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WRIT OF AMPARO

VIVARES v ST. THERESAS COLLEGE


GR No. 202666
September 29, 2014
DOCTRINE:
Nothing in the Rule would suggest that the habeas data protection shall be available only against abuses of a person or entity engaged in the business of
gathering, storing, and collecting of data. It does not necessarily mean that the activity must be done in pursuit of a business. What matters is that the person or
entity must be gathering, collecting or storing said data or information about the aggrieved party or his or her family.
FACTS:
Angela Tan together with her classmate (NenitaDaluz and Julienne Suzara), who are graduating students of St. Theresas College (STC) took photos of
themselves wearing only their undergarments which was uploaded by Angela on Facebook.
Some of their classmates reported said photos to their teacher Escudero. Escudero, through her students, viewed and downloaded said pictures. She showed the
said pictures to STCs Discipline-in-Charge for appropriate action.
Later, STC found Tan et al to have violated the students handbook and banned them from marching in their graduation ceremonies scheduled in March 2012.
The petitioners then filed a petition Injunction and Damages which in turn the court issued a TRO enjoining the school from barring the students in the graduation
ceremonies, however the STC still barred the said students.

Subsequently, Rhonda Vivares, mother of Nenita, and the other mothers filed a petition for the issuance of the writ of habeas data against the school. They
argued, among others, that:
1. The privacy setting of their childrens Facebook accounts was set at Friends Only. They, thus, have a reasonable expectation of privacy which must be
respected.
2. The photos accessed belong to the girls and, thus, cannot be used and reproduced without their consent. Escudero, however, violated their rights by saving
digital copies of the photos and by subsequently showing them to STCs officials. Thus, the Facebook accounts of the children were intruded upon;
3. The intrusion into the Facebook accounts, as well as the copying of information, data, and digital images happened at STCs Computer Laboratory;
They prayed that STC be ordered to surrender and deposit with the court all soft and printed copies of the subject data and have such data be declared illegally
obtained in violation of the childrens right to privacy. RTC denied.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petition for writ of habeas data is proper.

HELD:
The writ of habeas data is a remedy available to any person whose right to privacy in life, liberty or security is violated or threatened by an unlawful act or omission
of a public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing of data or information regarding the person, family,
home and correspondence of the aggrieved party.
The writ, however, will not issue on the basis merely of an alleged unauthorized access to information about a person. Availment of the writ requires the existence
of a nexus between the right to privacy on the one hand, and the right to life, liberty or security on the other. Thus, the existence of a persons right to informational
privacy and a showing, at least by substantial evidence, of an actual or threatened violation of the right to privacy in life, liberty or security of the victim are
indispensable before the privilege of the writ may be extended
The Supreme Court ruled that:
1. The petition for writ of habeas data can be availed of even if this is not a case of extralegal killing or enforced disappearance; and
2. The writ of habeas data can be availed of against STC even if it is not an entity engaged in the business of gathering, collecting, or storing data or information
regarding the person, family, home and correspondence of the aggrieved party.
Habeas data, to stress, was designed "to safeguard individual freedom from abuse in the information age." As such, it is erroneous to limit its applicability to
extralegal killings and enforced disappearances only.
Respondents contention that the habeas data writ may not issue against STC, it not being an entity engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing of data or
information regarding the person, family, home and correspondence of the aggrieved party, while valid to a point, is, nonetheless, erroneous.
As provided under Section 1. Habeas Data. The writ of habeas datais a remedy available to any person whose right to privacy in life, liberty or security is violated
or threatened by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing of
data or information regarding the person, family, home and correspondence of the aggrieved party.
To be sure, nothing in the Rule would suggest that the habeas data protection shall be available only against abuses of a person or entity engaged in the
businessof gathering, storing, and collecting of data. It does not necessarily mean that the activity must be done in pursuit of a business. What matters is that the
person or entity must be gathering, collecting or storing said data or information about the aggrieved party or his or her family. Whether such undertaking carries
the element of regularity, as when one pursues a business, and is in the nature of a personal endeavour, for any other reason or even for no reason at all, is
immaterial and such will not prevent the writ from getting to said person or entity

Caram v. Atty. Segui

Facts:
Petitioner Ma. Christina Yusay Caramhad an amorous relationship with Marcelino Gicano
Constantino III and eventually became pregnant with the latters child without the benefit of
marriage.
During this time, she intended to have the child adopted through Sun and Moon Home for
Children in Paraaque City to avoid placing her family in a potentially embarrassing situation for
having a second illegitimate son.
On July 26, 2009, Christina gave birth to Baby Julian. Sun and Moon shouldered all the
hospital and medical expenses.
On August 13, 2009, Christina voluntarily surrendered Baby Julian by way of a Deed of
Voluntary Commitment to the DSWD.

Issue:
Whether or not writ of Amparo is the proper remedy available to the Petitioner.
Ruling:
No. Christinas directly accusing the respondents of forcibly separating her from her child
and placing the latter up for adoption, supposedly without complying with the necessary legal
requisites to qualify the child for adoption, clearly indicates that she is not searching for a lost
child but asserting her parental authority over the child and contesting custody over him.
Since it is extant from the pleadings filed that what is involved is the issue of child custody
and the exercise of parental rights over a child, who, for all intents and purposes, has been legally
considered a ward of the State, the Amparo rule cannot be properly applied.
The privilege of the writ of amparo is a remedy available to victims of extra-judicial killings
and enforced disappearances or threats of a similar nature, regardless of whether the perpetrator
of the unlawful act or omission is a public official or employee or a private individual. It is
envisioned basically to protect and guarantee the right to life, liberty and security of persons, free
from fears and threats that vitiate the quality of life.

Pador vs Arcayan

Case Doctrine: To be entitled to the privilege of the Writ of Amparo , there must be substantial
evidence that their rights to life, liberty and security are being violated or threatened by an unlawful act or
omission.

Facts :
February 2008, rumors circulated that petitioner Nerio Pador was a marijuana planter in Barangay
Tabunan, Cebu City. Respondents Alberto Alivio, Carmelo Revales and Roberto Alimorin (Barangay
Tanods) raided their ampalaya farm to search for marijuana plants, but found none.
After the raid, petitioners Nerio and Rey Pador received invitation letters for a conference from
respondent Barangay Captain Arcayan. They referred the invitation letters to their counsel, who
advised them not to attend and, instead, send a letter-reply to Barangay Captain Arcayan. When the
latter received the letter-reply, he allegedly read its contents, got one copy, and refused to sign a
receipt of the document.
Petitioners then concluded that the conduct of the raid, the sending of the invitation letters, the refusal
of respondent barangay captain to receive their letter-reply as well as the possibility of more
harassment cases, false accusations, and possible violence from respondents gravely threatened
their right to life, liberty and security and necessitated the issuance of a writ of amparo.

Issue: WON a Writ of Amparo should be issued

Ruling: NO
SEC. 1. Petition. The petition for a writ of amparo is a remedy available to any person whose right
to life, liberty and security is violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission of a
public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity.

The writ shall cover extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or threats thereof.

Thus,to be entitled to the privilege of the writ, petitioners must prove by substantial evidence that their
rights to life, liberty and security are being violated or threatened by an unlawful act or omission.
The alleged intrusion upon petitioners ampalaya farm is an insufficient ground to grant the privilege
of the writ of amparo. Granting that the intrusion occurred, it was merely a violation of petitioners
property rights. The writ of amparo does not envisage the protection of concerns that are purely
property or commercial in nature
The allegation of petitioner that they can anticipate more harassment cases, false accusations and possible
violence from respondents is baseless, unfounded, and grounded merely on pure speculations and
conjectures

DE LIMA, ET AL. vs GATDULAN

CASE DOCTRINE: It is the Return that serves as the responsive pleading for petitions for the issuance of Writs of Amparo. It
allows the respondents to frame the issues subject to a hearing. Hence, it should be done prior to the hearing, not after.

FACTS:

- Respondent Magtanggol Gatdula filed a Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Amparo in the RTC of Manila on Feb. 27,
2012
- The Amparo was directed against petitioners. Respondent wanted De Lima, et al. to cease and desist from framing up
Gatdula for the fake ambush incident by filing bogus charges of Frustrated Murder against the respondent in relation to
the alleged ambush incident.
- Instead of deciding on whether to issue a Writ of Amparo, the judge ordered De Lima to file an answer. At the hearing,
De Limas counsel manifested that a Return and not an Answer, is appropriate for Amparo Cases.
- In an Order dated 2 March, The Judge insisted that since no writ has been issued, return is not the required pleading
but answer. The judge noted that the Rules of Court apply suppletorily in Amparo cases. He opined that the Revised
Rules of Summary Procedure applied and thus required an Answer.
- Judge Pampilo proceeded to conduct a hearing on the main case on 7 March 2012. Even without a Return nor an
Answer, he ordered the parties to file their respective memoranda within five (5) working days after that hearing. Since
the period to file an Answer had not yet lapsed by then, the judge also decided that the memorandum of De Lima, et al.
would be filed in lieu of their Answer.
- On 20 March, the RTC rendered a Decision granting the issuance of the Writ of Amparo. The RTC also granted the
interim reliefs prayed for, namely: temporary protection, production and inspection orders.
- RTC denied the petitioners MoR.
- Thus this Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45, assailing the RTC Decision on March 20.

ISSUES:

1. Won Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 is proper in this case
2. Won a Return or an Answer is appropriate in this case
HELD:
1.) NO. It is the Courts view that the Decision dated 20 March 2012 granting the writ of Amparo is not the judgment or
final order contemplated under this rule. Hence, a Petition for Review under Rule 45 may not yet be the proper remedy
at this time. This Decision pertained to the issuance of the writ under Section 6 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo, not
the judgment under Section 18. The Decision is thus an interlocutory order, as suggested by the fact that temporary
protection, production and inspection orders were given together with the decision. The temporary protection,
production and inspection orders are interim reliefs that may be granted by the court upon filing of the petition but
before final judgment is rendered.
2.) The insistence on filing of an Answer was inappropriate. It is the Return that serves as the responsive pleading for
petitions for the issuance of Writs of Amparo. The requirement to file an Answer is contrary to the intention of the Court
to provide a speedy remedy to those whose right to life, liberty and security are violated or are threatened to be
violated. In utter disregard of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo, Judge Pampilo insisted on issuing summons and requiring
an Answer basing it on Sec. 25 of A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC. It is clear from this rule that this type of summary procedure only
applies to MTC/MTCC/MCTCs. It is mind-boggling how this rule could possibly apply to proceedings in an RTC. Aside
from that, this Court limited the application of summary procedure to certain civil and criminal cases. A writ of Amparo
is a special proceeding. It is not a civil nor a criminal action, hence, the application of the Revised Rule on Summary
Procedure is seriously misplaced. It was erroneous that a memorandum was allowed instead of filing a Return. The
Return in Amparo cases allows the respondents to frame the issues subject to a hearing. Hence, it should be done prior
to the hearing, not after. A memorandum, on the other hand, is a synthesis of the claims of the party litigants and is a
final pleading usually required before the case is submitted for decision. One cannot substitute for the other since these
submissions have different functions in facilitating the suit. More importantly, a memorandum is a prohibited pleading
under the Rule on the Writ of Amparo.

The court nullified the Judges orders and directed him to determined within 48 hours whether the issuance of the Writ of
Amparo is proper on the basis of the petition and its attached affidavits.

NOTE:

The privilege of the Writ of Amparo should be distinguished from the actual order called the Writ of Amparo. The privilege
includes availment of the entire procedure outlined in A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC, the Rule on the Writ of Amparo. After examining the
petition and its attached affidavits, the Return and the evidence presented in the summary hearing, the judgment should detail
the required acts from the respondents that will mitigate, if not totally eradicate, the violation of or the threat to the petitioner's
life, liberty or security.

A judgment which simply grants the privilege of the writ cannot be executed. It is tantamount to a failure of the judge to
intervene and grant judicial succor to the petitioner. Petitions filed to avail of the privilege of the Writ of Amparo arise out of
very real and concrete circumstances. Judicial responses cannot be as tragically symbolic or ritualistic as granting the privilege
of the Writ of Amparo.

LEE v. Ilagan

Facts:

Ilagan and Lee are former common law partners.


He visited Lee in her condominium, rested for a while and went to his office. Upon arrival, Ilagan noticed that his digital
camera was missing.
Lee confronted Ilagan at the latters office regarding a purported sex video she discovered from that camera, but to no
avail, Ilagan slammed Lees head against a wall in his office and walked away.
After which Lee utilized the video as evidence in filing various complaints such as VAWC and administrative complaint in
NAPOLCOM where Ilagan works.
Ilagan claimed that Lees acts of reproducing the sex video and threatening to distribute the same to the upper echelons
at NAPOLCOM and uploading it to the internet violated his privacy and that of the other woman and therefore the
issuance of a writ of habeas data in his favor is warranted.

ISSUE: Is the privilege of the writ of habeas data in favor of Ilagan warranted?

Held: No. For the writ of habeas data will be issued, the right to privacy must be related to the right to life, liberty, or security.

As defined in Section 1 of the Habeas Data Rule, the writ of habeas data now stands as a remedy
available to any person whose right to privacy in life, liberty or security is violated or threatened
by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity
engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing of data or information regarding the person,
family, home, and correspondence of the aggrieved party. Thus, in order to support a petition
for the issuance of such writ, Section 6 of the Habeas Data Rule essentially requires that the petition
sufficiently alleges, among others, [t]he manner the right to privacy is violated or threatened
and how it affects the right to life, liberty or security of the aggrieved party. In other words,
the petition must adequately show that there exists a nexus between the right to privacy on the
one hand, and the right to life, liberty or security on the other .19 Corollarily, the allegations in
the petition must be supported by substantial evidence showing an actual or threatened violation of
the right to privacy in life, liberty or security of the victim the writ of habeas data will not issue to
protect purely property or commercial concerns nor when the grounds invoked in support of the
petitions therefor are vague and doubtful.

In this case, the Court finds that Ilagan was not able to sufficiently allege that his right to privacy in
life, liberty or security was or would be violated through the supposed reproduction and threatened
dissemination of the subject sex video. While Ilagan purports a privacy interest in the suppression of
this video which he fears would somehow find its way to public consumption he failed to explain
the connection between such interest and any violation of his right to life, liberty or security. Indeed,
courts cannot speculate or contrive versions of possible transgressions. As the rules and existing
jurisprudence on the matter evoke, alleging and eventually proving the nexus between ones privacy
right to the cogent rights to life, liberty or security are crucial in habeas data cases, so much so that a
failure on either account certainly renders a habeas data petition dismissible, as in this case.
the petition would equally be dismissible due to the inadequacy of the evidence presented. all that
Ilagan submitted was his self-serving testimony which hardly meets the substantial evidence
requirement as prescribed by the Habeas Data Rule. This is because nothing therein would indicate
that Lee actually proceeded to commit any overt act towards the end of violating Ilagans right to
privacy in life, liberty or security. Nor would anything on record even lead a reasonable mind to
concludethat Lee was going to use the subject video in order to achieve unlawful ends say for
instance, to spread it to the public so as to ruin Ilagans reputation. Contrastingly, Lee even made it
clear in her testimony that the only reason why she reproduced the subject video was to legitimately
utilize the same as evidence in the criminal and administrative cases that she filed against Ilagan.
MARYNETTE R. GAMBOA
vs.
P/SSUPT. MARLOU C. CHAN, in his capacity as the PNP-Provincial Director of Ilocos Norte, and P/SUPT. WILLIAM 0. FANG, in his capacity as Chief, Intelligence Division,
PNP Provincial Office, Ilocos Norte
G.R. No. 193636 July 24, 2012
Topic: The state interest of dismantling PAGs far outweighs the alleged intrusion on the private life of Gamboa, especially when the collection and
forwarding by the PNP of information against her was pursuant to a lawful mandate.
Facts: President GMA issued AO 275, "Creating an Independent Commission to Address the Alleged Existence of Private Armies in the Country." The body,
which was later on referred to as the Zearosa Commission, was formed to investigate the existence of private army groups (PAGs) in the country.
Petitioner Gamboa, Mayor of Dingras, Ilocos Norte, alleged that the PNP-Ilocos Norte conducted a series of surveillance operations against her and her aides, and
classified her as someone who keeps a PAG. Purportedly without the benefit of data verification, PNP-Ilocos Norte forwarded the information gathered on her to
the Zearosa Commission, thereby causing her inclusion in the Reports enumeration of individuals maintaining PAGs.
Through a broadcast by ABS-CBN and publication on print media, Gamboa averred she was publicly tagged as someone who maintains a PAG on the basis of the
unverified information that the PNP-Ilocos Norte.
Contending that her right to privacy was violated and her reputation maligned and destroyed, Gamboa filed a Petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas data
against respondents in their capacities as officials of the PNP-Ilocos Norte.
Trial court dismissed the Petition on the ground that Gamboa failed to prove through substantial evidence that the subject information originated from respondents,
and that they forwarded this database to the Zearosa Commission without the benefit of prior verification.
Issue: Whether petitioner is entitled to a writ of habeas data.
Held: No. Forwarding of information or intelligence report gathered by the PNP to the Commission is not an intrusion of petitioners right to privacy.
The right to privacy
Clearly, the right to privacy is considered a fundamental right that must be protected from intrusion or constraint. However, in Standard Chartered Bank v. Senate
Committee on Banks, this Court underscored that the right to privacy is not absolute, viz:
With respect to the right of privacy which petitioners claim respondent has violated, suffice it to state that privacy is not an absolute right. While it is true
that Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution, guarantees respect for the rights of persons affected by the legislative investigation, not every invocation of
the right to privacy should be allowed to thwart a legitimate congressional inquiry. In Sabio v. Gordon, we have held that the right of the people to
access information on matters of public concern generally prevails over the right to privacy of ordinary financial transactions. In that case, we
declared that the right to privacy is not absolute where there is an overriding compelling state interest. Employing the rational basis relationship
test, as laid down in Morfe v. Mutuc, there is no infringement of the individuals right to privacy as the requirement to disclosure information is for a valid
purpose, in this case, to ensure that the government agencies involved in regulating banking transactions adequately protect the public who invest in
foreign securities. Suffice it to state that this purpose constitutes a reason compelling enough to proceed with the assailed legislative investigation.
Therefore, when the right to privacy finds tension with a competing state objective, the courts are required to weigh both notions. In these cases, although
considered a fundamental right, the right to privacy may nevertheless succumb to an opposing or overriding state interest deemed legitimate and compelling.
The Writ of Habeas Data
The writ of habeas data is an independent and summary remedy designed to protect the image, privacy, honor, information, and freedom of information of an
individual, and to provide a forum to enforce ones right to the truth and to informational privacy. It seeks to protect a persons right to control information regarding
oneself, particularly in instances in which such information is being collected through unlawful means in order to achieve unlawful ends. It must be emphasized that
in order for the privilege of the writ to be granted, there must exist a nexus between the right to privacy on the one hand, and the right to life, liberty or security on
the other. Section 1 of the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data reads:
Habeas data. The writ of habeas data is a remedy available to any person whose right to privacy in life, liberty or security is violated or threatened by
an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing of data
information regarding the person, family, home and correspondence of the aggrieved party.
The determination of whether the privilege of the writ of habeas data, being an extraordinary remedy, may be granted in this case entails a delicate balancing of
the alleged intrusion upon the private life of Gamboa and the relevant state interest involved.
The Constitution explicitly mandates the dismantling of private armies and other armed groups not recognized by the duly constituted authority. It also provides for
the establishment of one police force that is national in scope and civilian in character, and is controlled and administered by a national police commission.
Taking into account these constitutional fiats, it is clear that the issuance of A.O. 275 articulates a legitimate state aim, which is to investigate the existence of
PAGs with the ultimate objective of dismantling them permanently.
SC held that Gamboa was able to sufficiently establish that the data contained in the Report listing her as a PAG coddler came from the PNP. Contrary to the
ruling of the trial court, however, the forwarding of information by the PNP to the Zearosa Commission was not an unlawful act that violated or threatened her
right to privacy in life, liberty or security.
The PNP was rationally expected to forward and share intelligence regarding PAGs with the body specifically created for the purpose of investigating the existence
of these notorious groups. Moreover, the Zearosa Commission was explicitly authorized to deputize the police force in the fulfillment of the formers mandate, and
thus had the power to request assistance from the latter.
The fact that the PNP released information to the Zearosa Commission without prior communication to Gamboa and without affording her the opportunity to
refute the same cannot be interpreted as a violation or threat to her right to privacy since that act is an inherent and crucial component of intelligence-gathering
and investigation. Additionally, Gamboa herself admitted that the PNP had a validation system, which was used to update information on individuals associated
with PAGs and to ensure that the data mirrored the situation on the field. Thus, safeguards were put in place to make sure that the information collected
maintained its integrity and accuracy.
In this case, respondents admitted the existence of the Report, but emphasized its confidential nature. That it was leaked to third parties and the media was
regrettable, even warranting reproach. But it must be stressed that Gamboa failed to establish that respondents were responsible for this unintended disclosure. In
any event, there are other reliefs available to her to address the purported damage to her reputation, making a resort to the extraordinary remedy of the writ of
habeas data unnecessary and improper.
Gamboa was unable to prove through substantial evidence that her inclusion in the list of individuals maintaining PAGs made her and her supporters susceptible
to harassment and to increased police surveillance. In this regard, respondents sufficiently explained that the investigations conducted against her were in relation
to the criminal cases in which she was implicated. As public officials, they enjoy the presumption of regularity, which she failed to overcome.
It is clear from the foregoing discussion that the state interest of dismantling PAGs far outweighs the alleged intrusion on the private life of Gamboa, especially
when the collection and forwarding by the PNP of information against her was pursuant to a lawful mandate. Therefore, the privilege of the writ of habeas data
must be denied.

Rodriguez v. Macapagal-Arroyo
GR No. 191805 and 193160

Case Doctrine:
1. An inquiry to the entitlement of the writ does not involve an inquiry to the civil, criminal or administrative liability.
2. Classification of inquiry
- Those who may be accountable
Accountability is not direct participation. It is you knowing or seeing but not doing anything
- Those who may be responsible
If you have direct involvement, you are responsible. You have responsibility for the act. You can be named as respondent. The court can order
you to do or not do something
2. For all military operations, there is command responsibility and accountability
3. In order to be accountable, knowledge of the act must be established
4. The interim relief of a temporary protection order is only available before final judgment
- The privilege of the writ of amparo, once granted, necessarily entails the protection of the aggrieve party; there is no need to issue a temporary
protection order independently of the privilege of the writ ofamparo

Facts:
Petitioner Noriel Rodriguez is a member of AlyansaDagitiMannalonIti Cagayan (Kagimungan), apeasant organization affiliated with KilusangMagbubukid
ng Pilipinas (KMP). He claims that the militarytagged KMP as an enemy of the State under the OplanBantayLaya, making its members targets of
extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances.
Rodriguez was abducted by military men and was tortured repeatedly when he refused toconfess to his membership in the NPA.
When released, he filed a Petition for the Writ of Amparo and Petition for the Writ of Habeas Data with Prayers for Protection Orders, Inspection of
Place, andProduction of Documents and Personal Properties.
The petition was filed against former Pres. Arroyo, etal.
The writs were granted but the CA dropped Pres Arroyo as party-respondent, as she may not be suedin any case during her tenure of office or actual
incumbency.

Issues:
1. Whether former Pres GMA should be dropped as respondent on the basis of presidential immunity from suit?
2. Whether the doctrine of command responsibility can be used inamparo and habeas data cases.
3. Whether the president, as commander-in-chief of the military, can be held responsible oraccountable for extrajudicial killings and enforced
disappearances.
4. Whether Rodriguez has proven through substantial evidence that former President Arroyo isresponsible or accountable for his abduction.
5. Whether the interim reliefs prayed for by the Petitioner maybe granted after the writs of amparo and hebeas data have already been issued in his favor.
Held:

1. No. It bears stressing that since there is no determination of administrative, civil or criminalliability in amparo and habeas data proceedings, courts can only go
as far as ascertainingresponsibility or accountability for the enforced disappearance or extrajudicial killing.

As was held in the case of Estrada v Desierto, a non-sitting President does not enjoy immunity from suit, even for acts committed during the latters tenure; that
courts should look with disfavor upon the presidential privilege of immunity, especially when it impedes the search for truth or impairs thevindication of a right. The
deliberations of the Constitutional Commission also reveal that the intent of the framers is clear that presidential immunity from suit is concurrent only with his
tenure and not histerm.
(The term means the time during which the officer may claim to hold the office as of right, andfixes the interval after which the several incumbents shall succeed
one another. The tenure representsthe term during which the incumbent actually holds office. The tenure may be shorter than the term forreasons within or
beyond the power of the incumbent.) Therefore, former Pres. GMA cannot use suchimmunity to shield herself from judicial scrutiny that would assess whether,
within the contextof amparo proceedings, she was responsible or accountable for the abduction of Rodriguez.
2. Yes.
As we explained in Rubrico v. Arroyo, command responsibility pertains to the responsibility of commanders for crimes committed by subordinate
members of the armedforces or other persons subject to their control in international wars or domestic conflict." Although originally used for ascertaining criminal
complicity, the command responsibility doctrine has also found application in civil cases for human rights abuses. This development in the use of command
responsibility in civil proceedings shows that the application of this doctrine has been liberally extended even to cases not criminal in nature. Thus, it is our view
that command responsibility may likewise find application in proceedings seeking the privilege of the writ of amparo.
Precisely in the case at bar, the doctrine of command responsibility may be used to determine whether respondents are accountable for and have the
duty to address the abduction of Rodriguez in order to enable the courts to devise remedial measures to protect his rights. Clearly, nothing precludes this Court
from applying the doctrine of command responsibility in amparo proceedings to ascertain responsibility and accountability in extrajudicial killings and enforced
disappearances.
In other words, command responsibility may be loosely applied in amparo cases in order to identify those accountable individuals that have the power to
effectively implement whatever processes an amparo court would issue. In such application, the amparo court does not impute criminal responsibility but merely
pinpoint the superiors it considers to be in the best position to protect the rights of the aggrieved party. Such identification of the responsible and accountable
superiors may well be a preliminary determination of criminal liability which, of course, is still subject to further investigation by the appropriate government agency.
Thus, although there is no determination of criminal, civil or administrative liabilities, the doctrine of command responsibility may nevertheless be applied
to ascertain responsibility and accountability within these foregoing definitions.

3. Yes.
To hold someone liable under the doctrine of command responsibility, the following elements must:
a. the existence of a superior-subordinate relationship between the accused as superior and the perpetrator of the crime as his subordinate;
b. the superior knew or had reason to know that the crime was about to be or had been committed; and
c. the superior failed to take the necessary and reasonable measures to prevent the criminal acts or punish the perpetrators thereof

The president, being the commander-in-chief of all armed forces, necessarily possesses control over the military that qualifies him as a superior within
the purview of the command responsibility doctrine.

4. No.
Rodriguez anchors his argument on a general allegation that on the basis of the "Melo Commission" and the "Alston Report," respondents in G.R. No.
191805 already had knowledge of and information on, and should have known that a climate of enforced disappearances had been perpetrated on members of the
NPA. Without even attaching, or at the very least, quoting these reports, Rodriguez contends that the Melo Report points to rogue military men as the perpetrators.
While the Alston Report states that there is a policy allowing enforced disappearances and pins the blame on the President, we do not automatically impute
responsibility to former President Arroyo for each and every count of forcible disappearance.
Aside from Rodriguezs general averments, there is no piece of evidence that could establish her responsibility or accountability for his abduction. Neither was
there even a clear attempt to show that she should have known about the violation of his right to life, liberty or security, or that she had failed to investigate, punish
or prevent it.

6. The SC held that provisional relief, such as the interim reliefs of temporary protection order, inspection order and production order are intended to assist
the court before it arrives at a judicious determination of the amparo petition. Being interim reliefs, they can only be granted before a final adjudication of
the case is made. In any case, it must be underscored that the privilege of the writ of amparo, once granted, necessarily entails the protection of the
aggrieved party. Thus, since the Court grant the petitioner the privilege of the writ of amparo, there is no need to issue a temporary protection order
independently of the former.

CHANGE OF NAME

ONDE, Petitioner, v. THE OFFICE OF THE LOCAL CIVIL REGISTRAR OF LAS PIAS CITY

Facts:Petitioner filed a petition for correction of entries in his certificate of live birth before the RTC and
named respondent Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Las Pias City as sole respondent. He prayed for the
following corrections

Entry From To
1) Date and place of marriage of his December 23, 1983 - Not
parents Bicol Married
2) First name of his mother Tely Matilde
3) His first name Franc Ler Francler

The RTC dismissed his petition, noting that the first correction (the date and place of marriage of parents)
are substantial corrections, while the other corrections maybe made before the City Civil Registry under R.A
9048. Francler moved to reconsider, but the RTC denied it, hence he filed a petition for review on certiorari
under Rule 45 to assail the ruling of the RTC.

Hence, the petition to the Supreme Court


Petitioner argues that Rule 108 of the Rules of Court allows a substantial correction of entries in the civil
registry, stating that in Eleosida v. Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City have actually ruled that substantial
changes in the civil registry are now allowed under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.

The OSG on the otherhand, contends that the RTC correctly dismissed the petition for correction of entries.
It points out that the first names of petitioner and his mother can be corrected thru administrative
proceedings under R.A. No. 9048. While the correction of the marriage status of his parents is a substantial
correction affecting his legitimacy. Hence, it must be dealt with in adversarial proceedings where all
interested parties are impleaded.

Issue:

(1) whether the correction on the first name of petitioner and his mother can be done by the city civil
registrar under R.A. No. 9048

(2) whether the entry on petitioners birth certificate that his parents were married on December 23, 1983 in
Bicol to not married is substantial in nature requiring adversarial proceedings.

Held:

Petition Denied.

1. The RTC is correct. The first name of petitioner and his mother as appearing in his birth certificate
can be corrected by the city civil registrar under R.A. No. 9048. Indeed, under Section 15 of R.A. No.
9048, clerical or typographical errors on entries in a civil register can be corrected and changes of
first name can be done by the concerned city civil registrar without need of a judicial order

In Silverio v. Republic it was held that under R.A. No. 9048, jurisdiction over applications for change
of first name is now primarily lodged with administrative officers.

The intent and effect of said law is to exclude the change of first name from the coverage of Rules
103 (Change of Name) and 108 (Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the Civil Registry) of the Rules
of Court, until and unless an administrative petition for change of name is first filed and subsequently
denied. The remedy and the proceedings regulating change of first name are primarily administrative in
nature, not judicial

2. RTC is also correct, in ruling that correcting the entry on petitioners birth certificate that his parents
were married on December 23, 1983 in Bicol to not married is a substantial correction requiring
adversarial proceedings. In Republic v. Uy,it was held that corrections of entries in the civil register
including those on citizenship, legitimacy of paternity or filiation, or legitimacy of marriage, involve
substantial alterations. Substantial errors in a civil registry may be corrected and the true facts
established provided the parties aggrieved by the error avail themselves of the appropriate adversary
proceedings

However in this case SC clarified, that the RTCs dismissal is without prejudice. Petitioner can avail of the
administrative remedy for the correction of his and his mothers first name. He can also file a new petition
before the RTC to correct the alleged erroneous entry on his birth certificate that his parents were married
on December 23, 1983 in Bicol. This substantial correction is allowed under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court

In addition, the court stresses that a petition seeking a substantial correction of an entry in a civil register
must implead as parties to the proceedings not only the local civil registrar, as petitioner did in the dismissed
petition for correction of entries, but also all persons who have or claim any interest which would be affected
by the correction. This is required by Section 3, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.

Republic v. Olaybar, GR 189538, Feb. 10, 2014

FACTS:

Respondent MerlindaOlaybar requested from the National Statistics Office (NSO) a Certificate of No Marriage (CENOMAR) as one of the
requirements for her marriage with her boyfriend of 5 years.
Upon receipt thereof, she discovered that she was already married to a certain Ye Son Sune, a Korean National, on June 24, 2002 at the
MTCC, Palace of Justice.
She denied having contracted said marriage and claimed that she did not know the alleged husband; she did not appear before the
solemnizing officer; and that the signature appearing in the marriage certificate is not hers.
She thus filed a Petition for Cancellation of Entries in the Marriage Contract especially the entries in the wife portion thereof.
She impleaded the Local Civil Registrar of Cebu City and her alleged husband as parties to the case.
During trial, she testified that she could not have appeared before the supposed solemnizing officer at the time the marriage was
allegedly celebrated because she was then in Makati working as a medical distributor in Hansao Pharma.
She also presented as witness an employee of MTCC who confirmed that the marriage of Ye Son Sune was indeed celebrated in their
office, but claimed that the alleged wife who appeared was definitely not respondent.
Lastly, a document examiner testified that the signature appearing in the marriage contract was forged.
The RTC granted the petition in favor of respondent. Finding that the signature appearing in the subject marriage contract was not that
of respondent, the court found basis in granting her prayer to straighten her record and rectify the terrible mistake. The Local Civil
Registrar was directed to cancel all the entries in the WIFE portion of the alleged marriage contract.
The petitioner Republic of the Philippines moved for the reconsideration of the decision on the ground that:
(1) there was no clerical spelling, typographical and other innocuous errors in the marriage contract for it to fall within the
provisions of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court; and
(2) granting the cancellation of all the entries in the wife portion of the alleged marriage contract is, in effect, declaring the
marriage void ab initio.
The court denied the motion for reconsideration. The RTC held that it had jurisdiction to take cognizance of cases for correction of
entries even on substantial errors under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court being the appropriate adversary proceeding required. Considering
that respondents identity was used by an unknown person to contract marriage with a Korean national, it would not be feasible for
respondent to institute an action for declaration of nullity of marriage since it is not one of the void marriages under Art. 35 and 36 of
the Family Code.
ISSUE:

Whether the cancellation of entries in the marriage contract which, in effect, nullifies the marriage may be undertaken in a Rule 108
proceeding

RULING:

No. But in this case, respondent sought, not the nullification of marriage as there was no marriage to speak of, but the correction of the
record of such marriage to reflect the truth as set forth by the evidence. Otherwise stated, in allowing the correction of the subject certificate
of marriage by cancelling the wife portion thereof, the trial court did not, in any way, declare the marriage void as there was no marriage to
speak of.Aside from the certificate of marriage, no such evidence was presented to show the existence of marriage. Rather, respondent
showed by overwhelming evidence that no marriage was entered into and that she was not even aware of such existence. The testimonial
and documentary evidence clearly established that the only "evidence" of marriage which is the marriage certificate was a forgery. While we
maintain that Rule 108 cannot be availed of to determine the validity of marriage, we cannot nullify the proceedings before the trial court
where all the parties had been given the opportunity to contest the allegations of respondent; the procedures were followed, and all the
evidence of the parties had already been admitted and examined.

Republic v Uy
G.R. No. 198010
August 12, 2013

FACTS:
o Respondent filed a Petition for Correction of Entry in her Certificate of Live Birth. Impleaded as respondent is
the Local Civil Registrar of Gingoog City.
o She alleged that she was born on February 8, 1952. Her Certificate of Live Birth shows that her full name is
Anita Sy when in fact she is allegedly known to her family and friends as Norma S. Lugsanay.
o She also alleged that she is an illegitimate child considering that her parents were never married, so she had to
follow the surname of her mother. She also contended that she is a Filipino citizen and not Chinese, and all her
siblings bear the surname Lugsanay and are all Filipinos
o Respondent allegedly filed earlier a petition for correction of entries with the Office of the Local Civil Registrar
of Gingoog City to effect the corrections on her name and citizenship which was supposedly granted. However,
the National Statistics Office (NSO) records did not bear such changes. Hence, the petition before the RTC.
o RTC issued an Order setting the case for hearing, with the directive that the said Order be published in a
newspaper of general circulation and that the order and petition be furnished the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG) and the City Prosecutors Office for their information and guidance.Respondent complied with the
publication requirement.
o RTC issued an Order in favor of respondent and the CA affirmed in toto. The CA held that respondents failure
to implead other indispensable parties was cured upon the publication of the Order setting the case for hearing
in a newspaper of general circulation for three consecutive weeks and by serving a copy of the notice to the
Local Civil Registrar, the OSG and the City Prosecutors Office.
ISSUE:
Whether the petition is dismissible for failure to implead indispensable parties
HELD:
Yes.Cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry is governed by Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. Sec. 3 of
the said Rule provides thatwhen cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil register is sought, the civil registrar
and all persons who have or claim any interest which would be affected thereby shall be made parties to the
proceeding.
In this case, respondent sought the correction of entries in her birth certificate, particularly those pertaining to her first
name, surname and citizenship. She sought the correction allegedly to reflect the name which she has been known for
since childhood. She likewise relied on the birth certificates of her full blood siblings who bear the surname
Lugsanay instead of Sy and citizenship of Filipino instead of Chinese. The changes, however, are obviously
not mere clerical as they touch on respondents filiation and citizenship. In changing her surname,she in effect changes
her status from legitimate to illegitimate; and in changing her citizenship from Chinese to Filipino, the same affects her
rights and obligations in this country. Clearly, the changes are substantial.
In this case, it was only the Local Civil Registrar of Gingoog City who was impleaded as respondent.
Respondents birth certificate shows that her full name is Anita Sy, that she is a Chinese citizen and a legitimate child
of Sy Ton and SoteraLugsanay. In filing the petition, however, she seeks the correction of her first name and surname,
her status from legitimate to illegitimate and her citizenship from Chinese to Filipino. Thus, respondent should
have impleaded and notified not only the Local Civil Registrar but also her parents and siblings as the persons who
have interest and are affected by the changes or corrections respondent wanted to make.
A reading of Sections 4 and 5, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court shows that the Rules mandate two sets of notices to
different potential oppositors: one given to the persons named in the petition and another given to other persons who
are not named in the petition but nonetheless may be considered interested or affected parties.
Doctrine: When the change of name will result to the change of status, from legitimate to illegitimate, RULE 108 shall apply

Republic v. Coseteng-Magpayo
Facts:

Julian Edward Emerson Coseteng Magpayo (respondent)


is the son of Fulvio M. Magpayo Jr. and Anna Dominique Marquez-Lim Coseteng who, as respondents certificate of live birth
But Julian alleged that his parents were never really married
So from Julian Julian Coseteng Magpayo he wanted to change it to Julian Marques-Lim Coseteng
To support the petition, the following were presented:
1. NSO certification that Anna Coseteng does not appear to be married in its records
2. School records from elementary to College that he was using COSETENG
3. He ran and elected as Councilor and Used COSETENG
TC : NO opposition, hence, the petition was granted

The Name of Mr. Magpayo as father was deleted on the records

The republic then filed a motion for reconsideration


o The Republic contends that the deletion of the entry on the date and place of marriage of respondents parents from his
birth certificate has the effect of changing his civil status from legitimate to illegitimate, hence, any change in civil status of
a person must be effected through an appropriate adversary proceeding.
o The Republic adds that by ordering the deletion of respondents parents date of marriage and the name of respondents
father from the entries in respondents birth certificate,the trial court exceeded its jurisdiction

Issue(s) : WON the court has jurisdiction to erase the fathers name

Ruling: NO

A person can effect a change of name under Rule 103 (CHANGE OF NAME) using valid and meritorious grounds including

(a) when the name is ridiculous, dishonorable or extremely difficult to write or pronounce;

(b) when the change results as a legal consequence such as legitimation;

(c) when the change will avoid confusion;

(d) when one has continuously used and been known since childhood by a Filipino name, and was unaware of alien parentage;

(e) a sincere desire to adopt a Filipino name to erase signs of former alienage, all in good faith and without prejudicing anybody; and

(f) when the surname causes embarrassment and there is no showing that the desired change of name was for a fraudulent purpose or that
the change of name would prejudice public interest.

The change being sought in respondents petition goes so far as to affect his legal status in relation to his parents. It seeks to change his
legitimacy to that of illegitimacy.Rule 103 then would not suffice to grant Julians supplication.

Changes which may affect the civil status from legitimate to illegitimate are substantial and controversial alterations which can only be
allowed after appropriate adversary proceedings

Since respondents desired change affects his civil status from legitimate to illegitimate, Rule 108 applies. It reads:
SECTION 1. Who may file petition.Any person interested in any act, event, order or decree concerning the civil status of persons
which has been recorded in the civil register, may file a verified petition for the cancellation or correction of any entry relating
thereto, with the [RTC] of the province where the corresponding civil registry is located.

SEC. 3. Parties.When cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil register is sought, the civil registrar and all persons who have
or claim any interest which would be affected thereby shall be made parties to the proceeding.

SEC. 4. Notice and publication. Upon the filing of the petition, the court shall, by an order, fix the time and place for the hearing of
the same, and cause reasonable notice thereof to be given to the persons named in the petition. The court shall also cause the
order to be published once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the province. (emphasis,
italics and underscoring supplied)

Rule 108 clearly directs that a petition which concerns ones civil status should be filed in the civil registry in which the entry is sought to be
cancelled or corrected that of Makati in the present case, and all persons who have or claim any interest which would be affected thereby
should be made parties to the proceeding.

As earlier stated, however, the petition of respondent was filed not in Makati where his birth certificate was registered but in Quezon
City. And as the above-mentioned title of the petition filed by respondent before the RTC shows, neither the civil registrar of Makati nor his
father and mother were made parties thereto.

G.R. No. 186027


Republic v. Mercadera
December 8, 2010

Doctrine: Not all alterations allowed in ones name are confined under Rule 103. Corrections for clerical errors may be set right
under Rule 108. It also allows substantial errors in other entries like citizenship, civil status, and paternity to be corrected,
provided there is an adversary proceeding.

I. RELEVANT FACTS:
- Mercadera sought the correction of her given name as it appeared in her Certificate of Live Birth - from Marilyn L. Mercadera
to Merlyn L. Mercadera before the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Dipolog City.
- The Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Dipolog City, however, refused to effect the correction unless a court order was
obtained.
- Mercadera was then constrained to file a Petition For Correction of Some Entries as Appearing in the Certificate of Live Birth
under Rule 108 before the Regional Trial Court of Dipolog City (RTC).
- The RTC ruled that the documentary evidence presented by Mercadera sufficiently supported the circumstances alleged in her
petition.
- The OSG timely interposed an appeal praying for the reversal and setting aside of the RTC decision.It argues that the correction
in the spelling of Mercaderas given name is in truth a material correction as it would modify or increase substantive rights.What
the lower court actually allowed was a change of Mercaderas given name, which would have been proper had she filed a
petition under Rule 103 and proved any of the grounds therefor.
- The CA affirmed the RTC.

II. ISSUE:
- WON Mercadera shouldve file a petition under Rule 103.

III. RULING:

NO. The change of name contemplated under Article 376 and Rule 103 must not be confused with Article 412 and Rule
108. A change of ones name under Rule 103 can be granted, only on grounds provided by law. In order to justify a request for
change of name, there must be a proper and compelling reason for the change and proof that the person requesting will be
prejudiced by the use of his official name. To assess the sufficiency of the grounds invoked therefor, there must be adversarial
proceedings.

In petitions for correction, only clerical, spelling, typographical and other innocuous errors in the civil registry may be raised.
Considering that the enumeration in Section 2, Rule 108also includes changes of name, the correction of a patently misspelled
name is covered by Rule 108. Suffice it to say, not all alterations allowed in ones name are confined under Rule 103. Corrections
for clerical errors may be set right under Rule 108.

This rule in names, however, does not operate to entirely limit Rule 108 to the correction of clerical errors in civil registry entries
by way of a summary proceeding. Republic v. Valencia is the authority for allowing substantial errors in other entries like
citizenship, civil status, and paternity, to be corrected using Rule 108 provided there is an adversary proceeding. After all, the
role of the Court under Rule 108 is to ascertain the truths about the facts recorded therein.

NOTE:

The petition filed by Mercadera before the RTC correctly falls under Rule 108 as it simply sought a correction of a misspelled
given name. To correct simply means to make or set aright; to remove the faults or error from.

Besides, granting that Rule 103 applies to this case and that compliance with the procedural requirements under Rule 108 falls
short of what is mandated, it still cannot be denied that Mercadera complied with the requirement for an adversarial proceeding
before the lower court. The publication and posting of the notice of hearing in a newspaper of general circulation and the
notices sent to the OSG and the Local Civil Registry are sufficient indicia of an adverse proceeding. The fact that no one opposed
the petition, including the OSG, did not deprive the court of its jurisdiction to hear the same and did not make the proceeding
less adversarial in nature.

Republic v. Judge De la Cruz,the dissenting opinion penned by Justice Pacifico De Castro echoed the same view:
It is not accurate to say that Rule 108 would be rendered unconstitutional if it would allow the correction of more than mere
harmless clerical error, as it would thereby increase or modify substantive rights which the Constitution expressly forbids
because Article 412 of the Civil Code, the substantive law sought to be implemented by Rule 108, allows only the correction of
innocuous clerical errors not those affecting the status of persons. As was stressed in the dissent on the aforesaid Wong Case,
Article 412 does not limit in its express terms nor by mere implication, the correction authorized by it to that of mere clerical
errors. x x x it would be reasonable and justified to rule that Article 412 contemplates of correction of erroneous entry of
whatever nature, procedural safeguards having only to be provided for, as was the manifest purpose of Rule 108.
x x x proceedings for the correction of erroneous entry should not be considered as establishing one's status in a legal manner
conclusively beyond dispute or controversion, x x x the books making up the civil register and all documents relating thereto x x
x shall be prima facie evidence of the facts therein contained. Hence, the status as corrected would not have a superior quality
for evidentiary purpose. Moreover, the correction should not imply a change of status but a mere rectification of error to make
the matter corrected speak for the truth. x x x

Finally in Republic v. Valencia,the above stated views were adopted by this Court insofar as even substantial errors or matters in
a civil registry may be corrected and the true facts established, provided the parties aggrieved avail themselves of the
appropriate adversary proceeding. If the purpose of the petition is merely to correct the clerical errors which are visible to the
eye or obvious to the understanding, the court may, under a summary procedure, issue an order for the correction of a mistake.
However, as repeatedly construed, changes which may affect the civil status from legitimate to illegitimate, as well as sex, are
substantial and controversial alterations which can only be allowed after appropriate adversary proceedings depending upon
the nature of the issues involved. Changes which affect the civil status or citizenship of a party are substantial in character and
should be threshed out in a proper action depending upon the nature of the issues in controversy, and wherein all the parties
who may be affected by the entries are notified or represented and evidence is submitted to prove the allegations of the
complaint, and proof to the contrary admitted x x x.

Where such a change is ordered, the Court will not be establishing a substantive right but only correcting or rectifying an
erroneous entry in the civil registry as authorized by law. In short, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court provides only the procedure or
mechanism for the proper enforcement of the substantive law embodied in Article 412 of the Civil Code and so does not violate
the Constitution.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES V. CARLITO I. KHO, ET. AL.
G.R. No. 170340, June 29, 2007

DOCTRINES:
When all the procedural requirements under Rule 108 are thus followed, the appropriate adversary proceeding necessary to
effect substantial corrections to the entries of the civil register is satisfied. Publication of the order of hearing under Section 4 of
Rule 108 cured the failure to implead an indispensable party.

RELEVANT FACTS:
1. On February 12, 2001, Carlito and his siblings Michael, Mercy Nona and Heddy Moira filed before the RTC of Butuan City
a verified petition for correction of entries in the civil registry of Butuan City to effect changes in their respective birth
certificates. Carlito also asked the court in behalf of his minor children, Kevin and Kelly, to order the correction of some
entries in their birth certificates.
2. The Local Civil Registrar of Butuan City was impleaded as respondent.
3. As required, the petition was published for three consecutive weeks in Mindanao Daily Patrol-CARAGA, a newspaper of
general circulation, after which it was set for hearing on August 9, 2001.
4. On January 31, 2002, respondents presented documentary evidence showing compliance with the jurisdictional
requirements of the petition. They also presented testimonial evidence consisting of the testimonies of Carlito and his
mother, Epifania. During the same hearing, an additional correction in the birth certificates of Carlitos children was
requested to the effect that the first name of their mother be rectified from Maribel to Marivel.
5. By Decision of September 4, 2002, the trial court directed the local civil registrar of Butuan City to correct the entries in
the record of birth of Carlito, as follows:
(1) change the citizenship of his mother from Chinese to Filipino;
(2) delete John from his name; and
(3) delete the word married opposite the date of marriage of his parents.
(4) The last correction was ordered to be effected likewise in the birth certificates of respondents Michael, Mercy
Nona, and Heddy Moira.
6. Additionally, the trial court ordered the correction of the birth certificates of the minor children of Carlito to reflect the
date of marriage of Carlito and Marivel Dogmoc as January 21, 2000, instead of April 27, 1989, and the name Maribel as
Marivel.
7. October 27, 2005, the CA denied petitioners appeal and affirmed the decision of the trial court. The CA ruled that
although Carlito failed to observe the requirements of Rule 103 of the Rules of Court, he had complied nonetheless with
the jurisdictional requirements for correction of entries in the civil registry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. The
petition for correction of entry in Carlitos birth record, it noted, falls under letter o of the enumeration under Section 2
of Rule 108.
8. In the present petition, petitioner Republic contends that since the changes sought by respondents were substantial in
nature, they could only be granted through an adversarial proceeding in which indispensable parties, such as Marivel
and respondents parents, should have been notified or impleaded.
9. Petitioner further contends that the jurisdictional requirements to change Carlitos name under Section 2 of Rule 103 of
the Rules of Court were not satisfied because the Amended Petition failed to allege Carlitos prior three-year bona fide
residence in Butuan City, and that the title of the petition did not state Carlitos aliases and his true name as Carlito John
I. Kho. Petitioner concludes that the same jurisdictional defects attached to the change of name of Carlitos father.
ISSUES:
1. WON the failure to implead Marivel and Carlitos parents rendered the trial short of the required adversary proceeding
and the trial courts judgment void.
1. WON jurisdictional requirements to change Carlitos name under Section 2 of Rule 103 of the Rules of Court were not
satisfied.

RULINGS OF THE SUPREME COURT:


1. No, the publication of the order of hearing under Section 4 of Rule 108 cured the failure to implead an indispensable
party. The purpose precisely of Section 4, Rule 108 is to bind the whole world to the subsequent judgment on the
petition. The sweep of the decision would cover even parties who should have been impleaded under Section 3, Rule
108, but were inadvertently left out.
2. With respect to the correction in Carlitos birth certificate of his name from Carlito John to Carlito, the same was properly
granted under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. As correctly pointed out by the CA, the cancellation or correction of
entries involving changes of name falls under letter o on changes of name of Section 2 of Rule 108. Hence, while the
jurisdictional requirements of Rule 103 (which governs petitions for change of name) were not complied with,
observance of the provisions of Rule 108 suffices to effect the correction sought for.

OTHER RULINGS (For Recitation purposes)

During the hearing on January 31, 2002, the city prosecutor who was acting as representative of the OSG did not raise any
objection to the non-inclusion of Marivel and Carlitos parents as parties to the proceeding. Parenthetically, it seems highly
improbable that Marivel was unaware of the proceedings to correct the entries in her childrens birth certificates, especially
since the notices, orders and decision of the trial court were all sent to the residence she shared with Carlito and the children.

With respect to the date of marriage of Carlito and Marivel, their certificate of Marriage shows that indeed they were married
on January 21, 2000, not on April 27, 1989. With respect to Carlitos mother, it bears noting that she declared at the witness
stand that she was not married to Juan Kho who died in 1959. Again, that testimony was not challenged by the city prosecutor.

The correction of the mothers citizenship from Chinese to Filipino as appearing in Carlitos birth record was also proper. Of note
is the fact that during the cross examination by the city prosecutor of Epifania, he did not deem fit to question her citizenship.
Such failure to oppose the correction prayed for, which certainly was not respondents fault, does not in any way change the
adversarial nature of the proceedings. Also significant to note is that the birth certificates of Carlitos siblings uniformly stated the
citizenship of Epifania as Filipino.

Outside the ambit of substantial corrections, of course, is the correction of the name of Carlitos wife from Maribel to Marivel.
The mistake is clearly clerical or typographical, which is not only visible to the eyes, but is also obvious to the understanding
considering that the name reflected in the marriage certificate of Carlito and his wife is Marivel.