1. ORTIGAS & CO. LTD., petitioner, vs.

THE COURT OF APPEALS

MMC Ordinance No. 81-01, also known as the Comprehensive Zoning Area for the National Capital Region. The
ordinance reclassified as a commercial area a portion of Ortigas Avenue.

Deed of Sale executed prior to ordinance reclassifying the property prohibited commercial use.

Current Leasee claimed that MMC Ordinance No. 81-01 classified the area where the lot was located as commercial area
and said ordinance must be read into the August 25, 1976 Deed of Sale as a concrete exercise of police power.
Ortigas and Company averred that inasmuch as the restrictions on the use of the lot were duly annotated on the title
it issued to Emilia Hermoso, said restrictions must prevail over the ordinance, specially since these restrictions were
agreed upon before the passage of MMC Ordinance No. 81-01.
Issue: MMC Ordinance No. 81-01 nullified the building restriction imposing exclusive residential use on the property
in question
Ruling:
Contract of sale was entered into in August 1976, while the zoning ordinance was enacted only in March 1981. The
trial court reasoned that since private respondent had failed to show that MMC Ordinance No. 81-01 had retroactive
effect, said ordinance should be given prospective application only.
In general, we agree that laws are to be construed as having only prospective operation. Lex prospicit, non
respicit. Equally settled, only laws existing at the time of the execution of a contract are applicable thereto and not later
statutes, unless the latter are specifically intended to have retroactive effect.
But, the foregoing principles do admit of certain exceptions. One involves police power. A law enacted in the exercise
of police power to regulate or govern certain activities or transactions could be given retroactive effect and may
reasonably impair vested rights or contracts.
Police power legislation is applicable not only to future contracts, but equally to those already in
existence.[10] Nonimpairment of contracts or vested rights clauses will have to yield to the superior and legitimate exercise
by the State of police power to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order, safety, and general welfare of
the people. Statutes in exercise of valid police power must be read into every contract. [12] Noteworthy, in Sangalang vs.
Intermediate Appellate Court,[13] we already upheld MMC Ordinance No. 81-01 as a legitimate police power measure
The contractual stipulations annotated on the Torrens Title, on which Ortigas relies, must yield to the ordinance.
When that stretch of Ortigas Avenue from Roosevelt Street to Madison Street was reclassified as a commercial zone
by the Metropolitan Manila Commission in March 1981, the restrictions in the contract of sale between Ortigas and
Hermoso, limiting all construction on the disputed lot to single-family residential buildings, were deemed extinguished by
the retroactive operation of the zoning ordinance and could no longer be enforced
2. ST. LUKE'S MEDICAL CENTER EMPLOYEE'S ASSOCIATION-AFW (SLMCEA-AFW) AND MARIBEL S.
SANTOS, Petitioners,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (NLRC) AND ST. LUKE'S MEDICAL CENTER, INC.,

Congress passed and enacted Republic Act No. 7431 known as the "Radiologic Technology Act of 1992." Said law
requires that no person shall practice or offer to practice as a radiology and/or x-ray technologist in the Philippines
without having obtained the proper certificate of registration.

Issue: whether petitioner Santos was illegally dismissed by private respondent SLMC on the basis of her inability to
secure a certificate of registration from the Board of Radiologic Technology

Ruling:

It is argued, that petitioner Santos' failure to comply with the certification requirement did not constitute just cause for
termination as it violated her constitutional right to security of tenure. This contention is untenable.

While the right of workers to security of tenure is guaranteed by the Constitution, its exercise may be reasonably
regulated pursuant to the police power of the State to safeguard health, morals, peace, education, order, safety, and
the general welfare of the people.

It has long been recognized that the regulation of this field is a reasonable method of protecting the health and safety
of the public to protect the public from the potentially deadly effects of incompetence and ignorance among those who
would practice medicine.

The fact that another employee, who likewise failed to pass the required exam, was allowed by private respondent to
apply for and transfer to another position with the hospital does not constitute unlawful discrimination. This was a valid
exercise of management prerogative, petitioners not having alleged nor proven that the reassigned employee did not
qualify for the position where she was transferred.

Page 1 of 5
 3. CANORE-CO vs. TORRES
May the Office of the President validly constitute an ad hoc committee to take over and manage the affairs of an
electric cooperative?

Petitioner CANORECO is an electric cooperative organized under the provisions of P.D. No. 269, otherwise known
as the National Electrification Administration Decree, as amended by P.D. No. 1645.
Then President Corazon signed into law R.A. No. 6938 and R.A. No. 6939. The former is the Cooperative Code of the
Philippines, while the latter created the Cooperative Development Authority (CDA) and vested solely upon the CDA
the power to register cooperatives.

R.A. No. 6939 provide that cooperatives created under P.D. No. 269, as amended by P.D. No. 1645, shall have three
years within which to qualify and register with the CDA.

Power struggle- because of it an AD HOC Committee is hereby constituted to take over and manage the affairs of
CANORECO until such time as a general membership meeting can be called to decide the serious issues affecting
the said cooperative and normalcy in operations is restored.

Issue: PRESIDENT HAS NO POWER TO TAKE OVER AND MANAGE OR TO ORDER THE TAKE-OVER OR
MANAGEMENT OF CANORECO. The creation of the Ad Hoc Committee for the purpose of take-over was illegal and
void.

Petitioners assert that there is no provision in the Constitution or in a statute expressly, or even impliedly, authorizing
the President or his representatives to take over or order the take-over of electric cooperatives. Although conceding
that while the State, through its police power, has the right to interfere with private business or commerce, they
maintain that the exercise thereof is generally limited to the regulation of the business or commerce and that the
power to regulate does not include the power to take over, control, manage, or direct the operation of the
business.

Ruling: Petition impressed with merit.

Having registered itself with the CDA, power is vested upon the board of directors the conduct and management of
the affairs of cooperatives. Memorandum Order No. 409 clearly removed from the Board of Directors of CANORECO
the power to manage the affairs of CANORECO and transferred such power to the Ad Hoc Committee, albeit
temporarily.

Power struggle = Intra-corporate dispute. Must be resolved before CDA through mediation or conciliation.

Neither can police power be invoked to clothe with validity the assailed Memorandum Order No. 409. Police power is
the power inherent in a government to enact laws, within constitutional limits, to promote the order, safety, health,
morals, and general welfare of society.[15] It is lodged primarily in the legislature. By virtue of a valid delegation of
legislative power, it may also be exercised by the President and administrative boards, as well as the lawmaking
bodies on all municipal levels, including the barangay.

The pertinent laws on cooperatives, namely, R.A. No. 6938, R.A. No. 6939, and P.D. No. 269 as amended by P.D.
No. 1645 do not provide for the President or any other administrative body to take over the internal management of a
cooperative.

Memorandum Order No. 409 has no constitutional and statutory basis. It violates the basic underlying principle
enshrined in Article 4(2) of R.A. No. 6938 that cooperatives are democratic organizations and that their affairs shall be
administered by persons elected or appointed in a manner agreed upon by the members. Likewise, it runs counter to
the policy set forth in Section 1 of R.A. No. 6939 that the State shall, except as provided in said Act, maintain a policy
of non-interference in the management and operation of cooperatives.

4. Gancayo v. Quezon City

Quezon City Council issued Ordinance No. 2904, entitled An Ordinance Requiring the Construction of Arcades, for
Commercial Buildings to be Constructed in Zones Designated as Business Zones in the Zoning Plan of Quezon City, and
Providing Penalties in Violation Thereof. Ordinance No. 2904 was passed by the city council, there was yet no building
code passed by the national legislature.

The ordinance covered the property of Justice Gancayco. Justice Gancayco sought the exemption of a two-storey building
being constructed on his property from the application of Ordinance No. 2904 that he be exempted from constructing an
arcade on his property.

Page 2 of 5
Decades after, the Metropolitan Manila Development Authority (MMDA) conducted operations to clear obstructions along
the sidewalk of EDSA. Notice sent, Justice Gancayco did not comply with the notice. Soon after the lapse of the fifteen
(15) days, the MMDA proceeded to demolish the party wall. The ordinance authorized the taking of private property
without due process of law and just compensation. The City Government of Quezon City claimed that the ordinance was a
valid exercise of police power, regulating the use of property in a business zone.

Issue: WHETHER OR NOT ORDINANCE NO. 2904 IS CONSTITUTIONAL.

Ruling:

On Estoppel: Justice Gancayco may still question the constitutionality of the ordinance to determine whether or not the
ordinance constitutes a taking of private property without due process of law and just compensation. It was only in 2003
when he was allegedly deprived of his property when the MMDA demolished a portion of the building. Because he was
granted an exemption in 1966, there was no taking yet to speak of.

Violation of Equal Protection: N/A. He benefited from the exemption.

Zoning and the regulation of the construction of buildings are valid exercises of police power

Power expressly delegated to Quezon City, through the city council, as provided in its charter. In
the exercise of police power, property rights of individuals may be subjected to restraints and burdens in
order to fulfil the objectives of the government. Otherwise stated, the government may enact legislation
that may interfere with personal liberty, property, lawful businesses and occupations to promote
the general welfare. However, the interference must be reasonable and not arbitrary. And to
forestall arbitrariness, the methods or means used to protect public health, morals, safety or
welfare must have a reasonable relation to the end in view. (SJS v. Alfredo Lim)

A zoning ordinance is defined as a local city or municipal legislation which logically

arranges, prescribes, defines and apportions a given political subdivision into specific land uses
as present and future projection of needs

To reiterate, at the time that the ordinance was passed, there was no national building code enforced to guide the
city council; thus, there was no law of national application that prohibited the city council from regulating the construction
of buildings, arcades and sidewalks in their jurisdiction.

MMDAs Police Power

The Court had the occasion to rule that MMDA's powers were limited to the formulation, coordination, regulation,
implementation, preparation, management, monitoring, setting of policies, installing a system, and administration. Nothing
in Republic Act No. 7924 granted MMDA police power, let alone legislative power.

The MMDA is, as termed in the charter itself, a "development authority". It is an agency created for the
purpose of laying down policies and coordinating with the various national government agencies,
people's organizations, non-governmental organizations and the private sector for the efficient and
expeditious delivery of basic services in the vast metropolitan area. All its functions are administrative in
nature .

MMDA's insistence that it was only implementing Presidential Decree No. 1096 (Building Code) and its
implementing rules and regulations is not persuasive. The power to enforce the provisions of the Building
Code was lodged in the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH), not in MMDA. There is also
no evidence showing that MMDA had been delegated by DPWH to implement the Building Code.

5. JMM PROMOTION AND MANAGEMENT, vs. CA

Assailed is the government's power to control deployment of female entertainers to Japan by requiring an Artist Record
Book (ARB) as a precondition to the processing by the POEA of any contract for overseas employment. By contending
that the right to overseas employment, is a property right within the meaning of the Constitution, petitioners vigorously
aver that deprivation thereof allegedly through the onerous requirement of an ARB violates the due process clause and
constitutes an invalid exercise of the police power
Ruling: It is a valid exercise of police power.
Police power: nature
- an inherent attribute of sovereignty which virtually "extends to all public needs," [2] this "least limitable"[3] of
governmental powers grants a wide panoply of instruments through which the state, as parens patriae gives effect
to a host of its regulatory powers.

Page 3 of 5
 - The police power of the State, is a power coextensive with self-protection, and is not inaptly termed 'the law of
overruling necessity
The State shall afford full protection to labor, local and overseas, organized and unorganized and promote full
employment and equality of employment opportunities for all.
Obviously, protection to labor does not indicate promotion of employment alone. Under the welfare and social justice
provisions of the Constitution, the promotion of full employment, while desirable, cannot take a backseat to the
government's constitutional duty to provide mechanisms for the protection of our workforce, local or overseas.
Due Process Clause
Petitioners' assertion that the police power cannot, nevertheless, abridge the right of our performing workers to return to
work abroad after having earlier qualified under the old process, because, having previously been accredited, their
accreditation became a property right," protected by the due process clause.
We find this contention untenable.
While one cannot be deprived of the right to work and the right to make a living because these rights are property rights,
the arbitrary and unwarranted deprivation of which normally constitutes an actionable wrong.
Nevertheless, no right is absolute, and the proper regulation of a profession, calling, business or trade has always been
upheld as a legitimate subject of a valid exercise of the police power by the state particularly when their conduct affects
either the execution of legitimate governmental functions, the preservation of the State, the public health and welfare and
public morals.

Non-impairment clause

- must yield to the loftier purposes targeted by the government. Equally important, into every contract is read
provisions of existing law, and always, a reservation of the police power for so long as the agreement deals with a
subject impressed with the public welfare.

Equal Protection: the challenged Department Order clearly applies to all performing artists and entertainers destined for
jobs abroad; valid classification.

6. MAGTAJAS vs.PRYCE PROPERTIES CORPORATION

Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cagayan de Oro City enacted an ordinances PROHIBITING THE ISSUANCE OF
BUSINESS PERMIT AND CANCELLING EXISTING BUSINESS PERMIT TO ANY ESTABLISHMENT FOR THE USING
AND ALLOWING TO BE USED ITS PREMISES OR PORTION THEREOF FOR THE OPERATION OF CASINO and
PROHIBITING THE OPERATION OF CASINO AND PROVIDING PENALTY FOR VIOLATION THEREFOR.

PAGCOR is a corporation created directly by P.D. 1869 to help centralize and regulate all games of chance, including
casinos on land and sea within the territorial jurisdiction of the Philippines.

Cagayan de Oro City is expressly vested with the police power, it is also authorized the local government units to regulate
properties and businesses within their territorial limits in the interest of the general welfare.

Important points:

*The morality of gambling is not a justiciable issue. Gambling is not illegal per se. While it is generally considered
inimical to the interests of the people, there is nothing in the Constitution categorically proscribing or penalizing gambling

It is settled that questions regarding the wisdom, morality, or practicibility of statutes are not addressed to the judiciary but
may be resolved only by the legislative and executive departments, to which the function belongs in our scheme of
government.or, for that matter, even mentioning it at all.(POLITICAL QUESTION)

The tests of a valid ordinance:

1) It must not contravene the constitution or any statute.

2) It must not be unfair or oppressive.

3) It must not be partial or discriminatory.

4) It must not prohibit but may regulate trade.

5) It must be general and consistent with public policy.

Page 4 of 5
 6) It must not be unreasonable.

Sec. 458 of the Local Government Code, local government units are authorized to prevent or suppress, among others,
"gambling and other prohibited games of chance." Obviously, this provision excludes games of chance which are not
prohibited but are in fact permitted by law.

The apparent flaw in the ordinances in question is that they contravene P.D. 1869 and the public policy embodied therein
insofar as they prevent PAGCOR from exercising the power conferred on it to operate a casino. The decree creating
PAGCOR has been, not really repealed by the Code, but merely "modified pro tanto" in the sense that PAGCOR cannot
now operate a casino over the objection of the local government unit concerned.

Reconciliation of the PAGCOR decree and the LGC

The proper resolution of the problem at hand is to hold that under the Local Government Code, local government units
may (and indeed must) prevent and suppress all kinds of gambling within their territories except only those allowed by
statutes like P.D. 1869. The exception reserved in such laws must be read into the Code, to make both the Code and
such laws equally effective and mutually complementary.

We find that the ordinances violate P.D. 1869, which has the character and force of a statute, as well as the public policy
expressed in the decree allowing the playing of certain games of chance despite the prohibition of gambling in general

The rationale of the requirement that the ordinances should not contravene a statute is obvious. Municipal governments
are only agents of the national government. Local councils exercise only delegated legislative powers conferred on them
by Congress as the national lawmaking body. The delegate cannot be superior to the principal or exercise powers higher
than those of the latter. It is a heresy to suggest that the local government units can undo the acts of Congress, from
which they have derived their power in the first place, and negate by mere ordinance the mandate of the statute

Casino gambling is authorized by P.D. 1869. This decree has the status of a statute that cannot be amended or nullified
by a mere ordinance. Hence, it was not competent for the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cagayan de Oro City to enact
Ordinance No. 3353 prohibiting the use of buildings for the operation of a casino and Ordinance No. 3375-93 prohibiting
the operation of casinos. For all their praiseworthy motives, these ordinances are contrary to P.D. 1869 and the public
policy announced therein and are therefore ultra vires and void.

7. CITY OF MANILA, vs. LAGUIO, JR.

Page 5 of 5