9/20/2015 G.R. No.

110571

TodayisSunday,September20,2015

RepublicofthePhilippines
SUPREMECOURT
Manila

SECONDDIVISION

G.R.No.110571March10,1994

FIRSTLEPANTOCERAMICS,INC.,petitioner,
vs.
THECOURTOFAPPEALSandMARIWASAMANUFACTURING,INC.,respondents.

Castillo,Laman,Tan&Pantaleonforpetitioner.

DeBorja,Medialdea,Ata,Bello,Guevarra&Serapioforprivaterespondent.

NOCON,J.:

Brought to fore in this petition for certiorari and prohibition with application for preliminary injunction is the novel
questionofwhereandinwhatmannerappealsfromdecisionsoftheBoardofInvestments(BOI)shouldbefiled.A
thorough scrutiny of the conflicting provisions of Batas Pambansa Bilang 129, otherwise known as the "Judiciary
ReorganizationActof1980,"ExecutiveOrderNo.226,alsoknownastheOmnibusInvestmentsCodeof1987and
SupremeCourtCircularNo.191is,thus,calledfor.

Briefly, this question of law arose when BOI, in its decision dated December 10, 1992 in BOI Case No. 92005
grantedpetitionerFirstLepantoCeramics,Inc.'sapplicationtoamenditsBOIcertificateofregistrationbychanging
thescopeofitsregisteredproductfrom"glazedfloortiles"to"ceramictiles."Eventually,oppositorMariwasafileda
motion for reconsideration of the said BOI decision while oppositor FilHispano Ceramics, Inc. did not move to
reconsiderthesamenorappealtherefrom.Soonrebuffedinitsbidforreconsideration,Mariwasafiledapetitionfor
reviewwithrespondentCourtofAppealspursuanttoCircular191.

Actingonthepetition,respondentcourtrequiredtheBOIandpetitionertocommentonMariwasa'spetitionandto
showcausewhynoinjunctionshouldissue.OnFebruary17,1993,respondentcourttemporarilyrestrainedtheBOI
fromimplementingitsdecision.ThistemporaryrestrainingorderlapsedbyitsowntermsonMarch9,1993,twenty
(20)daysafteritsissuance,withoutrespondentcourtissuinganypreliminaryinjunction.

OnFebruary24,1993,petitionerfileda"MotiontoDismissPetitionandtoLiftRestrainingOrder"onthegroundthat
respondentcourthasnoappellatejurisdictionoverBOICaseNo.92005,thesamebeingexclusivelyvestedwith
theSupremeCourtpursuanttoArticle82oftheOmnibusInvestmentsCodeof1987.

OnMay25,1993,respondentcourtdeniedpetitioner'smotiontodismiss,thedispositiveportionofwhichreadsas
follows:

WHEREFORE,privaterespondent'smotiontodismissthepetitionisherebyDENIED,forlackofmerit.

Privaterespondent is herebygivenaninextendible periodoften(10)daysfrom receipt hereof within

whichtofileitscommenttothepetition.1

Upon receipt of a copy of the above resolution on June 4, 1993, petitioner decided not to file any motion for
reconsiderationasthequestioninvolvedisessentiallylegalinnatureandimmediatelyfiledapetitionforcertiorari
andprohibitionbeforethisCourt.

Petitionerpositstheviewthatrespondentcourtactedwithoutorinexcessofitsjurisdictioninissuingthequestioned
resolutionofMay25,1993,forthefollowingreasons:

I.RespondentcourthasnojurisdictiontoentertainMariwasa'sappealfromtheBOI'sdecisioninBOI
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CaseNo.92005,whichhasbecomefinal.

II. The appellate jurisdiction conferred by statute upon this Honorable Court cannot be amended or
supersededbyCircularNo.191.2

Petitionerthenconcludesthat:

III.Mariwasahaslostitrighttoappeal...inthiscase.3

PetitionerarguesthattheJudiciaryReorganizationActof1980orBatasPambansaBilang129andCircular191,
"PrescribingtheRulesGoverningAppealstotheCourtofAppealsfromaFinalOrderorDecisionoftheCourtofTax
AppealsandQuasiJudicialAgencies"cannotbethebasisofMariwasa'sappealtorespondentcourtbecausethe
procedure for appeal laid down therein runs contrary to Article 82 of E.O. 226, which provides that appeals from
decisionsorordersoftheBOIshallbefileddirectlywiththisCourt,towit:

Judicialrelief.AllordersordecisionsoftheBoard
(of Investments) in cases involving the provisions of this Code shall immediately be executory. No
appealfromtheorderordecisionoftheBoardbythepartyadverselyaffectedshallstaysuchanorder
ordecisionProvided, that all appeals shall be filed directly with the Supreme Court within thirty (30)
daysfromreceiptoftheorderordecision.

Ontheotherhand,Mariwasamaintainsthatwhatever"obviousinconsistency"or"irreconcilablerepugnancy"there
mayhavebeenbetweenB.P.129andArticle82ofE.O.226onthequestionofvenueforappealhasalreadybeen
resolved by Circular 191 of the Supreme Court, which was promulgated on February 27, 1991 or four (4) years
afterE.O.226wasenacted.

Sections1,2and3ofCircular191,ishereinquotedbelow:

1. Scope. These rules shall apply to appeals from final orders or decisions of the Court of Tax
Appeals. They shall also apply to appeals from final orders or decisions of any quasijudicial agency
fromwhichanappealisnowallowedbystatutetotheCourtofAppealsortheSupremeCourt.Among
these agencies are the Securities and Exchange Commission, Land Registration Authority, Social
Security Commission, Civil Aeronautics Board, Bureau of Patents, Trademarks and Technology
Transfer, National Electrification Administration, Energy Regulatory Board, National
Telecommunications Commission, Secretary of Agrarian Reform and Special Agrarian Courts under
RA6657,GovernmentServiceInsuranceSystem,EmployeesCompensationCommission,Agricultural
InventionsBoard,InsuranceCommissionandPhilippineAtomicEnergyCommission.

2. Cases not covered. These rules shall not apply to decisions and interlocutory orders of the
National Labor Relations Commission or the Secretary of Labor and Employment under the Labor
CodeofthePhilippines,theCentralBoardofAssessmentAppeals,andotherquasijudicialagencies
fromwhichnoappealtothecourtsisprescribedorallowedbystatute.

3.Whomayappealandwheretoappeal.Theappealofapartyaffectedbyafinalorder,decision,or
judgment of the Court of Tax Appeals or of a quasijudicial agency shall be taken to the Court of
Appealswithintheperiodandinthemannerhereinprovided,whethertheappealinvolvesquestionsof
fact or of law or mixed questions of fact and law. From final judgments or decisions of the Court of
Appeals,theaggrievedpartymayappealbycertioraritotheSupremeCourtasprovidedinRule45of
theRulesofCourt.

It may be called that Section 9(3) of B.P. 129 vests appellate jurisdiction over all final judgments, decisions,
resolutions,ordersorawardsofquasijudicialagenciesontheCourtofAppeals,towit:

(3) Exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all final judgments, decisions, resolutions, orders, awards of
RegionalTrialCourtsand
quasijudicial agencies, instrumentalities, boards or commissions, except those falling within the
appellatejurisdictionoftheSupremeCourtinaccordancewiththeConstitution,theprovisionsofthis
Act, and of subparagraph (1) of the third paragraph and subparagraph (4) of the fourth paragraph of
Section17oftheJudiciaryActof1948.

The Intermediate Appellate Court shall have the power to try cases and conduct hearings, receive
evidenceandperformanyandallactsnecessarytoresolvefactualissuesraisedincasesfallingwithin
its original and appellate jurisdiction, including the power to grant and conduct new trials or further
proceedings.

TheseprovisionsshallnotapplytodecisionsandinterlocutoryordersissuedundertheLaborCodeof
thePhilippinesandbytheCentralBoardofAssessmentAppeals.
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ClearlyevidentintheaforequotedprovisionofB.P.129isthelaudableobjectiveofprovidingauniformprocedureof
appealfromdecisionsofallquasijudicialagenciesforthebenefitofthebenchandthebar.Equallylaudableisthe
twinobjectiveofB.P.129ofuncloggingthedocketofthisCourttoenableittoattendtomoreimportanttasks,which
inthewordsofDeanVicenteG.Sinco,asquotedinourdecisioninCondev.IntermediateAppellateCourt4is"less
concernedwiththedecisionsofcasesthatbeginandendwiththetransientrightsandobligationsofparticularindividualsbut
is more intertwined with the direction of national policies, momentous economic and social problems, the delimitation of
governmentalauthorityanditsimpactuponfundamentalrights.

InDevelopmentBankofthePhilippines vs.Court of Appeals,5this Court noted that B.P. 129 did not deal only with
"changesintherulesonprocedures"andthatnotonlywastheCourtofAppealsreorganized,butitsjurisdictionandpowers
werealsobroadenedbySection9thereof.Explainingthechanges,thisCourtsaid:

...Itsoriginaljurisdictiontoissuewritsofmandamus,prohibition,certiorariandhabeascorpus,which
theretoforecouldbeexercisedonlyinaidofitsappellatejurisdiction,wasexpandedby(1)extendingit
soastoincludethewritofquowarranto,andalso(2)empoweringittoissueallsaidextraordinarywrits
"whetherornotinaidofitsappellatejurisdiction."Itsappellatejurisdictionwasalsoextendedtocover
notonlyfinaljudgmentsofRegionalTrialCourts,butalso"allfinaljudgments,decisions,resolutions,
ordersorawardsof...quasijudicialagencies,instrumentalities,boardsorcommissions,exceptthose
falling within the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in accordance with the Constitution, the
provisions of this Act, and of subparagraph (1) of the third paragraph and subparagraph (4) of the
fourthparagraphofSection17oftheJudiciaryActof1948,"itbeingnoteworthyinthisconnectionthat
thetextofthelawisbroadandcomprehensive,andtheexplicitlystatedexceptionshavenoreference
whatever to the Court of Tax Appeals. Indeed, the intention to expand the original and appellate
jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals over quasijudicial agencies, instrumentalities, boards, or
commissions,isfurtherstressedbythelastparagraphofSection9whichexcludesfromitsprovisions,
onlythe"decisionsandinterlocutoryordersissuedundertheLaborCodeofthePhilippinesandbythe
CentralBoardofAssessmentAppeals."6

However,itcannotbedeniedthatthelawmakingsystemofthecountryisfarfromperfect.Duringthetransitional
period after the country emerged from the Marcos regime, the lawmaking power was lodged on the Executive
Department.Theobviouslackofdeliberationinthedraftingofourlawscouldperhapsexplainthedeviationofsome
ofourlawsfromthegoalofuniformprocedurewhichB.P.129soughttopromote.

Inexempligratia,ExecutiveOrderNo.226ortheOmnibusInvestmentsCodeof1987providesthatallappealsshall
befileddirectlywiththeSupremeCourtwithinthirty(30)daysfromreceiptoftheorderordecision.

Noteworthy is the fact that presently, the Supreme Court entertains ordinary appeals only from decisions of the
Regional Trial Courts in criminal cases where the penalty imposed is reclusionperpetua or higher. Judgments of
regionaltrialcourtsmaybeappealedtotheSupremeCourtonlybypetitionforreviewoncertiorariwithinfifteen(15)
days from notice of judgment in accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court in relation to Section 17 of the
Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended, this being the clear intendment of the provision of the Interim Rules that "
(a)ppealstotheSupremeCourtshallbetakenbypetitionforcertiorariwhichshallbegovernedbyRule45ofthe
RulesofCourt."Thus,therightofappealprovidedinE.O.226withinthirty(30)daysfromreceiptoftheorderor
decisionisclearlynotinconsonancewiththepresentprocedurebeforethisCourt.Onlydecisions,ordersorrulings
ofaConstitutionalCommission(CivilServiceCommission,CommissiononElectionsorCommissiononAudit),may
bebroughttotheSupremeCourtonoriginalpetitionsforcertiorariunderRule65bytheaggrievedpartywithinthirty
(30)daysformreceiptofacopythereof.7

Underthiscontextualbackdrop,thisCourt,pursuanttoitsConstitutionalpowerunderSection5(5),ArticleVIIIofthe
1987 Constitution to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure in all courts, and by way of
implementation of B.P. 129, issued Circular 191 prescribing the rules governing appeals to the Court of Appeals
from final orders or decisions of the Court of Tax Appeals and quasijudicial agencies to eliminate unnecessary
contradictionsandconfusingrulesofprocedure.

Contrarytopetitioner'scontention,althoughacircularisnotstrictlyastatuteorlaw,ithas,however,theforceand
effectoflawaccordingtosettledjurisprudence.8InInciongv.deGuia,9acircularofthisCourtwastreatedaslaw.In
adoptingtherecommendationoftheInvestigatingJudgetoimposeasanctiononajudgewhoviolatedCircularNo.7ofthis
Courtdated
September 23, 1974, as amended by Circular No. 3 dated April 24, 1975 and Circular No. 20 dated October 4, 1979,
requiring raffling of cases, this Court quoted the ratiocination of the Investigating Judge, brushing aside the contention of
respondent judge that assigning cases instead of raffling is a common practice and holding that respondent could not go
againstthecircularofthisCourtuntilitisrepealedorotherwisemodified,as"(L)awsarerepealedonlybysubsequentones,
andtheirviolationornonobservanceshallnotbeexcusedbydisuse,orcustomsorpracticetothecontrary."10

TheargumentthatArticle82ofE.O.226cannotbevalidlyrepealedbyCircular191becausetheformergrantsa
substantive right which, under the Constitution cannot be modified, diminished or increased by this Court in the

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exerciseofitsrulemakingpowersisnotentirelydefensibleasitseems.RespondentcorrectlyarguedthatArticle82
of E.O. 226 grants the right of appeal from decisions or final orders of the BOI and in granting such right, it also
providedwhereandinwhatmannersuchappealcanbebrought.Theselatterportionssimplydealwithprocedural
aspectswhichthisCourthasthepowertoregulatebyvirtueofitsconstitutionalrulemakingpowers.

The case of Bustos v. Lucero 11 distinguished between rights created by a substantive law and those arising from
procedurallaw:

Substantivelawcreatessubstantiverights....Substantiverightsisatermwhichincludesthoserights
which one enjoys under the legal system prior to the disturbance of normal relations (60 C.J., 980).
Substantivelawisthatpartofthelawwhichcreates,definesandregulatesrights,orwhichregulates
rightsanddutieswhichgiverisetoacauseofaction,asoppossedtoadjectiveorremediallaw,which
prescribesthemethodofenforcingrightsorobtainsaredressfortheirinvasion.12

Indeed,thequestionofwhereandinwhatmannerappealsfromdecisionsoftheBOIshouldbebroughtpertains
onlytoprocedureorthemethodofenforcingthesubstantiverighttoappealgrantedbyE.O.226.Inotherwords,the
right to appeal from decisions or final orders of the BOI under E.O. 226 remains and continues to be respected.
Circular191simplytransferredthevenueofappealsfromdecisionsofthisagencytorespondentCourtofAppeals
and provided a different period of appeal, i.e., fifteen (15) days from notice. It did not make an incursion into the
substantiverighttoappeal.

ThefactthatBOIisnotexpresslyincludedinthelistofquasijudicialagenciesfoundinthethirdsentenceofSection
1 of Circular 191 does not mean that said circular does not apply to appeals from final orders or decision of the
BOI.ThesecondsentenceofSection1thereofexpresslystatesthat"(T)heyshallalsoapplytoappealsfromfinal
orders or decisions of any quasijudicial agency from which an appeal is now allowed by statute to the Court of
AppealsortheSupremeCourt."E.O.266isonesuchstatute.Besides,theenumerationisprecededbythewords"
(A)mongtheseagenciesare...,"stronglyimplyingthatthereareotherquasijudicialagencieswhicharecovered
by the Circular but which have not been expressly listed therein. More importantly, BOI does not fall within the
purviewoftheexclusionslistedinSection2ofthecircular.Onlythefollowingfinaldecisionsandinterlocutoryorders
are expressly excluded from the circular, namely, those of: (1) the National Labor Relations Commission (2) the
Secretary of Labor and Employment (3) the Central Board of Assessment Appeals and (4) other quasijudicial
agenciesfromwhichnoappealtothecourtsisprescribedorallowedbystatute.SinceinDBPv.CA13weupheldthe
appellatejurisdictionoftheCourtofAppealsovertheCourtofTaxAppealsdespitethefactthatthesameisnotamongthe
agencies reorganized by B.P. 129, on the ground that B.P. 129 is broad and comprehensive, there is no reason why BOI
shouldbeexcludedfrom
Circular191,whichisbutimplementaryofsaidlaw.

Clearly,Circular191effectivelyrepealedorsupersededArticle82ofE.O.226insofarasthemannerandmethodof
enforcingtherighttoappealfromdecisionsoftheBOIareconcerned.AppealsfromdecisionsoftheBOI,whichby
statutewaspreviouslyallowedtobefileddirectlywiththeSupremeCourt,shouldnowbebroughttotheCourtof
Appeals.

WHEREFORE,inviewoftheforegoingreasons,theinstantpetitionforcertiorariandprohibitionwithapplicationfor
temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. The Temporary
RestrainingOrderissuedonJuly19,1993isherebyLIFTED.

SOORDERED.

Narvasa,C.J.,Padilla,RegaladoandPuno,JJ.concur.

#Footnotes

1Rollo,p.71.

2Rollo,p.180.

3Ibid.

4G.R.No.70443,144SCRA144(1986).

5G.R.No.86625,180SCRA609(1989).

6Ibid.

7Sec.7,Art.IX,1987Constitution.

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8Sarev.Aseron,G.R.No.L22380,20SCRA1027(1967)Pascualvs.CommissionofCustoms,G.R.
No.L12219,4SCRA1020(1962).

9A.M.R249RTJ,154SCRA93(1987).

10Article7,NewCivilCode.

1181Phil.640.

1236C.J.2752C.J.S.,1026.

13Supra.

TheLawphilProjectArellanoLawFoundation

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