EN BANC

[G.R. No. L-54718. May 31, 1983.]

CRISOLOGO VILLANUEVA Y PAREDES , petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON

ELECTIONS, MUNICIPAL BOARD OF CANVASSERS OF DOLORES
QUEZON, AND VIVENCIO G. LIRIO , respondents.

Crisologo P. Villanueva in his own behalf.

The Solicitor General for respondents.
Danosos, Lirio, Bautista & Asso. for private respondents.

SYLLABUS

1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; ELECTION; WITHDRAWAL OR CANCELLATION OF

CERTIFICATES OF CANDIDACY; WITHDRAWAL NOT MADE UNDER OATH INEFFECTIVE.
The law on the matter of withdrawal or cancellation of certificates of candidacy is Section
27 of the 1978 Election Code. There is absolutely no vagueness or ambiguity in the
provision as to the need of a sworn statement of withdrawal or cancellation of a duly filed
certificate of candidacy.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; SUBSTITUTION OF CANDIDATES MUST BE MADE AFTER THE LAST DAY
FOR FILING OF CERTIFICATES OF CANDIDACY; EFFECT OF NON-COMPLIANCE WITH THE
RULE. Substitution of a candidate by reason of withdrawal is proper only when such
withdrawal is made after the last day for filing of certificates of candidacy. This is as
clearly provided by Section 28 of the 1978 Election Code. While it may be true as
persistently pointed out by the petitioner that a certificate of candidacy duly filed may be
withdrawn or cancelled at any time before the day of election, it does not necessarily
follow that such withdrawn or cancelled certificate of candidacy may be the subject of
substitution by another certificate of candidacy. For substitution to take place, the
withdrawal must be effected after the last day for filing of certificates of candidacy. If the
withdrawal was made prior to or on the said last day, as what happened in the instant case,
substitution is not allowed. Hence, the person filing a certificate of candidacy is filing said
certificate in his own right, not as substitute candidate, and the filing to make the
certificate of candidacy valid must not be after the last day for filing ordinary certificates
of candidacy.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; CASE AT BAR. By and large, petitioner was, therefore, not a
candidate, either in substitution of Mendoza or in his own right, as he filed his certificate of
candidacy on January 25, 1980, long after the last day for filing certificates of candidacy.
Whatever votes may have been cast in his favor are necessarily considered stray votes.
There is thus no legal basis for the annulment of respondent Lirio's proclamation as vice-
mayor.
4. ID.; ID.; COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS; LIMITED POWER OF THE SUPREME COURT
TO REVIEW DECISIONS THEREOF. Where the COMELEC did not commit any error in
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 issuing Resolutions Nos. 9192 and 9885, this Court cannot properly exercise its limited
jurisdiction to review decision, orders ruling of the COMELEC, which under the present
Constitution has been narrowed down to one of review by certiorari which may be invoked
only when there is grave abuse of discretion, or lack or excess of jurisdiction, or patent
errors of law.
TEEHANKEE, J., dissenting :
1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; ELECTIONS; WITHDRAWAL OF CERTIFICATE OF
CANDIDACY; REQUISITE THAT WITHDRAWAL MUST BE UNDER OATH IS MERELY
DIRECTORY. The fact that Mendoza's withdrawal was not sworn is but a technicality
which cannot be used to frustrate the people's will in favor of petitioner as the substituted
candidate. This has long been settled and unquestioned doctrine-ignored in the main
opinion. In Guzman vs. Board of Canvassers, 48 Phil. 211, clearly applicable, mutatis
mutandis, this Court held that "(T)he will of the people cannot be frustrated by a
technicality that a certificate of candidacy had been properly sworn to. This legal provision
is mandatory and non-compliance therewith before the election would be fatal to the
status of the candidate before the electorate, but after the people have expressed their
will, the result of the election cannot be defeated by the fact that the candidate has not
sworn to his certificate of candidacy." (See also Gundan vs. Court of First Instance, 66 Phil.
125) As likewise ruled by this Court in Canceran vs. Comelec, 107 Phil. 607, the legal
requirement that a withdrawal be under oath will be held to be merely directory and
Mendoza's failure to observe the requirement should be "considered a harmless
irregularity."
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; LAW DOES NOT INTEND THAT A WITHDRAWAL MUST BE EFFECTED
AFTER THE LAST DAY FOR FILING OF CERTIFICATE OF CANDIDACY. Mendoza's
withdrawal of a certificate of candidacy right on the very same day that he filed his
certificate of candidacy on January 4, 1980 which was the very last day for filing of
certificates of candidacy shows that his certificate of candidacy was but a sham. It is
against the ordinary course of human behavior and conduct. Yet the majority judgment
would uphold Comelec's second ground and rule that "for substitution to take place, the
withdrawal must be effected after the last day for filing of certificates of candidacy. If the
withdrawal was made prior to or on the said last day, as what happened in the instant case,
substitution is not allowed." (At page 3-4; emphasis copied) Such construction provides a
loophole not intended by the law whereby a sham candidate files and withdraws his
certificate of candidacy on the very last day for filing of such certificates of candidacy and
thereby shuts out a bona fide substitute candidate, like petitioner who had not filed his
candidacy in difference to Mendoza's candidacy who was one of his "co-planners" with
some concerned citizens . . . (who) held caucuses to put a slate that will run against the
erstwhile unopposed KBL slate."
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; DENIAL OF PETITIONER'S SUBSTITUTE CANDIDACY IS NOT IN
CONSONANCE WITH THE SUBSTANCE AND SPIRIT OF LAW. The Comelec's post-
election act of denying petitioner's substitute candidacy as sustained by the majority
certainly does not seem to be in consonance with the substance and spirit of the law.
Section 28 of the 1978 Election Code provides for such substitute candidates in case of
death, withdrawal or disqualification u to mid-day of the very day of the elections.
4. ID.; ID.; CARDINAL RULE IS THAT THE PURPOSE OF ELECTION LAW IS TO GIVE
EFFECT TO, NOT TO FRUSTRATE THE WILL OF THE VOTERS. The cardinal rule that the
purpose of election laws to give effect to, rather than to frustrate, the will of the voters
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 should received the foremost consideration. This court has the time and again reaffirmed
the right of the people to vote as particles of sovereignty. We have consistently held in an
unbroken line of cases, "after the termination of the election, public interest must be made
to prevail over that of the defeated candidate" (De Guzman vs. Board of Canvassers, 48
Phil. 211 [1925], citing Lino Luna vs. Rodriguez, 39 Phil. 208 [1918]).
5. ID.; ID.; ESSENCE OF ELECTIONS IS TO GIVE THE ELECTORATE A CHOICE AND TO
ELECT THE CANDIDATE OF THEIR CHOICE. The very essence of elections os to give the
electorate a choice and to elect the candidate of their choice. I vote, therefore, that
petitioner's substitute certificate of candidacy should be given due course and his votes
counted and that he should be forthwith seated as the people's choice if the official count
of his voters shows the truth of his averment that he polled the highest number of votes.

DECISION

DE CASTRO , J : p

Petitioner Crisologo Villanueva seeks in this petition for certiorari with preliminary
injunction to set aside Resolution No. 9192 of respondent Commission on Elections dated
February 21, 1980, denying his petition for annulment of the proclamation of respondent
Vivencio Lirio as the elected vice-mayor of Dolores, Quezon, as well as Resolution No. 9885
of said Commission dated July 31, 1980, denying his motion for reconsideration and
supplemental motion for reconsideration.
It appears that on January 4, 1980, which is the last day for the filing of certificates of
candidacy in the January 30, 1980 elections, one Narciso Mendoza, Jr. filed with the
Election Registrar of Dolores, Quezon, his sworn certificate of candidacy for the office of
vice-mayor of said municipality. Subsequently, however, but on the same day, Mendoza
filed an unsworn letter withdrawing his said certificate of candidacy.
On January 25, 1980, herein petitioner filed with the Election Registrar of Dolores, Quezon,
his sworn "Certificate of Candidacy in Substitution" of the aforementioned Narciso
Mendoza, Jr. for the office of vice-mayor of said municipality.
On January 31, 1980, the respondent Municipal Board of Canvassers proclaimed, on the
basis of the results of its canvass, respondent Vivencio Lirio as the duly elected vice-
mayor of Dolores, Quezon. Respondent Board considered all the votes cast in favor of
petitioner as stray votes on the ground that his certificate of candidacy was not given due
course by the Commission on Elections, Manila, and his name was not included in the
certified list of official candidates.
prcd

On February 6, 1980, petitioner filed with the COMELEC a petition to annul the
proclamation of respondent. He likewise prayed that COMELEC should order the official
counting of the votes that may have been cast in his favor and thereafter, to proclaim him
as the duly elected vice-mayor of Dolores, Quezon.
On February 21, 1980, COMELEC issued the herein questioned resolution denying the said
petition, upon the reasoning that petitioner could not have filed his candidacy in
substitution of Mendoza's because the withdrawal of the latter had produced no legal
effect, the same not having been made under oath as required by Section 27 of the
Election Code, and even assuming the efficacy of said withdrawal, the same was made not
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 after the last day for filing of certificates of candidacy as provided under Section 28 of
said Code, but on the very same last day. COMELEC reaffirmed its stand upon petitioner's
filing of a motion for reconsideration and supplemental motion for reconsideration. Hence,
the present recourse.

Petitioner insists that the withdrawal of Narciso Mendoza's certificate of candidacy was
valid and effective, and therefore, his certificate of candidacy in substitution of Mendoza's
was, likewise, valid and effective. Petitioner further alleged that there is sufficient legal
basis for the annulment of the proclamation of respondent Lirio, petitioner having
supposedly polled the highest number of votes for vice-mayor of Dolores, Quezon. LLjur

The law on the matter of withdrawal or cancellation of certificates of candidacy is Section

27 of the 1978 Election Code, which provides:
"Sec. 27. Withdrawal or cancellation of certificates of candidacy. No
certification of candidacy duly filed shall be considered withdrawn or cancelled
unless the candidate files with the office which received the certificate of
candidacy or with the Commission, a sworn statement of withdrawal or
cancellation at any time before the day of election." (Emphasis supplied)
There is absolutely no vagueness or ambiguity of the above provision, as to the need of a
sworn statement of withdrawal or cancellation of a duly filed certificate of candidacy. That
the withdrawal of Mendoza's certificate of candidacy was not made under oath is not
disputed. As such, the withdrawal produces no legal effect for failure to comply with the
clear and unequivocal mandate of the law. Mendoza, therefore, for all legal intents and
purposes, remained to be a candidate for vice-mayor of Dolores, Quezon, up to January 30,
1980, the date of the elections, as correctly ruled by the COMELEC.
Even assuming that the questioned withdrawal is effective, under a liberal construction of
the law as invoked by petitioner, which should not be the case when the terms of the
statute are clear and unmistakable, still petitioner may not derive comfort therefrom for
Mendoza's withdrawal was made on January 4, 1980, on the very last day for filing
certificates of candidacy. Substitution of a candidate by reason of withdrawal is proper
only when such withdrawal is made after the last day for filing of certificates of candidacy.
This is as, likewise, clearly provided by Section 28 of the 1978 Election Code.
"Sec 28. Candidates in case of death, withdrawal or disqualification of
another. If, after the last day for filing certificates of candidacy, a candidate
with a certificate of candidacy duly filed should die, withdraw or be disqualified
for any cause, any voter qualified for the office may file his certificate of
candidacy for the office for which the deceased, the candidate who has
withdrawn, or disqualified person was a candidate in accordance with the
preceding sections on or before mid-day of the day of the election, and if the
death, withdrawal or disqualification should occur between the day before the
election and the mid-day of election day, said certificate may filed with any
election committee in the political subdivision where he is a candidate: Provided,
however, That if the candidate who died, withdrew or was disqualified is the
official candidate of a political party, group or aggrupation, only a person
belonging to, and certified by, the same political party, group or aggrupation may
file a certificate of candidacy for the same office."

While it may be true as persistently pointed out by the petitioner that a certificate of
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 candidacy duly filed may be withdrawn or cancelled at any time before the day of election,
it does not necessarily follow that such withdrawn or cancelled certificate of candidacy
may be the subject of substitution by another's certificate of candidacy. For substitution to
take place, the withdrawal must be effected after the last day for filing of certificates of
candidacy. If the withdrawal was made prior to or on the said last day, as what happened
in the instant case, substitution is not allowed. Hence, the person filing a certificate of
candidacy is filing said certificate in his own right, not as substitute candidate, and the
filing to make the certificate of candidacy valid must not be after the last day for filing
ordinary certificates of candidacy, which is January 4, 1980. prLL

By and large, petitioner was, therefore, not a candidate, either in substitution of Mendoza
or in his own right, as he filed his certificate of candidacy on January 25, 1980, long after
the last day for filing certificates of candidacy. Whatever votes may have been cast in his
favor are necessarily considered stray votes. [Section 155 (15), Election Code] There is
thus no legal basis for the annulment of respondent Lirio's proclamation as vice-mayor.
In view of the foregoing, the COMELEC did not commit any error in issuing Resolution Nos.
9192 and 9885. In such a case, this Court cannot properly exercise its limited jurisdiction
to review decisions, orders or rulings of the COMELEC, which under the present
Constitution has been narrowed down to one of review by certiorari which may be invoked
only when there is grave abuse of discretion, or lack or excess of jurisdiction (Aratuc v.
COMELEC, 88 SCRA 251), or patent errors of law.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is dismissed, without special pronouncement as to cost.
SO ORDERED.
Makasiar, Aquino, Concepcion, Jr., Guerrero, Abad Santos, Melencio-Herrera, Plana, Escolin,
Vasquez, Relova and Gutierrez, Jr., JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions
FERNANDO , C.J., dissenting:

I dissent on the ground that the bona fides of petitioner Crisologo Villanueva y Paredes as
a substitute candidate cannot, in his opinion, be successfully assailed. It follows that the
votes cast in his favor must be counted. Such being the case, there is more than sufficient
justification for his proclamation as Vice Mayor assuming that he did poll a greater
number of votes than private respondent Vivencio Lirio.

TEEHANKEE , J., dissenting:

I am constrained to dissent from the majority decision penned by Mr. Justice de Castro.
With all due respect, the same seems to be based on too technical and literal a reading of
the provisions of the Election Code on substitute candidates in case of death, withdrawal
or disqualification of another and disregards the substance and spirit of the law as well as
the basic antecedent facts which are hereinbelow stated.
In this particular case, one Narciso Mendoza, Jr. had filed on the last day for filing of
certificates of candidacy in the January 30, 1980 local elections his sworn certificate of
candidacy for the office of vice mayor of the municipality of Dolores, Quezon. But later on
the very same day, Mendoza filed an unsworn letter in his own handwriting withdrawing his
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 said certificate of candidacy "for personal reasons."
Later on January 25, 1980, petitioner Crisologo Villanueva, upon learning of Mendoza's
withdrawal, filed his sworn "Certificate of Candidacy in Substitution" of Mendoza's for the
said office of vice mayor as a one-man independent ticket pitted against the otherwise
unopposed KBL complete ticket. There being no time to include petitioner's name in the
Comelec list of registered candidates (since the election was only four days away),
petitioner as substitute candidate circularized formal notices of his candidacy to all
chairmen and members of the citizens election committees in compliance with the
suggestion of the Comelec Law Manager, Atty. Zoilo Gomez. cdphil

The results showed petitioner to be the clear winner over respondent with a margin of 452
votes (3,112 votes as against his opponent respondent Lirio's 2,600 votes). But the
Municipal Board of Canvassers disregarded all votes cast in favor of petitioner as stray
votes on the basis of the Provincial Election Officer's opinion that since petitioner's name
does not appear in the Comelec's certified list of candidates for that municipality, it could
be presumed that his candidacy was not duly approved by the Comelec so that his votes
could not be "legally counted." This was gross error, since it is impossible to require that
the names of substitute candidates should appear in the Comelec's certified list of
candidates as of the deadline of January 4, 1980, while such substitute candidacies
perforce are filed after the last day of such deadline and up to the very day (mid-day) of the
election itself. Hence, petitioner's substitute certificate of candidacy filed on January 25,
1980 was endorsed to the Provincial Election Officer on January 28, 1980. But that officer,
for unexplained reasons, instead of transmitting the papers to the Comelec Law
Department by the fastest communication (by telegram or messenger) before Election
Day on January 30th, sent them by registered mail, which was received only February 11,
1980, long after the elections. On the basis of non-fulfillment of this impossible condition,
that petitioners substitute candidacy must appear in the Comelec list, the canvassers
proclaimed the repudiated candidate respondent Vivencio G. Lirio as the only unopposed
candidate and as duly elected vice mayor of the municipality of Dolores.
Petitioner Villanueva consequently filed on February 6, 1980 a petition with the Comelec to
annul respondent's proclamation and praying that Comelec order the official counting of
the majority votes cast in his favor and thereafter to proclaim him as the duly elected vice
mayor.
Comelec issued its questioned resolution on February 21, 1980 denying the petition on
two ground after citing the pertinent legal provisions, as follows:
"The 1978 Election Code provides:
'SEC. 27. . . . No certificate of candidacy duly filed shall be
considered withdrawn . . . unless the candidate files with the office which
received the certificate . . . or with the Commission a sworn statement of
withdrawal . . ."
'Sec. 28. . . . If, after the last day for filing certificates of
candidacy, a candidate with a certificate of candidacy duly filed should . . .
withdraw . . . any voter qualified for the office may file his certificate of
candidacy for the office for which . . . the candidate who has withdrawn . . .
was a candidate on or before mid-day of election . . .'

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 "Clearly, Petitioner Villanueva could not have substituted for Candidate Mendoza
on the strength of Section 28 of the 1978 Election Code which he invokes. For one
thing, Mendoza's withdrawal of his certificate is not under oath, as required under
Sec. 27 of the Code; hence it produces no legal effect. For another, said
withdrawal was made not after the last day (JANUARY 4, 1980) for filing
certificates of candidacy, as contemplated under Sec. 28 of the Code, but on that
very same day." (Emphasis copied)
To start with, Comelec's first ground for denying due course to petitioner's substitute
certificate of candidacy, i.e. that Mendoza's withdrawal of his certificate of candidacy was
not "under oath," deserves scant consideration. It is not seriously contended by
respondent nor by the Comelec that Mendoza's withdrawal was not an actual fact and a
reality, so much so that no votes were cast for him at all. In fact, Mendoza's name, even
though his candidacy was filed on the last day within the deadline, was not in the
Comelec's certified list of candidates. His unsworn withdrawal filed later on the same day
had been accepted by the election registrar without protest nor objection. llcd

The fact that Mendoza's withdrawal was not sworn is but a technicality which cannot be
used to frustrate the people's will in favor of petitioner as the substitute candidate. This
has long been settled and unquestioned doctrine ignored in the main opinion. In Guzman
vs. Board of Canvassers, 48 Phil. 211, clearly applicable, mutatis mutandis, this Court held
that "(T)he will of the people cannot be frustrated by a technicality that the certificate of
candidacy had not been properly sworn to. This legal provision is mandatory and non-
compliance therewith before the election would be fatal to the status of the candidate
before the electorate, but after the people have expressed their will, the result of the
election cannot be defeated by the fact that the candidate has not sworn to his certificate
of candidacy." (See also Gundan vs. Court of First Instance, 66 Phil. 125) As likewise ruled
by this Court in Canceran vs. Comelec, 107 Phil. 607, the legal requirement that a
withdrawal be under oath will be held to be merely directory and Mendoza's failure to
observe the requirement should be "considered a harmless irregularity."
Secondly, Mendoza's withdrawal of his certificate of candidacy right on the very same day
that he filed his certificate of candidacy on January 4, 1980 which was the very last day for
filing of certificates of candidacy shows that his certificate of candidacy was but a sham.
It is against the ordinary course of human behavior and conduct. Yet the majority judgment
would uphold Comelec's second ground and rule that "for substitution to take place, the
withdrawal must be effected after the last day for filing of certificates of candidacy. If the
withdrawal was made prior to or on the said last day, as what happened in the instant case,
substitution is not allowed." (At pages 3-4; emphasis copied. Such construction provides a
loophole not intended by the law whereby a sham candidate files and withdraws his
certificate of candidacy on the very last day for filing of such certificates of candidacy and
thereby shuts out a bona fide substitute candidate, like petitioner who had not filed his
candidacy in deference to Mendoza's candidacy who was one of his "co-planners" with
"some concerned citizens . . . (who) held caucuses to put up a slate that will run against the
erstwhile unopposed KBL slate." (Petitioner's memorandum, page 2)
As in this case, petitioner learned of the sham candidacy and withdrawal only much later
than the last day for filing of certificates of candidacy and forthwith filed his substitute
certificate of candidacy on January 25, 1980, just four days before the scheduled elections
of January 30, 1980. Mendoza's candidacy could not but be considered a sham one under
such circumstances, whatever may have been his "personal reasons" for withdrawing his
candidacy, although it is noteworthy that private respondent states that his (respondent's)
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 candidacy was "to the dismay and frustration of a certain Narciso Mendoza, Jr., who took
time persuading Governor Alcala to make private respondent withdraw so he could take
his place in the KBL slate for Vice-Mayor. Sensing perhaps, that he had no way of winning
as an independent candidate, coupled with the fact that he may not have a valid certificate
of candidacy for not being a registered voter in the municipality of Dolores, Quezon, said
Narciso Mendoza, Jr. caused the withdrawal of his certificate of candidacy the very day he
filed it (January 4, 1980) through a letter addressed to the Municipal Election Registrar."
(Respondent's memorandum, page 2) LLjur

Thirdly, the Comelec's post-election act of denying petitioner's substitute candidacy as

sustained by the majority certainly does not seem to be in consonance with the substance
and spirit of the law. Section 28 of the 1978 Election Code provides for such substitute
candidates in case of death, withdrawal or disqualification up to mid-day of the very day of
the elections. Mendoza's withdrawal was filed on the last hour of the last day which he had
filed earlier that same day. For all intents and purposes, such withdrawal should therefore
be considered as having been made substantially and in truth after the last day, even going
by the literal reading of the provision by the Comelec, as upheld by the majority decision.
Specially, if the difficulty of communications should be taken into account, particularly the
bizarre fact that no one would expect a genuine bona fide candidate to file his candidacy
on the last day of the deadline and then surreptitiously withdraw the same in handwriting
(apparently to keep it known to as few people as possible) later on the very same last day.
Fourthly, the cardinal rule that the purpose of election laws is to give effect to, rather than
frustrate, the will of the voters should receive the foremost consideration. This Court has
time and again reaffirmed the right of the people to vote as particles of sovereignty. We
have consistently held in an unbroken line of cases, "after the termination of the election,
public interest must be made to prevail over that of the defeated candidate" (De Guzman
vs. Board of Canvassers, 48 Phil. 211 [1925], citing Lino Luna vs. Rodriguez. 39 Phil. 208
[1918]). As stressed by the now Chief Justice in Badelles vs. Cabili (27 SCRA 121 [1969]),
"it is [the people's] undeniable right to have officials of their unfettered choice." Thus, we
have invariably held that the will of the electorate should ever be respected, not defeated
or frustrated by material defects in the winning candidate's certificate of candidacy
(including one not being a registered elector in the very municipality where he was
nevertheless elected president of Meycauayan, Yra vs. Abao, 52 Phil. 380 [1928], which
while mandatory before the elections (and would therefore render null and void the
certificate of candidacy) were held to be directory only after the elections, as otherwise
innocent voters will be deprived of their votes without any fault on their part. (Lino Luna,
supra; also Canceran vs. Comelec, 107 Phil. 607 [1960], Corocoro vs. Bascara, 9 SCRA 522
[1963], Pungutan vs. Abubakar, 43 SCRA 11 [1972]; and Lacson, Jr. vs. Posadas 72 SCRA
170 [1976]). After all, the whole purpose of these first martial law local elections on
January 30, 1980 was to enable the people to exercise their right of suffrage and to vote
for the candidates of their choice. It is not conducive to justice and democracy that
independent or opposition candidates be summarily knocked out and that the nominees of
the party in power be thereby left unopposed. The said 1980 local elections were precisely
called to give the electorate a chance after nine years to elect the candidates of their
choice and it would be tragic to tell them now that it was but an exercise in futility and they
could not even vote yes or no for respondent as the unopposed candidate left for the vice-
mayoralty due to the constricted application of the letter rather than the substance and
spirit of the law which is what gives the law life and meaning (Cf. the writer's dissents in
Gabatan vs. Comelec, G.R. No. 52381, January 26, 1980; and Sibulo vs. Comelec, G.R. No.
52422, January 29, 1980)
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 Finally, the very essence of elections is to give the electorate a choice and to elect the
candidate of their choice. I vote, therefore, that petitioner's substitute certificate of
candidacy should be given due course and his votes counted and that he should be
forthwith seated as the people's choice if the official count of his votes shows the truth of
his averment that he polled the highest number of votes. The losing candidate repudiated
by the people should not offend the sovereign will of the people who rejected him by
assuming office as the lone unopposed candidate in consequence of the Comelec's
unjustified post-election refusal to give due course to petitioner's substitute candidacy.
(Cf. the writer's separate concurrence in Nepomuceno vs. Comelec, G.R. Nos. 52427 and
52506, May 15, 1980) LLjur

This would be but to give substance and meaning to the President's oft-repeated pleas for
encouraging legitimate opposition rather than to alienate them. Here, petitioner presented
to his townmates impressive credentials: the nation's youngest first councilor in the 1967
elections who was to take up law and graduate as a U.P. lawyer during his councilorship
and became a member of the bar in 1973 and an active law practitioner. There is no
question of "turncoatism" or disqualification here. All that is asked is to respect the verdict
of the electorate and not to disenfranchise them by declaring their legitimate votes for
petitioner as stray votes.

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