CHAPTER - IV

MAJOR ISSUES AND TENSION

AREAS IN UNION-STATE
RELATIONS
 Federalism is unique example of reconciliation of state autonomy with

the vital objective of maintaining the unity and integrity of the country. It is

based on the principle of division of functions between the centre and the

states, with each operating within its respective sphere. But in actual practice,

in most of the federations of the world, the centre has become powerful than

the units and has a tendency to dominate them.

In India also, this tendency persists. Not only has the constitution

divided the powers between the centre and the states to give a special tilt in

favour of the centre, but also the centre has come to acquire some of the

powers of the states as well. As a result, often a demand is made that this

trend must be checked and the states must be permitted greater autonomy

within their spheres. Almost all the state governments in India addressed

their grievances against the centre at one point of time or the other.

The constitutional framework of union-state relationship worked

reasonably well during the 17 year period from 1950 to 1967. During this

period, the Congress party was ruling both in the centre and in the states

(except PEPSI) in 1953 and Kerala in 1957), therefore, the relations between

the centre and the states by and large were smooth. Even if there were a few

differences, they were resolved either on party basis or at the intra-

governmental level. Hence, there was nO open confrontation between the

union and the aggrieved states, and the complaints quieted down after the

event passed off.

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 However, with the passage of time, many irritants have cropped up into

the working of the Indian federalism. The era of co-operation ended partially

after the death of Nehru on 27th May 1964 and largely after the Fourth

General Election held in February 1967. After these elections, the dominance

of the Congress party at the centre and in some states declined considerably.

Its majority in the Lok Sabha was reduced from 361 in 1962 to 282 seats. In 9

states, the non-Congress governments came into power. Particularly, after

1980, the political situation in the country has undergone a qualitative change

as some powerful regional parties have come into power in some states, and

CPI (M) has further strengthened its hold in West Bengal and Tripura.

Moreover, the Janata Party was ruling in Karnataka. The opposition leaders of

the Congress party in these states began to speak the language of conflict,

threats, warnings and complaints. The relations between the centre and the

states strained mainly because of partisan role of the centre. In this backdrop,

an attempt is made in this chapter to discuss major tension areas between the

centre and the states.

Office of the Governor

Article 153 of the Indian constitution provides that there shall be a

Governor in each state. However, the seventh amendment in 1956 makes it

possible to appoint the same person as a Governor for two or more states.

Regarding his appointment Article 155 stipulates that the President of India

shall appoint the Governor of a state by warrant under his hand and seal. As

the President of India acts in accordance with the advice given by the union

council of ministers, headed by Prime Minister, it is true that the President

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appoints him on the advice of the Council of Ministers. Speaking in actual

terms, he is appointed by the President on the advice of Prime Minister

alone.

Article 156 says that the Governor shall hold office during the pleasure

of the President. Subject to this provision, he shall hold office for a term of

five years from the date on which he enters upon his office. The Governor

can resign by writing a letter of resignation addressed to the President. The

former Governor continues to hold office till the new Governor enters upon

his office. Since he holds office during the pleasure of the President, no

process of impeachment or any other method of removal is not prescribed by

the constitution.

In the appointment of Governors, two important usages are developed

in India. Firstly, while appointing the Governors, consultation with the Chief

Minister of concerned state. Secondly, appointing an outsider of the state as

the Governor. These two usages are proved beneficial in strengthening the

prestige of the office of the Governor on one hand and smooth functioning of

federal polity on the other. From the commencement of the constitution,

successive governments at the centre often honoured the second usage. In

case of the first usage serious controversies and misgivings were developed.

Up to 1967, the consultation of Chief Minister went smooth. After 1967, non

congress governments were formed in a large number of states and the

usage of consultation was left behind.

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 In the absence of any standard guidelines and desirable qualifications,

the office of the Governor has become a perennial source for the ruling clique

to post any person of their choices irrespective of his caliber and competence

to man the position. The growing discontentment among the opposition ruled

states seem to be not for their non-involvement in the in selection of

Governor. But those who were appointed have developed a tendency to act

for and on behalf of the party in power at the centre and subverting

democracy for partisan ends. It is used as a means of rewarding the party

stalwarts, the defeated politicians, the defectors, and those bureaucrats who

loyal to the party in the past. The Table 4.1 gives the list of some Governors

who were appointed recently (2000-09) and the posts they held earlier.

Table: 4.1
List of some Governors and posts they held earlier
S.No Name of the Governor State Post Held Earlier
1 E.L.S. Narasimhan Andhra Pradesh Intelligence Bureau
Chief
2 M.K. Narayananan West Bengal National Security
Adviser
3 Sankar Narayan Maharashtra Senior Congress Leader
4 Sivaraj Patil Punjab Senior Congress Leader
5 M.A. Farooq Jharkhand Senior Congress Leader
6 Prabha Rao Rajasthan Senior Congress Leader
7 Urmilaben Patel Himachal
Pradesh Senior Congress Leader
8 Sekhar Dutt Chattisgarh Bureaucrat
9 Sivindhar Singh Goa Indian Administrative
Service
10 Balmiki Prasad Singh Sikkim Indian Administrative
Service
11 Gurubachan Singh Manipur Indian Police Service
12 Ranjit Sekhar Meghalaya India Police Service
13 Nikil Kumar Nagaland Indian Police Service
14 Madhan Mohan Lakharia Mizoram Retired Military Officer
Source: Andhra Jyothi (Daily), entitled 'New Governors' dated: Jan 20, 2010, p. 4.

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 The above table reveals that most of the Governors are either senior

political leaders or bureaucrats. In most of the cases, senior political leaders

belonged to the Congress Party or bureaucrats loyal to it were appointed.

Therefore, it was alleged that the Raj Bhavans had become the centers of

petty politics and the Governors are not in conformity with the expectations of

the founding fathers of the constitution. The Raj Bhawans were quite often

used as resting oasis, dumping grounds or police outposts for retired

recalcitrant or defeated politicians. N. D.Tiwari, who worked as Governor of

Andhra Pradesh, in 2009 had to resign for his immoral activities in Raj

Bhawan. He was forced to resign as soon as the episode was shown in a

Telugu Television Channel. Selection of Governors from incongruous

background also affects the integrity and impartiality-the necessary

concomitants of. the office. The office of the Governor is fast losing its

importance in the popular mind for non-selection of persons of eminence and

proven administrative ability.

Role of Governor

As our constitution embodies the parliamentary or cabinet system of

government of the British model both for the centre and the states, the

Governor imitates Her Majesty, the Queen, within his microcosm. In all

constitutional functions, it is the Council of Ministers, which acts collectively to

aid and advice the Governor in the exercise of his functions except when he

is required to exercise his functions in his discretion {Article 163). This does

not mean that he must accept its advice immediately and automatically. But

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he may ask his Council of Ministers to reconsider its advice to which he is

ultimately bound to accept. Similarly, while exercising the discretionary

powers, the Governor cannot behave like a despot because the President of

India can restrain him or even dismiss him, as a last resort.

The Governor has unique role to play in Indias federal system. But his

role has always been a controversial issue almost ever since the inception of

this high office. It has become an important and irritating ingredient in centre-

state relations. The very mode of his appointment and the misuse of his

discretionary powers were the centre of controversy. K.V. Rao says, today

at the root of all troubles is the simple fact that the Head of the State is

neither chosen by that state nor is he responsible to it, nor removable.1 By

the very method of appointment and removal, the Governor becomes

subordinate to the President and events prove that he cannot disobey him.

K.V. Rao distinguishes between his role as a link and that of an agent. His

role as a link is more positive than the role as an agent. He cannot be both

these things at the same time. He should be a reflection of the state

government, but not its antithesis nor a spy of the centre. Leaving aside the

discussion as to what an ideal situation would be, the post 1967 period

shows that the Governor is today more an agent of the centre rather than of

the state. It is observed that over the years, the parties in power at the centre

misused this institution to serve their vested interests. Their partisan and

selfish acts have reduced the Indian federalism into a mockery of state

autonomy. Sudhanshu Tripathi, a writer felt that some of the Governors

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themselves sold to the wishes of political masters at the centre causing

abysmal fall of their constitutional authority.2

Discretionary Powers of the Governor

Article 163 makes the Governor sole judge in matters in which he is

required to act in his discretion. The constitution visualizes situations where

he is to act in his discretion and not on the advice of the Council of Ministers.

The decision of the Governor in his discretion shall be final and the validity of

anything done by the Governor shall not be called in question on the ground

that he ought or ought not to have acted in his discretion. Moreover, what is

his discretionary field of activities is also left to his discretion.

Although the phrase in his discretion is mentioned in the constitution,

the provisions relating to the exercise of these powers are couched in general

and vague terms. K.V. Rao a noted political scientist lays the blame for this

vagueness on the defective composition of the Constituent Assembly and

lack of time at the disposal of the assembly. He says the whole set of

articles numbering about 20 concerning the state governments were passed

in a hurry in one day that the whole constitution and its structure was

envisaged in such a way as if the Congress and its then High command

would be in power for a long time.3 The authority of the Govenor even in the

discretionary field is not unrestrained. If it is misused either because of

personal ambitions or as partisan in the currents and cross currents of state

politics, the President can always check him. If necessary, he may even

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remove him. Therefore, discretion has to be exercised so as not to

jeopardize the working of Parliamentary democracy.4

The following are some instances where an opportunity arises for the

Governor, to exercise his discretion.

> He determines whether the government of a state can or cannot be

carried on in accordance with the provisions of the constitution. If he

feels that it cannot be carried on, he can make a report to the

President under Art. 356 (1).

> If after the general elections, no single party is able to secure a clear

majority or post-election splits reduce the majority to a minority, the

Governor can use his discretion to determine which party has the best

chances of forming a stable government.

> In case, the Governor concludes that none of the parties represented

in the legislature is in a position to form a stable government, he can in

his discretion dissolve the legislature and order fresh elections.

> The Governor can reserve a bill or bills passed by the state legislature

for consideration of the President

> In case, a Ministry refuses to resign following its defeat on a crucial

policy issue.

> In case, the Governor finds the Chief Minsters non-compliance with

his advice tantamounting to a violation of the spirit of the constitution;

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> In case, he is satisfied that the Chief Minister has lost his majority in

the Assembly.

> In case, the Governor has reasons to believe that, the state

government is engaged in activities, which are likely to endanger

national security and social harmony.

It is alleged that several Governors exercised their discretionary

powers extensively and created a good deal of public controversy.5 They

often acted with partisan attitude and as agents of the party in power at the

centre. In the name of discretionary powers, they misused their powers with

regard to different areas of the administration of the state. They are

discussed below.

(a) Appointing Chief Ministers

The Governor has nothing to do with his discretion in the appointment

of the Chief Minister as long as the political party staking claim for formation

of government commands clear majority. This did not pose any problem till

1967 because the Congress enjoyed a comfortable majority both at the

centre and in the states. The Post-1967 period, posed a dilemma as the

Congress after the General Election of 1967 was reduced to a minority in

eight states. Several questions of importance arose. In case there is a hung

assembly and the situation is fluid, the discretionary role of the Governor

becomes very important. Dr. Iqbal Narayan calls it as the situational

discretion.6 It means if a single party secures majority seats, then the

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Governor is left with no choice except appointing the majority party leader as

the Chief Minister of a state. But if no party is able to command the

confidence of majority of Members of the Assembly, then there is an ample

scope for the Governor to act in his discretion. Under these circumstances,

should he ask the leader of the single largest party or group of parties

merged in a coalition to form the government?

Noted constitutional experts have supported the view that the leader of

the opposition be invited if he is sure of providing a stable government. K.

Subba Rao opines that the leader of the opposition be invited unless his

chances of forming the government are quite bleak. The term stability is

taken to mean not only the numerical superiority of the ruling party but also

its ability to hold on to the majority strength and continuing with it.7 In both

the above given cases the problem becomes embarrassing and complicated

due to the presence of independents in the legislature and defections from

one party to the other (this problem has come down to the maximum extent

after anti-defection law was made in 1989). No easy solutions are available

and whichever minority party or group of parties was called upon to form a

government, stood the chance of converting itself into a majority by securing

the support of defectors from other parties by promising ministerial office to

the leaders of the defectors.8

A close observation of state politics in India over the years makes it

crystal clear that there is no unanimity of practice whether the Governor of a

state has to invite single largest party leader as the Chief Minister or a leader

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of the combined front of different political parties. Here the Governor may

exercise his unlimited discretion in appointing a Chief Minister either by

inviting the leader of the single largest party or alliance in the assembly

closest to majority or may choose the favorite of the centre and give him

enough time to muster a visible majority9 as the Governor of Jharkhand did

at the behest of centre. This may be the Congress again in some states and

asking it to form the government would be wrong because the voters may or

may not have voted in favour of the opposition, but one thing is clear that

they certainly voted against the Congress.10

There are several instances where the governors have adopted

divergent norms to guide their behaviour. In the first general elections held in

Madras state in 1952 the Communists, Socialists, Kissan Mazdoor Party

formed a front, gained major seats, and elected T. Prakasam as their leader.

But the Governor, instead of inviting T. Prakasam to form the government,

invited the congress party leader to form the government on the pretext that

the party emerged as a single largest party. Again, in 1967 the Governor of

Rajasthan invited the leader of the largest party, the Congress, ignoring the

claim of the United Front, which had 92 out of 184 MLAs at its back. While

the same did not happen in some of the cases. For instance, in 1965, the

Governor of Kerala did not invite the leader of the single largest party CPI to

form a government. The same happened in Bengal in 1971, Haryana in 1982

and Utter Pradesh in 1993 and 1996 (where BJP emerged as the single

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largest party). It may be inferred from these examples that the Governors

acted in such a way, which is beneficial to the ruling party at the centre.

(b) Testing the Majority

Testing the majority of the government in the event of party splits is

another opportunity in the hands of the Governors to prove their loyalty to the

party at the centre and to subvert the democratic process of testing the

majority of government on the floor of House11 as recently happened in Goa

on February 2, 2005. Earlier instead of counting heads of legislators on the

floor of House, the Governors in several cases have inflicted the ignominy of

forcing legislators to parade before them. The parade system is the physical

verification of the list in the assembly. He must summon the session of the

assembly and ask the contenders to show their strength without the least

possible delay. The result is not very satisfactory and does not give effect to

the verdict of the electorate. But the electorate has to thank itself for not

giving a clear verdict.12 There are many examples of Raj Bhavan inspired

political coups with blessings from Delhi as happened in Andhra Pradesh and

Jammu & Kashmir in 1984.

The case of Andhra Pradesh is worthy of mentioning here. The

Governor of Andhra Pradesh Ram Lai played a highly controversial role in

the political events of August 1984. When Ram Lai was appointed as the

Governor of Andhra Pradesh, then the Chief Minister N.T. Rama Rao

criticised the centre on the ground that the state government was not

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consulted in the matter. Still, the relations between the Governor and the

Chief Minister were cordial in the first few months. But slowly the Governor

started giving pinpricks to the government on a few issues like his indecision

when he was requested to prorogue the Legislative Council in March 1984 to

stall the privileges issue against the Eenadu (perception that it is a pro-

Telugu Desam Party news paper), the appointment of G.N. Reddy as Vice

Chancellor of Sri Venkateswara University against the recommendation of the

State Chief Minister, etc. But a crisis situation was created over the political

events of August 1984.

Opposition against the style of functioning of N.T. Rama Rao surfaced

both in the Telugu Desam Party and the Government. The tallying point in

this dissident activity was the then Finance Minister N. Nadendla Bhaskara

Rao. It was alleged that N. Bhaskar Rao was plotting for the overthrow of the

Chief Minister with the support of the Congress Party in the state. In due

course, the Chief Minister sacked Bhaskar Rao from the ministry for his anti

party activities. This event was followed by the resignation of three Ministers

from the Cabinet. Immediately Bhaskar Rao staked his claim to the office of

the Chief Minster on the ground that N.T. Rama Rao had lost his majority

while he himself had the backing of an overwhelming majority of the

Assembly members. He also called on the Governor and put forward his

claim. N.T Rama Rao, on the other hand, submitted a memorandum to the

Governor containing the names of 163 MLAs said to be his supporters. In

spite of repeated pleas, the Governor was neither willing to see the 163

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MLAs nor summon the Assembly to prove his majority by the Chief Minister.

The stand of the Govenor went against all canons of constitutional propriety

and set the stage for a deep political crisis. He dismissed Rama Rao and

appointed Bhaskara Rao as the Chief Minister on August 15, 198, on the

ground that he was satisfied that Bhaskar Rao had majority in the Assembly.

While Rama Rao was denied an opportunity to prove his majority on the floor

of the Assembly within three days, Bhaskar Rao was given 30 days time to

prove his majority in the Assembly.

The dubious role played by the Governor in the murky happenings

attracted nation-wide attention and become extremely controversial. N.T.

Rama Rao and the non-congress opposition party leaders described the

action of Ram Lai as daylight murder of democracy and alleged that the

Congress party at the centre engineered the developments. The press was

also very critical about the action of Ram Lai. There was a wide-spread

demand for the recall of the Governor. In the face of the pouring criticism

against his role, Ram Lai resigned the office of the Governor and the central

government appointed Dr. Sankar Dayal Sharma as the new Governor of

Andhra Pradesh.

On completion of one months time, Bhaskara Rao could not face the

Assembly and consequently laid down his office. The Govenor then had no

alternative but to reinstate N.T. Rama Rao as the Chief Minister on

September 16, 1984.

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 The foregoing account clearly established the fact that the role played

by the then Governor Ram Lai created serious strains in the relations

between the centre and the state government.

(c) Dismissal of Ministry

When the Governor appoints the Chief Minister under Articlel 64 (1),

he is not acting on anyones advice. But while appointing the Council of

Ministers under the same clause he acts on the advice of the Chief Minister.

This would imply that he is not as free while removing a Minister or the

Council as a whole as he is while removing the Chief Minister. The advice of

the Chief Minister is obligatory on the part of the Governor with regard to the

dismissal of other Ministers. It is well said, In the absence of such authority

in the hands of the Chief Minister, Parliamentary democracy is nothing but a

farce.13 But the Governor cannot dismiss the ministry in a collective form.

The words during the pleasure of the Governor in reality mean the pleasure

of the legislative assembly and not to the Governor. Lastly, in all cases of

dismissal either of the Chief Minister, a Minister or the entire ministry the

decision of the Governor is final and cannot be challenged in any court of

Generally, the Chief Minister will remain in office as long as he

commands majority in the lower house of state legislature. Sometimes the

splits or defections in ruling party jeopardize the position of the Chief Minister.

In such situation, the Governor has to ask the Chief Minister either to prove

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his majority on the floor of the house or may demand his resignation. If the

Chief Minister refuses to prove his majority in the Assembly, then the

Governor may remove such Chief Minister. On many occasions, Governors

acted almost whimsically by dismissing Chief Ministers, which ought to have

been decided by the legislature. In the following cases, some of the

Governors did not give a chance to some Chief Ministers to prove their

majority on the floor of the house; instead, they hurriedly removed them

making the office of the Governor a centre of controversy. The following

Table 4.2 gives a few such instances.

Table - 4.2

Chief Ministers not given a chance to prove their Majority

Name of the Name of the

Year State
Governor Chief Minister
1984 Jammu & Kashmir Jag Mohan Faruq Abdullah
1984 Sikkim Talwar Khan Nar Bahadur Bhandari
1984 Andhra Pradesh Ram Lai N.T.Rama Rao
1988 Nagaland K.V.Krishna Rao Hikishe Sharma
1989 Karnataka S.R. Bommai
1991 Haryana Ramesh Bhandari Om Prakash Chautala
1997 Uttar Pradesh S.S. Bhandari Kalyan Singh
1998 Bihar Rabri Devi
Source: A compilation from various documents and News papers.

(d) Suspension and Dissolution of the Assembly

The Governor is empowered to dissolve the Assembly, which is

another controversial area of his discretionary powers, to ensure the

administration of state in accordance with the constitutional provisions. If the

Ministry enjoys a majority and yet demands dissolution, there is no alternative

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but to order dissolution. Similarly, the Governor can order dissolution, under

article 356, if the Ministry resigns without passing the budget. But if the

suggestion of dissolution comes from a Ministry that has lost its majority and

is afraid of the opposition taking over, the Governor can refuse. In this case,

it is his duty to summon the house and try to find an alternative in the

assembly. In his discretion, he can refuse to accept the advice of dissolution.

Generally, the Governor is supposed to be guided by the advice of

Council of Ministers. Instances of both acceptance and rejection of the

ministerial advice for dissolution of assembly are not lacking. The debatable

cases in this regard in recent years appear to be those of Punjab, Nagaland

and Uttar Pradesh and latest being the dissolution of Bihar Assembly in May

2005, where the then Governor spoke of the likelihood of Nitish Kumar

staking claim to form government as the real justification for his

recommending the dissolution. In fact, it is not obligatory on the part of the

Governor to agree to the advice of a defeated Ministry to dissolve the

Legislative Assembly. Nor has there emerged any uniform practice in this

respect. Moreover, there is no clear constitutional directive, to deal with a

situation obtaining from the defeat of the Ministry.

On several occasions, the power of declaring failure of constitutional

machinery has been misused by suspending or dissolving the assemblies

keeping in view the interests of the ruling party at the centre. Whenever the

ruling party at the centre felt that it would be in a position to form alternative

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Ministry either by maneuvering defections or otherwise, the Assemblies were

suspended, otherwise they were dissolved. The following Table 4:3 gives the

list of assemblies suspended in order to give the Congress party a chance to

form the government.

Table: 4.3
Assemblies suspended to give a chance to
Congress to form the Government

Name of the State Year

Rajasthan 1967
Uttar Pradesh 1970
Odisha 1971
Assam 1979
Source: A compilation from various documents and News Papers

On the other hand, assemblies were dissolved in the following states

in order to prevent the opposition to form the government when the Congress

Ministries or the Ministers supported by it went out of office. They are shown

in the Table: 4.4 given below.

Table: 4.4
Assemblies dissolved to prevent
the opposition to form the government
Name of the State Year
Andhra Pradesh 1954
Kerala 1965, 1967 and 1982
Manipur 1969
Tripura 1971
West Bengal 1971
Odisha 1973
Assam 1982
Source: A compilation from various documents and News Papers

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 Here it may also be mentioned that the assemblies were also straight

away dissolved in some cases when the state governments not belonging to

the party in power at the centre. This was done in the states shown in the

table: 4.5 given below.

Table: 4.5
Assemblies dissolved strait away
Name of the State/UTs Year dissolved
PEPSU 1953
Kerala 1959
Haryana 1967
Tamil Nadu 1976
Karnataka 1977
Bihar, Haryana, Himachal Pradesh, MP, Punjab,
Rajasthan, West Bengal, U.P and Odisha. 1977
Puducherry. 1978
Punjab, U.P, Bihar, Odisha, M.P, Rajasthan,
1980
Gujarat, Maharashtra and Tamil Nadu
Source: The Indian Journal of Political Science, Vol. 46, No.2, April-June, 1985

Assemblies of the above states dissolved though the ruling party still

had a majority in the assembly and the chances of the Congress party to

come into power were very remote, almost nil. Particularly in 1977, the

Janata Government dismissed nine Congress governments on the pretext

that in these states Congress was defeated in the Lok Sabha elections. On

the same grounds, in 1980, the Congress government in the Centre

dismissed nine opposition ruled states. It is important to note that in Kerala in

1965, the assembly was dissolved immediately after the mid-term poll and

that too before the newly elected MLAs could take the oath of office.

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(e) Suspension of the Assemblies for resolving intra-party conflict

The factional strife has been one of the characteristics of the Congress

party and whenever the factional fight crossed the reasonable limits of the

party discipline, the Congress government at the centre suspended the

assembly in order to resolve those conflicts. This was done in Punjab in

1951, 1956 and again in 1983, in Andhra Pradesh in 1973, in U.P and

Odisha in 1975.

The Assemblies have also been suspended in order to conceal the

inefficiency, corruption and mal-administration of the Congress party in power

at the state level. This was done in U.P in 1973 and in Gujarat in 1974. This,

example has again been repeated in Punjab n 1983.

It is evident from the above context that the office of Governor has

come in for serious criticism, particularly as regards the discretionary powers

causing heavy strain on federalism since long. Quite a few have shown

disregard for the norms of parliamentary democracy and constitutional

niceties. But a close scrutiny of all the instances of exercise of Governors

powers in the past would reveal that the Governors have not exactly used

their discretion in the true sense of the term as the framers of the constitution

thought.

(f) Reserving Bills for Presidential Assent

Another area of concern between the union and states is the

reservation of bills by the Governors for the assent of the President of India.

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Under the Articles of 200 and 201 of the constitution, the Governor is

empowered to give his assent to a bill or withhold it or to reserve it for

consideration of the President. This way the centre exercises enough

leverage by procuring, through the Governors the bills passed by state

assemblies and adopts delaying tactics.15 with respect to opposition led state

governments. These governments have a point in accusing the centre of

misusing the office of Governor to subvert the mandate they have received

from electorate to pursue welfare programmes for them. In fact, the states do

not enjoy full legislative freedom even in the matters mentioned in the state

list.

(2) Controversy over Governors Address

According to Article 175 (1), the Governor can address either house of

the state legislature separately or both the houses assembled. He also

delivers the special address at the commencement of the first session after

each General Election to the legislative assembly and at the commencement

of the first session of the year and an inaugural address at the budget

session. The address, whenever delivered, is prepared by the Chief Minster

and his Council of Ministers. The address must not refer to the High Court

and should be in accordance with the oath that the Govenor takes under

Article 159. In all cases, it is a written speech and he merely intones the

words of the Ministry.

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 The important question in this regard is that can he delete an

objectionable part from this address. There is no unanimity of practice

whether the Governor of a state must read out the address given to him by

the Ministry. In the case of West Bengal, Governor Dharma Vira refused to

read out some portions in March 1969 from the address given to him by the

United Front government that were derogatory to him and the central

government. The result was that the state assembly adopted only a

conditional motion of thanks. The motion included a highly critical expression

that the Governor had unlawfully omitted that part of the speech, approved by

the Council of Ministers, which referred to the unwarranted and

unconstitutional dismissal of the United Front Ministry formed after the Fourth

General Elections.

Unlike Dharma Vira, Dr. D.C. Pavate, Governor of Punjab, in his

address to the assembly in March 1969, commented that after the fall of the

United Front Ministry headed by Gurunam Singh in November 1967,

fundamental rights were violated and trampled upon in Punjab. He also said

that the budget session of the assembly in March 1968 constituted an

unfortunate Chapter in the history of democracy in the country as the police

was brought into the Punjab assembly and constitutional rights and practices

were gravely violated at the time of the passing of the budget. While in the

former case, the Governor skipped some portion of the address, in the latter

case, the Governor added his personal feelings to the address.

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 Some constitutional experts like Ashoka Sen and M. C. Setalvad held

the view that he can avoid reading certain lines or paragraphs when these

lines or paragraphs condemn the Govenor for his earlier actions (it would be

as if the Governor was delivering a verdict against his own self) and it is not

within the limits of constitutional propriety.16

(3) Differences over Important Appointments

As constitutional head of the state government, the Governor appoints

different dignitaries in the state. As India has Parliamentary type of

governments in the states, the Governor has to discharge his duties on the

advice of the state Council of Ministers headed by Chief Minister. But on

some occasions, the Governors refused to act on the advice of the state

government while making certain important appointments, which has thrown

the office of the Governor into deep controversy.

Generally, the Governor of a state acts as the Chancellor of all

Universities in the state. In that capacity, he appoints Vice-Chancellors to

different state universities from time to time. In Andhra Pradesh, the

Governor refused to appoint the Vice-Chancellors to Kakatiya and Sri

Venkateswara Universities from among the list of the candidates submitted

by the state government. In Kerala, the Governor made inordinate delay to

sign on the ordinance, which was intended to take action on erring Vice-

Chancellors of the state. In the same state, the Governor appointed two

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student representatives to the Executive Council of a University without

taking into account the confidence of the University authorities.

In Bihar, the Governor Govind Narayan Singh refused to accept the

removal and appointments of Vice-Chancellors to seven Universities in the

state. In Odisha, the Governor S. S. Ansari appointed a retired Medical

Professor as the Vice-Chancellor of a University by ignoring the

recommendations of state Council of Ministers. The Governor Tapase of

Uttar Pradesh refused to appoint the Vice-Chancellors recommended by the

state government. In 1990s, the Governor of Tamil Nadu Dr. M.Chenna

Reddy also ignored the recommendation of the state government to appoint

Vice-Chancellors to state Universities. The then Jayalalitha government in

Tamil Nadu relieved him from all the duties concerned with the Universities.

During the Chief Ministership of Sri. N. T. Rama Rao, the then

Governor Kum. Kumud Ben Joshi instead of appointing Cabinet

recommended candidate former Justice of Delhi High Court Rajendra

Aggarwal as Lokayukta, appointed Avula Sambasiva Rao as Lokayukta of the

state. In Karnataka, the Governor P.Venkata Subbaiah has taken three

months time to nominate five members to state legislative Council. In Punjab,

the then Governor M. Chenna Reddy refused to appoint a sixth member to

State Public Service Commission as recommended by the state government.

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(4) Failure of Constitutional Machinery

Prior to going into the details of proper use or misuse of the Article

356, it is essential to make a brief peep into the constitutional provisions

regarding to the Presidents rule. The constitution provides for carrying on the

administration of a state by the centre in case of failure of the constitutional

machinery.17 The constitution lays down that:

> It is a duty of the union to ensure that the government of every state is

carried on in accordance with the provisions of the constitution (Art.

355). Therefore, the President is empowered to make a proclamation,

when he is satisfied that the government of a state cannot be carried

on in accordance with the provisions of the constitution, either on

report of the Governor or otherwise (Art. 356 (1).

> Such proclamation may also be made by the President wherein any

state has failed to comply with or to give effect to any directions given

by the union, in the exercise of its executive power to the state (Art.

365).

The expression failure of the constitutional machinery and arising of

a situation in which the government of the state can not be carried out in

accordance with the provisions of the constitution are quite vague and H.N.

Kunzru18 and Naziruddin Ahmed19 raised this point in the Constituent

Assembly. But Dr. Ambedkar was in no mood to explain its meaning and he

merely said that the phrase has been used in the Government of India Act

182
1935 and every body must be quite familiar. Therefore, with its defacto and

dejure meaning, I do not think any further explanation is necessary.20

Misuse of Article 356

While discussing this article 'in the Constituent Assembly, some

members expressed their apprehension about the possibility of its misuse

because of the vague expression and the use of the word otherwise.21 Even

Dr. B.R. Ambedkar himself did not rule out this possibility22 however, he

expected that this article would be sparingly used and the President would

take proper precaution before actually suspending the administration of the

state.23 But unfortunately this expectation of Dr B.R. Ambedkar did not prove

to be true and its misuse started immediately after the adoption of the new

constitution in 1950. This provoked Dr. B.R. Ambedkar to say: The people

have got a very legitimate ground for suspicion that the government is

manipulating the article in the constitution for the purpose of maintaining their

own party in office in all parts of India... .This is a rape of the constitution.24

In all till 2009, the Presidents rule has been imposed 115 times and

this provision, in fact, has been misused by:

(i) Dismissing the state governments having majority in the assembly;

(ii) Suspending and dissolving the assemblies on partisanconsideration;

(iii) Not giving a chance to the opposition to form government when

electoral verdict was indecisive;

183
(iv) Denying opportunity to the opposition to form government when

Ministry resigned in anticipation of its defeat on the floor of the house;

(v) Not allowing the opposition to form government even after the defeat

of the Ministry on the floor of the house.

Dismissal of State Governments

There is a saying in Bengal that who ever goes to Lanka becomes a

Ravana which is almost true about Indian politics as well because the

Congress and Janata governments at the centre dismissed the state

governments, keeping in view the party interests. Some of the state

governments, which were dismissed under this article, had majority and

prepared to prove their majority on the floor of the House. Yet they were

dismissed on unconvincing grounds. A few of such examples are given

below.

(1) Gian Singh Rarewales Ministry in PEPSU was dismissed (1953) on the

following grounds:

There was no law and order in the state because

The cultivators did not pay rent.

Hands of a boy were chopped off.

Dacoities were committed in day light.

The house was adjourned by the Speaker on the request of the Chief

Minister.

Some of the members had crossed floor.

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 Election petition against 15-20 persons were pending in the court.

The Chief Minister has been unseated in an election petition.

There was slender majority of United Front in the Assembly

(26 out of 46).

(2) Namboodripad in Kerala was dismissed (1953) because his government

Remitted sentences of certain criminals.

Interfered in the course of administration in general and with the

course of judicial administration in particular.

Asked police not to interfere in labour v. management disputes unless

there was a beach of peace.

Denied money to some of the cooperative societies simply because

they did not apply in time.

Arrested agitators belonging to the Congress and other non-CPI

parties.

Collected Rs. 25 lakhs for party funds.

(3) Rao Birendera Singh in Haryana was dismissed because

Thirty members had defected one way or other and some of them had

defected more than once which had made the mockery of democracy.

The size of the Ministry was too large;

Interference of MLAs in the administration.

The defections were secured by not too honourable means, and

There was political instability.

185
(4) The Ministry of Karunanidhi in Tamil Nadu was dismissed because there

were allegations of corruption against the Ministry and also because it

made demand for state autonomy.

(5) Nine State Governments were dismissed in 1977 by the Janata

government at the centre on the ground that they had ceased to

represent the people- a conclusion drawn on the basis of Parliamentary

elections of that year.

(6) Another nine state governments were dismissed in 1980 by the Congress

government on the same ground and another reason that these state

assemblies adopted delaying tactics towards the constitution 45th

Amendment Bill seeking to extend the reservation of seats for scheduled

castes and schedule tribes in Lok Sabha and legislative assemblies.

The grounds mentioned above clearly prove that the party in power at

the centre has dismissed the state governments in an arbitrary manner.

Articles 355, 356 and 365 give enormous scope for the centre either to

interfere in the administration of a state or to take over the administration of

recalcitrant state. This provision is perhaps the most obnoxious one since the

very beginning and has been vehemently opposed and criticized by state

governments. At times, the recommendations of Governors have been

procured by the centre to remove a particular Chief Minister and his

government from office. There are several examples since the first imposition

of Presidents rule in Kerala in 1959 to Bihar in 2005 on the alleged failure of

the state governments on various grounds like law and order problem,

corruption, failure to pass budget etc.

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 For the proper understanding of the use of Article 356, it is aptly

divided by the scholars into different phases on the basis of important

national political events.

The First Phase (1950-1966)

This period began with the inauguration of constitutional era in 1950.

This period continued up to the end of 1966 to be followed by Fourth General

Elections in 1967. Article 356 was used on nine occasions beginning with

imposition of the Presidents rule in Punjab from 20th June 1951. The

occasions for Presidents rule during this period were few in comparison to

the frequency with which Article 356 was invoked after this phase.25 The most

important aspect of nature of politics of this phase was formative years of

nations politics.

Besides Punjab, the Presidents rule during this phase was imposed in

PEPSU in 1953 (Patiala and East Punjab States Union), Andhra State (new

state created out of Madras) Odisha and Kerala. The major victim of use of

Article 356 during this phase was Kerala. During this phase in Kerala, the

political instability made two ministries led by Pattam Thanu Pillai and Govind

Menon fell down. The state came under Presidents rule on March 23, 1956.

After the election Indias first Communist led government assumed power

through ballot. But within two years, the non-communist opposition combined

launched a non-violent movement to dislodge the communists out of power.

The non-communist led agitation became law and order issue and therefore,

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the Governor recommended imposition of the Presidents rule in the state for

the second time in 1959. The post-presidents rule election results in Kerala

sounded deeper instability and the Praja Socialist Party-Congress coalition

had to face many crises and dramatics ultimately leading to the imposition of

Presidents rule for the fifth time in the state.

Prominent political leaders and intellectuals criticized the frequent

Imposition of Presidents rule in Kerala. A.K. Gopalan denounced the

imposition as being undemocratic, unjust, and irregular and against all

norms of democratic functioning in this country.26 Ashok Mehta, the veteran

socialist leader indicted the Rajpramukh for being partisan in his conduct and

the central government for setting up of wrong kinds of practices and wrong

kinds of traditions in the country.27 During this phase, incidence of the

Presidents rule was quite low because of dominance of Congress at the

centre as well as states. However, the way the Article was used speaks

volumes against the government. The imposition of Presidents rule in all

cases was technically not sound. It exposed the intolerant attitude towards

non-congress governments. This pattern also continued in the later years.

Second Phase (1967-77)

The period between 1967-1977 can be called as an era of political

instability and emergency. The second phase was influenced by the political

stature of Mrs. Indira Gandhi. During her Prime Ministership (1967-1977),

Article 356 was used 29 times. The states that affected were Punjab (Thrice),

188
Rajasthan (once), Haryana (once), West Bengal (thrice), Uttar Pradesh (4

times), Bihar (Thrice), Kerala (once), Odisha (Thrice), Mysore (once),

Gujarat (Thrice), Manipur (Twice), Tripura (once), Andhra Pradesh (once),

Nagaland (once) and Tamil Nadu (once). In this phase, the duration of the

Presidents rule varied from 18 days to 494 days. The Uttar Pradesh became

the victim of the Article 356 for four times.28

The most remarkable feature of this phase was that the Article 356

was used in Congress ruled states of Andhra Pradesh, Uttar Pradesh and

Odisha to cure factional feud in the party. The revolt in the party of these

states was against the leaders of the government. The Chief Ministers of

these three states were not duly elected by the legislators but were imposed

by the High Command of the Congress Party. The continuance of Chief

Ministers of Congress ruled states depend upon their loyalty to bosses and till

they enjoy blessings from above. This shows that the dissolution and

suspension of the assembly under Article 356 was always politically

motivated in order to perpetuate the interests of the ruling party at the

centre.29

The centre should realize that Presidents rule is a mechanism best

used sparingly in extreme situations. If it is to be made additional weapon in

the ruling partys armory to bring its members to the book, it would loose

much of its sanctity.30 The higher echelons of Governance in the country did

not understand this during this phase.

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The Third Phase (1977-1984)

Between 1977 and 1984, the country passed through a peculiar

political developments and unprecedented electoral fortunes for the parties.

Mrs. Indira Gandhi who was ousted from power by a negative vote against

Congress in 1977 and even put behind the bar came to limelight when the

Janata experiment in Delhi failed due to intra-party and inter-party feuds.

Political ambitions of some leaders prevented a functioning government to

loose credibility and another mid-term poll was imposed on the nation in

January 1980. Negative vote against Mrs. Indira Gandhi in 1977 saw her out

of power but in 1980, a positive vote brought her back.31

The history of Presidents rule during this phase was an act of political

vengeance. The Janata party on return to power developed a new political

thesis. Their electoral success was analysed from a different angle.

Immediately after Lok Sabha elections, the new power brokers thought about

dissolving state assemblies of nine states from where the Janata party

returned to Lok Sabha with thumping majority. Keeping in view of these aims

and objectives, the then Union Home Minister Mr. Charan Singh advised the

Chief Ministers of 9 states to resign to facilitate a fresh election to the state

assemblies. But the Congress Chief Ministers of these nine states refused to

comply with the advice of the union. Therefore, the union government

unilaterally dissolved the state assemblies and imposed Presidents rule in

nine states, namely Bihar, Haryana, Himachal Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh,

Odisha, Punjab, Rajasthan, Uttar Pradesh and West Bengal. There was no

190
failure of constitutional machinery nor Chief Ministers in these states have

advised the Governors to dissolve nor had the Governors on their own

reported to the President to promulgate Presidents rule. A Congress

stalwart, Sardar Swaran Singh accused Janata government of doing

greatest injustice to the constitution and to the concept of morality if it by pass

constitutional provisions.32

In 1980, when Congress regained power at the centre, it followed the

above precedent established by the Janata government and dissolved the

Assemblies of the nine states- Gujarat, Haryana, Madhya Pradesh,

Maharashtra, Odisha, Punjab, Rajasthan, Tamil Nadu and Uttar Pradesh

where Janata party or its associates fared badly in the election. In 1984, the

then Governor of Jammu & Kashmir recommended Presidents rule on the

false grounds of administrative and national interest vis-a-vis insurgency and

terrorism by the State supported pro-Pakistan elements. In 2005, even the

BJP led A.B. Vajpayee government wanted to use Art. 356 in Bihar on the

basis of the report of Governor S. S. Bhandari but the then President K.R.

Narayanan sent back the cabinet recommendation for reconsideration.

The Fourth Phase (1985-1996)

This phase is the unique combination of majority, minority and coalition

governments in India. After the assassination of Mrs. Indira Gandhi on

October 31, 1984, her son Mr. Rajiv Gandhi sworn in as the Prime Minister of

India. In the election, which was held in December 1984, the Congress under

191
the leadership of Mr. Rajiv Gandhi returned to power with massive mandate.

In 1989 elections, a coalition government led by Mr. V.P.Singh came to

power but within a year, it was disappeared due to internal bickering. After

that, Mr. Chandra Sekhar formed the government with the support of

Congress party. This government also failed to continue more than three

months. This political instability led to another mid-term poll in 1991. But

unfortunately, during the election campaign Mr. Rajiv Gandhi was

assassinated. In this election, Congress emerged as a single largest party

and P.V.Narasimha Rao take the reigns of the government.

Rajivs government was involved in causing Presidents rule in six

states, namely Punjab, Jammu & Kashmir, Nagaland, Mizoram, Tamil Nadu

and Karnataka. In Jammu & Kashmir and Punjab, the most sensitive areas

where ethno-centrism was one of the rises, the centre preferred keeping the

legislature under suspended animation. It was done with a view to share

power without facing election. Success came in Srinagar but when Punjab

could not provide scope the house was dissolved. In Tamil Nadu, Nagaland,

Mizoram and Karnataka the legislatures were dissolved without exploring the

possibilities of forming alternative governments. Each of these occasions for

involving the Presidents rule was highly controversial.33

The V.P. Singh government imposed Presidents rule in two states,

namely, Jammu & Kashmir and Karnataka. But after the exit of V.P.Singh,

Chandrasekhar became the Prime Minister and used Article 356 where non-

192
compliance to centres directive warranted action under Article 356. The DMK

government of Karunanidhi was dismissed even without a report from the

Governor. During the Prime Ministership of Sri. P.V.Narasimha Rao the ugly

incident of Babri Masjid demolition took place on December 6, 1992. In the

wake of the demolition, communal riots broke leading to dissolution of four

state assemblies Uttar Pradesh, Himachal Pradesh, Rajasthan and Madhya

Pradesh where BJP was ruling. The plea was taken under threat to the

security of the nation as well as murder of secular bases of the country.34

The Fifth Phase (1997-2000)

Bihar occupied a prominent position during this phase. The NDA

government imposed Presidents rule in Bihar in 1998. As a price of keeping

of BJPs unworkable coalition alive in Delhi, democracy was to be subverted

in Bihar. The ostensible reasons were the breakdown of law and order and

extra-constitutional role of Laloo Prasad Yadav in Rabri Devis government.

Then all checks and balances afforded by the constitution were brought into

play. Rastrapati Bhavan had shown extra-ordinary vigilance and the

President used in one time power to block a cabinet decision to Presidents

rule. The then President K.R. Narayanan on September 25, 1998 repeated

the history by returning the decision of Presidents rule in Bihar and the

suspension of the assembly.

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The Sixth Phase (2001-2009)

This phase may be termed as an era of coalition governments at the

center. The central government applied Article 356 after careful consideration

of the situation only. In 2001, President Rule was imposed in Manipur in the

wake of political crisis caused by the fall of the Samata Party-led United

Democratic Alliance (UDA) government. The crisis began when 3 months old

Koijam government was defeated in a vote of confidence. Although BJPs

central leadership issued a whip to its MLAs to support Koijam, 24 of them

voted against the government. In the 60-member house, 18 members voted

in favour of the confidence motion and 39 members voted against it. Two

members abstained and one member was disqualified. Some of the members

claimed for the formation of the government. However, Governor Ved

Prakash Marwah told the media persons that he had listened to the claims of

all of them but none was convincing. The claims he said, were all based on

hypothetical support.

In Uttar Pradesh, after the February 2002 elections, no party had a

sufficient majority and therefore, Presidents rule was imposed. In 2003,

again, President rule was imposed in Utter Pradesh because after the

collapse of Mayawati government in August, 2003, Mulayam Singh Yadav of

Samadiwadi Party became the Chief Minister. He failed to submit the list of

supporters and resigned.

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 In 2005, the centre applied Article 356 in Goa despite the Chief

Minster Pratap Singh Rane won a controversial vote of confidence in the

Assembly with the help of Pro-tem Speakers casting vote. The centre has

taken suo motu action without waiting for the Governors report. Bharatia

Janata Party vehemently criticised the central government for imposing

presidents rule in Goa. It alleged that the Pro-tem speaker obstructed UGDP

MLA Mathavy Saldanha from taking party in the proceedings and cast his

vote in favour of the government.

In 2005 elections for Bihar assembly, no party could get enough

majority to form the government. Rashtriya Janata Dal (RJD) emerged as the

single largest party with 75 votes of 243-member assembly. It also had the

support of 16 MLAs of other parties. However, this party has shortage of 31

members. Lok Janashakti of Ram Vilas Paswan won 29 seats. But he

refused to support any of the parties. NDA did not come forward to form the

government. After a week-long impasse over the formation of government,

the central government imposed president rule in Bihar.

In November 2007, President rule was imposed in Karnataka after JD

(S), an ally of BJP coalition voted against the governments confidence

motion. The centers decision to impose Presidents rule, the second time in

the last two months, brings to an end the political drama that was witnessed

in the state on the issue of transfer of power between coalitions partners BJP

and JD(S). The crisis was triggered by BJPs refusal to accept JD(S)

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demands to sign a new power-sharing deal allotting plum ministerial portfolios

to it.

In 2009, Sibu Soren Government Jharkhand was reduced to minority.

No political party or coalition appeared feasible to form the government.

Therefore, on the basis of the Governor M. O. H. Farooks report, the union

government imposed president rule in the state.

In this phase, centre was not hasty in imposing Presidents rule. It was

done only after careful consideration. The judgement of Supreme Court on

Bommai case and the recommendations of Sarkaria Commission and the

compulsion of coalition might have worked well in this phase.

According to an experts study in the first 38 years, Governors have

recommended the death of democratic federalism in 59 out of 77 occasions

when Presidents rule has been imposed denying duly elected governments

right to governance.35 The arbitrary dismissal of the state governments,

suspension and dissolution of the assembly on partisan consideration clearly

shows that this provision has been thoroughly misused by the central

government. It has, therefore made a mockery of the state autonomy and

that is the reason why some of the regional parties, particularly the DMK and

AIADMK in the South and Akali Dal in the North demanded the deletion of

Article 356 which provides for the imposition of the Presidents rule in the

state.

The following Table 4.6 indicates the number of times the President

rule is imposed in various states and union territories during 1950-2009.

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 Table - 4.6
Presidents Rule in States and Union Territories
(As on 2009)
State/Union No. times
SI. No Year of Imposition
Territory Imposed
1 Andhra Pradesh 2 1954, 1973
2 Arunachal Pradesh 1 1979
3 Assam 4 1979,1981,1982, 1990
1968, 1969,1972, 1977,
4 Bihar 8
1980, 1995, 1999, 2005
5 Chhattisgarh Nil
6 Goa 5 1966, 1979, 1990, 1999, 2005
7 Gujarat 5 1971, 1974, 1976, 1980, 1996
8 Haryana 3 1967, 1977, 1991
9 Himachal Pradesh 2 1977, 1992
10 Jammu & Kashmir 2 1986,1990
11 Jharkhand 1 2009
12 Karnataka 5 1971, 1977, 1989, 1990, 2007
1956, 1956, 1959, 1964, 1965,
13 Kerala 9
1970, 1979, 1981,1982
14 Madhya Pradesh 3 1977, 1980, 1992
15 Maharashtra 1 1980
1972, 1973,1977, 1979, 1981,
16 Manipur 8
1992, 1994, 2001
17 Meghalaya 2 1991,2009
18 Mizoram 3 1977, 1978, 1988
19 Nagaland 3 1975, 1988, 1992
1961, 1971, 1973, 1976,1977,
20 Odisha 6
1980
21 Patiala East Punjab States Union 1 1953
1951, 1966, 1968, 1971, 1977,
22 Punjab 8
1980, 1983, 1987,
23 Rajasthan 4 1967, 1977, 1980, 1992
24 Sikkim 2 1979, 1984
25 Tamil Nadu 4 1976. 1980, 1988, 1991
26 Tripura 3 1972, 1977, 1993
1968, 1970, 1973, 1975, 1977,
27 Uttar Pradesh 11 1980 1992, 1995, 1996, 2002,
2003
28 Uttarakhand Nil
29 West Bengal 4 1968, 1970, 1971, 1977
1968, 1974, 1974, 1978, 1983,
30 Puducherry (Union Territory) 6
1991
Total 116

197
Basu D.D., Introduction to the Constitution of India, LexisNexis Butterworths Wadhwa Nagpur,
2008 and Compiled from various other documents.
Furthermore, incumbents of this high office have failed to express the

clear and proper conception of their own role. In several cases, they have

violated the gubernatorial ethics and fairness. Successive governments of all

political parties have misused the high office for their narrow and selfish

political ends even at the cost of subverting the popular mandate by playing

political match fixing of the worst kind. As Sarkaria Commission Report says:

Looking forward to further office under union or to play an active role in

politics after completion of their tenure, many have themselves preferred to

act as the Prime Ministers hatchet men.36

The Supreme Court heard all such cases where Article 356 was used

or abused. In the S. R. Bommai vs. Union of India (1994), the Court gave its

judgement observing that decision of the President to impose Presidents rule

in fact is decision of the union government, which come to President in the

form of advice. Therefore, this advice can be questioned and thus, the

judiciary can review imposition of Presidents rule. The judgement of Apex

Court will be an eye opening for the erring Governors.37 In this case, a 9

Judge-Bench of the Supreme Court observed, whenever a doubt arises

whether a Ministry has lost the confidence of the House, the only way of

testing it is on the floor of the house.38 The assessment of the strength of

the Ministry is not a matter of private opinion of any individual, be a Governor

or the President."39

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 Since this judgement, the attitude of the party in power has greatly

changed. In 2001, the union government promised that while appointing the

Governor, it would accommodate the views and wishes of the concerned

state government. In the light of the Sarkaria Commissions observations and

the judgement of Apex Court, the Presidents rule assumed a new dimension.

It is a positive development in regard to centre-state relation.

Deployment of the CRPF or BSF in the States

Another area of conflict between the union and the states in India has

been the issue of deployment of central Para-military forces by the union in

the states.40 Several central enterprises and undertakings, such as the steel

and ammunition factories, the post and telegraph offices and railways etc.,

are spread all over the states. In times of strikes, lock-outs and violent

demonstrations, these become the object of violence and arson. The central

Para-military forces are deployed in almost every state and union territories

and these are a versatile force trained and equipped to deal with armed

hostiles as well as anti-social elements.

In times of crises like communal riots or strikes, or naxilites violence,

the states themselves make a request the central government for the

deployment of central forces. They often complain of inadequate or delayed

deployment. However, at times when the union decides to deploy the central

forces in a state or states for maintaining public order or for protecting upon

property in the states, the state governments, particularly those controlled by

199
parties other than the one which is in power at the centre, strongly oppose

the decision. In 1968, serious trouble developed between the centre and

Kerala over the deployment of central Para-military forces on 19th September

1968. The central government employees all over the country went on strike

and the situation in certain places took violent turn. Without consulting or

even informing the Kerala government in advance, the then Home Minister.

Y. B. Chavan dispatched a battalion of CRPF into that state to guard central

government offices there. The Chief Minister E. M. S. Namboodripad

protested against Y. B. Chavans action. Further, the state cabinet decided to

withdraw, with the permission of the Courts, all cases connected with the

strike other than those involving violent attacks on persons and property. The

union government took a serious view of this decision, and told the state

government that its action was illegal and unconstitutional.

Another such instance took place in West Bengal on April 8, 1969

when the Defence Security Corps personnel at the Gun and Shell Factory,

Cossipore (West Bengal) resorted to firing to disperse a violent mob of

workers and this resulted in the death of five persons. The United Front and

its trade wing, the Rashtriya Sangram Samiti, called a 24-hour Bangla-

Bandh (stoppage of work), and the strike was a total success. The union

government appointed a single-member Commission of inquiry to enquire

into the facts and circumstances relating to the firing. The then Deputy Chief

Minister of West Bengal criticized the appointment of enquiry committee

without consulting the state government. The Chief Minister of Punjab

200
Gurnam Singh also resented the deployment of CRPF units in his state, and

asserted that those units could not act without the authority from the state

government.

The union government maintained in all these cases of protest that it

had the unfettered right of stationing CRPF and BSF units anywhere it liked

to protect the country from internal subversion or external threats. Later in

1976 by 42nct Constitutional Amendment Act, the union government made it

amply clear that the central government had the unquestioned right to deploy

not only the CRPF and BSF units, but also the units of the armed forces in

any state in aid of the civil power. For this purpose, the amendment added a

new Entry 2A to the union list.

Centre Encroachment on States Autonomy

The other important grievance of the states against the union

government was that it was encroaching upon their autonomy even in respect

of those subjects that had been included in the state legislative List and that

the Indian union in actual practice became a unitary state. The state

governments felt that the party in power at centre used the constitution as a

tool to whittle down the authority of states. The centre encroached into the

states autonomy by its amending power. For instance, 3rd 6th, 7th and 42nd

Amendment Acts have brought a number of state subjects under the control

of centre. This has further enlarged the financial, industrial, administrative

and legislative powers of the centre. They alleged that the 42nd

Constitutional Amendment Act transferred five entries of state list to

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concurrent list, which paved the way for centralization of powers. In the same

way, the federal spirit was slowly damaged by the centre through the partisan

use of the institutions like the Governor. In order to check the increasing

trends towards centralization, the state leaders began to demand that they

should be given more powers. The Chief Minister of West Bengal, Jyothi

Basu, has always advocated freedom for the states, both political and

financial, to the extent that the Chief Minister could run his state

administration freely without the interference of the union government. Tamil

Nadu Chief Minister M.Karunanidhi urged amendment of the constitution for

this purpose.

In 1978, the National Development Council met in New Delhi, wherein

some Chief Ministers demanded for more powers for the states. But they

could not express a unanimous view about the model of state autonomy.

However, the then Maharashtra Chief Minister, Vasant Rao Patil said, My

concept of state autonomy is not like that of Sheikh Abdullah or Jyothi Basu

but limited planning.41 The Punjab Finance Minister, Balwant Singh,

maintained: Punjabs interest lay not in the political autonomy of the kind

suggested by Jyothi Basu but in greater financial powers, so that the state

could marshal its share of national kitty to accelerate its development.42 On

the other hand, Sheikh Abdullah had always pleaded for a separate entity of

the Jammu & Kashmir under Article 370 of the Indian constitution.

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Financial Autonomy

In the financial matters, the autonomy of the states is seriously

restricted. The division of taxing powers is weighted in favour of the union.

Therefore, the states find themselves dependent upon the union because of

their meager resources and restricted field of taxation. They are dependent

upon the union for allocation of funds from and out of the taxes collected by

it and also from grants.43 The allocation of discretionary grants and loans by

the central government, it is alleged serves a powerful leverage in influencing

the policies and programmes of state governments even in spheres such as

education, medical and public health, which are constitutionally within the

competence of states. Though there is little direct control of the union over

the financial resources earmarked by the constitution for the states, yet, the

former is always in a position to bear indirect pressure upon the states. The

union being in charge of the purse strings can always persuade state to take

its advice.44

In any federation, the resources of revenue are distributed between

the centre and federating units so that the units have sufficient amount of

autonomy in the financial sphere. But in India, the resources allocated to the

states are far from satisfactory. All important sources of revenue are given in

the union list and the position of the states is so weak that they exist at the

doles of the centre. Grants are given to the states but political or partisan

strings may also be traced behind them. The states find themselves

dependent upon the union because of their meager resources and restricted

203
field of taxation. Though there is little direct control of the union over the

financial resources earmarked by the constitution for the states, yet, the

former is always in a position to bear indirect pressure upon the states.

Therefore, a critic said, Ordinarily, the centre can do a lot to feed or starve

states by its overall policy.45The union being in charge of the purse of strings

can always persuade states to take its advice.46

Above all, the way the central leadership treats the states while giving

grants is often a source of reaction from the states. They regard it as the

most serious constraint upon their autonomy. The states ruled by parties

other than the one in power at the centre often make complaints of

discretionary and step-motherly treatment in matters of allocation of funds

and giving of grants-in-aid.47 in the past, almost all the leaders of regional

and local parties, as well as the leaders of CPI(M), BSP and even CPI

always voiced against the discriminatory treatment meted out to their ruled

states by the Congress at the centre. The use of the superior financial power

of the centre for partisan ends by the party in power remains a perpetual

complaint of the state governments. The DMK government of Tamil Nadu

even appointed a commission that made drastic recommendations in the

direction of devolution of financial powers in favour of the states.

The financial autonomy for the states is, therefore, being advanced on

the following grounds:

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 The present allocation of resources is unfair.

The sources allotted to the states are inelastic.

The states have failed to get their due.

The allocation of resources through Finance Commission and the

Planning Commission is also defective.

Lack of faith in the independence of these two commissions due to

their undemocratic composition.

The true concept of autonomy, in fact, implies not only with the internal

freedom of a state but with its limitations as well. The concept does not mean

mere independence or sovereignty of the states. It indicates non-interference

of the federal government in the prescribed domain of the states. The rights

of the states to work independently of the union within a federal system called

autonomy. Thus, autonomy has assumed the character of the rights of the

states and this has become the backbone of all the modern federal systems.

Taxes not shared in Federal Spirit

There were also complaints from different states that the centre had

not shared taxes with them in the spirit of constitution. They felt that they had

to perform the ever-widening functions in development and social services,

but matching finances were not being transferred to them from the centre,

and that under the existing system of allocation of funds the rich states had

got more and poor states less, resulting in an ever-widening gap.

205
Undue Role of Planning Commission

The Planning Commission has greatly upset the federal structure and

greatly modified the centre-state relationship. It has led to intervention in the

autonomy of the states. It has expanded the authority of the union

government often in total disregard of the federal intentions of constitution. It

has assumed the role of super-cabinet to impose its decisions on the states.

The development funds are allocated to the states by the centre on the

advice of the Planning Commission. It determines the amount to be spent on

a particular project in a state. In also settles the priorities of development.

The subject on which development is to be made fall under the state list, but

how they are to be developed is determined by the Planning Commission.

The action is to be taken by the states but initiative comes from the centre.

The bulk of the funds assigned by the union to the states fall within the

category of discretionary grants and these are made on the

recommendations of the Planning Commission. The powers and scope of

activity of the Planning Commission are so wide and extensive that they

cover almost the entire field of government activity. The commission also

prepares all plans of economic development of the country, fixes all broad

targets and the order of priorities. The same body allocates funds for the

various schemes of development and projects.

The state governments, of course, prepare their own plans, but the

final shape is determined only after their representatives have held

206
discussions with the Planning Commission. The targets and priorities fixed by

the Planning Commission have to be bom in mind by the planners in the

states and if it were not so, the state plans were either substantially modified

or scuttled. Thus, the Planning Commission controls the developmental

activities of all the states. Even the legislative activities of the state

governments relating to such subjects of the state list as agriculture,

education, health and co-operation passed into the hands of the Planning

Commission, The Planning Commission often makes grants for new projects,

but states are obliged to use them only for that particular purpose only.48

There was hardly any developmental activity of the state governments

where the Planning Commission is not involved, and the composition of the

commission is such that amounted to the domination of the union

government. Surprisingly states do not represent in it and so the interests of

the states are often overlooked. Voices here, therefore, get higher that the

Planning Commission had become another super-cabinet or parallel

government and that through financial control it had made the states

subservient to the centre. Therefore, the schemes, which the states consider

to be of great importance for them, are delayed or rejected. It was done on

the assumption that the centre knows better than that of the states in fixing

priorities and the latter should observe as to what details their schemes

should have and to what extent variants should be permitted. In the opinion

of Chanda, centralized planning process has eroded the concept of exclusive

state functions and services like education, agriculture and industrial housing

207
which constituted the raison detre of the states.49 Demands were put forth

that the Planning Commission should be made an autonomous body and

should not merely be a wing of the central government.

Industrial Policy

The states also feel agitated the way the Union government

unilaterally formulates certain economic policies, which affects not only the

national market, but also causes greater repercussions for the state

governments. Many vital issues such as price policy, wage policy,

development and licensing industries, distribution of public and private

projects among the states, and regulation of trade and commerce are solely

determined and formulated by the union government. The exclusion of the

states in the formulation of these economic policies is one of the major

irritants for the states. Since India is on the path of market-oriented economy,

the style needs to be changed in order to win the confidence of the states.

The centre has monopolized the control of industries, trade, the

commerce and production and distribution of goods. It includes location of

industries like nuclear and thermal energy and licensing of industrial and

export units, incentives affecting economic activity carried on within the

states. The states argued that these were subjects of the State Legislative

List- Industries in entry 24, trade and commerce in entry 26, and production,

supply and distribution of goods in entry 27. But taking advantage of the

constitutional provisions (that Parliament could regulate them in national

208
interest) the centre had brought them virtually under its own control.

Parliament had passed in 1995 the Industries (Development and Regulation)

Act, specifying those industries, which had to the controlled by the centre in

national interest. The Act originally passed was fair and reasonable and

rightly gave the centre control over vital and strategic industries. However, in

the course of time, more and more industries were brought within the purview

of the said Act, and the result was that the constitutional scheme was

considerably subverted.

Therefore, the lack of control on these subjects irritates the states,

because they dislike their dependence on the centre on such vital matters

affecting their developmental needs. Even items like razor blades, paper

gums, shoes, match sticks, household electrical appliances, cosmetics,

soaps and other toilet requisites passed under the central domain. Over

centralization, it was pointed out by state leaders, had resulted in poor rate of

economic growth and the consequent poverty of the people.

Disputes over supply and distribution of essential Items

Supply and distribution of essential items of daily use, such as sugar,

wheat, kerosene, rice and vanaspati, ghee were also brought under central

control and the state leaders often made complaints that the Union Ministers

with political motives handled the supply and distribution of these

commodities. These commodities became, it was alleged, instruments of

winning elections in the states.50

209
Price Policy

Another grievance of the states against centre is price and wage

policy. The central government alone determines the price and wage policy

but the states have to suffer the impact of price rise and wage rise, which put

heavy strain on their financial resources and causes higher budgetary

deficits. For instance, the sugar price increased in one year period (Jan

2009-Dec 2009) from Rs. 20 to Rs.46. In the same way, the prices of wheat

and the rice also increased. Some state governments distribute these

commodities to the poor at subsidized prices. When the prices of these

commodities rise, the state governments have to bear additional burden.

Therefore, the state governments demand for more assistance to the states.

The Chief Minister of Punjab, Prakash Singh Badal criticized over the

monopoly of the centre in deciding the prices of agricultural produce. He said,

Punjab has 1.5 per cent of the land but it takes care of 40 per cent of rice

and more than 40 per cent of wheat requirement of the country. But we are

like beggars before the centre. The centre decides on its own prices of

agricultural produce and the states have no choice but to accept them

whereas the cost of inputs like diesel or pesticides, etc is rising. Nobody has

realized what sacrifice Punjab has made for the country. Multi-cropping has

devastated our land, ground water levels have gone deep down, our farmers

have put every thing in agriculture. Therefore, in return, we expect a better

deal for the sacrifice we have made. Our canal system needs rejuvenation

210
but we have no money.51 Therefore, he seeks the centre to render help for

this purpose.

Wage Policy

The union government enhances the wages of its employees. It

announces Dearness Allowances every sixth months on the basis of the price

rise. It also revises the pay scales of its employees once in every ten years.

The central government has enough resources to meet the wages of its

employees. Generally, it is generous in rising wages of its employees. State

governments also have to announce Dearness Allowance to their employees

in proportion to the central government once in every sixth months. Some

state governments revise pay scales of their employees once in every five

years. Moreover, the state governments employees demand to revise their

pay scales also on par with the centre. But the state governments do not

have enough resources to carry the burden of the wages when they are

increased because the states have to spend huge amounts for welfare

schemes. The sources of revenues of the state governments are also limited

and they have to depend on centre for loans. Therefore, the state

governments feel that because of the centers wage policy, they are suffering.

All these have been the major issues and tension areas in the union-

state relations and these have tended to make Indian federation, develop

confluctual and confrontational character.52 The objective of co-operative

federalism had suffered a setback in the face of centre-state conflict over

these issues and areas.

211
REFERENCES

1. Rajni Goyal., The Governor: Constitutional Position and Political

Realty, Published in the Indian Journal of Political Science, Vol. 53,

No. 4, Oct-Dec, 1992. p. 520.

2. Sudhanshu Tripathi, Indian Federalism at Work: Role of Governor,

Published in the Indian Journal of Public Administration, Vol. LIV, No.

1, January-March, 2008.

3. Rao, K.V., Role of State Governor in India, Deep & Deep

Publications, New Delhi, 1988, pp. 194-195.

4. Pylee, M.V., Role of State Govenor in India, p. 193.

5. Digambar Misra, How they became Governors: Portraits of An

Indian State Elite, Indian Journal of Political Science, June 1980, pp.

198-213.

6. S.L. Sikri, The Indian Federal System Indian Government and

Politics, Kalyani Publications, New Delhi, 1989, p. 265.

7. Dahiya, M. S., Office of the Governor in India, Sundeep

Publications, New Delhi, 1979, p. 52.

8. Seervai, H. M., Constitutional Law of India, Tripathi Publishers,

Bombay, 1984, Vol. II, p.1736.

9. V.N. Narayan, Puppet shows in Raj Bhawans, The Tribune,

December 18, 1988. p. 8.

10. Dahiya, M. S., op. cit. p. 57.

212
11. Subhash C. Kashyap, Goa Governors Coup, South Asia Politics,

March 2005, New Delhi, p. 2.

12. Dahiya, M.S., op. cit. p. 57.

13. Gupta, D, C., Indian Government and Politics, Vikas Publishers,

New Delhi, 1978, p. 35.

14. Siwach, J. R., Office of the Governor: A critical Study, 1950-73,

Sterling Publications, New Delhi, 1977, p. 83.

15. Statesman, Veto or Assent , September 7, 1988, p. 7

16. Rajni Goyal, op. cit. p. 517-518.

17. Article 356 of the Indian Constitution. This Article empowers the

President of India (Centre) to impose his Rule in a State.

18. Constituent Assembly Debates, Vol. IX, p. 176.

19. Naziruddin Ahmed said: This article says practically nothing. It says

almost every thing. It enables the Centre to interfere on the slightest

pretext and it may enable the Centre to refuse to interfere on the

gravest occasion. So carefully guarded is its vagueness, so elusive is

its draftsmanship that we cannot but admire the Drafting Committee for

its vagueness and evasions. Ibid. 162.

20. Ibid. 177.

21. H.V. Kamath said: It is a constitutional crime to empower the

President to interfere not merely on the report of the Governor or ruler

of a state but otherwise. Otherwise is a mischievous word. It is

diabolical word in this context and I pray to God that this will be

deleted from this article. If God does not intervene today, I am sure at

213
 no distant date He will intervene when things will take more serious

turn and the eyes of every one of us will be more awake than they are

today. Ibid. 134.

22. Dr. B.R. Ambedkar said: In regard to general debate which has taken

place in which it has been suggested that these articles are liable to be

abused, I may say that I do not altogether deny that there is a

possibility of these articles being abused or employed for political

purposes. Ibid. p. 177.

23. Ibid.

24. Siwach, J.R., Politics of Presidents Rule in India, Indian Institute of

Advanced study, Simla, 1979, p. 29.

25. Basu, D.D., Introduction to the Constitution of India, Prentice-Hall

of India, New Delhi, 1992, p. 321.

26. Lok Sabha Debates, Part-H, Vol. Ill, 29th March 1956.

27. Ibid.

28. Maheswari, S., Presidents Rule in India, Allied Publications, New

Delhi, 1977, p. 21.

29. Ibid. p. 21

30. Dr. Rabindra Kumar Setty, Political Crisis and Presidents Rule in

Indian State, APH. Publishing Corporation, New Delhi, 2003, New

Delhi, p.79.

31. Ibid. p. 73.

32. Purohit, B.D., Janata Government on Trial, Jodhpur, 1978, p.124.

33. Dr. Rabindra Kumar Shetty, op. cit. p. 80.

214
34. Ibid. 81

35. Rajeev Dhawan, Power without Responsibility, Express Magazine,

New Delhi, January 15, 1989.

36. Sudhanshu Tripathi, op. cit. p. 69.

37. S.R. Bommai v. Union of India, (1994) 3 S.C.C.95.

38. Ibid. Para 395.

39. Ibid. Para 119.

40. Dr. Rabindra Kumar Shetty, op. cit. pp. 83-84.

41. The Times of India, New Delhi, March 23, 1978.

42. Gelhot, N.S., Indian Government and Politics, Rawat Publications,

New Delhi, 1996. p. 46.

43. Ghai, K.K., Indian Government and Politics, Kalyani Publishers,

New Delhi, 2003, p.174.

44. Vidya Dhar Mahajan, Select Modern Governments, S. Chand &

Company, New Delhi, 1975, p. 244.

45. Rao, K.V., The Parliamentary Democracy of India, Law Publishing

House, Madras, 1981, pp. 325-326.

46. Vidya Dhar Mahajan, op. cit. p. 326.

47. Rao, K.V., op. cited, pp. 325-326

48. Ibid. 326.

49. Gehlot, N.S., op. cit. p. 46.

50. Rao, K.V., op. cit. p. 326.

215
51. India Today, State of the States, and Indias Best & Worst

States, September 28, 2009, India Today, p. 49.

52. Ghai, K.K, op. cit. p. 179.

216