the
CCP, Fall 2013, http://www.sandiego.edu/cas/documents/polisci/TylerMcKnightPaper.pdf,
CL)
Perhaps the most reasonable and likely path the CCP will pursue to shore up its legitimacy is by
embracing nationalism. There is a lot for the Chinese to be proud of these days. They are a country that has risen from the
ashes of the Cultural Revolution to become the second largest economy in the world. Most of the people of China no longer live a life
of subsistence, but one of material wealth. Many Chinese can now afford things that were once considered luxury items such as
televisions and cars. China has firmly established itself as an economic power. China is now not only economically strong, but also
politically and militarily strong on the international stage. After many years of subjugation, exploitation, and
humiliation at the hands of foreign powers China is now a strong nation. China is powerful
enough now to defend its borders against any potential threat. Increasingly, China is also
able to flex its muscles beyond its own borders and territorial waters as exemplified by Chinas recent
establishment of an Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) over the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu islands in the East China Sea. Chinas
ability to project power is quickly catching up with potential rivals such as Japan and the United States. The use of
nationalism to support regime legitimacy is not a new concept for the CCP. Since the late 1970s the CCP
have been cultivating nationalism as a way to compensate for the weaknesses of communist ideology. After the turmoil of the
Cultural Revolution and the sanxin weiji (three spiritual crises) the CCP started using nationalism as a way to establish a
hegemonic order of political values and as a way to rally popular support behind a less popular regime and its policies by creating a
sense of community. The CCP double downed on using nationalism as a way to unite the country and
reinforce its legitimacy after the Tiananmen Square protests in the spring of 1989. Nationalism was
viewed as a way to counter Western liberal ideas and calls for democracy. As the CCP did after the protest of 1989 and continues to
do today, the party continues to sell itself as the protector of the Chinese people against foreign aggression. If the CCP were
to allow weakness, disunity, and disorder at home it would open a Pandoras box.
Such chaos would weaken China and give foreign aggressors the chance to reassert
themselves. With Chinas history of foreign exploitation, such an argument can carry a lot of
weight in China. China is once again a strong country and it does not want to fall back into a role
of subjugation.xxiii The problem with nationalism is it is a fickle beast. If the CCP were to strongly embrace and
stoke nationalism, it would be hard to contain it. If the CCP were to define itself as the guardians of Chinese
nationalism it would have to work hard to ensure it appeases the concerns of nationalist. China continues to have a number of
festering territory disputes with its neighbors: the continued de facto independence of Taiwan, its border with India, and the
Senkaku/Diaoyu islands in the East China Sea to name a few. With its history of foreign exploitation, China is acutely sensitive to
any territory dispute. The CCP would have a very hard time maintaining its nationalist credentials if it were to allow other countries
to assert control over any of the disputed areas. The Chinese leaders ran into this problem in the late 1990s when there was a distinct
rise in nationalism in China. The authors of the popular nationalist book The China That Can Say No were openly critical of the
Chinese government for taking a stance they viewed as too soft towards the United States and Japan. They endorsed taking action to
annex Taiwan at any cost and open confrontation with Japan and the United States. A move such as this would at best be risky
considering China was, and still is, dependent on Japan and the United States to ensure its continued economic growth.xxiv As a
result of Chinas history of humiliation and the CCPs need to strengthen its nationalist credentials, China is more likely
than other countries to use strong-arm tactics or force to assert itself. Such moves
are a double-edged sword for the CCP. They could help the CCP to maintain its credentials as the guardians of
the Chinese people, but this would be at the expense of hurting its standing in the international community, or worse, sending China
on path towards armed conflict. When military units of opposing countries are in close proximity to each other and tensions run
high, it can be very difficult to prevent acts of aggression from spilling over into armed conflict. Posturing on one side can be viewed
as an imminent intent to attack on the other. China will have to balance a fine line to ensure their actions are not viewed as too soft
at home or overly aggressive by the international community. If the CCP relies heavily on nationalism to strengthen its legitimacy
and it is viewed too soft at home, it will hurt the staying power of the regime. If China is viewed as too aggressive by its neighbors, it
could face reduced foreign investment, sanctions

Economic growth and performative legitimacy is key in a world where

many Chinese no longer believe in Communism
The Politic '13 (The Politic, "Performance Legitimacy: An Unstable Model for Sustaining
Power", The Politic, January 10, thepolitic.org/performance-legitimacy-an-unstable-model-for-
sustaining-power/, CL)
Surely, the
CCPs hold on power for the past three decades suggests that performance legitimacy is
a workable model for justifying rule. However, Chinas economic growth of the past 30 years was
unprecedented in magnitude and duration, as the country averaged 10% growth annually.[8] Thus, the
effectiveness of Chinas performance legitimacy model was perhaps augmented in ways that normal economic growth would not
make possible. Therefore, looking into a future in which China expects high, but more ordinary growth rates, performance
legitimacy will inherently be a less effective method of justifying power. Moreover, accustomed to rapid economic progress,
Chinese citizens will take growth for granted, reducing the effectiveness of performance
legitimacy and elevating the importance of alternative justifications of power. Performance-based
legitimation is also unstable because the government must reach ever-higher benchmarks of performance to maintain its
rule. Improvements in official accountability, a key tenet of performance legitimacy, can actually make future legitimacy harder to
achieve.[9] Specifically, by increasing transparency and accountability, the Chinese government makes its mistakes more noticeable
to the Chinese citizenry. Thus, Chinas achievements are increasingly at risk of being overshadowed by
even minor missteps.[10] In this way, as transparency is increased, Chinas achievements produce
diminishing marginal gains to its performance legitimacy. In other words, over time it
becomes increasingly difficult to sustain performance legitimacy. The Chinese government must constantly
re-legitimate its rule, as achievements and setbacks keep its performance legitimacy in fluctuation. Therefore, sole reliance on
performance legitimacy is unstable because it progressively becomes a less effective method of maintaining power. Overreliance
on performance legitimacy is also unstable because when a government fails to deliver on its
promises, it loses its only source of legitimacy. As University of Chicago Professor of Sociology, Dingxin Zhao,
writes, performance legitimacy is intrinsically unstable because it carries concrete promises and therefore will trigger immediate
political crisis when the promises are unfulfilled.[11] As mentioned, by improving the quality of life of its citizens through rapid
economic growth, the Chinese government demonstrated to its people that it is fit to lead. If Chinas economic miracle
were to suddenly end, its performance legitimacy would be undermined, and the country could
find itself in a legitimacy crisis. Although it would be unfair to say that China is solely reliant on performance legitimacy,
the country stands on shaky ideological footing, as most citizens no longer believe
in Communism.[12] Moreover, the government possesses weak moral grounds to rule, as corruption is rampant and
Chinese citizens are well aware of it (recent revelations of the immense wealth of Premier Wen Jiabaos family is a prime
example).[13] Thus, if Chinas economic growth were to cease, the country would lack
other forms of political justification to compensate for a decline in performance
legitimacy. As a result, Chinese citizens might withdraw support of such a government
lacking ideological and moral grounds to rule. Some may argue that performance legitimacy
alone has enabled the CCP to maintain its rule for the past thirty years; improvements to governing
accountability bolstered Chinas performance legitimacy and allowed it to sustain power. Surely, the Chinese government has made
great strides toward comprehensive governing accountability, as bureaucratic administration has become more institutionalized,
regulated, and disciplined.[14] However, a system that lacks moral grounds to rule inherently can never
fully deliver on governing accountability. Thus, a government cannot maximize its
performance legitimacy unless it possesses a moral justification to rule. For example,
Chinas government is not morally justifiable because corruption is rampant and even shows signs of worsening.[15] If a
government were held fully accountable for its actions, its officials could not get away with actions such as misusing public funds and
amassing vast private wealth. However, as corruption is rampant in China, the government obviously does not possess governing
accountability. Thus, a lack of moral justification to rule indirectly weakens a governments
performance legitimacy by undermining its governing accountability. By contrast, moral legitimacy is a
prerequisite of full governing accountability. Therefore, a regime that intertwines both moral and performance legitimacy is
inherently more stable than one that is not morally justified. Moreover, a lack of ideological agreement between citizen and state
necessarily reduces ones quality of life. Since people naturally favor a system in which their quality of life is maximized, a system
that relies on performance legitimacy and neglects moral and ideological legitimacy is not as
stable as one that intertwines both forms of legitimacy. Performance legitimacy takes into account some aspects
of quality of life: economic well-being, social stability, governing competence, and accountability. However, quality of life also
intrinsically entails concomitant ideology, ethics, and morality. For example, Chinese citizens do not possess
freedom of expression, and the government censors material that could subvert the Communist regime. When I was in China, many
of my college friends openly criticized the CCPs censorship of the Internet. Others were less vocal, but nonetheless shared a desire
to be able to freely express themselves, both in person and online. Forbidding freedom of expression reduces ones quality of life
because by restricting expression, the government takes something of value from its citizens. Similar arguments could be extended
to a just legal system, or an upright leadership. Thus, a regime that possesses performance legitimacy in
addition to moral and ideological legitimacy is more stable than one that is solely reliant on
consistent performance.