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Tribunal Europeo de Derechos Humanos y su respuesta al reto de la

transexualidad Historia de un cambio de criterio Susana Sanz Caballero

:Consolidado Sentencias TEDH

-6 de noviembre de 1980: Caso Van Oosterwijck vs Blgica.

Hombre trans a quien se le diagnostic disforia de gnero, y se someti a una


operacin de cambio de sexo subvencionado en parte por el servicio mdico de la
Comunidad Europea quien adems le expidi una tarjeta de trabajador con su nombre
masculino. Pidi la rectificacin de su registro civil con el sexo masculino y nombre de
Daniel , fue denegado, apel pero fue denegado nuevamente.

Alegada violacin a los art. 3 ( tratos crueles y degradante ) , 8 ( vida privada) y 12 (


derecho al matrimonio).

Se declar improcedente por considerar que pudo ir al Tribunal Casatorio antes de


recurrir al TEDH.

-24 de enero de 1981: Caso Rees vs Reino Unido.

Hombre trans con tratamiento hormonal, que se lleg a cambiar de nombre. Fue
operado gracias al Sistema Pblico de Salud, y solicit ante el Registro Civil el cambio
del componente sexo de sus documentos de identidad alegando la prevalencia del
sexo social:

En el Reino Unido se estableca la prevalencia del sexo gonadal gracias al precedente


Corbett v. Corbett (1971) (que determin la nulidad del matrimonio entre una mujer
trans y su pareja por ser ella cromosmicamente un hombre, siendo utilizado en
diferentes sentencias ms : White Sugar , transexualidad como un engao dentro del
mbito laboral , y R v Tan and others cuando a una mujer trans se le deneg el
tratamiento legal de una mujer, sino de un hombre. )

El seor Rees argument que el derecho ingls no le permita a l un status legal


como corresponda a su actual condicin.

Alegada violacin a los arts. 3 (tratos crueles y dregadante), 8 (vida privada) y 12(
derecho al matrimonio)

La Corte examina que las obligaciones impugnadas dentro del derecho a la vida
privada, es la obligacin de garanta puesto que el negarse a cambiar el acta de
nacimiento de una persona transexual puede ser calificada como una interferencia.

Frente a ello, el Tribunal reconoce que existen pases que si han regulado sobre la
materia con reservas, como otros no, por ende, los pases cuentan con un amplio
margen de apreciacin.

These observations are particularly relevant here. Several States have, through
legislation or by means of legal interpretation or by administrative practice, given
transsexuals the option of changing their personal status to fit their newly-gained
identity. They have, however, made this option subject to conditions of varying
strictness and retained a number of express reservations (for example, as to previously
incurred obligations). In other States, such an option does not - or does not yet - exist.
It would therefore be true to say that there is at present little common ground between
the Contracting States in this area and that, generally speaking, the law appears to be
in a transitional stage. Accordingly, this is an area in which the Contracting Parties
enjoy a wide margin of appreciation.

Transsexualism is not a new condition, but its particular features have been identified
and examined only fairly recently. The developments that have taken place in
consequence of these studies have been largely promoted by experts in the medical
and scientific fields who have drawn attention to the considerable problems
experienced by the individuals concerned and found it possible to alleviate them by
means of medical and surgical treatment. The term transsexual is usually applied to
those who, whilst belonging physically to one sex, feel convinced that they belong to
the other; they often seek to achieve a more integrated, unambiguous identity by
undergoing medical treatment and surgical operations to adapt their physical
characteristics to their psychological nature. Transsexuals who have been operated
upon thus form a fairly well-defined and identifiable group.

- 1990: Caso Cossey vs Reino Unido.(8y12) mujer trans operada. -> margen de
apreciacin, consenso no suficiente.
- 1992: Caso B. vs Francia (3, 8 y 12) : mujer trans operada , no puede
conseguir trabajo. -> violacin del art.8 : la situacin en la que se encuentra B.
no es de justo equilibrio entre el inters general y el inters individual. Le
recomienda repararlas, dejando al arbitrio el escoger los medios por los cuales
lo har.
- 1998: Caso Sheffield et Horsham vs. Reino Unida : dos peticiones juntas
Kristina Sheffield: mujer trans operada y con cambio de nombre (permiso de
conducir y pasaporte) en otros documentos no incluyendo el acta registral , en
cada trmite tiene que utilizar su nombre masculino , desempleada y Raquel
Horshman : mujer trans, cambio de nombre pasaporte pero no acta de
nacimiento , exiliado : ( art.8 , 12, 14 (no discriminacin) ) : las actores
pretenden el reconocimiento del sexo cerebral , la Corte reconoce que dicho
aporte contribuye al debate pero resalta nuevamente el margen de apreciacin
de los estados.
- 2002 11 de julio : Caso Christine Goodwin v. Reino Unido : mujer trans,
operada bajo el sistema pblico de salud, sufri acoso laboral cuando quiz
denunciar no le recibieron la denuncia, entre otros prejuicios. (8 , 12 , 14 (no
discriminacin) ) , : Tedh decide analizar el consenso mundial , e interpretar la
convencin al da de hoy.-> debido a que existe una tendencia internacional,
no hay consenso en el sector mdico se declar vulnerado el art. 8 y 12.

The stress and alienation arising from a discordance between the position in
society assumed by a post-operative transsexual and the status imposed by law
which refuses to recognise the change of gender cannot, in the Court's view, be
regarded as a minor inconvenience arising from a formality. A conflict between
social reality and law arises which places the transsexual in an anomalous
position, in which he or she may experience feelings of vulnerability, humiliation
and anxiety.
The Court is struck by the fact that nonetheless the gender re-assignment
which is lawfully provided is not met with full recognition in law, which might be
regarded as the final and culminating step in the long and difficult process of
transformation which the transsexual has undergone. The coherence of the
administrative and legal practices within the domestic system must be regarded
as an important factor in the assessment carried out under Article 8 of the
Convention

Nor, given the numerous and painful interventions involved in such surgery and
the level of commitment and conviction required to achieve a change in social
gender role, can it be suggested that there is anything arbitrary or capricious in
the decision taken by a person to undergo gender re-assignment.

82. While it also remains the case that a transsexual cannot acquire all the
biological characteristics of the assigned sex (Sheffield and Horsham, cited
above, p. 2028, 56), the Court notes that with increasingly sophisticated
surgery and types of hormonal treatments, the principal unchanging biological
aspect of gender identity is the chromosomal element. It is known however that
chromosomal anomalies may arise naturally (for example, in cases of intersex
conditions where the biological criteria at birth are not congruent) and in those
cases, some persons have to be assigned to one sex or the other as seems
most appropriate in the circumstances of the individual case. It is not apparent
to the Court that the chromosomal element, amongst all the others, must
inevitably take on decisive significance for the purposes of legal attribution of
gender identity for transsexuals (see the dissenting opinion of Thorpe LJ in
Bellinger v. Bellinger cited in paragraph 52 above; and the judgment of
Chisholm J in the Australian case, Re Kevin, cited in paragraph 55 above).
83. The Court is not persuaded therefore that the state of medical science or
scientific knowledge provides any determining argument as regards the legal
recognition of transsexuals.
90. Nonetheless, the very essence of the Convention is respect for human
dignity and human freedom. Under Article 8 of the Convention in particular,
where the notion of personal autonomy is an important principle underlying the
interpretation of its guarantees, protection is given to the personal sphere of
each individual, including the right to establish details of their identity as
individual human beings (see, inter alia, Pretty v. the United Kingdom, no.
2346/02, judgment of 29 April 2002, 62, and Mikuli v. Croatia, no. 53176/99,
judgment of 7 February 2002, 53, both to be published in ECHR 2002-...). In
the twenty first century the right of transsexuals to personal development and to
physical and moral security in the full sense enjoyed by others in society cannot
be regarded as a matter of controversy requiring the lapse of time to cast
clearer light on the issues involved. In short, the unsatisfactory situation in
which post-operative transsexuals live in an intermediate zone as not quite one
gender or the other is no longer sustainable. Domestic recognition of this
evaluation may be found in the report of the Interdepartmental Working Group
and the Court of Appeal's judgment of Bellinger v. Bellinger (see paragraphs 50,
52-53).
91. The Court does not underestimate the difficulties posed or the important
repercussions which any major change in the system will inevitably have, not
only in the field of birth registration, but also in the areas of access to records,
family law, affiliation, inheritance, criminal justice, employment, social security
and insurance. However, as is made clear by the report of the
Interdepartmental Working Group, these problems are far from insuperable, to
the extent that the Working Group felt able to propose as one of the options full
legal recognition of the new gender, subject to certain criteria and procedures.
No concrete or substantial hardship or detriment to the public interest has
indeed been demonstrated as likely to flow from any change to the status of
transsexuals and, as regards other possible consequences, the Court considers
that society may reasonably be expected to tolerate a certain inconvenience to
enable individuals to live in dignity and worth in accordance with the sexual
identity chosen by them at great personal cost.
93. Having regard to the above considerations, the Court finds that the
respondent Government can no longer claim that the matter falls within their
margin of appreciation, save as regards the appropriate means of achieving
recognition of the right protected under the Convention. Since there are no
significant factors of public interest to weigh against the interest of this
individual applicant in obtaining legal recognition of her gender reassignment, it
reaches the conclusion that the fair balance that is inherent in the Convention
now tilts decisively in favour of the applicant. There has, accordingly, been a
failure to respect her right to private life in breach of Article 8 of the Convention.
Caso I vs. Reino Unido: mujer trans operada, a quien le piden su certificado
registral en diversos trmites incluyendo el de trabajo. ( 8 , 12 , 14 ) : el Tedh
analiza el caso de acuerdo a un enfoque evolutivo :
56. The Court observes that the applicant, registered at birth as male, has
undergone gender re-assignment surgery and lives in society as a female.
Nonetheless, the applicant remains, for legal purposes, a male. This has had,
and continues to have, effects on the applicant's life where sex is of legal
relevance and distinctions are made between men and women, as, inter alia, in
the area of pensions and retirement age. The applicant has also given
examples of situations where she has been required, as a matter of course, to
show her birth certificate. Though the Government argued that she would be
able to request to show some other form of identification, this would risk in itself
drawing attention to the applicant's situation.
57. It must also be recognised that serious interference with private life can
arise where the state of domestic law conflicts with an important aspect of
personal identity.

-2003: Caso Van Kuck vs Alemania ( derecho a ser odo 6, vida privada 8 , (no
discriminacin) 14): mujer trans, demanda que el servicio privado de salud le
costee sus operaciones de cambio de sexo. El Tedh hace importantes
precisiones sobre el derecho a la vida privada:

69. As the Court has had previous occasion to remark, the concept of private
life is a broad term not susceptible to exhaustive definition. It covers the
physical and psychological integrity of a person (X and Y v. the Netherlands,
judgment of 26 March 1985, Series A no. 91, p. 11, 22). It can sometimes
embrace aspects of an individuals physical and social identity (Mikulic v.
Croatia, no. 53176/99, 53, 7 February 2002). Elements such as, for example,
gender identification, name and sexual orientation and sexual life fall within the
personal sphere protected by Article 8 (see e.g. B. v. France, cited above, 63;
Burghartz v. Switzerland, judgment of 22 February 1994, Series A no. 280-B,
24; Dudgeon v. the United Kingdom, judgment of 22 October 1991, Series A no.
45, 41; Laskey, Jaggard and Brown v. the United Kingdom, judgment of 19
February 1997,Reports 1997-I, 36, and Smith and Grady v. the United
Kingdom, nos. 33985/96 and 33986/96, 71, ECHR 1999-VI). Article 8 also
protects a right to personal development, and the right to establish and develop
relationships with other human beings and the outside world (see, for example,
Burghartz v. Switzerland, Commissions report, op. cit., 47; Friedl v. Austria,
Series A no. 305-B, Commissions report, 45). Likewise, the Court has held
that though no previous case has established as such any right to self-
determination as being contained in Article 8, the notion of personal autonomy
is an important principle underlying the interpretation of its guarantees (see
Pretty v. the United Kingdom, no. 2346/02, 61, 29 April 2002). Moreover, the
very essence of the Convention being respect for human dignity and human
freedom, protection is given to the right of transsexuals to personal
development and to physical and moral security (see I. v. the United Kingdom,
cited above, 70; Christine Goodwin, cited above, 90).

71. However, the boundaries between the States positive and negative
obligations under Article 8 do not lend themselves to precise definition. The
applicable principles are nonetheless similar. In determining whether or not
such an obligation exists, regard must be had to the fair balance which has to
be struck between the general interest and the interests of the individual; and in
both contexts the State enjoys a certain margin of appreciation (see, for
instance, Keegan v. Ireland, judgment of 26 May 1994, Series A no. 290, p. 19,
49, B. v. France, cited above, p. 47, 44, and, as recent authorities, Sheffield
and Horsham, judgment of 30 July 1998, Reports 1998-V, p. 2026, 52, and
Mikulic, cited above, 57).

81. The Court of Appeal also reproached the applicant with having deliberately
caused her condition of transsexuality. In evaluating the applicants sexual
identity and development, the Court of Appeal analysed her past prior to the
taking of female hormones and found that the applicant had only shown male
behaviour and was thus genuinely male orientated. In doing so, the Court of
Appeal, on the basis of general assumptions as to male and female behaviour,
substituted its views on most intimate feelings and experiences for those of the
applicant, and this without any medical competence. It thereby required the
applicant not only to prove that this orientation existed and amounted to a
disease necessitating hormone treatment and gender re-assignment surgery,
but further to show a genuine nature of her transsexuality although, as stated
above (see 75 above), the essential nature and cause of transsexualism are
uncertain. ( importante)
http://www.dgti.org/tsgrecht/allesrecht/91-vankueckvsgermany.html

-2006 : Grant vs Reino Unido : mujer trans operada con cambio de nombre y
sexo a quien no le permitieron jubilarse a la edad de las mujeres. (8 , 1 (
propiedad) , 14 (no discriminacin) ) -> El TEDH establece violado el art.8 por
no haberle reconocdo su identidad de genero tras el caso Gooldwin.

- 2007 : L vs. Lituania : hombre trans a medio operar, (3 tratos crueles


inhumanos y degradantes, 8 vida privada, 12 derecho a contraer matrimonio )
pidi cambio de nombre y sexo estando solamente bajo terapia hormonal pues
todava no se encuentra regulado la ciruga . No tenia recursos adecuados y
efectivos a su disposicin. -> se alega tratos crueles , inhumanos y
degradantes por la no expedicin de la ley de ciruga de cambio de sexo sin
embargo el TEDH lo desestima pues no alcanza a un umbral suficiente, sobre
vida privada :

59. The Court finds that the circumstances of the case reveal a limited
legislative gap in gender-reassignment surgery, which leaves the applicant in a
situation of distressing uncertainty vis--vis his private life and the recognition of
his true identity. Whilst budgetary restraints in the public health service might
have justified some initial delays in implementing the rights of transsexuals
under the Civil Code, over four years have elapsed since the relevant
provisions came into force and the necessary legislation, although drafted, has
yet to be adopted (paragraph 30 above). Given the few individuals involved
(some 50 people, according to unofficial estimates see paragraph 22 above),
the budgetary burden on the State would not be expected to be unduly heavy.
Consequently, the Court considers that a fair balance has not been struck
between the public interest and the rights of the applicant.

-2009 : caso Schlumpf v. Switzerland ( disponible slo en francs) : mujer trans


mayor con tratamiento hormonal ,a quien su seguro se rehusa a pagar los
costos de su tratamiento quirurguico ya que no cumple con los dos aos de
espera de dos aos para permitir reconsideracin, como lo exige la
jurisprudencia del Tribunal Federal de Seguros. ( arts. 8 , 6 , 1 ( dignidad) ) ->
el TEDH declar vulnerados ambos artculos puesto que no se haba respetado
el derecho a ser oda de la demandantes ya que la Corte Federal de Seguros
no acept opiniones mdicas sino ella se sustituyo su juicio por el de la
medicina, adems respecto del art.8 el periodo de dos aos exigido fue
aplicado mecnicamente sin tener en cuenta opiniones mdicos , por lo cual,
no hay un equilibrio razonable entre los intereses de la compaa de seguros y
de la demandante.
- 2014 : CASE OF HMLINEN v. FINLAND : (arts. 8, 14) mujer trans
operada con cambio de nombre pero no de numero de identidad que revela
an que es hombre. Plantea un cambio de sexo registral , pero es necesario
que no este casado o tener el consentimiento de su esposa quien se niega.
Dice que dicho requisito es desproporcional e irrazonable.
75. In the absence of a European consensus and taking into account that the
case at stake undoubtedly raises sensitive moral or ethical issues, the Court
considers that the margin of appreciation to be afforded to the respondent State
must still be a wide one (see X, Y and Z v. the United Kingdom, cited above,
44). This margin must in principle extend both t the States decision whether or
not to enact legislation concerning legal recognition of the new gender of post-
operative transsexuals and, having intervened, to the rules it lays down in order
to achieve a balance between the competing public and private interests.

El TEDH determina que no lo es, puesto que existen diversas opciones legales
a la actora para poder seguir con una figura parecida al matrimonio. (*voto
disidente)

2015: Caso Y.Y. vs Turkey ( slo en francs) : hombre trans quien pide autorizaci
para realizar su cambio de sexo pero se le es denegado en base a que no cumpli uno
de los requisitos establecidos en el Cdigo Civil : esterilizacin.

The Court observed that the proceedings in the national courts had directly concerned the
applicants freedom to establish his gender a freedom which was an essential part of the
right to self-determination. The Court had stated on many occasions that it was aware of the
seriousness of the problems encountered by transsexuals and had emphasised the importance
of permanently examining the need for appropriate legal measures. It was crucial that the
Convention should be interpreted and applied in a manner which rendered guarantees
practical and effective. Should the Court fail to maintain a dynamic and evolutive approach, it
might obstruct any reform or improvement.

In that connection it emphasised that, in the appendix to Recommendation CM/Rec(2010)5,


the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe had stated that prior requirements for
legal recognition of gender reassignment should be regularly reviewed in order to remove
abusive requirements. Moreover, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe had, in
particular, called upon the member States to guarantee the rights of such persons to official
documents reflecting their chosen gender identity, without any prior obligation to undergo
sterilisation or other medical procedures such as gender reassignment surgery or hormonal
therapy.

In any event, the Court did not find it necessary to rule on the question of the applicants
access to medical treatment which would have enabled him to satisfy that requirement. The
Court took the view that the principle of respect for the applicants physical integrity precluded
any obligation for 4 him to undergo treatment aimed at permanent sterilisation. The Court
took the view that, even supposing that the rejection of the initial request for access to sex
change surgery was based on a relevant ground, it was not based on a sufficient ground. The
resulting interference with the applicants right to respect for his private life could not
therefore be considered necessary in a democratic society.
A pesar de que luego la Corte nacional le brindara la posibilidad de acceder al cambio de sexo ,
el TEDH concluyo que la reiterada negativa constituyo una violacin al art 8.

No encuentra violacin al art. 6 pues haba razones para la denegatoria, aunque no fueron
suficientes.