Curry's Paradox

First published Wed Jan 10, 2001; substantive revision Wed Feb 13, 2008
Curry's paradox, so named for its discoverer, namely Haskell B. Curry, is a paradox
within the family of so-called paradoxes of self-reference (or paradoxes of circularity).
Like the liar paradox (e.g., this sentence is false) and Russell's paradox, Curry's
paradox challenges familiar naive theories, including naive truth theory (unrestricted T-
schema) and naive set theory (unrestricted axiom of abstraction), respectively. If one
accepts naive truth theory (or naive set theory), then Curry's paradox becomes a direct
challenge to one's theory of logical implication or entailment. Unlike the liar and
Russell paradoxes Curry's paradox is negation-free; it may be generated irrespective of
one's theory of negation. An intuitive version of the paradox runs as follows.
Consider the following list of sentences, named The List.

1. Tasmanian devils have strong jaws.

2. The second sentence on The List is circular.
3. If the third sentence on The List is true, then every sentence is true.
4. The List comprises exactly four sentences.
Although The List itself is not paradoxical, the third sentence (a conditional) is. Is it
true? Well, suppose, for conditional proof, that its antecedent is true. Then
the third sentence of The List is true
is true. Since the third sentence of The List is `If the third sentence of The List is true,
then every sentence is true', substitution (of identity) yields that
If the third sentence of The List is true, then every sentence is true
is true. But, then, Modus Ponens on the above two sentences yields that
every sentence is true
is true. So, by conditional proof, we conclude that
If the third sentence of The List is true, then every sentence is true
is true. By substitution (of identity, as above), it follows that
the third sentence of The List is true
is true. But, now, by Modus Ponens on the above two sentences we get that
every sentence is true
is true. By the Release rule for truth,[1] we conclude: every sentence is true! So goes (one
version of) Curry's paradox.

1. Brief History and Some Caveats

2. Curry's Paradox: Truth-, Set-, and Property-Theoretic Versions
3. Significance, Solutions, and Open Problems
Bibliography
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1. Brief History and Some Caveats

In 1942 Haskell B. Curry presented what is now called Curry's paradox. Perhaps the
most intuitive version of the paradox is due to Arthur N. Prior (1955), who recast
Curry's paradox as a proof of God's existence. (Let C = If C is true then God exists.)
The version presented above is (in effect) Prior's version.
There are basically two different versions of Curry's paradox, a truth-theoretic (or
proof-theoretic) and a set-theoretic version; these versions will be presented below.
(There is also a third one concerning properties, which may or may not be the same as
the set-theoretic version; it depends on whether sets and semantical properties are the
same thing. This is briefly touched on below.) For now, however, there are a few
caveats that need to be issued.
Caveat 1. Lb's Paradox. Prior's version is (in effect) rehearsed by Boolos and Jeffrey
(1989), where neither Prior nor Curry is given credit; rather, Boolos and Jeffrey point
out the similarity of the paradox to reasoning used within the proof of Lb's Theorem;
and subsequent authors, notably Barwise & Etchemendy (1984), have called the
paradoxLb's paradox. While there is no doubt strong justification for the alternative
name (given the similarity of Curry's paradox to the reasoning involved in proving
Lb's Theorem) the paradox does appear to have been first discovered by Curry.
Caveat 2. Geometrical Curry Paradox (Jigsaw Paradox). This is not the same Curry
paradox under discussion; it is a well-known paradox, due to Paul Curry, having to do
with so-called geometrical dissection. (The so-called Banach-Tarski geometrical
paradox is related to Paul Curry's geometrical paradox.) See Gardner 1956 and
Fredrickson 1997 for full discussion of this (geometrical) Curry paradox.
2. Curry's Paradox: Truth-, Set-, and Property-
Theoretic Versions
2.1 Truth-Theoretic Version
Assume that our truth predicate satisfies the following T-schema.
T-Schema: T[A]A,
where [ ] is a name-forming device. Assume, too, that we have the principle
calledAssertion (also known as pseudo modus ponens):
Assertion: (A & (AB)) B
(NB: We could also use the principle called Contraction: ((A(AB))(AB).)
Curry's paradox quickly generates triviality, the case in which everything is true.
By diagonalization, self-reference or the like we can get a sentence C such that
C = T[C] F,
where F is anything you like. (For effect, though, make F something obviously false.)
By an instance of the T-schema (T[C]C) we immediately get
T[C] (T[C]F),
Again, using the same instance of the T-Schema, we can substitute C for T[C] in the
above to get (1).
1. C (CF) [by T-schema and Substitution]
2. (C & (CF)) F [by Assertion]
3. (C & C) F [by Substitution, from 2]
4. C F [by Equivalence of C and C&C, from 3]
5. C [by Modus Ponens, from 1 and 4]
6. F [by Modus Ponens, from 4 and 5]
Letting F be anything entailing triviality Curry's paradox quickly 'shows' that the world
is trivial!

2.2 Set-Theoretic Version

The same result ensues within naive set theory. Assume, in particular, the (unrestricted)
axiom of abstraction (or comprehension):
Unrestricted Abstraction: x {y | A(y)} A(x).
Moreover, assume that our conditional, , satisfies Contraction (as above), which
permits the deduction of
(s s A)
from
s s (s s A).
In the set-theoretic case, let C =df {x | x x F}, where F remains as you please (but
something obviously false, for effect). From here we reason thus:
1. x C (x x F) [by Naive Abstraction]
2. C C (C C F) [by Universal Specification, from 1]
3. C C (C C F) [by Simplification, from 2]
4. C C F [by Contraction, from 3]
5. C C [by Modus Ponens, from 2 and 4]
6. F [by Modus Ponens, from 4 and 5]

So, coupling Contraction with the naive abstraction schema yields, via Curry's paradox,
triviality.

2.3 Property-Theoretic Version

On the surface, it's plausible that every meaningful predicate corresponds (or
expresses, or denotes, or whathaveyou) a semantical property. In particular, for
every meaningful predicate F, there is a semantical property <(y : F(y))> such that an
object x exemplifies <(y :F(y))> just if F is true of x. Letting E be the exemplification
relation, this unrestricted semantical property principle (USP) takes a familiar form,
namely,
USP: xE<(y : F(y))> F(x).
Curry's property-theoretic paradox results from replacing (membership)
with E(exemplification) in Unrestricted Abstraction (UA) and replacing the set-notation
with the property notion.[2]

3. Significance, Solutions, and Open Problems

3.1 Significance
What is the significance of Curry's paradox? The answer depends on one's approach to
paradox in general. Any comprehensive theory of language has to give some sort
account of the paradoxes (e.g., the liar, or Russell's, or etc.). Classical approaches tend
to fiddle with the T-schema (or naive abstraction) or reject the existence of certain
(paradoxical) sentences. Such classical approaches tend to respond to Curry's paradox
in the same fashion by rejecting the existence of Curry sentences or fiddling with the
unrestricted T-schema (or naive abstraction). Some popular variations of these two
options include Gupta-Belnap revision theory (1993), Tarski's familiar hierarchical
theory (or Russellian type theory), Simmons's singularity theory (1993), Burge's
indexical theory (1979), Kripke's fixed point semantics (1975), Gaifman's pointer
semantics (1988), Barwise-Etchemendy situation-cum-Aczel-set-theory (1984),
Glanzberg's contextual semantics (2001) and, similarly Parsons (1974), and others.
(NB: These theories are quite different from each other; however, each of them fits
under one of the two so-called classical options mentioned above; they either modify
the naive T-schema or reject the existence of so-called strengthened liar sentences.)
Where Curry's paradox becomes especially significant is not with classical approaches
but rather with certain non-classical approaches. In particular, Curry's paradox is a
direct challenge to any non-classical approach that attempts to preserve one of the
canvassed schemas truth, sets, semantical properties in unrestricted form (while
nonetheless allowing Curry sentences to arise in the language).
The two most prominent non-classical approaches, at least with respect to dealing with
Curry, are paraconsistent and paracomplete approaches. The former affords (negation-)
inconsistent but non-trivial theories (by rejecting explosion, the rule from a sentence
and its negation to an arbitrary sentence). The latter rejects excluded middle, that is,
the validity of the disjunction of a sentence and its negation.[3]
In the target non-classical theories (all of which have classical logic as a proper
extension), the so-called material conditional (the hook or horseshoe) is not a
terribly adequate conditional, where the hook is a disguised disjunction, namely AB.
In target paracomplete theories, the hook fails to satisfy Identity (validity of
if A then A, in the hook sense of if). In the target paraconsistent theories, the hook
fails to detach (fails to satisfy modus ponens). So, the target non-classical theories
tend to seek out a conditional that goes beyond the hook.
To focus matters a bit more (though still keeping things slightly loose), let a suitable
conditional be a conditional with the following minimal features.

1. Identity: AA is valid.
2. (Rule) Modus Ponens: The argument (form) from A and AB to B is valid.
3. Curry-generating contraction is avoided!
There are other constraints one might impose (e.g., substitutivity of equivalents,
avoidance of omega-inconsistency in arithmetic, perhaps more), but the above
conditions serve as a minimal constraint on a suitable conditional.[4]
What Curry's paradox teaches us is that, regardless of their merits with respect to simple
Liar-like sentences, not just any old paraconsistent or paracomplete theory will work if
we're to preserve one or more of the given (unrestricted) principles. On pain of
triviality, no connective in the language can satisfy contraction or absorption and
support the Truth or UA or USP schemes (at least if the logic is otherwise relatively
normal). Among other things, this constraint rules out quite a few popular candidates
for (otherwise suitable) conditionals including, for example, various
popular relevant conditionals, including those of E and R.
In the next two subsections, I sketch two basic (in various ways related) approaches to a
suitable conditional, so understood. Details and refinements (of which there are many!)
are left to cited work.

3.2 A simple non-normal worlds solution

One family of approaches to a suitable conditional invokes non-normal worlds
(originally introduced by Kripke for purposes of modeling modal logics for
which Necessitation fails). A particularly simple approach, which suits either
paraconsistent or paracomplete (or both) approaches to paradox, is due to Graham Priest
(1992) and, in a slightly different form, Routley and Loparic (1973). The idea may be
seen easily through its semantics, as follows.[5]
Setting negation aside (for purposes of Curry), we assume a propositional language
with the following connectives: conjunction (&), disjunction (), and entailment ().
(For purposes of resolving Curry's paradox, negation may be set aside; however, the
current semantics allow for a variety of approaches to negation, as well as quantifiers.)
An interpretation is a 4-tuple, (W,N,[ ], f), where W is a non-empty set of worlds (index
points), N is a non-empty subset of W, [ ] is a function from propositional parameters to
the powerset of W; we may, for convenience, see the range of [ ] as comprising
propositions (sets of worlds at which various sentences are true), and so call the values
of [ ] propositions. We let NN be the set of so-called non-normal worlds,
namely NN = WN. In turn, f is a function from (ordered) pairs of propositions to NN.
Now, [ ] is extended to all sentences (A, B, ) via the following clauses:
[A&B] = [A][B]
[AB] = [A][B]
The value of an entailment is the union of two sets: N, the class of normal worlds where
the entailment is true, and NN, the of non-normal worlds where the entailment is true.
Assuming the usual S5 truth conditions, N and NN are specified thus:
N = W, if [A][B]; otherwise, N = .
NN = f([A],[B]).
With all this in hand, validity is defined in the usual way: namely, as truth-preservation
at all normal worlds of all interpretations.
One could define validity over all worlds (of all interpretations); however, while this
would yield a suitable conditional in the going sense, the conditional would be even
weaker than the (very) weak (but nonetheless suitable) conditional generated from the
normal-worlds-only account of validity.
Priest (1992) gives a sound and complete proof theory for the given semantics, but this
is left for the reader to consult.

3.3 A different solution

In very recent work, Field (2008) has championed a non-classical (paracomplete but
non-paraconsistent) theory of truth that involves a related but, in various ways, more
sophisticated approach to a suitable conditional. In particular, Field gives an extension
of the familiar (Kripkean) Strong Kleene approach to truth, where the extended
language contains a (primitive) suitable conditional.[6]
3.3.1 A non-normal neighborhood framework
For present purposes, I simply sketch (a proper part of) what Field calls a general
semantics for his conditional. (More constraints are needed to give Field's conditional,
but the aim here is simply to sketch the basic idea.) Field also gives an elegant
semantics that utilizes a variation on constructions due to Kripke (1975) and Brady
(1989); however, the worlds approach is sufficient for present purposes.
With the aim of giving an extension of Strong Kleene logic (see many-valued logic),
Field proposes the following framework, letting the syntax be as in the non-normal
worlds approach above. (Of course, both approaches are to be extended to the predicate
and quantification cases, but the propositional level gives the basic idea.) Let W be an
infinite set of worlds, with @ a (unique) actual element. In turn, a similarity relation
is imposed on W so that each w W enjoys a set of similar worlds (a so-called
neighborhood of w). Specifically, Field proposes that each w W be assigned a
(possibly empty) directed family Fw that comprises non-empty subsets of W,
where directedness means
(w W)(X,Y Fw)(Z Fw) Z XY
Such directedness of Fw allows for incomparability, so that the similarity relation
needn't be linear.
Towards avoiding Curry paradox, a few other tweaks are required. (Towards getting all
of the features of Field's conditional, even more constraints are required, but these are
left to Field's work (2008).) Define the following features for any w W.
 1. Normality: w is normal just if w X for all X Fw.
2. Non-normality: w is non-normal just if it is not normal.
3. Loneliness: w is lonely just if {w} Fw.
4. Happiness: w is happy just if it is not lonely.
Field's proposal stipulates that @ be both normal and happy on any interpretation, but
otherwise worlds may be non-normal and lonely. (That @ is to be happy is not merely
Field's warmheartedness; contraction-related validities would emerge were it lonely.)
With this setup, sentences in the conditional-free fragment are assigned Kleene values
(viz., 1, 0.5, 0) at worlds in a standard way. In particular, conjunction and disjunction
are min andmax, respectively, and negation is 1 minus the value of the negatum all
relativized to worlds. The given worlds, of course, play no essential role in any of the
extensional connectives; one needn't look at other worlds to figure out the values of
such sentences. The worlds come into play in the conditional. Where |A|w is the value
of A at w,

1. |AB|w = 1 if |A|y |B|y for some X Fw and any y X

2. |AB|w = 0 if |A|y > |B|y for some X Fw and any y X
3. |AB|w = 0.5 otherwise.
With these valuation conditions in place, the validity (or semantic consequence) relation
is defined only over actual points of all interpretations. Let A be actually verified in an
interpretation just if A takes the value 1 at @ in the given interpretation. Then an
argument from set S of sentences to conclusion A is valid iff any interpretation that
actually verifies Sactually verifies A. (Here, a set S of sentences is actually verified just
if all of its members are actually verified.)
Two notable features of the conditional
One notable feature of Field's approach is that, with his other constraints (omitted here)
in place, the conditional reduces to the hook in contexts in which Excluded Middle
holds. (See Field 2008 for discussion.) This feature is absent from the simple non-
normal worlds approach sketched above.
Another notable feature (in the broader, Fieldian construction) is that the conditional
gives rise to a natural determinacy operator actually, to an infinite hierarchy of
stronger and stronger determinacy operators. Given Field's paracomplete purposes (in
which some sentences, like Curry sentences, are not determinately true), this is a
significant achievement. For present purposes, however, details are left to Field's work.

Open Issues and Problems

With either of the foregoing approaches the simple non-normal or Field's one
need not reject the existence of Curry sentences (which are difficult to reject when one's
language is a natural language) in order to keep any of the given naive principles
(truth, sets, properties); however, there are various philosophical issues that need to be
addressed, a few of which are canvassed below.
One philosophical issue confronting either approach is the very nature of such non-
normal worlds. What are they? (Of course, they're very different in the two approaches,
but one might ask the question on either approach.) If, as Field (2008) is inclined to do,
one takes a fairly instrumentalist approach towards the formal semantics, then perhaps
this question is not terribly pressing. If, as Priest is sometimes inclined to do, one takes
a realist approach towards the formal setup, the question seems to be pressing.
Priest's suggestion (1992), with respect to the simple non-normal framework (or more
sophisticated variants), is that non-normal worlds are simply (impossible) worlds where
the laws of logic are different. But is there any reason, independent of Curry's paradox,
to admit such worlds? Fortunately, the answer seems to be yes. One reason has to do
with the common (natural language) reasoning involving counter-logicals, including,
for example, sentences such as If intuitionistic logic is correct, then double negation
elimination is invalid. Invoking non-normal worlds provides a simple way of
modelling such sentences and the reasoning involving them.[7]
There are other philosophical (and logical) problems that remain open. One of the most
important recent papers discussing such problems is Restall 2007. Restall argues that
the sorts of non-classical approach discussed above must give up either transitivity of
entailment, infinitary disjunction or distributive lattice logic (i.e., an infinitary
disjunction operator distributing over finite conjunction); otherwise, as Restall shows,
Curry's paradox arises immediately and triviality ensues. The importance of Restall's
point lies not only in the formal constraints imposed on suitable non-classical
approaches to Curry; its importance lies especially in the philosophical awkwardness
imposed by such constraints. For example, one (formal) upshot of Restall's point is that,
on a natural way of modelling propositions (e.g., in familiar world-semantics), some
classes of propositions will not have disjunctions on the (given sort of) non-classical
approach; the philosophical upshot (and important open problem) is that there is no
obvious explanation for why such classes lack such a disjunction. (Needless to say, it is
not a sufficient explanation to note that the presence of such a disjunction would
otherwise generate triviality via Curry's paradox.) See Field 2008 for a recent reply to
Restall.
The foregoing issues and open problems confront various non-classical approaches to
paradox, problems that arise particularly sharply in the face of Curry's paradox. It
should be understood, however, that such problems may remain pressing even for those
who are firmly committed to classical approaches to paradox. After all, one might be
interested not so much in accepting or believing such non-classical proposals, but rather
in using such proposals to model various naive but non-trivial theories naive truth
theory, naive set theory, semantical property theory, naive denotation theory, etc.. One
need not believe or accept such theories to have an interest in modeling them
accurately. If one has such an interest, then the foregoing problems arising from Curry's
paradox must be addressed. (See Slaney 1989, and the classic Meyer, Dunn, and
Routley 1979, and also Restall 2000 for further discussion.)

Bibliography
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