Caltex Philippines, Inc.

, petitioner-appellee

Vs.

Enrico Palomar, in his capacity as The Postmaster General, respondent-appellant

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FACTS:

In the year 1960, Caltex Philippines conceived and laid the ground work for a promotional scheme
calculated to drum up patronage for its oil products. The contest was entitled Caltex Hooded Pump
Contest, which calls for participants to estimate the actual number of liters as hooded gas pump at
each Caltex station will dispense during a specific period.

Foreseeing the extensive use of the mails not only as amongst the media for publicizing the
contest but also for the transmission of communications, representations were made by Caltex with the
postal authorities for the contest to be cleared in advance for mailing. This was formalized in a letter
sent by Caltex to the Post master General, dated October 31, 1960, in which Caltex, thru its counsel,
enclosed a copy of the contest rules and endeavored to justify its position that the contest does not
violate the The Anti-Lottery Provisions of the Postal Law.

Unfortunately, the Palomar, the acting Postmaster General denied Caltexs request stating that
the contest scheme falls within the purview of the Anti-lottery Provision and ultimately, declined
Clatexs request for clearance.

Caltex sought reconsideration, stressing that there being no consideration involved in part of the
contestant, the contest was not commendable as a lottery. However, the Postmaster General
maintained his view that the contest involves consideration, or even it does not involve any
consideration it still falls as Gift Enterprise, which was equally banned by the Postal Law.

ISSUE:

1. Whether the petition states a sufficient cause of action for declaratory relief?
2. Whether or not the scheme proposed by Caltex the appellee is within the coverage of the
prohibitive provisions of the Postal Law?

HELD:

I.

By express mandate of Section 1 of Rule 66 of the old Rules of Court which deals with the applicability
to invoke declaratory relief which states: Declaratory relief is available to person whose rights are
affected by a statute, to determine any question of construction or validity arising under the statute and
for a declaration of rights thereunder.

In amplification, conformably established jurisprudence on the matter, laid down certain conditions:
 1. There must be a justiciable controversy.
2. The controversy must be between persons whose interests are adverse.
3. The party seeking declaratory relief must have a legal interest in the controversy.
4. The issue involved must be ripe for judicial determination.

With the appellees bent to hold the contest and the appellants threat to issue a fraud order if carried
out, the contenders are confronted by an ominous shadow of imminent and inevitable litigation unless
their differences are settled and stabilized by a declaration. And, contrary to the insinuation of the
appellant, the time is long past when it can rightly be said that merely the appellees desires are
thwarted by its own doubts, or by the fears of others which admittedly does not confer a cause of
action. Doubt, if any there was, has ripened into a justiciable controversy when, as in the case at bar, it
was translated into a positive claim of right which is actually contested.

Construction

Is the art or process of discovering and expounding the meaning and intention of the authors of the
law with respect to its application to a given case, where that intention is rendered doubtful, amongst
others, by reason of the fact that the given case is not explicitly provided for in the law.

It is not amiss to point out at this juncture that the conclusion we have herein just reached is not
without precedent. In Liberty Calendar Co. vs. Cohen, 19 N.J., 399, 117 A. 2d., 487, where a corporation
engaged in promotional advertising was advised by the county prosecutor that its proposed sales
promotion plan had the characteristics of a lottery, and that if such sales promotion were conducted,
the corporation would be subject to criminal prosecution, it was held that the corporation was entitled
to maintain a declaratory relief action against the county prosecutor to determine the legality of its sales
promotion plan.

II.

Is the Contest Scheme a Lottery?

Lottery

Extends to all schemes for the distribution of prizes by chance

e.g. policy playing, gift exhibitions, prize concerts, raffles and fairs as well as various forms of gambling.

Three Essential Elements:

1. Consideration
2. Prize
3. 3. Chance

No, according to the Supreme Court, the contest scheme is not a lottery but it appears to be more
of a gratuitous distribution since nowhere in the rules is any requirements that any fee be paid, any
merchandise be bought, any services be rendered, or any value whatsoever be given for the privilege to
participate. Since, a prospective contestant has to do is go to a Caltex Station, request for the entry form
which is available on demand and accomplish and submit the same for the drawing of the winner.
Because of this, the contest fails to exhibit any discernible consideration which would brand it as a
lottery.

Moreover, the law does not condemn the gratuitous distribution of property by chance, if no
consideration is derived directly or indirectly from the party receiving the chance, but it does condemn
as criminal scheme in which a valuable consideration of some kind is paid directly or indirectly for the
chance to draw a prize.

Is the scheme, as sales promotion which would benefit the sponsor in the way of increased patronage
be considered as a consideration and thus violates the Postal Law?

No, the required element of consideration does not consist of the benefit derived by the sponsors
of the contest. The true test lies on whether or not the participant pays a valuable consideration for the
chance of winning and not whether or not those conducting the enterprise receiver something of value
for the distribution of the prize.

Is the Contest Scheme a Gift Enterprise?

Even if the term Gift Enterprise is not yet defined explicitly, there appears to be a consensus
among lexicographers and standard authorities that the term is common applied to a sporting artifice of
under which goods are sold for their market value but by way of inducement to purchase the product,
the purchaser is given a chance to win a prize.

And thus, the term of gift enterprise cannot be established in the case at bar since there is not
sale of anything to which the chance offered is attached as an inducement to the purchaser. The contest
is open to all qualified contestant irrespective of whether or not they buy the appellees products.

The lesson that we derive from this state of the pertinent jurisprudence is that every case must be
resolved upon the particular phraseology of the applicable statutory provision. It is only logical that
the term under a construction should be accorded no other meaning than that which is consistent with
the nature of the word associated therewith.

In the end, the Supreme Court ruled out that under the prohibitive provision of the Postal Law, gift
enterprise and similar schemes therein contemplated are condemnable only if, like lotteries, they
involve the element of consideration. Finding non in the contest, it was ruled out that the appellee may
not be denied the use of the mails for the purpose thereof.

Socorro Ramirez vs. CA and Garcia [G.R. No. 93833. September 28, 1995]

15AUG

Ponente: KAPUNAN, J.
FACTS:
Petitioner made a secret recording of the conversation that was part of a civil case filed in the Regional
Trial Court of Quezon City alleging that the private respondent, Ester S. Garcia, vexed, insulted and
humiliated her in a hostile and furious mood and in a manner offensive to petitioners dignity and
personality, contrary to morals, good customs and public policy.. Private respondent filed a criminal
case before the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City for violation of Republic Act 4200, entitled An Act to
prohibit and penalize wire tapping and other related violations of private communication, and other
purposes. Petitioner filed a Motion to Quash the Information. The trial court granted the said motion.
The private respondent filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari with the Supreme Court, which referred
the case to the Court of Appeals in a Resolution. Respondent Court of Appeals promulgated its decision
declaring the trial courts order as null and void, after subsequently denied the motion for
reconsideration by the petitioner.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the applicable provision of Republic Act 4200 does not apply to the taping of a private
conversation by one of the parties to the conversation.
HELD:
NO. Petition denied. Costs against petitioner.
RATIO:
Legislative intent is determined principally from the language of the statute.
The unambiguity of the express words of the provision, taken together with the above-quoted
deliberations from the Congressional Record, therefore plainly supports the view held by the
respondent court that the provision seeks to penalize even those privy to the private communications.
Where the law makes no distinctions, one does not distinguish.
[P]etitioners contention that the phrase private communication in Section 1 of R.A. 4200 does not
include private conversations narrows the ordinary meaning of the word communication to a point
of absurdity.
56 SCRA 149 Statutory Construction Purpose of a Law
Civil Law Application of Laws Interpretation of Laws
In 1989, Cesario Ursua was charged with bribery and dishonesty. His lawyer then asked him to get a
copy of the complaint against him from the Office of the Ombudsman. His lawyer asked him that
because the law firms messenger, a certain Oscar Perez, was unable to go to the Ombudsman.
Before going to the Ombudsman, Ursua talked to Perez. He revealed to him that he feels uncomfortable
asking for a copy of the complaint because he is the respondent in the said case. Perez then told him
than he can go there as Oscar Perez so that he does not have to reveal his true identity.
At the Office of the Ombudsman, Ursua signed the logbook there as Oscar Perez. When he was
handed a copy of the complaint, he signed the receipt as Oscar Perez. However, a staff of the
Ombudsman was able to learn that he was in fact Cesario Ursua. The staff then recommended that a
criminal case be filed against Ursua. Eventually, Ursua was sentenced to three years in prison for
violating C.A. No. 142, as amended, otherwise known as An Act To Regulate The Use Of Aliases.
ISSUE: Whether or not Cesario Ursuas conviction is proper.
Commented [DUP1]: Senator Padilla:
So that when it is intercepted or recorded, the element of secrecy
would not appear to be material. Now, suppose, Your Honor, the
recording is not made by all the parties but by some parties and
involved not criminal cases that would be mentioned under Section 3
but would cover, for example civil cases or special proceedings
whereby a recording is made not necessarily by all the parties but
perhaps by some in an effort to show the intent of the parties
because the actuation of the parties prior, simultaneous even
subsequent to the contract or the act may be indicative of their
intention. Suppose there is such a recording, would you say, Your
Honor, that the intention is to cover it within the purview of this bill
or outside?
Senator Taada: That is covered by the purview of this bill, Your
Honor.
Senator Padilla:
Even if the record should be used not in the prosecution of offense
but as evidence to be used in Civil Cases or special proceedings?
Senator Taada:
That is right. This is a complete ban on tape recorded conversations
taken without the authorization of all the parties.
Senator Padilla: Now, would that be reasonable, Your Honor?
Senator Taada:
I believe it is reasonable because it is not sporting to record the
observation of one without his knowing it and then using it against
him. It is not fair, it is not sportsmanlike. If the purpose; Your honor,
is to record the intention of the parties. I believe that all the parties
should know that the observations are being recorded.
Commented [DUP2]: "It has been said that innocent people
have nothing to fear from their conversations being overheard. But
this statement ignores the usual nature of conversations as well as
the undeniable fact that most, if not all, civilized people have some
aspects of their lives they do not wish to expose. Free conversations
are often characterized by exaggerations, obscenity, agreeable
falsehoods, and the expression of anti-social desires of views not
intended to be taken seriously. The right to the privacy of
communication, among others, has expressly been assured by our
Constitution. Needless to state here, the framers of our Constitution
must have recognized the nature of conversations between
individuals and the significance of man's spiritual nature, of his
feelings and of his intellect. They must have known that part of the
pleasures and satisfactions of life are to be found in the unaudited,
and free exchange of communication between individuals free
from every unjustifiable intrusion by whatever means."
HELD: No. Ursua should be acquitted. The Supreme Court ruled that a strict application of C.A. No. 142,
as amended, in this case only leads to absurdity something which could not have been intended by the
lawmakers.
Under C.A. No. 142, as amended, save for some instances, a person is not allowed to use a name or an
alias other than his registered name or that which he was baptized. Under the law, what makes the use
of alias illegal is the fact that it is being used habitually and publicly in business transactions without
prior authorization by competent authority. In this case, Ursua merely used the name Oscar Perez
once, it was not used in a business transaction, the use of the name was with the consent of Oscar Perez
himself, and even if he used a different name, in this instance, he was not even required to disclose his
identity at the Office of the Ombudsman. When he was requesting a copy of the complaint, he need not
disclose his identity because the complaint is a public record open to the public.
In short, the evils sought to be avoided by the C.A. No. 142 was not brought about when Ursua used a
name other than his name. A strict application of the law is not warranted. When Ursua used the name
of Oscar Perez, no fraud was committed; there was no crime committed punishable under C.A. No. 142.
The purpose of the law is to punish evils defined therein so when no such evil was produced by Ursuas
act, said law need not be applied.

PEOPLE vs. CONCEPCION, 44 Phil. 126FACTS:

Venancio Concepcion, President of the Philippine National Bank and a member of theBoard thereof,
authorized an extension of credit in favor of "Puno y Concepcion, S. en C. to themanager of the
Aparri branch of the Philippine National Bank. "Puno y Concepcion, S. en C."was a co-
partnership where Concepcion is a partner. Subsequently, Concepcion was charged andfound guilty in
the Court of First Instance of Cagayan with violation of section 35 of Act
No.2 7 4 7 . S e c t i o n 3 5 o f A c t N o . 2 7 4 7 p r o v i d e s t h a t t h e N a t i o n a l B a n k s
h a l l n o t , d i r e c t l y o r indirectly, grant loans to any of the members of the board of directors of
the bank nor to agentsof the branch banks. Counsel for the defense argue that the
documents of record do not provethat authority to make a loan was given, but only show the
concession of a credit. They averredthat the granting of a credit to the co-partnership "Puno y
Concepcion, S. en C." by VenancioConcepcion, President of the Philippine National Bank,
is not a "loan" within the meaning of section 35 of Act No. 2747.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the granting of a credit of P300,000 to the co-partnership
" P u n o y Concepcion, S. en C." by Venancio Concepcion, President of the Philippine
National Bank, a"loan" within the meaning of section 35 of Act No. 2747.
HELD:
The Supreme Court ruled in the affirmative. The "credit" of an individual means hisability
to borrow money by virtue of the confidence or trust reposed by a lender that he will paywhat he may
promise. A "loan" means the delivery by one party and the receipt by the other party of a
given sum of money, upon an agreement, express or implied, to repay the sum loaned,with or without
interest. The concession of a "credit" necessarily involves the granting of "loans"up to the limit of the
amount fixed in the "credit,"

Director of Lands vs Court of Appeals

G. R. No. 102858, 28 July 1997, 276 SCRA 276
FACTS
:1.

On 8 December 1986, private respondent Teodoro Abistado filed a petition for originalregistration of his
title over 648 sq.m. of land under PD 1529 however during the pendency ofthe petition, Teodoro died
hence his heirs were substituted as applicants, represented by theiraunt, who was appointed as their
guardian ad litem.2.

The Land registration court dismissed its petition for want of jurisdiction stating that theapplicants failed
to comply with the provisions of Section 23 (1) of PD 1529 requiring theApplicants to publish the notice
of initial hearing in a newspaper of general circulation in thePhilippines and was only published in the
Official Gazette and thus the court has not legallyacquired jurisdiction over the instant petition for want
of compliance with the mandatoryprovision requiring publication of the notice of initial hearing in a
newspaper of generalcirculation.3.

The case was appealed by the private respondents in the CA, which set aside the decision ofthe trial
court and ordered the registration of the title in the name of Teodoro Abistado. Themotion for
reconsideration was denied, thus this petition.
ISSUE
: Whether or not publication of the notice of initial hearing in an original land registration caseis
MANDATORY or DIRECTORY in relation to Section 23(1) of PD 1529.
HELD
: The Supreme Court held that provision of the law is MANDATORY. The law used the term
SHALL and denotes an IMPERATIVE and thus indicates the mandatory character of a statute,
itsimportance ultimately depends upon its context in the entire provision, and the Court holds that
thepresent case must be understood in its normal mandatory meaning.Land registration is a proceeding
in rem and as such is validated essentially in publication this beingso the process must be strictly
complied with, in that the one who is instituting the action must beable to prove his title against
the whole world. Hence, before the claimed property is taken fromconcerned parties and registered in
the name of the applicant, said parties must be given notice andopportunity to oppose, the reason of
which is DUE PROCESS.In the present case, there was failure to comply with the explicit publication
requirement of the law.The Court has declared that where the law speaks in clear and categorical
language, there is no roomfor interpretation; there is only room for application and there is no
alternative. Thus, the case wasdismissed without prejudice to reapplication after all the legal requisites
shall have been duly complied with.

Pascual vs. Pascual [G.R. No. 84240. March 25, 1992]

15AUG

Ponente: PARAS, J.
FACTS:
Don Andres Pascual died intestate (on October 12, 1973) without any issue, legitimate, acknowledged
natural, adopted or spurious children. Petitioners Olivia and Hermes both surnamed Pascual are the
acknowledged natural children of the late Eligio Pascual, the latter being the full blood brother of the
decedent Don Andres Pascual. Petitioners filed their Motion to Reiterate Hereditary Rights and the
Memorandum in Support of Motion to reiterate Hereditary Rights. the Regional Trial Court, presided
over by Judge Manuel S. Padolina issued an order, the dispositive portion of which resolved to deny this
motion reiterating their hereditary rights. Their motion for reconsideration was also denied. Petitioners
appealed their case to the Court of Appeals, but like the ruling of CA, their motion for reconsideration
was also dismissed. In this petition for review on certiorari, petitioners contend that they do not fall
squarely within the purview of Article 992 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, can be interpreted to
exclude recognized (and acknowledged) natural children as their illegitimacy is not due to the
subsistence of a prior marriage when such children were under conception.`

ISSUE:
Whether or not Article 992 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, can be interpreted to exclude recognized
natural children from the inheritance of the deceased.

HELD:
NO. Petition is devoid of merit.

RATIO:
The issue in the case at bar, had already been laid to rest in Diaz v. IAC, where this Court ruled that
under Art.992 of the Civil Code, there exists a barrier or iron curtain in that it prohibits absolutely a
succession ab intestado between the illegitimate child and the legitimate children and relatives of the
father or mother of said legitimate child.
[T]he interpretation of the law desired by the petitioner may be more humane but it is also an
elementary rule in statutory construction that when the words and phrases of the statute are clear and
unequivocal, their meaning must be determined from the language employed and the statute must be
taken to mean exactly what is says.

Eligio Pascual is a legitimate child but petitioners are his illegitimate children and the term illegitimate
refers to both natural and spurious. It may be said that the law may be harsh but that is the law (DURA
LEX SED LEX).

People of the Philippines vs. M. Mapa

G.R. No. L-22301
August 30, 1967
En Banc

Facts:

The accused was convicted in violation of Sec. 878 in connection to Sec. 2692 of the Revised
Administrative Code as amended by Commonwealth Act No. 56 and further amended by R.A. 4. On
August 13, 1962, the accused was discovered to have in its possession and control a home-made
revolver cal. 22 with no license permit. In the court proceeding, the accused admitted that he owns the
gun and affirmed that it has no license. The accused further stated that he is a secret agent appointed by
Gov. Leviste of Batangas and showed evidences of appointment. In his defense, the accused presented
the case of People vs. Macarandang, stating that he must acquitted because he is a secret agent and
which may qualify into peace officers equivalent to municipal police which is covered by Art. 879.

Issue:

Whether or not holding a position of secret agent of the Governor is a proper defense to illegal
possession of firearms.

Ruling:

The Supreme Court in its decision affirmed the lower courts decision. It stated that the law is explicit
that except as thereafter specifically allowed, "it shall be unlawful for any person to . . . possess any
firearm, detached parts of firearms or ammunition therefor, or any instrument or implement used or
intended to be used in the manufacture of firearms, parts of firearms, or ammunition." The next section
provides that "firearms and ammunition regularly and lawfully issued to officers, soldiers, sailors, or
marines [of the Armed Forces of the Philippines], the Philippine Constabulary, guards in the employment
of the Bureau of Prisons, municipal police, provincial governors, lieutenant governors, provincial
treasurers, municipal treasurers, municipal mayors, and guards of provincial prisoners and jails," are not
covered "when such firearms are in possession of such officials and public servants for use in the
performance of their official duties.
The Court construed that there is no provision for the secret agent; including it in the list therefore the
accused is not exempted.

Request of Judge Tito G. Gustilo that the second 25% of the special allowance for judges be included in
the computation of his retirement benefits; Callejo Sr., J., AM No. RTJ-04-1868

I.The Facts: In his letter dated May 26, 2004 addressed to Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Judge Tito G.
Gustilo requested that, considering his retirement is barely one month from November 2004, the
second tranche of the Special Allowance granted to judges under the Republic Act No. 9227 included in
the computation of his retirement benefits. In support thereof, Judge Gustilo points out that in the
past, Judges who retire in October are included in the grant of the December 13th month pay, invoking
the liberal policy of the Court in granting benefits to the underpaid Trial Court Judges. To
recall, Rep. Act No. 9227 granting additional compensation in the form of Special Allowance to judges
took effect in November 11, 2003. The special allowances shall be equivalent to 100% of the basic
monthly salary specified for their respective salary grades to be implemented uniformly in 4 years in
such sums or amounts equivalent to 25% of the basic salaries of the positions covered thereof.
Subsequent implementation shall be in such sums and amounts and up to the extent only that can be
supported by the funding source specified in Section 3 thereof. It is likewise reiterated that for purposes
of computing the retirement benefits, only the special allowance actually received and that which
accrued at the time of retirement shall be included.
II. The Issue: Whether or not the Court can adopt a liberal stance in interpreting the retirement laws in
favor of retiree Judge Gustilo.

III. The Ruling: No. The court denied Judge Gustilo's request for the inclusion of the second 25% of the
special allowance in the computation of his retirement benefits because Sec 5 of Rep. Act No. 9227 is
quite clear and unambiguous which, in plain reading, shows that only the allowances actually
received and the tranche or tranches already received and implemented, upon date of
retirement, shall be included in the computation of the retirement benefits. As such, there is no room
for interpretation but only simple application of the law.

PVB VS. CALLANGAN DIGEST

DECEMBER 21, 2016 ~ VBDIAZ

PHILIPPINE VETERANS BANK, Petitioner VS. JUSTINA CALLANGAN, in her capacity as Director of the
Corporation Finance Department of the Securities and Exchange Commission and/or the SECURITIES
AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION,

G.R. No. 191995

August 3, 2011

FACTS: On March 17, 2004, respondent Justina F. Callangan, the Director of the Corporation Finance
Department of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), sent the Bank a letter, informing it that it
qualifies as a public company under Section 17.2 of the Securities Regulation Code (SRC) in relation
with Rule 3(1)(m) of the Amended Implementing Rules and Regulations of the SRC. The Bank is thus
required to comply with the reportorial requirements set forth in Section 17.1 of the SRC.
The Bank responded by explaining that it should not be considered a public company because it is a
private company whose shares of stock are available only to a limited class or sector, i.e., to World War
II veterans, and not to the general public.
In a letter dated April 20, 2004, Director Callangan rejected the Banks explanation and assessed it a
total penalty of One Million Nine Hundred Thirty-Seven Thousand Two Hundred Sixty-Two and 80/100
Pesos (P1,937,262.80) for failing to comply with the SRC reportorial requirements from 2001 to 2003.
The Bank moved for the reconsideration of the assessment, but Director Callangan denied the motion in
SEC-CFD Order No. 085, Series of 2005 dated July 26, 2005. When the SEC En Banc also dismissed the
Banks appeal for lack of merit in its Order dated August 31, 2006, prompting the Bank to file a petition
for review with the Court of Appeals (CA).
On March 6, 2008, the CA dismissed the petition and affirmed the assailed SEC ruling, with the
modification that the assessment of the penalty be recomputed from May 31, 2004.
The CA also denied the Banks motion for reconsideration, opening the way for the Banks petition
for review on certiorari filed with this Court.
On June 16, 2010, the Court denied the Banks petition for failure to show any reversible error in
the assailed CA decision and resolution.
ISSUE: Whether or not the reportorial requirements of the SEC are applicable to Banks.
HELD: The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) required the Bank to comply with the reportorial
requirements under Section 17.1 of SRC since it qualifies as a public company under Section 17.2 of
the SRC. The Bank argued that it is a private company and not a public company because its shares are
available only to a limited class or sector. The Supreme Court held that public company, as
contemplated by the SRC, is not limited to a company whose shares of stocks are publicly listed; even
companies like the Bank, whose shares are offered only to a specific group of people, are considered a
public company, provided they meet the requirement as required under the SRC.

Barcellano vs Banas

FACTS: Respondent Dolores Bans, an heir of Bartolome Bans owned a lot in Bacacay, Albay.
Adjoining the said lot is a property owned by Vicente Medina. In 1997, Medina offered his lot for sale
to the owners of the adjoining lots. The property was eventually sold to Armando Barcellano. The
heirs of Bans contested the sale, and conveyed their intention to redeem the property. However,
according to Medina, the deed of sale has been executed. There was also mention that the Bans
heirs failed to give the amount required by Medina for them to redeem the lot. Action to redeem the
property was filed before the RTC. It denied the petition on the ground that the Bans heirs failed to
exercise their right to redemption within the period provided in article 1623 of NCC. On appeal, such
ruling was reversed.

ISSUE: W/N the RTC decision to deny the Bans heirs of their right of legal redemption is valid

HELD: The court denied the petition, and affirmed the appellate court decision granting the Bans
heirs the right to redeem the subject property. The decision was based on the provisions of article
1623 NCC.

We need only to discuss the requirement of notice under Art. 1623 of the New Civil Code, which
provides that:
 The right of legal pre-emption or redemption shall not be exercised except within thirty days from
the notice in writing by the prospective vendor, or by the vendor, as the case may be. The deed of
sale shall not be recorded in the Registry of Property, unless accompanied by an af davit of the
vendor that he has given written notice thereof to all possible redemptioners.

A written notice must be issued by the prospective vendor. Nothing in the record and pleadings
submitted by the parties showed that there was a written notice sent to the respondents. Without a
written notice, the period of 30 days within which the right of legal redemption may be exercised
does not exist. In this case, the law was clear. A written notice by the vendor is mandatory.