Criminal Law 1

1. The pro reo principle in criminal law provides that when moral certainty as to culpability hangs

in the balance, acquittal on reasonable doubt inevitably becomes a matter of right. (Lopez vs. People of

the Philippines). When in doubt, rule for the accused. This is in consonance with the constitutional

guarantee that the accused ought to be presumed innocent until and unless his guilt is established beyond

reasonable doubt. (People vs. Temporada)

2. Factual impossibility occurs when extraneous circumstances unknown to the actor or beyond his

control prevent the consummation of the intended crime. (Jacinto vs. People)

Intod v. Court of Appeals is also highly instructive. In Intod, the accused, intending to kill a

person, peppered the latters bedroom with bullets, but since the intended victim was not home at the

time, no harm came to him. The trial court and the CA held Intod guilty of attempted murder. But upon

review by the Supreme Court, he was adjudged guilty only of an impossible crime as defined and

penalized in paragraph 2, Article 4, in relation to Article 59, both of the Revised Penal Code, because of

the factual impossibility of producing the crime. The requisites of an impossible crime are: (1) that the act

performed would be an offense against persons or property; (2) that the act was done with evil intent; and

(3) that its accomplishment was inherently impossible, or the means employed was either inadequate or

ineffectual.

3. Discernment is different from intent. The distinction was elaborated in Guevarra v. Almodovar.Thus:

The word "intent" has been defined as:

"(a) design; a determination to do a certain things; an aim the purpose of the mind, including such

knowledge as is essential to such intent; . . .; the design resolve, or determination with which a person

acts." (46 CJS Intent, p. 1103.)

It is this intent which comprises the third element of dolo as a means of committing a felony, freedom and

intelligence being the other two. On the other hand, We have defined the term "discernment," as used in

Article 12(3) of the RPC, in the old case of People vs. Doquena, 68 Phil. 580(1939), in this wise:

"The discernment that constitutes an exception to the exemption from criminal liability of a minor

under fifteen years of age but over nine, who commits an act prohibited by law, is his mental capacity to

understand the difference between right and wrong ..." (italics Ours) p. 583

From the foregoing, it is clear that the terms "intent" and "discernment" convey two distinct

thoughts. While both are products of the mental processes within a person, the former refers to the desire

of one's act while the latter relate to the moral significance that person ascribes to the said act.

4. Estrada insanity test laid down by the court in People v. Estrada, which requires determination of two

distinct matters:

(1) whether the defendant is sufficiently coherent to provide his counsel with information necessary or

relevant to constructing a defense; and

(2) whether he is able to comprehend the significance of the trial and his relation to it.

These matters help ascertain if a person comprehends the state which he is in, particularly the

relationship between the defendant and his counsel and the defendant vis--vis the court proceedings. The

insanity tests should have been particularly observed in cases where the supreme penalty of death may be

imposed upon the accused considering that life once taken can never be restored by man. All protective

measures must be exercised so as not to wrongfully punish one who does not deserve it regardless of how

heinous the crime committed may be.

However, the mere fact that accused-appellants felonious acts are so bizarre does not necessarily

mean that he is insane or that he should be immediately subjected to mental examination. Insanity is

usually invoked by offenders in order to seek reduction of their penalty, avoid criminal prosecution or just
plainly attract compassion instead of condemnation. The court should consider the factual circumstances

of the case and whether it was intended for the actual determination of the defendants mental state or

simply to delay or interrupt judicial proceedings or frustrate justice.

12.