165629-2010-Lejano v. People PDF

EN BANC
[G.R. No. 176389. December 14, 2010.]
ANTONIO LEJANO , petitioner, vs . PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES ,

respondent.
[G.R. No. 176864. December 14, 2010.]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES , appellee, vs. HUBERT JEFFREY P.

WEBB, ANTONIO LEJANO, MICHAEL A. GATCHALIAN, HOSPICIO
FERNANDEZ, MIGUEL RODRIGUEZ, PETER ESTRADA and GERARDO
BIONG , appellants.
DECISION
ABAD , J : p
Brief Background
On June 30, 1991 Estrellita Vizconde and her daughters Carmela, nineteen years
old, and Jennifer, seven, were brutally slain at their home in Paraaque City. Following an
intense investigation, the police arrested a group of suspects, some of whom gave
detailed confessions. But the trial court smelled a frame-up and eventually ordered
them discharged. Thus, the identities of the real perpetrators remained a mystery
especially to the public whose interests were aroused by the gripping details of what
everybody referred to as the Vizconde massacre.
Four years later in 1995, the National Bureau of Investigation or NBI announced
that it had solved the crime. It presented star-witness Jessica M. Alfaro, one of its
informers, who claimed that she witnessed the crime. She pointed to accused Hubert
Jeffrey P. Webb, Antonio "Tony Boy" Lejano, Artemio "Dong" Ventura, Michael A.
Gatchalian, Hospicio "Pyke" Fernandez, Peter Estrada, Miguel "Ging" Rodriguez, and
Joey Filart as the culprits. She also tagged accused police of cer, Gerardo Biong, as an
accessory after the fact. Relying primarily on Alfaro's testimony, on August 10, 1995 the
public prosecutors filed an information for rape with homicide against Webb, et al. 1
The Regional Trial Court of Paraaque City, Branch 274, presided over by Judge
Amelita G. Tolentino, tried only seven of the accused since Artemio Ventura and Joey
Filart remained at large. 2 The prosecution presented Alfaro as its main witness with
the others corroborating her testimony. These included the medico-legal of cer who
autopsied the bodies of the victims, the security guards of Pitong Daan Subdivision, the
former laundrywoman of the Webb's household, police of cer Biong's former girlfriend,
and Lauro G. Vizconde, Estrellita's husband.
For their part, some of the accused testi ed, denying any part in the crime and
saying they were elsewhere when it took place. Webb's alibi appeared the strongest
since he claimed that he was then across the ocean in the United States of America. He
presented the testimonies of witnesses as well as documentary and object evidence to
prove this. In addition, the defense presented witnesses to show Alfaro's bad
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reputation for truth and the incredible nature of her testimony. ICAcHE
But impressed by Alfaro's detailed narration of the crime and the events
surrounding it, the trial court found a credible witness in her. It noted her categorical,
straightforward, spontaneous, and frank testimony, undamaged by grueling cross-
examinations. The trial court remained unfazed by signi cant discrepancies between
Alfaro's April 28 and May 22, 1995 af davits, accepting her explanation that she at rst
wanted to protect her former boyfriend, accused Estrada, and a relative, accused
Gatchalian; that no lawyer assisted her; that she did not trust the investigators who
helped her prepare her rst af davit; and that she felt unsure if she would get the
support and security she needed once she disclosed all about the Vizconde killings.
In contrast, the trial court thought little of the denials and alibis that Webb,
Lejano, Rodriguez, and Gatchalian set up for their defense. They paled, according to the
court, compared to Alfaro's testimony that other witnesses and the physical evidence
corroborated. Thus, on January 4, 2000, after four years of arduous hearings, the trial
court rendered judgment, nding all the accused guilty as charged and imposing on
Webb, Lejano, Gatchalian, Fernandez, Estrada, and Rodriguez the penalty of reclusion
perpetua and on Biong, an indeterminate prison term of eleven years, four months, and
one day to twelve years. The trial court also awarded damages to Lauro Vizconde. 3
On appeal, the Court of Appeals af rmed the trial court's decision, modifying the
penalty imposed on Biong to six years minimum and twelve years maximum and
increasing the award of damages to Lauro Vizconde. 4 The appellate court did not
agree that the accused were tried by publicity or that the trial judge was biased. It
found suf cient evidence of conspiracy that rendered Rodriguez, Gatchalian, Fernandez,
and Estrada equally guilty with those who had a part in raping and killing Carmela and in
executing her mother and sister.
On motion for reconsideration by the accused, the Court of Appeals' Special
Division of ve members voted three against two to deny the motion, 5 hence, the
present appeal.
On April 20, 2010, as a result of its initial deliberation in this case, the Court
issued a Resolution granting the request of Webb to submit for DNA analysis the
semen specimen taken from Carmela's cadaver, which specimen was then believed still
under the safekeeping of the NBI. The Court granted the request pursuant to section 4
of the Rule on DNA Evidence 6 to give the accused and the prosecution access to
scienti c evidence that they might want to avail themselves of, leading to a correct
decision in the case.
Unfortunately, on April 27, 2010 the NBI informed the Court that it no longer has
custody of the specimen, the same having been turned over to the trial court. The trial
record shows, however, that the specimen was not among the object evidence that the
prosecution offered in evidence in the case.
This outcome prompted accused Webb to le an urgent motion to acquit on the
ground that the government's failure to preserve such vital evidence has resulted in the
denial of his right to due process.
Issues Presented
Accused Webb's motion to acquit presents a threshold issue: whether or not the
Court should acquit him outright, given the government's failure to produce the semen
specimen that the NBI found on Carmela's cadaver, thus depriving him of evidence that
would prove his innocence. cAISTC

In the main, all the accused raise the central issue of whether or not Webb, acting
in conspiracy with Lejano, Gatchalian, Fernandez, Estrada, Rodriguez, Ventura, and Filart,
raped and killed Carmela and put to death her mother and sister. But, ultimately, the
controlling issues are:
1. Whether or not Alfaro's testimony as eyewitness, describing the crime and
identifying Webb, Lejano, Gatchalian, Fernandez, Estrada, Rodriguez, and two others as
the persons who committed it, is entitled to belief; and
2. Whether or not Webb presented suf cient evidence to prove his alibi and
rebut Alfaro's testimony that he led the others in committing the crime.
The issue respecting accused Biong is whether or not he acted to cover up the
crime after its commission.
The Right to Acquittal
Due to Loss of DNA Evidence
Webb claims, citing Brady v. Maryland, 7 that he is entitled to outright acquittal on
the ground of violation of his right to due process given the State's failure to produce
on order of the Court either by negligence or willful suppression the semen specimen
taken from Carmela.
The medical evidence clearly established that Carmela was raped and, consistent
with this, semen specimen was found in her. It is true that Alfaro identi ed Webb in her
testimony as Carmela's rapist and killer but serious questions had been raised about
her credibility. At the very least, there exists a possibility that Alfaro had lied. On the
other hand, the semen specimen taken from Carmela cannot possibly lie. It cannot be
coached or allured by a promise of reward or nancial support. No two persons have
the same DNA ngerprint, with the exception of identical twins. 8 If, on examination, the
DNA of the subject specimen does not belong to Webb, then he did not rape Carmela. It
is that simple. Thus, the Court would have been able to determine that Alfaro
committed perjury in saying that he did.
Still, Webb is not entitled to acquittal for the failure of the State to produce the
semen specimen at this late stage. For one thing, the ruling in Brady v. Maryland 9 that
he cites has long be overtaken by the decision in Arizona v. Youngblood, 1 0 where the
U.S. Supreme Court held that due process does not require the State to preserve the
semen specimen although it might be useful to the accused unless the latter is able to
show bad faith on the part of the prosecution or the police. Here, the State presented a
medical expert who testi ed on the existence of the specimen and Webb in fact sought
to have the same subjected to DNA test.
For, another, when Webb raised the DNA issue, the rule governing DNA evidence
did not yet exist, the country did not yet have the technology for conducting the test,
and no Philippine precedent had as yet recognized its admissibility as evidence.
Consequently, the idea of keeping the specimen secure even after the trial court
rejected the motion for DNA testing did not come up. Indeed, neither Webb nor his co-
accused brought up the matter of preserving the specimen in the meantime. cADTSH
Parenthetically, after the trial court denied Webb's application for DNA testing, he
allowed the proceeding to move on when he had on at least two occasions gone up to
the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court to challenge alleged arbitrary actions taken
against him and the other accused. 1 1 They raised the DNA issue before the Court of
Appeals but merely as an error committed by the trial court in rendering its decision in
the case. None of the accused led a motion with the appeals court to have the DNA
test done pending adjudication of their appeal. This, even when the Supreme Court had
in the meantime passed the rules allowing such test. Considering the accused's lack of
interest in having such test done, the State cannot be deemed put on reasonable notice
that it would be required to produce the semen specimen at some future time.
Now, to the merit of the case.
Alfaro's Story
Based on the prosecution's version, culled from the decisions of the trial court
and the Court of Appeals, on June 29, 1991 at around 8:30 in the evening, Jessica
Alfaro drove her Mitsubishi Lancer, with boyfriend Peter Estrada as passenger, to the
Ayala Alabang Commercial Center parking lot to buy shab u from Artemio "Dong"
Ventura. There, Ventura introduced her to his friends: Hubert Jeffrey P. Webb, Antonio
"Tony Boy" Lejano, Miguel "Ging" Rodriguez, Hospicio "Pyke" Fernandez, Michael
Gatchalian, and Joey Filart. Alfaro recalled frequently seeing them at a shabu house in
Paraaque in January 1991, except Ventura whom she had known earlier in December
1990.
As Alfaro smoked her shabu, Webb approached and requested her to relay a
message for him to a girl, whom she later identi ed as Carmela Vizconde. Alfaro
agreed. After using up their shabu, the group drove to Carmela's house at 80 Vinzons
Street, Pitong Daan Subdivision, BF Homes, Paraaque City. Riding in her car, Alfaro and
Estrada trailed Filart and Rodriguez who rode a Mazda pick-up and Webb, Lejano,
Ventura, Fernandez, and Gatchalian who were on a Nissan Patrol car.
On reaching their destination, Alfaro parked her car on Vinzons Street, alighted,
and approached Carmela's house. Alfaro pressed the buzzer and a woman came out.
Alfaro queried her about Carmela. Alfaro had met Carmela twice before in January
1991. When Carmela came out, Alfaro gave her Webb's message that he was just
around. Carmela replied, however, that she could not go out yet since she had just
arrived home. She told Alfaro to return after twenty minutes. Alfaro relayed this to
Webb who then told the group to drive back to the Ayala Alabang Commercial Center.
The group had another shabu session at the parking lot. After sometime, they
drove back but only Alfaro proceeded to Vinzons Street where Carmela lived. The
Nissan Patrol and the Mazda pick-up, with their passengers, parked somewhere along
Aguirre Avenue. Carmela was at their garden. She approached Alfaro on seeing her and
told the latter that she (Carmela) had to leave the house for a while. Carmela requested
Alfaro to return before midnight and she would leave the pedestrian gate, the iron grills
that led to the kitchen, and the kitchen door unlocked. Carmela also told Alfaro to blink
her car's headlights twice when she approached the pedestrian gate so Carmela would
know that she had arrived. ECAaTS
Alfaro returned to her car but waited for Carmela to drive out of the house in her
own car. Alfaro trailed Carmela up to Aguirre Avenue where she dropped off a man
whom Alfaro believed was Carmela's boyfriend. Alfaro looked for her group, found
them, and relayed Carmela's instructions to Webb. They then all went back to the Ayala
Alabang Commercial Center. At the parking lot, Alfaro told the group about her talk with
Carmela. When she told Webb of Carmela's male companion, Webb's mood changed
for the rest of the evening ("bad trip").
Webb gave out free cocaine. They all used it and some shabu, too. After about 40
to 45 minutes, Webb decided that it was time for them to leave. He said, "Pipilahan
natin siya [Carmela] at ako ang mauuna." Lejano said, "Ako ang susunod" and the others
responded "Okay, okay." They all left the parking lot in a convoy of three vehicles and
drove into Pitong Daan Subdivision for the third time. They arrived at Carmela's house
shortly before midnight.
Alfaro parked her car between Vizconde's house and the next. While waiting for
the others to alight from their cars, Fernandez approached Alfaro with a suggestion
that they blow up the transformer near the Vizconde's residence to cause a brownout
("Pasabugin kaya natin ang transformer na ito"). But Alfaro shrugged off the idea, telling
Fernandez, "Malakas lang ang tama mo." When Webb, Lejano, and Ventura were already
before the house, Webb told the others again that they would line up for Carmela but he
would be the first. The others replied, "O sige, dito lang kami, magbabantay lang kami."
Alfaro was the rst to pass through the pedestrian gate that had been left open.
Webb, Lejano, and Ventura followed her. On entering the garage, Ventura using a chair
mounted the hood of the Vizcondes' Nissan Sentra and loosened the electric bulb over
it ("para daw walang ilaw"). The small group went through the open iron grill gate and
passed the dirty kitchen. Carmela opened the aluminum screen door of the kitchen for
them. She and Webb looked each other in the eyes for a moment and, together, headed
for the dining area.
As she lost sight of Carmela and Webb, Alfaro decided to go out. Lejano asked
her where she was going and she replied that she was going out to smoke. As she
eased her way out through the kitchen door, she saw Ventura pulling out a kitchen
drawer. Alfaro smoked a cigarette at the garden. After about twenty minutes, she was
surprised to hear a woman's voice ask, "Sino yan?" Alfaro immediately walked out of the
garden to her car. She found her other companions milling around it. Estrada who sat in
the car asked her, "Okay ba?"
After sitting in the car for about ten minutes, Alfaro returned to the Vizconde
house, using the same route. The interior of the house was dark but some light ltered
in from outside. In the kitchen, Alfaro saw Ventura searching a lady's bag that lay on the
dining table. When she asked him what he was looking for, he said: "Ikaw na nga dito,
maghanap ka ng susi." She asked him what key he wanted and he replied: "Basta
maghanap ka ng susi ng main door pati na rin ng susi ng kotse." When she found a
bunch of keys in the bag, she tried them on the main door but none tted the lock. She
also did not find the car key. aDIHCT
Unable to open the main door, Alfaro returned to the kitchen. While she was at a
spot leading to the dining area, she heard a static noise (like a television that remained
on after the station had signed off). Out of curiosity, she approached the master's
bedroom from where the noise came, opened the door a little, and peeked inside. The
unusual sound grew even louder. As she walked in, she saw Webb on top of Carmela
while she lay with her back on the oor. Two bloodied bodies lay on the bed. Lejano
was at the foot of the bed about to wear his jacket. Carmela was gagged, moaning, and
in tears while Webb raped her, his bare buttocks exposed.
Webb gave Alfaro a meaningful look and she immediately left the room. She met
Ventura at the dining area. He told her, "Prepare an escape. Aalis na tayo." Shocked with
what she saw, Alfaro rushed out of the house to the others who were either sitting in
her car or milling on the sidewalk. She entered her car and turned on the engine but she
did not know where to go. Webb, Lejano, and Ventura came out of the house just then.
Webb suddenly picked up a stone and threw it at the main door, breaking its glass
frame.
As the three men approached the pedestrian gate, Webb told Ventura that he
forgot his jacket in the house. But Ventura told him that they could not get in anymore
as the iron grills had already locked. They all rode in their cars and drove away until they
reached Aguirre Avenue. As they got near an old hotel at the Tropical Palace area, Alfaro
noticed the Nissan Patrol slow down. Someone threw something out of the car into the
cogonal area.
The convoy of cars went to a large house with high walls, concrete fence, steel
gate, and a long driveway at BF Executive Village. They entered the compound and
gathered at the lawn where the "blaming session" took place. It was here that Alfaro
and those who remained outside the Vizconde house learned of what happened. The
rst to be killed was Carmela's mother, then Jennifer, and nally, Carmella. Ventura
blamed Webb, telling him, "Bakit naman pati yung bata?" Webb replied that the girl woke
up and on seeing him molesting Carmela, she jumped on him, bit his shoulders, and
pulled his hair. Webb got mad, grabbed the girl, pushed her to the wall, and repeatedly
stabbed her. Lejano excused himself at this point to use the telephone in the house.
Meanwhile, Webb called up someone on his cellular phone.
At around 2:00 in the morning, accused Gerardo Biong arrived. Webb ordered
him to go and clean up the Vizconde house and said to him, "Pera lang ang katapat
nyan." Biong answered, "Okay lang." Webb spoke to his companions and told them, "We
don't know each other. We haven't seen each other . . . baka maulit yan." Alfaro and
Estrada left and they drove to her father's house. 1 2
1. The quality of the witness
Was Alfaro an ordinary subdivision girl who showed up at the NBI after four
years, bothered by her conscience or egged on by relatives or friends to come forward
and do what was right? No. She was, at the time she revealed her story, working for the
NBI as an "asset," a stool pigeon, one who earned her living by fraternizing with
criminals so she could squeal on them to her NBI handlers. She had to live a life of lies
to get rewards that would pay for her subsistence and vices. aITECA
According to Atty. Artemio Sacaguing, former head of the NBI Anti-Kidnapping,

Hijacking, and Armed Robbery Task Force (AKHAR) Section, Alfaro had been hanging
around at the NBI since November or December 1994 as an "asset." She supplied her
handlers with information against drug pushers and other criminal elements. Some of
this information led to the capture of notorious drug pushers like Christopher Cruz
Santos and Orlando Bacquir. Alfaro's tip led to the arrest of the leader of the "Martilyo
gang" that killed a police of cer. Because of her talent, the task force gave her "very
special treatment" and she became its "darling," allowed the privilege of spending
nights in one of the rooms at the NBI offices.
When Alfaro seemed unproductive for sometime, however, they teased her about
it and she was piqued. One day, she unexpectedly told Sacaguing that she knew
someone who had the real story behind the Vizconde massacre. Sacaguing showed
interest. Alfaro promised to bring that someone to the NBI to tell his story. When this
did not happen and Sacaguing continued to press her, she told him that she might as
well assume the role of her informant. Sacaguing testified thus:
ATTY. ONGKIKO:
Q. Atty. Sacaguing, how did Jessica Alfaro become a witness in the
Vizconde murder case? Will you tell the Honorable Court?
xxx xxx xxx
A. She told me. Your Honor, that she knew somebody who related to
her the circumstances, I mean, the details of the massacre of the
Vizconde family. That's what she told me, Your Honor.
ATTY. ONGKIKO:
Q. And what did you say?
xxx xxx xxx
A. I was quite interested and I tried to persuade her to introduce to

me that man and she promised that in due time, she will bring to
me the man, and together with her, we will try to convince him to
act as a state witness and help us in the solution of the case.
xxx xxx xxx
Q. Atty. Sacaguing, were you able to interview this alleged witness?
WITNESS SACAGUING:
A. No, sir. TAECaD
ATTY. ONGKIKO:
Q. Why not?
WITNESS SACAGUING:
A. Because Jessica Alfaro was never able to comply with her

promise to bring the man to me. She told me later that she could
not and the man does not like to testify.
ATTY. ONGKIKO:
Q. All right, and what happened after that?
WITNESS SACAGUING:
A. She told me, "easy lang kayo, Sir," if I may quote, "easy lang Sir,
huwag kayong . . ."
COURT:
How was that?
WITNESS SACAGUING:
A. "Easy lang, Sir. Sir, relax lang, Sir, papapelan ko, papapelan ko na
lang 'yan."
xxx xxx xxx
ATTY. ONGKIKO:
Q. All right, and what was your reaction when Ms. Alfaro stated that
"papapelan ko na lang yan?"
WITNESS SACAGUING:
A. I said, "hindi puwede yan, kasi hindi ka naman eye witness."
ATTY. ONGKIKO:
Q. And what was the reply of Ms. Alfaro?
WITNESS SACAGUING:
A. Hindi siya nakakibo, until she went away.
(TSN, May 28, 1996, pp. 49-50, 58, 77-79)
Quite significantly, Alfaro never refuted Sacaguing's above testimony.

2. The suspicious details
But was it possible for Alfaro to lie with such abundant details some of which
even tallied with the physical evidence at the scene of the crime? No doubt, yes.
Firstly, the Vizconde massacre had been reported in the media with dizzying
details. Everybody was talking about what the police found at the crime scene and
there were lots of speculations about them. HTSIEa
Secondly, the police had arrested some "akyat-bahay" group in Paraaque and
charged them with the crime. The police prepared the confessions of the men they
apprehended and lled these up with details that the evidence of the crime scene
provided. Alfaro's NBI handlers who were doing their own investigation knew of these
details as well. Since Alfaro hanged out at the NBI of ces and practically lived there, it
was not too dif cult for her to hear of these evidentiary details and gain access to the
documents.
Not surprisingly, the confessions of some members of the Barroso "akyat bahay"
gang, condemned by the Makati RTC as fabricated by the police to pin the crime on
them, shows how crime investigators could make a confession ring true by matching
some of its details with the physical evidence at the crime scene. Consider the
following:
a.The Barroso gang members said that they got into Carmela's house by
breaking the glass panel of the front door using a stone wrapped in cloth to deaden the
noise. Alfaro could not use this line since the core of her story was that Webb was
Carmela's boyfriend. Webb had no reason to smash her front door to get to see her.
Consequently, to explain the smashed door, Alfaro had to settle for claiming that,
on the way out of the house, Webb picked up some stone and, out of the blue, hurled it
at the glass-paneled front door of the Vizconde residence. His action really made no
sense. From Alfaro's narration, Webb appeared rational in his decisions. It was past
midnight, the house was dark, and they wanted to get away quickly to avoid detection.
Hurling a stone at that glass door and causing a tremendous noise was bizarre, like
inviting the neighbors to come.
b.The crime scene showed that the house had been ransacked. The rejected
confessions of the Barroso "akyat-bahay" gang members said that they tried to rob the
house. To explain this physical evidence, Alfaro claimed that at one point Ventura was
pulling a kitchen drawer, and at another point, going through a handbag on the dining
table. He said he was looking for the front-door key and the car key.
Again, this portion of Alfaro's story appears tortured to accommodate the
physical evidence of the ransacked house. She never mentioned Ventura having taken
some valuables with him when they left Carmela's house. And why would Ventura
rummage a bag on the table for the front-door key, spilling the contents, when they had
already gotten into the house. It is a story made to t in with the crime scene although
robbery was supposedly not the reason Webb and his companions entered that house.
c.It is the same thing with the garage light. The police investigators found that
the bulb had been loosened to turn off the light. The confessions of the Barroso gang
claimed that one of them climbed the parked car's hood to reach up and darken that
light. This made sense since they were going to rob the place and they needed time to
work in the dark trying to open the front door. Some passersby might look in and see
what they were doing.
Alfaro had to adjust her testimony to take into account that darkened garage
light. So she claimed that Ventura climbed the car's hood, using a chair, to turn the light
off. But, unlike the Barroso "akyat-bahay" gang, Webb and his friends did not have
anything to do in a darkened garage. They supposedly knew in advance that Carmela
left the doors to the kitchen open for them. It did not make sense for Ventura to risk
standing on the car's hood and be seen in such an awkward position instead of going
straight into the house. EaISDC
A n d , thirdly, Alfaro was the NBI's star witness, their badge of excellent
investigative work. After claiming that they had solved the crime of the decade, the NBI
people had a stake in making her sound credible and, obviously, they gave her all the
preparations she needed for the job of becoming a fairly good substitute witness. She
was their "darling" of an asset. And this is not pure speculation. As pointed out above,
Sacaguing of the NBI, a lawyer and a ranking of cial, con rmed this to be a cold fact.
Why the trial court and the Court of Appeals failed to see this is mystifying.
At any rate, did Alfaro at least have a ne memory for faces that had a strong
effect on her, given the circumstances? Not likely. She named Miguel "Ging" Rodriguez
as one of the culprits in the Vizconde killings. But when the NBI found a certain Michael
Rodriguez, a drug dependent from the Bicutan Rehabilitation Center, initially suspected
to be Alfaro's Miguel Rodriguez and showed him to Alfaro at the NBI of ce, she ran
berserk, slapping and kicking Michael, exclaiming: "How can I forget your face. We just
saw each other in a disco one month ago and you told me then that you will kill me." As
it turned out, he was not Miguel Rodriguez, the accused in this case. 1 3
Two possibilities exist: Michael was really the one Alfaro wanted to implicate to
settle some score with him but it was too late to change the name she already gave or
she had myopic vision, tagging the wrong people for what they did not do.
3. The quality of the testimony
There is another thing about a lying witness: her story lacks sense or suffers
from inherent inconsistencies. An understanding of the nature of things and the
common behavior of people will help expose a lie. And it has an abundant presence in
this case.
One. In her desire to implicate Gatchalian, Fernandez, Estrada, Rodriguez, and
Filart, who were supposed to be Webb's co-principals in the crime, Alfaro made it a
point to testify that Webb proposed twice to his friends the gang-rape of Carmela who
had hurt him. And twice, they (including, if one believes Alfaro, her own boyfriend
Estrada) agreed in a chorus to his proposal. But when they got to Carmela's house, only
Webb, Lejano, Ventura, and Alfaro entered the house.
Gatchalian, Fernandez, Estrada, and Rodriguez supposedly stayed around Alfaro's
car, which was parked on the street between Carmela's house and the next. Some of
these men sat on top of the car's lid while others milled on the sidewalk, visible under
the street light to anyone who cared to watch them, particularly to the people who were
having a drinking party in a nearby house. Obviously, the behavior of Webb's
companions out on the street did not figure in a planned gang-rape of Carmela.
Two. Ventura, Alfaro's dope supplier, introduced her for the rst time in her life to
Webb and his friends in a parking lot by a mall. So why would she agree to act as
Webb's messenger, using her gas, to bring his message to Carmela at her home. More
inexplicably, what motivated Alfaro to stick it out the whole night with Webb and his
friends? AICDSa
They were practically strangers to her and her boyfriend Estrada. When it came
to a point that Webb decided with his friends to gang-rape Carmela, clearly, there was
nothing in it for Alfaro. Yet, she stuck it out with them, as a police asset would, hanging
in there until she had a crime to report, only she was not yet an "asset" then. If, on the
other hand, Alfaro had been too soaked in drugs to think clearly and just followed along
where the group took her, how could she remember so much details that only a drug-
free mind can?
Three. When Alfaro went to see Carmela at her house for the second time,
Carmella told her that she still had to go out and that Webb and his friends should
come back around midnight. Alfaro returned to her car and waited for Carmela to drive
out in her own car. And she trailed her up to Aguirre Avenue where she supposedly
dropped off a man whom she thought was Carmela's boyfriend. Alfaro's trailing
Carmela to spy on her unfaithfulness to Webb did not make sense since she was on
limited errand. But, as a critical witness, Alfaro had to provide a reason for Webb to
freak out and decide to come with his friends and harm Carmela.
Four. According to Alfaro, when they returned to Carmela's house the third time
around midnight, she led Webb, Lejano, and Ventura through the pedestrian gate that
Carmela had left open. Now, this is weird. Webb was the gang leader who decided what
they were going to do. He decided and his friends agreed with him to go to Carmela's
house and gang-rape her. Why would Alfaro, a woman, a stranger to Webb before that
night, and obviously with no role to play in the gang-rape of Carmela, lead him and the
others into her house? It made no sense. It would only make sense if Alfaro wanted to
feign being a witness to something she did not see.
Five. Alfaro went out of the house to smoke at the garden. After about twenty
minutes, a woman exclaimed, "Sino yan?" On hearing this, Alfaro immediately walked out
of the garden and went to her car. Apparently, she did this because she knew they came
on a sly. Someone other than Carmela became conscious of the presence of Webb and
others in the house. Alfaro walked away because, obviously, she did not want to get
involved in a potential confrontation. This was supposedly her frame of mind: fear of
getting involved in what was not her business.
But if that were the case, how could she testify based on personal knowledge of
what went on in the house? Alfaro had to change that frame of mind to one of boldness
and reckless curiosity. So that is what she next claimed. She went back into the house
to watch as Webb raped Carmela on the oor of the master's bedroom. He had
apparently stabbed to death Carmela's mom and her young sister whose bloodied
bodies were sprawled on the bed. Now, Alfaro testi ed that she got scared (another
shift to fear) for she hurriedly got out of the house after Webb supposedly gave her a
meaningful look.
Alfaro quickly went to her car, not minding Gatchalian, Fernandez, Estrada,
Rodriguez, and Filart who sat on the car or milled on the sidewalk. She did not speak to
them, even to Estrada, her boyfriend. She entered her car and turned on the engine but
she testi ed that she did not know where to go. This woman who a few minutes back
led Webb, Lejano, and Ventura into the house, knowing that they were decided to rape
and harm Carmela, was suddenly too shocked to know where to go! This emotional
pendulum swing indicates a witness who was confused with her own lies. HScaCT
4. The supposed corroborations

Intending to provide corroboration to Alfaro's testimony, the prosecution
presented six additional witnesses:
Dr. Prospero A. Cabanayan , the NBI Medico-Legal Of cer who autopsied the
bodies of the victims, testi ed on the stab wounds they sustained 1 4 and the presence
of semen in Carmela's genitalia, 1 5 indicating that she had been raped.
Normal E. White, Jr. , was the security guard on duty at Pitong Daan Subdivision
from 7 p.m. of June 29 to 7 a.m. of June 30, 1991. He got a report on the morning of
June 30 that something untoward happened at the Vizconde residence. He went there
and saw the dead bodies in the master's bedroom, the bag on the dining table, as well
as the loud noise emanating from a television set. 1 6
White claimed that he noticed Gatchalian and his companions, none of whom he
could identify, go in and out of Pitong Daan Subdivision. He also saw them along
Vinzons Street. Later, they entered Pitong Daan Subdivision in a three-car convoy. White
could not, however, describe the kind of vehicles they used or recall the time when he
saw the group in those two instances. And he did not notice anything suspicious about
their coming and going.
But White's testimony cannot be relied on. His initial claim turned out to be
inaccurate. He actually saw Gatchalian and his group enter the Pitong Daan Subdivision
only once. They were not going in and out. Furthermore, Alfaro testi ed that when the
convoy of cars went back the second time in the direction of Carmela's house, she
alone entered the subdivision and passed the guardhouse without stopping. Yet, White
who supposedly manned that guardhouse did not notice her.
Surprisingly, White failed to note Biong, a police of cer, entering or exiting the
subdivision on the early morning of June 30 when he supposedly "cleaned up" Vizconde
residence on Webb's orders. What is more, White did not notice Carmela arrive with her
mom before Alfaro's rst visit that night. Carmela supposedly left with a male
companion in her car at around 10:30 p.m. but White did not notice it. He also did not
notice Carmela reenter the subdivision. White actually discredited Alfaro's testimony
about the movements of the persons involved.
Further, while Alfaro testi ed that it was the Mazda pick-up driven by Filart that
led the three-vehicle convoy, 1 7 White claimed it was the Nissan Patrol with Gatchalian
on it that led the convoy since he would not have let the convoy in without ascertaining
that Gatchalian, a resident, was in it. Security guard White did not, therefore, provide
corroboration to Alfaro's testimony.
Justo Cabanacan , the security supervisor at Pitong Daan Subdivision testi ed
that he saw Webb around the last week of May or the rst week of June 1991 to prove
his presence in the Philippines when he claimed to be in the United States. He was
manning the guard house at the entrance of the subdivision of Pitong Daan when he
agged down a car driven by Webb. Webb said that he would see Lilet Sy. Cabanacan
asked him for an ID but he pointed to his United BF Homes sticker and said that he
resided there. Cabanacan replied, however, that Pitong Daan had a local sticker. TSacAE

Cabanacan testi ed that, at this point, Webb introduced himself as the son of
Congressman Webb. Still, the supervisor insisted on seeing his ID. Webb grudgingly
gave it and after seeing the picture and the name on it, Cabanacan returned the same
and allowed Webb to pass without being logged in as their Standard Operating
Procedure required. 1 8
But Cabanacan's testimony could not be relied on. Although it was not common
for a security guard to challenge a Congressman's son with such vehemence,
Cabanacan did not log the incident on the guardhouse book. Nor did he, contrary to
prescribed procedure, record the visitor's entry into the subdivision. It did not make
sense that Cabanacan was strict in the matter of seeing Webb's ID but not in recording
the visit.
Mila Gaviola used to work as laundry woman for the Webbs at their house at BF
Homes Executive Village. She testi ed that she saw Webb at his parents' house on the
morning of June 30, 1991 when she got the dirty clothes from the room that he and two
brothers occupied at about 4 a.m. She saw him again pacing the oor at 9 a.m. At
about 1 p.m., Webb left the house in t-shirt and shorts, passing through a secret door
near the maid's quarters on the way out. Finally, she saw Webb at 4 p.m. of the same
day. 1 9
On cross-examination, however, Gaviola could not say what distinguished June
30, 1991 from the other days she was on service at the Webb household as to enable
her to distinctly remember, four years later, what one of the Webb boys did and at what
time. She could not remember any of the details that happened in the household on the
other days. She proved to have a selective photographic memory and this only
damaged her testimony.
Gaviola tried to corroborate Alfaro's testimony by claiming that on June 30, 1991
she noticed bloodstains on Webb's t-shirt. 2 0 She did not call the attention of anybody
in the household about it when it would have been a point of concern that Webb may
have been hurt, hence the blood.
Besides, Victoria Ventoso, the Webbs' housemaid from March 1989 to May
1992, and Sgt. Miguel Muoz, the Webbs' security aide in 1991, testi ed that Gaviola
worked for the Webbs only from January 1991 to April 1991. Ventoso further testi ed
that it was not Gaviola's duty to collect the clothes from the 2nd oor bedrooms, this
being the work of the housemaid charged with cleaning the rooms.
What is more, it was most unlikely for a laundrywoman who had been there for
only four months to collect, as she claimed, the laundry from the rooms of her
employers and their grown up children at four in the morning while they were asleep.
And it did not make sense, if Alfaro's testimony were to be believed that Webb,
who was so careful and clever that he called Biong to go to the Vizconde residence at 2
a.m. to clean up the evidence against him and his group, would bring his bloodied shirt
home and put it in the hamper for laundrywoman Gaviola to collect and wash at 4 a.m.
as was her supposed habit. aSTHDc
Lolita De Birrer was accused Biong's girlfriend around the time the Vizconde
massacre took place. Birrer testi ed that she was with Biong playing mahjong from the
evening of June 29, 1991 to the early morning of June 30, when Biong got a call at
around 2 a.m. This prompted him, according to De Birrer, to leave and go to BF.
Someone sitting at the backseat of a taxi picked him up. When Biong returned at 7 a.m.
he washed off what looked like dried blood from his ngernails. And he threw away a
foul-smelling handkerchief. She also saw Biong take out a knife with aluminum cover
from his drawer and hid it in his steel cabinet. 2 1
The security guard at Pitong Daan did not notice any police investigator ashing
a badge to get into the village although Biong supposedly came in at the unholy hour of
two in the morning. His departure before 7 a.m. also remained unnoticed by the
subdivision guards. Besides, if he had cleaned up the crime scene shortly after
midnight, what was the point of his returning there on the following morning to dispose
of some of the evidence in the presence of other police investigators and on-lookers?
In fact, why would he steal valuable items from the Vizconde residence on his return
there hours later if he had the opportunity to do it earlier?
At most, Birrer's testimony only established Biong's theft of certain items from
the Vizconde residence and gross neglect for failing to maintain the sanctity of the
crime scene by moving around and altering the effects of the crime. Birrer's testimony
failed to connect Biong's acts to Webb and the other accused.
Lauro Vizconde testi ed about how deeply he was affected by the loss of her
wife and two daughters. Carmella spoke to him of a rejected suitor she called "Bagyo,"
because he was a Paraaque politician's son. Unfortunately, Lauro did not appear
curious enough to insist on nding out who the rejected fellow was. Besides, his
testimony contradicts that of Alfaro who testi ed that Carmela and Webb had an on-
going relation. Indeed, if Alfaro were to be believed, Carmela wanted Webb to come to
her house around midnight. She even left the kitchen door open so he could enter the
house.
5. The missing corroboration
There is something truly remarkable about this case: the prosecution's core
theory that Carmela and Webb had been sweethearts, that she had been unfaithful to
him, and that it was for this reason that Webb brought his friends to her house to gang-
rape her is totally uncorroborated!
For instance, normally, if Webb, a Congressman's son, courted the young
Carmela, that would be news among her circle of friends if not around town. But, here,
none of her friends or even those who knew either of them came forward to af rm this.
And if Webb hanged around with her, trying to win her favors, he would surely be seen
with her. And this would all the more be so if they had become sweethearts, a relation
that Alfaro tried to project with her testimony.
But, except for Alfaro, the NBI asset, no one among Carmela's friends or her
friends' friends would testify ever hearing of such relationship or ever seeing them
together in some popular hangouts in Paraaque or Makati. Alfaro's claim of a ve-hour
drama is like an alien page, rudely and unconnectedly inserted into Webb and Carmela's
life stories or like a piece of jigsaw puzzle trimmed to t into the shape on the board
but does not belong because it clashes with the surrounding pieces. It has neither
antecedent nor concomitant support in the veri able facts of their personal histories. It
is quite unreal. EICDSA
What is more, Alfaro testi ed that she saw Carmela drive out of her house with a
male passenger, Mr. X, whom Alfaro thought the way it looked was also Carmela's
lover. This was the all-important reason Webb supposedly had for wanting to harm her.
Again, none of Carmela's relatives, friends, or people who knew her ever testi ed about
the existence of Mr. X in her life. Nobody has come forward to testify having ever seen
him with Carmela. And despite the gruesome news about her death and how Mr. X had
played a role in it, he never presented himself like anyone who had lost a special friend
normally would. Obviously, Mr. X did not exist, a mere ghost of the imagination of
Alfaro, the woman who made a living informing on criminals.
Webb's U.S. Alibi
Among the accused, Webb presented the strongest alibi.
a. The travel preparations
Webb claims that in 1991 his parents, Senator Freddie Webb and his wife,
Elizabeth, sent their son to the United States (U.S.) to learn the value of independence,
hard work, and money. 2 2 Gloria Webb, his aunt, accompanied him. Rajah Tours booked
their ight to San Francisco via United Airlines. Jose na Nolasco of Rajah Tours
confirmed that Webb and his aunt used their plane tickets.
Webb told his friends, including his neighbor, Jennifer Claire Cabrera, and his
basketball buddy, Joselito Orendain Escobar, of his travel plans. He even invited them
to his despedida party on March 8, 1991 at Faces Disco along Makati Ave. 2 3 On March
8, 1991, the eve of his departure, he took girlfriend Milagros Castillo to a dinner at
Bunchums at the Makati Cinema Square. His basketball buddy Rafael Jose with Tina
Calma, a blind date arranged by Webb, joined them. They afterwards went to Faces
Disco for Webb's despedida party. Among those present were his friends Paulo Santos
and Jay Ortega. 2 4
b. The two immigration checks
The following day, March 9, 1991, Webb left for San Francisco, California, with his
Aunt Gloria on board United Airlines Flight 808. 2 5 Before boarding his plane, Webb
passed through the Philippine Immigration booth at the airport to have his passport
cleared and stamped. Immigration Of cer, Ferdinand Sampol checked Webb's visa,
stamped, and initialed his passport, and let him pass through. 2 6 He was listed on the
United Airlines Flight's Passenger Manifest. 2 7
On arrival at San Francisco, Webb went through the U.S. Immigration where his
entry into that country was recorded. Thus, the U.S. Immigration Naturalization Service,
checking with its Non-immigrant Information System, con rmed Webb's entry into the
U.S. on March 9, 1991. Webb presented at the trial the INS Certi cation issued by the
U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 2 8 the computer-generated print-out of the
US-INS indicating Webb's entry on March 9, 1991, 2 9 and the US-INS Certi cation dated
August 31, 1995, authenticated by the Philippine Department of Foreign Affairs,
correcting an earlier August 10, 1995 Certification. 3 0CSIcTa
c. Details of U.S. sojourn

In San Francisco, Webb and his aunt Gloria were met by the latter's daughter,
Maria Teresa Keame, who brought them to Gloria's house in Daly City, California. During
his stay with his aunt, Webb met Christopher Paul Legaspi Esguerra, Gloria's grandson.
In April 1991, Webb, Christopher, and a certain Daphne Domingo watched the concert
of Deelite Band in San Francisco. 3 1 In the same month, Dorothy Wheelock and her
family invited Webb to Lake Tahoe to return the Webbs' hospitality when she was in the
Philippines. 3 2
In May 1991, on invitation of another aunt, Susan Brottman, Webb moved to
Anaheim Hills, California. 3 3 During his stay there, he occupied himself with playing
basketball once or twice a week with Steven Keeler 3 4 and working at his cousin-in-
law's pest control company. 3 5 Webb presented the company's logbook showing the
tasks he performed, 3 6 his paycheck, 3 7 his ID, and other employment papers. On June
14, 1991 he applied for a driver's license 3 8 and wrote three letters to his friend Jennifer
Cabrera. 3 9
On June 28, 1991, Webb's parents visited him at Anaheim and stayed with the
Brottmans. On the same day, his father introduced Honesto Aragon to his son when he
came to visit. 4 0 On the following day, June 29, Webb, in the company of his father and
Aragon went to Riverside, California, to look for a car. They bought an MR2 Toyota car.
4 1 Later that day, a visitor at the Brottman's, Louis Whittacker, saw Webb looking at the
plates of his new car. 4 2 To prove the purchase, Webb presented the Public Records of
California Department of Motor Vehicle 4 3 and a car plate "LEW WEBB." 4 4 In using the
car in the U.S., Webb even received traffic citations. 4 5
On June 30, 1991 Webb, again accompanied by his father and Aragon, 4 6 bought
a bicycle at Orange Cycle Center. 4 7 The Center issued Webb a receipt dated June 30,
1991. 4 8 On July 4, 1991, Independence Day, the Webbs, the Brottmans, and the Vaca
family had a lakeside picnic. 4 9
Webb stayed with the Brottmans until mid July and rented a place for less than a
month. On August 4, 1991 he left for Longwood, Florida, to stay with the spouses Jack
and Sonja Rodriguez. 5 0 There, he met Armando Rodriguez with whom he spent time,
playing basketball on weekends, watching movies, and playing billiards. 5 1 In November
1991, Webb met performing artist Gary Valenciano, a friend of Jack Rodriguez, who
was invited for a dinner at the Rodriguez's house. 5 2 He left the Rodriguez's home in
August 1992, returned to Anaheim and stayed with his aunt Imelda Pagaspas. He
stayed there until he left for the Philippines on October 26, 1992.
d. The second immigration checks
As with his trip going to the U.S., Webb also went through both the U.S. and
Philippine immigrations on his return trip. Thus, his departure from the U.S. was
con rmed by the same certi cations that con rmed his entry. 5 3 Furthermore, a
Diplomatic Note of the U.S. Department of State with enclosed letter from Acting
Director Debora A. Farmer of the Records Operations, Of ce of Records of the US-INS
stated that the Certi cation dated August 31, 1995 is a true and accurate statement.
And when he boarded his plane, the Passenger Manifest of Philippine Airlines Flight No.
103, 5 4 certified by Agnes Tabuena 5 5 confirmed his return trip. ASaTHc
When he arrived in Manila, Webb again went through the Philippine Immigration.
In fact, the arrival stamp and initial on his passport indicated his return to Manila on
October 27, 1992. This was authenticated by Carmelita Alipio, the immigration of cer
who processed Webb's reentry. 5 6 Upon his return, in October 1992, Paolo Santos,
Joselito Erondain Escobar, and Rafael Jose once again saw Webb playing basketball at
the BF's Phase III basketball court.
e. Alibi versus positive identification
The trial court and the Court of Appeals are one in rejecting as weak Webb's alibi.
Their reason is uniform: Webb's alibi cannot stand against Alfaro's positive
identi cation of him as the rapist and killer of Carmela and, apparently, the killer as well
of her mother and younger sister. Because of this, to the lower courts, Webb's denial
and alibi were fabricated.
But not all denials and alibis should be regarded as fabricated. Indeed, if the
accused is truly innocent, he can have no other defense but denial and alibi. So how can
such accused penetrate a mind that has been made cynical by the rule drilled into his
head that a defense of alibi is a hangman's noose in the face of a witness positively
swearing, "I saw him do it."? Most judges believe that such assertion automatically
dooms an alibi which is so easy to fabricate. This quick stereotype thinking, however, is
distressing. For how else can the truth that the accused is really innocent have any
chance of prevailing over such a stone-cast tenet?
There is only one way. A judge must keep an open mind. He must guard against
slipping into hasty conclusion, often arising from a desire to quickly nish the job of
deciding a case. A positive declaration from a witness that he saw the accused commit
the crime should not automatically cancel out the accused's claim that he did not do it.
A lying witness can make as positive an identi cation as a truthful witness can. The
lying witness can also say as forthrightly and unequivocally, "He did it!" without blinking
an eye.
Rather, to be acceptable, the positive identi cation must meet at least two
criteria:
First, the positive identi cation of the offender must come from a credible
witness. She is credible who can be trusted to tell the truth, usually based on past
experiences with her. Her word has, to one who knows her, its weight in gold.
And second, the witness' story of what she personally saw must be believable,
not inherently contrived. A witness who testi es about something she never saw runs
into inconsistencies and makes bewildering claims.
Here, as already fully discussed above, Alfaro and her testimony fail to meet the
above criteria.
She did not show up at the NBI as a spontaneous witness bothered by her
conscience. She had been hanging around that agency for sometime as a stool pigeon,
one paid for mixing up with criminals and squealing on them. Police assets are often
criminals themselves. She was the prosecution's worst possible choice for a witness.
Indeed, her superior testi ed that she volunteered to play the role of a witness in the
Vizconde killings when she could not produce a man she promised to the NBI. ECcDAH
And, although her testimony included details, Alfaro had prior access to the
details that the investigators knew of the case. She took advantage of her familiarity
with these details to include in her testimony the clearly incompatible act of Webb
hurling a stone at the front door glass frames even when they were trying to slip away
quietly just so she can accommodate this crime scene feature. She also had Ventura
rummaging a bag on the dining table for a front door key that nobody needed just to
explain the physical evidence of that bag and its scattered contents. And she had
Ventura climbing the car's hood, risking being seen in such an awkward position, when
they did not need to darken the garage to force open the front door just so to explain
the darkened light and foot prints on the car hood.
Further, her testimony was inherently incredible. Her story that Gatchalian,
Fernandez, Estrada, Rodriguez, and Filart agreed to take their turns raping Carmela is
incongruent with their indifference, exempli ed by remaining outside the house, milling
under a street light, visible to neighbors and passersby, and showing no interest in the
developments inside the house, like if it was their turn to rape Carmela. Alfaro's story
that she agreed to serve as Webb's messenger to Carmela, using up her gas, and
staying with him till the bizarre end when they were practically strangers, also taxes
incredulity.
To provide basis for Webb's outrage, Alfaro said that she followed Carmela to
the main road to watch her let off a lover on Aguirre Avenue. And, inexplicably, although
Alfaro had only played the role of messenger, she claimed leading Webb, Lejano, and
Ventura into the house to gang-rape Carmella, as if Alfaro was establishing a reason for
later on testifying on personal knowledge. Her swing from an emotion of fear when a
woman woke up to their presence in the house and of absolute courage when she
nonetheless returned to become the lone witness to a grim scene is also quite
inexplicable.
Ultimately, Alfaro's quality as a witness and her inconsistent, if not inherently
unbelievable, testimony cannot be the positive identi cation that jurisprudence
acknowledges as sufficient to jettison a denial and an alibi.
f. A documented alibi
To establish alibi, the accused must prove by positive, clear, and satisfactory
evidence 5 7 that (a) he was present at another place at the time of the perpetration of
the crime, and (b) that it was physically impossible for him to be at the scene of the
crime. 5 8
The courts below held that, despite his evidence, Webb was actually in Paraaque
when the Vizconde killings took place; he was not in the U.S. from March 9, 1991 to
October 27, 1992; and if he did leave on March 9, 1991, he actually returned before
June 29, 1991, committed the crime, erased the fact of his return to the Philippines
from the records of the U.S. and Philippine Immigrations, smuggled himself out of the
Philippines and into the U.S., and returned the normal way on October 27, 1992. But this
ruling practically makes the death of Webb and his passage into the next life the only
acceptable alibi in the Philippines. Courts must abandon this unjust and inhuman
paradigm.
If one is cynical about the Philippine system, he could probably claim that Webb,
with his father's connections, can arrange for the local immigration to put a March 9,
1991 departure stamp on his passport and an October 27, 1992 arrival stamp on the
same. But this is pure speculation since there had been no indication that such
arrangement was made. Besides, how could Webb x a foreign airlines' passenger
manifest, of cially led in the Philippines and at the airport in the U.S. that had his name
on them? How could Webb x with the U.S. Immigration's record system those two
dates in its record of his travels as well as the dates when he supposedly departed in
secret from the U.S. to commit the crime in the Philippines and then return there? No
one has come up with a logical and plausible answer to these questions. aATEDS
The Court of Appeals rejected the evidence of Webb's passport since he did not
leave the original to be attached to the record. But, while the best evidence of a
document is the original, this means that the same is exhibited in court for the adverse
party to examine and for the judge to see. As Court of Appeals Justice Tagle said in his
dissent, 5 9 the practice when a party does not want to leave an important document
with the trial court is to have a photocopy of it marked as exhibit and stipulated among
the parties as a faithful reproduction of the original. Stipulations in the course of trial
are binding on the parties and on the court.
The U.S. Immigration certi cation and the computer print-out of Webb's arrival in
and departure from that country were authenticated by no less than the Of ce of the
U.S. Attorney General and the State Department. Still the Court of Appeals refused to
accept these documents for the reason that Webb failed to present in court the
immigration of cial who prepared the same. But this was unnecessary. Webb's
passport is a document issued by the Philippine government, which under international
practice, is the of cial record of travels of the citizen to whom it is issued. The entries
in that passport are presumed true. 6 0
The U.S. Immigration certi cation and computer print-out, the of cial
certi cations of which have been authenticated by the Philippine Department of Foreign
Affairs, merely validated the arrival and departure stamps of the U.S. Immigration of ce
on Webb's passport. They have the same evidentiary value. The of cers who issued
these certi cations need not be presented in court to testify on them. Their
trustworthiness arises from the sense of of cial duty and the penalty attached to a
breached duty, in the routine and disinterested origin of such statement and in the
publicity of the record. 6 1
The Court of Appeals of course makes capital of the fact that an earlier
certi cation from the U.S. Immigration of ce said that it had no record of Webb
entering the U.S. But that erroneous rst certi cation was amply explained by the U.S.
Government and Court of Appeals Justice Tagle stated it in his dissenting opinion, thus:
While it is true that an earlier Certi cation was issued by the U.S. INS
on August 16, 1995 nding "no evidence of lawful admission of Webb,"
this was already clari ed and deemed erroneous by no less than the US
INS Of cials. As explained by witness Leo Herrera-Lim, Consul and
Second Secretary of the Philippine Embassy in Washington D.C., said
Certi cation did not pass through proper diplomatic channels and was
obtained in violation of the rules on protocol and standard procedure
governing such request.
The initial request was merely initiated by BID Commissioner Verceles

who directly communicated with the Philippine Consulate in San
Francisco, USA, bypassing the Secretary of Foreign Affairs which is the
proper protocol procedure. Mr. Steven Bucher, the acting Chief of the
Records Services Board of US-INS Washington D.C. in his letter
addressed to Philip Antweiler, Philippine Desk Of cer, State
Department, declared the earlier Certi cation as incorrect and
erroneous as it was "not exhaustive and did not re ect all available
information." Also, Richard L. Huff, Co-Director of the Of ce of
Information and privacy, US Department of Justice, in response to the
appeal raised by Consul General Teresita V. Marzan, explained that "the
INS normally does not maintain records on individuals who are entering
the country as visitors rather than as immigrants: and that a notation
concerning the entry of a visitor may be made at the Nonimmigrant
Information system. Since appellant Webb entered the U.S. on a mere
tourist visa, obviously, the initial search could not have produced the
desired result inasmuch as the data base that was looked into
contained entries of the names of IMMIGRANTS and not that of NON-
IMMIGRANT visitors of the U.S. . 6 2DcITaC
The trial court and the Court of Appeals expressed marked cynicism over the
accuracy of travel documents like the passport as well as the domestic and foreign
records of departures and arrivals from airports. They claim that it would not have been
impossible for Webb to secretly return to the Philippines after he supposedly left it on
March 9, 1991, commit the crime, go back to the U.S., and openly return to the
Philippines again on October 26, 1992. Travel between the U.S. and the Philippines, said
the lower courts took only about twelve to fourteen hours.
If the Court were to subscribe to this extremely skeptical view, it might as well
tear the rules of evidence out of the law books and regard suspicions, surmises, or
speculations as reasons for impeaching evidence. It is not that of cial records, which
carry the presumption of truth of what they state, are immune to attack. They are not.
That presumption can be overcome by evidence. Here, however, the prosecution did not
bother to present evidence to impeach the entries in Webb's passport and the
certi cations of the Philippine and U.S.' immigration services regarding his travel to the
U.S. and back. The prosecution's rebuttal evidence is the fear of the unknown that it
planted in the lower court's minds.
7. Effect of Webb's alibi to others
Webb's documented alibi altogether impeaches Alfaro's testimony, not only with
respect to him, but also with respect to Lejano, Estrada, Fernandez, Gatchalian,
Rodriguez, and Biong. For, if the Court accepts the proposition that Webb was in the
U.S. when the crime took place, Alfaro's testimony will not hold together. Webb's
participation is the anchor of Alfaro's story. Without it, the evidence against the others
must necessarily fall.
CONCLUSION
In our criminal justice system, what is important is, not whether the court
entertains doubts about the innocence of the accused since an open mind is willing to
explore all possibilities, but whether it entertains a reasonable, lingering doubt as to his
guilt. For, it would be a serious mistake to send an innocent man to jail where such kind
of doubt hangs on to one's inner being, like a piece of meat lodged immovable between
teeth.
Will the Court send the accused to spend the rest of their lives in prison on the
testimony of an NBI asset who proposed to her handlers that she take the role of the
witness to the Vizconde massacre that she could not produce?
WHEREFORE , the Court REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the Decision dated
December 15, 2005 and Resolution dated January 26, 2007 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CR-H.C. 00336 and ACQUITS accused-appellants Hubert Jeffrey P. Webb,
Antonio Lejano, Michael A. Gatchalian, Hospicio Fernandez, Miguel Rodriguez, Peter
Estrada and Gerardo Biong of the crimes of which they were charged for failure of the
prosecution to prove their guilt beyond reasonable doubt. They are ordered
immediately RELEASED from detention unless they are con ned for another lawful
cause.
Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Director, Bureau of Corrections,
Muntinlupa City for immediate implementation. The Director of the Bureau of
Corrections is DIRECTED to report the action he has taken to this Court within ve
days from receipt of this Decision. TAacCE
SO ORDERED .
Peralta, Bersamin and Perez, JJ., concur.
Corona, C.J. and Leonardo-de Castro, J., join the dissent of J. Villarama.
Carpio Morales, J., please see concurring opinion.
Carpio, J., took no part. I testified in this case.
Velasco, Jr., J., is on official business.
Nachura J., took no part. Filied pleading as Solicitor General.
Brion, J., I certify that J. Brion cast a dissenting vote following J. Villarama. See
supplemental opinion. - by C.J. Corona
Del Castillo, J., took no part.
Villarama, Jr., J., see dissenting opinion.
Mendoza, J., I vote for the vacation of verdict of conviction there being a lingering
doubt.
Sereno, J., see separate concurring opinion.
Separate Opinions
CARPIO MORALES , J., concurring :
While it should be the common desire of bench and bar that crime is not left
unpunished, it is no less important, if not more so, that the innocent be shielded
from hasty prosecution and rash conviction. We have nothing but praise for
sincerity and zeal in the enforcement of the law. Nevertheless, the undeserved
penalties in icted upon the blameless, and the indelible stain upon their name,
which is never quite washed away by time, should caution all concerned to a
more careful and conscientious scrutiny of all the facts before the
nger is pointed and the stone is cast . 1 (emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
And so, as in all criminal cases, the very voluminous records of the present cases
call for a "more careful and conscientious scrutiny" in order to determine what the facts
are before the accused's conviction is affirmed.
On June 30, 1991, Estrellita Vizconde and her daughters, then 19-year old
Carmela and then seven-year old Jennifer, were found dead in their home at No. 80
Vinzons Street, BF Homes Subdivision, Paraaque. They all bore multiple stab wounds
on different parts of their bodies. Some of their personal belongings appeared to be
missing.
An intense and sustained investigation conducted by the police resulted in the
arrest of a group of suspects, the Akyat Bahay gang members, some of whom gave
detailed confessions to having committed the crimes, hence, their indictment in court. 2
The Makati Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 63 eventually found those suspects to
have been victims of police frame-up, however, and were thus ordered discharged.
Subsequently, in 1995, the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) which
conducted a parallel investigation announced that it had solved the crime by presenting
its "star witness" in the person of Jessica Alfaro y Mincey (Alfaro), one of its "informers"
or "assets," who claimed to have been an eyewitness to the crime. She named the
accused Hubert Jeffrey P. Webb, Antonio "Tony Boy" Lejano, Artemio "Dong" Ventura,
Michael A. Gatchalian, Hospicio "Pyke" Fernandez, Peter Estrada, Miguel "Ging"
Rodriguez, and Joey Filart as the culprits. She also tagged Paraaque police of cer
Gerardo Biong as an accessory after the fact. On the basis of Alfaro's account, an
Information was led on August 10, 1995 before the Paraaque RTC against Webb, et
al. 3 for rape with homicide, reading as follows: TCADEc
That on or about the evening of June 29 up to the early morning of June 30, 1991,
in the municipality of Paraaque, province of Rizal, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused Hubert Jeffrey P. Webb conspiring
and confederating with accused Antonio "Tony Boy" Lejano, Artemio "Dong"
Ventura, Michael Gatchalian y Adviento, Hiospicio "Pyke" Fernandez, Peter
Estrada, Miguel "Ging" Rodriguez and Joey Filart, mutually helping one another,
while armed with bladed instruments, with the use of force and intimidation, with
lewd design, with abuse of superior strength, nighttime and with the use of motor
vehicle, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge of the person
of Carmela Vizconde against her will and consent.
That by reason or on the occasion of the aforesaid rape or immediately thereafter,

the above-named accused with intent to kill, conspiring and confederating
together, mutually helping one another, did then and there and with evidence
premeditation, abuse of superior strength, nighttime, with the use of motor
vehicle, assault and stab with bladed instruments Carmela Vizconde, Estrellita
Vizconde and Jennifer Vizconde, thereby in icting upon them numerous stab
wounds in different parts of their bodies which caused their instantaneous death.
The accused GERARDO BIONG and JOHN DOES having knowledge after the
commission of the above-mentioned crime, and without having participated
therein as principals or accomplices, took part subsequent to its commission by
assisting, with abuse of authority as police of cer, the above-named principal
accused, to conceal or destroy the effects or instruments thereof by failing to
preserve the physical evidence and allowing their destruction in order to prevent
the discovery of the crime.
The case was, after the Presiding Judge of Branch 258 of the Paraaque RTC
inhibited, re-raf ed to Branch 274 of the Paraaque RTC. The trial court, then presided
over by Judge Amelita G. Tolentino, tried only seven of the accused, Artemio Ventura
and Joey Filart having remained at large. 4
At the trial, the prosecution presented Alfaro as its main witness. The other
witnesses were Dr. Prospero Cabanayan , the medico-legal of cer who autopsied the
bodies of the victims; Lolita Carrera Birrer , an ex-lover of Gerardo Biong; Mila
Gaviola , former laundrywoman of the Webbs; Normal White and Justo Cabanacan ,
security personnel of the Pitong Daan Subdivision, BF Homes, Paraaque, and Lauro G.
Vizconde , Estrellita's husband.
The defense presented testimonial evidence which tended to cast a bad light on
Alfaro's reputation for truth, as well as on the implausibility of her account.
At all events, some of the accused invoked alibi, claiming to have been
somewhere else at the time of the commission of the crime. In Webb's case, he
presented documentary and testimonial proof that he was in the United States of
America from March 1991 to October 1992.
The trial court, impressed by Alfaro's detailed narration of the events surrounding
the commission of the crime, deemed her a credible witness after nding her testimony
to have been corroborated by those of the other prosecution witnesses, as well as by
the physical evidence. To the trial court, her testimony was categorical, straightforward,
spontaneous, and frank, and withstood grueling cross-examinations by the different
defense counsel. cESDCa
On the other hand, it belittled the denial and alibi of accused Webb, Lejano,
Rodriguez, and Gatchalian in light of their positive identification by Alfaro.
And so after a protracted trial, the trial court rendered on January 4, 2000 a 172-
page decision nding all the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of rape with
homicide.
Thus the trial court disposed:
WHEREFORE, this Court hereby nds all the principal accused GUILTY BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIME OF RAPE WITH HOMICIDE AND HEREBY
SENTENCES EACH ONE OF THEM TO SUFFER THE PENALTY OF RECLUSION
PERPETUA. This Court likewise nds the accused Gerardo Biong GUILTY
BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT AS AN ACCESSORY AFTER THE FACT, AND
HEREBY SENTENCES HIM TO SUFFER AN IMPRISONMENT OF ELEVEN (11)
YEARS, FOUR (4) MONTHS AND ONE (1) DAY TO TWELVE (12) YEARS. In
addition, the Court hereby orders all the accused to jointly and severally pay the
victim's surviving heir, Mr. Lauro Vizconde, the following sums by way of civil
indemnity:
1) The amount of P150,000.00 for wrongful death of the victims;

2) The amount of P762,450.00 representing actual damages
sustained by Mr. Lauro Vizconde;
3) The amount of P2,000,000.00 as moral damages sustained by Mr.
Lauro Vizconde;
4) The amount of P97,404.55 as attorney's fees. 5
On appeal, the Court of Appeals rendered its challenged Decision of December

15, 2005 af rming with modi cation the trial court's decision by reducing the penalty
imposed on Biong to six years minimum and twelve years maximum and increasing the
award of civil indemnity to Lauro Vizconde to P200,000.00. 6 The appellate court found
that indeed there was suf cient evidence that Rodriguez, Gatchalian, Fernandez, and
Estrada had conspired to rape and kill Carmela as well as to kill Estrellita and Jennifer.
On motion for reconsideration by the accused, the appellate court's Special
Division of ve members, voting three against two, sustained its af rmance of the trial
court's decision. 7 Hence, this appeal.
On April 20, 2010, as a result of its initial deliberation in this case, the Court
issued a Resolution granting the request of Webb to submit for Deoxyribonucleic Acid
(DNA) analysis the semen specimen taken from Carmela's cadaver, which specimen
was believed to be still under the safekeeping of the NBI. The Court granted the request
pursuant to Section 4 of the Rule on DNA Evidence 8 to give the accused and the
prosecution access to scientific evidence which could affect the result of the case. CEHcSI
On April 27, 2010, however, the NBI informed the Court that it no longer had
custody of the specimen which it claimed had been turned over to the trial court.
Parenthetically, the trial court records do not show that the specimen was among the
object evidence that was offered in evidence in the case by any of the parties. It was in
light of this development that accused Webb led an urgent motion to acquit on the
ground that the government's failure to preserve such vital evidence has resulted in the
denial of his right to due process.
In the draft decision prepared by Justice Martin S. Villarama as a basis of this
Court's deliberation, the decision of the appellate court af rming with modi cation the
trial court's decision was affirmed.
In discussing why the Decision of the Court of Appeals is being af rmed with
modi cation, the draft decision which was the basis of this Court's deliberations,
started by stating a "fundamental rule," viz.:
It is a fundamental rule that ndings of the trial courts which are factual in nature
and which involve credibility are accorded respect when no glaring errors, gross
misapprehensions of facts and speculative, arbitrary and unsupported
conclusions can be gathered from such ndings. 9 When the trial court's ndings
have been af rmed by the appellate court, said ndings are generally conclusive
and binding upon this Court. 1 0
The draft decision, which was later adopted by the dissenters, found "no glaring
errors, gross misapprehensions of facts and speculative, arbitrary and unsupported
conclusions" made by the lower courts. It readily credited the testimony of prosecution
"star" witness Jessica Alfaro (Alfaro) who, it observed, "underwent exhaustive and
intense cross-examination by eight . . . defense lawyers . . . [and] revealed such details
and observations which only a person who was actually with the perpetrators could
have known."
The trial court banked primarily on Alfaro who claimed to be an eyewitness to the
massacre and considered the testimonies of the other prosecution witnesses as
merely corroborative of hers.
Jurisprudence has consistently summoned, however, that for testimonial
evidence to be worthy of belief, it must rstly proceed from the mouth of a credible
witness. A person may be credible where he is without previous conviction of a crime;
who is not a police character and has no police record; who has not perjured in the
past; whose af davit or testimony is not incredible; who has a good standing in the
community; and who is reputed to be trustworthy and reliable. 1 1 Secondly, the person's
testimony must in itself be credible.
Daggers v. Van Dyck 1 2 illuminates:
Evidence to be believed, must not only proceed from the mouth of a credible
witness, but it must be credible in itself such as the common experience and
observation of mankind can approve as probable under the circumstances. We
have no test of the truth of human testimony, except its conformity to our
knowledge, observation, and experience. Whatever is repugnant to these belongs
to the miraculous and is outside of judicial cognizance. (underscoring supplied)
CAHTIS
Alfaro was found both by the trial and appellate courts to be a credible witness.
She impressed the trial court which found her to have "testi ed in a categorical,
straightforward, spontaneous and frank manner, and [to] ha[ve] remained consistent in
her testimony." 1 3
By Alfaro's own admission, she was a habitual drug addict who inhaled and
sniffed shabu "every other day" 1 4 since December 1990. It was about this time that she
met Artemio "Dong" Ventura who provided her with a regular supply of shabu at the so-
called "house of shabu" in Paraaque. 1 5 In March 1991, she stopped getting her supply
of shabu from Ventura as she instead got it from other sources including Orly Bacquir
and Cris Santos and places such as Quezon City, Makati and Tondo. 1 6
Alfaro's tale about the circumstances surrounding the commission of the
complex crime follows:
In the afternoon of June 29, 1991, the date of the commission of the crime,
before she and accused Peter Estrada, who she claimed was her boyfriend, went to the
Alabang Commercial Center, she had taken illegal drugs, and in the evening of even
date, she not only smoked shabu but sniffed cocaine as well at the "parking lot." 1 7 It
was only in about October 1994 that she stopped taking illegal drugs.
The paper of authors Burrus and Marks, "Testimonial Reliability of Drug Addicts,"
18 teaches:
. . . [W]here the prolonged use of drugs has impaired the witness' ability to
perceive, recall or relate, impeaching testimony is uniformly sustained by the
courts. Aside from organic deterioration, however, testimony may be impugned if
the witness was under the in uence of drugs at the time of perceiving the event
about which he is testifying or at the time he is on the stand. This necessarily
follows, for even the temporary presence of drugs affects the functioning of the
body's organs, and thus bears directly on the credibility of the witness' testimony .
. . 1 9 (underscoring supplied)
Evidence derived from the testimony of a witness who was under the in uence of
drugs during the incident to which he is testifying is indeed very unreliable. 2 0 So it has
been held that "habitual users of narcotics become notorious liars and that their
testimony is likely to be affected thereby." 2 1
We believe it will be admitted that habitual users of opium, or other like narcotics,
become notorious liars. The habit of lying comes doubtless from the fact that the
users of those narcotics pass the greater part of their lives in an unreal world, and
thus become unable to distinguish between images and facts, between illusions
and realities. 2 2 (underscoring supplied)
Defense witness Dr. Rey San Pedro, then Deputy Executive Director of the
Dangerous Drugs Board, opined that drug addicts or dependents are generally liars who
would lie for less than noble objectives, such as for money and/or to satisfy their
craving for attention, viz.: DHECac
Atty. M. Ongkiko:
Q: Based on your experience, Doctor, will this dependency of shabu affect the
character of a person speci cally, for example, the capacity to tell the truth,
would that affect?
Witness Dr. Rey San Pedro:
A: Our general examination of patients showed that they become liars.

Atty. M. Ongkiko:
Q: They become liars. Yes, what would be the usual motivation for a shabu-
dependent person to become liars. Why, why do they lie?
A: My experience, Sir, is because they are aware that what they are doing is
wrong and therefore they want to hide it. Not only from the family, but also
from their friends.
Atty. M. Ongkiko:
Q: Yes. They could lie on the persons they go out with?

A: Yes, Sir.
Atty. M. Ongkiko:
Q: They could lie on the persons they meet?

A: Yes, Sir.
Atty. M. Ongkiko:
Q: They could lie on the persons from whom they allegedly get the drugs?
A: Yes, Sir.
Atty. M. Ongkiko:
Q: Is it not correct, Doctor, that the tendency of a drug dependent is to hide the
identity of the drug suppliers. Is this correct?
Witness Dr. Rey San Pedro: HDTcEI
A: This is our experience. I have not encountered a patient who would tell you
where they get their supply.
Atty. M. Ongkiko:
Q: Who would tell you the correct name of the drug supplier?
A: Yes, Sir.
Atty. M. Ongkiko:
Q: And who would tell you the correct address of the drug supplier, correct?
A: Correct.
Atty. M. Ongkiko:
Q: Their tendency is to give you misleading information, correct?

A: Yes, Sir.
Atty. M. Ongkiko:
Q: Now, would a drug dependent on shabu lie for money?

A: Yes.
Atty. M. Ongkiko:
Q: Yes. When I say lie for money so that she could get money?
A: She could get money.
Atty. M. Ongkiko:
Q: He will, from her relatives, from her friends, or even from third persons?
A: Yes, Sir. They even sell the family belongings.
Atty. M. Ongkiko:
Q: They even sell their personal effects?
A: Yes, Sir. ASaTCE
Atty. M. Ongkiko:
Q: Would they sell their honor to get money, like a woman becoming a
prostitute?
A: I have not encountered a case like that.

Atty. M. Ongkiko:
Q: You have not encountered that much. But tell me, Doctor, would they lie in
order to get attention?

A: Yes, they do.
Atty. M. Ongkiko:
Q: Yes, because they want to be the center of attention to cover up for their
drug dependency, correct?

A: Yes, Sir.
Atty. M. Ongkiko:
Q: Now, Doctor, if a person were drug dependent on shabu since 1990, 1991,
up to and including December, 1994. So, that is a long time, isn't it?
A: '90 to '94?
Atty. M. Ongkiko:
Q: Yes, drug dependent. What would it take, Doctor, in order that we can cure
this patient of his or her dependency on shabu, what would it take?
A: They have to be rehabilitated, Sir, treated and rehabilitated.
Atty. M. Ongkiko:
Q: Treated and rehabilitated, where?

A: In a hospital. CSEHcT
Atty. M. Ongkiko:
Q: In a hospital. Does the government provide for such facilities?
A: Yes, Sir.
xxx xxx xxx 2 3 (underscoring supplied)
Former National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) Director Epimaco Velasco had a

view similar to that of Dr. San Pedro's that any information which is being furnished
by a drug addict is "not generally reliable" and his capacity to lie may be "very great." 2 4
In their earlier mentioned paper, Burrus and Marks write on the "peculiar effects
upon veracity" of the principal types of drugs, like cocaine and amphetamine which
were used by Alfaro:
xxx xxx xxx
b. Cocaine Cocaine is a powerful cortical stimulant which causes a state of
euphoric excitement and varying degrees of pleasurable hallucinations. Under its
influence, a person experiences sensations of great muscular and mental strength
and overestimates his capabilities. He is truly, at least while under the drug's
in uence, in an "unreal" or "dream world," and the majority exception of
admitting impeaching testimony where the witness was under the influence of the
drug at the time of perception or testifying seems clearly sustainable in medical
evidence.
Over time, cocaine produces on the addict a degree of physical and mental
deterioration not found in connection with the use of opiates. The cocaine addict
is not a normal person; many, in fact, become paranoids and suffer from feelings
of persecution. Visual, auditory and tactual hallucinations are common, as are
digestive tract disorders, and occasionally convulsions.
It would seem to follow that, so far as medical evidence is concerned, expert
testimony should be admissible to impeach the cocaine addict. Both in its long-
run effect of organic deterioration and in its short run in uence, the drug severs
the user's contact with reality, and renders him, to that extent, unreliable . Even
the majority admits impeaching testimony in cases of organic deterioration.
There are few instances of deterioration more pronounced than that found in the
habitual user of cocaine.
xxx xxx xxx

e. Amphetamine Similar to the barbiturates and bromides, amphetamine
operates upon the central nervous system, and its effect on the user's ability
to perceive and accurately to relate is dependent on the amount of the
drug taken . Rather than a depressant however, amphetamine is a potent
stimulant, the initial proper dosage promoting wakefulness and alertness,
increased initiative, con dence, euphoria and increased motor activity. Thus, the
non-addict's sparing use of the drug, would not seem to impair reliability and
impeaching testimony to this end should be excluded. IHaCDE
Overdosage and repeated medication, however, can prove most harmful. Thus,
the addict may suffer vasomotor disturbances, dizziness, agitation, confusion
and delirium. The usual dosage taken by the addict is suf cient to cause toxic
psychosis characterized by hallucinations and paranoid delusions similar in
effect to cocaine. In this state, the amphetamine addict's testimonial capabilities
are definitely impaired.
The result is that with amphetamine, as well as with barbiturates and bromides,
impeachment should depend upon the amount of the drug taken and the extent
of its use. Absent excessive use to the extent of organic deterioration, the
barbiturate, bromide or amphetamine addict, when not intoxicated by the direct
in uence of the drug, is apparently perfectly reliable and the majority judicial
view, under these circumstances seems sustainable. Also, as with marihuana, its
effects vary with the personality make-up of the user, with the result that this, too,
should be considered in admitting or excluding the impeaching testimony. This,
of course, broadens the inquiry from the physiological-pharmacological effects of
drugs upon reliability to the psychological framework of the user in its relation to
his ability to tell the truth or proneness to lie. 2 5 (italics in the original; emphasis
and underscoring supplied)
How Alfaro got to be a "star" witness in this case was narrated by then NBI agent
Artemio Sacaguing:
Atty. Ongkiko:
Q All right, Atty. Sacaguing, how did the NBI treat Ms. Alfaro considering the
assistance that he was giving your group?
Witness Sacaguing:
A We gave her very special treatment. So, we consider her already the darling
of the group because she was giving us good projects and she loved it.
Atty. Ongkiko:
Q What do you mean by she loved it, she loved what?
Witness Sacaguing:
A She liked being treated that way.

Atty. Ongkiko:
Q Now tell the Honorable Court, was there ever any time where the group got
tired of giving Ms. Alfaro the VIP treatment?
xxx xxx xxx
Atty. Ongkiko:
Q All right, Atty. Sacaguing, how long did you give Ms. Alfaro this VIP
treatment? aCHDST
Witness Sacaguing:
A Well, she was always there and we treated her very nicely, but later on,
about . . . after the lapse of about one or two weeks, the boys, I mean, my
associates in my team, began teasing her because she could not give us
any project anymore.
Atty. Ongkiko:
Q What do you mean by projects, leads?
Witness Sacaguing:
A Projects, cases we could work on.
Atty. Ongkiko:
Q I see, and what do you mean by teasing?
xxx xxx xxx
Atty. Ongkiko:
Q Mr. Sacaguing, after your group teased her because, according to you, she
could not give you anymore projects, what was the reaction of Ms. Alfaro,
if any?
Please look at the judge, please do not look at me.
Witness Sacaguing:
A She seemed to have been piqued and she said . . .

Atty. Ongkiko:
Q She seemed to have been what?
Witness Sacaguing:
A Piqued, yes, "napikon".
Atty. Ongkiko:
Q I see, piqued.
Witness Sacaguing:
A Piqued.
Atty. Ongkiko:
Q Piqued. Ano yun, napikon?
Court:
p i c q u e d. (underscoring in the original)
Atty. Ongkiko:
Q And when she was piqued or "napikon", what did she say or what did she
do?
xxx xxx xxx

Atty. Ongkiko:
xxx xxx xxx
Q Atty. Sacaguing, how did Jessica Alfaro become a witness in the Vizconde
murder case. Will you tell the Honorable Court?
Witness Sacaguing:
A She told me, she knew somebody who . . .
Court:
Face the Court.
Witness Sacaguing:
A She told me, Your Honor, that she knew somebody who related to
her the circumstances, I mean, the details of the massacre of the
Vizconde family. That's what she told us, Your Honor. DHTCaI
Atty. Ongkiko:
Q And what did you say?

Please look at the Court.
Witness Sacaguing:
A I was quite interested and I tried to persuade her to introduce to me that
man and she promised that in due time, she will bring to me the man, and
together with her, we will try to convince him to act as a state witness and
help us in the solution of the case.
Atty. Ongkiko:
Q Did she ever bring to you or to your of ce this man that, according to her,
knew about the Vizconde murder case?
xxx xxx xxx
Atty. Ongkiko:
Q Atty. Sacaguing, were you able to interview this alleged witness?

Witness Sacaguing:
A No, sir.
Atty. Ongkiko:
Q Why not?
Witness Sacaguing:
A Because Jessica Alfaro was never able to comply with her promise to bring
the man to me. She told me later that she could not, and the man does not
like to testify.
Atty. Ongkiko:
Q All right, and what happened after that?
Witness Sacaguing:
A She told me, "easy lang kayo, Sir", if I may quote, "easy lang, Sir, huwag
kayong . . ."
Court:
Q How was that?

Witness Sacaguing: AacCIT
A "Easy lang, Sir. Sir, relax lang, Sir, papapelan ko yan, papapelan ko na lang
yan."
Atty. Ongkiko:
Q And what did you understand by her statement as you quoted it?
Witness Sacaguing:
A I thought it . . .
Prosecutor Zuo:
Objection, Your Honor, that is asking for the opinion of this witness, Your Honor.
Court:
Reform your question.

Atty. Ongkiko:
Q All right, and what was your reaction when Ms. Alfaro stated that
"papapelan ko na lang yan"?
Witness Sacaguing:
A I said, "hindi pwede yan, kasi, hindi ka naman eye witness."
Atty. Ongkiko:
Q And what was the reply of Ms. Alfaro?
Witness Sacaguing:
A Hindi siya nakakibo, until she went away.
Atty. Ongkiko:
Q She what?
Witness Sacaguing:
A She went away, she went out of my office.
Court:
You speak clearly, Mr. Witness, I could hardly get you.
Witness Sacaguing:
A She did not answer anymore, Your Honor. She just went out of the office.
xxx xxx xxx 2 6 (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
NBI agent Sacaguing was the special "handler" of Alfaro, an NBI "asset" who
regularly provided leads on projects or cases being investigated by the NBI, on which
account she received special treatment. From Sacaguing's above-quoted testimony,
Alfaro came forward with her "knowledge" about the commission of the crimes only
after being cajoled by the NBI agents about her lack of productivity and her failure to
make good her word that she knew and would bring someone who could "shed light" on
the crimes that occurred close to four years earlier. It is thus hard to fathom how her
motives for suddenly developing a rst handaccount of the commission of the crimes
could be treated as anything but suspect. Yet, the lower courts, despite the peculiar
circumstances related by Sacaguing, were not put on guard from swallowing Alfaro's
testimony. ISHCcT
Significantly, Alfaro never disputed Sacaguing's above-quoted testimony.

The trial court credited as satisfactory and plausible Alfaro's explanation for her
silence from the time she allegedly witnessed the crimes in June 1991 up to "about
October 1994" when the numbing effects of drug abuse only began to wear off and she
had an earnest desire to reform her life.
WITNESS JESSICA ALFARO ON CLARIFICATORY QUESTIONS BY THE COURT
Court:
Q: After that incident, did it not occur to your mind to immediately report the
same to the police authorities?
Witness Alfaro:
A: No, Your Honor, I did not.
Court:
Q: Why?
Witness Alfaro:
A: Because at rst, I was so scared. I just want to my Dad, but I didn't have a
chance to tell him.
Court:
Q: No, after the lapse of a reasonable time, after witnessing that incident, did
it not also occur to your mind to finally report it to the proper authorities?
Witness Alfaro:
A: I did not first have that in mind, only recently when I was out on drugs.
Court:
Q: When?
Witness Alfaro:
A: When I got out on drugs.

Court:

Q: When was that?
Witness Alfaro:
A: About October of 1994.
Court:
Q: What prompted you to finally reveal what you have witnessed?
Witness Alfaro:
A: Well, when I started having these nightmares about my daughter instead of
that Jennifer that I see in my dreams. It's my daughter whom I see crying,
and that triggered me, and then I got out from drugs, and then it came to
the point when I saw them accidentally, so, that's the thing which triggered
me, Your Honor. ScCEIA
Court:
Q: Any other reason?
Witness Alfaro:
A: Those are my main reasons.
Court:
Q: Is that your principal reason?

Witness Alfaro:
A: I wanted to change my life already. 2 7 (underscoring supplied)
Given Alfaro's confession of having for years, after the commission of the crimes,
been numbed by the effects of drug abuse, would the dissenters take as gospel truth
her what they termed "vivid" and "infallible" recollection of the minutiae surrounding the
commission of the crime in June 1991, and point to the accused as the malefactors,
particularly Webb, despite evidence, documentary and testimonial, supporting his alibi?
The explanation for this feat of wizardry is within arms-length Alfaro appears
to be a rehearsed witness. Prior to her decision to surface and claim to tell what she
"knew" about the crimes, the crimes had already been played out in the media, both
print and broadcast, in every gory detail. It was a raging topic that drew intense
discussions in both talk shows and informal gatherings, and all sorts of speculations
about it were rife. In fact, prior to the arrest of the accused, members of the Philippine
National Police (PNP) arrested some members of an "akyat-bahay" gang who were
charged accordingly. These gang members were later released upon orders of the
Makati Regional Trial Court after it was discovered that their confessions were
fabricated by the PNP to conform to the physical evidence found at the crime scene.
It is not thus dif cult to believe that Alfaro could have become familiar with the
evidentiary details of the crimes, given that she was practically a resident at the of ces
of the NBI which was actively investigating the crimes, not to mention her being an NBI
"star" witness.
Sadly, dissenters choose to gloss over the strikingly uncanny similarities
between the confessions of the "akyat-bahay" gang members and Alfaro's testimony.
The nature and extent of the similarities were ampli ed by Justice Dacudao in his
Dissenting Opinion, which is quoted at length:
It also bothers me that Ms. Alfaro's narration of the events in the case under
review was in many points uncannily similar to that set forth in the
extrajudicial confessions or sinumpaang salaysay executed by certain
members of the so-called "Akyat Bahay Gang" of the Barroso group (the brothers
Villardo Datuin Barroso, Jr. and Roberto Datuin Barroso and their several
companions Rolando Mendoza y Gomez, Ernesto Cesar, Bienvenido Baydo,
Angelito Santos y Bisen, Boy Kulit, Rey Doe and several other John Does). These
persons were earlier charged with two cases of robbery with homicide, and one
case of rape with homicide that is now the very subject of the case under review.
Indeed, I cannot understand why the three criminal cases that were instituted
before the Makati City RTC, Branch 63, (presided over by Judge Julio R. Logarta,)
which recited facts and events that are so strikingly akin to those set
forth in the information led in the case under review, hardly commanded the
attention of the trial court. The records of these criminal cases, which were
introduced in evidence by the accused-appellants during the trial of the case
under review, covered the following: ECcDAH
(1) Criminal Case No. 91-7135 led by then Assistant Chief State
Prosecutor Aurelio C. Trampe before the sale of Judge Julio R. Logarta of
the Makati City RTC, Branch 63, on November 11, 1991 (for robbery with
homicide) against Villardo Barroso y Datuin, Roberto Barroso y Datuin
Rolando Mendoza y Gomez, Ernesto Cesar, Bienvenido Baydo, Angelito
Santos y Bisen, Rey Doe and several other John Does still at large.
Crim. Case No. 91-7135
That on or about the 30th day of June 1991 at BF Homes Paraaque,

Metro Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above named accused conspiring and confederating together
and helping one another did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and
feloniously, by the use of force upon things, to wit, by breaking the glass in
the left side of the door to open it and from where they entered the house,
and once inside, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously and intent to gain and
against the consent of the owners thereof, forcibly open cabinet and
drawers inside the house, take and carry away therefrom, the following
pieces of personal property:
P140,000.00 in cash
Four (4) necklace

Five (5) rings
Two (2) bracelets
Two (2) pairs of earings
belonging to Mr. and Mrs. Lauro Vizconde of the total value of Two
Hundred Thousand (P200,000.00) Pesos, Philippine currency to the
damage and prejudice of said owners in the said total sum, and that on the
occasion of the said Robbery and for the purpose of enabling them to take,
steal, and carry away the articles above-mentioned herein accused, in
pursuant of their conspiracy, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously and with evident premeditation and taking advantage of their
superior number and strength and with intent to kill, treacherously attack,
assault, stab and use personal violence upon JENNIFER NICOLAS
VIZCONDE thereby in icting upon her multiple stab wounds in different
parts of her body thus causing her instantaneous death.
Contrary to law.
(2) Criminal case No. 91-7136 (for the rape with homicide of Carmela
Nicolas Vizconde led by ACSP Aurelio C. Trampe with the same RTC,
Branch 63, on November 11, 1919) also against the same accused. It
alleged:cHTCaI

That on or about the 30th day of June 1991 at BF Homes, Paraaque,
Metro Manila, Philippines, and within jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused, armed with knives, by means of violence, force
and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
have carnal knowledge of CARMELA NICOLAS VIZCONDE (without her)
consent, and that on the occasion of the commission of rape, and in
pursuance of their conspiracy, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously, with evident premeditation and taking advantage of their
superior number and strength and with intent to kill, treacherously attack,
assault, stab and use personal violence upon said CARMELA NICOLAS
VIZCONDE, thereby in icting upon her multiple stab wounds in different
parts of her body, thus causing her instantaneous death.
Contrary to law.
(3) Criminal Case No. 91-7137 (for robbery, with homicide wherein the
victim was ESTRELLITA NICOLAS VISCONDE) likewise led against the
same accused by ACSP Aurelio C. Trampe. It alleged:
That on or about the 30th day of June 1991 at BF Homes Paraaque,

Metro Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused conspiring and confederating together
and helping one another did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously, by the use of force upon things, to wit: by breaking the glass in
the left side of the door to open it and from where they entered the house
and once inside, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously and with intent to
gain and against the consent of the owners thereof, forcibly open cabinets
and drawers inside the house, take and carry away therefrom the following
pieces of personal property:
P140,000.00 in cash
Four (4) necklace

Five (5) rings
Two (2) bracelets
Two (2) pairs of earings

belonging to Mr. and Mrs. Lauro Vizconde, the total value of which is Two
Hundred Thousand (P200,000.00) pesos, Philippine Currency, to the
damage and prejudice of said owners in the said total sum; and that on the
occasion of the said Robbery and for the purpose of enabling them to take,
steal and carry way the articles above-mentioned, herein accused, in
pursuance of their conspiracy, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
with evident premeditation and taking advantage of their superior number
and strength and with intent to kill, treacherously attack, assault, stab and
use personal violence upon ESTRELLITA NICOLAS VIZCONDE thereby
inflicting upon her multiple stab wounds causing her instantaneous death.
Contrary to law.
Consider this: In the aforementioned cases, one of the accused therein (Angelito
Santos y Bisen) who by his account was bothered by his conscience, surrendered
and executed an af davit or sinumpaang salaysay narrating his participation in
the gruesome killing of members of the Vizconde family and the rape-killing of a
young Vizconde girl. And based on the extrajudicial confessions of the accused in
these cases (speci cally Angelito Santos y Bisen, Ernesto L. Cesar, the Barroso
brothers Villardo, Jr. and Roberto, and Rolando G. Mendoza) it appears that the
group conspired to rob the house of the Vizcondes in W. Vinzons Street inside the
BF Subdivision; that they used at least two (2) vehicles in going there (a mint
green Toyota Corona, and an owner's tinted jeepney); that when they entered the
subdivision, one of them motioned to the security guards manning the gate that
the other vehicles were with him; that when they reached the Vizconde residence
at W. Vinzons Street, BF Homes, one of them (Bienvenido "Ben" Baydo) climbed
the fence, and once inside the house opened the gate for the group; that
Bienvenido "Ben" Baydo put-out the light in the garage; that using a stone "na
binalot sa basahan" Ben Baydo broke the glass in the door and opened it; that a
woman who had apparently been roused from sleep (apparently referring to Mrs.
Estrellita Nicolas Vizconde) came near the door and shouted "magnanakaw"; that
Ben Baydo gagged the woman and dragged her inside the master's bedroom
where Ben Baydo, Boy Kulit, Rolando Mendoza and Roberto Barroso stabbed her
several times (one knife used in stabbing was described as "isang double blade
na mga anim na pulgada ang haba nang talim" ); that when a young girl
(apparently referring to Jennifer Nicolas Vizconde) inside started to cry and shout,
she too was stabbed to death by Rolando Mendoza, Ernesto Cesar, Villardo
Barroso, Jr., Ben Baydo and Boy Kulit; that in one of the rooms they found a
young woman (apparently referring to Carmela Nicolas Vizconde) who was raped
successively by Roberto Barroso, Rolando Mendoza, Ben Baydo, and Ernesto
Cesar and later repeatedly stabbed to death; and that they ransacked the house
for valuables and were able to nd cash and jewelries which they later on divided
among themselves. Some of the pieces of jewelry were pawned by some of the
accused at the Tambunting Pawnshop and the La Cebuana Pawnshop at Dart,
Paco. Carefully evaluated , it is plain enough that the statements contained in
the extrajudicial confessions or sinumpaang salaysay also overlapped or
corroborated each other in their material particulars . cADSCT
Stock must be taken of the fact that the detailed extrajudicial confessions or
sinumpaang salaysay of the several accused (especially Villardo Barroso y
Datuin, Jr., Roberto Barroso y Datuin, his Rolando Mendoza y Gomez, Ernesto
Cesar y Lizardo, Angelito Santos y Bisen) in the three criminal cases, were
acknowledged and rati ed before Judge Roberto L. Makalintal, Atty. Luis Matro,
Atty. Francis Tolentino and Atty. Salvador B. Aguas, who af rmed that the said
extrajudicial confessions or sinumpaang salaysay were freely and voluntarily
given by the af ants, and that no duress violence, intimidation or coercion of any
kind was employed against the af ants when the latter gave their statements if
they did not want to; and that indeed the af ants were made aware of their
constitutional right to have a lawyer of their choice to assist them during the
custodial investigation and to remain silent if they wished to. Nevertheless, as
seen in the consolidated decision rendered in the three criminal cases, these
extrajudicial confessions or sinumpaang salaysay were declared inadmissible by
the Makati City RTC, for having been allegedly obtained through duress, threats,
or intimidation. The dismissal of these criminal cases nowithstanding, it does not
detract from the fact: (1) that said criminal case had indeed been filed in court, (2)
that the criminal indictments were erected on the strength of the extrajudicial
confessions or sinumpaang salaysay executed by the accused therein, (3) that
these extrajudicial confessions or sinumpaang salaysay set forth facts
and events that are eerily similar to those which found their way into
the information was led in the case under review; (4) that the victims in the
three criminal cases are also the victims in the case under review; and (5) that
since the accused therein had been duly arraigned, as indeed, criminal
proceedings had been commenced thereon before a competent court, the accused
therein were in real danger of being convicted of the felonies charged. 2 8
(emphasis and underscoring supplied)
On the questioned inconsistencies between Alfaro's April 28, 1995 and May 22,
1995 Af davits, the dissenters brush them aside as not necessarily affecting her
credibility, citing People v. Sanchez 2 9 which held:
. . . [W]e advert to that all-too familiar rule that discrepancies between sworn
statements and testimonies made at the witness stand do not necessarily
discredit the witnesses. Sworn statement/af davits are generally subordinated in
importance to open court declarations because the former are often executed
when an af ant's mental faculties are not in such a state as to afford him a fair
opportunity of narrating in full the incident which has transpired. Testimonies
given during trials are much more exact and elaborate. Thus, testimonial evidence
carries more weight than sworn statements/affidavits. (underscoring supplied)
It bears emphasis that the questioned inconsistencies in Alfaro's Af davits, and

indeed they are too glaring to escape attention, arise not from an af davit and
testimony at the witness stand but from two affidavits.
And the dissenters forget that the rst Af davit, dated April 28, 1995, was given
about two months shy of four years from the occurrence of the crime in late June 1991
and, therefore, her mental faculties could not have been in "such a state as [not] to
afford [her] a fair opportunity of narrating in full the incident" subject of her tale. The
second Af davit, on the other hand, was executed 24 days after the rst Af davit or on
May 22, 1995. Do the dissenters find that Alfaro's mental faculties were more refreshed
at a date more remote from the occurrence of the crime she claims to have witnessed?
Again, as did the lower courts, the dissenters disregard the glaring
inconsistencies between Alfaro's two af davits vis- -vis her testimony in open court
which undeniably detract from credibility of witness and of testimony. Consider
these inconsistencies reflected in the tabulation below: HAEDIS
April 28, 1995 May 22, 1995 Testimony in Court

Affidavit Affidavit
Alfaro's She has no t met She knew Carmela She met Carmela in a
meeting with Carmela before the personally and met party sometime in
Carmela night of the crime her in a party January 1991 and in
sometime in a disco sometime in
February 1991 February 1991
The number There were only two Alfaro and Peter The entire group
of trips the trips made. After the Estrada made three made three trips to
group made first trip, Alfaro went trips to the Vizconde the Vizconde
to the back to the parking residence. During their residence. On the
Vizconde lot. The group was seco nd trip, the other seco nd trip, Webb
residence about to leave when accused stayed and his companions
she arrived. Ventura behind at the Alabang parked and stayed
signaled her to Commercial Center along Aguirre
board the Nissan Parking Lot. Peter Avenue. Only Alfaro
Patrol to take more Estrada and Alfaro went to the Vizconde
drugs and asked her went back to the residence.
to leave her car, but Vizconde residence
she refused. after about 30
Thereafter, she was minutes. This time,
instructed to jo in Carmela asked Jessica
the co nvo y o f to come back after
vehicles . They went midnight.
around BF Homes
for about 15 minutes
before they finally
proceeded to
Vinzons Street.
What Webb Alfaro did no t hear Before they left the After Webb said
said any instructio ns parking lot, Alfaro "Pipilahan . . .,"
from Webb or any o verheard Webb Lejano retorted, "Oo
member of the say, "Pipilahan natin pero ako ang
group. si Carmela, pero ako susunod." The others
ang mauuna. responded, "Okay,
okay."
What Alfaro Alfaro did not see After leaving the Before going to the
saw at the what transpired accused Webb, bedroom, Alfaro saw
scene of the inside the Vizconde Lejano and Ventura V entura
crime residence because inside the Vizconde rummaging thro ugh
she did no t go in . residence, Alfaro the ladies' bag o n
again entered the to p o f the dining
ho use through the table . She proceeded
kitchen door; to the bedroom after
V entura was co ming hearing the sound of
o ut as she was static and peeped
abo ut to enter and through the door. She
once inside, curiosity could not see
impelled Alfaro to anything so she
peep thro ugh the stepped inside where
first do o r on the left. she saw Webb
Noticing the high pumping Carmela.
volume of the TV set
inside the room, she
saw two bloodied
bodies on top of the
bed and on the floor,
she saw Webb
pumping on top of
Carmela who was
Alfaro's Alfaro did no t see gagged and in tears.
Alfaro peeped Alfaro first peeped
location in what transpired thro ugh the through the bedroom
the Vizconde inside the Vizconde bedro o m do o r and door and did no t see
bedroom in residence because saw two bloodied anything . Since she
relation to she did no t enter it . bodies and Webb did not see anything,
what she saw pumping Carmela. she walked inside
the bedro o m where
she saw the rape of
Carmela.
The dissenters approvingly note the trial court's ndings that Alfaro had
suf ciently explained these discrepancies between her two af davits as arising from a
desire "t o protect her former boyfriend Estrada and her relative Gatchalian, the
absence of a lawyer during the rst taking of her statements by the NBI, her
distrust of the rst investigators who took her statements and prepared her April
28, 1995 af davit, and her uncertainty if she could obtain adequate support and
security for her own life were she to disclose everything she knows about the Vizconde
killings." (underscoring supplied)
There was, however, no rational basis for Alfaro to mistrust her "handler"
Sacaguing who was present at the execution of the rst Af davit, or the NBI for that
matter, she, as stated earlier, having been accorded special treatment precisely
because she was one of the more valuable "assets" of the NBI. Sacaguing himself
testi ed that Alfaro was virtually dependent on them . . . "for protection, for sympathy
and even for her spiritual needs." 3 0 Accused Gatchalian's father, Atty. Francisco
Gatchalian, denied that his family was in any way related to Alfaro. And the lawyer who
is mentioned in the rst Af davit to have assisted her, Atty. Arturo Mercader, Jr., took
the witness stand and categorically stated that he was present during the taking of
such first Affidavit of Alfaro, he claiming that, inter alia:
Atty. Ongkiko:
Q And after the typing of the statement was nished by Agent Tamayo, what
happened?
Witness Mercader:
A Well, I received the statement and showed it to Jessica and asked her to
read it also.
Atty. Ongkiko:
Q Did Jessica Alfaro read her statement?

Witness Mercader: aSIHcT
A Yes, Your Honor.
Atty. Ongkiko:
Q How long did it take her to read the statement?
Witness Mercvader:
A Just for few minutes, Your Honor.

Atty. Ongkiko:
Q And after she read the statement, what happened next?
Witness Mercader:
A Well, she signed the statement and afterwards, I also af xed my signature
on it, Your Honor.
xxx xxx xxx

Atty. Aguirre:
Q While assisting Jessica Alfaro, did you notice any action on the part of
anybody which pressured Jessica Alfaro to finish her statement?
Witness Mercader:
A No, Your Honor, none that I have noticed. If I did, I would have objected to.
31
xxx xxx xxx

Prosecutor Zuno:
Q And that, I believe, to your own perception, at that time she was giving the
facts, the answer, in accordance with her recollection?
xxx xxx xxx
Witness Mercader:
A Your Honor, at that time what I noticed only was the spontaneity of the
answers of Jessica. Of course, I could not tell whether from where
Jessica was basing it. From the recollection or from a memorize
script, I do not know , Your Honor, about that. But de nitely, whenever
she was asked a question, she answers them readily as if she knows the
answer personally. 3 2 (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The trial court's order preventing the defense from cross-examining Alfaro on the
inconsistencies between her two Af davits was thus correctly SET ASIDE by the Court
of Appeals, to which this Court, by Resolution of January 22, 1996, referred for
disposition G.R. Nos. 122466 and 122504, the accused's petitions assailing, among
other orders, the trial court's order denying their right to cross examine Alfaro, for
purposes of impeachment, on her con icting Af davits. Thus, the appellate court, in its
Decision 3 3 in CA-G.R. SP Nos. 39839 and 39840 of June 21, 1996, held: DAHCaI
xxx xxx xxx

[T]he issue of the right of petitioners to cross-examine Jessica Alfaro on the
alleged inconsistencies between her first and second affidavits is too crucial to be
simply brushed aside with a perfunctory application of the general rule adverted
to in the preceding paragraphs. It may bring about a failure of justice .
Consequently, we consider the actuations of respondent judge in this regard to be
reviewable by certiorari under rule 65 of the Rules of Court. (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
Under Section 11, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, an adverse party's witness may
be impeached (1) by contradictory evidence; (2) by evidence that his general
reputation for truth, honesty, or integrity is bad; (3) by evidence that he has
made at other times statement inconsistent with his present testimony ;
and (4) by producing the record of his conviction of an offense. Insofar as
impeachment by evidence of prior inconsistent statements however, under
Section 13 of the same Rule 132, a proper foundation must rst be laid, in that,
the attention of the witness should rst be called to such statements, and he
should be asked whether or not he made them, and afforded an opportunity for
explanation, or af rmance, or denial of the authenticity of the writing. (emphasis
and underscoring in the original)
A testimony given four years after the occurrence of crime which gives minute
details that even contradict tales earlier given is too incredible as to draw dubiety. The
lucid observations of Court of Appeals Justice Renato C. Dacudao in his Dissent 3 4 for
the acquittal of the accused, and the graphic analysis of Justice Roberto Abad in his
ponencia on why Alfaro's testimony can not be relied upon are thus well taken.
It bears stressing that the defense's earnest assertion that the prosecution failed
to rebut the pieces of evidence, highlighted by the defense, that seriously dent its (the
prosecution's) case has not been controverted.
Respecting Alfaro's "eyewitness identi cation" of Webb as the rapist: As
re ected in the tabulations above, she had con icting claims on whether and where she
witnessed the commission of the crime. AT ALL EVENTS, such identi cation is not as
accurate and authoritative as the scienti c forms of identi cation evidence such as
Deoxyribonucleic Acid (DNA) testing, 3 5 which testing could not now, in the present
case, be carried out in view of the information of the NBI that it no longer has custody
of the semen specimen from rape victim Carmela's cadaver, claiming that it had turned
it over to the trial court. The NBI did not, however, present any documentary proof of
such claim. Parenthetically, it does not appear from the records that the specimen was
offered in evidence by any of the parties.
To Webb's credit, he had asked for the conduct of DNA evidence on October 6,
1997, during the trial on the merits, when he led a Motion to Direct NBI to Submit
Semen Specimen to DNA Analysis 3 6 which motion the prosecution opposed. 3 7 The
motion was subsequently denied by the trial court by its November 25, 1997 Order, 3 8
citing Lim v. Court of Appeals 3 9 to the effect that DNA, "being a relatively new science,
it has not as yet been accorded of cial recognition by our courts." Besides, the trial
court "believed" that no one in the Philippines had as yet the knowledge and expertise to
testify on matters involving DNA testing. What is worse, however, is that it "believed"
that DNA testing "will not subserve the ends of justice." 4 0 If the motion had been
granted and DNA analysis were carried out, nagging doubts on Webb's culpability for
the crimes or lack of it could have been dissipated. ECTHIA
FINALLY, even assuming arguendo that the burden of evidence had shifted to the
defense, the testimonial and documentary evidence of the defense indubitably
establishes that, with respect to accused Webb, he was out of the country when the
crime occurred.
It is undisputed that accused Webb's travel and immigration documents, which
have not been found to be spurious, unquestionably show that he left the Philippines for
the United States on March 9, 1991 and returned to the Philippines only on October 26,
1992. In rejecting Webb's alibi, the dissenters point out:
These dates [March 9, 1991 and October 26, 1992] are so distant from the time of
the commission of the crime, June 29, 1991 and June 30, 1991, and it would not
have been impossible during the interregnum for Webb to travel back to the
country and again y to the US several times considering that the travel time on
board an airline from the Philippines to San Francisco, and from San Francisco to
the Philippines takes only about twelve (12) hours to fourteen (14) hours. Given
the nancial resources and political in uence of his family, it was not unlikely
that Webb could have traveled back to the Philippines before June 29-30, 1991
and then departed for the US again, and returning to the Philippines in October
1992. There clearly exists, therefore, such possibility of Webb's presence at the
scene of the crime at the time of its commission, and its excuse cannot be
deemed airtight. (underscoring and italics supplied)
It is now the dissenters' reasoning which turns highly speculative and conjectural,
one borne out of unfounded suspicion. It suspects that the Webb family may have used
its " nancial resources and political in uence" to control all the U.S. and Philippine
immigration people, thus allowing Webb to secretly "travel back to the country and
again y to the U.S. several times " between March 9, 1991 and October 26, 1992. It
bears noting that the prosecution proffered no evidence to establish that during the
interregnum Webb had surreptitiously slipped out of the U.S.A. to the Philippines, and
that he subsequently re-entered the U.S.A. by bypassing all immigration controls and
protocols in both countries. This is the stuff of which spy novels are made, but not in
the real world where the lives of innocent individuals are at stake.
Facts decide cases. Conjectures and suspicions are not facts, hence, they have
no evidentiary value. They cannot be the bases of conviction as they cannot substitute
for the constitutional requirement of proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
Suspicions, no matter how strong they are, must never sway judgment. 4 1
At this juncture, given the evidence on record, it is crucial to heed the Court's
caveat that when an accused puts up the defense of alibi, "the courts should not at
once have a mental prejudice against him. For, taken in the light of all the evidence on
record, it may be sufficient to acquit him." 4 2
While alibi is, indeed, a weak defense because the accused can easily fabricate
his story to escape criminal liability, 4 3 in the present case, Webb's alibi could not have
been fabricated with ease. His travel and immigration documents showing his
departure from the Philippines and arrival in the U.S.A., not to mention the testimonial
and documentary evidence on his activities while in the U.S.A. between March 9, 1991
and October 26, 1992, deserve full credit. If half the world away could not even be
considered to be "so far removed from the crime scene" 4 4 as to evince the physical
impossibility of actual presence, then the defense of alibi can only be appreciated when
an accused lands in a different planet.
The dissenters cite People v. Larraaga 4 5 to highlight the weakness of alibi as a
defense. That case did not involve foreign and travel immigration documents or even
the use of a passport, the accused therein having claimed that he was in Quezon City at
the time the crime was committed in Cebu City. Because he was positively identi ed by
several prosecution witnesses whose testimonies, unlike Alfaro's, were credible and
trustworthy, this Court rejected Larraaga's alibi.
WHEREFORE , for failure of the prosecution to prove beyond reasonable doubt
the guilt of the accused, Hubert Jeffrey P. Webb, Antonio "Tony Boy" Lejano, Michael A.
Gatchalian, Hospicio "Pyke" Fernandez, Peter Estrada, and Miguel "Ging" Rodriguez, they
are ACQUITTED of the crime charged. DCTSEA
BRION , J., supplemental opinion:
In addition to my vote and independently of the merits of the present case, I write
this opinion to point out the growing disregard and non-observance of the sub judice
rule, to the detriment of the rights of the accused, the integrity of the courts, and,
ultimately, the administration of justice. I seize this opportunity fully aware that the
present case dubbed in the news media as the Vizconde Massacre is one of the
most sensational criminal cases in Philippine history in terms of the mode of
commission of the crime and the personalities involved. From the time the charges
were led, the case has captured the public's interest that an unusual amount of air
time and print space have been devoted to it. Of late, with the public's renewed interest
after the case was submitted for decision, key personalities have again been
unabashedly publicizing their opinions and commenting even on the merits of the case
before various forms of media. A Senior Justice of this Court, who was a witness in the
case (while he was in private law practice) and who consequently inhibited himself from
participation, was even publicly maligned in the print and broadcast media through
unsupported speculations about his intervention in the case. That was how bad and
how low comments about the case had been.
In essence, the sub judice rule restricts comments and disclosures pertaining to
pending judicial proceedings. The restriction applies not only to participants in the
pending case, i.e., to members of the bar and bench, and to litigants and witnesses, but
also to the public in general, which necessarily includes the media. Although the Rules
of Court does not contain a speci c provision imposing the sub judice rule, it supports
the observance of the restriction by punishing its violation as indirect contempt
under Section 3 (d) of Rule 71:
Section 3. Indirect contempt to be punished after charge and hearing. . . . a
person guilty of any of the following acts may be punished for indirect contempt:
xxx xxx xxx

(d) Any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or
degrade the administration of justice[.]
Persons facing charges for indirect contempt for violation of the sub judice rule
often invoke as defense their right to free speech and claim that the citation for
contempt constitutes a form of impermissible subsequent punishment.
We have long recognized in this jurisdiction that the freedom of speech under
Section 4, Article III of the Constitution is not absolute. A very literal construction of the
provision, as espoused by US Supreme Court Justice Hugo Black, 1 may lead to the
disregard of other equally compelling constitutional rights and principles. In Vicente v.
Majaducon, 2 this Court declared that "[the freedom of speech] needs on occasion to
be adjusted to and accommodated with the requirements of equally important public
interests such as the maintenance of the integrity of courts and orderly functioning of
the administration of justice." Courts, both within and outside this jurisdiction, have long
grappled with the dilemma of balancing the public's right to free speech and the
government's duty to administer fair and impartial justice. While the sub judice rule may
be considered as a curtailment of the right to free speech, it is "necessary to ensure the
proper administration of justice and the right of an accused to a fair trial." 3 Both these
latter concerns are equally paramount and cannot lightly be disregarded. HSCcTD
Before proceeding with this line of thought, however, let me clarify that the sub
judice rule is not imposed on all forms of speech. In so far as criminal proceedings are
concerned, two classes of publicized speech made during the pendency of the
proceedings can be considered as contemptuous: first, comments on the merits of the
case, and second, intemperate and unreasonable comments on the conduct of the
courts with respect to the case. Publicized speech should be understood to be limited
to those aired or printed in the various forms of media such as television, radio,
newspapers, magazines, and internet, and excludes discussions, in public or in private,
between and among ordinary citizens. The Constitution simply gives the citizens the
right to speech, not the right to unrestricted publicized speech.
Comments on the merits of the case may refer to the credibility of witnesses, the
character of the accused, the soundness of the alibis offered, the relevance of the
evidence presented, and generally any other comment bearing on the guilt or innocence
of the accused. 4 The danger posed by this class of speech is the undue in uence it
may directly exert on the court in the resolution of the criminal case, or indirectly
through the public opinion it may generate against the accused and the adverse impact
this public opinion may have during the trial. The signi cance of the sub judice rule is
highlighted in criminal cases, as the possibility of undue in uence prejudices the
accused's right to a fair trial. "The principal purpose of the sub judice rule is to preserve
the impartiality of the judicial system by protecting it from undue in uence." 5 Public
opinion has no place in a criminal trial. We ruled that
it is a traditional conviction of civilized society everywhere that courts and juries,
in the decision of issues of fact and law should be immune from every
extraneous in uence; that facts should be decided upon evidence
produced in court; and that the determination of such facts should be
uninfluenced by bias, prejudice or sympathies . 6
The right to a fair trial is an adjunct of the accused's right to due process which
"guarantees [him] a presumption of innocence until the contrary is proved in a trial . . .
where the conclusions reached are induced not by any outside force or in uence but
only by evidence and argument given in open court, where tting dignity and calm
ambiance is demanded." 7
In foreign jurisdictions, the courts do not hesitate to exercise their power to
punish for contempt where necessary to dispose of judicial business unhampered by
publications that tend to impair the impartiality of verdicts. 8
If the media publish prejudicial material, they can appear to urge, or may in fact
be urging, a particular nding: the media can "wage a campaign" against one of
the parties to proceedings. If the jury decides in accordance with an outcome
promoted by the media, it will appear as if the jurors were swayed by the media.
By the same token, if the jury's decision does not accord with media opinion, it
may appear as if they were deliberately reacting against it. Either way, it may
appear that the jury's decision was not impartial and based on the evidence
presented in court, even if it was. 9
ECTIcS
The accused must be assured of a fair trial notwithstanding the prejudicial publicity; 1 0
he has a constitutional right to have his cause tried fairly by an impartial tribunal,
unin uenced by publication or public clamor. 1 1 "The sub judice doctrine protects
against the appearance of decisions having been influenced by published material." 1 2
As may be observed from the cited material, the sub judice rule is used by
foreign courts to insulate members of the jury from being in uenced by prejudicial
publicity. But the fact that the jury system is not adopted in this jurisdiction is not an
argument against our observance of the sub judice rule; justices and judges are no
different from members of the jury, they are not immune from the pervasive effects of
media. "It might be farcical to build around them an impregnable armor against the
in uence of the most powerful media of public opinion." 1 3 As I said in another case, in
a slightly different context, even those who are determined, in their conscious minds, to
avoid bias may be affected. 1 4
Also, it is not necessary that the publicity actually in uenced the court's
disposition of the case; "the actual impact of prejudicial publicity is not relevant to
liability for sub judice contempt." 1 5 In several cases, the Court has noted the
enormous effect of media in stirring public sentience . . . Even while it may be
dif cult to quantify the in uence, or pressure that media can bring to bear on
[witnesses and judges] directly and through the shaping of public opinion, it is a
fact, nonetheless, that, indeed, it does so in so many ways and in varying degrees.
The conscious or unconscious effect that such a coverage may have on the
testimony of witnesses and the decision of judges cannot be evaluated but, it can
likewise be said, it is not at all unlikely for a vote of guilt or innocence to yield to it.
16
Comment on the conduct of the courts with respect to the case becomes
subject to a contempt proceeding when it is intemperate, is contumacious, and unduly
impairs upon the dignity of the court. A comment that impairs of the dignity of the court
"excites in the mind of the people a general dissatisfaction with all judicial
determinations, and indisposes their minds to obey them[.]" 1 7 If the speech tends to
undermine the con dence of the people in the honesty and integrity of the court and its
members, and lowers or degrades the administration of justice, then the speech
constitutes contempt. 1 8 "Unwarranted attacks on the dignity of the courts cannot be
disguised as free speech, for the exercise of said right cannot be used to impair the
independence and ef ciency of courts or public respect therefore and con dence
therein." 1 9 Without the sub judice rule and the contempt power, the courts will be
powerless to protect their integrity and independence that are essential in the orderly
and effective dispensation and administration of justice. HacADE
This, of course, is not meant to sti e all forms of criticism against the court. As
the third branch of the government, the courts remain accountable to the people. The
people's freedom to criticize the government includes the right to criticize the courts,
their proceedings and decisions. This is the principle of open justice, which is
fundamental to our democratic society and ensures that (a) there is a safeguard
against judicial arbitrariness or idiosyncrasy, and that (b) the public's con dence in the
administration of justice is maintained. 2 0 The criticism must, however, be fair, made in
good faith, and "not spill over the walls of decency and propriety." 2 1 And to enhance the
open court principle and allow the people to make fair and reasoned criticism of the
courts, the sub judice rule excludes from its coverage fair and accurate reports (without
comment) of what have actually taken place in open court.
In sum, the court, in a pending litigation, must be shielded from embarrassment
or in uence in its all-important duty of deciding the case. 2 2 Any publication pending a
suit, re ecting upon the court, the parties, the of cers of the court, the counsel, etc.,
with reference to the suit, or tending to in uence the decision of the controversy, is
contempt of court and is punishable. The resulting (but temporary) curtailment of
speech because of the sub judice rule is necessary and justi ed by the more
compelling interests to uphold the rights of the accused and promote the fair and
orderly administration of justice.
If we do not apply at all the sub judice rule to the present case, the reason is
obvious to those who have followed the case in the media both parties are in pari
delicto as both have apparently gone to the media to campaign for the merits of their
respective causes. Thus, the egregious action of one has been cancelled by a similar
action by the other. It is in this sense that this Supplemental Opinion is independent of
the merits of the case. Their common action, however, cannot have their prejudicial
effects on both; whatever the results may be, doubts will linger about the real merits of
the case due to the inordinate media campaign that transpired.
Lest we be misunderstood, our application of the sub judice rule to this case
cannot serve as a precedent for similar future violations. Precisely, this Supplemental
Opinion is a signal to all that this Court has not forgotten, and is in fact keenly aware of,
the limits of what can be publicly ventilated on the merits of a case while sub judice,
and on the comments on the conduct of the courts with respect to the case. This Court
will not standby idly and helplessly as its integrity as an institution and its processes
are shamelessly brought to disrepute.
VILLARAMA, JR. , J., dissenting :
With all due respect to my colleagues, I dissent from the majority decision
acquitting all the accused-appellants.
In the middle part of 1991, the gruesome deaths of 19-year old Carmela
Vizconde, her mother Estrellita and 7-year old sister Jennifer in the hands of unknown
assailants inside their home in a private subdivision shocked our countrymen and
alarmed the authorities of the rise in heinous crimes, particularly those committed by
individuals under the in uence of drugs. Investigations conducted by the police and
other bodies including the Senate, and even the arrest of two (2) sets of suspects
("akyat-bahay" gang and former contractor/workers of the Vizcondes), failed to unravel
the truth behind the brutal killings until an alleged eyewitness surfaced four (4) years
later. The ensuing courtroom saga involving sons of prominent families had become
one (1) of the most controversial cases in recent history as the entire nation awaited its
long-delayed closure.
The Case
Subject of review is the Decision 1 dated December 15, 2005 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR H.C. No. 00336 af rming with modi cations the Decision
dated January 4, 2000 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Paraaque City, Branch 274
nding the accused-appellants Hubert Jeffrey P. Webb, Antonio "Tony Boy" Lejano,
Michael A. Gatchalian, Hospicio "Pyke" Fernandez, Peter Estrada and Miguel "Ging"
Rodriguez guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principals, and accused-appellant
Gerardo Biong as accessory, of the crime of Rape with Homicide.
The petition for review on certiorari led earlier by accused Lejano (G.R. No.
176389) is hereby treated as an appeal, considering that said accused had in fact led
a notice of appeal with the CA. 2 In view of the judgment of the CA imposing the penalty
of reclusion perpetua, such appeal by notice of appeal is in accord with A.M. No. 00-5-
03-SC (Amendments to the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure to Govern Death
Penalty Cases) 3 which provides under Rule 124 (c):
(c) In cases where the Court of Appeals imposes reclusion perpetua, life
imprisonment or a lesser penalty, it shall render and enter judgment imposing
such penalty. The judgment may be appealed to the Supreme Court by notice of
appeal filed with the Court of Appeals.

Accordingly, G.R. No. 176389 was consolidated with the present appeal by all
accused (G.R. No. 176864) except Artemio Ventura and Joey Filart who are still at
larg e. 4 Only Webb and Gatchalian led their respective supplemental briefs in
compliance with our April 10, 2007 Resolution. 5
The Facts
The Information filed on August 10, 1995 reads:
That on or about the evening of June 29 up to the early morning of June 30, 1991,
in the municipality of Paraaque, province of Rizal, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused Hubert Jeffrey P. Webb conspiring
and confederating with accused Antonio "Tony Boy" Lejano, Artemio "Dong"
Ventura, Michael Gatchalian y Adviento, Hospicio "Pyke" Fernandez, Peter Estrada,
Miguel "Ging" Rodriguez and Joey Filart, mutually helping one another, while
armed with bladed instruments, with the use of force and intimidation, with lewd
design, with abuse of superior strength, nighttime and with the use of motor
vehicle, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge of the person
of Carmela Vizconde against her will and consent.
That by reason or on the occasion of the aforesaid rape or immediately thereafter,
the above-named accused with intent to kill, conspiring and confederating
together, mutually helping one another, did then and there, and with evident
premeditation, abuse of superior strength, nighttime, with the use of motor
vehicle, assault and stab with bladed instruments Carmela Vizconde, Estrellita
Vizconde and Jennifer Vizconde, thereby in icting upon them numerous stab
wounds in different parts of their bodies which caused their instantaneous death.
That accused GERARDO BIONG and JOHN DOES having knowledge after the
commission of the above-mentioned crime, and without having participated
therein as principals or accomplices, took part subsequent to its commission by
assisting, with abuse of authority as a police of cer, the above-named principal
accused, to conceal or destroy the effects or instruments thereof by failing to
preserve the physical evidence and allowing their destruction in order to prevent
the discovery of the crime.
CONTRARY TO LAW. 6
The RTC and CA concurred in their factual ndings based mainly on the
testimony of the prosecution's principal witness, Jessica M. Alfaro who is a confessed
former drug user, the declarations of four (4) other witnesses and documentary
exhibits. ESCTaA
Alfaro testi ed that on June 29, 1991 at around 8:30 in the evening, she drove her
Mitsubishi Lancer and, with her then boyfriend Peter Estrada, went to the Ayala Alabang
Commercial Center parking lot to get her order of one (1) gram of shabu from Artemio
"Dong" Ventura. There she met and was introduced to Ventura's friends: Hubert Jeffrey
P. Webb, Antonio "Tony Boy" Lejano, Miguel "Ging" Rodriguez, Hospicio "Pyke"
Fernandez, Michael Gatchalian and Joey Filart (she had previously seen them in a shabu
house located in Paraaque which they frequented as early as January 1991, 7 while she
had known Ventura since December 1990). 8 After paying for her shabu and while she
was smoking it, Webb approached her and requested a favor for her to relay a message
to a certain girl who happened to be Carmela, to which she agreed. After the group
nished their shabu session, they proceeded to Carmela's place at No. 80 Vinzons
Street, Pitong Daan Subdivision, BF Homes, Paraaque City. She and Estrada in her car
followed the two (2) vehicles: Webb, Lejano, Ventura, Fernandez and Gatchalian on
board a Nissan Patrol car; while Filart and Rodriguez rode a Mazda pick-up. 9
Upon reaching the area, Alfaro parked her car along Vinzons St. and approached
the gate of the house pointed to by Webb. She pressed the buzzer and when a woman
came out, she asked for Carmela. When she was able to talk to Carmela (an
acquaintance she had met only twice in January 1991), 1 0 Alfaro relayed Webb's
message that he was around. However, Carmela said she cannot make it as she had
just arrived home and told Alfaro to come back after twenty (20) minutes. She relayed
the answer of Carmela to Webb who then instructed the group to return to Ayala
Alabang Commercial Center. 1 1
At the same parking lot, the group had another shabu session before proceeding
again to Carmela's residence in a convoy. Alfaro went to Vinzons St. alone while the
Nissan Patrol and Mazda parked somewhere along Aguirre Avenue. Upon seeing
Carmela who was at their garden, Alfaro was approached by Carmela saying she was
going out for a while. Carmela told Alfaro that they come back before 12:00 midnight
and she would just leave the pedestrian gate, as well as the iron grill gate leading to the
kitchen door, open and unlocked. 1 2 Carmela further instructed Alfaro to blink her car's
headlights twice before reaching the pedestrian gate to signal her arrival. Alfaro
returned to her car but waited for Carmela's car to get out of the gate. Carmela drove
ahead and Alfaro likewise left Vinzons St. Upon reaching the main road, Aguirre Avenue,
she saw Carmela drop off the man who was with her in the car (whom she thought to
be her boyfriend). 1 3 Alfaro looked for the group and relayed Carmela's instructions to
Webb. Thereafter, they all went back to the Ayala Alabang Commercial Center. 1 4
At the parking lot, Alfaro relayed to the group what transpired during her last
conversation with Carmela. She also told Webb about Carmela's male companion; this
changed his mood for the rest of the evening ("bad trip" already). 1 5 Webb then gave out
complimentary cocaine and all of them used shabu and/or cocaine. 1 6 After about 40 to
45 minutes, Webb decided it was time to leave, declaring: "Pipilahan natin siya
[Carmela] at ako ang mauuna." Lejano said: "Ako ang susunod" and the others
responded "Okay, okay ." They all left the parking lot and their convoy of three (3)
vehicles entered Pitong Daan Subdivision for the third time. They arrived at the
Vizconde residence between 11:45 to 11:55 p.m. 1 7 HCacTI
Alfaro parked her car in between the Vizconde house and its adjacent house.
While waiting for the rest of the group to alight from their cars, Fernandez approached
her suggesting that they blow up the transformer near the pedestrian gate of the
Vizconde residence in order to cause a brownout ("Pasabugin kaya natin ang
transformer na ito" ). She shrugged off the idea and told Fernandez "Malakas lang ang
tama mo." When Webb, Lejano and Ventura were already standing infront of the
Vizconde residence, Webb repeated to the boys that they will line up for Carmela but he
will be the rst, and the others said, " O sige, dito lang kami, magbabantay lang kami." 1 8
Alfaro entered rst the pedestrian gate which was left open, followed by Webb,
Lejano and Ventura. At the garage, Ventura pulled out a chair to get on top of the hood
of the Vizcondes' Nissan Sentra car and loosened the electric bulb ("para daw walang
ilaw"). They proceeded to the iron grill gate which was likewise left open, and passed
through the dirty kitchen. It was Carmela who opened the aluminum screen door of the
kitchen for them to enter. Carmela and Webb for a moment looked at each other in the
eye, and then proceeded towards the dining area. As she lost sight of Carmela and
Webb, Alfaro decided to go out of the house. Lejano asked where she was going and
she told him she will smoke outside. On her way to the screen door, she saw Ventura
pulling a drawer in the kitchen. At the garden area, she smoked a cigarette. After about
twenty (20) minutes, she was surprised upon hearing a female voice uttered "Sino yan?"
and she immediately walked out towards her car. She found the others still outside
around her car and Estrada who was inside the car said: "Okay ba?" After staying in her
car for about ten (10) minutes, she returned to the house passing through the same
iron grill gate and dirty kitchen. While it was dark inside the house, there was light
coming from outside. In the kitchen, she saw Ventura searching a lady's bag on top of
the dining table. When she asked Ventura what was it he was looking for, he said: "Ikaw
na nga dito, maghanap ka ng susi." She asked him what particular key and he replied:
"Basta maghanap ka ng susi ng main door pati na rin ng susi ng kotse." When she found
a bunch of keys in the bag, she tried them on the main door of the house but none of
them fitted the lock; she also did not find any car key. 1 9
Unable to open the main door, Alfaro walked back towards the kitchen but upon
reaching the spot leading to the dining area, she heard a very loud static sound (like that
coming from a television which had signed off). Out of curiosity, she went to the door
of the master's bedroom where the sound was coming from and peeped inside. She
pushed the slightly ajar door with her ngers and the sound grew even louder. After
pushing the door wider, she walked into the room. There she saw a man on top of
Carmela who was lying on the oor, two (2) bloodied bodies on top of the bed and
Lejano who was at the foot of the bed about to wear his jacket. She turned her eyes on
Carmela who was gagged, moaning and in tears while Webb was pumping her, his bare
buttocks exposed. Webb gave her a look and she immediately left the room. At the
dining area, she met Ventura who told her: "Prepare an escape. Aalis na tayo." Shocked
by what she saw, Alfaro rushed out of the house and found the rest of the group
outside, in her car and on the sidewalk. 2 0
Alfaro boarded her car and started the engine but did not know where to
proceed. She saw Webb, Lejano and Ventura leaving the house already. Webb suddenly
picked up a stone and threw it to the main door, breaking its glass frame. When the
three (3) were near the pedestrian gate, Webb told Ventura that he left behind his
jacket. But Ventura said they cannot make it anymore as the iron grills were already
locked. They all rode in their cars and drove away until they reached Aguirre Avenue.
Near an old hotel in the Tropical Palace area, Alfaro saw the Nissan Patrol slow down
and something thrown out into a cogonal area. They went to a large house with high
walls and concrete fence, steel gate and long driveway located at BF Executive Village.
They parked their cars inside the compound and gathered in the lawn area where the
"blaming session" took place. It was only at this point that Alfaro and the others came
to know fully what happened at the Vizconde house. The mother was the rst one (1)
killed, then Jennifer and the last, Carmela. 2 1
HDcaAI
Ventura was blaming Webb telling him: "Bakit naman pati yung bata?" According
to Webb, the girl was awakened and upon seeing him molesting Carmela, she jumped
on him, bit his shoulders and pulled his hair. Webb got mad and grabbed the girl,
pushed her to the wall and stabbed her several times. Lejano excused himself and used
the telephone inside the house, while Webb called up someone on his cellular phone. At
around 2:00 in the morning, Gerardo Biong arrived and talked to Webb who ordered him
to clean up the Vizconde house, and said "Pera lang ang katapat nyan." Biong answered
"Okay lang ." Webb addressed the group and gave his nal instructions: "We don't know
each other. We haven't seen each other . . . baka maulit yan." She and Estrada then
departed and went to her father's house. 2 2
Dr. Prospero A. Cabanayan , medico-legal of cer of the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI), who conducted the autopsy on the cadavers of the victims, testified
on his ndings as stated in the autopsy reports he submitted to the court. The bodies
were photographed showing their condition before the start of the post-mortem
examination. 2 3 Considering that they were almost in complete rigor mortis, the victims
must have been dead for twelve (12) hours. Carmela's hands were on her back hogtied
with an electric cord and her mouth gagged with a pillow case. She had contusions on
her right forearm and thighs, ligature marks on her wrists and nine (9) stab wounds on
her chest (five [5] wounds are "connecting" or reaching to the back of the body). Further,
specimen taken from her genitalia tested positive for the presence of human
spermatozoa, which is indicative of complete penetration plus ejaculation of the male
sex organ into the female sex organ. The contusions on her thighs were probably due to
the application of blunt force such as a fist blow. 2 4
Dr. Cabanayan further testi ed that Estrellita was also hogtied from behind and
her wrists bore ligature marks from an electric cord with a plug. She sustained twelve
(12) stab wounds, eight (8) of which are "communicating" or perforating (through and
through stab wounds) which are fatal since vital organs are involved. 2 5 As to Jennifer,
her stab wounds, nineteen (19) in all, had the characteristics of one (1) which is
extremely blunt, the other extremely sharp. These wounds are located in different parts
of her body, most of which are on the left anterior chest. But unlike Carmela and
Estrellita, Jennifer had two (2) stab wounds on her back and incise wounds on her left
and right forearms, the latter usually referred to as defense wounds. Seven (7) of the
nine (9) stab wounds on her chest were perforating, hence fatal wounds. 2 6 Judging
from the characteristics of the stab wounds sustained by the victims, Dr. Cabanayan
concluded that they could have been in icted using sharp-edged, pointed and single-
bladed instruments such as a kitchen knife. 2 7
Normal E. White, Jr. , one (1) of four (4) security guards assigned at Pitong
Daan Subdivision which is part of the United BF Homes, testi ed that he and Edgar
Mendez were the guards on duty on the night of June 29, 1991, starting at 7:00 o'clock
in the evening until 7:00 o'clock in the morning of June 30, 1991. On June 30, 1991, at
around 6:00 a.m., a homeowner called his attention on the incident the previous night at
the Vizconde house. He immediately proceeded to said house where there were already
many people. The housemaids of the Vizcondes led him to the entrance at the kitchen
and pointed to the master's bedroom. Upon entering the room, he saw the bloodied
bodies of the victims: two (2) were on top of the bed, and one (1) lying down on the
oor. He is familiar with Mrs. Vizconde, Carmela and Jennifer because they were kind to
the guards and usually greeted them. Mrs. Vizconde was gagged and her hands tied,
while Jennifer was also lying on top of the bed. Carmela was lying on her back with one
(1) of her legs raised, her dress pulled up and her genitals exposed. He also noticed
that the TV was still on with loud sound. He went out to call the police but he met their
Security Chief whom he informed about the killings at the Vizconde house. He then
proceeded directly to the entrance/guard post of the subdivision and was told by
Mendez that there were already policemen who had arrived. 2 8 aDHCEA
Having been apprised of the arrival of the police, White, Jr. returned to the
Vizconde house to observe what was going on. He saw the policemen already
investigating the crime scene and one (1) of them he later came to know as Gerardo
Biong. There was also a woman who was with Biong when he was conducting the
investigation inside the Vizconde premises at the garage area. The maids were being
asked if they were able to hear the breaking of the main door's glass frame, and he saw
Biong in the act of further breaking the remaining glass. He recognized other
homeowners who were also there, including Michael Gatchalian who passed by infront
of the house. Afterwards, he returned to their guard post where their Of cer-in-Charge
(OIC), Justo Cabanacan, probed him and Mendez on anything they had observed the
previous night. He and Mendez told Cabanacan that they did not notice anything
unusual except "Mike" (Michael Gatchalian) and his friends entering and exiting the
subdivision gate ("labas-masok"). 2 9
White, Jr. recounted that Mike's group entered the subdivision on the night of
June 29, 1991. Upon approaching the gate, Mike's car slowed down on the hump. He
was about to ag down and verify ("sisitahin") but Mike (who was at the right front
seat) immediately opened his window to show his face and pointed to two (2) vehicles
behind him as his companions. Because of their policy allowing outsiders to enter the
subdivision as long as they are accompanied by a homeowner, he and Mendez just let
the three (3) vehicles in (Mike was in the rst car). That was actually the second time he
saw Mike and his "barkada" that night because he had earlier seen them at Vinzons St.
near the Gatchalian residence. However, he could no longer remember the precise time
he saw the group on these two (2) instances. 3 0
White, Jr. further testi ed that on the night of June 30, 1991, policemen took him
from the Pitong Daan Subdivision Homeowners' Association and brought him to the
Paraaque Municipal Building. Biong was forcing him to admit that he was one (1) of
those who killed the Vizconde women. Biong boxed him insisting he was among the
perpetrators and had no mercy for the victims. He and Mendez were later fetched by
the Chief of Security of Pitong Daan Subdivision Homeowners' Association, Nestor
Potenciano Jr., and OIC Justo Cabanacan. 3 1 Biong had also taken their logbook where
they list down the names of visitors, plate number of vehicles, name and street of the
homeowner they were staying at, etc. However, when presented with the alleged
logbook, White, Jr. said it was not the same logbook, he could not recognize its cover
and could not categorically con rm the entries supposedly made in his own
handwriting. 3 2
Justo Cabanacan , another security guard assigned at the Pitong Daan
Subdivision and the one (1) supervising his co-guards White, Jr., Mendez and Tungo,
testi ed that when he reported for duty on June 30, 1991 at about 7:00 o'clock in the
morning, he was met by Mendez who told him about the killing of a homeowner and her
family. When he asked Mendez if he and White, Jr. noticed anything unusual during their
tour of duty the previous night, Mendez said everything was alright except for Mike and
his friends who had gone in and out of the subdivision ("labas-masok") until the wee
hours in the morning of June 30, 1991. White, Jr. also reported to him that on the night
of June 29, 1991, while doing his roving duty around the subdivision, he noticed vehicles
parked along Vinzons St. near the house of Mr. Almogino where there seemed to be a
drinking party, and that Mike was "labas-masok" through the subdivision gate. He
con rmed it was indeed their policy that if one (1) is a son/daughter of a homeowner,
or accompanied by a homeowner or any relative of homeowner, he/she will no longer
be stopped or queried by the guards. In particular, he knows Mike and had seen him
visit the house of Lilet Sy, another homeowner. He often goes to Lilet Sy's house
because of the various complaints of homeowners against her like the presence of too
many people at her house until midnight and the vehicles of her visitors running over her
neighbors' plants. This Lilet Sy is also a suspected drug pusher within the subdivision.
33 CcEHaI
Cabanacan further testi ed that around the last week of May or rst week of
June 1991, he came to know Hubert Webb because he had stopped his car at the
subdivision gate as it had no local sticker of Pitong Daan Subdivision. It was around
7:00 o'clock in the evening when Webb arrived. He greeted Webb and asked about his
destination. Webb replied he was going to see Lilet Sy. When he asked Webb to leave
an identi cation card, Webb pointed to his car sticker saying he is also a BF Homes
resident. He explained to Webb that the sticker on his car was for United BF Homes and
not the local sticker of Pitong Daan Subdivision. Webb then said: "Taga-diyan lang ako
sa Phase III . . . saka anak ako ni Congressman Webb." He insisted on seeing Webb's ID
card and grudgingly Webb obliged and pulled out his wallet. Webb gave him a
laminated ID card with Webb's picture and with the name "Hubert Webb" written on it.
After seeing the ID card, he returned the same to Webb and allowed him to enter the
subdivision. However, he did not anymore record this incident in their logbook because
anyway Webb is the son of the Paraaque Congressman, a well-known personality. 3 4
In the morning of June 30, 1991, Cabanacan said he also went to the Vizconde
house upon being told by Mendez and White, Jr. of the killings. By afternoon of the
same day, he came to meet Biong who was conducting the investigation. Based on the
information given by Mendez and White, Jr., he prepared a written report on the incident
which he submitted to Nestor Potenciano, Jr. After the incident, Biong frequented their
place to investigate and asserting he had no female companion while conducting his
investigation at the Vizconde house on June 30, 1991. Aside from taking their logbook,
Biong also took his two (2) guards (Mendez and White, Jr.) to the police headquarters
on June 30, 1991 at around 7:00 p.m. The said guards also related to him what Biong
did to them. They said Biong punched them and forced them to admit having
participated in the Vizconde killings. 3 5
Mila Solomon Gaviola , a laundrywoman who worked at the Webb residence
located at Aguirre Avenue, BF Homes, Paraaque from January to July 1991 3 6 testi ed
that on June 30, 1991 at around 4:00 in the morning, she went to the room of Hubert to
get his and his brothers' (Jason and Michael's) dirty clothes, using the small "secret
door" at the second oor near the servants' quarters. She noticed that Michael and
Jason were still asleep while Hubert was sitting on the bed wearing only his pants.
When she nished collecting dirty clothes including those of Senator Webb, she
brought them down to the laundry area. She ate breakfast and rested for a while.
Afterwards, she started washing rst Senator Webb's clothes and then those of the
sons. She washed Hubert's white shirt with round neck and found it had fresh blood
stains at the stomach area and also splattered blood ("tilamsik lang") on the chest. She
had dif culty removing the blood stains and had to use Chlorox. After she nished
washing the clothes, she hanged them to dry on the second oor. Returning to the
servants' quarters, she peeped into Hubert's room through the "secret door." She saw
Hubert pacing the oor ("di mapakali"); this was about 9:00 a.m. already. She saw
Hubert again around 1:00 o'clock in the afternoon as he left the house passing through
the "secret door"; he was clad in t-shirt and shorts. Hubert was back at the house by
4:00 o'clock in the afternoon. She never saw him again until she left in July 1991. 3 7
Gaviola further testi ed that on June 30, 1991 at around 7:00 o'clock in the
morning, she saw Senator Webb at the sala reading a newspaper. 3 8 DACcIH
Lolita Carrera Vda. de Birrer , a widow and resident of United Paraaque

Subdivision 5, testi ed that on June 29, 1991 at around 6:00 p.m., Biong who was then
her boyfriend, asked her to come to the Paraaque police station to play "mahjong" at
Aling Glo's canteen located at the back of their of ce. They started playing at 6:30 in
the evening. Between 1:00 and 2:00 in the morning of June 30, 1991, the radio operator
at the police station went down to the canteen telling Biong he has a call. She took
Biong's place at the game while Biong went to the headquarters. After a while, she
followed Biong to ask if he was joining the next bet. Biong was on the telephone talking
with someone and visibly irked. She heard Biong's words: "Ano?. . . Saan?. . . Mahirap
yan ah! O sige, dadating ako. . . Ano?. . . Saan?. . . Dilaw na taxi?" Biong then told her he
was leaving and shortly thereafter a taxicab arrived with a man seated at the back seat.
Biong bade her good-bye saying he was going to BF Homes. She continued playing
"mahjong" until morning. At around 7:00 a.m., Biong came back and went straight to the
washing area of the canteen. She followed him and saw him cleaning blood stains on
his ngernails. After wiping his face and hands with a handkerchief, he threw it away
and when she asked why, Biong said it smelled stinky. Biong was in bad mood
("aburido") and complained, "Putang inang mga batang 'yon, pinahirapan ako nang
husto". Afterwards, Biong took out a knife with aluminum cover from his drawer and put
it in his steel cabinet. She invited him for lunch but another policeman, Galvan, came and
told Biong to proceed to BF Homes and investigate the three (3) dead persons there.
Biong answered, "Oo, susunod na ako" and then proceeded to Capt. Bartolome's of ce.
With Capt. Bartolome's permission, she joined them in going to the Vizconde residence.
39
Upon arriving at the Vizconde house, Biong asked that the victims' relatives and
the homeowners' association President be summoned. A certain Mr. Lopez and Ms.
Moreno arrived and also a security guard named White, Jr. who pointed to the location
of the victims' bodies. They entered the master's bedroom and she saw the mother and
a small girl on top of the bed, and a young woman sprawled on the oor. After
inspecting the bodies, Biong went to the toilet and turned on the faucet; the running
water washed out the blood on the ooring of the toilet. Biong searched the drawers
using his ballpen. She saw him took a round pendant watch and pocketed it. They went
out of the room and on the top of the dining table they saw a shoulder bag and
scattered next to it were various items such as Carmela's ATM card, her driver's license
and calling cards. Biong proceeded to the main door and removed its chain lock. When
they came out towards the garage area, Biong saw a stone by the window. He then
asked Capt. Bartolome to go inside the room of the two (2) maids to see for himself if
indeed the noise of the breaking glass could not be heard. When Capt. Bartolome was
already inside the middle room, Biong shattered the remaining glass of the main door
with the butt of his gun. When Biong asked if he could hear it, Capt. Bartolome
answered in the af rmative. Biong next inspected the garage where he saw the
footmarks on the car's hood; Biong also found ngerprints on the electric bulb. She
was just beside Biong at the time. They followed Biong towards the back of the house
but upon seeing another shoe print on the ground just outside the master's bedroom,
he directed them not to proceed any further. They left the Vizconde house at around
10:00 a.m. and proceeded to the Paraaque Municipal Building. 4 0 ICHDca
Birrer further testi ed that on July 1, 1991 at 10:00 o'clock in the morning, Biong
arrived at her house bringing along with him the two (2) maids of the Vizcondes. He
asked her to cook something for the maids to eat. Biong also instructed her to
interview the maids on what they know about the killings. She did as told but the maids
said they do not know anything as they were asleep. After they had lunch, Biong told her
to let the maids rest. While she and the maids were resting at the sala, Biong requested
to use her bathroom. Before taking a bath, Biong took out the contents of his pockets
which he put on the dining table. She saw Carmela's ATM card and driver's license,
bracelet, earrings and the round pendant watch Biong had taken from a jewelry box
while they were inside the Vizconde house. When Biong left her house, he brought all
said items with him. 4 1
On July 2, 1991 at around 6:00 p.m., Birrer was at the Paraaque Municipal
Building inside Biong's of ce. She saw Biong open his steel cabinet and took out a
brown leather jacket which she thought was imported. When she asked him where it
came from, Biong initially just said it was given as a gift but when she further queried,
he answered: "Natatandaan mo ba 'yong nirespondehan ko noong gabi sa BF Homes?
Doon galing 'yon." She asked Biong whether those were the youths he had mentioned
earlier and he said yes. As to the jewelries taken by Biong from the Vizconde house, she
was with Biong when the latter pawned them at a pawnshop near Chow-Chow; Biong
got P20,000.00 for the pawned items. 4 2
Birrer further testi ed that two (2) weeks after they went to the Vizconde
residence to investigate, Biong on two (2) occasions brought her along to a certain
house. It was only Biong who went inside the said house as she waited in a taxicab. In
both instances, Biong came out of the house with an envelope containing an
undisclosed amount of money. She remembered this because when she was already
staying in Pangasinan on December 7, 1995, she saw ashed on ABS-CBN's TV Patrol
News 7:00 p.m. newscast on television, a video footage of the house of Senator Webb.
She was certain it was that house where Biong went and came out carrying cash in an
envelope. 4 3
Lauro G. Vizconde , husband of Estrellita and father of Carmela and Jennifer,
testi ed on the personal circumstances of the victims. At the time of their deaths,
Estrellita was engaged in business (at one [1] time or another she was a garment
manufacturer, taxi operator, canteen owner and local employment recruiter), Carmela
was a graduating B.S. Psychology student at the University of Santo Tomas, while
Jennifer was a Grade I pupil at Bloom eld Academy at BF Resort, Las Pias, Metro
Manila. He left the Philippines in November 1989 to work in the United States of
America. He had not since returned to the country until this unfortunate tragedy befell
his family but communicated with his wife through telephone once or twice a month.
44 TAEcCS
Lauro G. Vizconde further testi ed that his daughter, when she was still alive, was
so close to him that she con des her daily activities, dreams, ambitions and plans in
life. She intended to pursue further masteral and doctoral degrees in business
psychology in the U.S.A. In fact, that was the reason he transferred from one (1) state
to another looking for a school where Carmela could enroll. However, he had to come
home in July 1991 and bury his wife and daughters whose violent deaths he was
informed of only upon arriving in the country and when he saw their bodies with stab
wounds at the funeral parlor just before burial. He spent burial expenses in the amount
of P289,000.00, plus P103,000.00 incidental expenses, P300,000.00 paid for memorial
lots and around P100,000.00 for the construction of the mausoleum with a grand
total of P793,950.00. He likewise incurred litigation expenses in the amount of
P97,404.50. 4 5
In one (1) of their telephone conversations when he was still in the U.S.A., Lauro
Vizconde recounted that Carmela mentioned to him that she had turned down a suitor
whom she called "Bagyo," who is a son of politician in Paraaque and comes from an
af uent family. He also expressed his mental anguish, wounded feelings, emotional
suffering due to the untimely demise of his family. It actually cost him his life, his heart
bled all the time and only time can tell when he can fully cope with the situation. He is
presently totally displaced and jobless; he misses his family and he now lives an
abnormal life with no inspiration and no more challenge to work for. When asked how
much compensation he will ask for moral damages, he answered saying he leaves the
matter to the sound discretion of the court as in truth, no amount can truly compensate
him for the loss of his loved ones. He sought justice for the death of his family and
hoped that the culprits, whoever they were, will be punished so that the souls of his
departed loved ones may rest in peace. 4 6
Defense Evidence
The accused chie y assailed the credibility of prosecution star witness Alfaro, in
particular her execution of two (2) allegedly inconsistent af davits (one on April 28,
1995 and another on May 22, 1995) and raised alibi and denial as defenses to the
charge of rape with homicide attended by conspiracy. During the trial, no less than 95
witnesses 4 7 were presented, and voluminous documentary exhibits were submitted.
The testimonies of the principal witnesses for the defense are summarized as
follows:
Hubert Jeffrey P. Webb testi ed that at the time of the killings between June
29 and 30, 1991, he was still in Anaheim Hills, California, U.S.A., having departed from
the Philippines on March 9, 1991 on board a United Airlines ight bound for San
Francisco. He was accompanied by Gloria Webb, whose husband Richard Webb is the
eldest brother of his father Senator Freddie Webb. It was the rst time he traveled to
the US and he returned to the Philippines only on October 25, 1992. On the eve of his
departure, he, Rael, Tina and his then girlfriend Milagros Castillo went out and had
dinner at Bunchchums. Later that night, they went to Faces Disco at Makati Avenue
where his friends Paulo Santos and Jay Ortega followed. They went home at 3:00
o'clock in the morning already. After driving around in the city and bringing Milagros
home, he arrived at his house at around 5:00 a.m. His parents were already preparing to
leave and so they headed to the airport. 4 8 Webb's friend Rafael Jose, Paulo Santos,
Senator Webb's security staff Miguel Muoz, Webbs' secretary Cristina Magpusao and
house girl Victoria Ventoso corroborated Webb's testimony that he departed from the
Philippines on March 9, 1991. 4 9 cCAIDS
Webb further testi ed that he stayed at the house of her Auntie Gloria and Uncle
Dinky at San Francisco until late April to May 1991. Upon the invitation of her aunt
Susan Brottman, sister of his mother, he rode a train and went to Anaheim where he
stayed until mid-July 1991. Thereafter, he rented a nearby place but did not complete
the one (1) month pre-paid lease period as he proceeded to Longwood, Florida. He
stayed at the residence of his Uncle Jack and Sonia Rodriguez for almost a year
(August 1991-August 1992). He went back to Anaheim and stayed at the house of his
godmother and sister of his mother, Imelda Pagaspas, until October 1992. He met his
relatives and other personalities while in the US; visited Lake Tahoe with the Wheelock
family; toured Disneyland where Luis Wheelock lmed them and attended a concert
with Christopher Esguerra who also took him out to the malls. 5 0
Webb further testified that in the later part of June 1991, his parents joined him in
the US. He applied for and was issued a driver's license on June 14, 1991. He also
worked at the pest control company of his cousin-in-law Alex del Toro. Aside from his
passport and airline ticket for return ight to the Philippines, Webb presented before
the court the logbook of jobs/tasks kept by del Toro, in which he pointed to the entries
therein which were actually performed by him; and also his purported pay check ($150
"pay to Cash"), ID and other employment papers. He also identi ed some handwritten
letters he mailed while he was in the US and sent to his friend Jennifer Cabrera in the
Philippines; photographs and video tape clips taken during his cousin Marie Manlapit's
wedding to Alex del Toro which wedding he attended in the US together with his
mother; and receipt issued for the mountain bicycle he bought on June 30, 1991 from
the Orange Cycle store in Anaheim. 5 1
Webb denied having met Carmela Vizconde and neither does he know Jessica
Alfaro. He had been jailed since August 9, 1995. When asked about his co-accused,
Webb said the only ones he had met before June 29, 1991 were Fernandez and
Rodriguez. He used to play basketball with Fernandez at BF Homes Phase III, during
which he also met Rodriguez. While he admitted having gone out on a group with
Fernandez to the houses of their basketball buddies, he denied having gone out with
Rodriguez at any time. 5 2 He also denied knowing Biong who is neither a driver nor
security aide of his father. 5 3
Gloria Webb testi ed that on March 9, 1991, she traveled with Webb on a
United Airlines ight to San Francisco. Webb stayed at her residence at 639 Gellert
Boulevard, Daly City, California until May 1991 when he left to be with his mother's
sister and relatives in Anaheim. Webb and her grandson attended a "concierto" in the
evenings and he also joined and helped her son-in-law with his business. Webb went
with them to church, to the malls and in shopping. In April 1991, Webb went on a trip to
Lake Tahoe with Mr. Wheelock and family. 5 4
Dorothy Wheelock testi ed that she became a US citizen in 1974 and has been
residing at 877 Las Lomas Drive, Milpitas, California. Webb's mother is her childhood
friend and schoolmate. When she heard that Webb was in the US looking for a job, she
invited him, and her husband Louis Wheelock picked him up at Daly City in April 1991.
To reciprocate the Webbs' hospitality while they visited the Philippines in 1990, she and
her family took Webb to a trip to Lake Tahoe in Nevada during which they even took a
video tape. Senator Freddie and Mrs. Webb also visited and stayed with them for four
(4) days in July 1991. They took them to a trip to Yosemite Park, also with video
footages taken by her husband. 5 5 TEDAHI
Steven Keeler testi ed that he had been an American citizen since 1982 and
resident of 4002 River Street, Newport Beach, California. He met Webb at a dinner in the
house of Webb's aunt Susan Brottman in Anaheim Hills around May or June 1991.
Brottman's son, Rey Manlapit, was his good friend. They played basketball with Webb,
went to bars, shopped and watched TV. He also knew that Webb bought a car and
worked for Alex del Toro for Environment First Termite Control. He believed that Webb
left for Florida towards the end of summer (July 1991). He could not recall any speci c
dates he was with Webb. 5 6
Honesto Aragon testi ed that he went to the US in 1967 and became a US
citizen in 1989. On June 28, 1991, he met then Congressman Freddie Webb at the
house of the latter's sister-in-law, Susan, at Anaheim. Congressman Webb introduced to
him his son Hubert Webb. He, Congressman Webb and Hubert went to some stores to
go shopping for a bicycle for Hubert. But they only bought bike accessories. He invited
them to snack before he brought them to his own house where he introduced to them
his son Andrew. The following day, June 29, 1991, they went to Riverside, California to
shop for a car for Hubert; though they found a Toyota MR2, they did not buy it because
it has questionable ownership. Early morning the next day, he picked up Congressman
Webb and they played tennis from 7:00 to 10:00 a.m. He and Congressman Webb were
close friends, as both of them were members of a basketball team in Letran. The rst
time he saw Hubert was when he was still a small kid and the other time on June 28,
1991 at the Brottman's residence in Anaheim. 5 7
Senator Freddie Webb testi ed that his son Hubert left for the US on March 9,
1991, the rst time he had gone out of the country. Hubert stayed with his sister-in-law
Gloria. They wanted to show Hubert the value of independence, hard work and
perseverance, and for him to learn how to get along and live with other people. Hubert
resigned from his job at Saztec before departing for the US. He and his wife also went
to the US on June 28, 1991. They stayed at the house of his sister-in-law, Susan
Brottman at Anaheim. From San Francisco, they went to Orlando, Florida, then back to
Los Angeles and returned to the Philippines on July 21, 1991. Among the places he
visited while in the US were the Yosemite Park, Nordstrom, Disneyland, Disneyworld.
Upon arriving at Anaheim, he saw his son Hubert and also informed Honesto Aragon
regarding their plan to procure a bicycle for Hubert. Hubert was with them again on
June 29, 1991 at dinner in the residence of his sister-in-law. On July 1, 1991, they went
shopping for some clothes. Together with Aragon, he and Hubert looked for a Toyota
MR2 car and paid for it with a check (the car was priced at $6,000-$7,000). 5 8
Senator Webb further testi ed that he knows Mila Gaviola who used to be their
"labandera." She left their house but returned to work for them again about a couple of
months after the Mt. Pinatubo eruption. As to Alfaro's statements implicating his son
Hubert in the Vizconde killings, he said the statements were not accurate because it
was physically impossible for Hubert to have participated in the crime as he was
abroad at the time. 5 9 STcEIC
Louis Whitaker testi ed that he left the Philippines and resided in the US since
September 1964. He met Jack Rodriguez when the latter fetched him and his wife
Sonia at the Los Angeles International Airport on June 28, 1991 upon their arrival from
the Philippines. They proceeded to the house of a mutual friend, Salvador Vaca, at
Moresbay Street in Lake Forest. They went to see Congressman Webb at a house in
Anaheim. That was the rst time he met Congressman Webb, Mrs. Webb, the sister-in-
law and a Mr. Aragon. On June 29, 1991, he and Rodriguez invited Congressman Webb
to see Mr. Vaca perform at La Calesa Restaurant in the City of Testin. When they
fetched Congressman Webb at his sister-in-law's house, he met again Mrs. Webb, and
also Hubert. He saw Hubert for the second time at Orlando, Florida when he went to the
house of Jack Rodriguez there; this was about July or August 1991. 6 0
Sonia H. Rodriguez testi ed that she was appointed UNESCO Commissioner
by then President Fidel V. Ramos. She has known accused Webb since he was a child.
On June 28, 1991, she and her husband boarded a plane for Los Angeles, California.
They were fetched at the LA airport by old-time friend Salvador Vaca and proceeded to
the latter's house in Orange County, California. They had dinner that evening with
spouses Freddie and Elizabeth Webb at the house of Susan Brottman. The next day, in
the afternoon of June 29, 1991, her husband and Salvador Vaca picked up Senator
Webb from the house of Susan Brottman and then came back to fetch her and Mrs.
Vaca to go to La Calesa, a restaurant owned by Mario Benitez, also a Filipino. However,
she and Mrs. Vaca decided to stay home. On June 30, 1991 at around 8:00 p.m., she
and her husband went to the house of Susan Brottman, together with Salvador and Mrs.
Vaca and Louis Whitaker. She recalled that Hubert was there at the time. She saw
Hubert again on July 4, 1991 when they went on a lakeside picnic with the Webb family,
Brottmans and Vacas. After watching the reworks, they went to Sizzler Restaurant.
The next day, she and her husband stayed overnight at San Francisco where they also
met Senator and Mrs. Webb. On August August 4, 1991, Hubert arrived in her home in
Florida with her son Tony, daughter-in-law Ana, and stayed with them for almost one (1)
year. The last time she saw Hubert was when he left Orlando, Florida on January 27,
1992. 6 1
Webb presented other witnesses to buttress his defense of alibi: Victor Yap
(who took video shots of Congressman Webb during a boat ride in Disneyland); 6 2
Armando Rodriguez (who testi ed seeing Hubert in Orlando either August or
September 1991); 6 3 performing artist Gary Valenciano (who testi ed meeting Hubert
at a dinner at the Rodriguez residence in Orlando on November 24, 1991, Jack
Rodriguez being the father of his high school classmate Antonio Rodriguez; 6 4 and
Christopher Paul Legaspi Esguerra (grandson of Gloria Webb who went with Hubert
Webb to watch the concert of the Deelite Band in San Francisco in the later part of April
1991 and saw Hubert Webb for the last time in May 1991). 6 5
Then a practicing lawyer, Atty. Antonio T. Carpio (now an Associate Justice of
this Court) testi ed that on June 29, 1991 between 10:00 and 11:00 o'clock in the
morning, he had a telephone conversation with former Congressman Webb who said he
was calling from Anaheim, U.S.A., where he and his wife went to look for a job for their
son Hubert. They also talked about bills to be drafted as his law of ce had been
engaged by Congressman Webb for bill drafting services as well as preparation of his
speeches and statements. When asked if he had personal knowledge that
Congressman Webb was really in the US at that time, he replied that since Webb had
told him he was leaving for the US, he just presumed it was so when Webb said he was
then at Anaheim. Neither did he have personal knowledge that Hubert Webb was in the
US at the time of his conversation with Congressman Webb. 6 6 DHTECc
Webb submitted the following documentary evidence in connection with his

sojourn in the US:
1) Video Tape recording of Disneyland trip on July 3, 1991; 6 7
2) Of cial Receipt issued by Orange Cycle Center dated June 30, 1991,
6 8 photographs of the bicycle purchased by Webb from said store; 6 9
3) Car plate with the name "Lew Webb"; 7 0

4) Passport with Philippine Immigration arrival stamp; 7 1
5) Photographs of Webb with Rodriguez family; 7 2
6) California Driver's License of Webb, 7 3 Original License Card of Webb
issued on June 14, 1991; 7 4
7) Statement of Account issued to Environment First Termite Control
showing Check No. 0180; 7 5 Bank of America Certi cation on Check
Nos. 0122 and 0180; 7 6
8) Public Records of California Department of Motor Vehicle on sale to
Webb of Toyota MR2 car; 7 7 Traf c citations issued to Webb; 7 8
Import documents of said car into the Philippines; 7 9
9) Certi cation issued by the US Immigration and Naturalization Service
and correspondence between US and Philippine Government; 8 0
computer-generated print-out of the US-INS indicating date of Webb's
entry in USA as March 9, 1991 and his date of departure as October
26, 1992; 8 1 US-INS Certi cation dated August 31, 1995
authenticated by the Philippine Department of Foreign Affairs,
correcting the earlier August 10, 1995 Certification; 8 2
10) Certi cation issued by Agnes Tabuena; 8 3 Passenger Manifest of
PAL Flight No. 103; 8 4 PAL ticket issued to Webb, 8 5 Arrival in Manila
Certi cation issued by the Philippine Immigration, 8 6 Diplomatic Note
of the US Department of State with enclosed letter from Acting
Director Debora A. Farmer of the Records Operations, Of ce of
Records of the US-INS stating that the Certi cation dated August 31,
1995 is a true and accurate statement; 8 7 and Certi cate of
Authentication of Philippine Consul Herrera-Lim. 8 8
Accused Antonio Lejano and Michael Gatchalian likewise raised the defense
of alibi claiming that they spent the night of June 29, 1991 until early morning of June
30, 1991 watching video tapes at the house of Carlos Syap at Ayala Alabang Village. STIEHc
Lejano further testi ed that with the exception of Miguel "Ging" Rodriguez and
Michael "Mike" Gatchalian who are his former schoolmates, he does not know any of his
co-accused. They left the house of Syap brothers early morning of June 30, 1991; it was
Cas Syap who brought him and Mike home. On July 5, 1991, he and Cas Syap went to
the police station where Mike, who was picked up as a suspect by the police on July 4,
was detained. When they met Biong there, they told him they are willing to vouch for
Mike's innocence and even volunteered to give statements. Biong told them to return
the following day. However, when he returned in the morning of July 6, 1991, Biong
wanted his ngerprints taken right away but he told Biong he needed to consult
someone rst. He eventually submitted himself for ngerprinting after his name came
out in the media. Lejano pointed out that Alfaro failed to identify him even as she
passed by him three (3) times, and was able to do so only when she was coached by
the prosecution camp. 8 9
On the part of Michael Gatchalian, he presented nine (9) witnesses: Atty.
Porfirio "Perry" Pimentel , RPN 9 broadcast executive who testi ed that he personally
took video footages of Mon Tulfo's interviews with some persons in America (including
Honesto Aragon and the bicycle shop owner) who attested that Hubert Webb was there
at the time of the Vizconde killings, but which segment was edited out in the program
he produced (Action 9); 9 0 Mark Anthony So , a former NBI intelligence agent who was
tasked to con rm photos of Hubert Webb (his classmate at DLSU St. Benilde) to
familiarize Alfaro with his facial features; 9 1 Matthew John Almogino , a childhood
friend and neighbor of Gatchalian, who testi ed that he was among those who went
inside the Vizconde house in the morning of June 30, 1991 and Biong even asked him
to take pictures; thereupon at around 9:30 a.m., he saw Gatchalian in front of the
Vizconde residence telling him that he just woke up and exchanged pleasantries with
him; and that as far as he knows, Webb, Fernandez, Lejano and Gatchalian are not
"magbabarkada"; 9 2 Atty. Leny Mauricio and Ana Marie Pamintuan of The
Philippine Star wherein a news article was published stating that Michael Gatchalian
had rejected government's offer for him to turn state witness in the Vizconde case; 9 3
Atty. Camilo Murillo who accompanied Gatchalian on July 19, 1991 when he gave his
statement to the NBI, testi ed that Atty. Pete Rivera relayed to Gatchalian the request
of then NBI Director Honesto Aragon for him to turn state witness and which offer was
refused by Gatchalian and his father; 9 4 and Atty. Manuel Sunga who accompanied
Gatchalian to the Department of Justice (DOJ) when he submitted his counter-af davit
(where there were already media people), testi ed that they were invited to the
conference room where State Prosecutor Zuo in the presence of then Secretary
Guingona made the offer for Gatchalian to turn state witness but it was rejected. 9 5
Atty. Francisco C. Gatchalian con rmed that the NBI and later the DOJ made
offers for his son to turn state witness in this case but they refused for the reason that
his son was innocent of the crime charged. Michael had told him that on the night of
June 29, 1991 until early morning of June 30, 1991, Michael was with his friends at
Ayala Alabang Village in Muntinlupa at the residence of the Syaps. Gatchalian narrated
that when he woke up to jog in the morning of June 30, 1991 around 7:00 to 7:30, he
passed by the Vizconde house and saw people milling in front. At about 8:30 a.m., he
saw the crowd getting bigger and so he instructed Michael who had wakened up, to
nd out and check what happened to their neighbor. Michael rushed out towards the
Vizconde residence and when he came back about 10:00 o'clock that same morning, he
reported that the house was robbed and people were killed inside the house. Both of
them stayed in their house that day. He denied Alfaro's claim that she was their distant
relative. 9 6
Accused Miguel Rodriguez maintained he was at home when the killings took
place. He presented as witness his rst cousin Mark Josef Andres Rualo who testi ed
that at around 1:00 in the morning of June 30, 1991, he called up Rodriguez asking why
he has not yet proceeded to the birthday party of Rualo at their house. Rodriguez
replied that he could not make it because he was not fetched by his brother Art (who
was the one with a car). So he handed the telephone to Art (who had arrived at the party
around 9:30 to 10:00 p.m.) for them to talk. From Rodriguez's residence at Pilar Village,
it will take about fteen (15) to twenty (20) minutes by car. It was a big party attended
by some eighty (80) guests and which ended by 3:30 to 4:00 a.m. But it was only the
rst time he had invited Rodriguez to his birthday party. He knows Lejano, Rodriguez's
close friend and classmate, because Rodriguez used to bring him along when
Rodriguez comes to his house. 9 7 DTAIaH
The other witnesses presented by Rodriguez, Col. Charles Calima, Jr. and Michael
Rodriguez, testi ed on the alleged incident of "mistaken identity" wherein Alfaro
supposedly pointed to one (1) "Michael Rodriguez," a drug dependent who was pulled
out by Col. Calima from the Bicutan Rehabilitation Center on the basis of the
description given by NBI agents. They testi ed that when Alfaro confronted this
"Michael Rodriguez," she became very emotional and immediately slapped and kicked
him telling him, "How can I forget your face. We just saw each other in a disco one
month ago and you told me then that you will kill me." Contrary to the physical
description given by the NBI, the accused Miguel Rodriguez he saw inside the court
room had no tattoo on his arm and de nitely not the same "Michael Rodriguez" whom
Alfaro slapped and kicked at the NBI premises. Michael Rodriguez testi ed that he was
blindfolded and brought to the comfort room by NBI agents and forced to admit that
he was Miguel Rodriguez; he identi ed Alfaro and Atty. Figueras from a collage of
photographs shown to him in court. 9 8
Accused Gerardo Biong testi ed that the last time he handled this case was
when General Filart announced the case as solved with the presentation of suspects
sometime in October 1991. However, he was subpoenaed by the NBI for the taking of
his statement because Lauro Vizconde complained that he had stolen jewelries at the
Vizconde house. He had sought the examination of latent ngerprints lifted from the
crime scene but the suspects turned out negative when tested. He denied the
accusation regarding the destruction of evidence as well as missing items during his
investigation at the Vizconde residence. The bloodied bed, mats, pillows and bed
sheets were burned by people at the funeral parlor as ordered by Mr. Gatmaitan.
Among the suspects he had then were Michael Gatchalian, Tony Boy Lejano and Cas
Syap. As to the testimony of Birrer that they played "mahjong" on the night of June 29,
1991, he said it was not true because the place was closed on Saturdays and Sundays.
After a surveillance on Birrer, he discovered she had in her possession Carmela's
driver's license and was driving a car already. He denied Birrer's account that he went to
a place after receiving a telephone call at 2:30 in the morning of June 30, 1991. As to
Alfaro, he met her for the rst time at the NBI on June 23, 1995. His brown jacket was
given to him long ago by a couple whose dispute he was able to settle. He only met
Webb and Estrada at the NBI. Biong denied the accusations of Birrer, saying that she
was angry at him because they separated and he had hit her after he heard about her
in delity. Neither has he seen Alfaro before the ling of this case. He was
administratively charged before the Philippine National Police (PNP) for Grave
Misconduct due to non-preservation of evidence. He was offered by the NBI to turn
state witness but he declined as he found it dif cult to involve his co-accused whom he
does not really know. 9 9
Biong admitted that Birrer went along with him, Galvan and Capt. Bartolome to
the Vizconde residence in the morning of June 30, 1991. Upon arriving at the Vizconde
house, he looked for the victims' relatives and the homeowners' association president;
Atty. Lopez and Mrs. Mia came. In going inside the house, they passed through the
kitchen door which was open already. On top of the kitchen table, there was a lady's
bag with things scattered; he later inspected them but did not think of examining the
bag or taking note of the calling cards and other items for possible relevance to the
investigation. Upon entering the master's bedroom, he saw the bloodied bodies. Mrs.
Vizconde's hands were hogtied from behind and her mouth gagged while Jennifer's
body was also bloodied. Carmela who was lying on a oor carpet was likewise gagged,
her hands hogtied from behind and her legs spread out, her clothes raised up and a
pillow case was placed on top of her private part. He had the bodies photographed and
prepared a spot report. 1 0 0
Biong also admitted that before the pictures were taken, he removed with his
bare hands the object, which was like a stocking cloth, that was wrapped around
Carmela's mouth and neck. As to the main door glass, it was the upper part which he
broke. There was a red jewelry box they saw where a pearl necklace inside could be
seen; he remembered he had it photographed but he had not seen those pictures. They
left the Vizconde house and brought the cadavers to the funeral parlor. He did not take
steps to preserve the bloodied carpet, bed sheets and blankets because they have
been previously told by NBI that no evidence can be found on such items. As for the
footprint and shoe print found on the hood of the car and at the back of the house, he
also could not recall if he had those photographed. It was only the following day that he
brought an employee of the Paraaque police to lift ngerprints from the crime scene;
he was the one (1) giving instructions at the time. However, no latent ngerprints had
been taken; despite attempts, no clear ngerprint had been lifted and he did not any
more ask why. 1 0 1 cSaCDT
Biong further admitted that he was so angry with the Vizconde housemaids as he
did not believe they did not hear anything despite the loud sound of the breaking of the
main door glass. He also admitted mauling Normal E. White, Jr. because he thought he
was withholding information during the investigation. Edgar Mendez did not tell him
about the entry of a three (3)-vehicle convoy into the subdivision on the night of June
29, 1991. As for Michael Gatchalian, he knows him because on July 3, 1991 at 4:30
a.m., they caught him at Vinzons St. at the entrance of Pitong Daan Subdivision for
possession of marijuana. However, he does not know any more what happened to that
case he led against Gatchalian as he was already dismissed from the service. 1 0 2 He
also admitted having mauled Gatchalian while interrogating him for his participation in
the Vizconde killings. 1 0 3
Ruling of the Trial Court
On January 4, 2000, the trial court rendered its Decision 1 0 4 nding all the
accused guilty as charged, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, this Court hereby nds all the principal accused GUILTY BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIME OF RAPE WITH HOMICIDE AND HEREBY
SENTENCES EACH ONE OF THEM TO SUFFER THE PENALTY OF RECLUSION
PERPETUA. This Court likewise nds the accused Gerardo Biong GUILTY
BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT AS AN ACCESSORY AFTER THE FACT, AND
HEREBY SENTENCES HIM TO SUFFER AN IMPRISONMENT OF ELEVEN (11)
YEARS, FOUR (4) MONTHS AND ONE (1) DAY TO TWELVE (12) YEARS . In
addition, the Court hereby orders all the accused to jointly and severally pay the
victims' surviving heir, Mr. Lauro Vizconde, the following sums by way of civil
indemnity:
1. The amount of P150,000.00 for wrongful death of the victims;

2. The amount of P762,450.00 representing actual damages sustained by Mr.
Lauro Vizconde;
3. The amount of P2,000,000.00 as moral damages sustained by Mr. Lauro
Vizconde;
4. The amount of P97,404.55 as attorney's fees;
Let an alias warrant of arrest be issued against the accused Artemio "Dong"
Ventura and Joey Filart for their eventual apprehension so that they can
immediately be brought to trial.
SO ORDERED. 1 0 5 TaSEHD
The trial court found Alfaro as a credible and truthful witness, considering the
vast details she disclosed relative to the incident she had witnessed inside the
Vizconde house. The trial court noted that Alfaro testi ed in a categorical,
straightforward, spontaneous and frank manner, and has remained consistent in her
narration of the events despite a lengthy and grueling cross-examination conducted on
her by eight (8) defense lawyers. Neither was her credibility and veracity of her
declarations in court affected by the differences and inconsistencies between her April
28, 1995 and May 22, 1995 af davits, which she had satisfactorily explained during the
trial considering the circumstances that she initially desired to protect her former
boyfriend Estrada and her relative Gatchalian, the absence of a lawyer during the rst
taking of her statements by the NBI, her distrust of the rst investigators who took her
statements and prepared her April 28, 1995 af davit, and her uncertainty if she could
obtain adequate support and security for her own life were she to disclose everything
she knows about the Vizconde killings.
On the other hand, the trial court ruled that principal accused Webb, Lejano,
Rodriguez and Gatchalian failed to establish their defense of alibi, the accused having
been positively identi ed by Alfaro as the group who conspired and assisted one (1)
another in plotting and carrying out on the same night the rape of Carmela, on the
occasion of which Carmela's mother and sister were also stabbed to death. The trial
court held that Alfaro gave a clear, positive and convincing testimony which was
suf ciently corroborated on its material points by the testimonies of other witnesses
and confirmed by the physical evidence on record.
The Court of Appeals Ruling
By Decision of December 15, 2005, the CA af rmed with modi cation the trial
court's decision:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 274 of Paraaque City in Criminal Case No. 95-404, nding accused-
appellants Hubert "Jeffrey" Webb y Pagaspas, Antonio "Tony Boy" Lejano,
Michael Gatchalian y Adviento, Hospicio "Pyke" Fernandez, Peter Estrada, Miguel
"Ging" Rodriguez GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT as principals, and
Gerardo Biong as accessory, of the crime of RAPE with HOMICIDE, is AFFIRMED
with MODIFICATION, as indicated:
1). We AFFIRM the sentence of accused-appellants Webb. Lejano,
Gatchalian, Fernandez, Estrada, and Rodriguez to suffer the penalty
o f reclusion perpetua and its corresponding accessory penalties
under Article 41 of the Revised Penal Code;
2). We MODIFY the penalty of Gerardo Biong who is an accessory to
the crime. Accused-appellant Biong is sentenced to an
indeterminate prison term of six (6) years of prision correccional, as
minimum, to twelve (12) years of prision mayor, as maximum, and
absolute perpetual disquali cation under Article 58 of the Revised
Penal Code; and acHDTE
3). We MODIFY the civil indemnity. Accused-appellants Webb. Lejano,

Gatchalian, Fernandez, Estrada and Rodriguez are ORDERED to pay
jointly and severally the surviving heir of the victims, Mr. Lauro
Vizconde. the amounts of P200,000.00 as civil indemnity,
P762,450.00 as actual damages, P2,000,000.00 as moral damages
and P97,404.55 as attorney's fees, with the corresponding
subsidiary liability against accused-appellant Biong pursuant to
Article 110, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code.
SO ORDERED. 1 0 6
The CA upheld the trial court in giving full weight and credence to the eyewitness
testimony of Alfaro which was duly corroborated by other prosecution witnesses who
had not been shown to have ill-motive and malicious intent in revealing what they know
about the Vizconde killings. It disagreed with the appellants' view that they were victims
of an unjust judgment upon their mere allegations that they were tried by publicity, and
that the trial judge was biased whose discriminatory and hostile attitude was
demonstrated by her rejection of 132 out of 142 exhibits of the defense during the bail
hearings and her refusal to issue subpoenas to prospective defense witnesses such as
former Secretary Teofisto Guingona and Antonio Calvento.
The CA also fully concurred with the trial court's conclusion that all the principal
accused failed to establish their defense of alib i after carefully evaluating the
voluminous documentary and testimonial evidence presented by the defense. On the
issue of conspiracy, the CA found that the prosecution was able to clearly and
convincingly establish its presence in the commission of the crime, notwithstanding
that appellants Rodriguez, Gatchalian, Estrada and Fernandez did not actually rape
Carmela, nor participated in killing her, her mother and sister.
On motion for reconsideration led by the appellants, the CA's Special Division of
Five, voting 3-2, af rmed the December 15, 2005 Decision. 1 0 7 In the Resolution dated
January 26, 2007, the majority reiterated that it has fully explained in its Decision why
the US-INS Certi cations submitted by appellant Webb deserve little weight. It stressed
that it is a case of positive identification versus alibi founded on documentary evidence.
On the basis of the rule that alibi is accepted only upon the clearest proof that the
accused was not and could not have been at the crime scene when it was committed,
the CA in resolving the appeal considered the weight of documentary evidence in light
of testimonial evidence an eyewitness account that the accused was the principal
malefactor. As to the issue of apparent inconsistencies between the two (2) af davits
executed by Alfaro, the CA said this is a settled matter, citing the Joint Decision in CA-
G.R. SP No. 42285 and CA-G.R. SP No. 42673 entitled "Rodriguez v. Tolentino" and
"Webb, et al. v. Tolentino, et al.," which had long become final.
Appellants' Arguments
Appellants Webb and Lejano set forth the following arguments in their
Supplemental Appeal Brief as grounds for the reversal of the CA Decision and their
acquittal in this case:
I
THE EVIDENCE ESTABLISHING APPELLANT WEBB'S ABSENCE FROM
PHILIPPINE TERRITORY BETWEEN 9 MARCH 1991 AND 27 OCTOBER 1992
ENGENDERS A REASONABLE DOUBT AND PRECLUDES AN ABIDING
CONVICTION, TO A MORAL CERTAINTY, OF HIS GUILT OF THE CRIME CHARGED.
THUS, AS CORRECTLY APPRECIATED BY JUSTICES TAGLE AND DACUDAO IN
THEIR SEPARATE DISSENTING OPINIONS
A. THE PASSPORT OF APPELLANT WEBB, AS THE OFFICIAL TRAVEL
DOCUMENT ISSUED BY THE PHILIPPINE GOVERNMENT TO HIM, IS
STAMPMARKED AND INITIALED WITH THE DEPARTURE DATE OF 9
MARCH 1991 AND ARRIVAL DATE OF 27 OCTOBER 1992, SHOWING THAT
HE WAS NOT IN THE PHILIPPINES BUT ABROAD AT THE TIME OF THE
COMMISSION OF THE CRIME ON 29 JUNE 1991. ESCacI
B. THE CERTIFICATIONS AND COMPUTER PRINTOUT ISSUED BY THE

UNITED STATES INS NON-IMMIGRANT INFORMATION SYSTEM, WHICH
INDICATE EXACTLY THE SAME DEPARTURE AND ARRIVAL DATES OF 9
MARCH 1991 AND 27 OCTOBER 1992, CONFIRM THAT IT WAS
PHYSICALLY IMPOSSIBLE FOR APPELLANT WEBB TO HAVE COMMITTED
THE CRIME.
C. THE RULING THAT APPELLANT WEBB WAS "SMUGGLED" INTO AND OUT
OF THE PHILIPPINES WITHIN 9 MARCH 1991 AND 27 OCTOBER 1992,
WITH THE US INS CERTIFICATIONS BEING THE PROBABLE PRODUCT OF
"MONEY, POWER, INFLUENCE, OR CONNECTIONS" IS BASED ON PURE
SPECULATION AND BIASED CONJECTURE AND NOT ON A CONCLUSION
THAT ANY COURT OF LAW SHOULD MAKE.
D. NO LESS THAN THE HONORABLE JUSTICE ANTONIO T. CARPIO
TESTIFIED IN OPEN COURT THAT IN THE MORNING OF 29 JUNE 1991, OR
BEFORE THE COMMISSION OF THE CRIME, HE HAD AN OVERSEAS
CONVERSATION WITH SEN. FREDDIE N. WEBB ON THE LATTER'S
PRESENCE IN THE UNITED STATES WITH HIS WIFE AND APPELLANT
WEBB.
II
THE DISSENTING JUSTICES CORRECTLY REJECTED JESSICA ALFARO FOR NOT

BEING A CREDIBLE WITNESS AND FOR GIVING INCONSISTENT AND
UNRELIABLE TESTIMONY.
III
THE COURT OF APPEALS MANIFESTLY ERRED IN DISCARDING EACH AND
EVERY PIECE OF THE ACCUSED'S EVIDENCE AND PRACTICALLY REDUCING THE
APPEAL BELOW INTO AN EXERCISE OF FINDING GROUNDS TO DOUBT,
SUSPECT AND ACCORDINGLY REJECT THE PROOF OFFERED BY THEM IN
THEIR DEFENSE INSTEAD OF GIVING DUE WEIGHT AND CONSIDERATION TO
EACH IN ORDER TO THOROUGHLY SATISFY ITSELF OF THE "MORAL
CERTAINTY" REQUIREMENT IN CRIMINAL CASES.
IV
IN LIGHT OF THE BASIC TENETS UNDERLYING OUR CRIMINAL JUSTICE
SYSTEM, WHICH ESCHEW A FINDING OF GUILT UNLESS ESTABLISHED BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT AND ORDAIN THE RESOLUTION OF ALL DOUBTS IN
FAVOR OF THE ACCUSED, THE COURT OF APPEALS MANIFESTLY ERRED IN
AFFIRMING THE CONVICTION OF APPELLANT WEBB WHEN THE DEFENSE OF
ALIBI HE ESTABLISHED BY OVERWHELMING EVIDENCE IS SUFFICIENT TO
ENGENDER REASONABLE DOUBT AS TO HIS GUILT OF THE OFFENSE CHARGED.
THE SCALES OUGHT TO HAVE BEEN TILTED IN HIS, AND NOT THE
PROSECUTION'S, FAVOR. 1 0 8
ASEcHI
Appellant Gatchalian reiterates the arguments he had raised in his appeal brief
and motion for reconsideration filed before the CA, as follows:
I
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING CREDENCE TO THE INCREDIBLE
TESTIMONY OF SUPPOSED EYEWITNESS JESSICA ALFARO AND
CORROBORATING WITNESSES NORMAL WHITE AND JUSTO CABANACAN.
II
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE PROSECUTION HAS
PROVED THE CONSPIRACY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT AND IN CONVICTING
HEREIN ACCUSED-APPELLANT BASED ON SUCH CONSPIRACY.
III
THE PROCEEDING BELOW WAS ATTENDED BY IRREGULARITIES SHOWING
PARTIALITY ON THE PART OF THE TRIAL JUDGE IN VIOLATION OF HEREIN
ACCUSED-APPELLANT'S RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS.
IV
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT ACQUITTING HEREIN ACCUSED-

APPELLANT.
xxx xxx xxx
I
BY ALL STANDARDS OF FAIRNESS AND JUSTICE, THE TESTIMONY OF JESSICA
ALFARO CANNOT BE JUDICIALLY RECOGNIZED.
II
THE CRIMINAL CONNECTION OF MICHAEL GATCHALIAN TO THE GRUESOME
VIZCONDE MURDERS HAS NOT EVEN BEEN REMOTELY SHOWN TO SERVE AS A
BASIS FOR CONVICTION.
III
IN THE REQUIRED JUDICIAL EVALUATION PROCESS, THE ENVIRONMENTAL
CIRCUMSTANCES IN THE RECORD OF THIS CASE POINT UNERRINGLY TO THE
INNOCENCE OF MICHAEL GATCHALIAN.
IV
THE RULES ON EVIDENCE ON BURDEN OF PROOF AND OF THE STANDING
PRESUMPTIONS IN LAW HAVE BEEN GROSSLY VIOLATED.
V
MICHAEL GATCHALIAN RESPECTFULLY INVOKES HIS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT
TO DUE PROCESS ON THE GROUNDS OF BIAS AND PREJUDICE, AND FOR ALL
THAT IT IS WORTH, HIS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO A SPEEDY TRIAL AND A
SPEEDY DISPOSITION OF HIS CASE. 1 0 9
Additionally, Gatchalian assails the denial by the trial court of his motion (and
also appellant Webb's) for DNA testing despite a certi cation from the NBI that the
specimen semen remained intact, which Justice Tagle in his dissenting opinion also
found as unjust. He further argues that the right to a speedy trial is violated even if the
delay was not caused by the prosecution but by events that are not within the control of
the prosecution or the courts. Thus, the length of time which took Alfaro to come
forward and testify in this case is most conspicuous. Her delay of four (4) years in
reporting the crime has to be taken against her, particularly with the story behind it. She
volunteered to come forward only after the arrests of previous accused did not lead
anywhere. Moreover, it is clear that she adopted the version previously advanced by an
"akyat-bahay" gang, as noted by Justice Dacudao in his dissenting opinion. Gatchalian
thus contends that the delay occurred even before a preliminary investigation was
conducted and cites cases upholding the right of accused persons to a speedy trial
where there was delay in the preliminary investigation. 1 1 0 DTEAHI
Totality of Evidence Established the

Guilt of Appellants Beyond Reasonable Doubt
Appellants assail the lower courts in giving full faith and credence to the
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, particularly Jessica Alfaro despite
inconsistencies and contradictions in her two (2) af davits, and the alleged "piece by
piece discarding" of their voluminous documentary exhibits and testimonies of no less
than ninety- ve (95) witnesses. They contend that the totality of evidence engenders a
reasonable doubt entitling them to acquittal from the grave charge of rape with
homicide.
After a thorough and conscientious review of the records, I rmly believe that the
CA correctly upheld the conviction of appellants.
Credibility of Prosecution
Witnesses
The determination of the competence and credibility of a witness rests primarily
with the trial court, because it has the unique position of observing the witness'
deportment on the stand while testifying. 1 1 1 It is a fundamental rule that ndings of
the trial courts which are factual in nature and which involve credibility are accorded
respect when no glaring errors, gross misapprehensions of facts and speculative,
arbitrary and unsupported conclusions can be gathered from such ndings. 1 1 2 When
the trial court's ndings have been af rmed by the appellate court, said ndings are
generally conclusive and binding upon this Court. 1 1 3
Reexamining the testimony of Alfaro, who underwent exhaustive and intense
cross-examination by eight (8) defense lawyers, it is to be noted that she revealed such
details and observations which only a person who was actually with the perpetrators
could have known. More importantly, her testimony was corroborated on its material
points by the declarations of other prosecution witnesses, to wit: [1] that their convoy
of three (3) vehicles repeatedly entered the Pitong Daan Subdivision on the night of
June 29, 1991 was con rmed by the security guard on duty, Normal White, Jr., who also
testi ed that he had seen Gatchalian and his group standing at the vicinity of the
Almogino residence located near the end of Vinzons St., which is consistent with
Alfaro's testimony that on their rst trip to the subdivision she parked her car infront of
the Vizconde house while appellants parked their respective cars near the dead end of
Vinzons St.; [2] that Ventura climbed on the hood of the Nissan Sentra car and loosened
the light bulb to turn it off was con rmed by the testimony of Birrer and appellant Biong
that they found a shoe print on the hood of the car parked inside the garage of the
Vizconde house; even defense witnesses Dennis Almogino (neighbor of the Vizcondes)
and SPO2 Reynaldo Carbonnel declared that the garage was totally without light; [3]
that a lady's bag was on top of the dining table in the kitchen was likewise con rmed by
Birrer and Biong; [4] that a loud static sound coming from the TV set inside the
master's bedroom which led Alfaro to the said room, matched with the observations of
the Vizconde housemaids, Birrer and Biong that when they went inside the Vizconde
house in the morning of June 30, 1991, the TV set inside the master's bedroom was still
turned on with a loud sound; [5] the positioning of the dead bodies of Carmela,
Estrellita and Jennifer and their physical appearance or condition (hogtied, gagged and
bloodied) was correctly described by Alfaro, consistent with the declarations of White,
Jr., Birrer and Biong who were among those who rst saw the bodies in the morning of
June 30, 1991; [6] that Carmela was raped by Webb and how the three (3) women were
killed as Alfaro learned from the conversation of the appellants at the BF Executive
Village house, was consistent with the ndings of Dr. Cabanayan who conducted the
autopsy and post-mortem examination of the cadavers in the morning of June 30, 1991
showing that the victims died of multiple stab wounds, the specimen taken from
Carmela's vaginal canal tested positive for spermatozoa and the approximate time of
death based on the onset of rigor mortis, which would place it between midnight and
2:00 o'clock in the morning of June 30, 1991; [7] that Webb, just before going out of the
gate of the Vizconde house, threw a stone which broke the glass frame of the main
door, jibed with the testimony of Birrer who likewise saw a stone near the broken glass
panel at the living room of the Vizconde house, and Biong himself testi ed that he even
demonstrated to Capt. Bartolome and the housemaids the loud sound by again hitting
the glass of the main door; 1 1 4 and [8] that after Webb made a call on his cellular phone,
Biong arrived at around 2:00 o'clock in the morning of June 30, 1991 at the BF
Executive Village house where she and appellants retreated, was consistent with the
testimony of Birrer that Biong left the "mahjong" session to answer a telephone call
between 1:00 to 2:00 o'clock in the morning of June 30, 1991 and thereafter Birrer
asked where he was going, to which Biong replied "BF" and shortly thereafter a taxicab
with a man at the backseat fetched Biong. CAcDTI
Indeed, Alfaro could not have divulged the foregoing details of the crime if she
did not really join the group of Webb in going to the Vizconde residence and witness
what happened during the time Webb, Lejano and Ventura were inside the house and
when the group retreated to BF Executive Village. Contrary to appellants' contention,
Alfaro's detailed testimony appears clear and convincing, thus giving the Court the
impression that she was sincere and credible. She even opened her personal life to
public scrutiny by admitting that she was addicted to shabu for sometime and that was
how she came to meet Webb's group and got entangled in the plot to gang-rape
Carmela. Her being a former drug user in no way taints her credibility as a witness. The
fact that a witness is a person of unchaste character or even a drug dependent does
not per se affect her credibility. 1 1 5
Alfaro's ability to recollect events that occurred four (4) years ago with her
mental condition that night of June 29, 1991 when she admittedly took shabu three (3)
times and even sniffed cocaine, was likewise questioned by the appellants. When the
question was posed to Alfaro on cross-examination, she positively stated that while
indeed she had taken shabu at that time, her perception of persons and events around
her was not diminished. Her faculties unimpaired by the drugs she had taken that night,
Alfaro was able to vividly recall what transpired the whole time she was with appellants.
Alfaro testi ed that even if she was then a regular shabu user, she had not reached that
point of being paranoid ("praning"). It was the rst time Alfaro sniffed cocaine and she
described its initial effect as being "stoned," but lasting only ve (5) to seven (7)
minutes. However, she did not fall asleep since shabu and "coke" are not downers.
Alfaro further explained her indifference and apathy in not dissuading Webb and
her group from carrying out their evil plan against Carmela as due to the numbing effect
of drugs, which also enabled her to dislodge from her mind the harrowing images of the
killings for quite sometime. Eventually, the chance to redeem herself came when she
was invited to a Christian fellowship, and with her child's future in mind, her desire to
transform her life grew stronger. As she cast off her addiction to drugs, its
desensitizing effect began to wear off and her conscience bothered her no end. Under
such circumstances, the delay of four (4) years in admitting her involvement in the
Vizconde killings cannot be taken against Alfaro. In fact, she had to muster enough
courage to nally come out in the open considering that during her last encounter with
appellants at a discotheque in 1995, she was threatened by appellant Rodriguez that if
she will not keep her mouth shut, she will be killed. He even offered her a plane ticket
for her to go abroad. Coming from wealthy and in uential families, and capable of
barbaric acts she had already seen, appellants instilled such fear in Alfaro that her
reluctance to report to the authorities was perfectly understandable.
I nd that the circumstances of habitual drug use and delay in reporting a crime
did not affect the competence and credibility of prosecution witness Alfaro. It bears
stressing that the fact of delay alone does not work against the witnesses. Delay or
vacillation in making a criminal accusation does not necessarily impair the credibility of
the witness if such delay is satisfactorily explained. 1 1 6
Besides, appellants failed to adduce any evidence to establish any improper
motive that may have impelled Alfaro to falsely testify against them, other than their
allegation that she regularly associated with NBI agents as one (1) of their informants.
The absence of evidence of improper motive on the part of the said witness for the
prosecution strongly tends to sustain the conclusion that no such improper motive
exists and that her testimony is worthy of full faith and credit. 1 1 7 Neither had
appellants established any ill-motive on the part of the other prosecution witnesses.
Inconsistencies and Discrepancies in Alfaro's April 28, 1995 and May 22,
1995 Affidavits
Appellants, from the start of preliminary investigation, have repeatedly harped on
the discrepancies and inconsistencies in Alfaro's rst and second af davits. However,
this Court has repeatedly ruled that whenever there is inconsistency between the
af davit and the testimony of a witness in court, the testimony commands greater
weig ht. 1 1 8 With greater relevance should this rule apply in situations when a
subsequent af davit of the prosecution witness is intended to amplify and correct
inconsistencies with the rst af davit, the discrepancies having been adequately
explained. We held in People v. Sanchez: 1 1 9
. . . we advert to that all-too familiar rule that discrepancies between sworn
statements and testimonies made at the witness stand do not necessarily
discredit the witnesses. Sworn statements/af davits are generally subordinated
in importance to open court declarations because the former are often executed
when an af ant's mental faculties are not in such a state as to afford him a fair
opportunity of narrating in full the incident which has transpired. Testimonies
given during trials are much more exact and elaborate. Thus, testimonial evidence
carries more weight than sworn statements/affidavits. 1 2 0
Alfaro explained the circumstances surrounding her execution of the rst

Af davit dated April 28, 1995 which was done without the presence of a lawyer and at
the house of agent Mario Garcia where she was brought by Atty. Sacaguing and Moises
Tamayo, another agent of task force Anti-Kidnapping, Hijack and Robbery (AKHAR). The
unusual questioning of these men gave her the impression that she was merely being
used to boost their career promotion and her distrust was even heightened when they
absolutely failed to provide her security. She was aghast upon discovering the
completed af davit which falsely stated that it was made in the presence of her lawyer
of choice (Atty. Mercader who was not actually present). Agent Tamayo also
incorporated inaccurate or erroneous information indicating that she was a college
graduate even if she tried to correct him. Tamayo simply told her to just let it remain in
the statement as it would not be noticed anyway. 1 2 1 Moreover, on account of her
urgent concern for her own security and fear of implicating herself in the case, Alfaro
admitted down playing her own participation in her narration (including the
circumstance that she had previously met Carmela before the incident) and those of
her ex-boyfriend Estrada and her relative, Gatchalian. ECaSIT
Prosecution Evidence Sufficient to Convict Appellants

This Court has consistently held that the rule on the trial court's appreciation of
evidence must bow to the superior rule that the prosecution must prove the guilt of the
accused beyond reasonable doubt. The law presumes an accused innocent, and this
presumption must prevail unless overturned by competent and credible proof. 1 2 2
Thus, we are tasked to consider two crucial points in sustaining a judgment of
conviction: rst, the identi cation of the accused as perpetrator of the crime, taking
into account the credibility of the prosecution witness who made the identi cation as
well as the prosecution's compliance with legal and constitutional standards; and
second, all the elements constituting the crime were duly proven by the prosecution to
be present. 1 2 3
There appears to be no question about the fact that a horrible and most
unfortunate crime has been committed. It is, in this case, indeed a given fact, but next to
it is the pivotal issue of whether or not the prosecution has been able to discharge its
equal burden in substantiating the identities of accused-appellants as the perpetrators
of the crime. As well said often, conviction must rest on the strength of the
prosecution's case and not on the weakness of the defense.
Positive Identification
of Accused-Appellants
Eyewitness identi cation constitutes vital evidence and, in most cases, decisive
of the success or failure of the prosecution. 1 2 4 Both the RTC and CA found the
eyewitness testimony of Alfaro credible and competent proof that appellants Webb,
Lejano, Gatchalian, Fernandez, Rodriguez and Estrada were at the scene of the crime
and that Webb raped Carmela as the bloodied bodies of her mother and sister lay on
top of the bed inside the master's bedroom, and right beside it stood Lejano while
Ventura was preparing for their escape. At another house in BF Executive Village where
the group retreated after leaving the Vizconde house, Alfaro witnessed the blaming
session, particularly between Ventura and Webb, and thereupon learned from their
conversation that Carmela's mother and sister were stabbed to death before she
herself was killed. Alfaro likewise positively identi ed appellant Biong, whom
somebody from the group described as the driver and bodyguard of the Webb family,
as the person ordered by Webb to "clean the Vizconde house."
The testimony of Alfaro on its material points was corroborated by Birrer, Dr.
Cabanayan, White, Jr., Cabanacan and Gaviola. Appellants' presence at the scene of the
crime before, during and after its commission was duly established. Their respective
participation, acts and declarations were likewise detailed by Alfaro who was shown to
be a credible witness. It is axiomatic that a witness who testi es in a categorical,
straightforward, spontaneous and frank manner and remains consistent on cross-
examination is a credible witness. 1 2 5 DCTHaS
A criminal case rises or falls on the strength of the prosecution's case, not on the
weakness of the defense. Once the prosecution overcomes the presumption of
innocence by proving the elements of the crime and the identity of the accused as
perpetrator beyond reasonable doubt, the burden of evidence then shifts to the defense
which shall then test the strength of the prosecution's case either by showing that no
crime was in fact committed or that the accused could not have committed or did not
commit the imputed crime, or at the very least, by casting doubt on the guilt of the
accused. 1 2 6
Appellants' Alibi and Denial
We have held in a number of cases that alibi is an inherently weak and unreliable
defense, for it is easy to fabricate and dif cult to disprove. 1 2 7 To establish alibi, the
accused must prove (a) that he was present at another place at the time of the
perpetration of the crime, and (b) that it was physically impossible for him to be at the
scene of the crime. Physical impossibility "refers to the distance between the place
where the accused was when the crime transpired and the place where it was
committed, as well as the facility of access between the two places." 1 2 8 Due to its
doubtful nature, alibi must be supported by clear and convincing proof. 1 2 9
"Alibi, the plea of having been elsewhere than at the scene of the crime at the time
of the commission of the felony, is a plausible excuse for the accused. Let there
be no mistake about it. Contrary to the common notion, alibi is in fact a good
defense. But, to be valid for purposes of exoneration from a criminal charge, the
defense of alibi must be such that it would have been physically
impossible for the person charged with the crime to be at the locus
criminis at the time of its commission, the reason being that no person
can be in two places at the same time. The excuse must be so airtight
that it would admit of no exception. Where there is the least possibility
of accused's presence at the crime scene, the alibi will not hold water .
1 3 0 [EMPHASIS SUPPLIED.]
The claim of appellant Webb that he could not have committed the crime
because he left for the United States on March 9, 1991 and returned to the Philippines
only on October 26, 1992 was correctly rejected by the RTC and CA. These dates are so
distant from the time of the commission of the crime, June 29, 1991 and June 30,
1991, and it would not have been impossible during the interregnum for Webb to travel
back to the country and again y to the US several times considering that the travel
time on board an airline from the Philippines to San Francisco, and from San Francisco
to the Philippines takes only about twelve (12) to fourteen (14) hours. Given the
nancial resources and political in uence of his family, it was not unlikely that Webb
could have traveled back to the Philippines before June 29-30, 1991 and then departed
for the US again, and returning to the Philippines in October 1992. There clearly exists,
therefore, such possibility of Webb's presence at the scene of the crime at the time of
its commission, and his excuse cannot be deemed airtight.
This Court in People v. Larraaga 1 3 1 had similarly rejected the defense of alibi of
an accused, involving a shorter travel distance (Quezon City to Cebu) and even shorter
period of time showing the least possibility of an accused's presence at the time of the
commission of the crime (a matter of hours) than in the case at bar (March 9, 1991 to
June 29, 1991 which is three [3] months). In denying the motion for reconsideration of
accused Larraaga, we held that accused Larraaga failed to establish his defense of
alibi, which is futile in the face of positive identification:
This case presents to us a balance scale whereby perched on one end is
appellants' alibi supported by witnesses who were either their relatives, friends or
classmates, while on the other end is the positive identi cation of the herein
appellants by the prosecution witnesses who were not, in any way, related to the
victims. With the above jurisprudence as guide, we are certain that the balance
must tilt in favor of the latter.
Besides, a thorough examination of the evidence for the prosecution shows that
the appellants failed to meet the requirements of alibi, i.e., the requirements of
time and place. They failed to establish by clear and convincing evidence that it
was physically impossible for them to be at the Ayala Center, Cebu City when the
Chiong sisters were abducted. What is clear from the evidence is that Rowen,
Josman, Ariel, Alberto, James Anthony and James Andrew were all within the
vicinity of Cebu City on July 16, 1997.HTScEI
Not even Larraaga who claimed to be in Quezon City satis ed the required proof
of physical impossibility. During the hearing, it was shown that it takes only
one (1) hour to travel by plane from Manila to Cebu and that there are
four (4) airline companies plying the route. One of the defense
witnesses admitted that there are several ights from Manila to Cebu
each morning, afternoon and evening. Indeed, Larraaga's presence in
Cebu City on July 16, 1997 was proved to be not only a possibility but a
reality. Four (4) witnesses identi ed Larraaga as one of the two men
talking to Marijoy and Jacqueline on the night of July 16, 1997 . Shiela
Singson testi ed that on July 16, 1997, at around 7:20 in the evening, she saw
Larraaga approach Marijoy and Jacqueline at the West Entry of Ayala Center.
The incident reminded her of Jacqueline's prior story that he was Marijoy's
admirer. Shiela con rmed that she knows Larraaga since she had seen him on
five (5) occasions. Analie Konahap also testified that on the same evening of July
16, 1997, at about 8:00 o'clock, she saw Marijoy and Jacqueline talking to two (2)
men at the West Entry of Ayala Center. She recognized the two (2) men as
Larraaga and Josman, having seen them several times at Glicos, a game zone,
located across her of ce at the third level of Ayala Center. Williard Redobles, the
security guard then assigned at Ayala Center, corroborated the foregoing
testimonies of Shiela and Analie. In addition, Rosendo Rio, a businessman from
Cogon, Carcar, declared that he saw Larraaga at Tan-awan at about 3:30 in the
morning of July 17, 1997. The latter was leaning against the hood of a white van.
And over and above all, Rusia categorically identi ed Larraaga as one of the
participes criminis. 1 3 2 [EMPHASIS SUPPLIED]
In the light of relevant precedents, I nd no reversible error committed by the
RTC in refusing to give credence to appellant Webb's argument that he could not have
committed the crime of rape with homicide because he was still in the US on June 29
and 30, 1991. The RTC thus correctly ruled:
Granting for the sake of argument that the claim of departure for the United
States of the accused Webb on March 9, 1991 and his arrival in the Philippines on
October 26, 1992 had been duly established by the defense, it cannot prove that
he remained in the United States during the intervening period. During the long
span of time between March, 1991 to October, 1992, it was not
physically impossible for the accused Webb to have returned to the
Philippines, perpetrate the criminal act, and travel back to the United
States .
It must be noted that the accused Webb is a scion of a rich, in uential, and
politically powerful family with the nancial capacity to travel back and forth
from the Philippines to the United States. He could very well afford the price of a
plane ticket to free him from all sorts of trouble. Since there are numerous airlines
plying the route from Manila to the United States, it cannot be said that there was
lack of available means to transport. Moreover, the lapse of more than three (3)
months from the time the accused Webb left the Philippines for the United States
on March 9, 1991 to June 29 and 30, 1991 when the crime was committed is
more than enough time for the accused Webb to have made several trips from the
United States to the Philippines and back. The Court takes judicial notice of the
fact that it only requires the short period of approximately eighteen (18)
hours to reach the Philippines from the United States, with the advent
of modern travel . AaSIET
It must likewise be noted that the father of the accused Webb, besides being rich
and in uential, was at that time in 1991, the Congressman of Paraaque and
later became a Senator of the Republic of the Philippines. Thus, the Webb money
and connections were at the disposal of the accused Webb, and it is worthy of
belief that the accused Webb could have departed and entered the country
without any traces whatsoever of his having done so. In fact, defense witness
Andrea Domingo, former Commissioner of the Bureau of Immigration and
Deportation testi ed on the practice of "human smuggling" at the Ninoy Aquino
International Airport.
On this point, the Supreme Court has declared in a case that even the lapse of the
short period of one (1) week was suf cient for an accused to go to one place, to
go to another place to commit a crime, and then return to his point of origin. The
principal factor considered by the Supreme Court in denying the defense of alibi
in People vs. Jamero (24 SCRA 206) was the availability to the accused of
the means by which to commit a crime elsewhere and then return to his
refuge . . . . 1 3 3 [EMPHASIS SUPPLIED]
There is likewise no merit in appellant Webb's contention that the CA

misappreciated his voluminous documentary evidence and numerous witnesses who
testi ed on his stay in the US. The CA, after a meticulous and painstaking reevaluation
of Webb's documentary and testimonial evidence, sustained the RTC's conclusion that
these pieces of evidence were either inadmissible, incompetent or irrelevant. I quote
with approval the CA's findings which are well-supported by the evidence on record:
(a) U.S. INS Certifications
xxx xxx xxx
The Court seriously doubts that evidentiary weight could be ascribed to the
August 31, 1995 and October 13, 1995 Certifications of the U.S. INS and computer
print-out of the Nonimmigrant Information System (NIIS) which allegedly
established Webb's entry to and exit from the United States. This is due to the
fallibility demonstrated by the US INS with regard to the certi cations which the
said of ce issued regarding the basic information under its direct control and
custody.
It is to be remembered that as part of his evidence, Webb presented the

explanation of one Steven P. Bucher, Acting Chief of Records Services Branch of
the U.S. INS, who admitted that the U.S. INS had previously reported on August 10,
1995, erroneously, that it had no record of the arrival and departure of Webb to
and from the United States. The said of ce later on admitted that it failed to
exhaustively study all information available to it. We are not convinced with this
explanation. It is to be noted that the U.S. INS is an agency well known for its
stringent criteria and rigid procedure in handling documents relating to one's
travel into and out of its territory. Such being the case, it would therefore be hard
to imagine that the said agency would issue a certification that it had no record of
a person's entry into and exit from the United States without rst conducting an
efficient verification of its records. cHESAD
We do not also believe that a second search could give rise to a different
conclusion, considering that there is no showing that the records searched were
different from those viewed in the rst search. The later certi cations issued by
the U.S. INS modifying its rst certi cation and which was issued only a few
weeks earlier, come across as a strained effort by Webb at establishing his
presence in the United States in order to reinforce his flimsy alibi.
It is not amiss to note that a reading of the rst Certi cate of Non-existence of
Record (Exhibit "212-D") subscribed by Debora A. Farmer of the U.S. INS would
show that the U.S. INS had made a "diligent" search, and found no record of
admission into the United States of Webb. The search allegedly included an
inquiry into the automated and non-automated records systems of the U.S. INS.
Be it also noted that the basis of the U.S. INS second certi cation (Exhibit "218")
was a printout coming also from automated information systems.
As pointed out by the Of ce of the Solicitor General in its appeal brief, "how it
became possible for the U.S. INS Archives in Washington, which is
supposed to merely download and copy the information given by the
San Francisco INS, to have an entry on accused-appellant Webb when
the said port of entry had no such record was never suf ciently
addressed by the defense ."
It is with this view that the Court recognizes little if not nil probative value in the
second certification of the U.S. INS.
xxx xxx xxx
(b) Passenger Manifest of United Airlines Flight

The purported passenger manifest for the United Airlines ight that allegedly
conveyed accused-appellant Webb for the United States, was not identi ed by
the United Airlines personnel who actually prepared and completed the
same . Instead, the defense presented Dulcisimo Daluz, the supervisor of
customer services of United Airlines in Manila, who had no hand in the actual
preparation or safekeeping of the said passenger manifest. It must be stressed
that to satisfactorily prove the due execution of a private document, the testimony
of the witness with regard to the execution of the said document must be positive.
Such being the case, his testimony thereto is at most hearsay and therefore not
worthy of any credit.
Likewise, we note that the said passenger manifest produced in court is a mere
photocopy and the same did not comply with the strict procedural
requirement of the airline company, that is, all the checking agents who
were on duty on March 9, 1991 must sign or initial the passenger
manifest . This further lessens the credibility of the said document. HSDCTA
(c) United Airline Ticket

. . . the alleged United Airline ticket of accused-appellant Webb offered in evidence
is a mere photocopy of an alleged original, which was never presented
below . Other than the submission that the original could no longer be produced
in evidence, there is no other proof that there ever was an original airline ticket in
the name of Webb. This does not satisfy the requirements set forth under Section
5 of Rule 130. . . . we nd that the photocopy presented in evidence has little if no
probative value. Even assuming there was such an original ticket in existence, the
same is hardly of any weight, in the absence of clear proof that the same was
indeed used by accused-appellant Webb to go to the United States.
(d) Philippine passport
The passport of accused-appellant Webb produced in evidence, and the
inscriptions appearing thereon, also offer little support of Webb's alibi. Be it noted
tha t what appears on record is only the photocopy of the pages of
Webb's passport . The Court therefore can only rely on the appreciation of the
trial court as regards the authenticity of the passport and the marks appearing
thereon, as it is the trial court that had the exclusive opportunity to view at rst
hand the original of the document, and determine for itself whether the same is
entitled to any weight in evidence.
(e) Video footage of accused-appellant Webb's parents in

Disneyland and Yosemite Park.
The video footage serendipitously taken by Victor Yap allegedly of Senator Webb
and his family while on vacation at Disneyland in Anaheim, California on July 3,
1991 does little to support the alibi of accused-appellant Webb for it is quite
interesting to note that nowhere did accused-appellant Webb appear in this
footage . None of the people shown in the lm was identi ed as the accused-
appellant Webb. Moreover, the records disclose that just before the segment of
the lm that showed Senator Webb, there was a gap or portion of static that
appeared which did not appear in any other portion of the footage. We nd that
this supports the conclusion that the videotape was possibly tampered as an
additional support to the alibi of accused-appellant that he was in the United
States.
xxx xxx xxx
(f) Video footage at Lake Tahoe and the del Toro-Manlapit
Wedding IHaCDE
. . . the video footage showing accused-appellant Webb seemingly on holiday at

Lake Tahoe with the Wheelocks, to our mind does not disprove that Webb was in
the country at the time of the Vizconde killing. Firstly, the date being shown
intermittently in the footage was not the same or near the date of the
Vizconde killing . As we have earlier stated, we do not discount the possibility
that Webb was in the Philippines during the time he was supposed to have been
in the United States, especially, when there are eyewitnesses who testi ed to the
effect that Webb was in the Philippines only a couple of weeks before the killing
and who also testi ed of Webb's participation in the crime. In any case, we take
judicial notice that modern electronic and photographic advances could offer a
means to splice or modify recorded images to con gure to a desired impression,
including the insertion or annotation of numeric figures on a recorded image.
Likewise, the videotape and photographs taken on Alex del Toro's wedding also
fail to convince, as this was allegedly taken on October 10, 1992 well after
the fateful days of June 29 and 30, 1991 .
(g) Photograph of Webb and Christopher Esguerra before the Dee
Lite Concert
The photograph of accused-appellant Webb with Esguerra allegedly taken in late
April 1991 before they went to a band concert has little probative value. It must be
pointed out that the image in the picture itself does not depict the date or
place it was taken, or of any Dee Lite concert allegedly attended by
Webb . Likewise, we observed that the photograph appears to have been
trimmed down from a bigger size , possibly to remove the date printed therein.
It is also to be noted that Esguerra admitted that the inscription appearing at the
back of the photograph of, "Hubert and I before the Dee Lite Concert, April 1991"
was only written by him in 1995, after it was given to him by accused-appellant's
mother, Elizabeth, before he took the witness stand. The Court cannot therefore
but cast suspicion as to its authenticity.
(h) Webb's Driver's License
We agree with the trial court's observation that the Driver's License allegedly
obtained by accused-appellant from the California Department of Motor
Vehicle sometime in the rst week of June 1991 is unworthy of credit,
because of the inconsistencies in Webb's testimony as to how he
obtained the same . In one testimony, Webb claimed he did not make an
application but just walked in the licensing of ce and he did not submit any
photograph relative to his application. In a later testimony, he claimed that he
submitted an ID picture for his driver's license, and that the picture appearing on
his driver's license was the very same picture he submitted together with his
application for the driver's license. These are two inconsistent testimonies on the
same subject matter, which render the said driver's license and the alleged date
when the same was obtained, unworthy of credit.
(i) Logbook of Alex del Toro and Check Payments of Webb's
salary EcAHDT
The employment records of accused-appellant, which include the alleged logbook

of del Toro in his pest control business, and check payments to Webb were also
offered to support the latter's alleged presence in the United States on the dates
near the day of the Vizconde killings. A review of the logbook shows that the
same is unworthy of any evidentiary weight. The entries where the accused
Webb were indicated to have performed work for del Toro, showed that
the name of Webb ("Hubie"/"U.B.") was merely superimposed on the
actual entries and could have been easily fabricated to create the
impression that Webb had some participation in the business of del Toro, and
therefore, are not reliable proofs of Webb's presence and occupation in the United
States around the time of the Vizconde killing.
The alleged check payments of Webb's salary are also unreliable. The check
dated June 13, 1991 was made payable to "Cash", while the other check which
appeared to be payable to "Hubert Webb" was however dated only July 10, 1991.
Neither of the said checks squarely placed accused-appellant Webb in
the United States at the time of the Vizconde killings . Simply put, neither
check is therefore clear proof to support Webb's alibi.
(j) Bicycle/Sportscar
The Toyota MR2 sportscar and Cannondale bicycle allegedly purchased by
accused-appellant Webb and his father in the United States appear to have been
purchased with great haste, and under suspicious circumstances.
Consider that immediately after the accused-appellant's father, former Senator

Freddie Webb, arrived in the United States, the rst thing he did was go out with
his friend Honesto Aragon and accused-appellant to look for a bicycle and a car
to be used by the latter in going to and from work. The car was bought sometime
in early July 1991 and the bicycle sometime on June 30, 1991. It is a wonder to
this Court that the accused-appellant and his father would buy a bicycle and a
sportscar at practically the same time to provide the accused-appellant
transportation to his work. Would not just a car or a bicycle do for him? Also, the
hurried purchase of the car right after the arrival of Freddie Webb appears at the
very least, suspicious, as a prospective car-buyer would understandably want to
make a canvas rst for the best car to buy, and not just to purchase the rst car
he sees.
Moreover, as aptly observed by the trial court, though it was made clear that the
purpose of purchasing the said bicycle and car was for accused-appellant's
convenience in going to and from his work we nd, that this contradicts the
other evidence presented by accused-appellant because it appears from his
evidence that other than his brief stint in del Toro's pest control company
business and his employment as a gasoline station attendant which incidentally
was not suf ciently proven, all that accused-appellant did in the United States
was to go sightseeing, shopping and meet with family and friends.
Lastly, the fact that the car and the bicycle were allegedly purchased in close
proximity to the date of the rape and killing of the Vizconde women does little to
dissuade the perception that the car and bicycle were purchased only for the
purpose of providing a plausible defense of alibi for Webb.
(k) Letters to Jennifer Claire Cabrera
Cabrera, a friend and neighbor of accused-appellant in BF Homes, Paraaque,
produced four (4) letters allegedly written and sent to her by Webb while he was in
the United States, in order to support the accused-appellant's alibi. These were
allegedly the only letters sent by Webb to her.
The letters were allegedly written and posted at around the same time the
Vizconde rape and killing happened, such that, if the letters were to be duly
considered, they would place Webb in the United States at the same time the June
30, 1991 killings occurred; thus, bolstering Webb's defense of alibi.
However, the said letters, to our mind, are not convincing proof of alibi, inasmuch
said letters were produced only in 1995 at the time she gave a statement, and the
same time Webb was charged. However, Cabrera admitted that she knew Webb
was being involved or accused in the Vizconde killings as early as 1991 and that
she was shocked upon learning that he was being implicated therein. CHDTIS
The Court nds it incredible that despite being shocked in 1991, about the
involvement of her friend, accused-appellant in the Vizconde rape-slay, Cabrera
would wait until 1995 to "produce" the letters that could have cleared her friend's
name. An interregnum of four years before coming out with valuable proof in
support of a friend is to our mind, a telling factor on the credibility of the alleged
letters.
Also, the impression that may be inferred from reading the letters was one of a
man who was pining away for his ladylove. Webb was quite expressive with his
feelings when he wrote that he missed Cabrera, "a lot," yet after only four letters
that was conveniently written sometime in June 1991, he thereafter stopped
writing letters to Cabrera as if the whole matter was already forgotten. It is highly
suspicious therefore that the only letters of accused-appellant Webb to Cabrera
were written and sent at the exact opportune time that the Vizconde killings
occurred which conveniently supplied a basis for his defense of alibi.
Moreover, from the contents of the letters, we can deduce that there was some
sort of romantic relationship with the accused-appellant Webb and Cabrera. In
fact, Webb in his letters referred to Cabrera as his "sweetheart" and "dearest", and
confessed to her that all he thinks about was her, and he was hoping he would
dream of her at night. It is not improbable, therefore, that Cabrera could have
prevaricated herself to save her friend.
In sum, accused-appellant tried vainly to establish his defense of alibi with the
presentation of not only a substantial volume of documentary evidence but also
testimonies of an overwhelming number of witnesses which were comprised
mostly of relatives and family friends who obviously wanted him to be
exonerated of the crime charged. It is for this reason that we regard their
testimonies with an eye of suspicion for it is but natural, although morally unfair,
for a close relative or friend to give weight to blood ties and close relationship in
times of dire needs especially when a criminal case is involved. 1 3 4 [EMPHASIS
SUPPLIED]

The rule is well-entrenched in this jurisdiction that in determining the value and
credibility of evidence, witnesses are to be weighed, not numbered. The testimony of
only one witness, if credible and positive, is suf cient to convict. 1 3 5 As to appellant
Webb's voluminous documentary evidence, both the RTC and CA judiciously examined
each exhibit and concluded that these do not pass the test of admissibility and
materiality insofar as proving the physical impossibility of his presence at the Vizconde
residence on June 29, 1991 until the early morning of June 30, 1991.
Appellant Webb cites the opposite view taken by Justices Tagle and Dacudao in
their dissenting opinions and urges this Court to accord the US INS certi cation and
other documents relative to his arrival and departure in the US on the dates March 9,
1991 and October 26, 1992, respectively, the presumption of regularity being of cial
documents issued by US authorities. Justices Tagle and Dacudao concurred in stating
that the conclusion of their three (3) colleagues (majority) that the US INS certi cations
did not exclude the possibility of Webb traveling back to the Philippines and again
departing for the US between March 9, 1991 and October 26, 1992 is nothing but
speculation and conjecture. Webb further mentions that since a Justice of this Court
"con rmed appellant Webb's alibi of being in the United States on 29 June 1991[,] [a]t
the very least, such exculpatory testimony coupled with the plethora of appellant
Webb's other documentary and testimonial evidence on his presence in the United
States on 29 June 1991 raises reasonable doubt as to appellant Webb's guilt of the
crime charged." 1 3 6
I find the contentions bereft of merit.
In the rst place, let it be emphasized that Justice Carpio's testimony before the
trial court con rmed merely the fact that his conversation with then Congressman
Webb took place on June 29, 1991 and what the latter relayed to him about his location
at the time such telephone call was made, who was with him in the US (his wife and
appellant Webb) and the purpose of their US trip (to nd a job for appellant Webb). Said
witness even admitted that he had no personal knowledge that appellant Webb was in
fact in the United States at the time of his telephone conversation with Congressman
Webb. 1 3 7
As to the travel documents consisting of his US passport, US INS certi cations
and other evidence presented by appellant Webb in support of his alibi, while it is true
that such presentation of passport, plane ticket and other travel documents can serve
as proof that he was indeed out of the country at the time of the Vizconde killings, 1 3 8 it
must still be shown that the evidence is clear and convincing, and the totality of such
evidence constitutes an airtight excuse as to exclude the least possibility of his
presence at the crime scene. However, appellant Webb failed in this regard and the RTC
and CA did not err in giving scant weight to his arsenal of evidence, particularly so on
the strength of the positive identi cation of appellant Webb as Carmela's rapist and
one of those who actually took part in the brutal killing of Carmela, her mother and
sister between midnight of June 29, 1991 and early morning of June 30, 1991. cTDECH
Indeed, alibi cannot be sustained where it is not only without credible

corroboration, but also where it does not, on its face, demonstrate the physical
impossibility of the accused's presence at the place and time of the commission of the
crime. 1 3 9 Against positive evidence, alibi becomes most unsatisfactory. Alibi cannot
prevail over the positive identi cation of a credible witness . 1 4 0 Appellant Webb was
placed at the crime scene by Alfaro who positively identi ed him as the one (1) who
plotted and committed the rape of Carmela, and later fatally stabbed her, her mother
and sister, aided by or in concert with Lejano and Ventura. Gaviola and Cabanacan gave
corroborating testimonies that appellant Webb was here in the country, as he was just
in his house at BF Homes Subdivision Phase III, at least a few weeks prior to and on
June 29 to 30, 1991.
Verily, it is only when the identi cation of the accused as the author of the crime
charged is inconclusive or unreliable that alibi assumes importance. Such is not the
situation in the case at bar where the identi cation of the perpetrators by a lone
eyewitness satisfied the moral certainty standard.
It is the prosecution's burden to prove the guilt of the accused beyond
reasonable doubt. De nitely, "reasonable doubt" is not mere guesswork whether or not
the accused is guilty, but such uncertainty that "a reasonable man may entertain after a
fair review and consideration of the evidence." Reasonable doubt is present when
after the entire comparison and consideration of all the evidences, leaves the
minds of the [judges] in that condition that they cannot say they feel an abiding
conviction, to a moral certainty, of the truth of the charge; a certainty that
convinces and directs the understanding, and satis es the reason and judgment
of those who are bound to act conscientiously upon it. 1 4 1
That reasonable doubt is not engendered by the presentation of certi cations of

entry into and exit from the US, passport with stamp marks of departure and
declarations of witnesses who are mostly relatives and friends of appellant Webb, can
be gleaned from the fact that passports and plane tickets indicating dates of arrival
and departure do not necessarily prove that the very same person actually took the
ight. This Court takes judicial notice of reported irregularities and tampering of
passports in the years prior to the recent issuance by the DFA of machine-readable
passports. In fact, the proliferation of photo-substituted passports, fake immigration
stamps, assumed identity and double passports, among others, have been cited as
grounds to justify the necessity of amending the Philippine Passport Act of 1996 (R.A.
No. 8239) as proposed in the Senate, ". . . to rally for the issuance of passports using
tamper proof and the latest data encryption technology; and provide stiffer penalties
against proliferators of fake passports." 1 4 2
It is worthy of note I note that the original of Webb's passport was not offered in
evidence and made part of the records, which only gives credence to the prosecution's
allegation that it bore signs of tampering and irregularities. And as earlier mentioned,
the much vaunted US-INS second certi cation dated August 31, 1995 based on a mere
computer print-out from the Non-immigrant Information System (Exhibit "213-1-D")
retrieved from the US- INS Archives in Washington, and the accompanying
certi cations, have little probative value, the truth of their contents had not been
testi ed to by the persons who issued the same. Moreover, the issuance of this
certi cation only a couple of weeks after the August 10, 1995 US-INS Of ce in San
Francisco was issued, only raised questions as to its accuracy. Said earlier certi cation
through Debora A. Farmer stated that: ECSaAc
[a]fter diligent search no record is found to exist in the records of the

Immigration and Naturalization Service. The search included a review of the
S ervice automated and nonautomated records system; there is no
evidence of any lawful admission to the United States as an immigrant,
or as a nonimmigrant, relating to Hubert P. Webb, born November 7,
1968, in the Philippines. The records searched are current as of July 1,
1995 for the immigrants and nonimmigrants . 1 4 3 [EMPHASIS SUPPLIED]

The above nding was relayed by Thomas Schiltgen, District Director of the
Immigration and Naturalization Service, San Francisco to Ms. Teresita V. Marzan,
Consul General of the Philippines:
SUBJECT: WEBB, HUBERT
RE: Hubert Jeffrey Webb
Dear Requester:
YOUR REQUEST WAS RECEIVED BY THIS OFFICE ON 07/10/95.
WE HAVE COMPLETED OUR SEARCH FOR RECORDS RESPONSIVE TO
YOUR REQUEST BUT DID NOT LOCATE ANY . IF YOU STILL BELIEVE THAT
WE HAVE RECORDS WITHIN THE SCOPE OF YOUR REQUEST, AND CAN PROVIDE
US WITH ADDITIONAL INFORMATION, WE WILL CONDUCT ANOTHER SEARCH. IF
YOU ELECT TO REQUEST ANOTHER SEARCH, WE RECOMMEND THAT YOU NOT
FOLLOW THE APPEALS PROCEDURE DESCRIBED BELOW UNTIL WE HAVE
COMPLETED THAT SEARCH.
YOU MAY APPEAL THE FINDING IN THIS MATTER BY WRITING TO THE OFFICE
OF INFORMATION AND PRIVACY, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,
SUITE 570, 1310 G. STREET, N.W., FLAG BUILDING, WASHINGTON D.C., 20530
WITHIN THIRTY (30) DAYS OF RECEIPT OF THIS LETTER. YOUR LETTER
SHOULD REFERENCE THE INS CONTROL NUMBER ABOVE AND THE LETTER
AND THE ENVELOPE SHOULD BE CLEARLY MARKED FOIA/PA APPEAL.
SINCERELY,
(SGD.) DISTRICT DIRECTOR 1 4 4 [EMPHASIS SUPPLIED]
To show that the August 10, 1995 US-INS Certi cation was erroneous, appellant
Webb presented the Memorandum addressed to Secretary Domingo L. Siazon signed
by Consul Leo M. Herrera-Lim, the Diplomatic Note dated October 30, 1995 and the
letter of Debora Farmer stating that the San Francisco certi cation was erroneous. 1 4 5
The prosecution, however, presented another document which indicated that an appeal
to the U.S. Department of Justice, Of ce of Information and Privacy yielded a negative
result on any record on le that one (1) Hubert Webb arrived in the United States on
March 9, 1991, and further that Richard L. Huff, Co-Director of the Of ce of Information
and Privacy had in effect sustained as correct the US-INS San Francisco report that
there is no such data on Hubert Webb in the San Francisco database so that the
Philippine Embassy in Washington, D.C. should instead ask the assistance of other U.S.
government agencies in their search for data on appellant Webb. 1 4 6THcaDA
The defense endeavored to explain why the US-INS Archives in Washington could
have made the "mistake" of stating that it had no data or information on the alleged
entry of appellant Webb on March 9, 1991 and his exit on October 26, 1992. However, it
had not satisfactorily addressed the nagging question of how it became possible for
the US-INS Archives in Washington, which is supposed to merely download and copy
the information given by the San Francisco INS, to have an entry on appellant Webb
when the said port of entry had no such record. Considering that many visitors
(nonimmigrants) are admittedly not entered into the NIIS database, and that diligent
search already yielded a negative response on appellant Webb's entry into the US on
March 9, 1991 as per the August 10, 1995 Certi cation, as to what US government
agency the alleged computer-generated print-out in the August 31, 1995 certi cation
actually came from remains unclear.
Appellant Webb's reliance on the presumption of regularity of of cial functions,
stressing the fact that the US-INS certi cations are of cial documents, is misplaced.
The presumption leaned on is disputable and can be overcome by evidence to the
contrary. 1 4 7 In this case, the existence of an earlier negative report on the NIIS record
on le concerning the entry of appellant Webb into and his exit from the US on March 9,
1991 and October 26, 1992, respectively, had raised serious doubt on the veracity and
accuracy of the subsequently issued second certi cation dated August 31, 1995 which
is based merely on a computer print-out of his alleged entry on March 9, 1991 and
departure on October 26, 1992.
As to the testimony of former Foreign Affairs Secretary Domingo L. Siazon, the
same cannot be given due credence since he is incompetent to testify on the contents
of the August 31, 1995 US-INS Certi cation, having merely received the said document
in his capacity as the head of the Department of Foreign Affairs of the Philippines.
Consul Leo M. Herrera-Lim's testimony likewise did not carry much weight considering
that its signi cance is con ned to the fact that the document from the US-INS was
transmitted and received by the DFA. It is to be noted that the certi cation issued by
the Philippine Embassy with respect to the US-INS Certi cations contained a
disclaimer, speci cally stating that the Embassy assumed no responsibility for the
contents of the annexed document. 1 4 8 The same observations regarding the
"consularized certi cations" was re ected in the Decision dated April 16, 1998 in CA-
G.R. SP No. 42285 ("Miguel Rodriguez v. Amelita Tolentino") and CA-G.R. SP No. 42673
("Hubert P. Webb v. Amelita Tolentino"). 1 4 9
Appellant Webb's travel documents and other supposed paper trail of his stay in
the US are unreliable proof of his absence in the Philippines at the time of the
commission of the crime charged. The non-submission in evidence of his original
passport , which was not formally offered and made part of the records, had deprived
the RTC, CA and this Court the opportunity to examine the same. Such original is a
crucial piece of evidence which unfortunately was placed beyond judicial scrutiny. DHACES
IWe quote the following observations made by the prosecution on Webb's

passport from the appeal brief of the OSG:
In tandem with the presentation of the various U.S. INS certi cations to bolster
appellant Webb's story of a U.S. sojourn before, during and after the commission
of the offense charged, he further anchors his defense on his passport (Exh.
AAAAAA and 294) ostensibly to show, among others, that the grant by the United
States government granted him a visa effective from April 6, 1989 to April 6, 1994
and the U.S. Immigration in San Francisco stampmarked it on March 9, 1991
(Exh. AAAAAA-6) on page 30 thereof (Exh. AAAAAA-2 and 294-D).
On its face, what the entries in the passport plainly suggest is that appellant
Webb violated U.S. immigration laws by "overstaying" beyond the usual six-(6)
month period allowed for tourists. However, he being the son of a Senator would
not unnecessarily violate U.S. immigration laws. It would be quite easy for him to
apply for and secure an extension of his authorized stay in the U.S., if only he
requested. But why did not he or his parents secure the extension? Why was there
no evidence to show that he ever requested an extension? Did he really overstay
in the U.S. or could he simply enter and leave the U.S. and the Philippines without
marking his passport? These raise serious questions on the integrity of the
passport.

Is appellant Webb really untouchable that even U.S. authorities in various states
would let him get "off the hook" without much of a fuss after his alleged brushes
with the law (TSN Hubert Webb dated September 10, 1997, p. 82)? This is
especially incredible considering that he was allegedly apprehended in the United
States near the U.S. border (Ibid., pp. 82-83) where authorities are always on the
look out for illegal aliens.
The questions involving appellant Webb's passport are not limited to the stamp
marks (or lack of stamp marks) therein. There are unusual things about his
passport which he has been unable to explain satisfactorily.
The passport of her mother, Elizabeth Webb, for example, appears to be well
preserved despite having been used more frequently than that of appellant Webb
who supposedly used it in only one trip abroad. Not only do some of the pages
appear smudged or untidy, but more signi cantly, the perforations on the
passport pages indicating the serial number of appellant Webb's passport no
longer t exactly on the pages that is, they are no longer aligned. The
perforations are intended not only to indicate the serial number of the passport
but more importantly to countercheck intercalations and tampering. The "non-
alignment" of the perforations is thus significant.
HASTCa
In addition to the over-all shabby appearance of appellant Webb's passport, what

is evident is the torn plastic portion of the dorsal page thereof near the holder's
signature. There is also the matter of the marked difference in the signatures of
appellant Webb as appearing on the dorsal side of the passport (Exh. AAAAAA-3
and 294-A-1) as compared with that appearing on his laminated photograph (Exh.
AAAAAA-5 and 294-C-1). Of course, he tried to offer an explanation on the
variance in the two (2) signatures. All he could reason out, however, was that he
wrote his name using his normal penmanship when in a lazy mood (TSN
Hubert Webb dated August 14, 1997, p. 27), implying that the signature appearing
on his laminated photograph is his real signature. A review of his other
documentary evidence supposedly bearing his signature shows that what
appears therein is his name written in his "normal penmanship," and that it is only
in the laminated picture (Exh. AAAAAA-5 and 294-C) that such "real signature"
appears. Following appellant Webb's explanation, it means that he was in a lazy
mood all the time! 1 5 0
Two (2) more documents presented by appellant Webb deserve a close look
his US Driver's License supposedly issued on June 14, 1991, and the Passenger
Manifest. The RTC's evaluation of said documents revealed their lack of probative value,
thus:
On August 14, 1997, [Webb] testi ed that he did not make any application since
the procedure in California provides for a walk-in system, that he did not submit
any photograph relative to his application for a Californian Driver's License,
inasmuch as a photograph of him was taken, and that, his driver's license was
issued sometime on the rst week of June, 1991. On the other hand, on
September 1, 1997, the accused suddenly and completely changed his testimony
while still on direct examination. He claims that the picture appearing on the
driver's license was the very same he submitted together with his application for
the driver's license. Thus, the discrepancy as to the source of the photograph
(Exhibit "334-E") between the testimony given on August 14, 1997 where the
accused Webb said that the California Department of Motor Vehicle took his
picture, and the testimony given on September 1, 1997 where he said that he
submitted it to the California DMV as an attachment to his supposed driver's
license application renders the accused Webb's testimony as unbelievable and
unworthy of credence.
It is beyond belief that the same picture submitted by the accused Webb became
the picture in the driver's license allegedly issued on June 14, 1991. Moreover, it is
contrary to human nature and experience, aside from the fact that it is likewise
contrary to the procedure described by the accused Webb in obtaining a driver's
license in the State of California. Since a driver's license is one of the principal
means of identi cation in the United States as well as in the Philippines, to allow
the applicants to produce their own pictures would surely defeat the purpose in
requiring them to appear before the Department of Motor Vehicle, that is, to
ensure the integrity and genuineness of the driver's license.
The Court takes note that the accused Webb, in his fervent desire to exculpate
himself from criminal liability, earlier offered in evidence the letter dated
January 10, 1992 of Mr. Robert L. Heafner, Legal Attache of the
Embassy of the United States to the then Director of the National Bureau of
Investigation, Alfredo S. Lim, (Exhibit "61") which stated in very clear terms that
the accused Webb's California Driver's License Number A8818707 was
issued on August 9, 1991 . Furthermore, the said letter states the listed address
of the accused Webb at the time of the issuance of the driver's license was 532
So. Avenida Faro Ave., Anaheim, California 92807. The said listed address of the
accused Webb at the time his driver's license was issued has demolished the
testimony of the defense witness Sonia Rodriguez that the accused Webb was
supposed to be already living with the Rodriguez family in Longwood, Florida by
the first week of August, 1991.
The accused Webb likewise offered in evidence the of cial communication
coming from the Federal Bureau of Investigation dated December 31,
1991 (Exhibit "MMM" and submarkings; Exhibit "66-C" and submarkings) which
likewise gave the information that the accused Webb was issued California
Driver's License No. 8818707 on August 9, 1991, and that as of August 9,
1991, the address of the accused Webb was 532 South Avenida Faro, Anaheim,
California 92807. The fact that the alleged Driver's License No. A8818707 was
issued on two (2) different dates (August 9, 1991 and June 14, 1991) casts a
serious doubt on its provenance and authenticity. IHAcCS
xxx xxx xxx

In order to establish that the accused Hubert Webb departed from the Philippines
on 09 March 1991 on board UA ight 808 the defense also presented witness
Dulcisimo Daluz, Station Manager of United Airlines for Manila who in turn
presented a document purporting to be the Passenger Manifest for the ight
departing on 09 March 1991 (Exhibits "233-A" to "233-N").
This document merits outright rejection considering that the defense witness
Daluz con rmed that the same was prepared by the UA departure area personnel
and not by himself. Thus, this document is merely hearsay and is devoid of any
merit whatsoever.
In respect of the plane ticket of the accused Hubert Webb, what was likewise
offered as part of the testimony of Daluz was a mere photo copy, wherein Daluz
also admitted not having any direct participation in its preparation.
The spurious nature of the document was observed by the witness Daluz himself
who admitted that there were irregularities in the Passenger Manifest
presented by the defense . According to Daluz, it is a strict procedural
requirement that all the checking agents who were on duty on March 9, 1991 were
supposed to initial the Passenger Manifest, However, he admitted that Exhibits
"223" and "223-N" did not contain the initials of the checking agents
who were supposed to initial the same .
The defense presented Agnes Tabuena, Vice-President for Finance and
Administration of the Philippine Airlines for the purpose of establishing that
Hubert Webb arrived in the Philippines only on 26 October 1992.
Like witnesses Daluz and Nolasco, Tabuena's statements on the witness stand
and the Certi cation was based exclusively on the Passenger Manifest of
PAL's PR 103 . Unfortunately for the defense, the said testimony is of no
probative value and of doubtful veracity considering that the witness did not
prepare the same, nor did the witness identify the persons who prepared the same
other than that they were "airport staff", nor did she had any idea when the
document was transmitted to her of ce. In fact, the witness could not even
interpret the contents of the said Passenger Manifest, much more testify as to the
due execution and genuineness thereof.
In view of the vital necessity to the other accused of establishing accused Webb's
alibi, it is important to note that Atty. Francisco Gatchalian, father of the accused
Michael Gatchalian was then a high ranking PAL Of cial and a colleague of
Tabuena. This makes the source of the document, even ignoring the fact of its
inadmissibility, suspicious. 1 5 1 [EMPHASIS SUPPLIED.] TcDaSI
The alibi of appellants Gatchalian and Lejano, who claimed they were at the Syap
residence at Ayala Alabang Village watching video tapes the whole night of June 29,
1991 until early morning of June 30, 1991, was even less plausible considering the
distance of that place from Pitong Daan Subdivision, which is just a few minutes ride
away. The RTC noted the manifestation of the defense on Andrew Syap's refusal to
testify on Gatchalian and Lejano's whereabouts during the night in question, despite
their efforts to convince him to do so. It further noted the testimony of Assistant NBI
Director Pedro Rivera that Carlos Syap upon seeing Gatchalian with their group even
berated Gatchalian for dragging him into his (Gatchalian's) own problem. Aside from
Alfaro, security guard Normal White, Jr. also testi ed that the presence of Gatchalian
(son of a homeowner), who pointed to the other appellants in the two (2) cars behind
him as his companions, was the reason they allowed his friends to enter the subdivision
on the night of June 29, 1991. White, Jr. also categorically declared he had, earlier that
same night, seen Gatchalian with his friends standing at Vinzons St. Thus, other than the
hearsay declaration of his father who merely testi ed on what his son told him about
spending the night watching video tapes at the Syap residence on June 29, 1991,
Gatchalian presented no corroborative evidence of his alibi.
As to appellant Lejano, he was positively identi ed by Alfaro as the rst to
express approval of Webb's plan to gang-rape Carmela by saying, "Ako ang susunod."
Lejano was also with Alfaro, Webb and Ventura in going inside the Vizconde house, and
whom she later saw inside the master's bedroom, at the foot of the bed where the
bloodied bodies of Estrellita and Jennifer lay, and just standing there about to wear his
jacket while Webb was pumping the hogtied and gagged Carmela on the oor. His alibi
is likewise feeble, as he could have easily gone to the Vizconde house within a few
minutes from the Syap residence where he and Gatchalian allegedly watched video
tapes.

Appellant Fernandez, on his part, insisted that Alfaro's story was simply
fabricated by her "hidden mentors" who considered the sworn statement of Roberto D.
Barroso taken on November 4, 1991. Barroso was one (1) of the members of the
"Akyat Bahay" gang who were earlier charged before the Makati City RTC in Criminal
Case Nos. 91-7135-37 for Rape with Homicide and for Robbery with Homicide in
connection with the Vizconde killings. There is an uncanny congruence in the details of
the incident as testi ed to by Alfaro, with the sworn statement of Barroso particularly
pertaining to the manner by which the garage light of the Vizconde house was put out,
the smashing of the glass panel of the main door, and the appearance of a woman who
opened the main door saying "Sino kayo?" 1 5 2
Such submissions are inane, in view of the dismissal of those cases led against
the rst set of suspects based on lack of evidence. Contrary to Fernandez's insinuation
of a fabricated eyewitness account, Alfaro gave much more minute details than the
limited narration given by Barroso. More important, Alfaro's testimony was suf ciently
corroborated on its material points, not only by the physical evidence, but also by the
testimonies of four (4) disinterested witnesses for the prosecution: White, Jr.,
Cabanacan, Gaviola and Birrer. EAHDac
Fernandez also cited as among the reasons why Alfaro's declarations were far
from positive, the non-recovery of the fatal weapons used in the killings. He contended
that a crucial link in the prosecution's physical evidence was thus missing, as Alfaro
could not even say what was the "object" or "thing" which she saw thrown out of the
Nissan Patrol while the group was on their way to the BF Executive Village. Hence, her
suggestion that what she saw Ventura took from the kitchen drawer may have been
kitchen knives used to kill the victims must fail. 1 5 3
Such proposition fails to persuade. The failure to present the murder weapon will
not exculpate the accused from criminal liability. The presentation and identi cation of
the weapon used are not indispensable to prove the guilt of the accused, much more so
where the perpetrator has been positively identified by a credible witness. 1 5 4
Appellant Rodriguez denies being a conspirator with Webb's group in the
commission of the crime, asserting that his presence and participation in the Vizconde
killings, from the time of its inception up to its consummation, was not established
beyond reasonable doubt. He cites the failure of Alfaro to mention his name as part of
the "group" twice in her testimony. These instances refer to Alfaro's direct examination
when she was asked to name the persons riding the convoy of three (3) vehicles when
they left Ayala Alabang Commercial Center parking lot to proceed to the Vizconde
residence at Pitong Daan Subdivision, 1 5 5 and the second time when she was asked to
enumerate the members of the "group" who were waiting along Aguirre Avenue during
their second trip to the Vizconde residence. 1 5 6 Thus, when Alfaro testi ed that the rest
of the group acted as lookouts while she, Webb, Lejano and Ventura went inside the
Vizconde house, it must be understood as limited only to those she had previously
enumerated, which definitely did not include Rodriguez. 1 5 7
The argument is untenable. The mere fact that Alfaro missed out naming
Rodriguez in two (2) instances during her direct examination does not give rise to the
conclusion that he was not positively identi ed by Alfaro as among those present and
participated prior to, during and after the commission of the crime as lookouts along
with the rest of the group. Contrary to Rodriguez's claim, the rst time that Alfaro
referred to and enumerated the members of the "group" which she had unexpectedly
joined that night, was at the beginning of her narration on how she met Ventura's
friends when she got her order of shabu at the Ayala Alabang Commercial Center
parking lot.
Q. And you said that Dong Ventura introduced you to this group, will you
name the group that was introduced to you by Dong Ventura?
A. First, he introduced me to Hubert Webb, then Fyke Fernandez, Miguel
Rodriguez , and then Tonyboy Lejano, Michael Gatchalian. 1 5 8
Alfaro was again asked to enumerate the members of the "group" when the
prosecution asked her to name the members of the group, in the later part of her direct
examination during the same hearing. 1 5 9 She also testi ed that after everyone,
including Rodriguez, took part in a shabu session, they left the parking lot. 1 6 0 It thus
logically follows that whenever Alfaro made reference to the "group" in her entire
narration, it necessarily included those she had enumerated she had met and had a
shabu session with at the Ayala Alabang Commercial Center parking lot. This same
group was with her from their rst trip to the Vizconde residence until the time they left
Pitong Daan Subdivision and retreated to a house at BF Executive Village early morning
of June 30, 1991. Alfaro had speci cally mentioned Rodriguez when asked by
Prosecutor Zuo to describe their relative positions at the lawn area of the BF Executive
Village house, thus establishing his presence during the "blaming session": SCEDaT
A. . . . kalat kami, sir, pero hindi kami magkakalayo . . .

xxx xxx xxx
Q. How about Miguel Rodriguez, how far was he from Hubert?
A. Two meters away.
xxx xxx xxx
A. Mike is very very near Ging Rodriguez . 1 6 1
It must be stressed that Alfaro categorically declared it was Rodriguez who

approached her at Faces Disco on March 30, 1995 and told her to shut up or she would
be killed. Aside from making that threat, Rodriguez also offered Alfaro a plane ticket so
she could leave the country. 1 6 2 Rodriguez's bare denial cannot be given any evidentiary
weight. We have ruled that denial is a self-serving negative evidence that cannot be
given greater weight than the declaration of a credible witness who testi ed on
affirmative matters. 1 6 3
Rodriguez's attempt to set up an alibi through the testimony of his cousin Mark
Rualo was equally frail. Even assuming as true Rualo's testimony that he had indeed
invited Rodriguez to attend his birthday party on June 29, 1991 but Rodriguez opted to
stay in his house and even talked to him on the phone when he called Rodriguez to ask
why he was not yet at the party, it cannot serve as proof of Rodriguez's whereabouts at
the time of the commission of the crime. It did not rule out the actual presence of
Rodriguez at the crime scene.
Appellant Estrada, just like Rodriguez and Fernandez, did not take the witness
stand and simply relied on the alibi defense of his co-accused, principally that of Webb.
Alfaro testi ed that it was Estrada, then her boyfriend, who was together with her in her
car throughout the night of June 29, 1991 until early morning of June 30, 1991. Estrada
was among those who acted as lookouts outside the Vizconde house after they all
concurred in the plan of Webb to gang-rape Carmela while they were still at the parking
lot of the Ayala Alabang Commercial Center.
Conspiracy among appellants duly proven
The existence of conspiracy between appellants Webb, Ventura, Lejano,
Gatchalian, Fernandez, Rodriguez and Filart was satisfactorily proven by the
prosecution. Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement
concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it. Conspiracy comes to
life at the very instant the plotters agree, expressly or impliedly, to commit the felony
and forthwith decide to actually pursue it. It may be proved by direct or circumstantial
evidence. 1 6 4 Although only one (1) rape was actually proven by the prosecution, as
conspirators who mutually agreed to commit the crime and assisted one (1) another in
its commission, on the occasion of which the rape victim Carmela, her mother Estrellita
and sister Jennifer, were killed, each of the accused-appellants shall be criminally liable
for rape with homicide. CIDaTc
Indeed, appellants by their individual acts, taken as a whole, showed that they
were acting in unison and cooperation to achieve the same unlawful objective, even if it
was only Webb, Ventura and Lejano who actually went inside the Vizconde house while
Estrada, Fernandez, Rodriguez, Gatchalian and Filart stood as lookouts outside the
house. Under these premises, it is not even necessary to pinpoint the precise
participation of each of the accused-appellants, the act of one being the act of all. 1 6 5
One who participates in the material execution of the crime by standing guard or
lending moral support to the actual perpetrators thereof is criminally responsible to the
same extent as the latter. There being conspiracy among the accused-appellants, they
are liable as co-principals regardless of the manner and extent of their participation. 1 6 6
Biong guilty as accessory after the fact
Appellant Biong contends that he cannot be convicted as accessory to the crime
of rape with homicide because the acts imputed to him did not result in the hiding of
the case. There was no evidence that such indeed was his intent or motive. He points
out that the bodies of the victims were found at their respective places where they were
assaulted and there was no evidence that they had been moved an inch from where
they breathed their last. He asserts that non-preservation of the evidence is not an
accessory crime under the Revised Penal Code. 1 6 7
The contentions have no merit.
The Revised Penal Code in Article 19 de nes an accessory as one who has
knowledge of the commission of the crime, yet did not take part in its commission as
principal or accomplice, but took part in it subsequent to its commission by any of
three modes: (1) pro ting himself or assisting the offender to pro t by the effects of
the crime; (2) concealing or destroying the body of the crime, or the effects or
instruments thereof in order to prevent its discovery; and (3) harboring, concealing, or
assisting in the escape of the principals of the crime, provided the accessory acts with
abuse of his public functions or when the offender is guilty of treason, parricide,
murder, or an attempt to take the life of the Chief Executive, or is known to be habitually
guilty of some other crime. 1 6 8
Under paragraph 3 of Article 19 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, there
are two (2) classes of accessories, one of which is a public of cer who harbors,
conceals or assists in the escape of the principal. Such public of cer must have acted
with abuse of his public functions, and the crime committed by the principal is any
crime, provided it is not a light felony. Appellant Biong is one (1) such public of cer, and
he abused his public function when, instead of immediately arresting the perpetrators
of the crime, he acceded to the bidding of appellant Webb to "clean the Vizconde
house," which means he must help hide any possible trace or sign linking them to the
crime, and not necessarily to prevent the discovery of the bodies in such actual
condition upon their deaths. Hence, such "cleaning" would include obliterating
ngerprints and other identifying marks which appellants Webb, Lejano and Ventura
might have left at the scene of the crime.cACEaI
Contrary to Biong's assertion, his failure to preserve evidence at the crime scene
such as ngerprints on the doors and objects inside the master's bedroom where the
bodies were found, the bloodied oor of the toilet, the actual material used in gagging
Carmela and Estrellita, the bloodied blankets and bed sheets, the original condition of
the broken glass panel of the main door, the shoe print and foot prints on the car hood
and at the back of the house, ngerprints on the light bulb at the garage was a form
of assistance to help the perpetrators evade apprehension by confusing the
investigators in determining initially what happened and the possible suspects.
Consequently, Biong's unlawful taking of the jewelries and Carmela's ATM card and
driver's license, his act of breaking the larger portion of the main door glass, the
washing out of the blood on the toilet oor and permitting the relatives to burn the
bloodied bed sheets and blankets had in fact misled the authorities in identifying
potential suspects. Thus, the police had a dif cult time guring out whether it was
robbers who entered the Vizconde house and perpetrated the rape-slay, or drug-crazed
addicts on the loose, or other persons having motive against the Vizconde family had
exacted revenge, or a brutal sexual assault on Carmela by men who were not strangers
to her which also led to the killings.
On the basis of strong evidence of appellant Biong's effort to destroy crucial
physical evidence at the crime scene, I hold that the RTC did not err in convicting him as
an accessory to the crime of rape with homicide.
Penalty
The CA was correct in af rming the sentence imposed by the RTC upon each of
the accused-appellants Webb, Lejano, Gatchalian, Rodriguez, Fernandez and Estrada.
The proper penalty is reclusion perpetua because the imposition of the death penalty
under the Revised Penal Code (in Article 335 thereof, as amended by R.A. No. 2632 and
R.A. No. 4111, when by reason or on the occasion of rape, a homicide is committed),
was prohibited by the Constitution at the time the offense was committed. 1 6 9 At any
rate, the subsequent passage of R.A. No. 9346 entitled "An Act Prohibiting the
Imposition of the Death Penalty in the Philippines," which was signed into law on June
24, 2006, would have mandated the imposition on accused-appellants the same
penalty of reclusion perpetua.
As to the penalty imposed by the CA on appellant Biong as accessory after the
fact to the crime of rape with homicide, we find the same proper and in order.
DNA Testing
Appellant Gatchalian reiterates his and appellant Webb's motion for DNA testing
of the semen specimen taken from the vaginal cavity of Carmela during the autopsy
conducted by Dr. Cabanayan, which motion was denied by the RTC for lack of available
scientific expertise and technology at the time.
With the great advances in forensic science and under pertinent state laws,
American courts allow post-conviction DNA testing when its application has strong
indications that the result could potentially exonerate the convict. Indeed, even a
convicted felon has the right to avail of new technology not available during his trial.
On October 2, 2007, this Court approved the Rule on DNA Evidence 170 which
took effect on October 15, 2007.
Pursuant to Section 4 of the Rule, the court may at any time, either motu proprio
or on application of any person who has a legal interest in the matter in litigation, order
a DNA testing after due notice and hearing. Such order shall issue upon showing of the
following: AacSTE
(a) A biological sample exists that is relevant to the case;

(b) The biological sample: (i) was not previously subjected to the type of DNA
testing now requested; or (ii) was previously subjected to DNA testing, but the
results may require confirmation for good reasons;
(c) The DNA testing uses a scientifically valid technique;
(d) The DNA testing has the scienti c potential to produce new information
that is relevant to the proper resolution of the case; and
(e) The existence of other factors, if any, which the court may consider as
potentially affecting the accuracy or integrity of the DNA testing. 1 7 1
By Resolution dated April 20, 2010, this Court granted appellant Webb's request
to submit for DNA analysis the semen specimen taken from the cadaver of Carmela
Vizconde under the custody of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI). We ordered
(1) the NBI to assist the parties in facilitating the submission of the said specimen to
the UP-Natural Science and Research Institute (UP-NSRI), Diliman, Quezon City; and (2)
the NBI and UP-NSRI to report to this Court within fteen (15) days from notice
regarding compliance with and implementation of the said resolution.
In his Compliance and Manifestation dated April 27, 2010, Atty. Reynaldo O.
Esmeralda, NBI Deputy Director for Technical Services, informed this Court that the
semen specimen/vaginal smear taken from the cadaver of Carmela Vizconde and all
original documents (autopsy and laboratory reports, and photographs) are no longer in
the custody of the NBI as these were submitted as evidence to the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Paraaque City, Branch 274 by then NBI Medico-Legal Chief, Prospero A.
Cabanayan, M.D., when the latter testi ed on direct and cross-examination on January
30, 31, February 1, 5, 6 and 7, 1996. Attached thereto are certi ed true copies of
Laboratory Report No. SN-91-17 (stating positive result for the presence of human
spermatozoa), Autopsy Report No. N-91-1665 (with remarks: "Smear for presence of
spermatozoa"), copy of the sworn statement of Dr. Cabanayan and certi ed true copy
of the envelope bearing his signed handwritten notation that all original photographs
have been submitted as evidence during the aforementioned hearing dates. 1 7 2
On May 11, 2010, the Of ce of the Solicitor General (OSG) led a Motion for
Reconsideration of our Resolution dated April 20, 2010 on grounds that (a) the DNA
testing order was issued in disregard of Section 4 of the Rule on DNA Evidence which
requires prior hearing and notice; (b) a determination of propriety of DNA testing at this
stage under the present Rule, separate from that led by Webb before the trial court on
October 6, 1997, is necessary as there was no opportunity back then to establish the
requisites for a DNA testing order under the Rule which took effect only in 2007; (c) the
result of the DNA testing will constitute new evidence, which cannot be received and
appreciated for the rst time on appeal; and (d) this Court failed to elucidate an
exceptional circumstance to justify its decision to consider a question of fact, as this
Court itself acknowledged in its April 20, 2010 Resolution that the result of DNA testing
is not crucial or indispensable in the determination of appellant Webb's guilt for the
crime charged. 1 7 3 EaHIDC
On May 21, 2010, Atty. Roberto Makalintal, Jr., Branch Clerk of RTC Paraaque
City, Branch 274, submitted his Comment on The Compliance and Manifestation Dated
April 27, 2010 of the NBI stating that: (a) There is no showing of actual receipt by RTC
Branch 274 of the specimen/vaginal smear mentioned in Dr. Cabanayan's af davit
dated April 27, 2010; (b) Based on available records such as the TSN of January 31,
1996 and February 7, 1996 during which Dr. Cabanayan testi ed, no such
specimen/vaginal smear was submitted to RTC Branch 274; (c) The TSN of January 31,
1996 on pages 57, 58 and 69 suggest that marked in evidence as Exhibits "S", "T" and
"U" by then Chief State Prosecutor Jovencito Zuo were only the photographs of the
three slides containing the semen specimen; (c) In the hearing of February 7, 1996, Dr.
Cabanayan's last testimony before RTC Branch 274 in this case, he testi ed that the
last time he saw those slides was when he had the photographs thereof taken in 1995
(the rst time was when he examined them in 1991), and as far as he knows between
1991 and 1995, those slides were kept in the Pathology Laboratory of the NBI; and (d)
The entire records of the cases were already forwarded to this Court a long time ago,
including the evidence formally offered by the prosecution and the accused. 1 7 4
Under our Resolution of June 15, 2010, we required the NBI to (a) show proof of
the release of the semen specimen to the RTC of Paraaque City, Branch 274 in 1996;
and (b) comment on the alleged con icting representations in its Compliance and
Manifestation dated April 27, 2010, both within ten days from notice. However, the NBI
has not complied with said directive.
In his Comment on the OSG's motion for reconsideration, appellant Fernandez
argued that when this Court, in the higher interest of justice, relaxed the Rule on DNA
Evidence to afford Webb the fullest extent of his constitutional rights, the prosecution
was not thereby denied its equally important right to due process. Contrary to the
OSG's claim that this Court immediately granted DNA testing without observing the
requisites under Section 4 of the Rule on DNA Evidence, and without due notice and
hearing, appellant asserts that the Resolution dated April 20, 2010 clearly de nes the
parameters of the DNA analysis to be conducted by the UP-NSRI assisted by the NBI.
Indeed, there are ample safeguards in the Rule to assure the reliability and acceptability
of the results of the DNA testing. Fernandez, however, objected to the statement of the
OSG that "in the light of positive identi cation" of appellant Webb by the principal
witness for the prosecution, Jessica Alfaro, the existing circumstances more than
warrant the af rmation of Webb's guilt. Alfaro's cross-examination exposed her as an
"out-and-out perjurer, a bold and intentional liar under oath" and a "fake witness" whose
account of the incident is "shot-through with fatal omissions, self-contradictions,
inconsistencies and inherent improbabilities." 1 7 5
DTcHaA
Appellant Lejano likewise led his comment, pointing out that the trial court
denied Webb's motion to direct the NBI to submit semen specimen for DNA analysis on
November 25, 1997 only after lengthy exchange of pleadings between the defense and
prosecution, the latter having properly opposed said motion. Hence, the People cannot
now rightfully claim that there was no notice or hearing on the issue of submitting the
semen specimen for DNA analysis. Citing Brady v. Maryland, 1 7 6 Lejano contended that
the suppression of exculpatory evidence or evidence that will show reasonable
probability that the verdict would have been different had the evidence been disclosed
grossly violates an accused's right to due process. In this case, the evidence needs
only to be subjected to DNA analysis to establish the innocence of appellant Webb, as
well as of petitioner and appellant Lejano. It was further asserted that the semen
specimen was already existing at the time of the trial, and hence can hardly be
considered as "new evidence" and that DNA testing of said semen specimen taken from
the victim Carmela Vizconde "has the scienti c potential to produce new information
that is relevant to the proper resolution of the case" (Sec. 4 (d), Rule on DNA Evidence).
177
On his part, appellant Webb stressed that there are exceptional circumstances
that justify this Court's order to immediately conduct the DNA analysis. He has been
behind bars for more than fteen (15) years. He has led a motion for DNA analysis as
early as 1997 or thirteen (13) years ago. The result of such test could yield evidence
that could acquit him while no damage will be suffered by the prosecution considering
that this Court emphasized in its Resolution of April 20, 2010 that the prosecution's
evidences and concerns regarding the proper preservation of evidence in the custody
of the NBI would have to be addressed in the light of the requirements laid down by the
Rule on DNA Evidence. As to the prosecution's argument that this Court cannot receive
and appreciate "new evidence," Section 4 of the Rule states that "the appropriate court
may, at any time, either motu proprio or on application of any person who has a legal
interest in the matter in litigation, order a DNA testing"; DNA testing is even available
post-conviction (Ibid., Sec. 6). This Court in accordance with proper procedure thus
decided to receive DNA evidence in order not to further delay the case, appellants after
all, were convicted more than ten (10) years ago in 2000 and have been incarcerated for
fifteen (15) years now.
Webb further underscored that where the evidence has not been offered, it is the
prosecution who should have the legal custody and responsibility over it. 1 7 8 The NBI's
letter dated April 23, 1997 con rmed that the semen specimen was in its custody. The
NBI's repudiation of such fact is belied by the records; the Prosecution's Formal Offer
of Evidence shows that Exhibits "S", "T" and "U" were merely photographs of the slides
containing the vaginal smear. Also, nowhere in the transcript of stenographic notes
taken during Dr. Cabanayan's testimony was it shown that he turned over the actual
slides to the trial court. On the contrary, when Dr. Cabanayan was asked on February 6,
1996 to produce the slides, which he had promised to bring during the previous
hearing, he admitted that he "forgot all about it" when he came to the hearing. Thus, it
appears from the record that from the time the semen specimen was taken from
Carmela Vizconde's cadaver, it has always been in the custody of the NBI. 1 7 9
Evidently, the NBI could no longer produce the semen specimen/vaginal smear
taken from the cadaver of Carmela Vizconde and consequently DNA analysis of said
physical evidence can no longer be done. Hence, this Court set aside the April 20, 2010
resolution and forthwith proceeded to resolve the present appeal on the basis of
existing evidence which have been formally offered by the parties and/or made part of
the records. STECDc
Appellant Webb's Urgent

Motion to Acquit
With the recall of the order for DNA testing, appellant Webb moved for his
acquittal on the ground of violation of his constitutional right to due process by reason
of the State's failure to produce the semen specimen, either through negligence or
willful suppression. Webb argues that the loss or suppression by the prosecution of the
semen specimen denied him the right to avail of the latest DNA technology and prove
his innocence. Citing American jurisprudence (Matter of Dabbs v. Vergari , 1 8 0 California
v. Trombetta 1 8 1 and Brady v. Maryland), 1 8 2 Webb contends that in disallowing the
DNA examination he had requested, the RTC denied him from presenting a "complete
defense" through that "singular piece of evidence that could have de nitively
established his innocence," the trial court relying instead on the identi cation of Jessica
Alfaro, a "perjured witness." The constitutional duty of the prosecution to turn over
exculpatory evidence to the accused includes the duty to preserve such evidence.
Webb maintains that the semen specimen extracted from the cadaver of
Carmela had exculpatory value, as even NBI's Dr. Cabanayan testi ed during the hearing
of February 7, 1996, that it was still possible to subject the same to DNA analysis to
identify the person to whom the sperm belonged. Thus, a DNA analysis of said semen
specimen excluding appellant Webb as the source thereof would disprove the
prosecution's evidence against him. Further, Webb points out that the prosecution
considered the presence of spermatozoa on the body of Carmela as evidence that she
was raped, offering the photographs of the glass slides containing the sperm cells as
proof that she was in fact raped on or about the late evening of June 29, 1991 or early
morning of June 30, 1991. But the only evidence of the prosecution that it was Webb
who raped Carmela was the testimony of Alfaro which was given full credit by the RTC
and CA despite all its inconsistencies, and despite all documentary and testimonial
evidence presented by the defense proving that Webb was at the United States at the
time the crime was committed.
On the matter of preserving DNA evidence, Webb cites Section 12 of the Rule on
DNA Evidence which authorizes the court to order the appropriate government agency
to preserve the DNA evidence during trial and even when the accused is already serving
sentence, until such time the decision of the court has become nal and executory.
While this Court has given Webb the best opportunity to prove his innocence in the
order granting DNA analysis of the sperm specimen taken from Carmela's cadaver,
such potentially exculpatory evidence could not be produced by the State. Webb now
claims that as a result of the destruction or loss of evidence under the NBI's custody,
he was effectively deprived of his right to present a complete defense, in violation of his
constitutional right to due process, thus entitling him to an acquittal.
SCaTAc
Loss of Semen Specimen

Not Ground for
Acquittal of Webb
Webb's argument that under the facts of this case and applying the cited rulings
from American jurisprudence, he is entitled to acquittal on the ground of violation of his
constitutional right to due process, is without merit.
In Brady v. Maryland 1 8 3 it was held that "the suppression by the prosecution of
evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the
evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or
bad faith of the prosecution." In said case, the petitioner was convicted of murder
committed in the course of robbery and sentenced to death. He later learned that the
prosecution suppressed an extrajudicial confession made by his accomplice who
admitted he did the actual killing. The US Supreme Court granted a new trial and
remanded the case but only on the question of punishment.
In Matter of Dabbs v. Vergari , 1 8 4 the court ordered DNA testing of specimen
taken from a rape victim after the sexual assault and from the accused who was
convicted, DNA testing being unavailable at the time of the trial. Accused therein was
identi ed by the victim as her attacker. The court found the factual circumstances
clearly showed that the semen specimen could have come only from the accused. It
noted that the witness testi ed that accused acted alone, had ejaculated and she did
not have sexual intercourse with any other person within 24 hours prior to the sexual
assault. DNA testing ultimately revealed that petitioner's DNA composition did not
match with that found on the victim's underwear. Consequently, the court granted
petitioner's subsequent motions to vacate the judgment of conviction.
In California v. Trombetta , 1 8 5 a case involving the prosecution for drunk driving,
the US Supreme Court ruled that the Due Process Clause of the Constitution does not
require that law enforcement agencies preserve breath samples in order to introduce
breath-analysis tests at trial.
Given our precedents in this area, we cannot agree with the California Court of
Appeal that the State's failure to retain breath samples for respondents
constitutes a violation of the Federal Constitution. To begin with, California
authorities in this case did not destroy respondents' breath samples in a
calculated effort to circumvent the disclosure requirements established by Brady
v. Maryland and its progeny. In failing to preserve breath samples for
respondents, the of cers here were acting "in good faith and in accord with their
normal practice." . . . The record contains no allegation of of cial animus towards
respondents or of a conscious effort to suppress exculpatory evidence. IaDTES
More importantly, California's policy of not preserving breath samples is without

constitutional defect. Whatever duty the Constitution imposes on the States to
preserve evidence, that duty must be limited to evidence that might be expected to
play a significant role in the suspect's defense.
To meet this standard of constitutional materiality, . . . evidence must both
possess an exculpatory value that was apparent before the evidence was
destroyed, and be of such a nature that the defendant would be unable to obtain
comparable evidence by other reasonably available means. Neither of these
conditions is met on the facts of this case. [ITALICS SUPPLIED.]
From the above cases, it is clear that what is crucial is the requirement of
materiality of the semen specimen sought for DNA testing. Appellant Webb must be
able to demonstrate a reasonable probability that the DNA sample would prove his
innocence. Evidence is material where "there is reasonable probability that, had the
evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been
different." 1 8 6
In People v. Yatar, 1 8 7 decided before the promulgation of the Rule on DNA
Evidence, the Court expounded on the nature of DNA evidence and the factors to be
considered in assessing its probative value in the context of scienti c and legal
developments. The proper judicial approach is founded on the concurrence of relevancy
and reliability. Most important, forensic identi cation though useful does not preclude
independent evidence of identification.
DNA is a molecule that encodes the genetic information in all living organisms. A
person's DNA is the same in each cell and it does not change throughout a
person's lifetime; the DNA in a person's blood is the same as the DNA found in his
saliva, sweat, bone, the root and shaft of hair, earwax, mucus, urine, skin tissue,
and vaginal and rectal cells. Most importantly, because of polymorphisms in
human genetic structure, no two individuals have the same DNA, with the notable
exception of identical twins.

DNA print or identi cation technology has been advanced as a uniquely effective
means to link a suspect to a crime, or to exonerate a wrongly accused suspect,
where biological evidence has been left. For purposes of criminal investigation,
DNA identi cation is a fertile source of both inculpatory and
exculpatory evidence . It can assist immensely in effecting a more accurate
account of the crime committed, efficiently facilitating the conviction of the guilty,
securing the acquittal of the innocent, and ensuring the proper administration of
justice in every case.HaIATC
DNA evidence collected from a crime scene can link a suspect to a crime or
eliminate one from suspicion in the same principle as ngerprints are used.
Incidents involving sexual assault would leave biological evidence such as hair,
skin tissue, semen, blood, or saliva which can be left on the victim's body or at the
crime scene. Hair and ber from clothing, carpets, bedding, or furniture could also
be transferred to the victim's body during the assault. Forensic DNA evidence is
helpful in proving that there was physical contact between an assailant and a
victim. If properly collected from the victim, crime scene or assailant, DNA can be
compared with known samples to place the suspect at the scene of the crime.
The U.P. National Science Research Institute (NSRI), which conducted the DNA
tests in this case, used the Polymerase chain reaction (PCR) ampli cation
method by Short Tandem Repeat (STR) analysis. With PCR testing, tiny amounts
of a speci c DNA sequence can be copied exponentially within hours. Thus,
getting suf cient DNA for analysis has become much easier since it became
possible to reliably amplify small samples using the PCR method.
In assessing the probative value of DNA evidence, courts should
consider, inter alia , the following factors : how the samples were collected,
how they were handled, the possibility of contamination of the samples, the
procedure followed in analyzing the samples, whether the proper standards and
procedures were followed in conducting the tests, and the quali cation of the
analyst who conducted the tests.
In the case at bar, Dr. Maria Corazon Abogado de Ungria was duly quali ed by the
prosecution as an expert witness on DNA print or identi cation techniques. Based
on Dr. de Ungria's testimony, it was determined that the gene type and DNA profile
of appellant are identical to that of the extracts subject of examination. The blood
sample taken from the appellant showed that he was of the following gene types:
vWA 15/19, TH01 7/8, DHFRP2 9/10 and CSF1PO 10/11, which are identical with
semen taken from the victim's vaginal canal. Verily, a DNA match exists between
the semen found in the victim and the blood sample given by the appellant in
open court during the course of the trial.
Admittedly, we are just beginning to integrate these advances in science and
technology in the Philippine criminal justice system, so we must be cautious as
we traverse these relatively unchartered waters. Fortunately, we can bene t from
the wealth of persuasive jurisprudence that has developed in other jurisdictions.
Specifically, the prevailing doctrine in the U.S. has proven instructive.
In Daubert v. Merrell Dow , it was ruled that pertinent evidence based on
scienti cally valid principles could be used as long as it was relevant
and reliable . Judges, under Daubert, were allowed greater discretion over which
testimony they would allow at trial, including the introduction of new kinds of
scientific techniques. DNA typing is one such novel procedure. AcSEHT
Under Philippine law, evidence is relevant when it relates directly to a

fact in issue as to induce belief in its existence or non-existence .
Applying the Daubert test to the case at bar, the DNA evidence obtained through
PCR testing and utilizing STR analysis, and which was appreciated by the court a
quo is relevant and reliable since it is reasonably based on scienti cally valid
principles of human genetics and molecular biology.
Independently of the physical evidence of appellant's semen found in
the victim's vaginal canal, the trial court appreciated the following
circumstantial evidence as being suf cient to sustain a conviction
beyond reasonable doubt : (1) Appellant and his wife were living in the house
of Isabel Dawang together with the victim, Kathylyn Uba; (2) In June 1998,
appellant's wife left the house because of their frequent quarrels; (3) Appellant
received from the victim, Kathylyn Uba, a letter from his estranged wife in the
early morning of June 30, 1998; (4) Appellant was seen by Apolonia Wania and
Beverly Denneng at 1:00 p.m. of June 30, 1998 near the kitchen of the house of
Isabel Dawang, acting strangely and wearing a dirty white shirt with collar; (5)
Judilyn Pas-a saw appellant going down the ladder of the house of Isabel at
12:30 p.m., wearing a dirty white shirt, and again at 1:30 p.m., this time wearing a
black shirt; (6) Appellant hurriedly left when the husband of Judilyn Pas-a was
approaching; (7) Salmalina Tandagan saw appellant in a dirty white shirt coming
down the ladder of the house of Isabel on the day Kathylyn Uba was found dead;
(8) The door leading to the second oor of the house of Isabel Dawang was tied
by a rope; (9) The victim, Kathylyn Uba, lay naked in a pool of blood with her
intestines protruding from her body on the second oor of the house of Isabel
Dawang, with her stained pants, bra, underwear and shoes scattered along the
periphery; (10) Laboratory examination revealed sperm in the victim's vagina
(Exhibits "H" and "J"); (11) The stained or dirty white shirt found in the crime scene
was found to be positive with blood; (12) DNA of slide, Exhibits "J" and "H",
compared with the DNA pro le of the appellant are identical; and (13) Appellant
escaped two days after he was detained but was subsequently apprehended,
such flight being indicative of guilt. 1 8 8 [EMPHASIS SUPPLIED.]
Indeed, in other jurisdictions it has been recognized that DNA test results are not
always exculpatory.
Postconviction test results are not always exculpatory. In addition, exculpatory
test results will not necessarily free the convicted individual. If the evidence does
exclude the petitioner, the court must weigh the signi cance of the exclusion in
relation to all the other evidence. Convicted offenders often believe that if crime
scene evidence does not contain their DNA they will automatically be exonerated.
Not nding the petitioner's DNA does not automatically indicate the case should
be overturned, however. In a rape case, for example, the perpetrator may have
worn a condom, or not ejaculated. In some cases, the absence of evidence is not
necessarily evidence of the defendant's absence or lack of involvement in the
crime. 1 8 9
We hold that the source of the semen extracted from the vaginal cavity of the
deceased victim is immaterial in determining Webb's guilt. From the totality of the
evidence presented by both the prosecution and the defense, Webb was positively
identified as Carmela's rapist.
As the records bear out, the positive identi cation of appellant Webb as
Carmela's rapist satis ed the test of moral certainty, and the prosecution had equally
established beyond reasonable doubt the fact of rape and the unlawful killing of
Carmela, Estrellita and Jennifer on the occasion thereof. Even assuming that the DNA
analysis of the semen specimen taken from Carmela's body hours after her death
excludes Webb as the source thereof, it will not exonerate him from the crime charged.
Alfaro did not testify that Webb had ejaculated or did not use a condom while raping
Carmela. She testi ed that she saw Webb rape Carmela and it was only him she had
witnessed to have committed the rape inside the Vizconde residence between late
evening of June 29, 1991 and early morning of June 30, 1991. Moreover, she did not
testify that Carmela had no sexual relations with any other man at least 24 hours prior
to that time. On the other hand, a positive result of DNA examination of the semen
specimen extracted by Dr. Cabanayan from Carmela's cadaver would merely serve as
corroborative evidence. ISTCHE
As to the loss of the semen specimen in the custody of the NBI, appellant Webb's
contention that this would entitle him to an acquittal on the basis of Brady v. Maryland
is misplaced.
In Arizona v. Youngblood, 1 9 0 a 10-year old boy was molested and sodomized by
the accused, a middle-aged man, for 1 1/2 hours. After the assault, the boy was
examined in a hospital where the physician used swab to collect specimen from the
boy's rectum and mouth, but did not examine them at anytime. These samples were
refrigerated but the boy's clothing was not. Accused was identi ed by the victim in a
photographic lineup and was convicted of child molestation, sexual assault and
kidnapping. During the trial, expert witnesses had testi ed that timely performance of
tests with properly preserved semen samples could have produced results that might
have completely exonerated the accused. The Court held:
There is no question but that the State complied with Brady and Agurs
here. The State disclosed relevant police reports to respondent, which
contained information about the existence of the swab and the clothing ,
and the boy's examination at the hospital. The State provided respondents' expert
with the laboratory reports and notes prepared by the police criminologist, and
respondent's expert had access to the swab and to the clothing.
xxx xxx xxx
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, as interpreted in Brady,
makes the good or bad faith of the State irrelevant when the State fails to
disclose to the defendant material exculpatory evidence. But we think the Due
Process Clause requires a different result when we deal with the failure of the
State to preserve evidentiary material of which no more can be said than that it
could have been subjected to tests, the results of which might have exonerated
the defendant. . . . We think that requiring a defendant to show bad faith on the
part of the police both limits the extent of the police's obligation to preserve
evidence to reasonable bounds and con nes it to that class of cases where the
interests of justice most clearly require it, i.e., those cases in which the police
themselves by their conduct indicate that the evidence could form a basis for
exonerating the defendant. We therefore hold that unless a criminal defendant
can show bad faith on the part of the police, failure to preserve
potentially useful evidence does not constitute a denial of due process
of law .
In this case, the police collected the rectal swab and clothing on the night of the
crime: respondent was not taken into custody until six weeks later. The failure
of the police to refrigerate the clothing and to perform tests on the
semen samples can at worst be described as negligent. None of this
information was concealed from respondent at trial, and the evidence
such as it was was made available to respondent's expert who
declined to perform any tests on the samples . The Arizona Court of Appeals
noted in its opinion and we agree that there was no suggestion of bad
faith on the part of the police. It follows, therefore, from what we have
said, that there was no violation of the Due Process Clause . [EMPHASIS
SUPPLIED.] IEAacT
In this case, there is no showing of bad faith on the part of the police
investigators, speci cally the NBI, for the non-production of the vaginal swab and glass
slide containing the semen specimen, during the trial and upon our recent order for DNA
testing. The prosecution did not conceal at anytime the existence of those vaginal swab
and glass slide containing the vaginal smear. Curiously, despite Dr. Cabanayan's
admission during the hearing that it was still possible to subject the semen specimen
to DNA analysis, the defense never raised the issue thereafter and resurrected the
matter only in October 1997 when Webb's counsel filed his motion.
It bears to stress that the vaginal smear itself was not formally offered by the
prosecution, but only the photographs of the glass slide containing the semen
specimen for the purpose only of proving that Carmela was in fact raped and not that
Webb was the source of the sperm/semen. As noted by the RTC when it denied Webb's
motion for DNA on November 25, 1997, prevailing jurisprudence stated that DNA being
a relatively new science then, has not yet been accorded of cial recognition by our
courts. The RTC also considered the more than six (6) years that have elapsed since the
commission of the crime in June 1991, thus the possibility of the specimen having been
tampered with or contaminated. Acting on reasonable belief that the proposed DNA
examination will not serve the ends of justice but instead lead to complication and
confusion of the issues of the case, the trial court properly denied Webb's request for
DNA testing.
We thus reiterate that the vaginal smear con rming the presence of
spermatozoa merely corroborated Alfaro's testimony that Carmela was raped before
she was killed. Indeed, the presence or absence of spermatozoa is immaterial in a
prosecution for rape. The important consideration in rape cases is not the emission of
semen but the unlawful penetration of the female genitalia by the male organ. 1 9 1 On
the other hand, a negative result of DNA examination of the semen specimen could not
have exonerated Webb of the crime charged as his identity as a principal in the rape-
slay of Carmela was satisfactorily established by the totality of the evidence. A nding
that the semen specimen did not match Webb's DNA does not necessarily negate his
presence at the locus criminis.
Civil Liability of Appellants
The Court sustains the award of P100,000.00 as civil indemnity, pursuant to
current jurisprudence that in cases of rape with homicide, civil indemnity in the amount
of P100,000.00 should be awarded to the heirs of the victim. 1 9 2 Civil indemnity is
mandatory and granted to the heirs of the victims without need of proof other than the
commission of the crime. For the deaths of Estrellita and Jennifer, the award of civil
indemnity ex delicto to their heirs, was likewise in order, in the amount of P50,000.00
each. 1 9 3 Following People v. Dela Cruz , 1 9 4 P75,000.00 civil indemnity and P75,000
moral damages in rape cases are awarded only if they are classi ed as heinous. 1 9 5 As
the rape-slay of Carmela took place in 1991, R.A. No. 7659 entitled "AN ACT TO
IMPOSE DEATH PENALTY ON CERTAIN HEINOUS CRIMES, AMENDING FOR THAT
PURPOSE THE REVISED PENAL LAWS, AS AMENDED, OTHER SPECIAL PENAL LAWS,
AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES," which was approved on December 13, 1993 and was to
become effective fteen (15) days after its publication in two national newspapers of
general circulation, was not yet effective. 1 9 6DcSTaC
As to moral damages, recent jurisprudence allows the amount of P75,000.00 to

be awarded in cases of rape with homicide. 1 9 7 We nd the amount of P2,000,000.00
as moral damages awarded by the RTC as af rmed by the CA, rather excessive. While
courts have a wide latitude in ascertaining the proper award for moral damages, the
award should not be to such an extent that it in icts injustice on the accused. 1 9 8 The
award of P2,000,000.00 as moral damages to the heir of the victims should
accordingly be reduced to P500,000.00. The rest of the awards given by the trial court
are affirmed.
In view of the foregoing, I respectfully vote that the appeals in the above-entitled
cases be DISMISSED and the Decision dated December 15, 2005 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR H.C. No. 00336 be AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION only as to
the award of damages.
SERENO , J., concurring :
The duty of the prosecution is not merely to secure a conviction, but to

secure a just conviction.
This highly publicized case became the center of the nation's attention owing to
the public outrage over the atrocious nature of the crime committed in what was then
thought to be a relatively secure neighborhood. Worse, it brought inconsolable grief to
a husband and father who lost his entire family to senseless violence while he was
working overseas. Events soon after the occurrence of the crime on 30 June 1991
would only help fuel civic indignation. Just two days thereafter, or on 2 July 1991, La
Salle Engineering student Eldon Maguan was gunned down in cold blood by
businessman Rolito Go over a parking skirmish in San Juan. 1 After the lapse of only 11
days, young Maureen Hultman and Roland John Chapman were fatally shot by Claudio
Teehankee, Jr. in Dasmarinas Village after a minor scuffle. 2
The vehement outcry to nd and punish those responsible for the Vizconde
horror initially led, four months after, to the arrest and eventual ling by the prosecution
of Information for two counts of robbery with homicide and one count of robbery with
rape against six named and an undetermined number of unnamed persons touted as
members of the Akyat Bahay gang. In view of the illegal arrests of the accused and
noncompliance with the requirements for conducting custodial investigation, including
evidence of torture in extracting confessions from the accused, the trial court in its
1993 Decision 3 pronounced the accused not guilty of the charges. During the same
year (1993), another set of suspects (apparently former contractors/workers of the
Vizcondes) was identi ed, only to be released later on due to insuf ciency of evidence.
4 IcAaEH
Almost four years after the crime was committed, self-confessed drug user
Jessica Alfaro (Alfaro) named young men from wealthy and powerful families as
perpetrators of the crime, which she claimed to have witnessed, thereby tantalizing a
sympathetic public with ideal visions of justice of morally depraved offenders nally
caught and no longer able to wreck random havoc on the lives of law-abiding citizens;
of privileged perpetrators subjected to the rule of law no matter how high and mighty;
of bereaved families brought a measure of comfort for the vindication of wasted young
lives.
However, there was little objective forensic evidence obtained from the crime
scene due to deplorable missteps taken by the investigating police of cers.
Consequently, Senior Police Of cer 1 Gerardo Biong and some John Does were
charged as accessories to the crime for "conceal[ing] and destroy[ing] the effects or
instruments thereof by failing to preserve the physical evidence and allowing their
destruction in order to prevent the discovery of the crime." 5
A review of the proceedings during preliminary investigation and trial showed
that the prosecution did not fare much better, for it committed acts of prosecutorial
misconduct that effectively deprived the accused of their constitutionally guaranteed
right to due process.
At the outset, it cannot be overemphasized that the prosecuting of cer "is the
representative not of an ordinary party to a controversy, but of a sovereignty whose
obligation to govern impartially is as compelling as its obligation to govern at all; and
whose interest, therefore, in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but
that justice shall be done. As such, he is in a peculiar and very de nite sense the servant
of the law, the twofold aim of which is that guilt shall not escape or innocence suffer.
He may prosecute with earnestness and vigor indeed, he should do so. But, while he
may strike hard blows, he is not at liberty to strike foul ones. It is as much his duty to
refrain from improper methods calculated to produce a wrongful conviction as it is to
use every legitimate means to bring about a just one." 6
In the words of Richard Refshauge: "The adversarial system . . . is rooted in the
notion of a contest with winners and losers, yet the prosecutor is ethically forbidden
from embracing that notion. The question then, is not what will make the prospect of a
conviction more certain, but what is fair and what will contribute to justice." 7
Thus, a criminal trial is not about personal redress for the victims, but about
determining the guilt and the just punishment of the accused. 8 What is in truth referred
to when expanding on the concept of "fair trial" is that the rights of the accused are
protected, to the extent necessary to ensure fairness for him. Rights of the victim are
not ignored, but they are respected only to the extent that they are consistent with the
fairness of the trial for the accused. 9
In Allado V. Diokno, 1 0 we also elucidated this delicate balancing of interests in
the following manner:
The sovereign power has the inherent right to protect itself and its people from
vicious acts which endanger the proper administration of justice; hence, the State
has every right to prosecute and punish violators of the law. This is essential for
its self-preservation, nay, its very existence. But this does not confer a license for
pointless assaults on its citizens. The right of the State to prosecute is not a carte
blanche for government agents to defy and disregard the rights of its citizens
under the Constitution. Con nement, regardless of duration, is too high a price to
pay for reckless and impulsive prosecution. Hence, even if we apply in this case
the "multifactor balancing test" which requires the of cer to weigh the manner
and intensity of the interference on the right of the people, the gravity of the crime
committed and the circumstances attending the incident, still we cannot see
probable cause to order the detention of petitioners. ATHCac
The purpose of the Bill of Rights is to protect the people against arbitrary and
discriminatory use of political power. This bundle of rights guarantees the
preservation of our natural rights which include personal liberty and security
against invasion by the government or any of its branches or instrumentalities.
Certainly, in the hierarchy of rights, the Bill of Rights takes precedence over the
right of the State to prosecute, and when weighed against each other, the scales
of justice tilt towards the former. Thus, relief may be availed of to stop the
purported enforcement of criminal law where it is necessary to provide for an
orderly administration of justice, to prevent the use of the strong arm of the law in
an oppressive and vindictive manner, and to afford adequate protection to
constitutional rights.
Let this then be a constant reminder to judges, prosecutors and other government
agents tasked with the enforcement of the law that in the performance of their
duties they must act with circumspection, lest their thoughtless ways, methods
and practices cause a disservice to their of ce and maim their countrymen they
are sworn to serve and protect. We thus caution government agents, particularly
the law enforcers, to be more prudent in the prosecution of cases and not to be
oblivious of human rights protected by the fundamental law. While we greatly
applaud their determined efforts to weed society of felons, let not their impetuous
eagerness violate constitutional precepts which circumscribe the structure of a
civilized community.
Indeed, at the core of our criminal justice system is the presumption of

innocence of the accused until proven guilty. Lip service to this ideal is not enough, as
our people are well acquainted with the painful reality that the rights of the accused to a
fair trial were violated with impunity by an unchecked authority in our not so distant
history. In response, the rights of the accused were enshrined in no less than the 1987
Constitution, particularly Article III thereof. They are further bolstered by the Rules of
Court, related legislation, general rules on evidence, and rules on ethical conduct.
The said rights of the accused come with the corresponding duties, nay,
guarantees on the part of the State, the prosecution in particular. The prosecution's
disregard of these standards amounts to prosecutorial misconduct.
Some examples of prosecutorial misconduct would be the intimidation of
defense witnesses, the obstruction of defense lawyers' access to prosecution
witnesses, the coercion of confession from the accused, the issuance of prejudicial
comments about the accused, the mishandling and/or withholding of evidence, and the
failure to preserve evidence. 1 1
Issuance of Prejudicial Comments About the Accused
Section 14 (2), Article III of the 1987 Constitution emphatically mandates: caIEAD
Section 14. (1) No person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense
without due process of law.
(2) In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until
the contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and
counsel, to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to
have a speedy, impartial, and public trial, to meet the witnesses face to face, and
to have compulsory process to secure the attendance of witnesses and the
production of evidence in his behalf. However, after arraignment, trial may
proceed notwithstanding the absence of the accused: Provided, that he has been
duly notified and his failure to appear is unjustifiable. (Underscoring supplied.)
The presumption of innocence of the accused is at the center of our criminal

justice system the cornerstone, as it were, of all the other rights accorded to the
accused, including the right to due process of law. In pronouncing the presumption of
innocence of the accused and their right to due process, the Constitution declares that
the risk of letting the guilty walk free would be error on the side of justice. This
outcome is infinitely better than imprisoning an innocent person.
Because the accused must be presumed innocent, and because they are entitled
to due process of law, it is the duty of the prosecution not to issue prejudicial
statements about them while the trial is being conducted. This standard applies with
even more force to the trial judge who must at all times not only be impartial, but also
appear to be so. 1 2
Allegations of issuance of prejudicial comments about the accused in this case
pertained to the acts of the trial judge, and not the prosecution. When allegations of
instances of the trial judge's bias were first brought to this Court, it was understandable
that the Court would accord the judge the presumption of regularity in the performance
of her duties. Her subsequent acts, however, as well as her Decision taken together
showed a pattern now recognizable in retrospect as bias against the accused,
amounting to denial of due process.
I n Webb, et al. v. People, 1 3 the accused assailed the Court of Appeals for
denying their Petition for the inhibition from the case of Judge Amelita Tolentino, the
presiding judge of Branch 274 of the Regional Trial Court of Paraaque.
Webb's rst Motion for the disquali cation of Judge Tolentino, led prior to their
arraignment, was anchored on the ground that the said judge had allegedly told the
media that "failure of the accused to surrender following the issuance of the warrant of
arrest is an indication of guilt." This motion was denied by Judge Tolentino. Two days
later, Webb led a second motion to disqualify her. Allegedly, she had further told the
media that the accused "should not expect the comforts of home," pending the
resolution of his Motion to be committed to the custody of the Philippine National
Police at Camp Ricardo Papa, Bicutan, Paraaque. The judge again denied the Motion.
Gerardo Biong also led a motion to disqualify her on the ground of bias and partiality,
but this Motion was also denied. SCEHaD
Thereafter, at the hearing for the accused's Petitions for bail during which the
prosecution presented Jessica Alfaro, Judge Tolentino issued an Order. The judge ruled
that Alfaro could not be cross-examined on the contents of the latter's April 28
Af davit. The af davit was held to be inadmissible in evidence, as it was allegedly not
executed in the presence of a counsel.
Alfaro was asked about her brother Patrick Alfaro and her uncle Robert Alfaro.
She admitted that her brother was a drug addict and had been arrested by the National
Bureau of Investigation (NBI) for illegal drug possession. She further claimed that her
brother was now in the United States. The prosecution objected to further questions
regarding the arrest and departure of Alfaro's brother on the ground that it was
irrelevant, immaterial and impertinent for cross-examination. Despite the defense
counsel's explanation that the questions were for the purpose of establishing Alfaro's
bias and motive for testifying against the accused, the trial court sustained the
objection.
Similar objections on the ground of irrelevance, immateriality and impertinence
were sustained by the trial court when the defense counsel cross-examined Alfaro on
her educational attainment. Prior to the cross-examination, Alfaro was shown her
transcript of records indicating her completion of only one academic year, thus earning
nine units of college.
Accused then led a Motion to disqualify Judge Tolentino or inhibit herself from
the case due to bias and prejudice, but she denied the Motion.
The accused thus assailed before this Court [1] the Order of judge Tolentino
denying Webb's motion for hospitalization; and [2] the Order of Judge Tolentino
disallowing the defense to cross-examine Alfaro on the contents of her April 28
affidavit.
Accused later led with this Court a Supplemental Petition to set aside Judge
Tolentino's Order denying their Motion for inhibition.
This Court resolved to refer the petitions to the Court of Appeals for proper
disposition.
In the meantime, the hearing on the accused's Petitions for bail continued, with
petitioner Webb ling a motion for deposition of witnesses residing in the United
States, who would testify on his presence in that country on the date of the commission
of the crime. This Petition was denied by Judge Tolentino on the ground that petitioner
failed to allege that the witnesses did not have the means to go to the place of the trial.
Petitioner Webb led another Supplemental Petition to the Court of Appeals
challenging the said Order.
The defense made their Formal Offer of Evidence upon conclusion of the
hearings on the Petitions for bail. The prosecution led its Comment/Objection to the
Formal Offer of Evidence. Judge Tolentino ruled on the accused's formal offer of
evidence, admitting only ten [10] out of the one hundred forty-two [142] exhibits offered
by the defense. Subsequently, the judge denied the accused's Petitions for bail. cEaCTS
The Court of Appeals rendered its Decision on the various Petitions and
Supplemental Petitions, reversing Judge Tolentino's refusal to admit Alfaro's April 28
Af davit. The appellate court, however, denied all the other reliefs prayed for. The
accused thus elevated the matter to this Court.
They subsequently led a Supplemental Petition, alleging, among others, that
during the trial on the merits, Judge Tolentino had allowed prosecution witness Atty.
Pedro Rivera to testify on the character of the accused, although the defense had not
put his character in issue; that the judge disallowed the defense to impeach the
credibility of Atty. Rivera by the presentation of an earlier statement executed by him,
on the ground that his statement was immaterial; and that, after ruling that the proffer
of oral evidence made by defense counsel Atty. Vitaliano Aguirre was improper on
cross-examination, Judge Tolentino struck the proffer from the record.
We affirmed the Court of Appeals' disposition, explaining as follows:
A critical component of due process is a hearing before an impartial and
disinterested tribunal [and] every litigant is entitled to nothing less than the cold
neutrality of an impartial judge for all the other elements of due process, like
notice and hearing, would be meaningless if the ultimate decision would come
from a partial and biased judge.[However, t]his right must be weighed with the
duty of a judge to decide cases without fear of repression. Hence, to disqualify a
judge on the ground of bias and prejudice the movant must prove the same by
clear and convincing evidence. . . .
As a general rule, repeated rulings against a litigant, no matter how erroneous and
vigorously and consistently expressed, are not a basis for disquali cation of a
judge on grounds of bias and prejudice. Extrinsic evidence is required to establish
bias, bad faith, malice or corrupt purpose, in addition to the palpable error which
may be inferred from the decision or order itself. Although the decision may seem
so erroneous as to raise doubts concerning a judge's integrity, absent extrinsic
evidence, the decision itself would be insuf cient to establish a case against the
judge. The only exception to the rule is when the error is so gross and patent as to
produce an ineluctable inference of bad faith or malice.
A perusal of the records will reveal that petitioners failed to adduce any extrinsic
evidence to prove that respondent judge was motivated by malice or bad faith in
issuing the assailed rulings. Petitioners simply lean on the alleged series of
adverse rulings of the respondent judge which they characterized as palpable
errors. This is not enough. We note that respondent judge's rulings resolving the
various motions led by petitioners were all made after considering the
arguments raised by all the parties. It is true that the respondent judge erred in
some of her rulings such as her rejection of petitioners' one hundred thirty two
pieces of evidence. It appears, however, that respondent judge reversed this
erroneous ruling and already admitted these 132 pieces of evidence after nding
that "the defects in [their] admissibility have been cured through the introduction
of additional evidence during the trial on the merits." This correction diminishes
the strength of petitioners' charge that respondent judge is hopelessly biased
against them. . . . SDHAEC
. . . There is still another reason why we should observe caution in disqualifying

respondent judge. The trial of the petitioners is about to end and to assign a new
judge to determine the guilt or innocence of petitioners will not be for the best
interest of justice. The records of the case at bar run into volumes. These
voluminous records cannot capture in print the complete credibility of witnesses
when they testi ed in court. As the respondent judge observed the demeanor of
witnesses while in the witness chair, she is in the best position to calibrate their
credibility. The task of evaluating the credibility of witnesses includes interpreting
their body language and their meaningful nuances are not expressed in the
transcripts of their testimonies.
We hasten to stress that a party aggrieved by erroneous interlocutory rulings in
the course of a trial is not without remedy. The range of remedy is provided in our
Rules of Court and we need not make an elongated discourse on the subject. But
certainly, the remedy for erroneous rulings, absent any extrinsic evidence of
malice or bad faith, is not the outright disquali cation of the judge. For there is
yet to come a judge with the omniscience to issue rulings that are always
infallible. The courts will close shop if we disqualify judges who err for we all err.
Mishandling and/or
Withholding of Evidence
The rights of the accused to have compulsory process to secure the production
of evidence on their behalf is a right enshrined in no less than our Constitution,
particularly Article III, Section 14 thereof, to wit:
Section 14:
(1) No person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without due
process of law.
(2) In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until
the contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and
counsel, to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to
have a speedy, impartial, and public trial, to meet the witnesses face to face, and
to have compulsory process to secure the attendance of witnesses and the
production of evidence in his behalf. . . . (Underscoring supplied.)
This right is echoed and further eshed out in the Rules of Criminal Procedure.
Rule 115, Section 1 thereof, provides:
SECTION 1. Rights of accused at the trial. In all criminal prosecutions, the
accused shall be entitled to the following rights:
(a) To be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved beyond reasonable
doubt.
(b) To be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. IaSAHC
(c) To be present and defend in person and by counsel at every stage of the
proceedings, from arraignment to promulgation of the judgment. The accused
may, however, waive his presence at the trial pursuant to the stipulations set forth
in his tail, unless his presence is speci cally ordered by the court for purposes of
identi cation. The absence of the accused without justi able cause at the trial of
which he had notice shall be considered a waiver of his right to be present thereat.
When an accused under custody escapes, he shall be deemed to have waived his
right to be present on all subsequent trial dates until custody over him is regained.
Upon motion, the accused may be allowed to defend himself in person when it
suf ciently appears to the court that he can properly protect his rights without the
assistance of counsel.
(d) To testify as a witness in his own behalf but subject to cross-examination
on matters covered by direct examination. His silence shall not in any manner
prejudice him.
(e) To be exempt from being compelled to be a witness against himself.
(f) To confront and cross-examine the witnesses against him at the trial.
Either party may utilize as part of its evidence the testimony of a witness who is
deceased, out of or can not with due diligence be found in the Philippines,
unavailable, or otherwise unable to testify, given in another case or proceeding,
judicial or administrative, involving the same parties and subject matter, the
adverse party having the opportunity to cross-examine him.
(g) To have compulsory process issued to secure the attendance of witnesses
and production of other evidence in his behalf.
(h) To have speedy, impartial and public trial.
(i) To appeal in all cases allowed and in the manner prescribed by law.
(Underscoring supplied.)
Section 10, Rule 116 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure, in fact further mandates:
SEC. 10. Production or inspection of material evidence in possession of
prosecution. Upon motion of the accused showing good cause and with notice
to the parties, the court, in order to prevent surprise, suppression, or alteration,
may order the prosecution to produce and permit the inspection and copying or
photographing of any written statement given by the complainant and other
witnesses in any investigation of the offense conducted by the prosecution or
other investigating of cers, as well as any designated documents, papers, books,
accounts, letters, photographs, objects, or tangible things not otherwise privileged,
which constitute or contain evidence material to any matter involved in the case
and which are in possession or under the control of the prosecution, police, or
other law investigating agencies. (Underscoring supplied.)
cSaATC
Thus, the accused's right of access to evidence requires the correlative duty of
the prosecution to produce and permit the inspection of the evidence, and not to
suppress or alter it.
Applying this standard to the present case, it is notable that during preliminary
investigation, the NBI presented to the Department of Justice (DOJ) Panel, among
others, the Sworn Statement of their principal witness, Alfaro, dated 22 May 1995.
Before submitting his Counter-Af davit, Webb led with the DOJ Panel a Motion for
Production and Examination of Evidence and Documents for the NBI to produce,
among others, any other written statements of Alfaro.
The DOJ Panel granted the Motion, and the NBI submitted a mere photocopy of
an earlier Sworn Statement of Alfaro dated 28 April 1995. The Statement did not
appear to be signed by Alfaro's counsel of choice, named as Atty. Arturo Mercader, Jr.
in the same document. In this earlier Sworn Statement, Alfaro declared that she had
never met Carmela before that fateful night; that she did not know why the accused
wanted to enter the Vizconde house, except that they were after Carmela; that the
accused entered the premises by jumping over the fence; that she did not know how
the accused were able to enter the house, as she was about ten (10) meters away from
the kitchen door; that she did not know who opened that door for the accused, but
hinted that one of the maids must have done it since Estrellita and Carmela were tied;
and that she had no idea what transpired in the house until they left the area.
This Statement contradicted salient points in Alfaro's 22 May 1995 Sworn
Statement, which was the basis of the NBI's complaint. In her 22 May 1995 Sworn
Statement, Alfaro claimed to have known Carmela since February 1991; that the group
decided to rape Carmela when Alfaro informed Webb that Carmela had dropped off a
man who appeared to be her boyfriend; that Carmela left open the gate through which
they entered the premises freely; that Alfaro led the group in entering the kitchen door;
that she witnessed the rape of Carmela by Webb and also saw the bodies of Estrellita
and Jennifer piled up on the bed.
The NBI explained that they produced a mere photocopy of the 28 April 1995
Sworn Statement, because the original was lost. When the DOJ Panel refused to issue a
subpoena duces tecum to Atty. Mercader, the accused led a case with the Regional
Trial Court of Makati, Branch 63, to obtain the original of the rst Sworn Statement.
Atty. Mercader then appeared and produced before the trial court the original Sworn
Statement of Alfaro dated 28 April 1995, which also contained his signature. Webb
retained a certi ed true copy of the rst Sworn Statement (certi ed by Assistant State
Prosecutor Jovencito Zuno), while the duplicate original copy thereof was submitted to
the DOJ Panel.
The DOJ Panel still found probable cause to charge the accused and on 10
August 1995, an Information for Rape with Homicide was led with the Regional Trial
Court of Paraaque against Webb, et al. It was raffled to Branch 274, presided by Judge
Amelita Tolentino, who thereupon issued warrants for their arrest. aTSEcA
Webb et al. came to this Court to assail the DOJ Panel's nding and the trial
court's issuance of warrants for their arrest. We upheld the right of petitioners to
compel the NBI to disclose exculpatory evidence in their favor:
Further, petitioners charge the NBI with violating their right to discovery
proceedings during their preliminary investigation by suppressing the April 28,
1995 original copy of the sworn statement of Alfaro and the FBI Report. The
argument is novel in this jurisdiction and as it urges an expansive reading of the
rights of persons under preliminary investigation it deserves serious
consideration. To start with, our Rules on Criminal Procedure do not expressly
provide for discovery proceedings during the preliminary investigation stage of a
criminal proceeding. Sections 10 and 11 of Rule 117 do provide an accused the
right to move for a bill of particulars and for production or inspection of material
evidence in possession of the prosecution. But these provisions apply after the
ling of the Complaint or Information in court and the rights are accorded to the
accused to assist them to make an intelligent plea at arraignment and to prepare
for trial.
This failure to provide discovery procedure during preliminary investigation does
not, however, negate its use by a person under investigation when indispensable
to protect his constitutional right to life, liberty and property. Preliminary
investigation is not too early a stage to guard against any signi cant erosion of
the constitutional right to due process of a potential accused. As aforediscussed,
the object of a preliminary investigation is to determine the probability that the
suspect committed a crime. We hold that the nding of a probable cause by itself
subjects the suspect's life, liberty and property to real risk of loss or diminution. In
the case at bar, the risk to the liberty of petitioners cannot be understated for they
are charged with the crime of rape with homicide, a non-bailable offense when the
evidence of guilt is strong.
Attuned to the times, our Rules have discarded the pure inquisitorial system of
preliminary investigation. Instead, Rule 112 installed a quasi-judicial type of
preliminary investigation conducted by one whose high duty is to be fair and
impartial. 44 As this Court emphasized in Rolito Go vs. Court of Appeals, "the right
to have a preliminary investigation conducted before being bound over for trial for
a criminal offense, and hence formally at risk of incarceration or some other
penalty, is not a mere or technical right; it is a substantive right." A preliminary
investigation should therefore be scrupulously conducted so that the
constitutional right to liberty of a potential accused can be protected from any
material damage. We uphold the legal basis of the right of petitioners to demand
from their prosecutor, the NBI, the original copy of the April 28, 1995 sworn
statement of Alfaro and the FBI Report during their preliminary investigation
considering their exculpatory character, and hence, unquestionable materiality to
the issue of their probable guilt. The right is rooted on the constitutional
protection of due process which we rule to be operational even during the
preliminary investigation of a potential accused. It is also implicit in Section (3)
(a) of Rule 112 which requires during the preliminary investigation the ling of a
sworn complaint which shall ". . . state the known address of the respondent and
be accompanied by af davits of the complainant and his witnesses as well as
other supporting documents . . . ."
In laying down this rule, the Court is not without enlightened precedents from
other jurisdictions. In the 1963 watershed case of Brady v. Maryland the United
States Supreme Court held that "suppression of evidence favorable to an accused
upon request violates due process where the evidence is material to guilt or
punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution." Its
progeny is the 1935 case of Mooney v. Holohan which laid down the proposition
that a prosecutor's intentional use of perjured testimony to procure conviction
violates due process. Thus, evolved jurisprudence firming up the prosecutor's duty
to disclose to the defense exculpatory evidence in its possession. The rationale is
well put by Justice Brennan in Brady "society wins not only when the guilty are
convicted but when criminal trials are fair." Indeed, prosecutors should not treat
litigation like a game of poker where surprises can be sprung and where gain by
guile is not punished. (Citations omitted.)
HSDaTC
Nevertheless, we ruled that with the production of the rst Sworn Statement, "
(p)etitioners thus had the fair chance to explain to the DOJ Panel then still conducting
their preliminary investigation the exculpatory aspects of this sworn statement.
Unfortunately for petitioners, the DOJ Panel still found probable cause to charge them
despite the alleged material discrepancies between the rst and second sworn
statements of Alfaro. For reasons we have expounded, this nding of probable cause
cannot be struck down as done with grave abuse of discretion."
It appeared, however, that the prosecution would continue to suppress Alfaro's
rst Sworn Statement. When bail hearings commenced on 9 October 1995, the
prosecution started with a presentation of the testimony of Alfaro. On 16 October
1995, Alfaro was allowed by the trial court to testify on the circumstances surrounding
the execution of the two Sworn Statements, notwithstanding that said statements were
not presented for proper identi cation and marking. On cross-examination, Alfaro
admitted that in the rst Sworn Statement were answers that were not hers, but were
only supplied by the NBI agents then present during the statement-taking. For instance,
she stated that the answer to question number 8 is not true, because she only nished
second year and was not actually a college graduate.
On the third day of Alfaro's cross-examination, the prosecution objected to
questions referring to the rst Sworn Statement on the ground that it was made
without the assistance of counsel. The trial court sustained the objection. 1 4 The
accused's counsel orally sought reconsideration, but this was denied. 1 5 When counsel
moved for reconsideration, the trial court denied the motion "with nality." 1 6 The
accused's counsel then showed the trial court their copy of the rst Sworn Statement
containing Atty. Mercader's signature and certi ed as a true copy by Asst. Prosecutor
Zuno. In turn, Assistant Prosecutor Atty. Zuno, who had the duplicate original thereof,
failed or refused to produce the statement despite repeated requests from the
accused Webb. (It was produced only on 24 October 1995.) Alfaro's cross-examination
continued, with no question pertaining to the first Sworn Statement allowed.
On 8 November 1995, the trial court issued its Order dated 30 October 1995 1 7
in open court. The Court rejected the admissibility of the rst Sworn Statement and
barred its use for the purpose of impeaching Alfaro's credibility or for refuting her
subsequent statements. All previous questions and answers connected with the said
Sworn Statement were also ordered expunged from the records. The trial court
reasoned that the said Sworn Statement was an "illegally obtained evidence, and
therefore, cannot be used either directly or indirectly against Alfaro." Citing Section 12,
Article III of the Constitution, the trial court concluded that "Alfaro could not be cross-
examined by the defense on the contents of the said af davit in order to discredit her
statement dated May 22, 1995 and her testimony in open court." 1 8
This Order led accused Webb et al. to seek Judge Tolentino's inhibition and to
incorporate the above instance as part of their proof of the trial judge's bias. The Court
of Appeals denied the Petition, and we af rmed the denial in the manner laid out in the
preceding discussion.
Failure to Preserve Evidence
As discussed in the preceding section, the accused's right to access to evidence
necessitates in the correlative duty of the prosecution to produce and permit the
inspection of the evidence, and not to suppress or alter it. When the prosecution is
called upon not to suppress or alter evidence in its possession that may bene t the
accused, it is also necessarily obliged to preserve the said evidence. To hold otherwise
would be to render illusory the existence of such right. DEcSaI
The advent of DNA technology prompted this Court's promulgation of the New
Rules for DNA Evidence. 1 9 As DNA evidence provides objective proof of identi cation
and may be obtained from evidence left in the scene of the crime or in the victim's
person, it also gives new meaning to the above duty of the prosecution.
The prosecution did not fare well when measured against this standard.
Alfaro testi ed that the group had earlier agreed that Webb would be the rst to
rape Carmela. When Alfaro said she saw Webb pumping Carmela, while two bloodied
bodies were on top of the bed, the former was so shocked that she "stepped back and
turned around to go outside." On her way out, she met Ventura near the door. He said,
"Prepare escape." Things had apparently gone awry, so they left the place. The NBI
proclaimed that the semen samples they had collected from Carmela were preserved in
slides and remained intact. Thus, in order for the prosecution's theory to be consistent,
pursuant to the quantum required in criminal cases, the DNA evidence in the slides must
positively match that from accused Webb.
Based on the foregoing circumstances, the defense counsel accordingly led a
Motion to Direct NBI to Submit Semen Specimen to DNA Analysis during the course of
the trial. Several exchanges of pleadings on the matter were led before the trial court,
and at no time was the timeliness of the ling of the Motion at issue. It could not have
been, considering that the Motion was timely led during the course of the trial. While
the Motion was led six years after the crime was committed, the trial of the accused
herein did not start until more than four years after the commission of the crime.
The trial court denied the Motion on 25 November 1997, holding that since more
than six (6) years had lapsed since the commission of the crime, there was no
assurance that the semen specimen remained uncontaminated. Also, the trial court
held that Webb was not able to show that the proper procedure for the extraction and
preservation of the semen sample had been complied with. Finally, the trial court held
that a DNA test would only lead to confusion of the issues.
However, as correctly held by Justice Lucenito Tagle in his Dissenting Opinion,
the trial judge's objections to the DNA testing were based on mere conjectures that ran
against the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty.
Meanwhile, the idea that a negative DNA test result would not have necessarily
exculpated Webb, because previous sexual congress by Carmela with another man
prior to the crime could not be discounted, would unrealistically raise the bar of
evidence and for the wrong party, i.e., for the part of the defense, instead of for the
prosecution. If a negative DNA test result could not be considered as providing
certainty that Webb did not commit the crime, would it not have at least cast a
reasonable doubt that he committed it?
Moreover, the argument against the relevance of the semen sample that the
presence of semen was not necessary to prove that rape was committed is not in
point. What the defense was after when it sought DNA testing was neither to prove nor
to disprove the commission of rape, but to pinpoint the identity of the assailant. In this
case, semen with spermatozoa was in fact obtained, and it did possess exculpatory
potential that might be bene cial to the accused. In Tijing v. Court of Appeals, 2 0 we
held that "courts should apply the results of science when competently obtained in aid
of situations presented, since to reject said result is to deny progress." Hence, it is the
constitutional duty of the trial judge to afford all possible means to both the NBI and
the counsel for accused, in order that such evidence may be scrutinized in open court.
The Court held in People v. Yatar: cHCSDa
DNA print or identi cation technology has been advanced as a uniquely effective
means to link a suspect to a crime, or to exonerate a wrongly accused suspect,
where biological evidence has been left. For purposes of criminal investigation,
DNA identi cation is a fertile source of both inculpatory and exculpatory
evidence. It can assist immensely in effecting a more accurate account of the
crime committed, ef ciently facilitating the conviction of the guilty, securing the
acquittal of the innocent, and ensuring the proper administration of justice in
every case.
DNA evidence collected from a crime scene can link a suspect to a crime or
eliminate one from suspicion in the same principle as ngerprints are used.
Incidents involving sexual assault would leave biological evidence such as hair,
skin tissue, semen, blood, o saliva which can be left on the victim's body or at the
crime scene. Hair and ber from clothing, carpets, bedding or furniture could also
be transferred to the victim's body during the assault. Forensic DNA evidence is
helpful in proving that there was physical contact between an assailant and a
victim. If properly collected from the victim, crime scene or assailant, DNA can be
compared with known samples to place the suspect at the scene of the crime. 2 1
Thus, when the present case reached this Court and a similar Motion was led,
we resolved to grant 2 2 petitioner's motion to allow DNA testing of the semen sample
collected from the victim in order to compare it with Webb's DNA. Unfortunately, said
semen sample appears to have been lost by the NBI, which had custody thereof. SEcTHA
Does the prosecution's loss of this potentially exculpatory evidence result in a

fundamentally unfair trial of the accused that entitles him to a judgment of acquittal?
In resolving this question in the negative, the Dissent cites Youngblood v. Arizona,
2 3 a United States Supreme Court Decision, which held that the prosecution's failure to
keep intact a piece of potentially exculpatory evidence does not result in a due process
violation, unless the accused is able to show that the prosecution acted in bad faith.
However, reliance on Youngblood is ill-advised.
First, Youngblood was promulgated more than two decades ago, in 1988, when
DNA testing was still in its infancy. Since then, the technology has grown by leaps and
bounds. 2 4 In the United States, there are now only eight (8) states that have not
adopted statutes allowing post-conviction DNA testing, 2 5 with some requiring the
correlative duty to preserve DNA evidence. So far, 261 convicts in the United States
have been exonerated as a result of post-conviction DNA testing. 2 6
Second, Youngblood was not a product of a unanimous Decision. The majority
opinion in Youngblood was penned by Justice Rehnquist and concurred in by Justices
White, O'Connor, Scalia and Kennedy, with Justice Stevens concurring with the result
and writing a Separate Opinion. Justice Blackmun wrote a strong Dissent, which was
joined in by Justices Brennan and Marshall.
A critique 2 7 of the Youngblood decision points out that there are two competing
due process interests therein. On the one hand is adjudicative fairness , which "seeks
to ensure that the accused receives meaningful protection in court, in other words,
reliable fact nding and a fair trial. . . . [and which] manifests itself in an assessment of
the materiality of evidence and prejudice to the accused . . . [as] paramount in
determining whether a due process violation has occurred." On the other hand is
instrumentalism , which seeks "to impose restraints on the state. . . . [by] punishing the
state for police and prosecutorial misconduct. . . . to deter future misconduct and to
create a prophylactic effect. In measuring the misconduct, one examines the subjective
intent of the of cer and whether the of cer acted in good faith or bad faith. Under this
approach, the focus is on the state, not the individual. Moreover, the focus on the state
and on deterring of cial misconduct invites an examination of the costs of providing
additional process."
The majority opinion in Youngblood focused on the state of mind of the police
of cer rather than on materiality and fairness to the accused. However, in his Separate
Opinion wherein he registered his reservation to the bad faith standard being laid out by
the majority, Justice Stevens recognized that "there may well be cases in which the
defendant is unable to prove that the State acted in bad faith but in which the loss or
destruction of evidence is nonetheless so critical to the defense as to make a criminal
trial fundamentally unfair." TcIAHS
While the earlier case Brady v. Maryland 2 8 held that due process violation could
be committed even without bad faith, 2 9 the majority distinguished Youngblood from
Brady by holding that the evidence in Brady was clearly favorable to the accused, while
that in Youngblood was only potentially exculpatory.
Justice Blackmun opined, though, that it was impossible for the accused to
prove that a particular piece of evidence was exculpatory when, precisely, it was no
longer in existence. Justice Blackmun also disapproved of the bad-faith standard,
because "(a)part from the inherent dif culty a defendant would have in obtaining
evidence to show a lack of good faith, the line between 'good faith' and 'bad faith' is
anything but bright, and the majority's formulation may well create more questions than
it answers."
Justice Blackmun proposed the following alternative to the bad-faith standard:
Rather than allow a State's ineptitude to saddle a defendant with an impossible
burden, a court should focus on the type of evidence, the possibility it might prove
exculpatory, and the existence of other evidence going to the same point of
contention in determining whether the failure to preserve the evidence in question
violated due process. To put it succinctly, where no comparable evidence is likely
to be available to the defendant, police must preserve physical evidence of a type
that they reasonably should know has the potential, if tested, to reveal immutable
characteristics of the criminal, and hence to exculpate a defendant charged with
the crime.
Justice Blackmun then gave his opinion on how to balance the defendant's rights
and the duty imposed upon the law enforcement to preserve evidence: STIEHc
Due process must also take into account the burdens that the preservation of
evidence places on the police. Law enforcement of cers must be provided the
option, as is implicit in Trombetta, of performing the proper tests on physical
evidence and then discarding it. Once a suspect has been arrested, the police,
after a reasonable time, may inform defense counsel of plans to discard the
evidence. When the defense has been informed of the existence of the evidence,
after a reasonable time, the burden of preservation may shift to the defense.
There should also be exibility to deal with evidence that is unusually dangerous
or difficult to store.
Third, it is not amiss to note that in the year 2000, the injustice of the Youngblood
decision was brought into sharp relief when more sophisticated DNA technology was
used on the degraded evidence. The technology yielded a DNA pro le that (1)
exonerated Larry Youngblood of the crime charged (child molestation, sexual assault
and kidnapping) and (2) enabled the police to nd the real offender. Excerpts from the
website of The Innocence Project, an organization advocating the use of DNA evidence,
are as follows:
Larry Youngblood was convicted in 1985 of child molestation, sexual assault, and
kidnapping. He was sentenced to ten years and six months in prison. In October
1983, a ten year old boy was abducted from a carnival in Pima County, Arizona,
and molested and sodomized repeatedly for over an hour by a middle aged man.
The victim was taken to a hospital, where the staff collected semen samples from
his rectum as well as the clothing he was wearing at the time of the assault.
Based on the boy's description of the assailant as a man with one dis gured eye,
Youngblood was charged with the crime. He maintained his innocence at trial, but
the jury convicted him, based largely on the eyewitness identi cation of the
victim. No serological tests were conducted before trial, as the police improperly
stored the evidence and it had degraded. Expert witnesses at trial stated that, had
the evidence been stored correctly, test results might have demonstrated
conclusively Youngblood's innocence.
Larry Youngblood appealed his conviction, claiming the destruction of potentially
exculpatory evidence violated his due process rights, and the Arizona Court of
Appeals set aside his conviction. He was released from prison, three years into his
sentence, but in 1988, the Supreme Court reversed the lower court's ruling, and his
conviction was reinstated (Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51). Youngblood
remained free as the case made its way through the Arizona appellate court
system a second time, but returned to prison in 1993, when the Arizona Supreme
Court reinstated his conviction.
In 1998, Youngblood was released on parole, but was sent back to prison in 1999
for failing to register his new address, as required by Arizona sex offender laws. In
2000, upon request from his attorneys, the police department tested the degraded
evidence using new, sophisticated DNA technology. Those results exonerated
Youngblood, and he was released from prison in August 2000. The district
attorney's office dismissed the charges against Larry Youngblood that year.
Shortly thereafter, the DNA pro le from the evidence was entered into the national
convicted offender databases. In early 2001, of cials got a hit, matching the
pro le of Walter Cruise, who is blind in one eye and currently serving time in
Texas on unrelated charges. In August 2002, Cruise was convicted of the crime
and sentenced to twenty-four years in prison. 3 0
In view of all the foregoing salient objections to Youngblood, it should not be

adopted in this jurisdiction. STcEIC
While it is a laudable objective to inquire into the state of mind of the prosecution
and punish it when it has committed prosecutorial misconduct, there are times when,
undoubtedly, whether through malice or plain ineptitude, its act or omission results in
plain injustice to the accused.
In our various decisions relating to interlucotory orders and incidents pertaining
to this case, this court's adherence to instrumentalism has led to our nding in each
instance that there was no due process violation committed against petitioner,
because bad faith was not shown by the prosecution or the trial judge.
However, since "the task of the pillars of the criminal justice system is to
preserve our democratic society under the rule of law, ensuring that all those who
appear before or are brought to the bar of justice are afforded a fair opportunity to
present their side," 3 1 the measure of whether the accused herein has been deprived of
due process of law should not be limited to the state of mind of the prosecution, but
should include fundamental principles of fair play. Hence, as we write nis to this case,
it is time we evaluate the total picture that the prosecution's acts or omissions have
wrought upon the accused's rights with each seemingly innocuous stroke, whatever its
intention may have been.
The various violations of the accused's rights have resulted in his failure to
secure a just trial. As such, the judgment of conviction cannot stand.
Footnotes
1.Records, Vol. 1, pp. 1-3.

2.Rollo (G.R. 176389), pp. 393-399 and rollo (G.R. 176864), pp. 80-104.
3.Records, Vol. 25, pp. 170-71.
4.CA rollo, Vol. IV, pp. 3478-3479.
5.Resolution dated January 26, 2007, rollo (G.R. 176839), pp. 197-214.
6.A.M. 06-11-5-SC effective October 15, 2007.
7.373 U.S. 83 (1963).
8.People v. Yatar, G.R. No. 150224, May 19, 2004, 425 SCRA 504, 514.
9.Supra note 7.
10.488 U.S. 41 (1988).
11.Webb v. De Leon, G.R. No. 121234, August 23, 1995, 247 SCRA 652; Webb v. People, G.R. No.
127262, July 24, 1997, 276 SCRA 243.
12.The ponencia, pp. 4-9.
13.TSN, August 6, 1996, pp. 13-41; TSN, May 22, 1997, pp. 72, 81-131, 142-157; Exhibits "274"
and "275".
14.Exhibits "G" to "G-2", "Q" to "R", "V", "W" and "X", Records, Vol. 8, pp. 308-310, 323-324, 328-
330.
15.Exhibits "H" to "K", Records, Vol. 8, pp. 311-315; TSN, January 30, 1996, pp. xx.
16.TSN, March 25, 1996, pp. 8-14, 17-34.

17.TSN October 10, 1995, pp. 97-98 (Records, Vol. 4, pp. 271-272).
18.TSN, March 14, 1996, pp. 79-89, 103-104.
19.TSN, December 5, 1995, pp. 21-65.
20.Id.
21.TSN, April 16, 1996, pp. 18-38, 79.
22.TSN, August 14, 1997 and September 1, 1997.
23.TSN, July 9, 1997, pp. 22-26.

24.TSN, July 8, 1997, pp. 15-19; and TSN, June 9, 1997, pp. 22-26.
25.Exhibit "227".
26.TSN, May 28, 1997, pp. 112-118, 121-122.
27.Exhibit "223".
28.Exhibits "207" to "219".
29.Exhibit "207-B".
30.Exhibit "212-D".
31.TSN, June 3, 1997, pp. 14-33; photograph before the concert Exhibit "295," Records (Vol.2), p.
208.
32.TSN, April 23, 1997, pp. 128-129, 134-148.
33.TSN, April 30, 1997, pp. 69-71.
34.TSN, June 2, 1997, pp. 51-64, 75-78.
35.TSN, June 16, 1997, pp. 12, 16-38, 43-59 and 69-93.
36.Exhibits "305".
37.Exhibits "306" and "307".
38.Exhibits "344" and "346".
39.Exhibits "244", "245" and "246".
40.TSN, July 16, 1997, pp. 35, 41-42, 48-49, 58, 61-62.
41.TSN, July 16, 1996, pp. 16-17, 23-32, 61-63, 78-84.
42.TSN, June 26, 1997, pp. 13-28.
43.Exhibit "338".
44.Exhibit "348".
45.Exhibits "341" and "342".
46.TSN, July 16, 1996, pp. 16-17, 23-32, 61-63, 78-84.
47.Exhibit "349".

48.Exhibit "337-B".
49.TSN, May 9, 1996, pp. 26-32, 37, 44-57.
50.Id.
51.TSN, July 7, 1997, pp. 19-35.
52.TSN, July 2, 1997, pp. 33-37.
53.Exhibit "212-D".
54.Exhibit "261".
55.Exhibit "260".
56.TSN, June 23, 1997.
57.People v. Hillado, 367 Phil. 29 (1999).
58.People v. Saban, G.R. No. 110559, November 24, 1999, 319 SCRA 36, 46.
59.Rollo (G.R. 176839), pp. 216-217.
60.Section 44, Rule 130, Rules of Court.
61.Antilon v. Barcelona, 37 Phil. 148 (1917).
62.Rollo (G.R. 176839), pp. 218-219.
CARPIO MORALES, J., concurring:

1.Salvacion v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. L-68633, July 11, 1986, 142 SCRA 707, 713.
2.The cases were (1) Criminal Case No. 91-7135 led by then Assistant Chief State
Prosecutor Aurelio C. Trampe before the sala of Judge Julio R. Logarta of the Makati
City RTC, Branch 63, on November 11, 1991 (for robbery with homicide) against Villardo
Barroso y Datuin, Roberto Barroso y Datuin Rolando Mendoza y Gomez, Ernesto Cesar,
Bienvenido Baydo, Angelito Santos y Bisen, Rey Doe and several other John Does still at
large; (2) Criminal case No. 91-7136 (for the rape with homicide of Carmela Nicolas
Vizconde led by ACSP Aurelio C. Trampe with the same RTC, Branch 63, on November
11, 1919) also against the same accused and (3) Criminal Case No. 91-7137 (for
robbery, with homicide wherein the victim was ESTRELLITA NICOLAS VISCONDE )
likewise filed against the same accused by ACSP Aurelio C. Trampe.
3.Records, Vol. I, pp. 1-3.
4.Rollo (G.R. No. 176389), pp. 393-399 and rollo (G.R. No. 176864), pp. 80-104.
5.Decision dated January 4, 2000.
6.CA rollo, Vol. IV, pp. 3478-3479.

7.Resolution dated January 26, 2007, rollo (G.R. No. 176839), pp. 197-214. The resolution was
penned by Justice Rodrigo V. Cosico, with the concurrence of Justices Regalado E.
Maambong and Normandie B. Pizarro. Justices Renato C. Dacudao and Lucenito N.
Tagle dissented.
8.A.M. 06-11-5-SC effective October 15, 2007. Section 4 states:
Application for DNA Testing Order. The appropriate court may, at any time, either motu
proprio or on application of any person who has a legal interest in the matter in litigation,
order a DNA testing. Such order shall issue after due hearing and notice to the parties
upon a showing of the following:
a. A biological sample exists that is relevant to the case;
b. The biological sample:
(i) was not previously subjected to the type of DNA testing now requested; or
(ii) was previously subject to DNA testing, but the results may require con rmation for good
reasons;
c. The DNA testing uses a scientifically valid technique;
d. The DNA testing has the scienti c potential to produce new information that is relevant to
the proper resolution of the case; and
e. The existence of other factors, if any, which the court may consider as potentially affecting
the accuracy or integrity of the DNA testing.
This rule shall not preclude a DNA testing, without need of a prior court order, at the behest of
any party, including law enforcement agencies, before a suit or proceeding is
commenced.
9.People v. Pringas, G.R. No. 175928, August 31, 2007, 531 SCRA 828.
10.People v. De Guzman, G.R. No. 173197, April 24, 2007, 522 SCRA 207.
11.Siao Tick Chong v. Republic, No. L-22151, March 30, 1970, 32 SCRA 253, 258.
12.37 N.J. Eq. 130, 132. Cited in SALONGA, Philippine Law on Evidence, 774 (1964) and VIII
FRANCISCO, THE REVISED RULES OF COURT IN THE PHILIPPINES, 458-459 (1997).
13.January 4, 2000 RTC Decision, p. 74.

14.Vide TSN, October 18, 1995, pp. 105-106.
15.TSN, October 23, 1995, pp. 6-9.
16.Id. at 25-27.
17.Id. at 35-36; TSN, October 10, 1995, pp. 80-96, 156-163.
18.35 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 259 (1960).
19.Ibid.
20.Vide 98 C.J.S. 348.
21.Vide People v. Lewis, 25 Ill. 2d 396, 185 NE 2d 168 where the Supreme Court of Illinois ruled:
The question of whether a witness is a narcotics addict is an important consideration in
passing upon the credibility of a witness for, as we have stated, the testimony of a
narcotics addict is subject to suspicion due to the fact that habitual users of narcotics
become notorious liars. (citations omitted)
In People v. Perkins, 26 Ill 2d 2300, 186 NE 2d 330 (1962) , the Supreme Court of Illinois said:
The defendant contends that the trial court erred in nding him guilty on the basis of the
uncorroborated testimony of a drug addict who was the only witness to the alleged
crime, and further urges that the evidence as a whole does not prove him guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt. We have repeatedly held that the fact that a witness is a narcotics
addict and a police informer has an important bearing upon his credibility
and, while his position is not that of an accomplice, the situation is suf ciently similar to
that of an accomplice to warrant a close scrutiny of the testimony of such a witness,
recognizing the fact that habitual users of narcotics become notorious liars and that
their testimony is likely to be affected thereby. (Citations omitted; emphasis supplied)
22.State v. Fong Loon, 29 Idaho 248, 158 Pac. 233, 236.
23.TSN, August 7, 1997, 35-45.

24.TSN, June 4, 1997, pp. 47-48.
Atty. Ongkiko:
Q: As an investigator, Governor, will you tell the Honorable Court how did you relate or
rather assess the reliability of any information furnished by a drug addict?
Witness Velasco:
A: Well, I will consider it, Your Honor, not generally reliable.
Atty. Ongkiko:
Q: Why do you say that?
Witness Velasco:
A: Well, because, you know, if one is under the in uence of drugs or one is considered to
be an addict, you could hardly believe his information.
Atty. Ongkiko:
Q: Why, why so?
Witness Velasco:
A: Because he is not in his state of mind.
Atty. Ongkiko:
Q: Well, what about the capacity to lie, Governor?
Witness Velasco:
A: Well, the capacity to lie may be very great, Your Honor.
Atty. Ongkiko:
Q: Well, because, you know, for maintaining or for in order to get money, they will lie."
(underscoring supplied)
25.BURRUS AND MARKS TESTIMONIAL RELIABILITY OF DRUG ADDICTS 35 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 259,
262-263, 269-270, 272-273 (1960).
26.TSN, May 28, 1996, pp. 49-50, 77-79.
27.TSN, July 29, 1996, pp. 77-78.
28.Justice Roberto Abad raised the same points, viz.:

a. The Barroso gang members said that they got into Carmela's house by breaking the glass
panel of the front door using a stone wrapped in cloth to deaden the noise. Alfaro could
not use this line since the core of her story was that Webb was Carmela's boyfriend.
Webb had no reason to smash her front door to get to see her.
Consequently, to explain the smashed door, Alfaro had to settle for claiming that, on the way
out of the house, Webb picked up some stone and, out of the blue, hurled it at the glass-
paneled front door of the Vizconde residence. His action really made no sense. From
Alfaro's narration, Webb appeared rational in his decisions. It was past midnight, the
house was dark, and they wanted to get away quickly to avoid detection. Hurling a stone
at that glass door and causing a tremendous noise was bizarre, like inviting the
neighbors to come.
b. The crime scene showed that the house had been ransacked. The rejected confessions of
the Barroso "akyat-bahay" gang members said that they tried to rob the house. To
explain this physical evidence, Alfaro claimed that at one point Ventura was pulling a
kitchen drawer, and at another point, going through a handbag on the dining table. He
said he was looking for the front-door key and the car key.
Again, this portion of Alfaro's story appears tortured to accommodate the physical evidence
of the ransacked house. She never mentioned Ventura having taken some valuables with
him when they left Carmela's house. And why would Ventura rummage a bag on the
table for the front-door key, spilling the contents, when they had already gotten into the
house. It is a story made to t in with the crime scene although robbery was supposedly
not the reason Webb and his companions entered that house.
c. It is the same thing with the garage light. The police investigators found that the bulb had
been loosed to turn off the light. The confessions of the Barroso gang claimed that one
of them climbed the parked car's hood to reach up and darken that light. This made
sense since they were going to rob the place and they needed time to work in the dark
trying to open the front door. Some passersby might look in and see what they were
doing.
Alfaro had to adjust her testimony to take into account that darkened garage light. So she
claimed that Ventura climbed the car's hood, using a chair, to turn the light off. But,
unlike the Barroso "akyat-bahay" gang, Webb and his friends did not have anything to do
in a darkened garage. They supposedly knew in advance that Carmela left the doors to
the kitchen open for them. It did not make sense for Ventura to risk standing on the car's
hood and be seen in such an awkward position instead of going straight into the house.
29.G.R. Nos. 121039-45, January 25, 1999, 302 SCRA 21.
30.TSN, October 6, 1997, p. 100.
31.Vide TSN, July 31, 1996, pp. 20-21, 44.
32.TSN, August 1, 1996, pp. 10, 15.
33.C A rollo (CA-G.R. SP No. 51173), pp. 209-225, penned by Associate Justice Ricardo P.
Galvez, with the concurrence of Associate Justices Antonio M. Martinez and Hilarion L.
Aquino.
34.Rollo, pp. 254-285, G.R. No. 176389.
35.People v. Rodrigo, G.R. No. 176159, September 11, 2008, 564 SCRA 584, 586.
36.Records, Vol. 17, pp. 186-196. Webb argued that:
xxx xxx xxx
7. Since the semen specimen is still in the custody and possession of the NBI, accused Webb
moves for the submission of the semen evidence to a DNA analysis by a US-government
or US government accredited forensic laboratory, preferably the Federal Bureau of
Investigation, Washington, D.C. If granted, accused Webb reserves his right to be
presented at all stages of the DNA typing process and to have access to the results
thereof.
xxx xxx xxx
37.Id. at 502-529.
38.Records, Vol. 18, pp. 256-259.

39.G.R. No. 112229, March 18, 1997, 270 SCRA 1, 3.
40.
41.People v. Tajada, G.R. No. 147200, December 17, 2002, 394 SCRA 159, 166; Monteverde v.
People, G.R. No. 139610, August 12, 2002, 387 SCRA 196, 215.
42.People v. Abellanosa, G.R. No. 121195, November 27, 1996, 264 SCRA 722, 746-747.
43.People v. Peruelo, No. L-50631, June 29, 1981, 105 SCRA 226-238.
44.People v. Domingo, G.R. No. 184958, September 17, 2009.
45.G.R. Nos. 138874-75, February 3, 2004, 421 SCRA 530.
BRION, J., supplemental:
1.See Justice Black's concurring opinion in Smith v. California , 361 U.S. 147 (1959), part of
which reads:
Certainly the First Amendment's language leaves no room for inference that abridgments of
speech and press can be made just because they are slight. That Amendment provides,
in simple words, that "Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech,
or of the press." I read "no law . . . abridging" to mean no law abridging . The First
Amendment, which is the supreme law of the land, has thus xed its own value on
freedom of speech and press by putting these freedoms wholly "beyond the reach" of
federal power to abridge. No other provision of the Constitution purports to dilute the
scope of these unequivocal commands of the First Amendment. Consequently, I do
not believe that any federal agencies, including Congress and this Court, have
power or authority to subordinate speech and press to what they think are
"more important interests ." The contrary notion is, in my judgment, court-made, not
Constitution-made. (361 U.S. 147, 157-159).
2.A.M. No. RTJ-02-1698, June 23, 2005, 461 SCRA 12, 24-25, citing Choa v. Chiongson, A.M. No.
MTJ-95-1063, August 9, 1996, 260 SCRA 477, 484-485.
3.Law Reform Commission New South Wales, Discussion Paper 43 (2000) Contempt by
Publication, http://www.lawlink.nsw.gov.au/lrc.nsf/pages/dp43chp02, last visited
December 9, 2010.
4.Ibid.; the Discussion Paper 43 (2000) of the Law Reform Commission of New South Wales
has identi ed some "high-risk publications" against which the sub judice rule applies.
These include:

a. A photograph of the accused where identity is likely to be an issue;
b. Suggestions that the accused has previous criminal convictions, has been previously
charged for committing an offense and/or previously acquitted, or has been involved in
other criminal activity;
c. Suggestions that the accused has confessed to committing the crime in question;
d. Suggestions that the accused has confessed to committing the crime in question;
e. Suggestions that the accused is guilty or innocent of the crime for which he or she is
charged, or that the jury should convict or acquit the accused; and
f. Comments which engender sympathy or antipathy for the accused and/or which disparage
the prosecution, or which make favorable or unfavorable references to the character or
credibility of the accused or a witness.
5.Ibid.
6.Nestle v. Sanchez, Nos. L-75209 and 78791, September 30, 1987, 154 SCRA 542, 546.
7.Re: Request Radio-TV Coverage of the Trial in the Sandiganbayan of the Plunder Cases
Against the Former President Joseph E. Estrada, A.M. No. 01-4-03-SC, June 29, 2001, 360
SCRA 248, 259-260.
8.People v. Godoy , G.R. Nos. 115908-09, March 29, 1995, 243 SCRA 64, 81, citing U.S. v. Sullen ,
36 F. 2d 220.
9.Supra note 3.
10.See Wayne Overbeck, Major Principles in Media Law, p. 298.

11.Supra note 6, at 546.
12.Supra note 3.
13.Supra note 7, at 260.
14.Separate Opinion of the author in Louis "Barok" C. Biraogo v. The Philippine Truth
Commission of 2010, G.R. Nos. 192935 & 193036, December 7, 2010, part of which
reads:
Where the government simply wants to tell its story, already labeled as true, well ahead of any
court proceedings, and judicial notice is taken of the kind of publicity and the ferment in
public opinion that news of government scandals generate, it does not require a leap of
faith to conclude that an accused brought to court against overwhelming public opinion
starts his case with less than equal chance of acquittal. The presumption of innocence
notwithstanding, the playing eld cannot but be uneven in a criminal trial when the
accused enters trial with a government-sponsored badge of guilty on his forehead. The
presumption of innocence in law cannot serve an accused in a biased atmosphere
pointing to guilt in fact because the government and public opinion have spoken against
the accused. [Citations omitted]
15.Supra note 3.
16.Supra note 7, at 259-260.
17.Supra note 8, at 82, citing J. Perfecto's dissenting opinion in In re Francisco Brillantes, 42
O.G. 59.
18.Id. at 94.
19.In the Matter of the Allegations Contained in the Columns of Mr. Amado P. Macasaet
Published in Malaya Dated September 18, 19, 20, and 21, 2007, A.M. No. 07-09-13-SC,
August 8, 2008, 561 SCRA 395, 448, citing Roxas v. Zuzuarregui , G.R. Nos. 152072 &
152104, July 12, 2007, 527 SCRA 446.
20.Id. at 434.
21.Tiongco v. Savillo , A.M. No. RTJ-02-1719, March 31, 2006, 486 SCRA 48, 64, citing In re
Almacen, infra note 22.
22.In re Almacen, No. L-27654, February 18, 1970, 31 SCRA 562.
VILLARAMA, JR., J., dissenting:
1.Penned by Associate Justice Rodrigo V. Cosico and concurred in by Associate Justices

Regalado E. Maambong and Lucenito N. Tagle (dissented in the resolution of appellants'
motion for reconsideration).
2.Rollo (G.R. No. 176389), p. 13.
3.Effective October 15, 2004.
4.Rollo (G.R. No. 176389), pp. 393-399 and rollo (G.R. No. 176864), pp. 80-104.
5.Rollo (G.R. No. 176864), pp. 263-499, 525-550.
6.Records, Vol. 1, pp. 1-3.
7.TSN, October 19, 1995, pp. 3-6 (Records, Vol. 5, pp. 37-40); TSN, October 23, 1995, pp. 10-24
(Records, Vol. 5, pp. 258-272).
8.TSN, October 23, 1995, pp. 6-10 (Records, Vol. 5, pp. 254-258).
9.TSN, October 10, 1995, pp. 79-81 and 93-99 (Records, Vol. 4, pp. 253-255, 267-273).
10.TSN, October 18, 1995, pp. 18-19, 27-40, 54 and 62-63 (Records, Vol. 4, pp. 943-944, 953-966,
980 and 988-989); TSN, October 30, 1995, pp. 27-29 (Records, Vols. 5 & 6, pp. 900-902);
TSN, November 8, 1995, pp. 91, 114, 117-118 (Records, Vol. 6, pp. 395, 418 and 421-
422); TSN, October 16, 1995, pp. 142-143 (Records, Vol. 4, pp. 694-695); Exhibit "A",
Records, Vol. 8, p. 508.
12.Pictures of the Vizconde house at Records, Vol. 1, pp. 82-87.

13.TSN, February 26, 1996, pp. 77-82.
14.TSN, October 10, 1995, pp. 104-121 and 155 (Records, Vol. 4, pp. 278-295 and 329).
15.TSN, March 4, 1996, p. 28.
17.Id. at p. 165 (339); TSN, October 16, 1995, pp. 33-35 (Records, Vol. 4, pp. 586-588); TSN,
October 24, 1995, pp. 98-100 (Records, Vols. 5, 6 & 7, pp. 528-530); TSN, February 29,
1996, pp. 42-64.
19.Id. at pp. 40-72, 75-76 (Id. at pp. 593-625, 628 to 628-A); TSN, January 25, 1996, pp. 14-15;
TSN, February 26, 1996, pp. 104-106.
20.TSN, October 10, 1995, pp. 76-97 (Records, Vol. 4, pp. 628-A to 649); May 22, 1995 Af davit,
Records, Vol. 1, p. 96.
21.Id. at pp. 97-104 (Id. at pp. 649-656); TSN, February 19, 1996, pp. 6-39; May 22, 1995
Affidavit, Records, Vol. 1, pp. 97-98.
22.Id. at pp. 111-112, 121-142 (Id. at pp. 663-664, 673-694); TSN, February 27, 1996, pp. 38, 50-
51; TSN, February 8, 1996, pp. 50, 55, 60-81; May 22, 1995 Af davit, Records, Vol. 1, pp.
97-98.
23.Exhibits "G" to "G-2", "Q" to "R", "V", "W" and "X", Records, Vol. 8, pp. 308-310, 323-324, 328-
330.
24.Exhibits "H" to "K", Records, Vol. 8, pp. 311-315; TSN, January 30, 1996, pp. 64, 67-91; TSN,
January 31, 1996, pp. 7-8.
25.Exhibit "Y" to "BB", Records, Vol. 8, pp. 456-459; TSN, January 31, 1996, pp. 59-75.
26.Exhibits "M" to "U", Records, Vol. 8, pp. 319-322; TSN, January 31, 1996, pp. 8-10, 13-20.
27.TSN, January 31, 1996, pp. 7, 17-18 and 74.
28.TSN, March 25, 1996, pp. 8-14, 17-34.
29.Id. at pp. 21-22, 34-55; TSN, May 2, 1996, pp. 63-64.
30.TSN, March 25, 1996, pp. 57-69.
31.Id. at pp. 70-79.

32.Id. at pp. 79-109.
33.TSN, March 14, 1996, pp. 12, 15-25, 41-45, 48, 51-54, 63-64; TSN, March 18, 1996, pp. 88-97.
34.TSN, March 14, 1996, pp. 79-89, 103-104.
35.Id. at pp. 104-106; TSN, March 18, 1996, pp. 20-22.
36.Employment Contract of Gaviola, Exhibit "C", Records, Vol. 8, p. 304.
37.TSN, December 5, 1995, pp. 21-65.
38.TSN, December 6, 1995, p. 19; TSN, December 13, 1995, pp. 88-89.
39.TSN, April 16, 1996, pp. 18-38, 79.
40.Id. at pp. 38-56.
41.Id. at pp. 55-66; TSN, April 23, 1996, pp. 12-13.
42.TSN, April 16, 1996, pp. 66-86.
43.Id. at pp. 96-104.
44.TSN, February 11, 1997, pp. 14-19, 24-28, 31.
45.Id. at pp. 48-49, 53-72, 82-102; Exhibits "SSSS" and "TTTT", Records, Vol. 12, pp. 790-795.
46.Id. at pp. 80-82, 103-105.
47.See page 4 of CA Decision, rollo (G.R. No. 176389), p. 121.
48.TSN, August 14, 1997, pp. 11-19.
49.TSN, July 8, 1997, pp. 15-23, 61-62; TSN, June 9, 1997, pp. 9-10, 20-26; TSN, July 3, 1997,
pp. 9-19; TSN, June 19, 1997, pp. 9-12, 29-36, 53-54; TSN, July 1, 1997, pp. 25-27.
50.Id. at pp. 28-73.
51.TSN, September 1, 1997, pp. 5-79; Exhibits "223" to "295", Records, Vol. 21, pp. 11-25, 26, 31,
203, 207; Exhibits "79", "319", "331", "234", "295", "346", "305", "306", "307" and "244" to
"246".
52.Id. at pp. 81-86.
53.Id. at pp. 90-91.
54.TSN, April 30, 1997, pp. 73-74.
55.TSN, April 23, 1997, pp. 128-129, 134-148.

56.TSN, June 2, 1997, pp. 51-64, 75-78.
57.TSN, July 16, 1996, pp. 16-17, 23-32, 61-63, 78-84.
58.TSN, July 16, 1997, pp. 37-42, 46-51, 58-62.
59.Id. at pp. 65-70.
60.TSN, June 26, 1997, pp. 13-28.
61.TSN, May 9, 1996, pp. 26-32, 37, 44-57.
62.TSN, July 29, 1997, pp. 54-58.
63.TSN, July 7, 1997, pp. 19-35.
64.TSN, July 2, 1997, pp. 33-37.
65.TSN, June 3, 1997, pp. 14-33.
66.TSN, August 12, 1997, pp. 9-12, 28-30.
67.Exhibit "331".
68.Exhibit "337-B".
69.Exhibit "349", Records, Vol. 21, p. 116 (Vol. 3), 29-32 (Vol. 4).
70.Exhibit "348".
71.Exhibit "319-A".
72.Exhibits "323", "325", "326".
73.Exhibit "344".
74.Exhibit "346".
75.Exhibit "309", "309-A" and submarkings.
76.Exhibit "347" and submarkings.
77.Exhibit "338".
78.Exhibits "341" and "342", Records, Vol. 21, pp. 6-9, 40, 63-65, 112, 140, 141-145 (Vol. 3).
79.Exhibits "369" and "364", Records, Vol. 21, pp. 24, 104-142 (Vol. 4).
80.Exhibits "207" to "219".
81.Exhibit "207-B".
82.Exhibit "212-D", Records, Vol. 21, p. 265 (Vol. 1).
83.Exhibit "260".
84.Exhibit "261".
85.Exhibit "262".
86.Exhibit "192", Records, Vol. 21, pp. 253-279 (Vol. 1), 1-7, 157, 158, 169 (Vol. 2), 194 (Vol. 1).
87.Exhibit "215" "215-B" "215-C", Records, Vol. 21, pp. 254-256, 272-274 (Vol. 1).
88.Exhibit "216"; TSN, April 15-17, 1997.
89.TSN, October 9, 1997, pp. 39-64.
90.TSN, February 4, 1998, pp. 6-7, 17-30.
91.TSN, February 9, 1998, pp. 18-19, 21-62.
92.TSN, January 21, 1998, pp. 14, 39-56.
93.TSN, February 16, 1998 and February 19, 1998.
94.TSN, January 22, 1998, pp. 18-21, 40-44.
95.TSN, January 26, 1998, pp. 91-92, 104-121.
96.TSN, February 3, 1998, pp. 10-11, 29-42.

97.TSN, January 14, 1998, pp. 6-7, 9-26, 38-41, 43-47.
98.TSN, August 6, 1996, pp. 13-41; TSN, May 22, 1997, pp. 72, 81-131, 142-157; Exhibits "274"
and "275".
99.TSN, November 12, 1997, pp. 7-8, 17-19, 38-43, 55-72.
100.TSN, November 17, 1997, pp. 43-73.

101.Id. at pp. 78-125.
102.TSN, November 12, 1997, pp. 37-39, 51-52, 91-94.
103.TSN, November 18, 1997, pp. 37-44.
104.Records, Vol. 25, pp. 1-171. Penned by Judge Amelita G. Tolentino (now an Associate
Justice of the Court of Appeals).
105.Records, Vol. 25, pp. 170-171.
106.CA rollo, Vol. IV, pp. 3478-3479.
107.Justices Renato C. Dacudao and Lucenito N. Tagle dissented. See Dissenting Opinion, CA
rollo Vol. IV.
108.Rollo (G.R. No. 176864), pp. 266-267.
109.Id. at pp. 356-358.

110.Id. at pp. 402-404.
111.People v. Comanda, G.R. No. 175880, July 6, 2007, 526 SCRA 689.
112.People v. Pringas, G.R. No. 175928, August 31, 2007, 531 SCRA 828.
113.People v. De Guzman, G.R. No. 173197, April 24, 2007, 522 SCRA 207.
114.See photographs, Exhibits "GGGG-1" and "GGGG-4", Records, Vol. 12, pp. 742-746.
115.People v. Comiling , G.R. No. 140405, March 4, 2004, 424 SCRA 698, 719, citing Francisco,
Evidence, Vol. VII, 1990 ed., p. 743.
116.People v. Simon , G.R. No. 130531, May 27, 2004, 429 SCRA 330, 352, citing People v.
Rostata, G.R. No. 91482, February 9, 1993, 218 SCRA 657.
117.People v. Zinampan, G.R. No. 126781, September 13, 2000, 340 SCRA 189, 200.
118.Fukuzume v. People, G.R. No. 143647, November 11, 2005, 474 SCRA 570.
119.G.R. No. 121039-45, January 25, 1999, 302 SCRA 21.
120.Id. at p. 50.
121.TSN, October 17, 1995, pp. 12-15, 23, 40-41, 139, 152, 161; TSN, October 18, 1995, p. 180;
TSN, July 2, 1996 , pp. 74, 82-86; TSN, July 11, 1996, pp. 43-52.
122.People v. Pineda , G.R. No. 141644, May 27, 2004, 429 SCRA 478, 495, citing People v.
Quima, No. L-74669, 14 April 1988, 159 SCRA 613 citing People v. Alto , 135 Phil. 136
(1968).
123.People v. Rodrigo, G.R. No. 176159, September 11, 2008, 564 SCRA 584, 597.
124.People v. Meneses , G.R. No. 11742, March 26, 1998, 288 SCRA 95, 97, citing People v.
Teehankee, Jr., 319 Phil. 128, 179 (1995).
125.People v. Magallanes, G.R. No. 136299, August 29, 2003, 410 SCRA 183, 197.
126.People v. Rodrigo, supra at p. 596.
127.People v. Mosquerra, G.R. No. 129209, August 9, 2001, 362 SCRA 441, 450, citing People v.
Batidor, G.R. No. 126027, February 18, 1999, 303 SCRA 335, 350; People v. Realin , G.R.
No. 126051, January 21, 1999, 301 SCRA 495, 512; People v. Tulop , G.R. No. 124829,
November 21, 1998, 289 SCRA 316, 333.
128.Id. at p. 450, citing People v. Saban, G.R. No. 110559, November 24, 1999, 319 SCRA 36, 46;
People v. Reduca , G.R. Nos. 126094-95, January 21, 1999, 301 SCRA 516, 534; and
People v. De Labajan, G.R. Nos. 129968-69, October 27, 1999, 317 SCRA 566, 575.
129.Id. at p. 451, citing People v. Hillado , G.R. No. 122838, May 24, 1999, 307 SCRA 535, 553
and People v. Balmoria, G.R. Nos. 120620-21, March 20, 1998, 287 SCRA 687, 708.
130.People v. Florentino Bracamonte , G.R. No. 95939, June 17, 1996, as cited in People v.
Aonuevo, G.R. No. 112989, September 18, 1996, 262 SCRA 22, 36.
131.G.R. Nos. 138874-75, February 3, 2004, 421 SCRA 530.
132.En Banc Resolution, July 21, 2005, 463 SCRA 654, 662-664.
133.Records, Vol. 25, pp. 122-124.
134.CA rollo, Vol. IV, pp. 3455-3463.
135.Bastian v. Court of Appeals , G.R. No. 160811, April 14, 2008, citing People v. Benito , G.R.
No. 128072, February 19, 1999, 303 SCRA 468; People v. Canada , No. L-63728,
September 15, 1986, 144 SCRA 121; People v. Luces , G.R. No. L-60744, November 25,
1983, 125 SCRA 813; People v. Demeterio , No. L-48255, September 10, 1983, 124 SCRA
914; People v. Romero , No. L-38786, December 15, 1982, 119 SCRA 234; and People v.
Zabala, 86 Phil. 251 (1950).
136.Rollo (G.R. No. 176864), pp. 288-299.
137.TSN, August 12, 1997, pp. 9-12, 28-30.
138.Vide: People v. Tagun, G.R. No. 137745, February 15, 2002, 377 SCRA 154, 169.
139.People v. Malones , G.R. No. 124388-90, March 11, 2004, 425 SCRA 318, 339-340, citing
People v. Aliposa, G.R. No. 97935, October 23, 1996, 263 SCRA 471.
140.Soriano v. People, G.R. No. 148123, June 30, 2008, 556 SCRA 595, 605.
141.Fernan, Jr. v. People , G.R. No. 145927, August 24, 2007, 531 SCRA 1, 31, citing People v.
Balacano, G.R. No, 127156, July 31, 2000, 336 SCRA 615, 621.
142.Sourced from Internet http://www.pinoymoneytalk.com/forum/index.php?topic=5848.0;
See also "Passport-reading Machine Uncovers Fake Documents" by Tina Santos,
Philippine Daily Inquirer, rst posted 03:29:00 06/15/2008 at website
http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/breakingnews/nation/view/20080615-142790/Passport-
reading-machine-uncovers-fake-documents; "DFA-RP Passport Exposes Filipinos to
Discrimination" by Venorica Uy, inquirer.net, Last Updated 07-05pm (Mla time)
03/13/2007 sourced from http://www.pinoymoneytalk.com/forum/index.php?
topic=5848.0.
143.Exhibits "YY", "DDD" and "213-1-D", Records, Vol. 9, pp. 1142, 1147 and Records, Vol. 26, p.
270.
144.Exhibits "XX" and "LLL", Records, Vol. 9, pp. 1141 and 1157.
145.Exhibits "30", "33" and "34", Records, Vol. 9, pp. 708, 711-713.
146.Cited by reference in Exhibit III, Records, Vol. 9, p. 1154.
You were informed by the San Francisco District Of ce of the Immigration and Naturalization
Service that no records responsive to you request could be located in its le. It has been
determined that this response is correct. For your information, the INS normally does not
maintain records on individuals who are entering the country as visitors rather than as
immigrants. A notation concerning the entry of a visitor may be made in the
Nonimmigrant Information System (NIIS), but many visitors are not entered into
this system. The NIIS was searched, and no records pertaining to Mr. Webb
are found . I am informed by the San Francisco District Of ce that this matter is still
pending in that office and that a formal response to your request will be issued shortly.
It is possible that either the State Department or the United States Customs Service might
have information concerning Mr. Webb's entry into the country. I suggest you write to
those agencies to request the information you seek.
147.Vide: Soriano v. People, G.R. No. 148123, June 30, 2008, 556 SCRA 595, 604.
148.Exhibit "42-M", Records, Vol. 9, p. 440.
149.Records, Vols. 24 & 25, pp. 98-109.
150.CA rollo, Vol. IV, pp. 2684-2687.
151.Records, Vol. 25, pp. 143-153.
152.CA rollo, Vol. IV, pp. 3564-3566.
153.Id. at p. 3564.
154.People v. Ortiz , G.R. No. 133814, July 17, 2001, 361 SCRA 274, citing People v. Sumaoy ,
G.R. No. 105961, October 22, 1996, 263 SCRA 460 and People v. Padao , G.R. No.
104400, January 28, 1997, 267 SCRA 64.
155.TSN, October 10, 1995, pp. 97-98.
156.Id. at pp. 129-131.
157.CA rollo, Vol. IV, pp. 3542-3550.
158.TSN, October 10, 1995, p. 81.
159.Id. at p. 88.
160.Id. at p. 97.
161.TSN, October 16, 1995, pp. 117-119.

162.TSN, October 17, 1995, pp. 72-79, 95.
163.People v. Watiwat, G.R. No. 139400, September 3, 2003, 410 SCRA 324, 335.
164.Article 8, The Revised Penal Code, as amended; People v. Amodia , G.R. No. 173791, April 7,
2009, 584 SCRA 518, citing People v. Pelopero , G.R. No. 126119, October 15, 2003, 413
SCRA 397, 410.
165.People v. Lagarto , G.R. Nos. 118828 & 119371, February 29, 2000, 326 SCRA 693, 748,
citing People v. Layno , G.R. No. 110833, November 21, 1996, 264 SCRA 558; People v.
Sumalpong, G.R. No. 124705, January 20, 1998, 284 SCRA 229; People v. Obello , G.R.
No. 108772, January 14, 1998, 284 SCRA 79; People v. Pulusan, G.R. No. 10037, May 21,
1998, 290 SCRA 353; People v. Medina , G.R. No. 127157, July 10, 1998, 292 SCRA 436;
and People v. Chua, G.R. No. 121792, October 7, 1998, 297 SCRA 229.
166.People v. Sicad, G.R. No. 133833, October 15, 2002, 391 SCRA 19, 34, citing People v. Diaz ,
G.R. No. 110829, April 18, 1997, 271 SCRA 504, 515 and People v. Abordo , G.R. No.
107245, December 17, 1999, 321 SCRA 23, 39.
167.CA rollo, Vol. IV, p. 3081.
168.People v. Antonio , G.R. No. 128900, July 14, 2000, 335 SCRA 646, 677, citing People v.
Malvenda, G.R. No. 115351, March 27, 1998, 288 SCRA 225.
169.People v. Magana, G.R. No. 105673, July 26, 1996, 259 SCRA 381, 402.
170.A.M. No. 06-11-5-SC.
171.Id., Sec. 4.
172.Rollo (G.R. No. 176389), pp. 531-542.
173.Id. at pp. 543-554.
174.Id. at pp. 560-563.
175.Id. at pp. 580-585.

176.373 U.S. 83 (1963).
177.Rollo (G.R. No. 176389), pp. 586-592.
178.See City Prosecution Of ce of General Santos City v. Bersales , A.M. No. MTJ-04-1552,
June 9, 2004, 431 SCRA 430, 436.
179.Id., pp.
180.149 Misc. 2d 844, 570 N.Y.S. 2d 765 (Sup. Ct. Westchester Co. 1990).
181.467 U.S. 479 (1984).
182.373 U.S. 83 (1963).
183.Id.
184.Supra note 180.
185.Supra note 181.
186.Matter of Dabbs v. Vergari, supra.
187.G.R. No. 150224, May 19, 2004, 428 SCRA 504.
188.Id. at pp. 514-517.
189.A LITIGATOR'S GUIDE TO DNA FROM THE LABORATORY TO THE COURTROOM by Ron C.
Michaelis, Robert G. Flanders, Jr. and Paula H. Wulff, 2008 published by Elsevier, Inc., p.
370.
190.488 U.S. 51 (1988), 102 L Ed 281, 109 S Ct 333.
191.People v. Bato , G.R. No. 134939, February 16, 2000, 325 SCRA 671, 678, citing People v.
Juntilla, G.R. No. 130604, September 16, 1999, 314 SCRA 568, 583; People v. Sacapao ,
G.R. No. 130525, September 3, 1999, 313 SCRA 650, 659; and People v. Manuel, G.R. No.
121539, October 21, 1998, 298 SCRA 184.
192.People v. Pascual, G.R. No. 172326, January 19, 2009, 576 SCRA 242, 260, citing People v.
Sevilleno, G.R. No. 152954, March 10, 2004, 425 SCRA 247, 257.
193.Nueva Espaa v. People , G.R. No. 163351, June 21, 2005, 460 SCRA 547, 555-556, citing
People v. Opuran, G.R. Nos. 147674-75, March 17, 2004, 425 SCRA 654, 673.
194.G.R. No. 166723, August 2, 2007, 529 SCRA 109, 118.
195.People v. Arellano, G.R. No. 176640, August 22, 2008, 563 SCRA 181, 189.
196.Id.
197.People v. Pascual, supra at 260-261.
198.Nueva Espaa v. People, supra at 558.
SERENO, J., concurring:
1.Go v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 101837, 11 February 1992, 206 SCRA 138.
2.People v. Teehankee, Jr., G.R. Nos. 111206-08, 6 October 1995, 319 Phil. 128 (1995).
3.Decision dated 13 September 1993 issued by the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 63 in
Criminal Case Nos. 91-7135 to 37.
4.Lejano v. People, G.R. Nos. 176389 and 176864, 20 April 2010.
5.Information, Regional Trial Court rollo, vol. 1, p. 34.
6.Tan v. Gallardo, G.R. Nos. L-41213-14 October 5, 1976, 73 SCRA 306, citing Suarez v. Platon,
et al., 69 Phil. 556 (1940).
7.The Prosecution Role in Upholding the Right to a Fair Trial and Responding to
Victims/Witnesses, The Prosecutor Papers, November 2005 at 10.
8.R v. Boucher, (1954) S.C.R. 16.
9.Stuart, Don, CHARTER JUSTICE IN CANADIAN CRIMINAL LAW, 2001, p. 7.

10.G.R. No. 113630, 5 May 1994, 232 SCRA 192.
11.Cramm, Paul, D. The Perils of Prosecutorial Misconduct, http://www.24-
7pressrelease.com/press-release/theperils-of-prosecutorial-misconduct-102380.php
accessed on 10 December 2010.
12.Montemayor v. Bermejo, Jr., A.M. No. MTJ-04-1535, 12 March 2004, 425 SCRA 403.
13.G.R. No. 127262, 24 July 1997, 276 SCRA 243, 342 Phil. 206.
14.TSN, 19 October 1995, pp. 23-24.
15.Id., pp. 25-33.
16.Id., pp. 33-45.

17.Order, Regional Trial Court rollo, vol. 1, pp. 852-860.
18.Id. at pp. 7-8.
19.A.M. No. 06-11-5-SC effective 15 October 2007.
20.G.R. No. 125901, 8 March 2001, 406 Phil. 449.
21.G.R. No. 150224, 19 May 2004, 428 SCRA 504.
22.Resolution dated 20 April 2010.
23.488 U.S. 51 (1988).
24.In his Article, OLD BLOOD, BAD BLOOD, AND YOUNGBLOOD: DUE PROCESS, LOST
EVIDENCE, AND THE LIMITS OF BAD FAITH, 86 Wash. U. L. Rev. 241, Norman C. Bay
reported (pp. 282-283):
Forensic DNA typing was not developed until 1985, when Dr. Alec Jeffreys, an English
scientist, used the technique to exonerate one suspect in the sexual assault and murder
of two young girls and to inculpate another. Three years later, in 1988, the same year
Youngblood was decided, the FBI began testing DNA. That same year, for the first time, a
state appellate court upheld the admission of DNA evidence in a criminal case. The
crime at issue in Youngblood occurred well before the advent of DNA testing, and the
Supreme Court decided the case when DNA testing was in its infancy, still embroiled in
litigation over its reliability and admissibility.
In the two decades since it was rst used, forensic DNA typing has continued to progress. At
this point, scientists have developed three generations of tests. The current, dominant
generation of technology is the polymerase chain reaction (PCR). This approach
analyzes DNA taken from the nucleus of a cell. PCR allows the DNA in a biological
sample to be replicated; only a minute amount of DNA is needed and the sample from
which it comes can be highly degraded. Only a few cells are required for reliable results.
Usable DNA can be recovered from a myriad of items, including computer keyboards,
hats, bandannas, eyeglasses, facial tissue, cotton swabs, dirty laundry, toothpicks,
chewing gum, cigarette butts, envelope seals, the mouths of bottles, the rims of glasses,
or urine stains.
PCR is usually followed by short tandem repeat (STR) testing, which compares thirteen
speci c regions, or loci, found on nuclear DNA. The odds that two unrelated individuals
will share the same thirteen-loci DNA pro le can be as high as one in a billion or more.
Thus, PCR-STR analysis is both highly sensitive and discriminating. It is sensitive in that
small amounts of biological material can be tested. It is discriminating in that the results
of a thirteen-loci comparison generate unique DNA pro les that can establish guilt or
innocence to a practical certainty in certain types of cases.
Yet another powerful forensic DNA tool has emerged: mitochondrial DNA (mtDNA) testing.
Unlike STR analysis, this technique examines the DNA contained in the mitochondria of
a cell, not its nucleus. This is important because some biological material, including hair
shafts, bones, and teeth, lack nuclei, but possess mitochondria. In some cases,
especially those involving decomposed tissue, only teeth or bones may remain.
Mitochondrial DNA testing allows for the study and comparison of DNA in such material.
One drawback to mtDNA is that it is not as discriminating as STR. Mitochondrial DNA is
passed maternally; consequently, siblings and maternal relatives have the same mtDNA,
and the test cannot distinguish among them. Nonetheless, mtDNA provides a powerful
supplement to STR and may allow for analysis when none is otherwise available.
Among other things, mtDNA has identi ed one of the unknown soldiers in the Tomb of
the Unknown Soldier in Arlington National Cemetery, the remains of Czar Nicholas II and
his family, and the likely offspring of Thomas Jefferson and Sally Heming.
Since 1985, the eld of forensic DNA typing has continued to progress. Emerging Y-
chromosome analysis focuses on variations in male genetic material; it may prove to be
helpful in sexual assault cases involving multiple male perpetrators. Hand-held or
portable devices with "labs-on-a-chip" may be developed that allow for rapid DNA testing
at a crime scene. Robotic systems are already being used to help process DNA samples.
Similarly, computer software compares and interprets STR data. In short, forensic DNA
typing will continue to become increasingly automated, faster, cheaper, and more
accurate. This, in turn, ought to affect the due process calculus when the state loses or
destroys potentially exculpatory evidence. The context in which such problems arise
today is entirely different than when Youngblood was decided." (Citations omitted.)
25.98 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 329

26.The Innocence Project. <http://www.innocenceproject.org> accessed on 12 December 2010.
27.86 Wash. U. L. Rev. 241.
28.373 U.S. 83 (1963).
29.The Court in Brady held: "The suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an
accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt
or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution."
30.The Innocence Project Know the Cases: Browse Pro les: Larry Youngblood,
<http://www.innocenceproject.org/Content/Larry_Youngblood.php> accessed on
12/13/2010
31.Tan v. People, G.R. No. 173637, 21 April 2009, 586 SCRA 139.

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EN BANC

[G.R. No. 176389. December 14, 2010.]

ANTONIO LEJANO , petitioner, vs . PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES ,

[G.R. No. 176864. December 14, 2010.]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES , appellee, vs. HUBERT JEFFREY P.

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According to Atty. Artemio Sacaguing, former head of the NBI Anti-Kidnapping,

A. I was quite interested and I tried to persuade her to introduce to

A. No, sir. TAECaD

A. Because Jessica Alfaro was never able to comply with her

Quite significantly, Alfaro never refuted Sacaguing's above testimony.

4. The supposed corroborations

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c. Details of U.S. sojourn

The initial request was merely initiated by BID Commissioner Verceles

That by reason or on the occasion of the aforesaid rape or immediately thereafter,

1) The amount of P150,000.00 for wrongful death of the victims;

On appeal, the Court of Appeals rendered its challenged Decision of December

A: Our general examination of patients showed that they become liars.

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Witness Dr. Rey San Pedro:

Witness Dr. Rey San Pedro:

Witness Dr. Rey San Pedro:

A: Yes, Sir. ASaTCE

A: I have not encountered a case like that.

Witness Dr. Rey San Pedro:

Witness Dr. Rey San Pedro:

Q: Treated and rehabilitated, where?

Former National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) Director Epimaco Velasco had a

xxx xxx xxx

A She liked being treated that way.

A She seemed to have been piqued and she said . . .

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Q And what did you say?

Q Atty. Sacaguing, were you able to interview this alleged witness?

Q How was that?

Reform your question.

Significantly, Alfaro never disputed Sacaguing's above-quoted testimony.

A: When I got out on drugs.

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Q: Is that your principal reason?

That on or about the 30th day of June 1991 at BF Homes Paraaque,

Four (4) necklace

Crim. Case No. 91-7136

That on or about the 30th day of June 1991 at BF Homes Paraaque,

Four (4) necklace

Two (2) pairs of earings

It bears emphasis that the questioned inconsistencies in Alfaro's Af davits, and

April 28, 1995 May 22, 1995 Testimony in Court

Q Did Jessica Alfaro read her statement?

A Yes, Your Honor.

A Just for few minutes, Your Honor.

xxx xxx xxx

xxx xxx xxx

xxx xxx xxx

BRION , J., supplemental opinion:

xxx xxx xxx

VILLARAMA, JR. , J., dissenting :

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Lolita Carrera Vda. de Birrer , a widow and resident of United Paraaque

Webb submitted the following documentary evidence in connection with his

3) Car plate with the name "Lew Webb"; 7 0

1. The amount of P150,000.00 for wrongful death of the victims;