LAND TITLES CHAPTER II
Republic of the Philippines status quo, both in the Intermediate Appellate Court and in the
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 81163 September 26, 1988
EDUARDO S. BARANDA and ALFONSO HITALIA, petitioners,
vs.
HONORABLE JUDGE TITO GUSTILO, ACTING REGISTER OF DEEDS AVITO
SACLAUSO, HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, and ATTY. HECTOR P.
TEODOSIO, respondents.
Eduardo S. Baranda for petitioners.
Rico & Associates for private respondents.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
Eduardo S. Baranda and Alfonso Hitalia were the petitioners in G.R. No.
64432 and the private respondents in G.R. No. 62042. The subject
matter of these two (2) cases and the instant case is the same a
parcel of land designated as Lot No. 4517 of the Cadastral Survey of Sta.
Barbara, Iloilo covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 6406.
The present petition arose from the same facts and events which
triggered the filing of the earlier petitions. These facts and events are
cited in our resolution dated December 29, 1983 in G.R. No. 64432, as
follows:
. . . This case has its origins in a petition for reconstitution of title
filed with the Court of First Instance of Iloilo involving a parcel of
land known as Lot No. 4517 of the Sta. Barbara Cadastre covered
by Original Certificate of Title No. 6406 in the name of Romana
Hitalia. Eventually, Original Certificate of Title No. 6406 was
cancelled and Transfer Certificate of Title No. 106098 was issued
in the names of Alfonso Hitalia and Eduardo S. Baranda The Court
issued a writ of possession which Gregorio Perez, Maria P. Gotera
and Susana Silao refused to honor on the ground that they also
have TCT No. 25772 over the same Lot No. 4517. The Court, after
considering the private respondents' opposition and finding TCT
No. 25772 fraudulently acquired, ordered that the writ of
possession be carried out. A motion for reconsideration having
been denied, a writ of demolition was issued on March 29, 1982.
Perez and Gotera filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with
the Court of Appeals. On August 6, 1982, the Court of Appeals
denied the petition. Perez and Gotera filed the petition for review
on certiorari denominated as G.R. No. 62042 before the Supreme
Court. As earlier stated the petition was denied in a resolution
dated January 7,1983. The motion for reconsideration was denied
in another resolution dated March 25, 1983, which also stated
that the denial is final. This decision in G.R. No. 62042, in
accordance with the entry of judgment, became final on March
25, 1983. The petitioners in the instant case G.R. No. 64432--
contend that the writs of possession and demolition issued in the
respondent court should now be implemented; that Civil Case No.
00827 before the Intermediate Appellate Court was filed only to
delay the implementation of the writ; that counsel for the
respondent should be held in contempt of court for engaging in a
concerted but futile effort to delay the execution of the writs of
possession and demolition and that petitioners are entitled to
damages because of prejudice caused by the filing of this petition
before the Intermediate Appellate Court. On September 26, 1983,
this Court issued a Temporary Restraining Order ' to maintain the
In view of this development, the petitioners filed in G.R. No. 62042 and
Regional Trial Court of Iloilo. Considering that (l)there is merit in
the instant petition for indeed the issues discussed in G.R. No.
64432 as raised in Civil Case No. 00827 before the respondent
court have already been passed upon in G.R. No. 62042; and (2)
the Temporary Restraining Order issued by the Intermediate
Appellate Court was only intended not to render the petition
moot and academic pending the Court's consideration of the
issues, the Court RESOLVED to DIRECT the respondent
Intermediate Appellate Court not to take cognizance of issues
already resolved by this Court and accordingly DISMISS the
petition in Civil Case No. 00827. Immediate implementation of the
writs of possession and demolition is likewise ordered. (pp. 107-
108, Rollo G.R. No. 64432)
On May 9, 1984, the Court issued a resolution denying with finality a
motion for reconsideration of the December 29, 1983 resolution in G.R.
No. 64432. On this same date, another resolution was issued, this time
in G.R. No. 62042, referring to the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo the ex-
parte motion of the private respondents (Baranda and Hitalia) for
execution of the judgment in the resolutions dated January 7, 1983 and
March 9, 1983. In the meantime, the then Intermediate Appellate Court
issued a resolution dated February 10, 1984, dismissing Civil Case No.
00827 which covered the same subject matter as the Resolutions above
cited pursuant to our Resolution dated December 29, 1983. The
resolution dated December 29, 1983 in G.R. No. 64432 became final on
May 20, 1984.
Upon motions of the petitioners, the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo,
Branch 23 presided by Judge Tito G. Gustilo issued the following order:
Submitted are the following motions filed by movants Eduardo S.
Baranda and Alfonso Hitalia through counsel dated August 28,
1984:
(a) Reiterating Motion for Execution of Judgment of Resolutions
dated January 7, 1983 and March 9, 1983 Promulgated by
Honorable Supreme Court (First Division) in G.R. No. 62042;
(b) Motion for Execution of Judgment of Resolution dated
December 29, 1983 Promulgated by Honorable Supreme Court
(First Division) in G.R. No. 64432;
(c) The Duties of the Register of Deeds are purely ministerial
under Act 496, therefore she must register all orders, judgment,
resolutions of this Court and that of Honorable Supreme Court.
Finding the said motions meritorious and there being no
opposition thereto, the same is hereby GRANTED.
WHEREFORE, Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-25772 is hereby
declared null and void and Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-
106098 is hereby declared valid and subsisting title concerning the
ownership of Eduardo S. Baranda and Alfonso Hitalia, all of Sta.
Barbara Cadastre.
The Acting Register of Deeds of Iloilo is further ordered to register
the Subdivision Agreement of Eduardo S. Baranda and Alfonso
Hitalia as prayed for." (p. 466, Rollo--G.R. No. 64432)
The above order was set aside on October 8, 1984 upon a motion for
reconsideration and manifestation filed by the Acting Registrar of Deeds
of Iloilo, Atty. Helen P. Sornito, on the ground that there was a pending
case before this Court, an Action for Mandamus, Prohibition, Injunction
under G.R. No. 67661 filed by Atty. Eduardo Baranda, against the former
which remained unresolved.
G.R. No. 64432 ex-parte motions for issuance of an order directing the
Regional Trial Court and Acting Register of Deeds to execute and
implement the judgments of this Court. They prayed that an order be
issued:
1. Ordering both the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo Branch XXIII,
under Hon. Judge Tito G. Gustilo and the acting Register of
Deeds Helen P. Sornito to register the Order dated September 5,
1984 of the lower court;
2. To cancel No.T-25772. Likewise to cancel No.T-106098 and
once cancelled to issue new certificates of title to each of
Eduardo S. Baranda and Alfonso Hitalia;
Plus other relief and remedies equitable under the premises. (p.
473, 64432 Rollo)
Acting on these motions, we issued on September 17,1986 a Resolution
in G.R. No. 62042 and G.R. No. 64432 granting the motions as prayed
for. Acting on another motion of the same nature filed by the
petitioners, we issued another Resolution dated October 8, 1986
referring the same to the Court Administrator for implementation by the
judge below.
In compliance with our resolutions, the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo,
Branch 23 presided by Judge Tito G. Gustilo issued two (2) orders dated
November 6,1986 and January 6,1987 respectively, to wit:
ORDER
This is an Ex-parte Motion and Manifestation submitted by the
movants through counsel on October 20, 1986; the
Manifestation of Atty. Helen Sornito, Register of Deeds of the
City of Iloilo, and formerly acting register of deeds for the
Province of Iloilo dated October 23, 1986 and the Manifestation
of Atty. Avito S. Saclauso, Acting Register of Deeds, Province of
Iloilo dated November 5, 1986.
Considering that the motion of movants Atty. Eduardo S. Baranda
and Alfonso Hitalia dated August 12, 1986 seeking the full
implementation of the writ of possession was granted by the
Honorable Supreme Court, Second Division per its Resolution
dated September 17,1986, the present motion is hereby
GRANTED.
WHEREFORE, the Acting Register of Deeds, Province of Iloilo, is
hereby ordered to register the Order of this Court dated
September 5, 1984 as prayed for.
xxx xxx xxx
ORDER
This is a Manifestation and Urgent Petition for the Surrender of
Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-25772 submitted by the
petitioners Atty. Eduardo S. Baranda and Alfonso Hitalia on
December 2, 1986, in compliance with the order of this Court
dated November 25, 1 986, a Motion for Extension of Time to
File Opposition filed by Maria Provido Gotera through counsel on
December 4, 1986 which was granted by the Court pursuant to
its order dated December 15, 1986. Considering that no
Opposition was filed within the thirty (30) days period granted
by the Court finding the petition tenable, the same is hereby
GRANTED.
WHEREFORE, Maria Provido Gotera is hereby ordered to
surrender Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-25772 to this
Court within ten (10) days from the date of this order, after
which period, Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-25772 is

hereby declared annulled and the Register of Deeds of
Iloilo is ordered to issue a new Certificate of Title in lieu
thereof in the name of petitioners Atty. Eduardo S. Baranda
and Alfonso Hitalia, which certificate shall contain a
memorandum of the annulment of the outstanding
duplicate. (pp. 286-287, Rollo 64432)
On February 9, 1987, Atty. Hector Teodosio, the counsel of Gregorio
Perez, private respondent in G.R. No. 64432 and petitioner in G.R. No.
62042, filed a motion for explanation in relation to the resolution dated
September 17, 1986 and manifestation asking for clarification on the
following points:
a. As to the prayer of Atty. Eduardo Baranda for the cancellation of
TCT T-25772, should the same be referred to the Court of Appeals
(as mentioned in the Resolution of November 27, 1985) or is it
already deemed granted by implication (by virtue of the
Resolution dated September 17, 1986)
b. Does the Resolution dated September 17, 1986 include not only
the implementation of the writ of possession but also the
cancellation of TCT T-25772 and the subdivision of Lot 4517?
Acting on this motion and the other motions filed by the parties, we
issued a resolution dated May 25, 1987 noting all these motions and
stating therein:
xxx xxx xxx
Since entry of judgment in G.R. No. 62042 was made on January 7,
1983 and in G.R. No. 64432 on May 30, 1984, and all that remains
is the implementation of our resolutions, this COURT RESOLVED to
refer the matters concerning the execution of the decisions to the
Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City for appropriate action and to
apply disciplinary sanctions upon whoever attempts to trifle with
the implementation of the resolutions of this Court. No further
motions in these cases will be entertained by this Court.
In the meantime, in compliance with the Regional Trial Court's orders
dated November 6, 1986 and January 6, 1987, Acting Register of Deeds
AvitoSaclauso annotated the order declaring Transfer Certificate of Title
No. T-25772 as null and void, cancelled the same and issued new
certificates of titles numbers T-111560, T-111561 and T-111562 in the
name of petitioners Eduardo S. Baranda and Alfonso Hitalia in lieu of
Transfer Certificate of TItle No. T-106098.
However, a notice of lis pendens "on account of or by reason of a
separate case (Civil Case No. 15871) still pending in the Court of
Appeals" was carried out and annotated in the new certificates of titles
issued to the petitioners. This was upheld by the trial court after setting
aside its earlier order dated February 12, 1987 ordering the cancellation
of lis pendens.
This prompted the petitioners to file another motion in G.R, No. 62042
and G.R. No. 64432 to order the trial court to reinstate its order dated
February 12, 1987 directing the Acting Register of Deeds to cancel the
notice of lis pendens in the new certificates of titles.
In a resolution dated August 17, 1987, we resolved to refer the said
motion to the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City, Branch 23 for
appropriate action.
Since respondent Judge Tito Gustilo of the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo,
Branch 23 denied the petitioners' motion to reinstate the February 12,
1987 order in another order dated September 17, 1987, the petitioners
filed this petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with
preliminary injunction to compel the respondent judge to reinstate his
order dated February l2, 1987 directing the Acting Register of Deeds to
LAND TITLES CHAPTER II
cancel the notice of lis pendens annotated in the new certificates of
titles issued in the name of the petitioners.
The records show that after the Acting Register of Deeds annotated a
notice of is pendens on the new certificates of titles issued in the name
of the petitioners, the petitioners filed in the reconstitution case an
urgent ex-parte motion to immediately cancel notice of lis pendens
annotated thereon.
In his order dated February 12, 1987, respondent Judge Gustilo granted
the motion and directed the Acting Register of Deeds of Iloilo to cancel
the lis pendens found on Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. T-106098; T-
111560; T-111561 and T-111562.
Respondent Acting Register of Deeds Avito Saclauso filed a motion for
reconsideration of the February 12, 1987 order stating therein:
That the undersigned hereby asks for a reconsideration of the said
order based on the second paragraph of Section 77 of P.D. 1529, to
wit:
"At any time after final judgment in favor of the defendant
or other disposition of the action such as to terminate finally
all rights of the plaintiff in and to the land and/or buildings
involved, in any case in which a memorandum or notice
of Lis Pendens has been registered as provided in the
preceding section, the notice of Lis Pendens shall be deemed
cancelled upon the registration of a certificate of the clerk of
court in which the action or proceeding was pending stating
the manner of disposal thereof."
That the lis pendens under Entry No. 427183 was annotated on T-
106098, T-111560, T-111561 and T-111562 by virtue of a case
docketed as Civil Case No. 15871, now pending with the
Intermediate Court of Appeals, entitled, "Calixta Provido, Ricardo
Provido, Sr., Maria Provido and Perfecto Provido, Plaintiffs, versus
Eduardo Baranda and Alfonso Hitalia, Respondents."
That under the above-quoted provisions of P.D. 152, the
cancellation of subject Notice of Lis Pendens can only be made or
deemed cancelled upon the registration of the certificate of the
Clerk of Court in which the action or proceeding was pending,
stating the manner of disposal thereof.
Considering that Civil Case No. 1587, upon which the Notice of Lis
Pendens was based is still pending with the Intermediate Court of
Appeals, only the Intermediate Court of Appeals and not this
Honorable Court in a mere cadastral proceedings can order the
cancellation of the Notice of Lis Pendens.
Adopting these arguments and on the ground that some if not all of the
plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 15871 were not privies to the case affected by
the Supreme Court resolutions, respondent Judge Tito Gustilo set aside
his February 12, 1987 order and granted the Acting Register of Deeds'
motion for reconsideration.
The issue hinges on whether or not the pendency of the appeal in Civil
Case No. 15871 with the Court of Appeals prevents the court from
cancelling the notice of lis pendens in the certificates of titles of the
petitioners which were earlier declared valid and subsisting by this
Court in G.R. No. 62042 and G.R. No. 64432. A corollary issue is on the
nature of the duty of a Register of Deeds to annotate or annul a notice
of lis pendens in a torrens certificate of title.
Civil Case No. 15871 was a complaint to seek recovery of Lot No. 4517
of Sta. Barbara Cadastre Iloilo, (the same subject matter of G.R. No
62042 and G.R. No. 64432) from petitioners Baranda and Hitalia filed by
Calixta Provido, Ricardo Provido, Maxima Provido and Perfecta Provido
before the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo, Branch 23. At the instance of
Atty. Hector P. Teodosio, the Provides' counsel, a notice of is pendens
was annotated on petitioners' Certificate of Title No. T-106098 covering
Lot No. 4517, Sta. Barbara Cadastre.
Acting on a motion to dismiss filed by the petitioners, the court issued
an order dated October 24, 1984 dismissing Civil Case No. 15871.
The order was then appealed to the Court of Appeals. This appeal is the
reason why respondent Judge Gustilo recalled the February 12, 1987
order directing the Acting Register of Deeds to cancel the notice of lis
pendens annotated on the certificates of titles of the petitioners.
This petition is impressed with merit.
Maria Provido Gotera was one of the petitioners in G.R. No. 62042.
Although Calixta Provido, Ricardo Provido, Maxima Provido and Perfecta
Provido, the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 15871 were not impleaded as
parties, it is very clear in the petition that Maria Provido was acting on
behalf of the Providos who allegedly are her co-owners in Lot No. 4517,
Sta. Barbara Cadastre as shown by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-
25772 issued in her name and the names of the plaintiffs in Civil Case
No. 15871, among others. (Annex "E" G.R. No. 62042, p. 51, Rollo) In
fact, one of the issues raised by petitioners Maria Provido Gotera and
Gregoria Perez in G.R. No. 62042 was as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
2. Whether or not, in the same reconstitution proceedings,
respondent Judge Midpantao L. Adil had the authority to declare
as null and void the transfer certificate of title in the name of
petitioner Maria Provido Gotera and her other co-owners.
It thus appears that the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 15871 were privies to
G.R. No. 62042 contrary to the trial court's findings that they were not.
G.R. No. 62042 affirmed the order of the then Court of First Instance of
Iloilo in the reconstitution proceedings declaring TCT No. 25772 in the
name of Providos over Lot No. 4517, Sta. Barbara Cadastre null and void
for being fraudulently obtained and declaring TCT No. 106098 over the
same parcel Lot No. 4517, Sta. Barbara Cadastre in the name of
petitioners Eduardo Baranda and Alfonso Hitalia valid and subsisting.
The decision in G.R. No. 62042 became final and executory on March
25,1983 long before Civil Case No. 15871 was filed.
Under these circumstances, it is crystal clear that the Providos, private
respondents herein, in filing Civil Case No. 15871 were trying to delay
the full implementation of the final decisions in G.R. No. 62042 as well
as G.R. No. 64432 wherein this Court ordered immediate
implementation of the writs of possession and demolition in the
reconstitution proceedings involving Lot No. 4517, Sta. Barbara
Cadastre.
The purpose of a notice of lis pendens is defined in the following
manner:
Lis pendens has been conceived to protect the real rights of the
party causing the registration thereof With the lis pendens duly
recorded, he could rest secure that he would not lose the property
or any part of it. For, notice of lis pendens serves as a warning to a
prospective purchaser or incumbrancer that the particular
property is in litigation; and that he should keep his hands off the
same, unless of course he intends to gamble on the results of the
litigation.
The private respondents are not entitled to this protection. The facts
obtaining in this case necessitate the application of the rule enunciated
in the cases of Victoriano v. Rovila (55 Phil. 1000), Municipal Council of

Paranaque v. Court of First Instance of Rizal (70 Phil., 363) and
Sarmiento v. Ortiz (10 SCRA 158), to the effect that:
We have once held that while ordinarily a notice of pendency
which has been filed in a proper case, cannot be cancelled while
the action is pending and undetermined, the proper court has the
discretionary power to cancel it under peculiar circumstances, as
for instance, where the evidence so far presented by the plaintiff
does not bear out the main allegations of his complaint, and
where the continuances of the trial, for which the plaintiff is
responsible, are unnecessarily delaying the determination of the
case to the prejudice of the defendant. (Victoriano v.
Rovira, supra; The Municipal Council of Paranaque v. Court of First
Instance of Rizal, supra)
The facts of this case in relation to the earlier cases brought all the way
to the Supreme Court illustrate how the private respondents tried to
block but unsuccessfuly the already final decisions in G.R. No. 62042
and G.R. No. 64432.
Parenthetically, respondent Judge Tito Gustilo abused his discretion in
sustaining the respondent Acting Register of Deeds' stand that, the
notice of lis pendens in the certificates of titles of the petitioners over
Lot No. 4571, Barbara Cadastre cannot be cancelled on the ground of
pendency of Civil Case No. 15871 with the Court of Appeals. In
upholding the position of the Acting Register of Deeds based on Section
77 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, he conveniently forgot the first
paragraph thereof which provides:
Cancellation of lis pendens. Before final judgment, a notice
of lis pendens may be cancelled upon Order of the Court after
proper showing that the notice is for the purpose of molesting the
adverse party, or that it is not necessary to protect the rights of
the party who caused it to be registered. It may also be cancelled
by the Register of Deeds upon verified petition of the party who
caused the registration thereof.
This Court cannot understand how respondent Judge Gustilo could have
been misled by the respondent Acting Register of Deeds on this matter
when in fact he was the same Judge who issued the order dismissing
Civil Case No. 15871 prompting the private respondents to appeal said
order dated October 10, 1984 to the Court of Appeals. The records of
the main case are still with the court below but based on the order, it
can be safely assumed that the various pleadings filed by the parties
subsequent to the motion to dismiss filed by the petitioners (the
defendants therein) touched on the issue of the validity of TCT No.
25772 in the name of the Providos over Lot Number 4571, Sta. Barbara
Cadastre in the light of the final decisions in G.R. No. 62042 and G.R. No.
64432.
The next question to be determined is on the nature of the duty of the
Register of Deeds to annotate and/or cancel the notice of lis pendens in
a torrens certificate of title.
Section 10, Presidential Decree No. 1529 states that "It shall be the duty
of the Register of Deeds to immediately register an instrument
presented for registration dealing with real or personal property which
complies with all the requisites for registration. ... . If the instrument is
not registrable, he shall forthwith deny registration thereof and inform
the presentor of such denial in writing, stating the ground or reasons
therefore, and advising him of his right to appeal by consulta in
accordance with Section 117 of this Decree."
Section 117 provides that "When the Register of Deeds is in doubt with
regard to the proper step to be taken or memoranda to be made in
LAND TITLES CHAPTER II
pursuance of any deed, mortgage or other instrument presented to him
for registration or where any party in interest does not agree with the
action taken by the Register of Deeds with reference to any such
instrument, the question shall be submitted to the Commission of Land
Registration by the Register of Deeds, or by the party in interest thru the
Register of Deeds. ... ."
The elementary rule in statutory construction is that when the words
and phrases of the statute are clear and unequivocal, their meaning
must be determined from the language employed and the statute must
be taken to mean exactly what it says. (Aparri v. Court of Appeals, 127
SCRA 231; Insular Bank of Asia and America Employees' Union [IBAAEU]
v. Inciong, 132 SCRA 663) The statute concerning the function of the
Register of Deeds to register instruments in a torrens certificate of title
is clear and leaves no room for construction. According to Webster's
Third International Dictionary of the English Language the
word shall means "ought to, must, ...obligation used to express a
command or exhortation, used in laws, regulations or directives to
express what is mandatory." Hence, the function of a Register of Deeds
with reference to the registration of deeds encumbrances, instruments
and the like is ministerial in nature. The respondent Acting Register of
Deeds did not have any legal standing to file a motion for
reconsideration of the respondent Judge's Order directing him to cancel
the notice of lis pendens annotated in the certificates of titles of the
petitioners over the subject parcel of land. In case of doubt as to the
proper step to be taken in pursuance of any deed ... or other
instrument presented to him, he should have asked the opinion of the
Commissioner of Land Registration now, the Administrator of the
National Land Title and Deeds Registration Administration in accordance
with Section 117 of Presidential Decree No. 1529.
In the ultimate analysis, however, the responsibility for the delays in the
full implementation of this Court's already final resolutions in G.R. No.
62042 and G.R. No. 64432 which includes the cancellation of the notice
of lis pendens annotated in the certificates of titles of the petitioners
over Lot No. 4517 of the Sta. Barbara Cadastre falls on the respondent
Judge. He should never have allowed himself to become part of dilatory
tactics, giving as excuse the wrong impression that Civil Case No. 15871
filed by the private respondents involves another set of parties claiming
Lot No. 4517 under their own Torrens Certificate of Title.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The February 12, 1987
order of the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo, Branch 23 is REINSTATED. All
subsequent orders issued by the trial court which annulled the February
12, 1987 order are SET ASIDE. Costs against the private respondents.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-20611 May 8, 1969
AURELIO BALBIN and FRANCISCO BALBIN, petitioners,
vs.
REGISTER OF DEEDS OF ILOCOS SUR, respondent.
Vicente Llanes for petitioners.
Office of the Solicitor General for respondent.
Manuel A. Argel for respondents third parties affected.
MAKALINTAL, J.:
Appeal from the resolution of the Commissioner of Land Registration in
LRC Consulta No. 366.
On November 15, 1961 petitioners presented to the register of deeds of
Ilocos Sur a duplicate copy of the registered owner's certificate of title
(OCT No. 548) and an instrument entitled "Deed of Donation inter-vivos,"
with the request that the same be annotated on the title. Under the
terms of the instrument sought to be annotated one Cornelio Balbin,
registered owner of the parcel of land described in OCT No. 548, appears
to have donated inter-vivos an undivided two-thirds (/) portion thereof
in favor of petitioners. The entire area of the land is 11.2225 hectares.
The register of deeds denied the requested annotation for being "legally
defective or otherwise not sufficient in law." It appears that previously
annotated in the memorandum of encumbrances on the certificate are
three separate sales of undivided portions of the land earlier executed by
Cornelio Balbin in favor of three different buyers. The pertinent entries
read:
Entry No. 5658. Sales.
Sale for the sum of P400.00 executed by the registered owner, conveying
an undivided portion of an area of 3,710 square meters only in favor of
Florentino Gabayan, this Original Certificate of Title No. 548 is hereby
cancelled with respect to said area of 3,710 square meters and in lieu
thereof, the name of the vendee ... is hereby substituted to succeed to all
rights, participation in interest of the vendor. ...
Date of Instrument: January 25, 1955, ...
xxx xxx xxx
Entry No. 5659. Sale of portion.
Sale for the sum of P100.00 executed by the registered owner, conveying
an undivided portion of an area of 16,713 square meters in favor of
Roberto Bravo, this Original Certificate of Title No. 548 is hereby cancelled
with respect to said undivided portion ... and in lieu thereof the name of
the vendee ... is hereby substituted to succeed to all rights, participation
and interest of the vendor ...
Date of Instrument: June 9, 1953. ...
Entry No. 5660. Sale of portion.

Sale for the sum of P400.00 executed by the registered owner,
conveying an undivided portion of an area of 15,000 square meters
in favor of Juana Gabayan, this Certificate of Title No. 548 is hereby
cancelled with respect to said undivided portion ... and in lieu
thereof the name of the vendee ... is hereby substituted to succeed
to all rights, participation and interest of the vendor ...
Date of Instrument: February 12, 1952. ...
The final part of the annotations referring to the abovementioned sales
contains an additional memorandum stating that "three co-owner's
duplicate certificates of title No. 548 have been issued (by the register of
deeds of Ilocos Sur) in the name of Florentino Gabayan, Roberto Bravo
and Juana Gabayan upon verbal request of Mr. Andres Cabeldo, Notary
Public of Caoayan, I. Sur, for and in the name of the vendees, this 5th day
of January, 1956 at Vigan, I. Sur." Mainly because these three other co-
owner's copies of the certificate of title No. 548 had not been presented
by petitioners, the Register of Deeds refused to make the requested
annotation.
Unsatisfied, petitioners referred the matter to the Commissioner of Land
Registration, who subsequently upheld the action of the Register of
Deeds in a resolution dated April 10, 1962. With respect to the principal
point in controversy, the Commissioner observed:
(1) It appears that the donor is now merely a co-owner of the
property described in the Original Certificate of Title No. 548,
having previously sold undivided portions thereof on three different
occasions in favor of three different buyers. Consequently, aside
from the owner's duplicate issued to Cornelio Balbin, there are now
three co-owner's duplicates which are presumably in the
possession of the three buyers. Accordingly, in addition to the
owner's duplicate of Original Certificate of Title No. 548, the three
co-owner's duplicates must likewise be surrendered. The claim of
counsel for the donees that the issuance of the three co-owner's
duplicates was unauthorized is beside the point. Unless and until a
court of competent jurisdiction rules to the contrary, these titles are
presumed to have been lawfully issued.lawphi1.et
Without presenting those three (3) other duplicates of the title,
petitioners would want to compel annotation of the deed of donation
upon the copy in their possession, citing section 55 of Act 496, which
provides that "the production of the owner's duplicate certificate of title
whenever any voluntary instrument is presented for registration shall be
conclusive authority from the registered owner to the register of deeds to
make a memorandum of registration in accordance with such
instrument." Under this provision, according to petitioners, the
presentation of the other copies of the title is not required, first, because
it speaks of "registered owner" and not one whose claim to or interest in
the property is merely annotated on the title, such as the three vendees-
co-owners in this case; and secondly, because the issuance of the
duplicate copies in their favor was illegal or unauthorized.
We find no merit in petitioners' contention. Section 55, supra, obviously
assumes that there is only one duplicate copy of the title in question,
namely, that of the registered owner himself, such that its production
whenever a voluntary instrument is presented constitutes sufficient
authority from him for the register of deeds to make the corresponding
memorandum of registration. In the case at bar, the three other copies of
the title were in existence, presumably issued under section 43 * of Act
496. As correctly observed by the Land Registration Commissioner,
petitioners' claim that the issuance of those copies was unauthorized or
illegal is beside the point, its legality being presumed until otherwise
LAND TITLES CHAPTER II
declared by a court of competent jurisdiction. There being several copies
of the same title in existence, it is easy to see how their integrity may be
adversely affected if an encumbrance, or an outright conveyance, is
annotated on one copy and not on the others. The law itself refers to
every copy authorized to be issued as a duplicate of the original, which
means that both must contain identical entries of the transactions,
particularly voluntary ones, affecting the land covered by the title. If this
were not so, if different copies were permitted to carry differing
annotations, the whole system of Torrens registration would cease to be
reliable.
One other ground relied upon by the Land Registration Commissioner in
upholding the action taken by the Register of Deeds of Ilocos Sur is that
since the property subject of the donation is presumed conjugal, that is,
property of the marriage of the donor, Cornelio Balbin, and his deceased
Republic of the Philippines
wife, Nemesia Mina, "there should first be a liquidation of the partnership
SUPREME COURT
before the surviving spouse may make such a conveyance." This legal
Manila
conclusion may appear too general and sweeping in its implications, for
EN BANC
without a previous settlement of the partnership a surviving spouse may
G.R. No. L-22486 March 20, 1968
dispose of his aliquot share or interest therein subject of course to the
TEODORO ALMIROL, petitioner-appellant,
result of future liquidation. Nevertheless, it is not to be denied that, if the
vs.
conjugal character of the property is assumed, the deed of donation
THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF AGUSAN, respondent-appellee.
executed by the husband, Cornelio Balbin, bears on its face an infirmity
Tranquilino O. Calo, Jr. for petitioner-appellant.
which justified the denial of its registration, namely, the fact that the two-
Office of the Solicitor General for respondent-appellee.
thirds portion of said property which he donated was more than his one-
CASTRO, J.:
half share, not to say more than what remained of such share after he
On June 28, 1961 Teodoro Almirol purchased from Arcenio Abalo a
had sold portions of the same land to three other parties.
parcel of land situated in the municipality of Esperanza, province of
It appears that there is a case pending in the Court of First Instance of
Agusan, and covered by original certificate of title P-1237 in the name of
Ilocos Sur (CC No. 2221), wherein the civil status of the donor Cornelio
"Arcenio Abalo, married to Nicolasa M. Abalo." Sometime in May, 1962
Balbin and the character of the land in question are in issue, as well as the
Almirol went to the office of the Register of Deeds of Agusan in Butuan
validity of the different conveyances executed by him. The matter of
City to register the deed of sale and to secure in his name a transfer
registration of the deed of donation may well await the outcome of that
certificate of title. Registration was refused by the Register of Deeds upon
case, and in the meantime the rights of the interested parties could be
the following grounds, inter alia, stated in his letter of May 21, 1962:
protected by filing the proper notices of lis pendens.
1. That Original Certificate of Title No. P-1237 is registered in the
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the decisions of the Register of Deeds of
name of Arcenio Abalo, married to Nicolasa M. Abalo, and by legal
Ilocos Sur and that of the Commissioner of Land Registration are affirmed.
presumption, is considered conjugal property;
No pronouncement as to costs.
2. That in the sale of a conjugal property acquired after the effectivity
of the New Civil Code it is necessary that both spouses sign the
document; but
3. Since, as in this case, the wife has already died when the sale was
made, the surviving husband can not dispose of the whole property
without violating the existing law (LRC Consulta No. 46 dated June
10, 1958).
To effect the registration of the aforesaid deed of absolute Sale,
it is necessary that the property be first liquidated and transferred
in the name of the surviving spouse and the heirs of the deceased
wife by means of extrajudicial settlement or partition and that the
consent of such other heir or heirs must be procured by means of
another document ratifying this sale executed by their father.
In view of such refusal, Almirol went to the Court of First Instance of
Agusan on a petition for mandamus (sp. civ. case 151), to compel the
Register of Deeds to register the deed of sale and to issue to him the
corresponding transfer certificate of title, and to recover P5,000 in moral
damages and P1,000 attorney's fees and expenses of litigation. It is
Almirol's assertion that it is but a ministerial duty of the respondent to
perform the acts required of him, and that he (Almirol) has no other
plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
 LAND TITLES CHAPTER II
In his answer with counterclaim for P10,000 damages, the Commissioner, after consideration of the matter shown by the
respondent reiterated the grounds stated in his letter of May 21, 1962, records certified to him, and in case of registered lands, after notice
averred that the petitioner has "other legal, plain, speedy and adequate to the parties and hearing, shall enter an order prescribing the step
remedy at law by appealing the decision of the respondent to the to be taken or memorandum to be made. His decision in such cases
Honorable Commissioner of Land Registration," and prayed for dismissal shall be conclusive and binding upon all Registers of Deeds: Provided,
of the petition. further, That when a party in interest disagrees with the ruling or
In its resolution of October 16, 1963 the lower court, declaring that resolution of the Commissioner and the issue involves a question of
"mandamus does not lie . . . because the adequate remedy is that law, said decision may be appealed to the Supreme Court within
provided by Section 4 of Rep. Act 1151", dismissed the petition, with thirty days from and after receipt of the notice thereof.
costs against the petitioner. The foregoing notwithstanding, the court a quo correctly dismissed
Hence the present appeal by Almirol. the petition for mandamus. Section 4 abovequoted provides that "where
The only question of law tendered for resolution is any party in interest does not agree with the Register of Deeds . . . the
whether mandamus will lie to compel the respondent to register the question shall be submitted to the Commissioner of Land Registration,"
deed of sale in question. who thereafter shall "enter an order prescribing the step to be taken or
Although the reasons relied upon by the respondent evince a memorandum to be made," which shall be "conclusive and binding upon
sincere desire on his part to maintain inviolate the law on succession and all Registers of Deeds." This administrative remedy must be resorted to by
transmission of rights over real properties, these do not constitute legal the petitioner before he can have recourse to the courts.
grounds for his refusal to register the deed. Whether a document is valid ACCORDINGLY, the Resolution of the lower court of October 16,
or not, is not for the register of deeds to determine; this function belongs 1969, is affirmed, at petitioner's cost.1wph1.t
THIRD DIVISION
properly to a court of competent jurisdiction.1
Whether the document is invalid, frivolous or intended to
harass, is not the duty of a Register of Deeds to decide, but a court of
CHARLES L. ONG, G.R. No. 175746
competent jurisdiction. (Gabriel vs. Register of Deeds of Rizal, et al.,
Petitioner,
L-17956, Sept. 30, 1953).
Present:
. . . the supposed invalidity of the contracts of lease is no valid
Ynares-Santiago, J. (Chairperson),
objection to their registration, because invalidity is no proof of their
- versus - Austria-Martinez,
non-existence or a valid excuse for denying their registration. The law
Chico-Nazario,
on registration does not require that only valid instruments shall be
Nachura, and Reyes, JJ.
registered. How can parties affected thereby be supposed to know
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
their invalidity before they become aware, actually or constructively,
Respondent. Promulgated:
of their existence or of their provisions? If the purpose of registration
March 12, 2008
is merely to give notice, then questions regarding the effect or
x ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x
invalidity of instruments are expected to be decided after, not before,
DECISION
registration. It must follow as a necessary consequence that
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
registration must first be allowed, and validity or effect litigated
This petition for review on certiorari assails the April 25, 2006
afterwards. (Gurbax Singh Pablo & Co. vs. Reyes and Tantoco, 92 Phil.
Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 76085, which
182-183).
reversed and set aside the January 16, 2002 Decision [2] of the Municipal
Indeed, a register of deeds is entirely precluded by section 4 of
Trial Court of Mangaldan, Pangasinan in Land Registration Case No. 99-
Republic Act 1151 from exercising his personal judgment and discretion
023, and the November 20, 2006 Resolution [3] which denied petitioners
when confronted with the problem of whether to register a deed or
motion for reconsideration.
instrument on the ground that it is invalid. For under the said section,
The antecedent facts are as follows.
when he is in doubt as to the proper step to be taken with respect to any
On July 1, 1999, petitioner Charles L. Ong (petitioner) in his
deed or other instrument presented to him for registration, all that he is
behalf and as duly authorized representative of his brothers, namely,
supposed to do is to submit and certify the question to the Commissioner
Roberto, Alberto and Cesar, filed an Application for Registration of
of Land Registration who shall, after notice and hearing, enter an order
Title[4] over Lot 15911 (subject lot) situated in Barangay Anolid,
prescribing the step to be taken on the doubtful question. Section 4 of
Mangaldan, Pangasinan with an area of five hundred seventy four (574)
R.A. 1151 reads as follows:
square meters, more or less. They alleged that they are the co-owners of
Reference of doubtful matters to Commissioner of Land
the subject lot; that the subject lot is their exclusive property having
Registration. When the Register of Deeds is in doubt with regard
acquired the same by purchase from spouses Tony Bautista and Alicia
to the proper step to be taken or memorandum to be made in
Villamil on August 24, 1998; that the subject lot is presently unoccupied;
pursuance of any deed, mortgage, or other instrument presented to
and that they and their predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
him for registration, or where any party in interest does not agree
continuous and peaceful possession of the subject lot in the concept of
with the Register of Deeds with reference to any such matter, the
owners for more than thirty (30) years.
question shall be submitted to the Commissioner of Land
After due notice and publication, only respondent Republic of
Registration either upon the certification of the Register of Deeds,
the Philippines (respondent), represented by the Office of the Solicitor
stating the question upon which he is in doubt, or upon the
General, opposed the application for registration of title. Respondent
suggestion in writing by the party in interest; and thereupon the

asserted that neither applicants nor their predecessors-in-interest have
been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation of the subject lot since June 12, 1945 or earlier as required by
Section 48(b) of Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended by Presidential
Decree (P.D.) No. 1073; that applicants failed to adduce any muniment of
title to prove their claims; that the tax declaration appended to the
application does not appear genuine and merely shows pretended
possession of recent vintage; that the application was filed beyond the
period allowed under P.D. No. 892; and that the subject lot is part of the
public domain which cannot be the subject of private appropriation.
On January 16, 2002, the trial court rendered a Decision in
favor of petitioner and his brothers, viz:
The foregoing evidences presented by the applicant
indubitably established sufficient basis to grant the applicant
(sic) for registration. Originally, the whole parcel of land was
owned by spouses Teofilo Abellara and Abella Charmine who
acquired the same by virtue of a Deed of Sale from Cynthia
Cacho, Agustin Cacho, Jr., Jasmin Cacho, Jover Cacho and Lauro
Cacho. Later, they sold the same parcel of land to spouses Tony
C. Villamil and Alicia Bautista, who in turn sold the same land to
herein applicants.
The same parcel of land has been declared in the
name of the applicant and her predecessors-in-interest and its
taxes has (sic) been religiously paid.
The said circumstances further show that the
possession and ownership of the applicant and her (sic)
predecessors-in-interest over the same parcel of land has (sic)
been continuous and peaceful under bona fide claim of
ownership before the filing of the instant application for
registration on [July 1, 1999].
WHEREFORE, after confirming the Order of General
Default, the Court hereby orders and decrees the registration of
a parcel of land as shown on plan ap-01-004897 approved by the
Bureau of Land(s) situated in Barangay Anolid, Mangaldan,
Pangasinan, containing an area of Five Hundred Seventy Four
(574) square meters, subject of the application for registration of
title, in accordance with Presidential Decree No. 1529, in favor of
CHARLIE L. ONG in his behalf and as representative of his
brothers namely, ROBERTO L. ONG, ALBERTO L. ONG and CESAR
L. ONG.
Furnish copies of this Decision to the Office of the
Solicitor General, Makati City, Metro Manila, the Office of the
Provincial Prosecutor, Dagupan City, Atty. Celestino Domingo Jr.,
the Office of the Land Registration Authority, Quezon City, as
well as the applicant.
SO ORDERED.[5]
Aggrieved, respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals
which rendered the assailed Decision, the dispositive portion of which
reads:
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is GRANTED. Accordingly, the
decision of the court a quo granting the application for
registration of title of applicants-appellees is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.[6]
LAND TITLES CHAPTER II
In reversing the decision of the trial court, the Court of Appeals found
that the subject lot is part of the alienable and disposable lands of the
public domain. Thus, it was incumbent upon petitioner to prove that they
possessed the subject lot in the nature and for the duration required by
law. However, petitioner failed to prove that he or his predecessors-in-
interest have been in adverse possession of the subject lot in the concept
of owner since June 12, 1945 or earlier as mandated by Section 14(1) of
P.D. 1529. It noted that the earliest tax declaration which petitioner
presented is dated 1971. Consequently, petitioner could not fairly claim
possession of the land prior to 1971. Neither was petitioner able to prove
that he or his predecessors-in-interest actually occupied the subject lot
prior to the filing of the application. Thus, the trial court erred in granting
the application for registration of title over the subject lot.
Hence, this petition raising the following issues:
1. WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONER, TOGETHER WITH HIS
BROTHERS, NAMELY, ROBERTO L. ONG, ALBERTO L. ONG AND
CEZAR L. ONG, HAVE REGISTRABLE OWNERSHIP OVER THE REAL
PROPERTY SUBJECT MATTER OF LAND REGISTRATION CASE NO.
99-023, AND
2. WHETHER OR NOT THE FINDINGS AND CONCLUSION OF
THE FORMER SPECIAL FOURTH DIVISION OF THE COURT OF
APPEALS THAT THE SUBJECT REAL PROPERTY IS A PUBLIC LAND IS
CORRECT.[7]
The petition lacks merit.
Section 14(1) of P.D. 1529 (Property Registration Decree), as
amended, provides
SEC. 14. Who may apply. The following persons may file in
the proper Court of First Instance an application for registration of
title to land, whether personally or through their duly authorized
representatives:
(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-
in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of
the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since
June 12, 1945, or earlier.
Thus, pursuant to the aforequoted provision of law, applicants for
registration of title must prove: (1) that the subject land forms part of the
disposable and alienable lands of the public domain, and (2) that they
have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation of the same under a bona fide claim of ownership since June
12, 1945, or earlier.[8] These requisites involve questions of fact which are
not proper in a petition for review on certiorari. Factual findings of the
court a quo are generally binding on this Court except for certain
recognized exceptions, as is the case here, where the trial court and the
Court of Appeals arrived at conflicting findings. [9] After a careful review of
the records, we sustain the findings and conclusions of the Court of
Appeals.
There is no dispute that the subject lot is classified as
alienable and disposable land of the public domain. The
Report[10] datedJanuary 17, 2000 of the Bureau of Lands stated that the
subject lot is within the alienable and disposable zone as classified under
Project 50 L.C. Map No. 698 and released and classified as such
on November 21, 1927.[11] This finding is, likewise, embodied in the
Report[12] dated January 7, 1999 of the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources Community Environment and Natural Resources Office
(DENR-CENRO) and the blue print Copy [13] of the plan covering the subject
lot. However, petitioner failed to prove that he or his predecessors-in-
interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of the subject lot since June 12, 1945 or
earlier.
The records show that petitioner and his brothers bought the
subject lot from spouses Tony Bautista and Alicia Villamil on August 24,
[14]
1998, who in turn purchased the same from spouses Teofilo Abellera
and Abella Sarmen on January 16, 1997.[15]The latter bought the subject
lot from Cynthia, Agustin Jr., Jasmin, Omir and Lauro, all surnamed Cacho,
on July 10, 1979.[16] The earliest tax declaration which was submitted in
evidence was Tax Declaration No. 25606[17] issued in 1971 in the names of
spouses Agustin Cacho and Eufrosinia Baustista. While tax declarations
are not conclusive proof of ownership, they constitute good indiciaof
possession in the concept of owner and a claim of title over the subject
property.[18] Even if we were to tack petitioners claim of ownership over
the subject lot to that of their alleged predecessors-in-interest, spouses
Agustin Cacho and Eufrosinia Baustista in 1971, still this would fall short
of the required possession from June 12, 1945 or earlier.
Further, as correctly pointed by the Court of Appeals, possession alone is
not sufficient to acquire title to alienable lands of the public domain
because the law requires possession and occupation. As held in Republic
v. Alconaba:[19]
The law speaks of possession and occupation. Since these
words are separated by the conjunction and, the clear intention of
the law is not to make one synonymous with the other. Possession
is broader than occupation because it includes constructive
possession. When, therefore, the law adds the word occupation, it
seeks to delimit the all encompassing effect of constructive
possession. Taken together with the words open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious, the word occupation serves to highlight
the fact that for an applicant to qualify, his possession must not be
a mere fiction. Actual possession of a land consists in the
manifestation of acts of dominion over it of such a nature as a party
would naturally exercise over his own property.[20]
Petitioner admitted that after he and his brothers bought the
subject lot from spouses Tony Bautista and Alicia Villamil in 1998, neither
he nor his brothers actually occupied the subject lot. [21] No improvements
were made thereon and the most that they did was to visit the lot on
several occasions.[22] Petitioners predecessor-in-interest, Tony Bautista
testified that he and his wife never actually occupied the subject lot from
the time they bought the same from spouses Teofilo Abellera and Abella
Sarmen in 1997.[23] Aside from these two testimonies, no other evidence
was presented to establish the character of the possession of the subject
lot by petitioners other alleged predecessors-in-interest. Clearly,
petitioners evidence failed to establish specific acts of ownership to
substantiate the claim that he and his predecessors-in-interest possessed
and occupied the subject lot in the nature and duration required by law.

The burden of proof in land registration cases rests on the
applicant who must show by clear, positive and convincing evidence that
his alleged possession and occupation of the land is of the nature and
duration required by law.[24] Unfortunately, petitioners evidence do not
constitute the well-nigh incontrovertible evidence necessary in cases of
this nature.[25] Accordingly, the Court of Appeals did not err in reversing
the Decision of the trial court and in denying his application for
registration of title over the subject lot.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition
is DENIED. The April 25, 2006 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CV No. 76085 which reversed and set aside the January 16, 2002 Decision
of the Municipal Trial Court of Mangaldan, Pangasinan in Land
Registration Case No. 99-023, and the November 20, 2006 Resolution
denying the motion for reconsideration, are AFFIRMED.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
THIRD DIVISION
NELSIE B. CAETE, RONA ANAS, G.R. No. 154080
MILAGROSA APUAN, ERLINDA AQUINO, GODOFREDO AQUINO, CORITA
BARREDO, TESSIE BARREDO, JESUS BATRINA, ALBERTO
BUENAVENTURA, BONIFACIO BUENAVENTURA, EUSEBIO CAPIRAL,
MARIO CAPIRAL, LOLITA CAPIRAL, ELENA CAPIRAL, LETICIA CAPIRAL,
RENATO CAPIRAL, ELY CABANGON, ERWIN CATALUNA, JESSIE CONRADO,
JOEL CONRADO, NARCISIO CONRADO, RICARDO CALAMPIANO,
ALUMNIO CORSANES, NILO COLATOY, MARJETO DAYAN, HENRY DIAZ,
SALVACION ESMANDE, REYNALDO FUENTEBELLA, GERRY GEQUILLANA,
DELSIE GARCIA, NERISSA GONZALES, VISITACION JUNSAY, ESTELA JOVEN,
JOSE LANZUELA, MARLON MALANGAYON, RENATO MARCELO, ANITA
MARZONIA, MARCELINO MONTALBO, AMADO MULI, JR., LEONITA
MULI, EDUARDO OLVIDO, ALMARIO PACON, ASUNCION PACON,
SALVACION PAGAYUNAN, ESTER PANTALEON, SHERLITA RABE, ANITA
REYES, MEDELYN RIOS, BERTITO RIVAS, ENGRACIA RIVERA, GERALYN
RIVERA, ARMANDO RIVERA, MA. MERCY SHERVA, ALEXANDER
SANGALAN, ERNESTO SANTIAGO, JOY SANTIAGO, ELENA TALION, JOE
RANDY TRESVALLES, ELIAS VALENZUELA, GERRY VALENZUELA, LILIBETH
VALENZUELA, JOSEPHINE VICTORINO, JOJO VICTORINO, MAXIMINO
VICTORINO, NOEL VICTORINO, REYNANTE VICTORINO, ROBERTO
VICTORINO and JOVITO VILLAREAL, represented by NELSIE B. CAETE,
Petitioners, Present:
Ynares-Santiago, J. (Chairperson),
- versus - Austria-Martinez,
Corona,*
Nachura, and
Reyes, JJ.
GENUINO ICE COMPANY, INC.,
Respondent. Promulgated:
January 22, 2008
x ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
LAND TITLES CHAPTER II
This petition for review on certiorari seeks to set aside the
Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals dated January 9, 2002 in CA-G.R. SP
No. 64337 entitled Genuino Ice Company, Inc. vs. Hon. Victorino P.
Evangelista, Nelsie B. Caete, et al., and its Resolution[2] dated June 26,
2002, dismissing petitioners Second Amended Complaint in Civil Case No.
Q-99-36483 filed in Branch 223 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City.
Records show that on January 11, 1999, petitioners filed a
complaint for cancellation of title to property covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) Nos. N-140441;[3] 14399;[4] RT-94384 (292245);
[5]
RT-94794 (292246);[6] and 292247.[7] Petitioners alleged that said titles
are spurious, fictitious and were issued under mysterious circumstances,
considering that the holders thereof including their predecessors-in-
interest were never in actual, adverse and physical possession of the
property, rendering them ineligible to acquire title to the said property
under the Friar Lands Act.[8] Petitioners also sought to nullify Original
Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 614 from which the foregoing titles sought to
be cancelled originated or were derived.
Respondent Genuino Ice Co., Inc. filed a motion to
dismiss[9] on the ground that the complaint states no cause of action
because petitioners are not real parties-in-interest; that no relief may be
granted as a matter of law; and that petitioners failed to exhaust
administrative remedies, but it was denied by the trial court. Respondent
moved for reconsideration but the same was denied.
On November 4, 1999, petitioners filed a Second Amended
Complaint[10] which sought to annul, in addition to the titles already
alleged in the original complaint, TCT Nos. 274095 and 274096; [11] 274097
and 274098;[12] and 274099.[13]
The Second Amended Complaint alleged the following causes
of action, as well as the remedy sought to be obtained, thus:
4. That plaintiffs (petitioners) and their predecessors-in-interest
are among those who have been in actual, adverse, peaceful and
continuous possession in concept of owners of unregistered parcels
of land situated at Sitio Mabilog, Barangay Culiat, Quezon City, Metro
Manila, which parcels of land are more particularly described as
follows:
(1) A parcel of unregistered land known as Lot 668,
situated at Barangay Culiat, Quezon City x x x.
(2) A parcel of unregistered land known as Lot 669,
situated at Barangay Culiat, Quezon City x x x.
Complaint on the following grounds:
5. That the above-described real property is a portion of a
friar land known as Piedad Estate, which property is intended for
distribution among the bona fide occupants thereof pursuant to
the Friar Lands Act.
6. That transfer certificates of title allegedly having originated
or derived from Original Certificate of Title No. 614 were issued by
the Register of Deeds of Quezon City, which transfer certificates of
title are in truth and in fact fictitious, spurious and null and void,
for the following reasons: (a) that no record of any agency of the
government shows as to how and in what manner was OCT 614
issued; (b) that no record of any proceedings whatsoever, whether
judicial or administrative, can support defendants claim that the
above-described property originated from OCT 614; and (c) that
the transfer certificates of title over the above-described property
were issued under mysterious circumstances for the above-named
defendants and their so-called predecessors-in-interest never had
any actual, adverse, physical possession of the said property, thus,
not allowed to acquire title over the property in litigation pursuant
to the Friar Lands Act.
7. That defendants are holders of transfer certificates of title
of the above-described property, which transfer certificates of title
are null and void, for reasons specifically mentioned in Paragraph
6 hereof x x x;
8. That the acts in acquiring and keeping the said transfer
certificates of title in violation of the Friar Lands Act and other
existing laws are prejudicial to plaintiffs rights over the above-
described property.
9. That equity demands that defendants transfer certificates
of title as specified in Paragraph 7 hereof be declared fictitious,
spurious and null and void ab initio.
PRAYER
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is most respectfully
prayed of this Honorable Court that judgment be rendered in
favor of plaintiffs and against defendants:
(1) Declaring as null and void ab initio OCT 614 and all
transfer certificates of title derived therefrom;
(2) Declaring as null and void defendants transfer certificates
of title over the property in litigation;
(3) Ordering defendant Register of Deeds of Quezon City to
cancel defendants transfer certificates of title and all transfer
certificates of title derived therefrom;
(4) Declaring the plaintiffs as bona fide occupants of the
property in litigation pursuant to the provisions of the Friar Lands
Act and other existing laws.[14]
Respondent moved to dismiss the Second Amended
a) The complaint states no cause of action because: (1) on the
allegations alone, plaintiffs (petitioners) are not real parties in
interest who may bring suit to cancel defendants (including
respondent) titles; (2) based on the allegations and prayer of the
complaint, no relief, as a matter of law, may be granted;
b) Prescription has set in;

c) There are earlier similar complaints (Civil Case Nos. Q-95-
22834 and Q-95-23111) filed by a different set of plaintiffs against
a different set of defendants but which involve the same subject
matter, cause of action and allegations of the plaintiffs, with
respect to the cancellation of OCT 614 and succeeding titles
derived from it. Said complaints have since been dismissed by
Branch 93 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, the dismissal
of which is the subject of a pending certiorari proceeding in the
appellate court.[15]
On January 3, 2001,[16] the trial court denied respondents
motion to dismiss the Second Amended Complaint. Its motion for
reconsideration was likewise denied hence respondent filed a petition for
certiorari with the Court of Appeals.
The appellate court granted respondents petition for
certiorari and dismissed petitioners Second Amended Complaint for
failure to state a cause of action. Hence, the instant petition raising the
following issues:
A. THAT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DECLARING THAT
THE COMPLAINT FILED BY THE PETITIONERS WITH THE
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF QUEZON CITY IN CIVIL CASE
NO. Q-99-36483 DOES NOT STATE A VALID CAUSE OF
ACTION;
B. THAT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DECLARING THAT
THE PETITIONERS ARE NOT REAL PARTIES IN INTEREST;
C. THAT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN APPLYING THE
DOCTRINE OF EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE
REMEDIES; and,
D. THAT THE COURT OF APPEALS ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE
OF DISCRETION AND DENIED PETITIONERS RIGHT TO DUE
PROCESS WHEN IT DISMISSED THEIR COMPLAINT.[17]
We deny the petition.
The subject lots are part of the Piedad Estate, Quezon City, a
Friar Land acquired on December 23, 1903 by the Philippine Government
from the Philippine Sugar Estates Development Company, Ltd., La
Sociedad Agricola de Ultramar, the British-Manila Estate Company, Ltd.,
and the Recoleto Order of the Philippine Islands, as indicated in Public Act
No. 1120 (Friar Lands Act) enacted on April 26, 1904. [18]
After the Piedad Estate was registered in OCT No. 614 in the
name of the Philippine Government in 1910 under the provisions of Act
496, the area was subdivided originally into 874 lots. As a result of
subsequent surveys executed in the course of disposition, the number of
lots increased to 1,305. Disposition of these lots was made by the Bureau
of Lands thru sales, under the Friar Lands Act, as early as 1910 and
records show that even before the Second World War, all lots in the
Piedad Estate have been disposed of. [19] The Piedad Estate has long been
segregated from the mass of the public domain and has become private
land duly registered under the Torrens system following the procedure for
LAND TITLES CHAPTER II
the confirmation of private lands prescribed in Act 496. Thus the lands
inside the Piedad Estate are no longer lands of the public domain. [20]
One who acquires land under the Friar Lands Act, as well as
his successors-in-interest, may not claim successional rights to purchase
by reason of occupation from time immemorial, as this contravenes the
historical fact that friar lands were bought by the Government of the
Philippine Islands, pursuant to an Act of Congress of the United States,
approved on July 1, 1902, not from individual persons but from certain
companies, a society and a religious order. Under the Friar Lands Act, only
actual settlers and occupants at the time said lands are acquired by the
Government were given preference to lease, purchase, or acquire their
holdings, in disregard of the settlement and occupation of persons before
the government acquired the lands. [21]
The basic rules of proper pleading and procedure require that
every pleading shall contain in a methodical and logical form, a plain,
concise and direct statement of the ultimate facts on which the party
pleading relies for his claim or defense, as the case may be, omitting the
statement of mere evidentiary facts. [22] And in all averments of fraud or
mistake, the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake must be stated
with particularity.[23]
It is axiomatic that the averments of the complaint determine
the nature of the action, and consequently, the jurisdiction of the
courts. This is because the complaint must contain a concise
statement of the ultimate facts constituting the plaintiff's cause of
action and must specify the relief sought. No rule is better
established than that which requires the complaint to contain a
statement of all the facts constituting the plaintiff's cause of
action. Additionally, Section 5, Rule 8 of the Rules of Court
provides that in all averments of fraud or mistake, the
circumstances constituting fraud or mistake must be stated with
particularity. In the case at bar, while there are allegations of fraud
in the above quoted complaints, the same are not particular
enough to bring the controversy within the SEC's jurisdiction. The
said allegations are not statements of ultimate facts but are mere
conclusions of law.
A pleading should state the ultimate facts essential to the
rights of action or defense asserted, as distinguished from mere
conclusions of fact, or conclusions of law. General allegations that
a contract is valid or legal, or is just, fair and reasonable, are mere
conclusions of law. Likewise, allegations that a contract is void,
voidable, invalid, illegal, ultra vires, or against public policy,
without stating facts showing its invalidity, are mere conclusions
of law.[24]
Ultimate facts means the essential facts constituting the
plaintiff's cause of action, or such facts as are so essential that they
cannot be stricken out without leaving the statement of the cause of
action inadequate.[25] Cause of action has been defined as an act or
omission of one party in violation of the legal right or rights of the other;
[26]
and its essential elements are: 1) a right in favor of the plaintiff by
whatever means and under whatever law it arises or is created; 2) an
obligation on the part of the named defendant to respect or not to violate
such right; and 3) an act or omission on the part of the named defendant
violative of the right of the plaintiff or constituting a breach of the
obligation of defendant to the plaintiff for which the latter may maintain
an action for recovery of damages. If these elements are not extant, the
complaint becomes vulnerable to a motion to dismiss on the ground of
failure to state a cause of action. [27] In the resolution of a motion to
dismiss based on failure to state a cause of action, only the facts alleged
in the complaint as well as its annexes must be considered. [28] The test in
such case is whether a court can render a valid judgment on the
complaint based upon the facts alleged and pursuant to the prayer
therein.[29]
Corollarily, the question of whether or not a complaint states
a cause of action against a defendant or the action is premature is one of
law. The trial court can consider all the pleadings filed, including annexes,
motions and the evidence on record. However in so doing, the trial court
does not rule on the truth or falsity of such documents. It merely includes
such documents in the hypothetical admission. Any review of a finding of
lack of cause of action based on these documents would not involve a
calibration of the probative value of such pieces of evidence but would
only limit itself to the inquiry of whether the law was properly applied
given the facts and these supporting documents. Therefore, what would
inevitably arise from such a review are pure questions of law, and not
questions of fact.
The trial court must likewise apply relevant statutes and
jurisprudence in determining whether the allegations in a complaint
establish a cause of action. While it focuses on the complaint, a court
clearly cannot disregard decisions material to the proper appreciation of
the questions before it. In resolving a motion to dismiss, every court must
take cognizance of decisions this Court has rendered because they are
proper subjects of mandatory judicial notice. The said decisions, more
importantly, form part of the legal system, and failure of any court to
apply them shall constitute an abdication of its duty to resolve a dispute
in accordance with law, and shall be a ground for administrative action
against an inferior court magistrate.[30]
Considering the foregoing, it is not difficult to see the need
for particularity and incipient substantiation in the petitioners Second
Amended Complaint.
First, their initial claim that OCT 614 of which all the other
subject titles are derivatives is null and void, has been proven wrong. As
has been held in Pinlac and other cases, OCT 614 did legally exist and was
previously issued in the name of the Philippine Government in 1910
under the provisions of Act 496.
Second, the Ad Hoc Committee of the then Ministry of
Natural Resources, which was specifically tasked to investigate the
historical background of the Piedad Estate, found that as early as the
period prior to the Second World War, all lots in the Piedad Estate had
already been disposed of.
Third, the Piedad Estate has been placed under
the Torrens system of land registration, which means that all lots therein
are titled.

Fourth, as held in the Balicudiong case, one who acquires
land under the Friar Lands Act, as well as his successors-in-interest, may
not claim successional rights to purchase by reason of occupation from
time immemorial, which means that petitioners claimed actual, adverse,
peaceful and continuous possession of the subject property is really of no
moment unless it is shown that their predecessors-in-interest were actual
settlers and occupants at the time said lands were acquired by the
Government, and whose rights were not disregarded even though they
were in occupation of the same before the government acquired the
land; yet, no period of time in relation to adverse possession is alleged.
Petitioners Second Amended Complaint betrays no more than
an incomplete narration of facts unsupported by documentary or other
exhibits; the allegations therein partake of conclusions of law
unsupported by a particular averment of circumstances that will show
why or how such inferences or conclusions were arrived at. It is replete
with sweeping generalizations and inferences derived from facts that are
not found therein. While there are allegations of fraud upon the claim
that the subject titles were fictitious, spurious and obtained under
mysterious circumstances, the same are not specific to bring the
controversy within the trial courts jurisdiction. There is no explanation or
narration of facts as would show why said titles are claimed to be
fictitious or spurious, contrary to the requirement of the Rules that the
circumstances constituting fraud must be stated with particularity;
otherwise, the allegation of fraud would simply be an unfounded
conclusion of law. In the absence of specific averments, the complaint is
defective, for it presents no basis upon which the court should act, or for
the defendant to meet it with an intelligent answer.
As to the second issue raised, petitioners claim that they
are bona fide occupants of the subject property within the contemplation
of the Friar Lands Act, having allegedly been in actual, adverse, peaceful
and continuous possession of the property, although it is not stated for
how long and since when. In their second amended complaint, they seek
judgment
(4) Declaring the plaintiffs as bona fide occupants of the
property in litigation pursuant to the provisions of the Friar Lands
Act and other existing laws. (Emphasis supplied)
They do not pray to be declared owners of the subject property despite
their alleged adverse possession but only to be adjudged as the bona
fide occupants thereof. In other words, petitioners concede the States
ownership of the property.
Being so, petitioners may not be considered the real parties in
interest for the purpose of maintaining the suit for cancellation of the
subject titles. The Court of Appeals is correct in declaring that only the
State, through the Solicitor General, may institute such
suit. Jurisprudence on the matter has been settled and the issue need not
be belabored. Thus
The Court also holds that private respondents are not the
proper parties to initiate the present suit. The complaint, praying as
it did for the cancellation of the transfer certificates of title of
petitioners on the ground that they were derived from a spurious
OCT No. 4216, assailed in effect the validity of said title. While
LAND TITLES CHAPTER II
private respondents did not pray for the reversion of the land to the
government, we agree with the petitioners that the prayer in the
complaint will have the same result of reverting the land to the
government under the Regalian doctrine. Gabila vs. Barriga ruled
that only the government is entitled to this relief. The Court in that
case held:
The present motion to dismiss is actually predicated
on Section 1(g), Rule 16 of the Revised Rules of Court, i.e.,
failure of the complaint to state a cause of action, for it
alleges in paragraph 12 thereof that the plaintiff admits that
he has no right to demand the cancellation or amendment
of the defendants title, because, even if the said title were
canceled or amended, the ownership of the land embraced
therein, or of the portion thereof affected by the
amendment, would revert to the public domain. In his
amended complaint the plaintiff makes no pretense at all
that any part of the land covered by the defendants title was
privately owned by him or by his predecessors-in-
interest. Indeed, it is admitted therein that the said land was
at all times a part of the public domain until December 18,
1964, when the government issued a title thereon in favor of
defendant. Thus, if there is any person or entity to relief, it
can only be the government.
In the case at bar, the plaintiffs own averments negate
the existence of such right, for it would appear therefrom
that whatever right might have been violated by the
defendant belonged to the government, not to the plaintiff.
Plaintiff-appellant argues that although his complaint is
captioned as one for cancellation of title, he has
nevertheless stated therein several causes of action based
on his alleged rights of possession and ownership over the
improvements, on defendant-appellees alleged fraudulent
acquisition of the land, and on the damages allegedly
incurred by him (plaintiff-appellant) in relation to the
improvements. These matters are merely ancillary to the
central issue of whether or not defendant-appellees title
should be canceled or amended, and they may not be
leaned upon in an effort to make out a cause of action in
relation to the said focal issue. Indeed, the principal relief
prayed for in the amended complaint is the cancellation or
amendment of defendant-appellees title.[31]
Under Rule 3, Section 2 of the Rules of Court, a real party in
interest is the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the
judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. Interest
within the meaning of the rule means material interest, an interest in
issue and to be affected by the decree, as distinguished from mere
interest in the question involved, or a mere incidental interest. The
interest of the party must also be personal and not one based on a desire
to vindicate the constitutional right of some third and unrelated
party. Real interest, on the other hand, means a present substantial
interest, as distinguished from a mere expectancy or a future, contingent,
subordinate, or consequential interest.[32]
If petitioners are to be believed, they would possess a mere
inchoate interest in the properties covered by the subject titles, a mere
expectancy conditioned upon the fact that if the questioned titles are
cancelled and the property is reverted to the State, they
would probably or possibly be given preferential treatment as qualified
buyers or lessees of the property under the Friar Lands Act. But this
certainly is not the interest required by law that grants them license or
the personality to prosecute their case. Only to the State does the
privilege belong.
On the issue of exhaustion of administrative remedies, suffice
it to state that since petitioners do not possess the necessary interest to
prosecute the case for cancellation of title in the courts, neither do they
have the right to pursue administrative remedies outside thereof. They
are not the owners; nor are they qualified applicants therefor. It has not
been shown by their complaint that they have previously taken steps to
avail of the benefits under the Friar Lands Act, since all they seek, should
the questioned titles be nullified, is to be declared bona fide occupants of
the property covered by the questioned titles. Neither is there any
indication that they possess the qualifications necessary to enable them
to avail of the preference granted under the Act.
Finally, there is no merit in petitioners contention that
respondent belatedly filed the petition for certiorari with the Court of
Appeals, and that the appellate court gravely abused its discretion when
it entertained and resolved the same.
The Order of the trial court dated January 3, 2001 denying
respondents motion to dismiss the Second Amended Complaint was
received by the respondent on January 16, 2001. Respondent filed a
motion for reconsideration on January 18, 2001 which was denied
on February 28, 2001. Respondent received the order denying its motion
for reconsideration on March 27, 2001. On the same day, it filed a Notice
to File Petition for Certiorari. On April 2, 2001, the petition for certiorari
was filed with the Court of Appeals.Clearly, the same was timely filed
hence, the appellate court correctly entertained the same.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the
Court of Appeals dated January 9, 2002 in CA-G.R. SP No. 64337
dismissing petitioners Second Amended Complaint in Civil Case No. Q-99-
36483 and the Resolution dated June 26, 2002denying the motion for
reconsideration, are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
 LAND TITLES CHAPTER II
One main reason why the informal sector has not become
formal is that from Indonesia to Brazil, 90 percent of the informal
lands are not titled and registered. This is a generalized
phenomenon in the so-called Third World. And it has many
consequences.
xxx
The question is: How is it that so many governments, from
Suharto's in Indonesia to Fujimori's in Peru, have wanted to title
these people and have not been able to do so effectively? One
reason is that none of the state systems in Asia or Latin
America can gather proof of informal titles. In Peru, the informals
have means of proving property ownership to each other which
are not the same means developed by the Spanish legal system.
The informals have their own papers, their own forms of
agreements, and their own systems of registration, all of which are
very clearly stated in the maps which they use for their own
informal business transactions.
If you take a walk through the countryside,
from Indonesia to Peru, and you walk by field after field--in each
field a different dog is going to bark at you. Even dogs know what
private property is all about. The only one who does not know it is
the government. The issue is that there exists a "common law"
and an "informal law" which the Latin American formal legal
system does not know how to recognize.
- Hernando De Soto[1]
This decision inevitably affects all untitled lands currently in
possession of persons and entities other than the Philippine government.
The petition, while unremarkable as to the facts, was accepted by the
Court en banc in order to provide definitive clarity to the applicability and
EN BANC scope of original registration proceedings under Sections 14(1) and 14(2)
of the Property Registration Decree. In doing so, the Court confronts not
only the relevant provisions of the Public Land Act and the Civil Code, but
also the reality on the ground. The countrywide phenomenon of untitled
HEIRS OF MARIO MALABANAN, G.R. No. 179987
lands, as well as the problem of informal settlement it has spawned, has
Petitioner,
unfortunately been treated with benign neglect. Yet our current laws are
Present:
hemmed in by their own circumscriptions in addressing the phenomenon.
PUNO, C.J.,
Still, the duty on our part is primarily to decide cases before us in accord
QUISUMBING,
with the Constitution and the legal principles that have developed our
YNARES-SANTIAGO, CARPIO,
public land law, though our social obligations dissuade us from casting a
- versus - AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
blind eye on the endemic problems.
CORONA,
I.
CARPIO MORALES,
On 20 February 1998, Mario Malabanan filed an application for land
TINGA,
registration covering a parcel of land identified as Lot 9864-A, Cad-452-D,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
Silang Cadastre,[2] situated in Barangay Tibig, Silang Cavite, and consisting
VELASCO, JR.,
of 71,324 square meters. Malabanan claimed that he had purchased the
CHURA,
property from Eduardo Velazco,[3] and that he and his predecessors-in-
LEONARDO DE CASTRO,
interest had been in open, notorious, and continuous adverse and
BRION,
peaceful possession of the land for more than thirty (30) years.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, PERALTA, and
Respondent. BERSAMIN, JJ.
The application was raffled to the Regional Trial Court of (RTC) Cavite-
Promulgated:
Tagaytay City, Branch 18. The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) duly
designated the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor of Cavite, Jose Velazco, Jr.,
April 29, 2009
to appear on behalf of the State. [4]Apart from presenting documentary
x--------------------------------------------------------------------------- x
evidence, Malabanan himself and his witness, Aristedes Velazco, testified
DECISION
at the hearing. Velazco testified that the property was originally belonged
TINGA, J.:
to a twenty-two hectare property owned by his great-grandfather, Lino
Velazco. Lino had four sons Benedicto, Gregorio, Eduardo and Estebanthe
fourth being Aristedess grandfather. Upon Linos death, his four sons
inherited the property and divided it among themselves. But by 1966,
Estebans wife, Magdalena, had become the administrator of all the
properties inherited by the Velazco sons from their father, Lino. After the
death of Esteban and Magdalena, their son Virgilio succeeded them in
administering the properties, including Lot 9864-A, which originally
belonged to his uncle, Eduardo Velazco. It was this property that was sold
by Eduardo Velazco to Malabanan.[5]
Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Jose Velazco, Jr. did not cross-
examine Aristedes Velazco. He further manifested that he also [knew] the
property and I affirm the truth of the testimony given by Mr. Velazco.
[6]
The Republic of the Philippines likewise did not present any evidence to
controvert the application.
Among the evidence presented by Malabanan during trial was
a Certification dated 11 June 2001, issued by the Community
Environment & Natural Resources Office, Department of Environment and
Natural Resources (CENRO-DENR), which stated that the subject property
was verified to be within the Alienable or Disposable land per Land
Classification Map No. 3013 established under Project No. 20-A and
approved as such under FAO 4-1656 on March 15, 1982.[7]
On 3 December 2002, the RTC rendered judgment in favor of
Malabanan, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, this Court hereby approves this application
for registration and thus places under the operation of Act 141,
Act 496 and/or P.D. 1529, otherwise known as Property
Registration Law, the lands described in Plan Csd-04-0173123-
D, Lot 9864-A and containing an area of Seventy One Thousand
Three Hundred Twenty Four (71,324) Square Meters, as
supported by its technical description now forming part of the
record of this case, in addition to other proofs adduced in the
name of MARIO MALABANAN, who is of legal age, Filipino,
widower, and with residence at Munting Ilog, Silang, Cavite.
Once this Decision becomes final and executory, the
corresponding decree of registration shall forthwith issue.
SO ORDERED.
The Republic interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals,
arguing that Malabanan had failed to prove that the property belonged to
the alienable and disposable land of the public domain, and that the RTC
had erred in finding that he had been in possession of the property in the
manner and for the length of time required by law for confirmation of
imperfect title.
On 23 February 2007, the Court of Appeals rendered a
Decision[8] reversing the RTC and dismissing the application of Malabanan.
The appellate court held that under Section 14(1) of the Property
Registration Decree any period of possession prior to the classification of
the lots as alienable and disposable was inconsequential and should be
excluded from the computation of the period of possession. Thus, the

appellate court noted that since the CENRO-DENR certification had
verified that the property was declared
alienable and disposable only on 15 March 1982, the Velazcos possession
prior to that date could not be factored in the computation of the period
of possession. This interpretation of the Court of Appeals of Section 14(1)
of the Property Registration Decree was based on the Courts ruling
in Republic v. Herbieto.[9]
Malabanan died while the case was pending with the Court of
Appeals;[10] hence, it was his heirs who appealed the decision of the
appellate court. Petitioners, before this Court, rely on our ruling
in Republic v. Naguit,[11] which was handed down just four months prior
to Herbieto. Petitioners suggest that the discussion in Herbieto cited by
the Court of Appeals is actually obiter dictumsince the Metropolitan Trial
Court therein which had directed the registration of the property had no
jurisdiction in the first place since the requisite notice of hearing was
published only after the hearing had already begun. Naguit, petitioners
argue, remains the controlling doctrine, especially when the property in
question is agricultural land. Therefore, with respect to agricultural lands,
any possession prior to the declaration of the alienable property as
disposable may be counted in reckoning the period of possession to
perfect title under the Public Land Act and the Property Registration
Decree.
The petition was referred to the Court en banc,[12] and on 11
November 2008, the case was heard on oral arguments. The Court
formulated the principal issues for the oral arguments, to wit:
1. In order that an alienable and disposable land of the public
domain may be registered under Section 14(1) of Presidential
Decree No. 1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration
Decree, should the land be classified as alienable and disposable as
of June 12, 1945 or is it sufficient that such classification occur at
any time prior to the filing of the applicant for registration provided
that it is established that the applicant has been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of the land under
a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier?
2. For purposes of Section 14(2) of the Property Registration
Decree may a parcel of land classified as alienable and disposable
be deemed private land and therefore susceptible to acquisition by
prescription in accordance with the Civil Code?
3. May a parcel of land established as agricultural in character
either because of its use or because its slope is below that of forest
lands be registrable under Section 14(2) of the Property
Registration Decree in relation to the provisions of the Civil Code on
acquisitive prescription?
4. Are petitioners entitled to the registration of the subject land
in their names under Section 14(1) or Section 14(2) of the Property
Registration Decree or both?[13]
Based on these issues, the parties formulated their respective
positions.
With respect to Section 14(1), petitioners reiterate that the
analysis of the Court in Naguit is the correct interpretation of the
provision. The seemingly contradictory pronouncement in Herbieto, it is
LAND TITLES CHAPTER II
submitted, should be considered obiter dictum, since the land registration
proceedings therein was void ab initio due to lack of publication of the
notice of initial hearing. Petitioners further point out that in Republic v.
Bibonia,[14] promulgated in June of 2007, the Court applied Naguit and
adopted the same observation that the preferred interpretation by the
OSG of Section 14(1) was patently absurd. For its part, the OSG remains
insistent that for Section 14(1) to apply, the land should have been
classified as alienable and disposable as of 12 June 1945. Apart
from Herbieto, the OSG also cites the subsequent rulings in Buenaventura
v. Republic,[15] Fieldman Agricultural Trading v. Republic [16] and Republic v.
Imperial Credit Corporation,[17] as well as the earlier case of Director of
Lands v. Court of Appeals.[18]
With respect to Section 14(2), petitioners submit that open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of an alienable land of the
public domain for more than 30 years ipso jure converts the land into
private property, thus placing it under the coverage of Section 14(2).
According to them, it would not matter whether the land sought to be
registered was previously classified as agricultural land of the public
domain so long as, at the time of the application, the property had
already been converted into private property through prescription. To
bolster their argument, petitioners cite extensively from our 2008 ruling
in Republic v. T.A.N. Properties.[19]
The arguments submitted by the OSG with respect to Section
14(2) are more extensive. The OSG notes that under Article 1113 of the
Civil Code, the acquisitive prescription of properties of the State refers to
patrimonial property, while Section 14(2) speaks of private lands. It
observes that the Court has yet to decide a case that presented Section
14(2) as a ground for application for registration, and that the 30-year
possession period refers to the period of possession under Section 48(b)
of the Public Land Act, and not the concept of prescription under the Civil
Code. The OSG further submits that, assuming that the 30-year
prescriptive period can run against public lands, said period should be
reckoned from the time the public land was declared alienable and
disposable.
Both sides likewise offer special arguments with respect to
the particular factual circumstances surrounding the subject property and
the ownership thereof.
II.
First, we discuss Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree. For a
full understanding of the provision, reference has to be made to the
Public Land Act.
A.
Commonwealth Act No. 141, also known as the Public Land
Act, has, since its enactment, governed the classification and disposition
of lands of the public domain. The President is authorized, from time to
time, to classify the lands of the public domain into alienable and
disposable, timber, or mineral lands. [20] Alienable and disposable lands of
the public domain are further classified according to their uses into (a)
agricultural; (b) residential, commercial, industrial, or for similar
productive purposes; (c) educational, charitable, or other similar
purposes; or (d) reservations for town sites and for public and quasi-
public uses.[21]
May a private person validly seek the registration in his/her
name of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain? Section 11
of the Public Land Act acknowledges that public lands suitable for
agricultural purposes may be disposed of by confirmation of imperfect or
incomplete titles through judicial legalization. [22] Section 48(b) of the
Public Land Act, as amended by P.D. No. 1073, supplies the details and
unmistakably grants that right, subject to the requisites stated therein:
Sec. 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines,
occupying lands of the public domain or claiming to own any
such land or an interest therein, but whose titles have not been
perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First
Instance of the province where the land is located for
confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate of
title therefor, under the Land Registration Act, to wit:
xxx
(b) Those who by themselves or through their
predecessors in interest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of
alienable and disposable lands of the public domain, under a
bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, since June 12,
1945, or earlier, immediately preceding the filing of the
application for confirmation of title except when prevented by
war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to
have performed all the conditions essential to a Government
grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the
provisions of this chapter.
Section 48(b) of Com. Act No. 141 received its present wording in 1977
when the law was amended by P.D. No. 1073. Two significant
amendments were introduced by P.D. No. 1073. First, the term
agricultural lands was changed to alienable and disposable lands of the
public domain. The OSG submits that this amendment restricted the
scope of the lands that may be registered. [23] This is not actually the case.
Under Section 9 of the Public Land Act, agricultural lands are a mere
subset of lands of the public domain alienable or open to disposition.
Evidently, alienable and disposable lands of the public domain are a larger
class than only agricultural lands.
Second, the length of the requisite possession was changed from
possession for thirty (30) years immediately preceding the filing of the
application to possession since June 12, 1945 or earlier. The Court
in Naguit explained:
When the Public Land Act was first promulgated in 1936, the
period of possession deemed necessary to vest the right to
register their title to agricultural lands of the public domain
commenced from July 26, 1894. However, this period was
amended by R.A. No. 1942, which provided that the bona
fide claim of ownership must have been for at least thirty (30)
years. Then in 1977, Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act was again
amended, this time by P.D. No. 1073, which pegged the reckoning
date at June 12, 1945. xxx
It bears further observation that Section 48(b) of Com. Act No, 141 is
virtually the same as Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree.

Said Decree codified the various laws relative to the registration of
property, including lands of the public domain. It is Section 14(1) that
operationalizes the registration of such lands of the public domain. The
provision reads:
SECTION 14. Who may apply. The following persons may file
in the proper Court of First Instance an application for registration
of title to land, whether personally or through their duly
authorized representatives:
(1) those who by themselves or through their predecessors-
in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation of alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain under a bona
fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
Notwithstanding the passage of the Property Registration
Decree and the inclusion of Section 14(1) therein, the Public Land Act has
remained in effect. Both laws commonly refer to persons or their
predecessors-in-interest who have been in open, continuous, exclusive
and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable
lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership
since June 12, 1945, or earlier. That circumstance may have led to the
impression that one or the other is a redundancy, or that Section 48(b) of
the Public Land Act has somehow been repealed or mooted. That is not
the case.
The opening clauses of Section 48 of the Public Land Act and
Section 14 of the Property Registration Decree warrant comparison:
Sec. 48 [of the Public Land Act]. The following described
citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public domain
or claiming to own any such land or an interest therein, but
whose titles have not been perfected or completed, may apply
to the Court of First Instance of the province where the land is
located for confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a
certificate of title therefor, under the Land Registration Act, to
wit:
xxx
Sec. 14 [of the Property Registration Decree]. Who may
apply. The following persons may file in the proper Court of First
Instance an application for registration of title to land, whether
personally or through their duly authorized representatives:
xxx
It is clear that Section 48 of the Public Land Act is more
descriptive of the nature of the right enjoyed by the possessor than
Section 14 of the Property Registration Decree, which seems to presume
the pre-existence of the right, rather than establishing the right itself for
the first time. It is proper to assert that it is the Public Land Act, as
amended by P.D. No. 1073 effective 25 January 1977, that has primarily
established the right of a Filipino citizen who has been in open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of
alienable and disposable lands of the public domain, under a bona fide
claim of acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945 to perfect or
complete his title by applying with the proper court for the confirmation
LAND TITLES CHAPTER II
of his ownership claim and the issuance of the corresponding certificate of
title.
Section 48 can be viewed in conjunction with the afore-quoted
Section 11 of the Public Land Act, which provides that public lands suitable
for agricultural purposes may be disposed of by confirmation of imperfect
or incomplete titles, and given the notion that both provisions declare that
it is indeed the Public Land Act that primarily establishes the substantive
ownership of the possessor who has been in possession of the property
since 12 June 1945. In turn, Section 14(a) of the Property Registration
Decree recognizes the substantive right granted under Section 48(b) of the
Public Land Act, as well provides the corresponding original registration
procedure for the judicial confirmation of an imperfect or incomplete title.
There is another limitation to the right granted under Section 48(b).
Section 47 of the Public Land Act limits the period within which one may
exercise the right to seek registration under Section 48. The provision has
been amended several times, most recently by Rep. Act No. 9176 in
2002. It currently reads thus:
Section 47. The persons specified in the next following section
are hereby granted time, not to extend beyond December 31,
2020 within which to avail of the benefits of this
Chapter: Provided, That this period shall apply only where the
area applied for does not exceed twelve (12) hectares: Provided,
further, That the several periods of time designated by the
President in accordance with Section Forty-Five of this Act shall
apply also to the lands comprised in the provisions of this Chapter,
but this Section shall not be construed as prohibiting any said
persons from acting under this Chapter at any time prior to the
period fixed by the President.[24]
Accordingly under the current state of the law, the substantive right
granted under Section 48(b) may be availed of only until 31 December
2020.
B.
Despite the clear text of Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act,
as amended and Section 14(a) of the Property Registration Decree, the
OSG has adopted the position that for one to acquire the right to seek
registration of an alienable and disposable land of the public domain, it is
not enough that the applicant and his/her predecessors-in-interest be in
possession under a bona fide claim of ownership since 12 June 1945; the
alienable and disposable character of the property must have been
declared also as of 12 June 1945. Following the OSGs approach, all lands
certified as alienable and disposable after 12 June 1945 cannot be
registered either under Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree
or Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act as amended. The absurdity of such
an implication was discussed in Naguit.
Petitioner suggests an interpretation that the alienable and
disposable character of the land should have already been
established since June 12, 1945 or earlier. This is not borne out by
the plain meaning of Section 14(1). Since June 12, 1945, as used in
the provision, qualifies its antecedent phrase under a bonafide
claim of ownership. Generally speaking, qualifying words restrict or
modify only the words or phrasesto which they are immediately
associated, and not those distantly or remotely located. [25] Ad
proximum antecedents fiat relation nisi impediatur sentencia.
Besides, we are mindful of the absurdity that would result if
we adopt petitioners position. Absent a legislative amendment, the
rule would be, adopting the OSGs view, that all lands of the public
domain which were not declared alienable or disposable
before June 12, 1945 would not be susceptible to original
registration, no matter the length of unchallenged possession by
the occupant. Such interpretation renders paragraph (1) of Section
14 virtually inoperative and even precludes the government from
giving it effect even as it decides to reclassify public agricultural
lands as alienable and disposable. The unreasonableness of the
situation would even be aggravated considering that before June
12, 1945, the Philippines was not yet even considered an
independent state.
Accordingly, the Court in Naguit explained:
[T]he more reasonable interpretation of Section 14(1) is that
it merely requires the property sought to be registered as already
alienable and disposable at the time the application for registration
of title is filed. If the State, at the time the application is made, has
not yet deemed it proper to release the property for alienation or
disposition, the presumption is that the government is still
reserving the right to utilize the property; hence, the need to
preserve its ownership in the State irrespective of the length of
adverse possession even if in good faith. However, if the property
has already been classified as alienable and disposable, as it is in
this case, then there is already an intention on the part of the State
to abdicate its exclusive prerogative over the property.
The Court declares that the correct interpretation of Section
14(1) is that which was adopted in Naguit. The contrary pronouncement
in Herbieto, as pointed out in Naguit, absurdly limits the application of
the provision to the point of virtual inutility since it would only cover
lands actually declared alienable and disposable prior to 12 June 1945,
even if the current possessor is able to establish open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession under a bona fide claim of ownership
long before that date.
Moreover, the Naguit interpretation allows more possessors
under a bona fide claim of ownership to avail of judicial confirmation of
their imperfect titles than what would be feasible under Herbieto. This
balancing fact is significant, especially considering our forthcoming
discussion on the scope and reach of Section 14(2) of the Property
Registration Decree.
Petitioners make the salient observation that the
contradictory passages from Herbieto are obiter dicta since the land
registration proceedings therein is void ab initio in the first place due to
lack of the requisite publication of the notice of initial hearing. There is no
need to explicitly overturn Herbieto, as it suffices that the Courts
acknowledgment that the particular line of argument used therein
concerning Section 14(1) is indeed obiter.
It may be noted that in the subsequent case of Buenaventura,
[26]
the Court, citing Herbieto, again stated that [a]ny period of possession
prior to the date when the [s]ubject [property was] classified as alienable
and disposable is inconsequential and should be excluded from the

computation of the period of possession That statement, in the context of
Section 14(1), is certainly erroneous. Nonetheless, the passage as cited
in Buenaventura should again be considered as obiter. The application
therein was ultimately granted, citing Section 14(2). The evidence
submitted by petitioners therein did not establish any mode of possession
on their part prior to 1948, thereby precluding the application of Section
14(1). It is not even apparent from the decision whether petitioners
therein had claimed entitlement to original registration following Section
14(1), their position being that they had been in exclusive possession
under a bona fide claim of ownership for over fifty (50) years, but not
before 12 June 1945.
Thus, neither Herbieto nor its principal discipular
ruling Buenaventura has any precedental value with respect to Section
14(1). On the other hand, the ratio of Naguit is embedded in Section
14(1), since it precisely involved situation wherein the applicant had been
in exclusive possession under a bona fide claim of ownership prior to 12
June 1945. The Courts interpretation of Section 14(1) therein was decisive
to the resolution of the case. Any doubt as to which
between Naguit or Herbieto provides the final word of the Court on
Section 14(1) is now settled in favor of Naguit.
We noted in Naguit that it should be distinguished from Bracewell v.
Court of Appeals[27] since in the latter, the application for registration had
been filed before the land was declared alienable or disposable. The
dissent though pronounces Bracewell as the better rule between the two.
Yet two years after Bracewell, its ponente, the esteemed Justice Consuelo
Ynares-Santiago, penned the ruling in Republic v. Ceniza,[28] which involved
a claim of possession that extended back to 1927 over a public domain
land that was declared alienable and disposable only in
1980. Ceniza cited Bracewell, quoted extensively from it, and following
the mindset of the dissent, the attempt at registration in Ceniza should
have failed. Not so.
To prove that the land subject of an application for
registration is alienable, an applicant must establish the
existence of a positive act of the government such as a
presidential proclamation or an executive order; an
administrative action; investigation reports of Bureau of Lands
investigators; and a legislative act or a statute.
In this case, private respondents presented a certification
dated November 25, 1994, issued by Eduardo M. Inting, the
Community Environment and Natural Resources Officer in the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources Office in
Cebu City, stating that the lots involved were "found to be within
the alienable and disposable (sic) Block-I, Land Classification
Project No. 32-A, per map 2962 4-I555 dated December 9,
1980." This is sufficient evidence to show the real character of
the land subject of private respondents application. Further, the
certification enjoys a presumption of regularity in the absence of
contradictory evidence, which is true in this case. Worth noting
also was the observation of the Court of Appeals stating that:
[n]o opposition was filed by the Bureaus of Lands
and Forestry to contest the application of appellees on
the ground that the property still forms part of the public
LAND TITLES CHAPTER II
domain. Nor is there any showing that the lots in
question are forestal land....
Thus, while the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that mere
possession of public land for the period required by law would
entitle its occupant to a confirmation of imperfect title, it did not
err in ruling in favor of private respondents as far as the first
requirement in Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act is concerned,
for they were able to overcome the burden of proving the
alienability of the land subject of their application.
As correctly found by the Court of Appeals, private
respondents were able to prove their open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession of the subject land even
before the year 1927. As a rule, we are bound by the factual
findings of the Court of Appeals. Although there are exceptions,
petitioner did not show that this is one of them. [29]
Why did the Court in Ceniza, through the same eminent member who
authored Bracewell, sanction the registration under Section 48(b) of
public domain lands declared alienable or disposable thirty-five (35) years
and 180 days after 12 June 1945? The telling difference is that in Ceniza,
the application for registration was filed nearly six (6) years after the land
had been declared alienable or disposable, while in Bracewell, the
application was filed nine (9) years before the land was declared
alienable or disposable. That crucial difference was also stressed
in Naguit to contradistinguish it from Bracewell, a difference which the
dissent seeks to belittle.
III.
We next ascertain the correct framework of analysis with respect to
Section 14(2). The provision reads:
SECTION 14. Who may apply. The following persons
may file in the proper Court of First Instance an
application for registration of title to land, whether
personally or through their duly authorized
representatives:
xxx
(2) Those who have acquired ownership over
private lands by prescription under the provisions of
existing laws.
The Court in Naguit offered the following discussion
concerning Section 14(2), which we did even then recognize, and still do,
to be an obiter dictum, but we nonetheless refer to it as material for
further discussion, thus:
Did the enactment of the Property Registration Decree and
the amendatory P.D. No. 1073 preclude the application for
registration of alienable lands of the public domain, possession
over which commenced only after June 12, 1945? It did not,
considering Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree,
which governs and authorizes the application of those who have
acquired ownership of private lands by prescription under the
provisions of existing laws.
Prescription is one of the modes of acquiring ownership
under the Civil Code.[[30]] There is a consistent jurisprudential rule
that properties classified as alienable public land may be
converted into private property by reason of open, continuous
and exclusive possession of at least thirty (30) years.[ [31]] With
such conversion, such property may now fall within the
contemplation of private lands under Section 14(2), and thus
susceptible to registration by those who have acquired ownership
through prescription. Thus, even if possession of the alienable
public land commenced on a date later than June 12, 1945, and
such possession being been open, continuous and exclusive, then
the possessor may have the right to register the land by virtue of
Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree.
Naguit did not involve the application of Section 14(2), unlike in this case
where petitioners have based their registration bid primarily on that
provision, and where the evidence definitively establishes their claim of
possession only as far back as 1948. It is in this case that we can properly
appreciate the nuances of the provision.
A.
The obiter in Naguit cited the Civil Code provisions on prescription as the
possible basis for application for original registration under Section 14(2).
Specifically, it is Article 1113 which provides legal foundation for the
application. It reads:
All things which are within the commerce of men are
susceptible of prescription, unless otherwise provided. Property of
the State or any of its subdivisions not patrimonial in character shall
not be the object of prescription.
It is clear under the Civil Code that where lands of the public domain are
patrimonial in character, they are susceptible to acquisitive prescription.
On the other hand, among the public domain lands that are not
susceptible to acquisitive prescription are timber lands and mineral lands.
The Constitution itself proscribes private ownership of timber or mineral
lands.
There are in fact several provisions in the Civil Code
concerning the acquisition of real property through prescription.
Ownership of real property may be acquired by ordinary prescription of
ten (10) years,[32] or through extraordinary prescription of thirty (30) years.
[33]
Ordinary acquisitive prescription requires possession in good faith, [34] as
well as just title.[35]
When Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree
explicitly provides that persons who have acquired ownership over private
lands by prescription under the provisions of existing laws, it unmistakably
refers to the Civil Code as a valid basis for the registration of lands. The
Civil Code is the only existing law that specifically allows the acquisition by
prescription of private lands, including patrimonial property belonging to
the State. Thus, the critical question that needs affirmation is whether
Section 14(2) does encompass original registration proceedings over
patrimonial property of the State, which a private person has acquired
through prescription.
The Naguit obiter had adverted to a frequently reiterated
jurisprudence holding that properties classified as alienable public land
may be converted into private property by reason of open, continuous and
exclusive possession of at least thirty (30) years. [36]Yet if we ascertain the
source of the thirty-year period, additional complexities relating to Section

14(2) and to how exactly it operates would emerge. For there are in fact
two distinct origins of the thirty (30)-year rule.
The first source is Rep. Act No. 1942, enacted in 1957, which
amended Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act by granting the right to seek
original registration of alienable public lands through possession in the
concept of an owner for at least thirty years.
The following-described citizens of the Philippines,
occupying lands of the public domain or claiming to own any
such lands or an interest therein, but whose titles have not
been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First
Instance of the province where the land is located for
confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate of
title therefor, under the Land Registration Act, to wit:
xxx xxx xxx
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors
in interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of
the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of
ownership, for at least thirty years immediately preceding the
filing of the application for confirmation of title, except when
prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively
presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a
Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title
under the provisions of this Chapter. (emphasis supplied)[37]
This provision was repealed in 1977 with the enactment of P.D.
1073, which made the date 12 June 1945 the reckoning point for the first
time. Nonetheless, applications for registration filed prior to 1977 could
have invoked the 30-year rule introduced by Rep. Act No. 1942.
The second source is Section 14(2) of P.D. 1529 itself, at least
by implication, as it applies the rules on prescription under the Civil Code,
particularly Article 1113 in relation to Article 1137. Note that there are
two kinds of prescription under the Civil Codeordinary acquisitive
prescription and extraordinary acquisitive prescription, which, under
Article 1137, is completed through uninterrupted adverse possession for
thirty years, without need of title or of good faith.
Obviously, the first source of the thirty (30)-year period
rule, Rep. Act No. 1942, became unavailable after 1977. At present, the
only legal basis for the thirty (30)-year period is the law on prescription
under the Civil Code, as mandated under Section 14(2). However, there is
a material difference between how the thirty (30)-year rule operated
under Rep. Act No. 1942 and how it did under the Civil Code.
Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as amended by Rep. Act
No. 1942, did not refer to or call into application the Civil Code provisions
on prescription. It merely set forth a requisite thirty-year possession
period immediately preceding the application for confirmation of title,
without any qualification as to whether the property should be declared
alienable at the beginning of, and continue as such, throughout the entire
thirty-(30) years. There is neither statutory nor jurisprudential basis to
assert Rep. Act No. 1942 had mandated such a requirement, [38] similar to
LAND TITLES CHAPTER II
our earlier finding with respect to the present language of Section 48(b),
which now sets 12 June 1945 as the point of reference.
Then, with the repeal of Rep. Act No. 1942, the thirty-year
possession period as basis for original registration became Section 14(2) of
the Property Registration Decree, which entitled those who have acquired
ownership over private lands by prescription under the provisions of
existing laws to apply for original registration. Again, the thirty-year period
is derived from the rule on extraordinary prescription under Article 1137
of the Civil Code. At the same time, Section 14(2) puts into operation the
entire regime of prescription under the Civil Code, a fact which does not
hold true with respect to Section 14(1).
B.
Unlike Section 14(1), Section 14(2) explicitly refers to the
principles on prescription under existing laws. Accordingly, we are
impelled to apply the civil law concept of prescription, as set forth in the
Civil Code, in our interpretation of Section 14(2). There is no similar
demand on our part in the case of Section 14(1).
The critical qualification under Article 1113 of the Civil Code is
thus: [p]roperty of the State or any of its subdivisions not patrimonial in
character shall not be the object of prescription. The identification what
consists of patrimonial property is provided by Articles 420 and 421, which
we quote in full:
Art. 420. The following things are property of public
dominion:
(1) Those intended for public use, such as roads, canals,
rivers, torrents, ports and bridges constructed by the State,
banks, shores, roadsteads, and others of similar character;
(2) Those which belong to the State, without being for
public use, and are intended for some public service or for
the development of the national wealth.
Art. 421. All other property of the State, which is not of the
character stated in the preceding article, is patrimonial property
It is clear that property of public dominion, which generally includes
property belonging to the State, cannot be the object of prescription or,
indeed, be subject of the commerce of man. [39] Lands of the public
domain, whether declared alienable and disposable or not, are property
of public dominion and thus insusceptible to acquisition by prescription.
Let us now explore the effects under the Civil Code of a declaration by the
President or any duly authorized government officer of alienability and
disposability of lands of the public domain. Would such lands so declared
alienable and disposable be converted, under the Civil Code, from
property of the public dominion into patrimonial property? After all, by
connotative definition, alienable and disposable lands may be the object
of the commerce of man; Article 1113 provides that all things within the
commerce of man are susceptible to prescription; and the same provision
further provides that patrimonial property of the State may be acquired
by prescription.
Nonetheless, Article 422 of the Civil Code states that
[p]roperty of public dominion, when no longer intended for public use or
for public service, shall form part of the patrimonial property of the
State. It is this provision that controls how public dominion property may
be converted into patrimonial property susceptible to acquisition by
prescription. After all, Article 420 (2) makes clear that those
property which belong to the State, without being for public use, and are
intended for some public service or for the development of the national
wealth are public dominion property. For as long as the property belongs
to the State, although already classified as alienable or disposable, it
remains property of the public dominion if when it is intended for some
public service or for the development of the national wealth.
Accordingly, there must be an express declaration by the
State that the public dominion property is no longer intended for public
service or the development of the national wealth or that the property
has been converted into patrimonial. Without such express declaration,
the property, even if classified as alienable or disposable, remains
property of the public dominion, pursuant to Article 420(2), and thus
incapable of acquisition by prescription. It is only when such alienable
and disposable lands are expressly declared by the State to be no longer
intended for public service or for the development of the national
wealth that the period of acquisitive prescription can begin to run. Such
declaration shall be in the form of a law duly enacted by Congress or a
Presidential Proclamation in cases where the President is duly
authorized by law.
It is comprehensible with ease that this reading of Section
14(2) of the Property Registration Decree limits its scope and reach and
thus affects the registrability even of lands already declared alienable and
disposable to the detriment of the bona fide possessors or occupants
claiming title to the lands. Yet this interpretation is in accord with the
Regalian doctrine and its concomitant assumption that all lands owned by
the State, although declared alienable or disposable, remain as such and
ought to be used only by the Government.
Recourse does not lie with this Court in the matter. The duty
of the Court is to apply the Constitution and the laws in accordance with
their language and intent. The remedy is to change the law, which is the
province of the legislative branch. Congress can very well be entreated to
amend Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree and pertinent
provisions of the Civil Code to liberalize the requirements for judicial
confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles.
The operation of the foregoing interpretation can be
illustrated by an actual example. Republic Act No. 7227, entitled An Act
Accelerating The Conversion Of Military Reservations Into Other
Productive Uses, etc., is more commonly known as the BCDA law.Section
2 of the law authorizes the sale of certain military reservations and
portions of military camps in Metro Manila, including Fort Bonifacio and
Villamor Air Base. For purposes of effecting the sale of the military camps,
the law mandates the President to transfer such military lands to the
Bases Conversion Development Authority (BCDA)[40] which in turn is
authorized to own, hold and/or administer them. [41] The President is
authorized to sell portions of the military camps, in whole or in part.
[42]
Accordingly, the BCDA law itself declares that the military lands subject

thereof are alienable and disposable pursuant to the provisions of
existing laws and regulations governing sales of government properties. [43]
From the moment the BCDA law was enacted the subject
military lands have become alienable and disposable. However, said lands
did not become patrimonial, as the BCDA law itself expressly makes the
reservation that these lands are to be sold in order to raise funds for the
conversion of the former American bases at Clark and Subic.[44] Such
purpose can be tied to either public service or the development of
national wealth under Article 420(2). Thus, at that time, the lands
remained property of the public dominion under Article 420(2),
notwithstanding their status as alienable and disposable. It is upon their
sale as authorized under the BCDA law to a private person or entity that
such lands become private property and cease to be property of the
public dominion.
C.
Should public domain lands become patrimonial because they
are declared as such in a duly enacted law or duly promulgated
proclamation that they are no longer intended for public service or for
the development of the national wealth, would the period of possession
prior to the conversion of such public dominion into patrimonial be
reckoned in counting the prescriptive period in favor of the possessors?
We rule in the negative.
The limitation imposed by Article 1113 dissuades us from ruling that the
period of possession before the public domain land becomes patrimonial
may be counted for the purpose of completing the prescriptive period.
Possession of public dominion property before it becomes patrimonial
cannot be the object of prescription according to the Civil Code. As the
application for registration under Section 14(2) falls wholly within the
framework of prescription under the Civil Code, there is no way that
possession during the time that the land was still classified as public
dominion property can be counted to meet the requisites of acquisitive
prescription and justify registration.
Are we being inconsistent in applying divergent rules for
Section 14(1) and Section 14(2)? There is no inconsistency. Section 14(1)
mandates registration on the basis of possession, while Section 14(2)
entitles registration on the basis of prescription.Registration under
Section 14(1) is extended under the aegis of the Property Registration
Decree and the Public Land Actwhile registration under Section 14(2) is
made available both by the Property Registration Decree and the Civil
Code.
In the same manner, we can distinguish between the thirty-year period
under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as amended by Rep. Act No.
1472, and the thirty-year period available through Section 14(2) of the
Property Registration Decree in relation to Article 1137 of the Civil
Code. The period under the former speaks of a thirty-year period of
possession, while the period under the latter concerns a thirty-year
period of extraordinary prescription. Registration under Section 48(b) of
the Public Land Act as amended by Rep. Act No. 1472 is based on thirty
years of possession alone without regard to the Civil Code, while the
registration under Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree is
founded on extraordinary prescription under the Civil Code.
LAND TITLES CHAPTER II
It may be asked why the principles of prescription under the Civil Code
should not apply as well to Section 14(1). Notwithstanding the vaunted
status of the Civil Code, it ultimately is just one of numerous statutes,
neither superior nor inferior to other statutes such as the Property
Registration Decree. The legislative branch is not bound to adhere to the
framework set forth by the Civil Code when it enacts subsequent
legislation. Section 14(2) manifests a clear intent to interrelate the
registration allowed under that provision with the Civil Code, but no such
intent exists with respect to Section 14(1).
IV.
One of the keys to understanding the framework we set forth today is
seeing how our land registration procedures correlate with our law on
prescription, which, under the Civil Code, is one of the modes for
acquiring ownership over property.
The Civil Code makes it clear that patrimonial property of the State may
be acquired by private persons through prescription. This is brought
about by Article 1113, which states that [a]ll things which are within the
commerce of man are susceptible to prescription, and that [p]roperty of
the State or any of its subdivisions not patrimonial in character shall not
be the object of prescription.
There are two modes of prescription through which immovables may be
acquired under the Civil Code. The first is ordinary acquisitive
prescription, which, under Article 1117, requires possession in good faith
and with just title; and, under Article 1134, is completed through
possession of ten (10) years. There is nothing in the Civil Code that bars a
person from acquiring patrimonial property of the State through ordinary
acquisitive prescription, nor is there any apparent reason to impose such
a rule. At the same time, there are indispensable requisitesgood faith and
just title. The ascertainment of good faith involves the application of
Articles 526, 527, and 528, as well as Article 1127 of the Civil Code,
[45]
provisions that more or less speak for themselves.
On the other hand, the concept of just title requires some
clarification. Under Article 1129, there is just title for the purposes of
prescription when the adverse claimant came into possession of the
property through one of the modes recognized by law for the acquisition
of ownership or other real rights, but the grantor was not the owner or
could not transmit any right. Dr. Tolentino explains:
Just title is an act which has for its purpose the transmission
of ownership, and which would have actually transferred
ownership if the grantor had been the owner. This vice or defect is
the one cured by prescription. Examples: sale with delivery,
exchange, donation, succession, and dacion in payment.[46]
The OSG submits that the requirement of just title necessarily precludes
the applicability of ordinary acquisitive prescription to patrimonial
property. The major premise for the argument is that the State, as the
owner and grantor, could not transmit ownership to the possessor before
the completion of the required period of possession. [47] It is evident that
the OSG erred when it assumed that the grantor referred to in Article
1129 is the State. The grantor is the one from whom the person invoking
ordinary acquisitive prescription derived the title, whether by sale,
exchange, donation, succession or any other mode of the acquisition of
ownership or other real rights.
Earlier, we made it clear that, whether under ordinary
prescription or extraordinary prescription, the period of possession
preceding the classification of public dominion lands as patrimonial
cannot be counted for the purpose of computing prescription. But after
the property has been become patrimonial, the period of prescription
begins to run in favor of the possessor. Once the requisite period has
been completed, two legal events ensue: (1) the patrimonial property
is ipso jure converted into private land; and (2) the person in possession
for the periods prescribed under the Civil Code acquires ownership of the
property by operation of the Civil Code.
It is evident that once the possessor automatically becomes
the owner of the converted patrimonial property, the ideal next step is
the registration of the property under the Torrens system. It should be
remembered that registration of property is not a mode of acquisition of
ownership, but merely a mode of confirmation of ownership. [48]
Looking back at the registration regime prior to the adoption
of the Property Registration Decree in 1977, it is apparent that the
registration system then did not fully accommodate the acquisition of
ownership of patrimonial property under the Civil Code. What the system
accommodated was the confirmation of imperfect title brought about by
the completion of a period of possession ordained under the Public Land
Act (either 30 years following Rep. Act No. 1942, or since 12 June
1945 following P.D. No. 1073).
The Land Registration Act [49] was noticeably silent on the
requisites for alienable public lands acquired through ordinary
prescription under the Civil Code, though it arguably did not preclude
such registration.[50] Still, the gap was lamentable, considering that the
Civil Code, by itself, establishes ownership over the patrimonial property
of persons who have completed the prescriptive periods ordained
therein. The gap was finally closed with the adoption of the Property
Registration Decree in 1977, with Section 14(2) thereof expressly
authorizing original registration in favor of persons who have acquired
ownership over private lands by prescription under the provisions of
existing laws, that is, the Civil Code as of now.
V.
We synthesize the doctrines laid down in this case, as follows:
(1) In connection with Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree,
Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act recognizes and confirms that those
who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have been in
open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of
alienable and disposable lands of the public domain, under a bona fide
claim of acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945 have acquired
ownership of, and registrable title to, such lands based on the length and
quality of their possession.
(a) Since Section 48(b) merely requires possession since 12
June 1945 and does not require that the lands should have been
alienable and disposable during the entire period of possession, the
possessor is entitled to secure judicial confirmation of his title
thereto as soon as it is declared alienable and disposable, subject to
the timeframe imposed by Section 47 of the Public Land Act. [51]
 LAND TITLES CHAPTER II
(b) The right to register granted under Section 48(b) of the would be abdicating its social responsibility to the Filipino people if we
Public Land Act is further confirmed by Section 14(1) of the Property simply levied the law without comment.
Registration Decree.
The informal settlement of public lands, whether declared alienable or
(2) In complying with Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree, not, is a phenomenon tied to long-standing habit and cultural
consider that under the Civil Code, prescription is recognized as a mode acquiescence, and is common among the so-called Third World countries.
of acquiring ownership of patrimonial property. However, public domain This paradigm powerfully evokes the disconnect between a legal system
lands become only patrimonial property not only with a declaration that and the reality on the ground. The law so far has been unable to bridge
these are alienable or disposable. There must also be an express that gap. Alternative means of acquisition of these
government manifestation that the property is already patrimonial or no public domain lands, such as through homestead or free patent, have
longer retained for public service or the development of national wealth,
under Article 422 of the Civil Code. And only when the property has
become patrimonial can the prescriptive period for the acquisition of
property of the public dominion begin to run.
proven unattractive due to limitations imposed on the grantee in the
encumbrance or alienation of said properties. [52] Judicial confirmation of
(a) Patrimonial property is private property of the
imperfect title has emerged as the most viable, if not the most attractive
government. The person acquires ownership of patrimonial property
means to regularize the informal settlement of alienable or disposable
by prescription under the Civil Code is entitled to secure registration
lands of the public domain, yet even that system, as revealed in this
thereof under Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree.
decision, has considerable limits.
(b) There are two kinds of prescription by which patrimonial
There are millions upon millions of Filipinos who have individually or
property may be acquired, one ordinary and other extraordinary.
exclusively held residential lands on which they have lived and raised
Under ordinary acquisitive prescription, a person acquires ownership
their families. Many more have tilled and made productive idle lands of
of a patrimonial property through possession for at least ten (10)
the State with their hands. They have been regarded for generation by
years, in good faith and with just title. Under extraordinary
their families and their communities as common law owners. There is
acquisitive prescription, a persons uninterrupted adverse possession
much to be said about the virtues of according them legitimate states. Yet
of patrimonial property for at least thirty (30) years, regardless of
such virtues are not for the Court to translate into positive law, as the law
good faith or just title, ripens into ownership.
itself considered such lands as property of the public dominion. It could
only be up to Congress to set forth a new phase of land reform to sensibly
B.
regularize and formalize the settlement of such lands which in legal
We now apply the above-stated doctrines to the case at bar.
theory are lands of the public domain before the problem becomes
insoluble. This could be accomplished, to cite two examples, by
It is clear that the evidence of petitioners is insufficient to establish that
liberalizing the standards for judicial confirmation of imperfect title, or
Malabanan has acquired ownership over the subject property under
amending the Civil Code itself to ease the requisites for the conversion of
Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act. There is no substantive evidence to
public dominion property into patrimonial.
establish that Malabanan or petitioners as his predecessors-in-interest
have been in possession of the property since 12 June 1945 or earlier. The
Ones sense of security over land rights infuses into every
earliest that petitioners can date back their possession, according to their
aspect of well-being not only of that individual, but also to the persons
own evidencethe Tax Declarations they presented in particularis to the
family. Once that sense of security is deprived, life and livelihood are put
year 1948. Thus, they cannot avail themselves of registration under
on stasis. It is for the political branches to bring welcome closure to the
Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree.
long pestering problem.
Neither can petitioners properly invoke Section 14(2) as basis for
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of
registration. While the subject property was declared as alienable or
Appeals dated 23 February 2007 and Resolution dated 2 October
disposable in 1982, there is no competent evidence that is no longer
2007 are AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs.
intended for public use service or for the development of the national
evidence, conformably with Article 422 of the Civil Code. The
SO ORDERED.
classification of the subject property as alienable and disposable land of
the public domain does not change its status as property of the public
dominion under Article 420(2) of the Civil Code. Thus, it is insusceptible
to acquisition by prescription.
VI.
A final word. The Court is comfortable with the correctness of
the legal doctrines established in this decision. Nonetheless, discomfiture
over the implications of todays ruling cannot be discounted. For, every
untitled property that is occupied in the country will be affected by this
ruling. The social implications cannot be dismissed lightly, and the Court