Académique Documents
Professionnel Documents
Culture Documents
Deirdre Dlugoleski
Professor Haroon
Islam in Pakistan
23 April 2012
Widening the Intersection of Two Ideas: The Khilafat Movement and Its Multi-
Layered Symbolism
I belong to two circles of equal size, but which are not concentric. One is India, and the
other is the Muslim world.1
Muhammad Ali, address to the Fourth Plenary Session of the Round Table Conference, London,
1930
By the time Muhammad Ali addressed the Round Table Conference in 1930, the political
landscape in India looked very different than it had a decade before. One of the most important
political movements of the decade, however, had already risen and declined in the space of four
or five years. The Khilafat Movement developed in the context of extreme fear for the safety of
the Muslim World. By the end of the 19th century, in the aftermath of the 'Mutiny' of 1857,
Muslims in India looked for a symbol of the survival of the rule of Islamic law and found it in
the Turkish sultan. Concern over the authority of the Ottoman sultan-caliph in the aftermath of
World War I, however, was not limited to the political; poets like Muhammad Iqbal addresses a
keenly felt concern for Islam's place in the world, where it seemed that it was under attack from
all quarters. Unlike Iqbal, however, the founders of the Khilafat movement were not separatists.
Although their agenda of the preservation of the caliphate in Turkey seemed to demand an extra-
territorial loyalty of their followers, they appealed to the symbol of the caliphate in the name of a
much broader, global Islam that was in danger; it was around this symbol that the Muslims of
India could unite and defend themselves, in turn, within Congress. For the Khilafat leadership,
1 Maulana Muhammad Ali Jauhar, quoted in Wasti, Syed. "The Circles of Maulana Mohamed Ali." Middle
Eastern Studies 38.4 (2002): 51-62. JSTOR. Web. 21 Apr. 2012.
Dlugoleski 2
religion and nationalism were very much synonymous. In this way, the Khilafatists blended the
ideas of Indian nationalism and the survival of Islam in the symbol of the caliphate. For
Muhammad Ali and many others, the Khilafat movement represented the intersection of the two
circles, where Islam and an independent India could coexist productively, and even allow them to
join hands with Hindus in the non-cooperation movement. Thus, the Aligarh-educated Ali
brothers, journalists like Zafar Ali Khan, and 'ulama of different schoools, such as Abdul Bari of
Firangi Mahal and Husain Ahmad Madani of Deoband, all championed the Khilafat cause and
eventually found themselves working towards the same goals as Gandhi with his non-
cooperation movement.
Although in its pan-Islamic appeal the Khilafat movement advocated a strong, unified
Muslim constituency within the national Congress, it is important to note that the movement
itself never began as any sort of centralized body. On the contrary, it was originally within the
framework of the Muslim League that leaders such as Muhammad and Shaukat Ali and Abdul
Bari raised the subject. The Muslim League in turn often took its cues from Congress. The two
often met at the same time in the same cities, and the League frequently endorsed Congress
decisions in its own resolutions. In July of 1920, the League even asked that the Congress meet
first, so that it could provide a recommended course of action for the Muslims.2 Thus, in its close
association with the Muslim League, the emerging Khilafat movement was pro-Congress from
the beginning. Although local committees had sprung up (primarily in large towns in Uttar
Pradesh, Bengal, the Punjab, Bombay and the Frontier3), these also operated within the existing
structure of Muslim League and Congress organizations. It was only after increased agitation
2 Hasan, Mushirul. Nationalism and Communal Politics in India 1885-1930. New Delhi: Manohar, 2000. Print. p.
1077.
3 Qureshi, M. Naeem. Pan-Islam in British Indian Politics: A Study of the Khilafat Movement, 1918-1924. Leiden:
Brill, 1999. Print.
Dlugoleski 3
throughout 1919 that, on 11 November,4 the Bombay Khilafat Committee changed its title to
The Central Khilafat Committee of India, Bombay. After this point, it produced a constitution
and established new provincial committees, including separate committees for women.
It is at this moment in its development that the Khilafat movement merits the most careful
attention. Whom did the Khilafat movement truly represent? And to what extent did it accurately
mirror their views? Although it did not by any means lose its ideological ties to the Muslim
League and to the Congress, it was now responsible for pushing a specific agenda in both the
domestic and international arenas. Unlike the strategy adopted by the Jama'at i-Ulama, the
Khilafatists never offered the option of different levels of involvement or association in their
organizational model. Instead, they wanted full participation or nothing their goals, after all,
included independence, and, more importantly, creating a solid, unified, Muslim constituency
within Congress. Thus, while the Khilafatists claimed to represent the Muslim opinion of India
(especially in their interactions with the British and in the national-level, English press), the ways
in which they projected their ideas to the population varied. It is virtually impossible to recover
what poor, rural peasants, individual Muslim League volunteers or 'ulama members, or
shopkeepers thought about pan-Islamism, the caliphate, or even Indian nationalism. But by
examining the different layers of symbolism that the Khilafat movement used to communicate at
different levels, we can attempt to construct a more accurate picture of how their ideas were
interpreted by their audience across India between 1919 and the decline of the movement in
1923.
In order to successfully claim to represent the voice of the Muslims of India, the Khilafat
movement not only had to work to win over Muslim support, but also had to present itself to
non-Muslims including non-Muslim Indians, the British, and on occasion the larger
4 Qureshi, Regionalizing Pan-Islamism, p. 121.
Dlugoleski 4
international community in such a way that would bolster this claim. For this reason, there is a
marked difference in how the movement presents itself in the English press, as opposed to the
Urdu, which the Khilafat leaders themselves often dominated. Thus, the Khilafat leadership also
used language within the sphere of the press as a tool to select, or at least narrow, their audience,
and temper their message accordingly. In the English press, the Khilafatists worked to build their
image of having already attained what they hoped to achieve a unified representative body for
India's Muslims. The Central Khilafat Committee often made sure that newspapers like The
Times of India and The Tribune (Lahore) published its communications with the British
government. Direct communication with the British gave the movement a sense of legitimacy; in
an English-language publication, a local magistrate would have the same chance as an English
speaking Hindu or non-Khilafatist Muslim to see that the Khilafat leadership was comfortable
advocating for Muslims and not only India's Muslims on an international stage. On 22
January 1920, The Tribune published a column titled The Khilafat and Loyalty to the
Sovereign, in which a commentator observes that the requirements of Islamic law are so
definite and of such a binding nature that they cannot be reduced by a hair's breadth to fit the
desires of allied and associated Powers any more than they can be enlarged to further the
mundane ambitions of Musalmans themselves.5 Here, the author has not acknowledge any
existence of interpretative difference in Islamic law, implying that all of India's Muslims are
obliged to follow the same set of principles. Later, on 25 June 1920, The Times published a letter
from the Central Khilafat Committee to the Viceroy, signed by about 90 Sunni Muslims, which
stated:
We, the undersigned, claim to represent the largest body of Sunni Muslim opinion. We
have most carefully read the Turkish peace terms and we consider them to be in direct
5 "The Khilafat and Loyalty to the Sovereign." The Tribune [Lahore] 22 Jan. 1920. World Newspaper Archive.
Web. 13 Apr. 2012.
Dlugoleski 5
theological division within Islam. It is likely that, while dealing with the British, the Central
for their dissatisfaction. While they knew the British understood the Sunni to be a majority, this
strategy also served the double advantage of strengthening their claim against British action in
regard to the holy places of Islam and solidifying their representative capacity within the
Congress; they could much more legitimately claim a staunch, unified following if they
The Khilafatists were also, however, eager to showcase the degree to which they
cooperated with non-Muslim groups as well. On March 18th, 1920 the Central Khilafat
Dear Sir, I am taking the liberty of writing to tell you that a number of English
Christians in India are praying for the guidance of God in the matter of [sic] political
future of India I understand that my Mahomedan fellow citizens are about to hold a
day of prayer in this connection. I would that the Christians would do the same.7
Thus, even as they presented themselves as theological sticklers in their correspondence to the
British government, they also worked to project an image of widespread support that was not
limited to the Muslim community. The treatment of the Shi'a community in the press is
illustrative of this trend. Although it often specified that it represented the Sunni Muslim opinion
in India, the Khilafat proved more than willing to sideline finer theological considerations for the
sake of mass-mobilization. In March 1921, at the annual pilgrimage to the shrine at Ajmer, Abdul
Bari addressed the Shi'a and expressed the possibility that the British had bombarded Najaf. He
6 "The Khilafat: Letter to the Viceroy." The Times of India 25 June 1920. ProQuest Historical Newspapers. Web.
14 Apr. 2012.
7 "The Khilafat: Letter to the Editor of the Times of India." The Times of India 18 Mar. 1920. Web. 14 Apr. 2012.
Dlugoleski 6
couched his argument in terms of religious freedom the same terms which the Khilafat
movement frequently presented to the British in their interactions (most publicly in the trial of
the 'Karachi Seven'). This allowed at least Western-educated Shi'a to support the Khilafat cause
on political grounds. The mujtahids, however, still presented a problem, since the Shi'a did not
acknowledge the caliphate, but by sidestepping this issue and presenting the issue of cooperation
with the Government specifically in terms of their own religious practice, the Khilafat movement
successfully gained some Shi'a participation. A draft of his speech was, of course, published in
The Independent,8 a newspaper in which Sayyid Husain, a prominent Khilafat member, was the
editor. Khilafat leaders like Abdul Bari and Azad had to work to present this pluralism within an
Islamic framework and maintain the 'ulama's support. Furthermore, the Khilafat leadership itself
was split in their personal reactions to the Shi'a. Husain Ahmad Madani, for example, held a deep
personal antipathy towards Shi'as, for all his enthusiasm for secular nationalism. On the other
hand, there was also a precedent to find common ground. Many of Shi'a mujtahids with whom
the movement entered into dialogue and the Khilafat leaders had come from Firangi Mahal,
which exemplifies a school of thought in Sunni Islam that emphasizes reconciliation and
common bonds. In either case, the Khilafat leadership was willing to work around the purely
theological priorities that they presented to the British in favor of expanding their support base,
and did so in the national English-language press; their top priority in this arena clearly lay in
legitimizing their representative capacity to the greatest possible extent. To this end, they
presented the caliphate in their interactions with the Shi'a community as just one among Islam's
Of course, the Central Khilafat Committee frequently used the national press as a means
of communicating directly to their supporters, often urging them to observe hartal, remember
8 Minault, The Khilafat Movement, p. 192.
Dlugoleski 7
their commitment to non-violence, and work peacefully with Hindus. Aside from its obvious
value as a simple message system, publishing these communications in the national English press
also helped bolster the Khilafat movement's implicit claim to a large following. In their own
Urdu publications, however, the Khilafat leadership capitalized on another talent that many of
them possessed: poetry. Although the traditional scene of poetic recitation, the musha'ira, was
typically reserved for upper-class men, a popular tradition of singing devotional poetry at
religious festivals (Muharram, for example) and pilgrimage sites ran along parallel lines. Thus,
by publishing political verses, the Khilafat leadership could effectively reach a Muslim audience
on an emotional level even illiterate members, who could have verses read to them, and still
feel their affect. Zafar Ali Khan and Hasrat Mohani, for example, were both poets, as well as
journalists and orators. Zafar Ali Khan (editor of Zamindar) in particular manipulated traditional
In this couplet, Zafar Ali Khan has invoked traditional image of the nightingale in a cage,
normally used to represent a lover begging his beloved to grant his desires. By consistently
titling his pieces with political topics (Martial Law, or The Central Khilafat Committee),
Zafar Ali Khan cued his readers in to the next level of meaning in this particular case, the
nightingale in the cage could be a call for India's independence. Hasrat Mohani, editor of Urdu-
e-Mu'alla, also wrote political poetry, much more explicitly so than Zafar Ali Khan's:
It is clear that the Khilafat leaders composed their verse with a much larger public in mind than
the traditional musha'ira although some, like Zafar Ali Khan, chose to retain a more traditional
ambiguity in their verse, many delivered an overtly political message clearly intended for mass-
mobilization. We must also, however, examine these poems in the context of their respective
Islamic cultural tradition in the same publication as overtly political prose appeals for religious
freedom and swaraj, Zafar Ali Khan and Hasrat Mohani associated the symbol of the caliphate
with a larger cultural identity to which their readers could easily relate. Furthermore, although it
is difficult to gauge how much Urdu political poetry directly affected political participation, it is
significant that others outside of the central Khilafat leadership often reproduced it at the local
level with the same message. A school teacher in Pilibhit, Muhammad Haider, wrote:
Thus, in political poetry, the Khilafat leaders had found a way to not only widely disseminate
their message to an Urdu-speaking audience, but also (since poetry in this cultural context was
heavily tied to public recitation) to make sure that it spread independently of their efforts.
Although it worked hard to present itself as a centralized body with a solid support base
in the national press, the Central Khilafat Committee was acutely aware that much work was
needed to actually create this constituency. Winning over the minds of their readers to their
ideology was one thing; creating facts on the ground was quite another. To do this, they had to
communicate the Khilafat message through entirely different means, and rely on another level of
symbols. Their interactions at the provincial level, therefore, served primarily for expanding their
influence. After the decision to transform the Bombay Khilafat Committee into the Central
Khilafat Committee, the leadership moved to both consolidate extant provincial committees and
to send volunteers to form new ones in areas that did not already have them. To achieve this
quickly and efficiently, Khilafat volunteers often integrated the new committee into extant
political and cultural groups. In his book Nationalism and Communal Politics in India 1885-
1930,12 Mushirul Hasan notes that Khilafat committees were often indistinguishable from local
Congress bodies, volunteer groups, Kisan Sabhas and Home Rule Leagues in their composition
and political objectives.13 According to the British Sind C.I.D. Reports for 1921, [i]n Sind the
Khilafat Committees generally speaking exist in name only. Most of the members belong to the
Congress organisations and practically all the work is in the hands of the latter.14 The reports of
the Khilafat Movement in the United Provinces indicated that by the time provincial Khilafat
committees had been established at Meerut, Lucknow and a network of branch committees
Because of this, however, Khilafat demands were heavily integrated with local demands;
it was not always clear who was acting. This allowed the community leadership to present and
disseminate the Khilafat ideology within the framework of their own specific concerns, while
simultaneously providing the Khilafat leadership with an extant platform upon which to present
their agenda. In Uttar Pradesh, Khilafat committees and Kisan Sabhas (Peasant Associations)
worked in cooperation, stirring up the population by making a specific appeal against their more
immediate enemy: the landlord. Since the landholding class was commonly perceived to be an
ally of the government, the Khilafatists actually organized Kisan Sabha rallies themselves in
several instances.16 According to the provincial records of the Non-Cooperation and Khilafat
Movements in Delhi, Maulana Mahmud-ul-Hassan and Maulvi Ahmed Said arrived in Delhi on
12 June 1920.17 At Dr. Ansari's request, they did not encourage any public demonstration. Maulvi
Ahmed Said, however, delivered an inflammatory speech urging religious students to do all in
their power to harm the English. On the 22nd of March, however, dissatisfied Khilafat members
outside the leadership formed their own Khilafat Workers' Association in order to better ensure
their opinions were heard.18 It seems more than coincidental that Asaf Ali, the founder of the
Home Rule League who also happened to be present in Delhi at that time, successfully urged the
local syces to form a trade union and demand an increase in pay immediately after Maulvi
Ahmed Said's address.19 In this instance, it is significant that there was apparently a considerable
gap between the Central Khilafat Committee's priorities and those of the workers; it is equally
significant that the workers chose to voice their more specific set of concerns still within the
framework of the Khilafat movement, and that these concerns were streamlined into the
beginnings of action against the government that could easily lend itself to the non-cooperation
platform. Furthermore, in these two instances, it is clear that the Khilafat movement was eager to
associate itself with local demands, even if it did not claim direct responsibility for the
corresponding action (e.g. the Kisan Sabha rallies, for instance, stayed Kisan Sabha rallies,
although the Khilafat volunteers had organized them). Their involvement in these organizations
allowed them to associate the success of the Khilafat movement with the realization of local
goals. Khilafat volunteers at a Kisan Sabha meeting in Faizabad (December 1920) assured
tenants that there would be no more evictions should Ghandi achieve home rule.20 In Bengal, a
very similar collaboration developed, most likely aided by the harvest failures, price rises, and
epidemics of the past several years; slogans of Khilafat protests emphasized swaraj over the
...even in the remote bazaars the common folk talked of the Congress and Swaraj but
the word 'Khilafat' bore a strange meaning in most of the rural areas. People thought it
came from khilaf, an Urdu word meaning 'against' or 'opposed to,' and so they took it to
mean: opposed to Government!22
Thus, by integrating the Khilafat movement so heavily with local concerns, the symbol of the
caliphate took on yet another meaning in the provinces: independence and economic well-being
This strategy, however, could sometimes prove a double-edged sword. In several cases,
local organizations sought to use the Khilafat movement for their own ends. One of the
resolutions adopted at the All-India Khilafat Conference in Calcutta (19 March 1924),23 'The
Draft Hindu-Muslim Pact,' does not actually refer to the mentioned pact, but to a power struggle
for communal shares in representation within a body comprised of Bengal Provincial Congress
Committee and the Khilafat provincial committee. In cases like this, in which a local body
overtly moved to place their own demands ahead of that of the Khilafat movement, the ideology
that the movement sought to spread stood in very real danger of complete eclipse. Possibly the
worst instance occurred in Malabar in 1921. In much the same manner as with the Kisan
movement in Uttar Pradesh, the local Khilafat committees in Malabar worked with the Tenants'
League, which tried (often unsuccessfully) to protect peasants from the eviction policies of their
(often Hindu) landlords. Khilafat volunteer groups grew around this framework, and called for a
type of non-cooperation that did not exclude violence. Alarmed, Congress and Khilafat leaders
tried to emphasize the real political goals of the Khilafat movement in the region. In February of
1921,24 Yaqub Hasan (affilliated with the Khilafat movement) arrived in Malabar to hold a non-
cooperation meeting (presumably in accordance with the real, non-violent principles that the
movement championed). The district government, however, arrested him and his three local
aides, sentenced them to six months' imprisonment, and banned all further political meetings. In
the face of further organized agitation, the government blamed Khilafat volunteers. This, and the
rumor that British police had desecrated a mosque, sparked an angry mob that soon escalated
into a full-on revolt. In the subsequent violence, the Mappillas targeted both the Government
forces and the Hindu landlords, burning estates, plantations and temples, and forcing conversions
while carrying Khilafat flags and, in some villages, proclaiming Khilafat kingdoms. Although the
British acknowledged both the impoverished condition of the tenants and the region's long
history of violent resistance, they identified the Khilafat-inspired religious tones of the uprising
as its main cause of the revolt. The official Home Government report emphasizes the role of the
It was also reported that there were growing indications of incitement to fanatical
outbreak incitment coming from the local Khilafat Committee the tour of the Ali
brothers and Ghandiji in the latter part of April left behind an aftermath of intensive
activity and the Khilafat movement assumed a more definitely religious aspect.25
The report goes on to state that reports had been received at the beginning of June that the local
Khilafat agitators were enrolling volunteers who were dressed in uniform with the Khilafat
badge and carrying swords.26 The Khilafat leadership, however, was quick to disown the
Mappillas (accounts of the Revolt do not even appear in the records of the Khilafat provincial
committees27), insisted that the conduct of Moplas [sic] [was] against Islamic teachings and
therefore condemnable,28 and cited the economic grievances and poverty of the tenants as the
main causes of the uprising. It is probable that both the Khilafat leadership and the government
were right (although it is equally probable that the government exaggerated the role of the
Khilafat's religious overtones). Still, it is clear that the provincial Khilafat movement had helped
organize the Mappila peasants, but had also worked so much within the concerns of the Tenants'
League that the Mappillas had misunderstood its principles of non-cooperation and resorted to
violence. For the tenants of Malabar, the caliphate had come to symbolize the redress of their
grievances against the Hindu landlords. Understandably, this was the beginning of a deep
Although the use of volunteers to set up and help run provincial committees allowed the
Khilafat movement to spread quickly, the movement achieved its most successful results (in
terms of adherence to the principles that it presented at a national level and mobilization towards
its stated goals) when it relied on the networks of its main leaders, who recognized the value of a
personal connection with their supporters and often toured to give speeches and rally support.
Educational institutions in particular were key propaganda targets; since the 19th century, any
political movement in India needed its own school to guarantee its success. Furthermore, Gandhi
and the non-cooperation movement in particular had made independence from Government
services, especially including education, an essential element of swaraj. The chance to not only
produce a noticeable and press-worthy effect for the non-cooperation movement while
26 Ibid.
27 Hasan, Regionalizing Pan-Islamism.
28 Zaidi, Sectarian Nationalism and Khilafat, p. 523.
Dlugoleski 14
simultaneously winning ideological supporters was not one to pass up, and the Khilafatists
wasted no time. Within the Khilafat leadership, the brothers Muhammad and Shaukat Ali had
both been educated at Aligarh and had done much work to develop the Old Boys network of
alumni and maintained connections with the student body after graduating; they were particularly
well-placed to return to their alma mater, appeal to the students, and challenge the trustees on the
issue of cooperation with the Government. On 11 October 1920, Shaukat Ali sponsored a
resolution at the Moradabad Provincial Conference pushing the withdrawal of students from
for Aligarh in five minutes so that, with God's help, I may reduce [sic] into practice the
resolution I am placing before you and may show to the world that Muslims at least will not
tolerate the ridicule of Islam.30 Khilafat Day took place six days later (17 October). By 19
October, The Times of India ran a brief column: Aligarh College. Serious Situation.31 The
article described the situation at the college as grave and never actually clarified what this
The Syndicate and staff are unanimous in upholding the traditional policy of the
institution. The Syndicate appeals to the press and public and especially the Mahomedan
community [sic] the Trustees and old boys to rise to the occasion and support in
maintaining the College and saving it from ruin.
The same day, The Leader of Allahabad ran a similar column: Aligarh Threatens to Boycott.32
This time, the article described the success of Khilafat Day in the whole town all shops, both
of Hindus and Mahomedans, were closed and published the resolution passed on the occasion,
in which Muslim India33 expressed its determination to boycott British goods if unacceptable
peace terms with Turkey were reached. Significantly, The Leader does not include any of the
main Khilafat leadership in its list of officials' attendance, including Shaukat Ali. The next day,
however, The Times produced another, much longer, column that anticipated the arrival of Abdul
Kalam Azad. It reported that Maulana Azad Ali had already harangued34 the students, and
stated that it is feared that the boys may leave school at any moment. A large number of
messages have been received from parents. Some have actually come to Aligarh, but they find
their sons for the time being out of control.35 The paper added that other schools had declared
themselves willing to follow Aligarh's example, should the students choose to walk out. It is
clear that Shaukat Ali's personal visit, accompanied by his appeal to the students, set the stage for
this situation. He, his brother Muhammad, and Gandhi all had arrived at Aligarh on 12 October,36
and addressed the trustees, staff and students, and, when the staff proved unreceptive, only the
students, urging them not to cooperate with a Government that limited their religious freedom.
The student non-cooperation movement soon produced the bulk of the Khilafat volunteer corps;
it is telling, then, that although students at secular institutions like Aligarh likely ranked the
preservation of the caliphate in Turkey fairly low on their list of priorities, they still rallied
around its symbol, which the Ali brothers had used to represent a government that would respect
religious freedom the same way that they presented their movement to the Shi'a in order to
The Ali brothers' use of their personal connections at Aligarh worked extremely well. The
most effective network that much of the Khilafat leadership had available was, however, the
'ulama; the Khilafatists often relied on them for mass-mobilization and the dissemination of their
message in the mosques. This is hardly surprising, given that a large part of the Khilafat
leadership were 'ulama themselves. Abdul Bari, possibly the greatest public relations asset to the
Khilafat movement, in particular enjoyed a great hold on the Muslim population of India. He was
himself an 'alim of Firangi Mahal and a Qadiriyya Sufi pir. Not only did this give him great
prestige, but it also enabled him to tap into a network of literally thousands of followers all over
India. Abdul Bari operated both through organizations like the Anjuman-i Mu'idu'l-Islam of
Lucknow (founded to further the interests of the Muslim community), and through religious
gatherings like the 'urs of Khwaja Muinud-din Chishti at Ajmer, at which sajjada nashins of Sufi
shrines, other 'ulama, and groups of wealthy, educated elite members of society were all present.
At the very beginning of the Khilafat movement's centralization in 1919, Abdul Bari worked
hard to secure a unanimous fatwa on the question of the caliphate and the Muslim holy places.
Although he succeeded in the end, the 'ulama of Deoband, Bengal and the Punjab refused to
sign, as did a handful of Bari's rivals from Firangi Mahal. In the end, the signatories reflected
Abdul Bari's family and Firangi Mahal connections in a group of Sufis and 'ulama from
More importantly, however, the 'ulama could replicate the Khilafat's mobilization of
personal networks through their local congregations. Furthermore, it was only with their sanction
that the Khilafatists could legitimately continue to push the nationalist cause in religious terms.
(When Hakim Ajmal Khan and Dr. Ansari, both prominent leaders in the movement, prematurely
broke with this religious symbol in 1922, it ruined their careers.38) More than the press, local
organizations, or even personal visits and networking, the Khilafat movement needed the 'ulama
as the real connection between them and the provinces. Thus, the role of the 'ulama merits a very
rather, they had their own agenda and demands. The 'ulama of India, urged on by none other than
Abdul Bari, sought their own unification in much the same way as the Khilafat movement, and at
the exact same time, resulting in the creation of the Jama'at i-Ulama i-Hind. The 'ulama of the
Jama'at were not completely successful in their goal Deoband, for instance, still remained aloof
and would not involve themselves directly in the political scene, but the fact remains that they
had, for the most part, a set of standards for an Islamic government (e.g. a return to shari'a)
which allowed them to identify with the goals of the Khilafat movement. While they were
willing to enthusiastically support the Khilafat nationalist agenda, they also fully expected the
emigration, refers to the example of the Prophet Muhammad, who left Mecca with his
followers and retreated temporarily to Medina in 622 AD, only to return and reconquer the holy
city and begin the spread of Islam through the Muslim conquests. In April of 1920, the Amir of
freedom and pledged himself to the cause of the caliphate a position that
his delegation to the Government of India reiterated later that month.39 The
Afghan government, in fact, never meant this offer seriously; they voiced it
only to pressure the British. This was not, however, the first mention of the
The Ali brothers had come close to advocating the options of either jihad or
When a land is not safe for Islam a Muslim has only two alternatives,
Jihad or Hijrat. That is to say, he must either make use of every force
God has given him for the liberation of the land and the ensurement
[sic] of perfect freedom for the practice and preaching of Islam, or he
must migrate to some other and freer land with a view to return[ing] to
it when it is once more safe for Islam In view of our weak condition,
migration is the only alternative for us.41
pressure the British and claim theological legitimacy with this statement, but
other Khilafatists, like Zafar Ali Khan and Abdul Kalam Azad, also supported
the idea. Thus, upon hearing the offer from the Afghan government, several
1928, The Times of India had also published a copy of the speech.43 The
'ulama (both outside of and within the Khilafat leadership), however, were
India was dar al-harb, or dar al-Islam. When consulted by some members of
the grounds that India was still dar al-Islam hijrat was not mandatory, and
the flight of Indian Muslims would actually hurt the cause of Islam within the
country. He added that he would prefer to wait for the opinion of the Jama'at-
41 Reetz, Dietrich. Hijrat: The Flight of the Faithful. A British File on the Exodus of Muslim Peasants from North
India to Afghanistan in 1920. Berlin: Druckerei Weinart, 1995. Print.
42 Originally cited in Qureshi, 'The 'Ulama of British India and the Hijrat of 1920,' p. 44.
43 "Message from the Amir." The Times of India 28 Aug. 1920. ProQuest Historical Newspapers. Web. 13 Apr.
2012.
44 Qureshi article p. 47
Dlugoleski 19
Multiple 'ulama from across India (some of them Khilafatists) challenged him
and argued that, since the British had replaced shari'a with their own legal
system, India was undeniably dar al-harb, and hijrat obligatory for the
faithful. Although Bari still refused to bend, Abdul Kalam Azad eventually
produced the fatwa sanctioning emigration but added that, since it was
time, the Hijrat movement developed within the framework of the Khilafat
Both the 'ulama and the volunteers also began a propaganda campaign.
While this included posters advertising the proper arrangements for hijrat
before leaving, many other aspects of the effort were much darker, and
came predominantly from the maulawis and mullahs. Rumors flew that the
British had destroyed the Ka'aba and taken Mecca and Medina, or that the
45 Qureshi article 50
46 Regionalizing Pan-Islam 369
Dlugoleski 20
muhajirin fertile tracts of land, and that they would be helped and fed by
regarding the occupation and defilement of the Holy Places by British troops
The role of the 'ulama in this process is telling. Although in many cases
Khilafat volunteers pressed for action, the 'ulama were the main driving
force, both behind the fatwa that sanctioned emigration (Azad only delivered
the fatwa after Bari refused to change his position under fire from members
of the 'ulama) and in convincing the masses to follow through with the
muhajirin had already crossed into Afghanistan. A week later, the number of
important to remember that the 'ulama were not unified on the question of
hijrat but in spite of this, thousands of people sold their property and
crossed to Afghanistan. If nothing else, this shows just how much an effect
an individual 'alim could have within his own personal network. It is equally
important to recall that the Khilfat leadership hesitated over the question;
they themselves were divided, with prominent leaders like Hasrat Mohani, Dr.
Ansari, Dr. Kitchlew and Asaf Ali firmly against the movement. Although the
had already begun emigrating. Earlier, the Central Committee (and the
Jama'at-i Ulama) had refused to patronize the Hijrat movement, and declared
it optional. And yet the Hijrat movement developed always within the
decked in Turkish flags.53 The 'ulama, even divided, could exercise such
control because they were (literally) the legitimizing factor of the Khilafat
symbols as they pleased. In this case, they did so in a way that completely
disregarded its nationalist agenda and the political caliphate itself, and
pushed a purely religious solution to British rule. The 'ulama, in the end, used
exactly the same strategy that the Khilafat movement had used in the
platform, tempered their message to fit their audience (i.e. the references to
tracts of land and material help from fellow Muslims must have been keenly
The Hijrat movement did not itself derail the Khilafat cause. It began in the spring and
summer of 1920, while the Khilafat realized its most successful mass-mobilization campaigns
either that year or in 1921. The Mappila Revolt of 1921 did much more damage to the
movement's reputation and goals. But the Hijrat movement is indicative of the larger tensions
inherent in the organization that caused its fracture, even before the Turks abolished the caliphate
in 1923. As early as 1921, moderates in the Central Khilafat Committee suggested working
towards a revision of the Treaty of Sevres, in light of Mustafa Kemal's victories.54 They
encountered resistance from other members who opposed working with the British and
working towards a solution to the caliphate question that would produce no foreseeable progress
for Indian nationalism. In the meantime, severe government reprisals after violent riots upon the
visit of the Prince of Wales (17 November 1921) and the deepening mistrust between Hindus and
Muslims after the Mappila Revolt of 1921 presented the Khilafat leadership with a formidable
series of challenges to their unity. In December of that year, a group of 'ulama headed by Hasrat
Mohani challenged non-violence on religious grounds.55 With the Ali brothers in jail at the time,
the moderate Khilafat leadership found itself hard pressed to refute their demands, since they
needed the 'ulama to relate to the masses. The final split occurred with the development of the
Tabligh movement, led by the 'ulama not against the British, but against the Hindus. For
supporters and leaders alike, the caliphate had been the symbol that had brought them together
where Muhammad Ali's two circles, India and Islam, overlapped. While it had created a support
base, however, it had not created a unified ideological following. Rather, the varied and
decentralized way in which the Khilafat movement presented the symbol of the caliphate at the
international, national, and local levels paved the way for the movement to splinter under
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