The Enabling Environment for Implementing the

Millennium Development Goals:

Government Actions to Support NGOs

Derick W. Brinkerhoff
Senior Fellow in International Public Management
Research Triangle Institute
1615 M Street NW, Suite 740
Washington, DC 20036

Paper presented at:

George Washington University Conference
The Role of NGOs in Implementing the Millennium Development Goals
Washington, DC
May 12-13, 2004
The United Nations Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) have focused the attention
of the international community on enduring problems of global poverty and have
attracted broad support. The MDGs establish ambitious targets for promoting economic
growth, improving health and education, empowering women, creating sustainable
development, and reducing poverty (UNDP 2003). The magnitude of the challenge is
captured in one estimate that, given current trends, 33 countries with more than a quarter
of the worlds people will achieve fewer than half the Millennium Development Goals by
2015 (DFID 2003: 6). Others express similar views, noting the varying prospects for
different regions of the world. An African Development Bank report notes that countries
in Asia, Eastern Europe, and Latin America and the Caribbean are on course to fulfill
many of the MDGs. But few African countries are likely to meet most of them (ADB
2002: 1).

What will it take to achieve the MDGs? This question preoccupies international donor
agencies, developing country governments, policy think tanks, international and national
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), local communities, and citizens groups.
Actions at all levels, from the global to the local, are called for; and the recommendations
for what needs to be done are numerous. Among the prescriptions for MDG country
implementation that these various actors voice is the need to create an enabling
environment to put in place the conditions that will facilitate the efforts of actors in the
public, private, NGO/civil society sectors to take the various steps needed to reach the
MDG targets.

A quick scan of printed and electronic sources reveals the ubiquity of the term. The
enabling environment is the topic of NGO conferences, World Bank training programs,
and USAID and other donor-supported technical assistance projects.1 It appears
repeatedly in analytic studies, policy briefs, and reports. However, like much of the
vocabulary of international development and assistance discourse, the term exhibits an
apparent clarity that masks the underlying complexity inherent in the conceptual territory
it subsumes. In some formulations, the enabling environment is defined so expansively
that it becomes nearly synonymous with socio-economic development itself. In others, it
is treated so narrowly as to be clearly inadequate to stimulate sufficient response absent
the presence of additional factors; for example, considering the enabling environment as
consisting primarily of an appropriate regulatory framework.

This paper seeks to clarify what government can and should do to support and encourage
societal partners to pursue actions related to the MDGs. It does not pretend to sort out the
definitional complexity or offer a comprehensive tour of the terms contours. In keeping

1
A few examples include: a) InterAction Symposium, Creating an Enabling Environment for
Achievement of the Millennium Development Goals, Washington, DC, October 2, 2002; b) The Nonprofit
Partnership Conference, An Enabling Environment: The Legal and Policy Framework Required for a
Vibrant NPO Sector, Johannesburg, South Africa, March 25-27, 2003; c) World Bank, Community Driven
Development Learning Module, Enabling Environment for Civil Society in CDD Projects, Washington,
DC, April 19, 2001; d) USAID/Nigeria, Request for Assistance (RFA) No. 620-04-003, Enabling
Environment, (USAID/Nigeria 2004); e) Asian Development Bank, Grant No. PRC 36445-02,
Strengthening the Enabling Environment and Building Institutional Capacity to Combat Land
Degradation, September 2003.
 2

with the theme of the conference, the main focus is on the role of government in enabling
NGOs to be engaged in reaching the MDGs. Government is not the only actor involved
in the MDGs; clearly all sectors of a society need to engage in order to make progress
toward those goals. But government has a primary role in structuring and influencing the
contributions of the private and NGO sectors.2 The paper begins with a brief discussion
of the evolution of attention to environmental factors in socio-economic development,
and then turns to what has commonly been considered governments role in creating an
enabling environment. Next, the paper develops a framework for more precisely
characterizing governments role in an enabling environment specifically for NGO
participation in the production of public goods. This is followed by a discussion of the
incentives for government to create such an enabling environment, touching on topics
such as the politics of pro-poor reform, accountability, citizen participation, and so on.
The paper closes with a brief investigation of several measurement and implementation
issues, and some concluding remarks.

From sustainability to the enabling environment

Those interested in economic development and poverty alleviation, whether academics or
practitioners, have long sought to identify what is necessary and what works to address
these objectives. For rich countries and international donor agencies, this interest has
been driven by the desire to make the best use of foreign assistance resources. During the
1980s, the donor community engaged in a number of soul-searching exercises as
evidence of the limited impact of project investments came to light, leading to a
concentration on sustainability (e.g., USAID 1988, World Bank 1985). Among the
findings of these and other reviews was the important influence of factors external to
projects and programs on their ability to generate long-term benefits. The current
attention to the enabling environment emerged from the earlier debate and analysis on
what to do in order to make better development project investments. Calls to improve the
enabling environment can be seen as the latest version of concern for sustainability and
aid effectiveness, which derives from the question, what needs to be in place in order for
donor interventions to yield lasting results?

This interest in the enabling environment reflects a swing away from a narrow focus on
project designs that can protect donor interventions from environmental hostility.
Donor investments shifted toward targeting the policy environment itself for intervention,
aiming at the range of factors that support and encourage actors in developing countries
to take actions to promote socio-economic improvement, and that generate country
ownership and commitment. Whereas the sustainability focus of the 1980s led donors to
look for ways to adapt their project/program designs and implementation to cope with
inhospitable and constraining operating environments, the trend begun in the 1990s up to
the present poses the question, how can environments be made more supportive so that
in-country actors can productively use project/program investments? The search for

2
There are many ways to define NGOs. The definition used in this paper is intentionally broad,
encompassing what has variously been identified as the third or nonprofit sector, civil society
organizations, nongovernmental development organizations, and grassroots organizations. Brinkerhoff and
Brinkerhoff (2002) discuss definitional questions, and cite the issue of sector blurring, which recognizes
that the lines distinguishing the public, private, and NGO sectors are not always bright.
 3

answers to this question has led to significant research and analysis devoted to better
mapping and understanding of the environment for international development efforts and
institutions (e.g., Brinkerhoff and Goldsmith 1992, Picciotto and Weisner 1998), as well
as spawning several generations of policy-based lending and grants.

While this shift in focus may seem like a subtle one, it has led to a dramatic reorientation
in the thinking of the development assistance community, with major policy implications.
As research findings increasingly demonstrated the links among successful socio-
economic development, the enabling environment, and government capacity coupled
with political will, donor agency policymakerswith the World Bank, which has
sponsored much of the research, in the leadbegan to emphasize targeting grants and
loans to countries with demonstrated performance records (see, for example, Dollar and
Svensson 1998, Burnside and Dollar 2000). In the World Bank, these findings undergird
the latest generation of policy-based lending, in which countries rated as high performers
receive loans with fewer conditionalities and more discretion in utilization of the funds
than previous generations of structural adjustment programs.3 Among bilateral donors,
the U.S. government recently concretized this emphasis with the Bush administrations
creation of the Millennium Challenge Account (MCA), which will reward countries that
have put in place the conditions for sustainability that will assure the effective utilization
of foreign assistance dollars. In the context of the MCA, the presence or absence of an
enabling environment distinguishes between those countries eligible for funding and
those that are excluded. Thus, the enabling environment shares a prominent place in the
foreign assistance policy arena along with the MDGs.

Defining the enabling environment

As noted, definitions of the enabling environment are numerous, and range from all-
encompassing to narrow. A typical general definition is as follows: An enabling
environment is a set of interrelated conditionssuch as legal, bureaucratic, fiscal,
informational, political, and culturalthat impact on the capacity of development
actors to engage in development processes in a sustained and effective manner (Thindwa
2001: 3). To be useful, broad definitions such as this one need to be unpacked. Getting
more specific about the enabling environment requires, first, elaborating a comprehensive
set of influential environmental factors; and second, clarifying the nature of their impacts
on various development actors.4 There is a vast body of research and experience that
offers a wealth of answers, and a comprehensive treatment is beyond the scope of this
paper. Table 1 contains a brief summary of commonly agreed-upon features of the
enabling environment, divided into five categories of factors: economic, political,
administrative, socio-cultural, and resources.5

3
Both the World Bank researchers analyses and the modified lending policies are topics of intense debate,
among Bank staff as well as outside observers. For recent critical discussion of the empirical research base
for performance-based selectivity in lending, see Mosley at al. (2003) and also Radelet (2004). This debate
fits within the ongoing arguments regarding the utility, appropriateness, and effectiveness of conditionality
(see, for example, Killick 1997, Santiso 2001, Koeberle 2003).
4
These are not the only clarifications that are in order. Other questions that arise include, in what ways are
the conditions interrelated? Are some conditions more important than others?
5
Huge amounts of the development literature address the topics in this table. For some useful treatments
that aggregate and synthesize research findings, see World Bank (2002, 1997) and UNDP (2002).
 4
Table 1. Key Features of the Enabling Environment
Category of Key Enabling Features
Environmental
Factors
Economic -Nondistortionary policy framework.
-Encouragement of free markets & open
competition.
-Supportive of investment (including physical
security).
-Low transactions costs, credible commitment.
Political -Democratic system that supports pluralism,
accountability, transparency, & responsiveness.
-Processes that encourage participation, social
contract, & state legitimacy.
-Rule of law, contract enforcement, respect for
human rights & property rights.
Administrative -Efficient service delivery capacity.
-Low levels of corruption.
-Institutional checks & balances.
-Decentralization.
-Civil service meritocracy.
Socio-cultural -Presence of social capital & trust.
-Tolerance of diversity.
-Norms of inclusiveness, equity, & fairness.
-Belief in the value & efficacy of individual
effort.
Resources -Policies & investments in health, education,
workforce development, information
technology, science & research.
-Adequate funding & institutional capacity.
Illustrative Government Enabling Actions
-Reducing red tape & unnecessary regulation.
-Managing macro-economic policy to control
inflation, deficit spending, & assure stability.
-Reducing tariffs, barriers to investment (level
playing field).
-Investing in physical infrastructure (roads,
transportation, etc.).
-Controlling criminality (e.g. mafias) & violence.
-Conducting free & fair elections.
-Making information widely available, promoting
free media.
-Devolving power & resources to subnational
levels of government.
-Limiting power & influence of interest groups.
-Supporting civil society.
-Assuring judicial independence.
-Curbing abuse & corruption.
-Creating incentives for performance.
-Separating service provision from financing.
-Building cross-sectoral partnerships.
-Establishing monitoring & evaluation systems.
-Improving coordination across agencies & sectors.
-Supporting marginalized & disadvantaged societal
groupspro-poor affirmative action, need-based
subsidies, safety nets, etc.
-Encouraging civic dialogue, social compacts, &
consensus building.
-Discouraging ethnic-based politics & policies.
- Controlling violence (e.g., ethnic cleansing).
-Setting policies & incentives that encourage
private investment & corporate social
responsibility.
-Allocating public resources to assure
maximization of social & economic potential.
 5

This summary of the enabling environment and government actions to support it reveals
the breadth and complexity of factors that analysts and practitioners have identified as
important to putting in place the conditions that can support socio-economic development
and the MDGs. Government needs to: a) improve policy, legal, and regulatory
frameworks; b) build institutional capacity across sectors and at various levels; c) seek
out and respond to citizens needs and preferences; d) establish and maintain a range of
oversight, accountability, and feedback mechanisms; and e) mobilize and allocate public
resources and investments. Indeed, many of the items in this table have been formalized
in selectivity choices and conditionalities for World Bank loans and in the eligibility
criteria for MCA funding. In one sense, then, the criteria for inclusion as an MCA
country, or for selection for a World Bank loan, become the defining features of an
enabling environment: good governance, investing in health and education, and sound
economic policies. Yet, the table also confirms, as others have pointed out, the
difficulties poor countries can face in meeting these conditionalities and criteria, and in
establishing an environment that enables rather than disables.

The table highlights the extent to which the features of the enabling environment reflect
the public-goods producing function of government, which relates to the basic rationale
for public-sector intervention. However, the table also makes clear that government is not
the only actor involved in contributing to an enabling environment. As the governance
terminology reflects, societal problem-solving, the production of public goods, and social
capital formation are not the sole purview of government actors.

Enabling environment for NGOs

Among the actors involved in governance are NGOs, and the focus here turns toward a
framework for examining governments role in an enabling environment for NGO
participation. Government-NGO relations are both complex and diverse, reflecting the
myriad rationales and modalities for cross-sectoral action. Najam (2000), for example,
distinguishes four types of relationships: cooperation, where government and NGOs
share similar ends and means; confrontation, where the ends and means of both actors
differ; complementarity, where the ends are similar, but the means differ; and co-
optation, where the means are similar, but the actors have different ends in mind. Given
this diversity and complexity, any effort to characterize an enabling environment will
necessarily be oversimplified. The intent here is to develop a broad-brush picture.6

Building on Fox et al. (2002), the role of government in fostering an enabling

environment can be categorized as consisting of the following actions: mandating,
facilitating, resourcing, partnering, and endorsing. Taking the three categories of NGO
engagement in the production of public goods (Brinkerhoff et al. 2003)service
provision, aggregation and representation of interests, policy advocacy/monitoringand
combining them with the classification of government actions yields a framework for

6
To elaborate on the specifics of government-NGO relations is beyond the scope of this paper. For an
overview see Brinkerhoff and Brinkerhoff (2002).
 6

clarifying how government can enable NGO engagement in the MDGs, as illustrated in
Table 2.

Mandating refers to the legal and regulatory framework that affects NGOs, all the way
from basic constitutional rights that allow citizens to organize independent of state
control, to laws governing the creation and operation of foundations, to NGO registration
laws.7 Laws affecting how government entities operate also play an enabling or
constraining role; for example, statutes on public hearings, sunshine legislation,
freedom of information, laws on citizen participation, etc. These statutes open the door
for NGOs to discover what government policies and programs exist or are planned, to
obtain budget information, to engage with public officials, and so on. Another important
element of government mandating has to do with laws and regulations that govern NGO
transparency and accountability, which affects both the legitimacy of individual NGOs
through assuring fiduciary responsibility and the broader legitimacy of philanthropy and
the NGO sector.8 Clearly, this government role in creating an enabling environment for
NGOs relates to the broader features of democratic political structures and economic
liberalism, briefly reviewed above, that support socio-economic development for all
societal actors, not just NGOs.

In its facilitating role, government provides incentives for NGOs; for example, for NGO
service providers these can include special provisions for contracting, such as set-asides.
Government can also provide incentives and capacity-building for other actors, public
and private, to work with NGOs. Another type of facilitating action is to make available
information to NGOs and citizens in readily understandable language and easily
accessible formats; this is important to enable NGOs to effectively represent
constituencies and to engage in advocacy (see Brinkerhoff and Goldsmith 2003).

Resourcing can involve direct public funding, as in the case of contracts and grants for
NGO service providers. In the U.S. for example, nonprofit, tax-exempt organizations rely
on government resources for about one-third of their revenues (Independent Sector 2001).
In the developing world, where governments are poorer, public funding of NGOs is
lower, with international donor agencies resources serving as an important source of
funds. However, beyond direct funding, government resourcing also includes the
establishment of financial incentives that encourage other actors to provide resources to
NGOs, such as tax policy that offers deductibility for contributions from individuals or
private firms through donations or bequests.

Partnering is a role that brings government into relationships with NGOs based more on
mutual interest and shared benefits, which capitalize on the comparative advantages of
the partners (see Brinkerhoff 2002). Government can establish mechanisms and

7
The International Center for Not-for-Profit Law has done extensive documentation of legal frameworks
affecting NGOs and civil society in a wide range of countries. See the publications and on-line library
available at <www.icnl.org>.
8
Many analysts of NGOs in developing countries have noted the existence of NGOs of dubious parentage,
suspicious purposes, and outright phoniness; see Fowlers (1997: 31-32) discussion of NGO pretenders.
On NGO legitimacy and accountability see Slim (2002).
 7

procedures that allow public entities to enter into partnership arrangements with NGOs.
An example would be where a government agency enables a policy advocacy NGO to
participate in establishing standard-setting and/or in policy outcomes monitoring. Or in
the legislative branch, members of parliament can bring in NGOs to collect data on
policy issues, conduct polls of their membership, and/or participate in committee
hearings and deliberations.

Endorsing refers to actions that publicize, praise, and encourage NGOs and civil society
groups. Governments role here relates to reinforcing cultural values and influencing
attitudes. Examples include policymakers publicizing the contributions of voluntarism to
social service provision, or promoting philanthropic values; or public agency sponsorship
of forums that bring together NGOs, private businesses, and individual citizens for policy
dialogue.

Table 2. Governments Roles in Enabling NGO Contributions to Public Goods

Government enabling roles and illustrative actions

NGO Mandating Facilitating Resourcing Partnering Endorsing
functions
Service -NGO registration & -Contracting -Tax & -Formation of -Publicizing the
provision licensing laws. rules, set-asides. inheritance laws. service delivery value of public
-Laws permitting -Procurement -Public funding partnerships with service,
contracting out of regulations. of service NGOs. philanthropy,
public services. contracts. -Supporting corporate social
databases to responsibility.
-Import duty
exemptions. match NGOs -Recognizing the
with other contributions of
partners. NGO service
providers.

Interest -Laws & regulations -Building -Grants for -Supporting -Reinforcing

aggregation on right to organize, capacity for citizen creation of NGO societal values of
hold public public officials participation. associations. equity,
& meetings. to foster citizen inclusiveness, &
-Establishment -Involving
representation -Procedures participation. of social funds. NGOs in justice.
mandating citizen -Literacy parliamentary -Promoting civic
participation, programs. committees, education.
sunshine laws, etc. blue-ribbon task
forces, etc.

Policy -Laws & regulations -Demystifying -Public funding -Creation of -Encouragement

advocacy & for access to policies & of NGO public arenas & of media
information. budgets. participation in forums for reporting on
monitoring policy shared policy NGOs role in
- Laws on freedom -Translation of
of expression. public monitoring. dialogue. advocacy &
documents into accountability.
-NGO accountability
& reporting local languages. -Support for
requirements (often -Establishing reporting on NGO
linked to social policy research
registration). accountability results &
mechanisms findings.
 8

Supply and demand: incentives

The above framework seeks to clarify the features of an enabling environment for NGO
participation in the MDGs, but it does not address the conditions under which a
government would take the actions necessary to create such an enabling environment.
What are the incentives for government to foster an enabling environment? Perhaps the
strongest drivers derive from service delivery needs; government can expand service
coverage and increase efficiency and effectiveness by accessing NGOs, whether as
contractors, so-called gap fillers (operating autonomously where government services
are unavailable), or full-fledged partners. Governments everywhere, even autocratic ones,
face some pressures to open or broaden access to basic services. For the service delivery
function, which relates to several of the MDGs, the instrumental nature of government-
NGO interaction establishes clear incentives for government to enable NGO action.

For the interest aggregation and policy advocacy functions of NGOs, however, the
incentives picture is mixed. These functions can have an impact on service delivery
effectiveness; and they also can increase the quality and responsiveness of public policies
and programs, reduce the degree of social exclusion of marginalized groups, express
public values, and build social capital. These contributions can occur in the context of
incremental improvements in specific policy/program interventions, in which case
government has some incentives to enable NGOs to fulfill these functions. Such
contributions can also lead over time to broader societal change, such as redefinition of
state-citizen interaction, opening up of political space, and/or enacting democratic
governance and civic values (see, for example, Fisher 1998).

In mature democracies, these NGO functions are part and parcel of state-society relations
and are firmly supported in the constitutional framework and the government apparatus
that structures accountability, responsiveness, and checks and balances (see Boris and
Steuerle 1999). In these societies, the full range of enabling conditions illustrated in
Table 2 is largely in place and operational. Yet, the existence of an enabling environment
does not override the realities of differential access to power and influence, the
pervasiveness of interest-group politics, and the persistence of a marginalized and
relatively impoverished underclass in the democracies of the industrialized world.

For the poor countries of the globe where democratization is nascent, partial, or
nonexistent, the incentives for government to enable NGOs interest aggregation and
policy advocacy functions are less clear-cut and in some situations are limited or
negative.9 Many developing and transitioning country governments view NGOs with
suspicion and antagonism, fearful of their potential for fueling political opposition and
jealous of their donor funding, even as they turn to NGOs for service delivery.
Government often seeks to maintain controls over NGOs through registration, regulation,
and, in some cases, repression. In Egypt, for example, where the government seeks to

9
The percentage of countries by region (excluding Western Europe) ranked by Freedom House in 2003 as
not free or partly free are: Sub-Saharan Africa, 77%; Middle East/North Africa, 94%; Central/Eastern
Europe and former Soviet Union, 56%; Americas, 34%, and Asia Pacific, 54%. Calculations are based on
data from <www.freedomhouse.org/research/survey2003.htm>.
 9

limit Islamic fundamentalist organizations, NGOs must meet strict requirements to

organize and are regulated by the Ministry of Social Welfare.

The MDGs targeting poverty reduction, womens empowerment, and environmental

sustainability involve much more than incremental tinkering with technical content of
socioeconomic policies and programs. Taken to their logical conclusion, they require
substantial degrees of social change, accompanied by redistribution of public revenues
and expenditures. Thus, as the extensive literature on the political economy of
policymaking demonstrates, powerful societal actors often oppose the changes necessary
to reach pro-poor goals and they exercise a high degree of influence and control over
government (see, for example, World Bank 1997, Brinkerhoff and Crosby 2002,
Lakshman 2003). Such power dynamics are at play at local as well as national levels.
Thus, the existence of a nominally supportive legal framework notwithstanding (the
mandating column in Table 2), government may be reticent to facilitate, provide
resources for, partner with, or endorse NGOs to organize and empower citizens, engage
in policy advocacy, and/or exercise monitoring and accountability. All societies and their
governments operate with some degree of patronage, both formal and informal, which
tends to preserve existing social patterns and power differentials (Brinkerhoff and
Goldsmith forthcoming).

In terms of pro-poor change and involvement from grassroots NGOs, Jenkins and Goetz,
writing about relatively democratic India, offer a sobering realism regarding the
likelihood that government actors will be open to enabling the poor or their NGO
representatives to take a seat at the policy table:

changing the elitist culture of the bureaucracy through training and

inculcation of new pro-people valueshardly offers a viable replacement
for the inducements bureaucrats earn from looking the other way when
regulations are violated and from mediating the access of politicians and
local business elites to state funds. It is hard to see how peoples
knowledge can translate into power without critical engagements with the
bureaucracy, or exposure and prosecution of corrupt practicesall
supported by a social movement to protect the poor from the inevitable
backlash (1999: 613-614).

Much of the donor discussion of enabling environments has a dry technocratic tone or a
feel-good participatory one. But it should not be forgotten that power and politics drive
the incentives that influence actors behaviors. Business regulatory regimes, for example,
emerge not simply from technical discussions of best practices but from bargaining
among powerbrokers inside government and outside in the firms being regulated.
Government cannot be counted on to supply either the features of an enabling
environment for socio-economic transformation (Table 1) or the more specific enabling
conditions for NGOs to engage in social change (Table 2) absent mobilization of demand
and application of political pressure. NGOs have a role to play both in creating their own
enabling environment that will foster their participation, and in serving as a source of
demand for change related to the broader set of environmental factors that enable
 10

transformation in the economic, political, administrative, socio-cultural and resource

allocation realms summarized in Table 1. This latter role is well documented, for
example, in areas such as anti-corruption, judicial and election monitoring, and
community organizing, where NGOs have been critical to successfully mobilizing
demand and political pressure.

The demand-making and mobilization task can be relatively easy for service delivery,
which tends to be non-controversial and readily accepted as a beneficial public good. Yet
even in cases where the desirability of the service is not at issue, challenges to entrenched
interests arise in the course of renegotiating the distribution of service costs, resources,
and benefits, as Bloom (2000) points out regarding efforts to increase equity in health
services. It can become progressively more difficult for NGOs to influence those
components of the enabling environment that support interest aggregation, citizen
mobilization, and advocacy. For example, in some countries it can be a major struggle
for NGOs simply to gain rights and access to public information (see Jenkins and Goetz
1999).

Addressing the politics of the enabling environment is central if NGOs are to fulfill their
potential functions in contributing to the MDGs. This does not mean that NGOs must
necessarily sacrifice one function in favor of another; experience shows that NGOs often
simultaneously engage in service delivery, policy advocacy, and constituency
empowerment (Brinkerhoff and Brinkerhoff 2002). Even in relatively hostile settings,
NGOs can on occasion exploit small openings that allow for progress to be made in
enhancing their enabling environment. Well known examples of NGOs that began with a
service delivery focus, but have grown to encompass advocacy and community
empowerment, and eventually to influence the extent to which their government operates
democratically are BRAC (Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee) and the
Grameen Bank in Bangladesh (see Karim 2000). For some NGOs, their mission aims
directly at pressuring government actors for change, not simply to create an enabling
environment for NGOs, but for promoting socioeconomic development, democracy, and
social justice. As these NGOs connect across national boundaries, they contribute to
transnational civil society, an increasingly potent force for change around the world, well
skilled in the exercise of power politics (see Florini 2000).

As countries democratize and decentralize, the opportunities for government-NGO

interactions increase, as do the possibilities for NGOs to engage in demand-making to
create a more favorable enabling environment. These arise in response to the incentives
for responsiveness and accountability that flow from democratization and
decentralization. The exploitation of accountability linkages can enhance the
effectiveness of NGO demand-making, such as through political campaigns, lobbying,
and public hearings with legislators and policymakers; and in the executive branch
through engagement with service delivery agencies in participatory planning exercises,
client satisfaction surveys, and so on. The interaction patterns that evolve from this kind
of cross-sectoral pushing and pulling result in an iterative process of engagement,
exchange, feedback, adjustment, and re-engagement. As a result, government-NGO
 11

relations and the features of the enabling environment can be highly dynamic
(Brinkerhoff and Brinkerhoff 2002).

It should be noted that the accountability linkages in these dynamic interactions go both
ways. As NGOs play roles in holding politicians, policymakers, and service deliverers to
account, so governments roles in regulating, contracting, and partnering with NGOs
serve to increase their accountability and responsiveness as well. In countries where the
government does not interact significantly with NGOs, these roles tend to be fulfilled de
facto by the international donors who fund NGO service delivery, policy monitoring, and
advocacy programs. With increasing levels of democratization and cross-sectoral
collaboration, it becomes more likely that developing country governments will at least
parallel donors in assuring some measure of NGO accountability, if not eventually
replace them. Some NGOs are not comfortable with the notion of oversight of their
activities and argue for unfettered autonomy, but increasingly the establishment of
transparency and accountability is seen as important for NGO credibility and legitimacy,
both as service providers and as policy advocates.10

Measurement and implementation issues

Concern for metrics that can be used for assessment of an enabling environment arises on
a number of fronts. Since features of the enabling environment are being employed as
criteria to decide which countries receive international donor grants and loans under
initiatives such as the MCA, measurement of those criteria takes on fundamental
importance. This is not the place to engage in detailed discussion of the choice and
utility of the MCA and other selectivity indicators, which others have dealt with
extensively (see Radelet 2003 and 2004, Jafari and Sud 2004). The point is to recognize
that the intense focus on indicator selection and eligibility thresholds, which have
preoccupied donors, countries seeking donor resources, and other interested parties, has
limited attention to other aspects of measurement related to enabling environments.

In terms of making progress toward the MDGs with NGO participation, two other
measurement considerations are important. Both of these concern the link between
measurement and implementation. First is a focus on capacity assessment. As noted here,
as well as by numerous other analyses, a critical issue for the enabling environment is
whether societal actors, both in and outside of government, have the requisite capacity to
establish and sustain appropriate enabling conditions to support NGO efforts that will
advance the MDGs. This issue suggests that efforts to measure institutional capacity are
a necessary complement to tracking enabling environment indicators. It also raises two
related questions. First, what measures might provide indications of progress toward a

10
Issues of performance accountability relate most directly to NGOs in their role as service providers,
where the focus is on downward accountability to beneficiaries and upward to funders, whether
international donors or governments (see, for example, Ebrahim 2003, and Edwards and Hulme 1996).
NGOs as self-proclaimed representatives of, and advocates for, various special groups (the poor and
marginalized, ethnic/religious minorities, women, children, etc.) face pressures for democratic
accountability in both national and international policy arenas. For a useful discussion of NGO legitimacy
and accountability that addresses both performance and democratic dimensions, see Slim (2002).
 12

better enabling environment? Second, what strategies and interventions will build the
needed institutional capacity?11

Second is a focus on monitoring and measurement of the enabling environment for

purposes of performance improvement and change management. The relevant managerial
perspectives here are several: for example, public sector managers in government service
delivery agencies, policymakers reviewing public agency performance and allocating
resources, and managers of NGOs working on MDG-related programs. This
measurement focus relates to a body of research and practice regarding strategic
management, in which the items identified in Tables 1 and 2 would be used to inform
assessment and strategy formulation for managing change.12 Given the dynamism of the
enabling environment, this type of monitoring and measurement is called for on an
ongoing basis, rather than being a one-shot undertaking. As poverty-focused NGOs
participate in negotiating relative entitlements to public benefits and mobilizing political
power in support of the MDGs, a strategic orientation to the enabling environment will be
helpful.

Finally, related to implementation capacity, there is the issue of global and transnational
impacts on an individual countrys enabling environment. How much of creating an
enabling environment is within the control of a particular government and its governance
partners? Globalizationremoval of trade barriers, liberalization of capital markets,
rapid technological changehas, in the view of many observers, challenged the
sovereignty of the nation-state as well as posed serious burdens on state capacity to cope
with greater economic, political, and social interdependence (see Rondinelli and Cheema
2003). Coupled with these forces, as previously noted, donor-imposed conditionalities
and transnational civil society add to the external pressures that developing and
transitioning country governments face. However, to the extent that global forces push
governments in the positive direction of improving their enabling environments, the issue
shifts away from lack of control toward capacity constraints.

Conclusions
The MDGs contain ambitious targets whose achievement depends upon the concerted
efforts of national and international actors, supported by substantial investment of
resources. The enabling environment in a particular country strongly influences the
effectiveness of those actors effortsin the public, NGO, or private sectorsand the
sustainability of MDG-promoting investments. The features of the enabling environment
have been targets of investment and capacity-building, as well as, more recently, criteria

11
Capacity assessment and capacity building are topics of perennial discussion, debate, and diatribe in the
international development community. The UNDP has sought to play a leadership role in addressing issues
of capacity development and technical cooperation; see, for example, Fukuda-Parr et al. (2002). For a
recent highly critical perspective, see Dichter (2003).
12
A large literature provides analysis and guidance on change management and performance improvement.
Brinkerhoff and Crosby (2002) offer a toolkit for public sector reformers that is also relevant for NGOs.
Lusthaus et al. (2002) provide a useful compendium of insights and advice on performance enhancement
and enabling environments. J. Brinkerhoffs (2002) book on partnership is helpful for NGOs working with
government or the private sector.
 13

employed to assist donors in deciding ex ante which countries are good bets for
development dollars and for specifying conditionalities associated with those dollars.

NGOs are important to the fight against poverty, and through their roles in service
delivery, policy advocacy, and constituency empowerment can contribute to making
progress on the MDGs. Maximizing these contributions depends upon government
actions to create an appropriate enabling environment, as elaborated in this paper. Local
NGOs themselves can take steps to push their government to implement these actions,
but in many cases they cannot do it alone. International NGOs can provide support and
fill gaps when necessary, using either their own or donor-provided resources.
International donors, intervening directly, can also address the implementation issues
raised above in various ways. Through conditionalities, as already mentioned, they can
induce governments to facilitate NGO participation in the MDGs. Through targeted
investment in pilot activities they can demonstrate the constructive roles NGOs can play.
Through the convening of neutral forums, they can bring government and NGOs together
to engage in information sharing, dialogue, and negotiation. Government resistance to
NGOs derives to some degree from political concerns, but it can also stem from
ignorance and lack of capacity. Sometimes NGOs are the resistant parties, with a hostile
or fearful orientation to government.

To the extent that countries move in the direction of the features of the enabling
environment for socio-economic development identified in Table 1, the likelihood
increases that government will take actions to support NGO involvement in the
production of public goods (Table 2). While restricting international donor assistance to
countries where those features are already positive can assure that resources will be well
spent and progress made, the real challenge remains to develop strategies for NGOs and
the MDGs where those features are weak or absent.

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