Art 4

Art. 4. Criminal liability. Criminal liability shall be incurred:

1. By any person committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act done be different from that
which he intended.
2. By any person performing an act which would be an offense against persons or property, were it
not for the inherent impossibility of its accomplishment or an account of the employment of
inadequate or ineffectual means.

JAM Circumstances
Art. 11. Justifying circumstances. The following do not incur any criminal liability:

1. Anyone who acts in defense of his person or rights, provided that the following circumstances
concur;
First. Unlawful aggression.
Second. Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it. library
Third. Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself.

2. Any one who acts in defense of the person or rights of his spouse, ascendants, descendants, or
legitimate, natural or adopted brothers or sisters, or his relatives by affinity in the same degrees and
those consanguinity within the fourth civil degree, provided that the first and second requisites
prescribed in the next preceding circumstance are present, and the further requisite, in case the
revocation was given by the person attacked, that the one making defense had no part therein.

3. Anyone who acts in defense of the person or rights of a stranger, provided that the first and
second requisites mentioned in the first circumstance of this Art. are present and that the person
defending be not induced by revenge, resentment, or other evil motive.

4. Any person who, in order to avoid an evil or injury, does not act which causes damage to another,
provided that the following requisites are present;
First. That the evil sought to be avoided actually exists;
Second. That the injury feared be greater than that done to avoid it;
Third. That there be no other practical and less harmful means of preventing it.

5. Any person who acts in the fulfillment of a duty or in the lawful exercise of a right or office.

6. Any person who acts in obedience to an order issued by a superior for some lawful purpose.

Art. 12. Circumstances which exempt from criminal liability. the following are exempt from
criminal liability:
1. An imbecile or an insane person, unless the latter has acted during a lucid interval.
When the imbecile or an insane person has committed an act which the law defines as a felony
(delito), the court shall order his confinement in one of the hospitals or asylums established for
persons thus afflicted, which he shall not be permitted to leave without first obtaining the
permission of the same court.

2. A person under nine years of age.

3. A person over nine years of age and under fifteen, unless he has acted with discernment, in which
case, such minor shall be proceeded against in accordance with the provisions of Art. 80 of this
Code. When such minor is adjudged to be criminally irresponsible, the court, in conformably with
the provisions of this and the preceding paragraph, shall commit him to the care and custody of his
family who shall be charged with his surveillance and education otherwise, he shall be committed to
the care of some institution or person mentioned in saidArt. 80.

4. Any person who, while performing a lawful act with due care, causes an injury by mere accident
without fault or intention of causing it.

5. Any person who act under the compulsion of irresistible force.

6. Any person who acts under the impulse of an uncontrollable fear of an equal or greater injury.

7. Any person who fails to perform an act required by law, when prevented by some lawful
insuperable cause.

Chapter Three
CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH MITIGATE CRIMINAL LIABILITY

Art. 13. Mitigating circumstances. The following are mitigating circumstances;

1. Those mentioned in the preceding chapter, when all the requisites necessary to justify or to
exempt from criminal liability in the respective cases are not attendant.

2. That the offender is under eighteen year of age or over seventy years. In the case of the minor, he
shall be proceeded against in accordance with the provisions of Art. 80.

3. That the offender had no intention to commit so grave a wrong as that committed.

4. That sufficient provocation or threat on the part of the offended party immediately preceded the
act.

5. That the act was committed in the immediate vindication of a grave offense to the one
committing the felony (delito), his spouse, ascendants, or relatives by affinity within the same
degrees.

6. That of having acted upon an impulse so powerful as naturally to have produced passion or
obfuscation.

7. That the offender had voluntarily surrendered himself to a person in authority or his agents, or
that he had voluntarily confessed his guilt before the court prior to the presentation of the evidence
for the prosecution;

8. That the offender is deaf and dumb, blind or otherwise suffering some physical defect which thus
restricts his means of action, defense, or communications with his fellow beings.

9. Such illness of the offender as would diminish the exercise of the will-power of the offender
without however depriving him of the consciousness of his acts.

10. And, finally, any other circumstances of a similar nature and analogous to those above
mentioned.

Chapter Four
CIRCUMSTANCE WHICH AGGRAVATE CRIMINAL LIABILITY
Art. 14. Aggravating circumstances. The following are aggravating circumstances:
1. That advantage be taken by the offender of his public position.

2. That the crime be committed in contempt or with insult to the public authorities.

3. That the act be committed with insult or in disregard of the respect due the offended party on
account of his rank, age, or sex, or that is be committed in the dwelling of the offended party, if the
latter has not given provocation.

4. That the act be committed with abuse of confidence or obvious ungratefulness.

5. That the crime be committed in the palace of the Chief Executive or in his presence, or where
public authorities are engaged in the discharge of their duties, or in a place dedicated to religious
worship.

6. That the crime be committed in the night time, or in an uninhabited place, or by a band, whenever
such circumstances may facilitate the commission of the offense.
Whenever more than three armed malefactors shall have acted together in the commission of an
offense, it shall be deemed to have been committed by a band.

7. That the crime be committed on the occasion of a conflagration, shipwreck, earthquake, epidemic
or other calamity or misfortune.

8. That the crime be committed with the aid of armed men or persons who insure or afford
impunity.

9. That the accused is a recidivist.

A recidivist is one who, at the time of his trial for one crime, shall have been previously convicted by
final judgment of another crime embraced in the same title of this Code.

10. That the offender has been previously punished by an offense to which the law attaches an equal
or greater penalty or for two or more crimes to which it attaches a lighter penalty.

11. That the crime be committed in consideration of a price, reward, or promise.

12. That the crime be committed by means of inundation, fire, poison, explosion, stranding of a
vessel or international damage thereto, derailment of a locomotive, or by the use of any other
artifice involving great waste and ruin.

13. That the act be committed with evidence premeditation.

14. That the craft, fraud or disguise be employed.

15. That advantage be taken of superior strength, or means be employed to weaken the defense.

16. That the act be committed with treachery (alevosia).

There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against the person, employing
means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its
execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make.
17. That means be employed or circumstances brought about which add ignominy to the natural
effects of the act.

18. That the crime be committed after an unlawful entry.

There is an unlawful entry when an entrance of a crime a wall, roof, floor, door, or window be
broken.

20. That the crime be committed with the aid of persons under fifteen years of age or by means of
motor vehicles, motorized watercraft, airships, or other similar means. (As amended by RA 5438).

21. That the wrong done in the commission of the crime be deliberately augmented by causing other
wrong not necessary for its commissions.

PARDON
Art. 36. Pardon; its effect. A pardon shall not work the restoration of the right to hold public
office, or the right of suffrage, unless such rights be expressly restored by the terms of the pardon.
A pardon shall in no case exempt the culprit from the payment of the civil indemnity imposed upon
him by the sentence.
Art. 95. Obligation incurred by person granted conditional pardon. Any person who has been
granted conditional pardon shall incur the obligation of complying strictly with the conditions
imposed therein otherwise, his non-compliance with any of the conditions specified shall result in
the revocation of the pardon and the provisions of Article 159 shall be applied to him.

p. "Conditional Pardon" refers to the exemption of an individual, within certain limits or conditions,
from the punishment which the law inflicts for the offense he had committed resulting in the partial
extinction of his criminal liability;
q. "Absolute Pardon" refers to the total extinction of the criminal liability of the individual to whom
it is granted without any condition. It restores to the individual his civil and political rights and remits
the penalty imposed for the particular offense of which he was convicted;

Special Complex Crimes

Art. 48. Penalty for complex crimes. When a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave
felonies, or when an offense is a necessary means for committing the other, the penalty for the most
serious crime shall be imposed, the same to be applied in its maximum period.

Direct Assault/ Indirect Assault

Art. 148. Direct assaults. Any person or persons who, without a public uprising, shall employ force
or intimidation for the attainment of any of the purpose enumerated in defining the crimes of
rebellion and sedition, or shall attack, employ force, or seriously intimidate or resist any person in
authority or any of his agents, while engaged in the performance of official duties, or on occasion of
such performance, shall suffer the penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum
periods and a fine not exceeding P1,000 pesos, when the assault is committed with a weapon or
when the offender is a public officer or employee, or when the offender lays hands upon a person in
authority. If none of these circumstances be present, the penalty of prision correccional in its
minimum period and a fine not exceeding P500 pesos shall be imposed.
Art. 149. Indirect assaults. The penalty of prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods
and a fine not exceeding P500 pesos shall be imposed upon any person who shall make use of force
or intimidation upon any person coming to the aid of the authorities or their agents on occasion of
the commission of any of the crimes defined in the next preceding article.
ART 210-212 BRIBERY (DIRECT, INDIRECT, QUALIFIED) AND CORRUPTION OF PUBLIC OFFICERS

Violations under PD 46 - receiving directly or indirectly any gift, present or any other valuable thing
on any occasion, including Christmas, when such gift, present or other valuable thing is given by
reason of his official position.

Art. 210. Direct bribery. Any public officer who shall agree to perform an act constituting a crime,
in connection with the performance of this official duties, in consideration of any offer, promise, gift
or present received by such officer, personally or through the mediation of another, shall suffer the
penalty of prision mayor in its medium and maximum periods and a fine [of not less than the value
of the gift and] not less than three times the value of the gift in addition to the penalty
corresponding to the crime agreed upon, if the same shall have been committed.
If the gift was accepted by the officer in consideration of the execution of an act which does not
constitute a crime, and the officer executed said act, he shall suffer the same penalty provided in the
preceding paragraph; and if said act shall not have been accomplished, the officer shall suffer the
penalties of prision correccional, in its medium period and a fine of not less than twice the value of
such gift.
If the object for which the gift was received or promised was to make the public officer refrain from
doing something which it was his official duty to do, he shall suffer the penalties of prision
correccional in its maximum period and a fine [of not less than the value of the gift and] not less
than three times the value of such gift.
In addition to the penalties provided in the preceding paragraphs, the culprit shall suffer the penalty
of special temporary disqualification.
The provisions contained in the preceding paragraphs shall be made applicable to assessors,
arbitrators, appraisal and claim commissioners, experts or any other persons performing public
duties. (As amended by Batas Pambansa Blg. 872, June 10, 1985).

Art. 211. Indirect bribery. The penalties of prision correccional in its medium and maximum
periods, and public censure shall be imposed upon any public officer who shall accept gifts offered
to him by reason of his office. (As amended by Batas Pambansa Blg. 872, June 10, 1985).

Art. 212. Corruption of public officials. The same penalties imposed upon the officer corrupted,
except those of disqualification and suspension, shall be imposed upon any person who shall have
made the offers or promises or given the gifts or presents as described in the preceding articles.

Art 217 MALVERSATION

Art. 217. Malversation of public funds or property; Presumption of malversation. Any public officer
who, by reason of the duties of his office, is accountable for public funds or property, shall
appropriate the same or shall take or misappropriate or shall consent, through abandonment or
negligence, shall permit any other person to take such public funds, or property, wholly or partially,
or shall otherwise be guilty of the misappropriation or malversation of such funds or property, shall
suffer:
1. The penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods, if the amount involved in
the misappropriation or malversation does not exceed two hundred pesos.
2. The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods, if the amount involved is more
than two hundred pesos but does not exceed six thousand pesos.
3. The penalty of prision mayor in its maximum period to reclusion temporal in its minimum period,
if the amount involved is more than six thousand pesos but is less than twelve thousand pesos. 4.
The penalty of reclusion temporal, in its medium and maximum periods, if the amount involved is
more than twelve thousand pesos but is less than twenty-two thousand pesos. If the amount
exceeds the latter, the penalty shall be reclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion
perpetua.
In all cases, persons guilty of malversation shall also suffer the penalty of perpetual special
disqualification and a fine equal to the amount of the funds malversed or equal to the total value of
the property embezzled.
The failure of a public officer to have duly forthcoming any public funds or property with which he is
chargeable, upon demand by any duly authorized officer, shall be prima facie evidence that he has
put such missing funds or property to personal use. (As amended by RA 1060).

ART. 247 DEATH OR PHYSICAL INJURIES INFLICTED UNDER EXCEPTIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES

Art. 247. Death or physical injuries inflicted under exceptional circumstances. Any legally married
person who having surprised his spouse in the act of committing sexual intercourse with another
person, shall kill any of them or both of them in the act or immediately thereafter, or shall inflict
upon them any serious physical injury, shall suffer the penalty of destierro.
If he shall inflict upon them physical injuries of any other kind, he shall be exempt from punishment.
These rules shall be applicable, under the same circumstances, to parents with respect to their
daughters under eighteen years of age, and their seducer, while the daughters are living with their
parents.
Any person who shall promote or facilitate the prostitution of his wife or daughter, or shall
otherwise have consented to the infidelity of the other spouse shall not be entitled to the benefits of
this article

ART 248 Murder

Art. 248. Murder. Any person who, not falling within the provisions of Article 246 shall kill
another, shall be guilty of murder and shall be punished by reclusion temporal in its maximum
period to death, if committed with any of the following attendant circumstances:
1. With treachery, taking advantage of superior strength, with the aid of armed men, or employing
means to weaken the defense or of means or persons to insure or afford impunity.
2. In consideration of a price, reward, or promise.
3. By means of inundation, fire, poison, explosion, shipwreck, stranding of a vessel, derailment or
assault upon a street car or locomotive, fall of an airship, by means of motor vehicles, or with the
use of any other means involving great waste and ruin.
4. On occasion of any of the calamities enumerated in the preceding paragraph, or of an earthquake,
eruption of a volcano, destructive cyclone, epidemic or other public calamity.
5. With evident premeditation.
6. With cruelty, by deliberately and inhumanly augmenting the suffering of the victim, or outraging
or scoffing at his person or corpse.

ART 249 Homicide

Art. 249. Homicide. Any person who, not falling within the provisions of Article 246, shall kill
another without the attendance of any of the circumstances enumerated in the next preceding
article, shall be deemed guilty of homicide and be punished by reclusion temporal.

ART 293 ROBBERY

Art. 293. Who are guilty of robbery. Any person who, with intent to gain, shall take any personal
property belonging to another, by means of violence or intimidation of any person, or using force
upon anything shall be guilty of robbery.

ART 308 THEFT

Art. 308. Who are liable for theft. Theft is committed by any person who, with intent to gain but
without violence against or intimidation of persons nor force upon things, shall take personal
property of another without the latter's consent.
Theft is likewise committed by:
1. Any person who, having found lost property, shall fail to deliver the same to the local authorities
or to its owner;
2. Any person who, after having maliciously damaged the property of another, shall remove or make
use of the fruits or object of the damage caused by him; and
3. Any person who shall enter an inclosed estate or a field where trespass is forbidden or which
belongs to another and without the consent of its owner, shall hunt or fish upon the same or shall
gather cereals, or other forest or farm products.

ART 315 ESTAFA

Art. 315. Swindling (estafa). Any person who shall defraud another by any of the means
mentioned hereinbelow shall be punished by:

1st. The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its minimum
period, if the amount of the fraud is over 12,000 pesos but does not exceed 22,000 pesos, and if
such amount exceeds the latter sum, the penalty provided in this paragraph shall be imposed in its
maximum period, adding one year for each additional 10,000 pesos; but the total penalty which may
be imposed shall not exceed twenty years. In such cases, and in connection with the accessory
penalties which may be imposed under the provisions of this Code, the penalty shall be termed
prision mayor or reclusion temporal, as the case may be.

2nd. The penalty of prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods, if the amount of the
fraud is over 6,000 pesos but does not exceed 12,000 pesos;

3rd. The penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum
period if such amount is over 200 pesos but does not exceed 6,000 pesos; and

4th. By arresto mayor in its maximum period, if such amount does not exceed 200 pesos, provided
that in the four cases mentioned, the fraud be committed by any of the following means:

1. With unfaithfulness or abuse of confidence, namely:

(a) By altering the substance, quantity, or quality or anything of value which the offender shall
deliver by virtue of an obligation to do so, even though such obligation be based on an immoral or
illegal consideration.

(b) By misappropriating or converting, to the prejudice of another, money, goods, or any other
personal property received by the offender in trust or on commission, or for administration, or
under any other obligation involving the duty to make delivery of or to return the same, even though
such obligation be totally or partially guaranteed by a bond; or by denying having received such
money, goods, or other property.

(c) By taking undue advantage of the signature of the offended party in blank, and by writing any
document above such signature in blank, to the prejudice of the offended party or of any third
person.

2. By means of any of the following false pretenses or fraudulent acts executed prior to or
simultaneously with the commission of the fraud:
(a) By using fictitious name, or falsely pretending to possess power, influence, qualifications,
property, credit, agency, business or imaginary transactions, or by means of other similar deceits.

(b) By altering the quality, fineness or weight of anything pertaining to his art or business.

(c) By pretending to have bribed any Government employee, without prejudice to the action for
calumny which the offended party may deem proper to bring against the offender. In this case, the
offender shall be punished by the maximum period of the penalty.

(d) [By post-dating a check, or issuing a check in payment of an obligation when the offender therein
were not sufficient to cover the amount of the check. The failure of the drawer of the check to
deposit the amount necessary to cover his check within three (3) days from receipt of notice from
the bank and/or the payee or holder that said check has been dishonored for lack of insufficiency of
funds shall be prima facie evidence of deceit constituting false pretense or fraudulent act. (As
amended by R.A. 4885, approved June 17, 1967.)]

(e) By obtaining any food, refreshment or accommodation at a hotel, inn, restaurant, boarding
house, lodging house, or apartment house and the like without paying therefor, with intent to
defraud the proprietor or manager thereof, or by obtaining credit at hotel, inn, restaurant, boarding
house, lodging house, or apartment house by the use of any false pretense, or by abandoning or
surreptitiously removing any part of his baggage from a hotel, inn, restaurant, boarding house,
lodging house or apartment house after obtaining credit, food, refreshment or accommodation
therein without paying for his food, refreshment or accommodation.

3. Through any of the following fraudulent means:

(a) By inducing another, by means of deceit, to sign any document.

(b) By resorting to some fraudulent practice to insure success in a gambling game.

(c) By removing, concealing or destroying, in whole or in part, any court record, office files,
document or any other papers.

ART 320-323 ARSON

Art. 320. Destructive arson. The penalty of reclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion
perpetua shall be imposed upon any person who shall burn:

1. Any arsenal, shipyard, storehouse or military powder or fireworks factory, ordinance, storehouse,
archives or general museum of the Government.

2. Any passenger train or motor vehicle in motion or vessel out of port.

3. In an inhabited place, any storehouse or factory of inflammable or explosive materials.

Art. 321. Other forms of arson. When the arson consists in the burning of other property and
under the circumstances given hereunder, the offender shall be punishable:

1. By reclusion temporal or reclusion perpetua:

(a) if the offender shall set fire to any building, farmhouse, warehouse, hut, shelter, or vessel in port,
knowing it to be occupied at the time by one or more persons;

(b) If the building burned is a public building and value of the damage caused exceeds 6,000 pesos;
(c) If the building burned is a public building and the purpose is to destroy evidence kept therein to
be used in instituting prosecution for the punishment of violators of the law, irrespective of the
amount of the damage;

(d) If the building burned is a public building and the purpose is to destroy evidence kept therein to
be used in legislative, judicial or administrative proceedings, irrespective of the amount of the
damage; Provided, however, That if the evidence destroyed is to be used against the defendant for
the prosecution of any crime punishable under existing laws, the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua;

(e) If the arson shall have been committed with the intention of collecting under an insurance policy
against loss or damage by fire.

2. By reclusion temporal:

(a) If an inhabited house or any other building in which people are accustomed to meet is set on fire,
and the culprit did not know that such house or building was occupied at the time, or if he shall set
fire to a moving freight train or motor vehicle, and the value of the damage caused exceeds 6,000
pesos;

(b) If the value of the damage caused in paragraph (b) of the preceding subdivision does not exceed
6,000 pesos;

(c) If a farm, sugar mill, cane mill, mill central, bamboo groves or any similar plantation is set on fire
and the damage caused exceeds 6,000 pesos; and

(d) If grain fields, pasture lands, or forests, or plantings are set on fire, and the damage caused
exceeds 6,000 pesos.

3. By prision mayor:

(a) If the value of the damage caused in the case mentioned in paragraphs (a), (c), and (d) in the next
preceding subdivision does not exceed 6,000 pesos;

(b) If a building not used as a dwelling or place of assembly, located in a populated place, is set on
fire, and the damage caused exceeds 6,000 pesos;

4. By prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its medium period:

(a) If a building used as dwelling located in an uninhabited place is set on fire and the damage caused
exceeds 1,000 pesos;

(b) If the value or the damage caused in the case mentioned in paragraphs (c) and (d) of subdivision
2 of this article does not exceed 200 pesos.

5. By prision correccional in its medium period to prision mayor in its minimum period, when the
damage caused is over 200 pesos but does not exceed 1,000 pesos, and the property referred to in
paragraph (a) of the preceding subdivision is set on fire; but when the value of such property does
not exceed 200 pesos, the penalty next lower in degree than that prescribed in this subdivision shall
be imposed.
6. The penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods, if the damage caused in
the case mentioned in paragraph (b) of subdivision 3 of this article does not exceed 6,000 pesos but
is over 200 pesos.

7. The penalty of prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods, if the damage caused in
the case mentioned paragraph (b) subdivision 3 of this article does not exceed 200 pesos.

8. The penalty of arresto mayor and a fine ranging from fifty to one hundred per centum if the
damage caused shall be imposed, when the property burned consists of grain fields, pasture lands,
forests, or plantations when the value of such property does not exceed 200 pesos. (As amended by
R.A. 5467, approved May 12, 1969).

Art. 322. Cases of arson not included in the preceding articles. Cases of arson not included in the
next preceding articles shall be punished:

1. By arresto mayor in its medium and maximum periods, when the damage caused does not exceed
50 pesos;

2. By arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum period, when the
damage caused is over 50 pesos but does not exceed 200 pesos;

3. By prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods, if the damage caused is over 200
pesos but does not exceed 1,000 pesos; and

4. By prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods, if it is over 1,000 pesos.

Art. 323. Arson of property of small value. The arson of any uninhabited hut, storehouse, barn,
shed, or any other property the value of which does not exceed 25 pesos, committed at a time or
under circumstances which clearly exclude all danger of the fire spreading, shall not be punished by
the penalties respectively prescribed in this chapter, but in accordance with the damage caused and
under the provisions of the following chapter.

ART 335 RAPE

Art. 335. When and how rape is committed. Rape is committed by having carnal knowledge of a
woman under any of the following circumstances:
1. By using force or intimidation;
2. When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; and
3. When the woman is under twelve years of age, even though neither of the circumstances
mentioned in the two next preceding paragraphs shall be present.
The crime of rape shall be punished by reclusion perpetua.
Whenever the crime of rape is committed with the use of a deadly weapon or by two or more
persons, the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death.
When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, the victim has become insane, the penalty shall be
death.
When rape is attempted or frustrated and a homicide is committed by reason or on the occasion
thereof, the penalty shall be likewise death.
When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, a homicide is committed, the penalty shall be
death. (As amended by R.A. 2632, approved June 18, 1960, and R.A. 4111, approved June 20, 1964).

ART. 349 BIGAMY

Art. 349. Bigamy. The penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed upon any person who shall
contract a second or subsequent marriage before the former marriage has been legally dissolved, or
before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered
in the proper proceedings.

ART. 350 ILLEGAL MARRIAGE

Art. 350. Marriage contracted against provisions of laws. The penalty of prision correccional in its
medium and maximum periods shall be imposed upon any person who, without being included in
the provisions of the next proceeding article, shall have not been complied with or that the marriage
is in disregard of a legal impediment.
If either of the contracting parties shall obtain the consent of the other by means of violence,
intimidation or fraud, he shall be punished by the maximum period of the penalty provided in the
next preceding paragraph.

ART. 351 PREMATURE MARRIAGE IN REL. TO RA10655 (DECRIMINALIZING PREMATURE

MARRIAGE)
Art. 351. Premature marriages. Any widow who shall marry within three hundred and one day
from the date of the death of her husband, or before having delivered if she shall have been
pregnant at the time of his death, shall be punished by arresto mayor and a fine not exceeding 500
pesos.
The same penalties shall be imposed upon any woman whose marriage shall have been annulled or
dissolved, if she shall marry before her delivery or before the expiration of the period of three
hundred and one day after the legal separation.
*ALREADY REPEALED
ART 353 LIBEL
Art. 353. Definition of libel. A libel is public and malicious imputation of a crime, or of a vice or
defect, real or imaginary, or any act, omission, condition, status, or circumstance tending to cause
the dishonor, discredit, or contempt of a natural or juridical person, or to blacken the memory of
one who is dead.

ART 358, 359 SLANDER/ SLANDER BY DEED

Art. 358. Slander. Oral defamation shall be punished by arresto mayor in its maximum period to
prision correccional in its minimum period if it is of a serious and insulting nature; otherwise the
penalty shall be arresto menor or a fine not exceeding 200 pesos.

Art. 359. Slander by deed. The penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision
correccional in its minimum period or a fine ranging from 200 to 1,000 pesos shall be imposed upon
any person who shall perform any act not included and punished in this title, which shall cast
dishonor, discredit or contempt upon another person. If said act is not of a serious nature, the
penalty shall be arresto menor or a fine not exceeding 200 pesos.
SPECIAL LAWS

ISLAW: Evasion of Service of Sentence, Escape from Confinement, Suspended Penalty

Sec. 2. This Act shall not apply to persons convicted of offenses punished with death penalty or life-
imprisonment; to those convicted of treason, conspiracy or proposal to commit treason; to those
convicted of misprision of treason, rebellion, sedition or espionage; to those convicted of piracy; to
those who are habitual delinquents; to those who have escaped from confinement or evaded
sentence; to those who having been granted conditional pardon by the Chief Executive shall have
violated the terms thereof; to those whose maximum term of imprisonment does not exceed one
year, not to those already sentenced by final judgment at the time of approval of this Act, except as
provided in Section 5 hereof.

Sec. 5. It shall be the duty of the Board of Indeterminate Sentence to look into the physical, mental
and moral record of the prisoners who shall be eligible to parole and to determine the proper time
of release of such prisoners. Whenever any prisoner shall have served the minimum penalty
imposed on him, and it shall appear to the Board of Indeterminate Sentence, from the reports of the
prisoner's work and conduct which may be received in accordance with the rules and regulations
prescribed, and from the study and investigation made by the Board itself, that such prisoner is
fitted by his training for release, that there is a reasonable probability that such prisoner will live and
remain at liberty without violating the law, and that such release will not be incompatible with the
welfare of society, said Board of Indeterminate Sentence may, in its discretion, and in accordance
with the rules and regulations adopted hereunder, authorize the release of such prisoner on parole,
upon such terms and conditions as are herein prescribed and as may be prescribed by the Board.
The said Board of Indeterminate Sentence shall also examine the records and status of prisoners
who shall have been convicted of any offense other than those named in Section 2 hereof, and have
been sentenced for more than one year by final judgment prior to the date on which this Act shall
take effect, and shall make recommendation in all such cases to the Governor-General with regard
to the parole of such prisoners as they shall deem qualified for parole as herein provided, after they
shall have served a period of imprisonment not less than the minimum period for which they might
have been sentenced under this Act for the same offense.

PROBATION LAW (COLINARES VS PEOPLE; GR NO 182748)

Ordinarily, Arnel would no longer be entitled to apply for probation, he having appealed from the
judgment of the RTC convicting him for frustrated homicide.

But, the Court finds Arnel guilty only of the lesser crime of attempted homicide and holds that the
maximum of the penalty imposed on him should be lowered to imprisonment of four months
of arresto mayor, as minimum, to two years and four months of prision correccional, as
maximum. With this new penalty, it would be but fair to allow him the right to apply for probation
upon remand of the case to the RTC.

Some in the Court disagrees. They contend that probation is a mere privilege granted by the state
only to qualified convicted offenders. Section 4 of the probation law (PD 968) provides: That no
application for probation shall be entertained or granted if the defendant has perfected the appeal
from the judgment of conviction.[15] Since Arnel appealed his conviction for frustrated homicide, he
should be deemed permanently disqualified from applying for probation.

But, firstly, while it is true that probation is a mere privilege, the point is not that Arnel has the right
to such privilege; he certainly does not have. What he has is the right to apply for that privilege. The
Court finds that his maximum jail term should only be 2 years and 4 months. If the Court allows him
to apply for probation because of the lowered penalty, it is still up to the trial judge to decide
whether or not to grant him the privilege of probation, taking into account the full circumstances of
his case.

Secondly, it is true that under the probation law the accused who appeals from the judgment of
conviction is disqualified from availing himself of the benefits of probation. But, as it happens, two
judgments of conviction have been meted out to Arnel: one, a conviction for frustrated homicide by
the regional trial court, now set aside; and, two, a conviction for attempted homicide by the
Supreme Court.
If the Court chooses to go by the dissenting opinions hard position, it will apply the probation law on
Arnel based on the trial courts annulled judgment against him. He will not be entitled to probation
because of the severe penalty that such judgment imposed on him. More, the Supreme Courts
judgment of conviction for a lesser offense and a lighter penalty will also have to bend over to the
trial courts judgmenteven if this has been found in error. And, worse, Arnel will now also be made to
pay for the trial courts erroneous judgment with the forfeiture of his right to apply for
probation. Ang kabayo ang nagkasala, ang hagupit ay sa kalabaw (the horse errs, the carabao gets
the whip). Where is justice there?

The dissenting opinion also expresses apprehension that allowing Arnel to apply for probation would
dilute the ruling of this Court in Francisco v. Court of Appeals[16]that the probation law requires that
an accused must not have appealed his conviction before he can avail himself of probation. But
there is a huge difference between Franciscoand this case.

In Francisco, the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Makati found the accused guilty of grave oral
defamation and sentenced him to a prison term of one year and one day to one year and eight
months of prision correccional, a clearly probationable penalty. Probation was his to ask! Still, he
chose to appeal, seeking an acquittal, hence clearly waiving his right to apply for probation. When
the acquittal did not come, he wanted probation. The Court would not of course let him. It served
him right that he wanted to save his cake and eat it too. He certainly could not have both appeal and
probation.

The Probation Law, said the Court in Francisco, requires that an accused must not have appealed his
conviction before he can avail himself of probation. This requirement outlaws the element of
speculation on the part of the accusedto wager on the result of his appealthat when his conviction is
finally affirmed on appeal, the moment of truth well-nigh at hand, and the service of his sentence
inevitable, he now applies for probation as an escape hatch thus rendering nugatory the appellate
courts affirmance of his conviction.[17]

Here, however, Arnel did not appeal from a judgment that would have allowed him to apply for
probation. He did not have a choice between appeal and probation. He was not in a position to say,
By taking this appeal, I choose not to apply for probation. The stiff penalty that the trial court
imposed on him denied him that choice. Thus, a ruling that would allow Arnel to now seek probation
under this Courts greatly diminished penalty will not dilute the sound ruling in Francisco. It remains
that those who will appeal from judgments of conviction, when they have the option to try for
probation, forfeit their right to apply for that privilege.

Besides, in appealing his case, Arnel raised the issue of correctness of the penalty imposed on
him. He claimed that the evidence at best warranted his conviction only for attempted, not
frustrated, homicide, which crime called for a probationable penalty. In a way, therefore, Arnel
sought from the beginning to bring down the penalty to the level where the law would allow him to
apply for probation.
In a real sense, the Courts finding that Arnel was guilty, not of frustrated homicide, but only of
attempted homicide, is an original conviction that for the first time imposes on him a probationable
penalty. Had the RTC done him right from the start, it would have found him guilty of the correct
offense and imposed on him the right penalty of two years and four months maximum. This would
have afforded Arnel the right to apply for probation.
The Probation Law never intended to deny an accused his right to probation through no fault of his.
The underlying philosophy of probation is one of liberality towards the accused. Such philosophy is
not served by a harsh and stringent interpretation of the statutory provisions.[18] As Justice Vicente
V. Mendoza said in his dissent in Francisco, the Probation Law must not be regarded as a mere
privilege to be given to the accused only where it clearly appears he comes within its letter; to do so
would be to disregard the teaching in many cases that the Probation Law should be applied in favor
of the accused not because it is a criminal law but to achieve its beneficent purpose.[19]

One of those who dissent from this decision points out that allowing Arnel to apply for probation
after he appealed from the trial courts judgment of conviction would not be consistent with the
provision of Section 2 that the probation law should be interpreted to provide an opportunity for the
reformation of a penitent offender. An accused like Arnel who appeals from a judgment convicting
him, it is claimed, shows no penitence.

This may be true if the trial court meted out to Arnel a correct judgment of conviction. Here,
however, it convicted Arnel of the wrong crime, frustrated homicide, that carried a penalty in excess
of 6 years. How can the Court expect him to feel penitent over a crime, which as the Court now
finds, he did not commit? He only committed attempted homicide with its maximum penalty of 2
years and 4 months.

Ironically, if the Court denies Arnel the right to apply for probation under the reduced penalty, it
would be sending him straight behind bars. It would be robbing him of the chance to instead
undergo reformation as a penitent offender, defeating the very purpose of the probation law.
At any rate, what is clear is that, had the RTC done what was right and imposed on Arnel the correct
penalty of two years and four months maximum, he would have had the right to apply for
probation. No one could say with certainty that he would have availed himself of the right had the
RTC done right by him. The idea may not even have crossed his mind precisely since the penalty he
got was not probationable.

The question in this case is ultimately one of fairness. Is it fair to deny Arnel the right to apply for
probation when the new penalty that the Court imposes on him is, unlike the one erroneously
imposed by the trial court, subject to probation?

WHEREFORE, the Court PARTIALLY GRANTS the petition, MODIFIES the Decision dated July 31, 2007
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR 29639, FINDSpetitioner Arnel Colinares GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of attempted homicide, and SENTENCES him to suffer an indeterminate penalty
from four months of arrestomayor, as minimum, to two years and four months
of prision correccional, as maximum, and to pay Rufino P. Buena the amount of P20,000.00 as moral
damages, without prejudice to petitioner applying for probation within 15 days from notice that the
record of the case has been remanded for execution to the Regional Trial Court of San Jose,
Camarines Sur, in Criminal Case T-2213.

IS RA7877 (ANTI-SEXUAL HARASSMENT LAW) ABSORBED IN THE CRIME OF ACTS OF

LASCIVIOUSNESS
Anti-Sexual Harassment Act of 1995 (RA. 7877), Sexual harassment is committed by a person who,
having authority, influence or moral ascendancy over another in a work or training or education
environment, demands, requests or otherwise
requires any sexual favor from the other, regardless of whether the demand, request or requirement
for submission is accepted by the object of the act.

Under Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code, the crime of acts of lasciviousness is committed when
the offender commits "lewdness" to another person of either sex.
It can be done "by using force and intimidation or when the offended party is deprived of reason or
otherwise unconscious, or when the offended party is under 12 years of age."

DEATH PENALTY (PEOPLE VS MUOZ; GR NO. L-38969-70; FEB 9, 1989)

The penalty for murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code was reclusion temporal in its
maximum period to death, but this was modified by Article III, Section 19(l) of the 1987 Constitution
providing as follows:
Excessive fines shall not be imposed, nor cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment inflicted Neither
shall death penalty be imposed, unless, for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes, the
Congress hereafter provides for it. Any death penalty already imposed shall be reduced to reclusion
perpetua.
Conformably, the Court has since February 2, 1987 not imposed the death penalty whenever it was
called for under the said article but instead reduced the same to reclusion perpetua as mandated by
the above provision. The maximum period of the penalty was thus in effect lowered to the medium,
the same period applied, as before, where the offense was not attended by any modifying
circumstance, with the minimum period, i. e., reclusion temporal maximum, being still applicable in
all other cases. The three-grade scheme of the original penalty, including death, was thus
maintained except that the maximum period was not imposed because of the constitutional
prohibition.
In People v. Gavarra 37 Justice Pedro L. Yap declared for the Court that "in view of the abolition of
the death penalty under Section 19, Article III of the 1987 Constitution, the penalty that may be
imposed for murder is reclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion perpetua" thereby
eliminating death as the original maximum period. Later, without categorically saying so, the Court,
through Justice Ameurfina Melencio-Herrera in People v. Masangkay 38 and through Justice Andres
R. Narvasa in People v. Atencio 39 divided the modified penalty into three new periods, the limits of
which were specified by Justice Edgardo L. Paras in People v. Intino, 40 as follows: the lower half
of reclusion temporal maximum as the minimum; the upper half of reclusion temporal maximum as
the medium; and reclusion perpetua as the maximum.
The Court has reconsidered the above cases and, after extended discussion, come to the conclusion
that the doctrine announced therein does not reflect the intention of the framers as embodied in
Article III, Section 19(l) of the Constitution. This conclusion is not unanimous, to be sure. Indeed,
there is much to be said of the opposite view, which was in fact shared by many of those now voting
for its reversal. The majority of the Court, however, is of the belief that the original interpretation
should be restored as the more acceptable reading of the constitutional provision in question.
The advocates of the Masangkay ruling argue that the Constitution abolished the death penalty and
thereby limited the penalty for murder to the remaining periods, to wit, the minimum and the
medium. These should now be divided into three new periods in keeping with the three-grade
scheme intended by the legislature. Those who disagree feel that Article III, Section 19(l) merely
prohibits the imposition of the death penalty and has not, by reducing it to reclusion perpetua, also
correspondingly reduced the remaining penalties. These should be maintained intact.
A reading of Section 19(l) of Article III will readily show that there is really nothing therein which
expressly declares the abolition of the death penalty. The provision merely says that the death
penalty shall not be imposed unless for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes the Congress
hereafter provides for it and, if already imposed, shall be reduced to reclusion perpetua. The
language, while rather awkward, is still plain enough. And it is a settled rule of legal hermeneutics
that if the language under consideration is plain, it is neither necessary nor permissible to resort to
extrinsic aids, like the records of the constitutional convention, for its interpretation. 41
At that, the Court finds that such resort, even if made, would not be of much assistance either in the
case at bar. Accepting arguendo that it was the intention of the framers to abolish the death penalty,
we are still not convinced from the debates in the Constitutional Commission that there was also a
requirement to adjust the two remaining periods by dividing them into three shorter periods. This is
not a necessary consequence of the provision as worded. The following exchange cited by those in
favor of Masangkay is at best thought-provoking but not decisive of the question:
FR. BERNAS: The effect is the abolition of the death penalty from those statutes-only the death
penalty. The statute is not abolished, but the penalty is abolished.
MR. MAAMBONG: That is what I am worried about, because the statutes, especially in the General
Criminal Law, which is the Revised Penal Code, do not necessarily punish directly with death.
Sometimes it has a range of reclusion temporal to death or reclusion perpetua to death. And what
would be the effect on the judges, for example, if the range is reclusion temporal to death and he
can no longer impose the death penalty? He will have difficulty in computing the degrees.
Could the committee enlighten us on how the judge will look at the specific situation.
FR. BERNAS: I grant that the judges will have difficulty, but I suppose that the judges will be equal to
their tasks. The only thing is, if there is a range, the range cannot go as far as death (Record,
CONCOM, July 18, 1986, Vol. I, 749).
FR. BERNAS: Certainly, the penalties lower than death remain.
MR. REGALADO: That would be reclusion perpetua. But the range of the penalty for murder consists
of three periods. The maximum period of reclusion temporal under the present status is the
minimum period for the penalty for murder. The medium period is reclusion perpetua. The
maximum period is death. If we now remove the death penalty, we will, therefore, have a range of
penalty of 17 years, 4 months and 1 day to 20 years of reclusion temporal up to reclusion perpetua.
You cannot divide reclusion perpetua into two. While it has a duration of 30 years, it is an indivisible
penalty. Where do we get the medium period now until such time that Congress gets around to
accommodate this amendment?
FR. BERNAS: As I said, this is a matter which lawyers can argue with judges about. All we are saying
is, the judges cannot impose the death penalty (Record, CONCOM July 18, 1986, Vol. I, p. 750).
So there we have it "this is a matter which lawyers can argue with judges about." Assuming that
Commissioner Bernas's answer reflected the consensus of the body, we are still not persuaded that
it was the intention of the framers to lower not only the maximum period but also the other periods
of the original penalty. That is not necessarily inferable from his statement that "the judges will be
equal to their task," especially so since he also said and we think with more definiteness-that "all we
are saying is that the judges cannot impose the death penalty" (Emphasis supplied). We understand
this to mean that they were not saying more.
The question as we see it is not whether the framers intended to abolish the death penalty or
merely to prevent its imposition. Whatever the intention was, what we should determine is whether
or not they also meant to require a corresponding modification in the other periods as a result of the
prohibition against the death penalty.
It is definite that such a requirement, if there really was one, is not at all expressed in Article III,
Section 19(l) of the Constitution or indicated therein by at least clear and unmistakable implication.
It would have been so easy, assuming such intention, to state it categorically and plainly, leaving no
doubt as to its meaning. One searches in vain for such a statement, express or even implied. The
writer of this opinion makes the personal observation that this might be still another instance where
the framers meant one thing and said another-or strangely, considering their loquacity elsewhere
did not say enough.
ROBBERY WITH HOMICIDE (PEOPLE VS GANO; GR NO. 134373; FEB 28, 2001)
Accused Castanito Gano killed three (3) persons by reason or on the occasion of the robbery. The
question that needs to be resolved is whether the multiplicity of homicides could be appreciated as
an aggravating circumstance. For sometime, this ticklish issue has been the subject of conflicting
views by this Court when it held in some cases that the additional rapes/homicides committed on
the occasion of robbery would not increase the penalty, while in other cases it ruled that the
multiplicity of rapes/ homicides committed could be appreciated as an aggravating
circumstance. But in People v. Regala this Court spoke with finality on the matter -
It should be noted that there is no law providing that the additional rape/s or homicide/s should be
considered as aggravating circumstance. The enumeration of aggravating circumstances under
Article 14 of the Revised Penal Code is exclusive as opposed to the enumeration in Article 13 of
the same Code regarding mitigating circumstances where there is specific paragraph (paragraph
10) providing for analogous circumstances.
It is true that the additional rapes (or killings in the case of multiple homicide on the occasion of the
robbery) would result in an anomalous situation where from the standpoint of the gravity of the
offense, robbery with one rape would be on the same level as robbery with multiple
rapes. However, the remedy lies with the legislature. A penal law is liberally construed in favor of the
offender and no person should be brought within its terms if he is not clearly made so by the
statute.
This case is singular in its barbarity and nauseating in the manner with which the accused, bolo in
hand, butchered his preys. Notwithstanding the viciousness with which he perpetrated the offense,
we are constrained to apply the principle laid down in People v. Regala, and accordingly, the two (2)
other killings contrary to the ruling of the trial court, should not be appreciated as aggravating
circumstances.

IMPOSSIBLE CRIME OF THEFT (PEOPLE VS JACINTO; GR NO. 162540; JULY 13, 2009)
In this case, petitioner unlawfully took the postdated check belonging to Mega Foam, but the same
was apparently without value, as it was subsequently dishonored. Thus, the question arises on
whether the crime of qualified theft was actually produced.
The Court must resolve the issue in the negative.
Thus, the requisites of an impossible crime are: (1) that the act performed would be an offense
against persons or property; (2) that the act was done with evil intent; and (3) that its
accomplishment was inherently impossible, or the means employed was either inadequate or
ineffectual.
In this case, petitioner performed all the acts to consummate the crime of qualified theft, which is a
crime against property. Petitioner's evil intent cannot be denied, as the mere act of unlawfully taking
the check meant for Mega Foam showed her intent to gain or be unjustly enriched. Were it not for
the fact that the check bounced, she would have received the face value thereof, which was not
rightfully hers. Therefore, it was only due to the extraneous circumstance of the check being
unfunded, a fact unknown to petitioner at the time, that prevented the crime from being
produced. The thing unlawfully taken by petitioner turned out to be absolutely worthless, because
the check was eventually dishonored, and Mega Foam had received the cash to replace the value of
said dishonored check.
From the above discussion, there can be no question that as of the time that petitioner took
possession of the check meant for Mega Foam, she had performed all the acts to consummate the
crime of theft, had it not been impossible of accomplishment in this case.

FORCIBLE ABDUCTION WITH RAPE

Art. 342. Forcible abduction. The abduction of any woman against her will and with lewd designs
shall be punished by reclusion temporal.
The same penalty shall be imposed in every case, if the female abducted be under twelve years of
age.
*If the woman was thereafter raped, it the crime is Forcible Abduction with Rape, and if there be
several rapes, the other rapes are considered as separate crimes.

PEOPLE VS ABLANEDA
The elements of the crime of forcible abduction, as defined in Article 342 of the Revised Penal Code,
are: (1) that the person abducted is any woman, regardless of her age, civil status, or reputation; (2)
that she is taken against her will; and (3) that the abduction is with lewd designs. On the other hand,
rape is committed by having carnal knowledge of a woman by force or intimidation, or when the
woman is deprived of reason or is unconscious, or when she is under twelve years of age.
All these elements were proven in this case. The victim, who is a woman, was taken against her will,
as shown by the fact that she was intentionally directed by accused-appellant to a vacant hut. At her
tender age, Magdalena could not be expected to physically resist considering that the lewd designs
of accused-appellant could not have been apparent to her at that time. Physical resistance need not
be demonstrated to show that the taking was against her will. The employment of deception suffices
to constitute the forcible taking, especially since the victim is an unsuspecting young girl. Considering
that it was raining, going to the hut was not unusual to Magdalena, as probably the purpose was to
seek shelter. Barrio girls are particularly prone to deception. It is the taking advantage of their
innocence that makes them easy culprits of deceiving minds. Finally, the evidence shows that the
taking of the young victim against her will was effected in furtherance of lewd and unchaste
designs. Such lewd designs in forcible abduction is established by the actual rape of the victim.

*
POWER OF THE OMBUDSMAN TO SUSPEND A CONGRESSMAN

DISREGARD TOWARDS RANK, AGE

BATTERED WOMAN SYNDROME

R.A. 10655

R.A. 8552

ADOPTEE KILLED THE ADOPTER = NO PARRICIDE

NOTE: TIME OF COMMISSION OF CRIME VS TIME OF PROMULGATION OF JUDGMENT