RESPONSE TO KEITH LEHRER: THOMAS REID

ON COMMON SENSE AND MORALS

ESTHER KROEKER
University of Antwerp

abstract

This paper is a response to Keith Lehrers Reid on Common Sense and Morals.
I start by defending the general claim that it is appropriate to call Reid a moral
realist. I continue by discussing three aspects of Reids account of moral ideas.
First, our first moral conceptions are non-propositional mental states that are
essential ingredients of moral perception. Our first moral conceptions are not
gross, indistinct and egocentric but are uninformed mental states that might be
about others. Second, moral perception functions like perception of aesthetic
properties and of the mental states of other humans, and this kind of perception is
both immediate and informed. Third, I discuss the role of moral feelings in moral
motivation.

Key Terms: Reid, Lehrer, conception, moral perception

Keith Lehrers paper Thomas Reid on Common Sense and Morals is an original
attempt to understand Reids account of how moral agents come to form moral
conceptions. This paper follows Lehrers earlier paper Reid, the Moral Faculty,
and First Principles, in which he attempts to defend the legitimacy of Reids
principles of common sense and of moral principles in particular. His aim now is
to present an interpretation of Reids moral philosophy as objective and cognitive
but non-realist, and to show how we form our first moral conceptions. Lehrer
argues that moral judgments, for Reid, are generated by the moral sense and
are true, but they are not about any abstract moral qualities which may exist in

The Journal of Scottish Philosophy 11.2 (2013): 131143

DOI: 10.3366/jsp.2013.0053
Edinburgh University Press
www.euppublishing.com/jsp

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the world. Moreover, moral conceptions are not innate. They arise, rather, from
an innate faculty that generates reliable judgments in response to how an agent
conceives of an action.
Lehrers paper that is the object of this response is a welcome sequel to his
earlier paper and develops in the right direction. In the paper under scrutiny here,
Lehrer turns his focus to the moral conceptions involved and presupposed in
the principles generated by the moral sense, and he correctly recognizes that the
agents perception of particular actions plays an important role in the formation
of moral conceptions. In this paper Lehrer thus offers a more complete picture of
Reids account of how we form moral ideas and judgments.
In what follows, I will briefly offer a general remark about Lehrers paper as
a whole, and then turn to several more specific aspects of his interpretation. The
general picture that Lehrer correctly presents of Reids account is the following.
The first moral conceptions of human beings are formed by perceiving particular
actions and their particular qualities. As human beings mature under the effect
of education, example, discipline and reasoning, agents generalize and abstract
from the particular conceptions to form general conceptions that are governed
and informed by moral principles. Although I agree with this general picture, I
argue that Reid understands the details of this picture differently.

1. a general remark about reids moral realism

What might be confusing about Lehrers overall interpretation is his claim that
Reid is not a moral realist. Lehrer defends this claim by drawing attention to
Reids nominalist ontology. We and not nature sort things into kinds and sorts,
Lehrer points out quoting from Reid (IP: 302; Works: 364). For Reid, universals,
properties which can be predicated of several individuals, do not exist. As
Lehrer correctly notices, Reid holds that only individuals exist. Individuals have
particular qualities, which also exist, but only as qualities of particular individuals
(IP: 302303; Works: 364). And according to Reid, the conceptions of general
attributes are not conceptions of individual things but of the meaning of general
words (IP: 305; Works: 365). From Reids nominalism about species and kinds,
Lehrer concludes that moral properties do not exist for Reid, and hence that Reid
is not a moral realist.
Lehrers conclusion is correct if we think of moral realism as the view that
general moral attributes or properties exist in the world. Reid, it is true, sometimes
describes moral qualities as general notions of right and wrong (AP: 195; Works:
599). And these general notions are not about existing properties. However, in
many passages his use of the term property or moral quality does not refer to
general words or notions but to particular, existing, moral qualities of agents and
actions (this is especially clear in AP: V.7). We must not forget, therefore, that

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Reid is a moral realist about particular individuals and their moral properties.
Lehrer, I believe, recognizes this fact since he rightly points out that moral
judgment is based on awareness of individual qualities of moral worth, of merit
and demerit (Lehrer 2013: 114). Therefore, if we think of moral qualities as
particular qualities, Reid is, in this sense, a moral realist. Those who oppose
moral realism think there are no existing moral qualities at all, whether particular
or general. Since Reid disagrees with such a non-realist ontology, and holds
that there are existing moral properties, I think it is in fact more appropriate to
call him a moral realist. Let us now consider more specific aspects of Lehrers
interpretation.

2. remarks about specific aspects of lehrers

interpretation of reids account

2.1 Conception and judgment and how we form our first moral
conceptions
One question Lehrer poses is how, according to Reid, do young children first
arrive at the original conceptions of right and wrong? Reids view, Lehrer
answers, is that our first moral conceptions arise as we perceive individual
qualities of moral experience, and that these conceptions are relative to ones own
experience. We first begin, Lehrer writes, with a conception of being wronged,
of an individual action toward ourselves as being an injury and wrong. We feel
indignation and resentment at being wronged (Lehrer 2013: 116). This claim,
Lehrer notes, gives rise to a puzzle: how could the child form a judgment that
injury has been done to himself before having the general conceptions of right and
wrong? The judgment, it seems, presupposes conception (of right and wrong), and
conception seems to presuppose judgment (that injury has been done to oneself).
Lehrers solution is that our first moral conceptions are gross, indistinct, and
relative to ones own experience. The first moral conceptions, he writes, are
relative, unclear, and egocentric feelings and judgments about qualities that give
rise to our own resentment, and lead us to direct our attention to the particular
injury. As the moral faculty develops, he continues, we are able to generalize, to
abstract, and to form clear conceptions of right and wrong, and these are made
clearer and more distinct by being governed by moral principles.
Lehrers arguments concerning the first part of his solution (that our first
moral conceptions arise from the perception of individual moral actions) are
convincing and, I think, correct. However, the second claim that the first moral
conceptions are gross, indistinct, and egocentric is more problematic. I do
not think Reid would characterize our first moral conceptions in this way. My
view, as I will try to show in the following paragraphs, is that Reid would rather
characterize our first moral conceptions as uniformed non-propositional concep-
tions. Once we recognize that Reid might think of our first moral conceptions as

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non-propositional mental attitudes, the solution to the puzzle becomes evident.

Moreover, Reid holds, contrarily to what Lehrer writes, that our first conceptions
might be about others as well as about ourselves.
We must draw on Reids views about perception to understand how he might
solve the puzzle. Here are the premises we find in Reids writing, and that
lead to the conclusion that non-perceptual conception is an ingredient of moral
perception:
1. There is such a thing as non-propositional conception.
2. Non-propositional conception is an ingredient of all perception.
3. Moral perception is a case of perception.
4. Therefore, one ingredient of moral perception is non-propositional
conception.
The first premise makes a claim about Reids understanding of conception.
Reid has a specific understanding of this mental state. Conception, for Reid, is
a non-propositional attitude that may take place alone or as an ingredient of
perception or of other mental operations. When writing about perception, Reid
describes conception as an act of mind that does not suppose judgment (IP: II.5).
The conception of a tree, for instance, might be the act of having the tree in mind
without thinking of the tree as an object with such-and-such qualities, or as a
species of a kind, or as subject to certain regularities, and so on. I can simply hold
the tree in my mind without forming any judgment about it (IP: V.1).
Reid seems to think that conception can take place before our rational faculties
have developed, and even before one can form judgments. When Reid describes
mechanical and animal motives, for example, he writes that mechanical motives
like instincts function without conception. Small babies and infants are moved by
mechanical motives only. But once the infants faculties develop, he or she is able
to conceive of the object of desire, and the motive turns into an animal motive
(AP: 78, 93; Works: 545, 552). At this point, the childs rational faculty is not
developed enough to form any judgment about the object of desire. Conception
is therefore non-propositional and appears prior to judgment, since children
are moved by animal motives before they are moved by rational motives. The
child first conceives of an object without predicating anything of the object. As
the rational faculties develop further the child quickly develops the capacity to
form judgments, first about objects and their qualities, and then later about their
usefulness and worth.
Reid, it is true, also writes of conception in a looser and more general sense of
thinking of a general notion, idea (see, for example, AP: 711; Works: 21214;
and especially IP: 27; Works: 224), or of forming a belief (IP: 25; Works: 223).
Our general ideas and notions of individual objects might be formed by perception
but may also be informed by reasoning, testimony, memory, and so forth. These
notions or conceptions involve acts such as judging, believing, and predicating

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attributes of objects. Conception in this sense involves having general concepts

and notions and having informed ideas of objects and actions. Now, Reid is not
clear about the content of these general ideas. The conception here might be
propositional, but it might also be a non-propositional conception of a general
propositional object. However, I do not want to make a claim about possible ways
in which Reid thinks of conceptions (for such a discussion see Folescu 2013). The
point here is rather that, despite possible ways of understanding general notions
or ideas, Reid clearly thinks there is such a thing as a mental state that is non-
conceptual and which he calls conception. Lehrer does not draw attention to this
fact, and it is not always easy to ascertain how he understands conceptions, and
how he thinks Reid understands this mental state.
The second premise is that non-propositional conception is an ingredient
of perception. I will not attempt to show why Reid would accept the second
premise here. Other philosophers, such as James Van Cleve (Van Cleve 2004) and
Marina Folescu (Folescu 2013), have convincingly defended this interpretation
of Reid. Folescu calls the kind of conception involved in perception perceptual
conception, and she argues, correctly I think, that perceptual conception is always
non-propositional. This kind of conception is only one ingredient of perception,
however, since another ingredient is also belief such as there is a tree or that
tree is big. Still, non-propositional conception is an ingredient of perception. Let
us now consider the third premise, that moral perception is a genuine case of
perception, for Reid.
Let us recall that an agent perceives an object, according to Reid, when, in
consequence of a physical impression resulting from the object or from some
physical medium between the agent and the object, a certain sign suggests
contingently and immediately the conception of the object and a belief about
the object. As I defend in an earlier paper, moral perception, for Reid, functions
like our perception of the character traits, moods, feelings of other persons, and
like our perception of aesthetic properties (Kroeker 2010). Our perception of
anger in another person, for instance, is suggested by the facial expression of the
person, the modulations of her voice, or other behavior perceived by our external
senses (IHM: 190). Reid holds that small children perceive anger in others as
well and are put to a fright by it. They might not be able to form any judgments
about anger, but they form the conception of this existing but non-visible quality
(IHM: 60; Works: 122). Hence, Reid writes that facial expressions, behaviors,
modulations of the voice, are natural signs or representations of affections of the
mind, and none of these are gained by experience. They equally effect savages
and children (Lectures on the Fine Arts: 30; see also AP: 3312; Works: 6645).
Facial expressions and behaviors are natural signs of affections and feelings but
also of beauty, virtue and vice in a person. Virtue per se, Reid writes, is a quality
of the mind, and virtue is revealed in an agents actions and behavior, as the
following passage makes evident:

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The virtues, the graces, the muses, have a beauty that is intrinsic. It lies not
in the feeling of the spectator, but in the real excellence of the object. If we
do not perceive their beauty, it is owing to the defect or to the perversion
of our faculties . . . The features of the human face, the modulations of
the voice, and the proportions, attitudes, and gestures of the body, are all
natural expressions of good or bad qualities of the person. (IP: 4934; Works:
453)

We consider the moral virtues as inherent in the mind of a good man, even
when there is no opportunity of exercising them. (AP: II.3; Works: 540)

Reids general understanding of perception thus applies to moral perception, since

the behavior of the agent functions as a natural sign that suggests contingently and
immediately the (non-propositional) conception of and belief about the agents
moral worth.1 My view, therefore, is that Reid understands moral perception as a
case of perception in general.
The conclusion that follows is that non-propositional conception is an
ingredient of moral perception. Moreover, if our first conceptions do not
presuppose any judgment, then the puzzle Lehrer discusses is solved. Our first
moral conceptions are the building blocks of our moral judgments, and of our
more general moral conceptions.
Are these first moral (non-propositional) conceptions gross and indistinct?
Reid certainly seems to suggest this idea in several passages. However, Reid
sometimes writes that non-propositional conception is an ingredient of the
perception of the child, the savage, but also of the adult, and that all have
the same thing in mind. They differ only in the judgments that are associated
with these conceptions. The following examples suggest that our first moral
judgments, and not conceptions, are uninformed and indistinct. Reid writes, for
instance, that the child and the adult have the same notion, or non-propositional
conception of a jack for roasting meat. If the adults general idea differs
from the childs conception, it is due to other powers of the mind (IP: 97;
Works: 258). Another example is the perception of beauty. Both the adult and
the child have a clear conception of beauty. The adult, however, may give
reasons for his conception. When the adult perceives beauty he forms a non-
propositional conception that is accompanied with informed judgments about
the object (IP: 598; Works: 501). My suggestion, therefore, is that adults and
children might have the same non-propositional conceptions in mind. Older
children and adults are able to generalize and abstract from these conceptions
and form judgments about why certain actions are moral or not. Adults also
recognize the truth of general moral principles, and they recognize certain
actions as being subsumed or not under these general rules. However, it is
possible that the adult and the child both have the same conception in mind.

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The conception is always present, but the judgments associated with it might
appear and then change as the child develops and thinks about beauty. It is
therefore difficult to make the claim that our first moral conceptions are gross and
indistinct.
A final remark in this section is that, contrarily to Lehrers interpretation, these
early conceptions are not necessarily about injury done to ourselves, for Reid.
Reid writes in the Active Powers:

Our first moral conceptions are probably got by attending coolly to the conduct
of others, and observing what moves our approbation, what our indignation.
These sentiments spring from our moral faculty as naturally as the sensations
of sweet and bitter from the faculty of taste. [italics are mine](AP: 279; Works:
641)

And

When we are capable of contemplating the actions of other men, or of

reflecting upon our own calmly and dispassionately, we begin to perceive in
them the qualities of honest and dishonest, of honorable and base, of right and
wrong, and to feel the sentiments of moral approbation and disapprobation.

These sentiments are at first feeble, easily warped by passions and prejudices,
and apt to yield to authority. By use and time, the judgment, in morals as in
other matters, gathers strength, and feels more vigour . . . By an impulse of
nature, we venture to judge for ourselves, as we venture to walk by ourselves.
[italics are mine](AP: 277; Works: 640)

Our first moral conceptions might thus be of moral virtue and vice in others, and
of right and wrong conduct in others. It is therefore incorrect to interpret Reid as
holding that our first moral conceptions are egocentric.
Therefore, first moral conceptions are conceptions of moral worth in others and
in ourselves, of merit and demerit in the actions of others or in our own actions.
And instead of describing our first moral conceptions as indistinct, I describe them
as uninformed. Children who lack knowledge of general principles might still
form non-propositional conceptions of the virtue of agents. This conception is not
necessarily gross and indistinct since it is an ingredient of the moral perception
of adults as well. The general moral ideas/notions of adults retain the element
of non-propositional conception, but adults may also conceive of the actions as
instances of general rules and as subsumed under more general laws and concepts.
Adults have the same conceptions as children, but these conceptions might be
more or less informed by their judgments, moral knowledge, and other powers of
the mind.

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2.2. Immediate and informed moral perception

A second puzzle Lehrer discusses arises because of Reids claim that moral
perception is immediate it does not require reason together with Reids claim
that moral perception is shaped by education, example, discipline and reason
(Lehrer 2013: 123). The solution Lehrer offers is that moral perception may be a
moral judgment about non-existent intentional objects that are only contemplated.
I might perceive that some contemplated action, what I might do tomorrow, is my
duty, though the action does not exist, Lehrer writes (Lehrer 2013: 124). The act
of thinking about the non-existent object, according to Lehrer, may be the result
of factors like reasoning, discipline, and education. However, once the action is
clearly thought about, the moral judgment about the action is immediate, without
the labor of reason (AP: 280; Works: 641).
Lehrers understanding of Reids possible solution is highly plausible and
interesting. However, I believe Reids solution would differ slightly from Lehrers,
for reasons that are related to the issues discussed in the previous section. I
will show that moral perception is not about non-existing objects (as Lehrer
suggests) but only of existing agents and actions (AP: 349), and that the natural
signs involved in moral perception suggest both naturally and as the effect of
experience.
Lehrer seems to think that moral perception could be about existing objects
and also about future non-existent objects. However, it seems to me that Reids
view is that moral perception is the perception that this particular agents action or
set of actions is morally right or wrong, or that this particular person is virtuous
or vicious in performing this action or set of actions. In seeing someone take
someones purse, for example, I perceive in certain circumstances that the action
is one of stealing, that it is wrong, that the person is acting viciously, and that the
agent merits blame. In such cases of moral perception, the conception involved is
a non-propositional act of holding the wrong action in mind, and moral perception
is the conception accompanied with the belief or judgment about the moral
character of the agent and his or her action. The moral perception in this case
is immediate since the judgment is not the result of inference, of the application
of a rule, or of any other mental process. Hence, I take it that Reid understands
moral perception in the same way he understands other cases of perception: as
immediate conception and belief about existing objects.
However, Lehrer is correct to point out that moral perception may be both
immediate and the result of education and reasoning. If moral perception
functions in the same way as our perception of the feelings, affections, moods,
intentions of others, and in the same way as our perception of beauty, then this
result is to be expected. Indeed, these qualities are suggested by a particular
category of natural signs, which, I have pointed out above, are features such as
facial expressions and gestures of the body (IHM: 190; Works: 195).

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As I argue earlier (Kroeker 2010), the distinguishing mark of these natural

signs is that they suggest qualities instinctively, prior to experience, but also as the
result of experience and reasoning. The following passage shows the instinctive
nature of these natural signs:
The involuntary signs of the passions and dispositions of the mind, in the
voice, features, and action, are a part of the human constitution which deserves
admiration. The signification of these signs is known to all men by nature, and
previous to all experience. (AP: 141; Works: 574, see also Works: 562)
Mental qualities are suggested previous to the experience one might have of the
conjunction between certain signs and what they signify.
However, Reid also writes that these natural signs can be mastered and studied
and will then also suggest as a result of experience and reasoning. The natural
signs that suggest various dispositions of mind are the foundation of the fine arts,
and of taste, and Reid points out that a fine taste may be improved by reasoning
and experience, but if the first principles of it were not planted in our minds by
nature, it could never be acquired (IHM: 60; Works: 122). Great painters and
artists, for example, can gain mastery of the signs and how they are connected
to certain qualities: It is only great painters that can arrive at this: to know the
particular formation of the face and features to express every passion (Lectures
on the Fine Arts: 3132). Hence, these natural signs suggest naturally, before
experience, but may also suggest as a result of experience and reasoning. I can
perceive your distress, for instance, because your specific facial features naturally
lead me to perceive your sadness. Or, I might offer reasons for the perception of
your sadness that involve experience and reasoning. In the same way, your acts of
kindness may suggest a virtuous disposition, which I perceive prior to experience.
But experience might teach me, as well, that certain actions are expressions of
kind intentions. The natural sign suggests certain qualities prior to experience.
However, experience and reasoning may also teach us to gain mastery of signs and
what they signify. The puzzle is thus solved: moral perception, just as perception
of the mental states of others, can be both immediate and the result of experience
and reasoning.
Let us now briefly consider moral judgments about future states of affairs,
about actions that one ought to perform or not. Since I do not think these cases
are cases of moral perception for Reid, it is not clear whether Reid would
think of these judgments as immediate. By immediate Reid usually means
that something is not the result of inference. Perception is always immediate.
First principles are also immediate, in the sense that once our faculties have
matured, and when our attention is turned to them, we recognize their truth
non-inferentially. However, moral judgments about future non-existent states of
affairs are not cases of perception and are not always instances of first principles
of morals. Some moral judgments about what we ought to do might be inferred

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from moral axioms. Therefore, it is not certain that moral judgments about future
states of affairs are always immediate for Reid.
To conclude this section, let us notice that a crucial and important point in
Lehrers paper concerns moral disagreement. Lehrer argues that the fact that
moral judgments may be immediate and yet the effect of reasoning and experience
accounts for moral disagreement. This fact also accounts for moral error. This is
an important point, and Lehrer correctly draws our attention to it. Natural signs
signify because of original faculties that are innate. We naturally, or originally,
perceive the moral qualities of certain intentions and dispositions of an agent as
we are faced with the agents actions. However, contexts and situations may be
complex, and we are often warped by our corrupted desires and intentions, and
hence it is possible to fail to interpret signs accurately. These factors may lead to
error in moral judgments, as well as to disagreement about what the signs signify.

2.3. Moral judgments and Feelings

A last issue I will discuss concerns the relation between moral judgments and
feelings. Lehrer offers two reasons for which Reid thinks of feelings as necessarily
annexed to moral judgments. I find difficulties with the second one only. The first
explanation for the relation between moral judgments and feelings, according
to Lehrers understanding of Reid, is that the moral sense gives rise to both.
Judgments and feelings are both part of the meaning of moral worth. Hence,
a person who judges that an action has moral worth but feels nothing, Lehrer
convincingly argues, might not understand the meaning of moral worth.
The second explanation for which feelings always accompany moral judgment,
Lehrer writes, is connected with motivation. The necessary connection between
moral judgment and feeling, according to Lehrer, explains why a person who is
not at all moved in favor of choosing a course of action has not genuinely judged
the action to be right, or why a person who is not at all moved to abstain from a
course of action, has not genuinely judged that the action is wrong (Lehrer 2013:
125). Whether moral judgments always lead to motivation is a question that will
not be discussed here. The point which leads to puzzles, and which is the focus
here, is Lehrers suggestion that moral judgments are motivating because of the
moral feelings that are associated with them. I am not convinced with the claim
that moral feelings, or approbation and disapprobation in general, are necessary
for moral motivation for Reid. Reids Essays on the Active Powers suggest that
moral judgment is either moral perception (a judgment about the moral worth
of some object) or a judgment about how one ought to act (a rational principle
of action). The first kind of moral judgments are not motivating, and the second
are motivating but not in virtue of approbation and disapprobation. I will end
my response by briefly defending this interpretation of Reids account of the
motivation of moral judgments.

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Moral judgments which are formed in cases of moral perception are not
motivating, according to my interpretation of Reid. When we contemplate an
existing moral action, Reid writes, we form a judgment, and this judgment gives
rise to an associated feeling of approbation or disapprobation (AP: 185). When
I judge that a person is morally worthy for performing an action like helping
another person in distress, I approve of such an action. The approbation, Reid
holds, is a mental act of desiring the good of the person performing the action and
of having associated feelings (AP: 349). It seems clear to me that I might approve
of acts of many persons without being motivated to act in any way. Evidence of
this is that I might approve of actions of strangers acting in foreign countries, or
of persons that are deceased. My desire for the agents good might move me to be
thankful or appreciative, but might not move me to act morally.
Let us now consider moral judgments concerning what I ought to do Reids
rational principles of action, which are motives and hence are, not surprisingly,
motivating for Reid. These judgments place the agent in a relation to a future
action, and these are the kinds of moral judgments that guide agents in their
moral actions. Let us assume that I form the judgment that, in a particular case,
I ought to help someone who is in trouble. If, as Reid holds, moral judgments
are accompanied with approbation or disapprobation, then let us say that I also
approve of my act of helping someone. Recall that approbation involves a certain
feeling and a desire for the good of the object. But what is the object whose
good I desire? The object of approbation is the person performing the action
(see AP: 180 where Reid clearly writes that approbation is directed toward the
agent performing the action). Hence, in this case, I approve of myself performing
the act of helping, and I desire my good. The problem, as I see it, is that this
desire for my own good cannot be what moves me to act morally since my aim in
cases of what I ought, morally, to do is not to fulfill my own good but to fulfill a
moral end. Motivation, therefore, to act morally, does not lie in moral approbation
(or disapprobation). Hence, moral judgments about what one ought, morally, to
do, are motivating, according to Reid, but not in virtue of the moral feelings of
approbation and disapprobation.
Reid, unfortunately, is not clear about what motivates us in this case. Feelings,
alone, are not about anything they have no objects. Hence, it is difficult to think
of them as moving us towards anything. Desires have objects and are directed
towards ends. However, the desire involved in approbation and disapprobation is
not directed toward virtue or duty and hence does not seem to motivate us toward
that end. Moreover, Reid is not clear, in general, about the role of desires in moral
motivation. Some passages seem to suggest that moral conviction, mere moral
judgment without affection, moves an agent to act.2 But other passages suggest
that moral motives and principles of action are desires for certain moral ends.3
These passages are not conclusive, however, and it may well be possible, for Reid,
to be moved to act morally in the absence of any desire, affection, or feeling.

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conclusion

Lehrers paper leads to interesting claims about Reids account. He argues that
our first moral conceptions arise when the child perceives injury done to himself.
First moral conceptions are thus gross, indistinct and egocentric. As the child
matures, Lehrer continues, the conceptions become informed by general moral
principles and thus become more distinct and clear. I have argued in the first
section that our first moral conceptions are not indistinct and are not egocentric,
since children and adults have the same non-propositional conceptions in mind
when they perceive the moral qualities of others. Our first moral conceptions are,
rather, non-propositional, and they are formed prior to our moral judgments.
Lehrer also argues that our future actions might be perceived and thought
about differently. Once the conception is formed, for Lehrer, the perception is
immediate. Hence, moral perception may be both the result of reasoning and
immediate. In the second section I have tried to show, however, that thinking
about future events is not a case of moral perception, and hence is not necessarily
immediate. Moral perception is always of existing agents and actions. Still,
this perception might be both immediate and the fruit of experience, as Lehrer
suggestion. The explanation of this fact, however, is that moral perception
functions like our perception of beauty (or also of the mental states of others). This
kind of perception might be immediate but also the consequence of our experience
and knowledge.
Finally, I have argued in the third section, contrary to Lehrer, that approbation
and disapprobation are not necessary for moral motivation. Lehrers general
interpretation is therefore correct, but I have argued that Reid would understand
the details of this interpretation differently. I also agree with an important
conclusion Lehrer draws from his interpretation of Reid. Since moral perception
may be instinctive, original, and yet informed by reasoning, practice, and
experience, an important conclusion is that these factors might lead us to interpret
moral situations differently and to perceive moral actions differently. This is
a point that merits more attention, since it explains the possibility of moral
disagreement. Lehrer therefore opens up new and important directions for the
study of Reids moral philosophy.4

references
Folescu, Marina (2013) Perceptual and Imaginative Conception: the Distinction that Reid
Missed, forthcoming inTodd Buras and Rebecca Copenhaver (eds), Mind, Knowledge
and Action: Essays in Honor of Reids Tercentenary.
Kroeker, Esther (2010) On Natural Signs, Taste and Moral Perception, in Sabine Roeser
(ed.), Reid on Ethics, London and New York: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 4668.
Lehrer, Keith (2010) Reid, the Moral Faculty, and First Principles, in Sabine Roeser (ed.),
Reid on Ethics, London and New York: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 2545.

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 Response to Keith Lehrer

Reid, Thomas (1863) The Philosophical Works of Thomas Reid (Works), D. D., 6th edition,
ed. Sir W. Hamilton, Edinburgh: James Thin.
(1973) Thomas Reids Lectures on the Fine Arts, ed. Peter Kivy, The Hague: Martinus
Nijhoff.
(1997) An Inquiry into the Human Mind (IHM), the Edinburgh Edition of Thomas
Reid, ed. Derek R. Brookes, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.
(2002) Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man (IP), the Edinburgh Edition of
Thomas Reid, ed. Derek R. Brookes and Knud Haakonssen, Edinburgh: Edinburgh
University Press.
(2010) Essays on the Active Powers of Man (AP), the Edinburgh Edition of Thomas
Reid, ed.Knud Haakonssen and James A. Harris, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University
Press.
Van Cleve, James (2004) Reids Theory of Perception, in Terence Cuneo and Ren
van Woudenberg (eds), The Cambridge Companion to Thomas Reid, Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, pp. 10133.

notes
1
The story is a bit more complex since the agents actions also function as a sign of the
agents moral worth. For a more complete development of Reids understanding of moral
perception see Kroeker 2010.
2
There may be conviction without passions; and the conviction of what we ought to do,
in order to some end which we have judged fit to be pursued, is what I call a rational
motive (AP: 219; Works: 612).
3
A thing may be desired either on its own account, or as the means in order to something
else. That only can properly be called an object of desire, which is desired upon its own
account; and it is only such desires that I call principles of action (AP: 110; Works:
559). And All of the principles of action imply the desire of some object; and the desire
of an object cannot be without aversion to its contrary; and, according as the object is
present or absent, desire and aversion, will be variously modified into joy or grief, hope
or fear [my italics](AP: 137; Works: 572).
4
A special thanks to Keith Lehrer for giving me the opportunity to think through his
paper and Reids moral philosophy. I also want to thank the organizers and participants
of the Conference Scottish Common Sense Philosophy and the Natural Law Tradition
in America, where I presented a version of this paper.

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