The Supreme Court upheld the decision of respondent judge.

Petitioners contention that the private respondent has not established prior possession is untenable.
The law is clear in stating that the execution of a sale thru a public instrument shall be equivalent to the
delivery of the thing, unless there is stipulation to the contrary. By virtue of the above pronouncement,
private respondent acquired the rights to possess the land the moment he and the vendor executed the
deed of sale, thus, vesting him the right of a lawful possessor.

Moreover, the Court said that respondent judge did not commit any errors in rendering his judgment.
The first error alleged by the petitioner is unsustainable. The act of entering the property and excluding
the lawful possessor therefrom necessarily implies the exertion of force over the property, and this is all
that is necessary. The words "by force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth" include every situation
or condition under which one person can wrongfully enter upon real property and exclude another who
has had prior possession therefrom. Even though no force is used by him other than such as is
necessarily implied from the mere acts of planting himself on the ground and excluding private
respondent therefrom.

Consequently the respondent judges declaration of liability for the rents thereafter is correct and
proper. The assertion by the petitioner that there is no legal or factual basis for the payment of monthly
rentals because bad faith on the part of him was never proved deserves no merit.

It should be noted that possession acquired in good faith does not lose this character except in the case
and from the moment facts exist which show that the possessor is not unaware that he possesses the
thing improperly or wrongfully. (Art. 528, Civil Code). Possession in good faith ceases from the moment
defects in the title are made known to the possessors, by extraneous evidence or by suit for recovery of
the property by the true owner. A possessor in good faith is entitled to the fruits only so long as his
possession is not legally interrupted, and such interruption takes place upon service of judicial summons
(Arts. 544 and 1123, Civil Code).

A perusal of the records of the case shows that petitioner received private respondent's complaint for
forcible entry with summons on November 29. His good faith therefore ceased on that same date.
Accordingly, the computation of the payment of monthly rental should start from December, 1976,
instead of August, 1976.
EDCA PUBLISHING v. SANTOS

Possession of movable property acquired in GF is equivalent to title. There is no need to produce a

receipt.

FACTS:

EDCA Publishing sold 406 books to a certain Professor Jose Cruz who ordered these by telephone, which
was agreed to be payable on delivery. The books were subsequently delivered to him with the
corresponding invoice, and he paid with a personal check.

Cruz then sold the 120 of the books to Leonor Santos who asked for verification, and was then showed
the invoice for the books.

EDCA became suspicious when Cruz ordered another set of books even before his check cleared. Upon
investigation, EDCA found that he wasnt the person he claimed to be (Dean in DLSU). EDCA had the
police capture Cruz, as well as seize the books from Santos. Santos demanded the return of the books.

RTC granted the writ of preliminary attachment.

Subsequent dishonor of a check, which did not render the contract of sale void does not amount to
unlawful deprivation of property. (There was a perfected contract of sale so the proper remedy is
specific performance)

ISSUE:

Whether or not the owner was unlawfully deprived of the property?

HELD: No.

Santos was a good faith buyer after taking steps to verify the identity of the seller. When she was
showed the invoice, she reasonably believed that he was a legitimate seller.

With regard to unlawful deprivation, EDCA was not unlawfully deprived of the property by mere failure
of consideration. There was already a perfected contract of sale. Proof was even substantiated when
EDCA gave the invoice as proof of payment upon delivery of the books. This did not amount to unlawful
taking, because by the delivery of EDCA to Cruz, ownership of the books already transferred to him.
Based on the afore cited facts

The contract of sale is consensual and is perfected once agreement is reached between the parties on the
subject matter and the consideration.
Under the rule of law, The contract of sale is perfected at the moment there is a meeting of
minds upon the thing which is the object of the contract and upon the price.

According to the Civil Code:

ART. 1475. The contract of sale is perfected at the moment there is a meeting of minds
upon the thing which is the object of the contract and upon the price.

From that moment, the parties may reciprocally demand performance, subject to the provisions of the law
governing the form of contracts.

ART. 1477. The ownership of the thing sold shall be transferred to the vendee upon the
actual or constructive delivery thereof.

ART. 1478. The parties may stipulate that ownership in the thing shall not pass to the
purchaser until he has fully paid the price.

It is clear that ownership in the thing sold shall not pass to the buyer until full payment of the
purchase price only if there is a stipulation to that effect. Otherwise, the rule is that such ownership shall
pass from the vendor to the vendee upon the actual or constructive delivery of the thing sold even if the
purchase price has not yet been paid. Non-payment only creates a right to demand payment or to rescind
the contract, or to criminal prosecution in the case of bouncing checks. But absent the stipulation above
noted, delivery of the thing sold will effectively transfer ownership to the buyer who can in turn transfer it to
another. Actual delivery of the books having been made, Cruz acquired ownership over the books which he
could then validly transfer to the private respondents. The fact that he had not yet paid for them to EDCA
was a matter between him and EDCA and did not impair the title acquired by the private respondents to the
books.

Article 559 provides that "the possession of movable property acquired in good faith is equivalent
to a title," thus dispensing with further proof. Leonor Santos took care to ascertain first that the books
belonged to Cruz before she agreed to purchase them. The private respondent did not have to go beyond
that invoice to satisfy herself that the books being offered for sale by Cruz belonged to him; yet she did.
Although the title of Cruz was presumed under Article 559 by his mere possession of the books, these
being movable property, Leonor Santos nevertheless demanded more proof before deciding to buy them.

Petition is denied.
LONGINOS JAVIER, vs. SEGUNDO JAVIER, ET AL

FACTS:

This case relates to the ownership of the lot, and of the house standing thereon, No. 521 Calle Real,
Malate, Manila. The court below found that the land belonged to the Longinos as administrator of the
estate of his father, Manuel Javier, and that the defendant Isabel Hernandez and Manuel Ramon Javier,
her son, are the owners of the house standing on the lot. Judgment was rendered in favor of the
Longinos for the possession of the property, but giving the defendants a reasonable opportunity to
remove the house. It is claimed finally by Segundo et al that the case should be decided by an
application of the principles of law meant that community of property existed because the house was
owned by the Segundo and the land by the Longinos.

ISSUE: WON principles of community of property is applicable in this case.

RULING: NO. The contention can not be maintained, for such a condition of affairs does not create a
community of property within the meaning of that term as it is used in title 3, book 2 of the Civil Code.
If, on the other hand, it is itself belonged to the heirs of Manuel Javier, and that two of the defendants
were such heirs, it can be said that the decision of the court below was fully as favorable to Segundo et
al as it could be. Article 397 of the Civil Code relates to improvements made upon the common property
by one of the co-owners. The burden of proof was on Segundo to show that the house was built with
the consent of their cotenants. Even if a tacit consent was shown this would not require such cotenants
to pay for the house