G.R. No.

164749
ROMULO ABROGAR and ERLINDA ABROGAR, Petitioners
vs
COSMOS BOTTLING COMPANY and INTERGAMES, INC., Respondents
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:

This case involves a claim for damages arising from the negligence causing the death of a
participant in an organized marathon bumped by a passenger jeepney on the route of the race.
The issues revolve on whether the organizer and the sponsor of the marathon were guilty of
negligence, and, if so, was their negligence the proximate cause of the death of the participant;
on whether the negligence of the driver of the passenger jeepney was an efficient intervening
cause; on whether the doctrine of assumption of risk was applicable to the fatality; and on
whether the heirs of the fatality can recover damages for loss of earning capacity of the latter
who, being then a minor, had no gainful employment.
The Case
By this appeal, the parents of the late Rommel Abrogar (Rommel), a marathon runner, seek the
review and reversal of the decision promulgated on March l 0, 2004,1 whereby the Court of
Appeals (CA) reversed and set aside the judgment rendered in their favor on May 10, 1991 by
the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 83, in Quezon City2 finding and declaring respondents
Cosmos Bottling Company (Cosmos), a domestic soft-drinks company whose products included
Pop Cola, and Intergames, Inc. (Intergames), also a domestic corporation organizing and
supervising the 1st Pop Cola Junior Marathon" held on June 15, 1980 in Quezon City, solidarily
liable for damages arising from the untimely death of Rommel, then a minor 18 years of age,3
after being bumped by a recklessly driven passenger jeepney along the route of the marathon.
Antecedents
The CA narrated the antecedents in the assailed judgment,4 viz.:
[T]o promote the sales of "Pop Cola", defendant Cosmos, jointly with Intergames, organized an
endurance running contest billed as the "1st Pop Cola Junior Marathon" scheduled to be held
on June 15, 1980. The organizers plotted a 10-kilometer course starting from the premises of
the Interim Batasang Pambansa (IBP for brevity), through public roads and
streets, to end at the Quezon Memorial Circle. Plaintiffs' son Rommel applied with the
defendants to be allowed to participate in the contest and after complying with defendants'
requirements, his application was accepted and he was given an official number. Consequently,
on June 15, 1980 at the designated time of the marathon, Rommel joined the other participants
and ran the course plotted by the defendants. As it turned out, the plaintiffs' (sic) further alleged,
the defendants failed to provide adequate safety and precautionary measures and to exercise
the diligence required of them by the nature of their undertaking, in that they failed to insulate
and protect the participants of the marathon from the vehicular and other dangers along the
marathon route. Rommel was bumped by a jeepney that was then running along the route of the
marathon on Don Mariano Marcos A venue (DMMA for brevity), and in spite of medical
treatment given to him at the Ospital ng Bagong Lipunan, he died later that same day due to
severe head injuries.
On October 28, 1980, the petitioners sued the respondents in the then Court of First Instance of
Rizal (Quezon City) to recover various damages for the untimely death of Rommel (i.e., actual
and compensatory damages, loss of earning capacity, moral damages, exemplary damages,
attorney's fees and expenses oflitigation).5
Cosmos denied liability, insisting that it had not been the organizer of the marathon, but only its
sponsor; that its participation had been limited to providing financial assistance to Intergames;6
that the financial assistance it had extended to Intergames, the sole organizer of the marathon,
had been in answer to the Government's call to the private sector to help promote sports
development and physical fitness;7 that the petitioners had no cause of action against it
because there was no privity of contract between the participants in the marathon and Cosmos;
and that it had nothing to do with the organization, operation and running of the event.8
As counterclaim, Cosmos sought attorney's fees and expenses of litigation from the petitioners
for their being unwarrantedly included as a defendant in the case. It averred a cross-claim
against Intergames, stating that the latter had guaranteed to hold Cosmos "completely free and
harmless from any claim or action for liability for any injuries or bodily harm which may be
sustained by any of the entries in the '1st Pop Cola Junior Marathon' or for any damage to the
property or properties of third parties, which may likewise arise in the course of the race."9 Thus,
Cosmos sought to hold Intergames solely liable should the claim of the petitioners prosper.10
On its part, Intergames asserted that Rommel's death had been an accident exclusively caused
by the negligence of the jeepney driver; that it was not responsible for the accident; that as the
marathon organizer, it did not assume the responsibilities of an insurer of the safety of the
participants; that it nevertheless caused the participants to be covered with accident insurance,
but the petitioners refused to accept the proceeds thereof;11 that there could be no cause of
action against it because the acceptance and approval of Rommel's application to join the
marathon had been conditioned on his waiver of all rights and causes of action arising from his
participation in the marathon;12 that it exercised due diligence in the conduct of the race that the
circumstances called for and was appropriate, it having availed of all its know-how and
expertise, including the adoption and implementation of all known and possible safety and
precautionary measures in order to protect the participants from injuries arising from vehicular
and other forms of accidents;13 and, accordingly, the complaint should be dismissed.
In their reply and answer to counterclaim, the petitioners averred that contrary to its claims,
Intergames did not provide adequate measures for the safety and protection of the race
participants, considering that motor vehicles were traversing the race route and the participants
were made to run along the flow of traffic, instead of against it; that Intergames did not provide
adequate traffic marshals to secure the safety and protection of the participants;14 that
Intergames could not limit its liability on the basis of the accident insurance policies it had
secured to cover the race participants; that the waiver signed by Rommel could not be a basis
for denying liability because the same was null and void for being contrary to law, morals,
customs and public policy;15 that their complaint sufficiently stated a cause of action because in
no way could they be held liable for attorney's fees, litigation expenses or any other relief due to
their having abided by the law and having acted honestly, fairly, in good faith by according to
Intergames its due, as demanded by the facts and circumstances.16
At the pre-trial held on April 12, 1981, the parties agreed that the principal issue was whether or
not Cosmos and lntergames were liable for the death of Rommel because of negligence in
conducting the marathon.17
Judgment of the RTC
In its decision dated May 10, 1991,18 the RTC ruled as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiffs-spouses Romulo Abrogar and
Erlinda Abrogar and against defendants Cosmos Bottling Company, Inc. and Intergames, Inc.,
ordering both defendants, jointly and severally, to pay and deliver to the plaintiffs the
amounts of Twenty Eight Thousand Sixty One Pesos and Sixty Three Centavos (28,061.63) as
actual damages; One Hundred Thousand Pesos (100,000.00) as moral damages; Fifty
Thousand Pesos (50,000.00) as exemplary damages and Ten Percent (10%) of the total
amount of One Hundred Seventy Eight Thousand Sixty One Pesos and Sixty Three Centavos
(178,061,63) or Seventeen Thousand Eight Hundred Six Pesos and Sixteen Centavos
(17,806.16) as attorney's fees.
On the cross-claim of defendant Cosmos Bottling Company, Inc., defendant Intergames, Inc, is
hereby ordered to reimburse to the former any and all amounts which may be recovered by the
plaintiffs from it by virtue of this Decision.
SO ORDERED.
The RTC observed that the safeguards allegedly instituted by Intergames in conducting the
marathon had fallen short of the yardstick to satisfy the requirements of due diligence as called
for by and appropriate under the circumstances; that the accident had happened because of
inadequate preparation and Intergames' failure to exercise due diligence;19 that the respondents
could not be excused from liability by hiding behind the waiver executed by Rommel and the
permission given to him by his parents because the waiver could only be effective for risks
inherent in the marathon, such a:s stumbling, heat stroke, heart attack during the race, severe
exhaustion and similar occurrences;20 that the liability of the respondents towards the
participants and third persons was solidary, because Cosmos, the sponsor of the event, had
been the principal mover of the event, and, as such, had derived benefits from the marathon
that in turn had carried responsibilities towards the participants and the public; that the
respondents' agreement to free Cosmos from any liability had been an agreement binding only
between them, and did not bind third persons; and that Cosmos had a cause of action against
Intergames for whatever could be recovered by the petitioners from Cosmos.21
Decision of the CA
All the parties appealed to the CA.
The petitioners contended that the RTC erred in not awarding damages for loss of earning
capacity on the part of Rommel for the reason that such damages were not recoverable due to
Rommel not yet having finished his schooling; and that it would be premature to award such
damages upon the assumption that he would finish college and be gainfully employed.22
On their part, Cosmos and Intergames separately raised essentially similar errors on the part of
the RTC, to wit: (1) in holding them liable for the death of Rommel; (2) in finding them negligent
in conducting the marathon; (3) in holding that Rommel and his parents did not assume the risks
of the marathon; (4) in not holding that the sole and proximate cause of the death of Rommel
was the negligence of the jeepney driver; and (5) in making them liable, jointly and solidarily, for
damages, attorney's fees and expenses of litigation.23
The CA reduced the issues to four, namely:
1. Whether or not appellant Intergames was negligent in its conduct of the "1st Pop Cola Junior
Marathon" held on June 15, 1980 and if so, whether its negligence was the proximate cause of
the death of Rommel Abrogar.
2. Whether or not appellant Cosmos can be held jointly and solidarily liable with appellant
Intergames for the death of Rommel Abrogar, assuming that appellant Intergames is found to
have been negligent in the conduct of the Pop Cola marathon and such negligence was the
proximate cause of the death of Rommel Abrogar.
3. Whether or not the appellants Abrogar are entitled to be compensated for the "loss of earning
capacity" of their son Rommel.
4. Whether or not the appellants Abrogar are entitled to the actual, moral, and exemplary
damages granted to them by the Trial Court.24
In its assailed judgment promulgated on March 10, 2004,25 the CA ruled as follows:
As to the first issue, this Court finds that appellant Intergames was not negligent in organizing
the said marathon.
Negligence is the omission to do something which a reasonable man, guided upon those
considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct to human affairs, would do, or doing
something which a prudent and reasonable man would not do.
The whole theory of negligence presuppose some uniform standard of behavior which must be
an external and objective one, rather than the individual judgment good or bad, of the particular
actor; it must be, as far as possible, the same for all persons; and at the same time make proper
allowance for the risk apparent to the actor for his capacity to meet it, and for the circumstances
under which he must act.
The question as to what would constitute the conduct of a prudent man in a given situation must
of course be always determined in the light of human experience and of the acts involved in the
particular case.
In the case at bar, the trial court erred in finding that the appellant Intergames failed to satisfy
the requirements of due diligence in the conduct of the race.
The trial court in its decision said that the accident in question could have been avoided if the
route of the marathon was blocked off from the regular traffic, instead of allowing the runners to
run together with the flow of traffic. Thus, the said court considered the appellant Intergames at
fault for proceeding with the marathon despite the fact that the Northern Police District, MPF,
Quezon City did not allow the road to be blocked off from traffic.
This Court finds that the standard of conduct used by the trial court is not the ordinary conduct
of a prudent man in such a given situation. According to the said court, the only way to conduct
a safe road race is to block off the traffic for the duration of the event and direct the cars and
public utilities to take alternative routes in the meantime that the marathon
event is being held. Such standard is too high and is even inapplicable in the case at bar
because, there is no alternative route from IBP to Don Mariano Marcos to Quezon City Hall.
The Civil Code provides that if the law or contract does not state the diligence which is to be
observed in the performance of an obligation that which is expected of a good father of the
family shall only be required. Accordingly, appellant Intergames is only bound to exercise the
degree of care that would be exercised by an ordinarily careful and prudent man in the same
position and circumstances and not that of the cautious man of more than average prudence.
Hence, appellant Intergames is only expected to observe ordinary diligence and not
extraordinary diligence.
In this case, the marathon was allowed by the Northern Police District, MPF, Quezon City on the
condition that the road should not be blocked off from traffic. Appellant Intergames had no
choice. It had to comply with it or else the said marathon would not be allowed at all.
The trial court erred in contending that appellant Intergames should have looked for alternative
places in Metro Manila given the condition set by the Northern Police District, MPF, Quezon
City; precisely because as Mr. Jose Castro has testified the said route was found to be the best
route after a careful study and consideration of all the factors involved. Having conducted
several marathon events in said route, appellant Intergames as well as the volunteer groups
and the other agencies involved were in fact familiar with the said route. And assuming that
there was an alternative place suitable for the said race, the question is would they be allowed
to block off the said road from traffic?
Also, the trial court erred in stating that there was no adequate number of marshals, police
officers and personnel to man the race so as to prevent injury to the participants.
The general rule is that the party who relies on negligence for his cause of action has the
burden of proving the existence of the same, otherwise his action fails.
Here, the appellants-spouses failed to prove that there was inadequate number of marshals,
police officers, and personnel because they failed to prove what number is considered
adequate.
This court considers that seven (7) traffic operatives, five (5) motorcycle policemen, fifteen (15)
patrolmen deployed along the route, fifteen (15) boyscouts, twelve (12) CA Ts, twenty (20)
barangay tanods, three (3) ambulances and three (3) medical teams were sufficient to stage a
safe marathon.
Moreover, the failure of Mr. Jose R. Castro, Jr. to produce records of the lists of those
constituting the volunteer help during the marathon is not fatal to the case considering that one
of the volunteers, Victor Landingin of the Citizens Traffic Action (CTA) testified in court that CTA
fielded five units on June 15, 1980, assigned as follows: (1) at the sphere head; (2) at the finish
line; (3) tail ender; (4) & (5) roving.
The trial court again erred in concluding that the admission of P/Lt. Jesus Lipana, head of the
traffic policemen assigned at the marathon, that he showed up only at the finish line means that
he did not bother to check on his men and did not give them appropriate instructions. P/Lt.
Lipana in his testimony explained that he did not need to be in the start of the race because he
had predesignated another capable police officer to start the race.
In addition, this Court finds that the precautionary measures and preparations adopted by
appellant Intergames were sufficient considering the circumstances surrounding the case.
Appellant Intergames, using its previous experiences in conducting safe and successful road
races, took all the necessary precautions and made all the preparations for the race. The initial
preparations included: determination of the route to be taken; and an ocular inspection of the
same to see if it was well-paved, whether it had less corners for easy communication and
coordination, and whether it was wide enough to accommodate runners and transportation.
Appellant Intergames choose the Don Mariano Marcos Avenue primarily because it was well-
paved; had wide lanes to accommodate runners and vehicular traffic; had less corners thus
facilitating easy communication and coordination among the organizers and cooperating
agencies; and was familiar to the race organizers and operating agencies. The race covered a
ten-kilometer course from the IBP lane to the Quezon City Hall Compound passing through the
Don Mariano Marcos A venue, which constituted the main stretch of the route. Appellant
Intergames scheduled the marathon on a Sunday morning, when traffic along the route was at
its lightest. Permission was sought from the then Quezon City Mayor Adelina Rodriguez for the
use of the Quezon City Hall Grandstand and the street fronting it as the finish line. Police
assistance was also obtained to control and supervise the traffic. The Quezon City Traffic
Detachment took charge of traffic control by assigning policemen to the traffic route. The
particular unit assigned during the race underwent extensive training and had been involved in
past marathons, including marathons in highly crowded areas. The Philippine Boy Scouts
tasked to assist the police and monitor the progress of the race; and Citizens Traffic Action
Group tasked with the monitoring of the race, which assigned five units consisting of ten
operatives, to provide communication and assistance were likewise obtained. Finally, medical
equipments and personnel were also requested from Camp Aguinaldo, the Philippine Red Cross
and the Hospital ng Bagong Lipunan.
Neither does this Court find the appellant Intergames' conduct of the marathon the proximate
cause of the death of Rommel Abrogar. Proximate cause has been defined as that which, in
natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces injury,
and without which the result would not have occurred.
It appears that Rommel Abrogar, while running on Don Mariano Marcos A venue and after
passing the Philippine Atomic Energy Commission Building, was bumped by a jeepney which
apparently was racing against a minibus and the two vehicles were trying to crowd each other.
In fact, a criminal case was filed against the jeepney driver by reason of his having killed
Rommel Abrogar.
This proves that the death of Rommel Abrogar was caused by the negligence of the jeepney
driver. Rommel Abrogar cannot be faulted because he was performing a legal act; the marathon
was conducted with the permission and approval of all the city officials involved. He had the
right to be there. Neither can the appellant Intergames be faulted, as the organizer of the said
marathon, because it was not negligent in conducting the marathon.
Given the facts of this case, We believe that no amount of precaution can prevent such an
accident. Even if there were fences or barriers to separate the lanes for the runners and for the
vehicles, it would not prevent such an accident in the event that a negligent driver loses control
of his vehicle. And even if the road was blocked off from traffic, it would still not prevent such an
accident, if a jeepney driver on the other side of the road races with another vehicle loses
control of his wheel and as a result hits a person on the other side of the road. Another way of
saying this is: A defendant's tort cannot be considered a legal cause of plaintiffs damage if that
damage would have occurred just the same even though the defendant's tort had not been
committed.
This Court also finds the doctrine of assumption of risk applicable in the case at bar. As
explained by a well-known authority on torts:
"The general principle underlying the defense of assumption of risk is that a plaintiff who
voluntarily assumes a risk of harm arising from the negligent or reckless conduct of the
defendant cannot recover for such harm. The defense may arise where a plaintiff, by contract or
otherwise, expressly agrees to accept a risk or harm arising from the defendant's conduct, or
where a plaintiff who fully understands a risk or harm caused by the defendant's conduct, or by
a condition created by the defendant, voluntarily chooses to enter or remain, or to permit his
property to enter or remain, within the area of such risk, under circumstances manifesting his
willingness to accept the risk.
xxxx
"Assumption of the risk in its primary sense arises by assuming through contract, which may be
implied, the risk of a known danger. Its essence is venturousness. It implies intentional exposure
to a known danger; It embraces a mental state of willingness; It pertains to the preliminary
conduct of getting into a dangerous employment or relationship, it means voluntary incurring the
risk of an accident, which may or may not occur, and which the person assuming the risk may
be careful to avoid; and it defeats recovery because it is a previous abandonment of the right to
complain if an accident occurs.
"Of course, if the defense is predicated upon an express agreement the agreement must be
valid, and in the light of this qualification the rule has been stated that a plaintiff who, by contract
or otherwise, expressly agreed to accept a risk of harm arising from the defendant's negligent or
reckless conduct, cannot recover for such harm unless the agreement is invalid as contrary to
public policy.
xxxx
"The defense of assumption of risk presupposes: (1) that the plaintiff had actual knowledge of
the danger; (2) that he understood and appreciated the risk from the danger; and (3) that he
voluntarily exposed himself to such risk. x x x
"The term 'risk' as used in this connection applies to known dangers, and not to things from
which danger may possibly flow. The risk referred to is the particular risk, or one of the risks,
which the plaintiff accepted within the context of the situation in which he placed himself and the
question is whether the specific conduct or condition which caused the injury was such a risk."
In this case, appellant Romulo Abrogar himself admitted that his son, Rommel Abrogar,
surveyed the route of the marathon and even attended a briefing before the race. Consequently,
he was aware that the marathon would pass through a national road and that the said road
would not be blocked off from traffic. And considering that he was already eighteen years of age,
had voluntarily participated in the marathon, with his parents' consent, and was well aware of
the traffic hazards along the route, he thereby assumed all the risks of the race. This is precisely
why permission from the participant's parents, submission of a medical certificate and a waiver
of all rights and causes of action arising from the participation in the marathon which the
participant or his heirs may have against appellant Intergames were required as conditions in
joining the marathon.
In the decision of the trial court, it stated that the risk mentioned in the waiver signed by Rommel
Abrogar only involved risks such as stumbling, suffering heatstroke, heart attack and other
similar risks. It did not consider vehicular accident as one of the risks included in the said
waiver.
This Court does not agree. With respect to voluntary participation in a sport, the doctrine of
assumption of risk applies to any facet of the activity inherent in it and to any open and obvious
condition of the place where it is carried on. We believe that the waiver included vehicular
accidents for the simple reason that it was a road race run on public roads used by vehicles.
Thus, it cannot be denied that vehicular accidents are involved. It was not a track race which is
held on an oval and insulated from vehicular traffic. In a road race, there is always the risk of
runners being hit by motor vehicles while they train or compete. That risk is inherent in the sport
and known to runners. It is a risk they assume every time they voluntarily engage in their sport.
Furthermore, where a person voluntarily participates in a lawful game or contest, he assumes
the ordinary risks of such game or contest so as to preclude recovery from the promoter or
operator of the game or contest for injury or death resulting therefrom. Proprietors of
amusements or of places where sports and games are played are not insurers of safety of the
public nor of their patrons.
In McLeod Store v. Vinson 213 Ky 667, 281 SW 799 (1926), it was held that a boy, seventeen
years of age, of ordinary intelligence and physique, who entered a race conducted by a
department store, the purpose of which was to secure guinea fowl which could be turned in for
cash prizes, had assumed the ordinary risks incident thereto and was barred from recovering
against the department store for injuries suffered when, within catching distance, he stopped to
catch a guinea, and was tripped or stumbled and fell to the pavement, six or eight others falling
upon him. The court further said: "In this (the race) he was a voluntary participant. xxx The
anticipated danger was as obvious to him as it was to appellant (the department store). While
not an adult, he was practically 17 years of age, of ordinary intelligence, and perfectly able to
determine the risks ordinarily incident to such games. An ordinary boy of that age is practically
as well advised as to the hazards of baseball, basketball, football, foot races and other games of
skill and endurance as is an adult
x x x."
In the case at bar, the "1st Pop Cola Junior Marathon" held on June 15, 1980 was a race the
winner of which was to represent the country in the annual Spirit of Pheidippides Marathon
Classic in Greece, if he equals or breaks the 29-minute mark for the 10-km. race. Thus,
Rommel Abrogar having voluntarily participated in the race, with his parents' consent, assumed
all the risks of the race.
Anent the second issue, this Court finds that appellant Cosmos must also be absolved from any
liability in the instant case.
This Court finds that the trial court erred in holding appellant Cosmos liable for being the
principal mover and resultant beneficiary of the event.
In its decision it said that in view of the fact that appellant Cosmos will be deriving certain
benefits from the marathon event, it has the responsibility to ensure the safety of all the
participants and the public. It further said that the stipulations in the contract entered into by the
two appellants, Cosmos and Intergames, relieving the former from any liability does not bind
third persons.
This Court does not agree with the reasoning of the trial court. The sponsorship contract
entered between appellant Cosmos and appellant Intergames specifically states that:
1. COSMOS BOTTLING CORPORATION shall pay INTERGAMES the amount of FIFTY FIVE
THOUSAND PESOS (55,000.00) representing full sponsorship fee and in consideration
thereof, INTERGAMES shall organize and stage a marathon race to be called '1st POP COLA
JUNIOR MARATHON.
xxxx
3. INTER GAMES shall draw up all the rules of the marathon race, eligibility requirements of
participants as well as provide all the staff required in the organization and actual staging of the
race. It is understood that all said staff shall be considered under the direct employ of
INTERGAMES which shall have full control over them.
xxxx
5. INTERGAMES shall secure all the necessary permits, clearances, traffic and police
assistance in all the areas covered by the entire route of the '1st POP COLA JUNIOR
MARATHON.
12. INTERGAMES shall hold COSMOS BOTTLING CORPORATION, completely free and
harmless from any claim or action for liability for any injuries or bodily harm which may be
sustained by any of the entries in the '1st POP COLA JUNIOR MARATHON', or for any
damages to the property or properties of third parties, which may likewise arise in the course of
the race.
From the foregoing, it is crystal clear that the role of the appellant Cosmos was limited to
providing financial assistance in the form of sponsorship. Appellant Cosmos' sponsorship was
merely in pursuance to the company's commitment for spo1is development of the youth as well
as for advertising purposes. The use of the name Cosmos was done for advertising purposes
only; it did not mean that it was an organizer of the said marathon. As pointed out by
Intergames' President, Jose Castro Jr., appellant Cosmos did not even have the right to suggest
the location and the number of runners.
To hold a defendant liable for torts, it must be clearly shown that he is the proximate cause of
the harm done to the plaintiff. The nexus or connection of the cause and effect, between a
negligent act and the damage done, must be established by competent evidence.
In this case, appellant Cosmos was not negligent in entering into a contract with the appellant
Intergames considering that the record of the latter was clean and that it has conducted at least
thirty (30) road races.
Also there is no direct or immediate causal connection between the financial sponsorship and
the death of Rommel Abrogar. The singular act of providing financial assistance without
participating in any manner in the conduct of the marathon cannot be palmed off as such
proximate cause. In fact, the appellant spouses never relied on any representation that Cosmos
organized the race. It was not even a factor considered by the appellants-spouses in allowing
their son to join said marathon.
In view of the fact that both defendants are not liable for the death of Rommel Abrogar,
appellants-spouses are not entitled to actual, moral, exemplary damages as well as for the "loss
of earning capacity" of their son. The third and fourth issues are thus moot and academic.
UPON THE VIEW WE TAKE OF THIS CASE, THUS, the judgment appealed from must be, as
it hereby is, REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and another entered DISMISSING the complaint a
quo. The appellants shall bear their respective costs.
SO ORDERED.26
Issues
In this appeal, the petitioners submit that the CA gravely erred:
A.
x x x in reversing the RTC Decision, (and) in holding that respondent Intergames was not
negligent considering that:
1. Respondent Intergames failed to exercise the diligence of a good father of the family in the
conduct of the marathon in that it did not block off from traffic the marathon route; and
2. Respondent Intergames' preparations for the race, including the number of marshal during
the marathon, were glaringly inadequate to prevent the happening of the injury to its
participants.
B.
x x x in reversing the RTC Decision, (and) in holding that the doctrine of assumption of risk finds
application to the case at bar even though getting hit or run over by a vehicle is not an inherent
risk in a marathon race. Even assuming arguendo that deceased Abrogar made such waiver as
claimed, still there can be no valid waiver of one's right to life and limb for being against public
policy.
C.
x x x in reversing the RTC Decision, (and) in absolving respondent Cosmos from liability to
petitioners on the sole ground that respondent Cosmos' contract with respondent Intergames
contained a stipulation exempting the former from liability.
D.
x x x m reversing the RTC Decision and consequently holding respondents free from liability,
(and) in not awarding petitioners with actual, moral and exemplary damages for the death of
their child, Rommel Abrogar.27
Ruling of the Court
The appeal is partly meritorious.
I
Review of factual issues is allowed because of
the conflict between the findings of fact
by the RTC and the CA on the issue of negligence
The petitioners contend that Intergames was negligent; that Cosmos as the sponsor and
Intergames as the organizer of the marathon both had the obligation to provide a reasonably
safe place for the conduct of the race byblocking the route of the race from vehicular traffic and
by providing adequate manpower and personnel to ensure the safety of the participants; and
that Intergames had foreseen the harm posed by the situation but had not exercised the
diligence of a good father of a family to avoid the risk;28 hence, for such omission, Intergames
was negligent.29
Refuting, Cosmos and Intergames submit that the latter as the organizer was not negligent
because it had undertaken all the precautionary measures to ensure the safety of the race; and
that there was no duty on the part of the latter as the organizer to keep a racecourse "free and
clear from reasonably avoidable elements that would [occasion] or have the probable tendency,
to occasion injury."30
The issue of whether one or both defendants were negligent is a mixed issue of fact and law.
Does this not restrict the Court against reviewing the records in this appeal on certiorari in order
to settle the issue?
The Court can proceed to review the factual findings of the CA as an exception to the general
rule that it should not review issues of fact on appeal on certiorari. We have recognized
exceptions to the rule that the findings of fact of the CA are conclusive and binding in the
following instances: (1) when the findings are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or
conjectures; (2) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3)
when there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) when the judgment is based on a misapprehension
of facts; (5) when the findings of facts are conflicting; (6) when in making its findings the CA
went beyond the issues of the case, or its findings are contrary to the admissions of both the
appellant and the appellee; (7) when the findings are contrary to the trial court; (8) when the
findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (9) when
the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner's main and reply briefs are not
disputed by the respondent; (10) when the findings of fact are premised on the supposed
absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record; and (11) when the CA
manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties, which, if properly
considered, would justify a different conclusion.31 Considering that the CA arrived at factual
findings contrary to those of the trial court, our review of the records in this appeal should have
to be made.
Negligence is the failure to observe for the protection of the interests of another person that
degree of care, precaution, and vigilance which the circumstances justly demand, whereby such
other person suffers injury.32 Under Article 1173 of the Civil Code, it consists of the "omission of
that diligence which is required by the nature of the obligation and corresponds with the
circumstances of the person, of the time and of the place."33 The Civil Code makes liability for
negligence clear under Article 2176,34 and Article 20.35
To determine the existence of negligence, the following time-honored test has been set in Picart
v. Smith:36
The test by which to determine the existence of negligence in a particular case may be stated
as follows: Did the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use that reasonable care and
caution which an ordinarily prudent person would have used in the same situation? If not, then
he is guilty of negligence. The law here in effect adopts the standard supposed to be supplied
by the imaginary conduct of the discreet paterfamilias of the Roman law. The existence of
negligence in a given case is not determined by reference to the personal judgment of the actor
in the situation before him. The law considers what would be reckless,
blameworthy, or negligent in the man of ordinary intelligence and prudence and determines
liability by that.
The question as to what would constitute the conduct of a prudent man in a given situation must
of course be always determined in the light of human experience and in view of the facts
involved in the particular case. Abstract speculation cannot here be of much value but this much
can be profitably said: Reasonable men govern their conduct by the circumstances which are
before them or known to them. They are not, and are not supposed to be, omniscient of the
future. Hence they can be expected to take care only when there is something before them to
suggest or warn of danger. Could a prudent man, in the case under
consideration, foresee harm as a result of the course actually pursued? If so, it was the duty of
the actor to take precautions to guard against that harm. Reasonable foresight of harm, followed
by the ignoring of the suggestion born of this prevision, is always necessary before negligence
can be held to exist. Stated in these terms, the proper criterion for determining the existence of
negligence in a given case is this: Conduct is said to be negligent when a prudent man in the
position of the tortfeasor would have foreseen that an effect harmful to another was sufficiently
probable to warrant his foregoing the conduct or guarding against its consequences.37 (bold
underscoring supplied for emphasis)
A careful review of the evidence presented, particularly the testimonies of the relevant
witnesses, in accordance with the foregoing guidelines reasonably leads to the conclusion that
the safety and precautionary measures undertaken by Intergames were short of the diligence
demanded by the circumstances of persons, time and place under consideration. Hence,
Intergames as the organizer was guilty of negligence.
The race organized by Intergames was a junior marathon participated in by young persons aged
14 to 18 years. It was plotted to cover a distance of 10 kilometers, starting from the IBP Lane,38
then going towards the Batasang Pambansa, and on to the circular route towards the Don
Mariano Marcos Highway,39 and then all the way back to the Quezon City Hall compound where
the finish line had been set.40 In staging the event, Intergames had no employees of its own to
man the race,41 and relied only on the "cooperating agencies" and volunteers who had worked
with it in previous races.42 The cooperating agencies included the Quezon City police, barangay
tanods, volunteers from the Boy Scouts of the Philippines, the Philippine National Red Cross,
the Citizens Traffic Action Group, and the medical teams of doctors and nurses coming from the
Office of the Surgeon General and the Ospital ng Bagong Lipunan.43 According to Jose R.
Castro, Jr., the President of Intergames, the preparations for the event included conducting an
ocular inspection of the route of the race,44 sending out letters to the various cooperating
agencies,45 securing permits from proper authorities,46 putting up directional signs,47 and setting
up the water stations.48
We consider the "safeguards" employed and adopted by Intergames not adequate to meet the
requirement of due diligence.
For one, the police authorities specifically prohibited Intergames from blocking Don Mariano
Marcos Highway in order not to impair road accessibility to the residential villages located
beyond the IBP Lanc.49
However, contrary to the findings of the CA,50 Intergames had a choice on where to stage the
marathon, considering its admission of the sole responsibility for the conduct of the event,
including the choice of location.
Moreover, the CA had no basis for holding that "the said route was found to be the best route
after a careful study and consideration of all the factors involved."51 Castro, Jr. himself attested
that the route had been the best one only within the vicinity of the Batasan Pambansa, to wit:
COURT
q Was there any specific reason from ... Was there any specific reason why you used this route
from Batasan to City Hall? Was there any special reason?
a We have, your Honor, conducted for example the Milo Marathon in that area in the Batasan
Pambansa and we found it to be relatively safer than any other areas within the vicinity. As a
matter of fact, we had more runners in the Milo Marathon at that time and nothing happened,
your Honor.52
The chosen route (IBP Lane, on to Don Mariano Marcos Highway, and then to Quezon City Hall)
was not the only route appropriate for the marathon. In fact, Intergames came under no
obligation to use such route especially considering that the participants, who were young and
inexperienced runners, would be running alongside moving vehicles.
Intergames further conceded that the marathon could have been staged on a blocked-off route
like Roxas Boulevard in Manila where runners could run against the flow of vehicular traffic.53
Castro, Jr. stated in that regard:
COURT TO WITNESS
q What law are you talking about when you say I cannot violate the law?
a The police authority, your Honor, would not grant us permit because that is one of the
conditions that if we are to conduct a race we should run the race in accordance with the flow of
traffic.
q Did you not inform the police this is in accordance with the standard safety measures for a
marathon race?
a I believed we argued along that line but but (sic) again, if we insist the police again would not
grant us any permit like ... except in the case of Roxas Boulevard when it is normally closed
from 8 a.m. when you can run against the flow of traffic.
q You were aware for a runner to run on the same route of the traffic would be risky because he
would not know what is coming behind him?
a I believed we talked of the risk, your Honor when the risk has been minimized to a certain
level. Yes, there is greater risk when you run with the traffic than when you run against the traffic
to a certain level, it is correct but most of the races in Manila or elsewhere are being run in
accordance with the flow of the traffic.
xxxx
ATTY. VINLUAN
q Following the observation of the Court, considering the local condition, you will agree with me
the risks here are greater than in the United States where drivers on the whole follow traffic
rules?
a That is correct.
q And because of that fact, it is with all the more reason that you should take all necessary
precautions to insure the safety of the runners?
a That is correct.54
xxxx
COURT:
xxxx
Q In your case in all the marathons that you had managed, how many cases have you
encountered where the routes are blocked off for vehicular traffic?
A These are the International Marathon, Philippines Third World Marathon and the Milo
Marathon. We are blocking them to a certain length of time.
Q What was the purpose of blocking the routes? Is it for the safety of the runners or just a
matter of convenience?
A In blocking off the route, Your Honor, it is light easier for the runners to run without
impediments to be rendered by the people or by vehicles and at the same time it would be also
advantageous if the road will be blocked off for vehicle traffic permitted to us by the traffic
authorities.
Q So, in this case, you actually requested for the traffic authorities to block off the route?
A As far as I remember we asked Sgt. Pascual to block off the route but considering that it is the
main artery to Fairview Village, it would not be possible to block off the route since it will cause a
lot of inconvenience for the other people in those areas and jeepney drivers.
Q In other words, if you have your way you would have opted to block off the route.
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q But the fact is that the people did not agree.
A Yes, Your Honor, and it is stated in the permit given to us.55
Based on the foregoing testimony of Castro, Jr., Intergames had full awareness of the higher
risks involved in staging the race alongside running vehicles, and had the option to hold the race
in a route where such risks could be minimized, if not eliminated. But it did not heed the danger
already foreseen, if not expected, and went ahead with staging the race along the plotted route
on Don Mariano Marcos Highway on the basis of its supposedly familiarity with the route. Such
familiarity of the organizer with the route and the fact that previous races had been conducted
therein without any untoward incident56 were not in themselves sufficient safeguards. The
standards for avoidance of injury through negligence further required Intergames to establish
that it did take adequate measures to avert the foreseen danger, but it failed to do so.
Another failing on the part of Intergames was the patent inadequacy of the personnel to man the
route. As borne by the records, Intergames had no personnel of its own for that purpose, and
relied exclusively on the assistance of volunteers, that is, "seven (7) traffic operatives, five (5)
motorcycle policemen, fifteen (15) patrolmen deployed along the route, fifteen (15) boy scouts,
twelve (12) CATs, twenty (20) barangay tanods, three (3) ambulances and three (3) medical
teams"57 to ensure the safety of the young runners who would be running alongside moving
vehicular traffic, to make the event safe and well coordinated.
Although the party relying on negligence as his cause of action had the burden of proving the
existence of the same, Intergames' coordination and supervision of the personnel sourced from
the cooperating agencies did not satisfy the diligence required by the relevant circumstances. In
this regard, it can be pointed out that the number of deployed personnel, albeit sufficient to
stage the marathon, did not per se ensure the safe conduct of the race without proof that such
deployed volunteers had been properly coordinated and instructed on their tasks.
That the proper coordination and instruction were crucial elements for the safe conduct of the
race was well known to Intergames. Castro, Jr. stated as much, to wit:
ATTY. LOMBOS:
xxxx
Q You also said that if you block off one side of the road, it is possible that it would be more
convenient to hold the race in that matter. Will you tell the Honorable Court if it is possible also
to hold a race safely if the road is not blocked off?
A Yes, sir.
Q How is it done.
A You can still run a race safely even if it is partially blocked off as long as you have the
necessary cooperation with the police authorities, and the police assigned along the route of the
race and the police assigned would be there, this will contribute the safety of the participants,
and also the vehicular division, as long as there are substantial publicities in the newspapers,
normally they will take the precautions in the use of the particular route of the race.
Q Let me clarify this. Did you say that it is possible to hold a marathon safely if you have this
traffic assistance or coordination even if the route is blocked or not blocked?
A It is preferable to have the route blocked but in some cases, it would be impossible for the
portions of the road to be blocked totally. The route of the race could still be safe for runners if a
proper coordination or the agencies are notified especially police detailees to man the particular
stage.58
Sadly, Intergames' own evidence did not establish the conduct of proper coordination and
instruction. Castro, Jr. described the action plan adopted by Intergames in the preparation for
the race, as follows:
COURT
a Did you have any rehearsal let us say the race was conducted on June 15, now before June
15 you call a meeting of all these runners so you can have more or less a map-up and you
would indicate or who will be stationed in their places etc. Did you have such a rehearsal?
WITNESS
a It is not being done, your honor, but you have to specify them. You meet with the group and
you tell them that you wanted them to be placed in their particular areas which we pointed out to
them for example in the case of the Barangay Tanod, I specifically assigned them in the areas
and we sat down and we met.
COURT
q Did you have any action, plan or brochure which would indicate the assignment of each of the
participating group?
WITNESS
a Normally, sir, many of the races don't have that except when they called them to meeting
either as a whole group or the entire cooperating agency or meet them per group.
COURT
q Did you have a check list of the activities that would have to be entered before the actual
marathon some kind of system where you will indicate this particular activity has to be checked
etc. You did not have that?
WITNESS
q Are you asking, your honor, as a race director of I will check this because if I do that, I won't
have a race because that is not being done by any race director anywhere in the world?
COURT
I am interested in your planning activities.
q In other words, what planning activities did you perform before the actual marathon?
a The planning activities we had, your honor, was to coordinate with the different agencies
involved informing them where they would be more or less placed.
COURT
q Let us go to ... Who was supposed to be coordinating with you as to the citizens action group
who was your ... you were referring to a person who was supposed to be manning these people
and who was the person whom you coordinate with the Traffic Action Group?
WITNESS
a I can only remember his name ... his family name is Esguerra.
q How about with the Tanods?
a With the Tanods his name is Pedring Serrano.
q And with the Boys Scouts? (sic)
a And with the Boys Scouts of the Phils. (sic) it is Mr. Greg Panelo.
COURT
q When did you last meet rather how many times did you meet with Esguerra before the
marathon on June 15?
WITNESS
a The Citizens Traffic Action Group, your honor, had been with me m previous races.
COURT
q I am asking you a specific question. I am not interested in the Citizen Traffic Action Group. The
marathon was on June 15, did you meet with him on June 14, June 13 or June 12?
a We met once, your honor, I cannot remember the date.
q You don't recall how many days before?
a I cannot recall at the moment.
q How about with Mr. Serrano, how many times did you meet with him before the race?
a If my mind does not fail me, your honor, I met him twice because he lives just within our area
and we always see each other.
q How about with Panelo, how many times did you meet him?
a With Mr. Panelo, I did not meet with them, your honor.
q Was there an occasion where before the race you met with these three people together since
you did not meet with Panelo anytime? Was there anytime where you met with Serrano and
Esguerra together?
WITNESS
a No, your honor.
COURT
g When you met once with Esguerra, where did you meet? What place?
a I cannot recall at the moment, your honor, since it was already been almost six years ago.
g How about Serrano, where did you meet him?
a We met in my place.
q From your house? He went in your house?
a Yes, your honor.
q So you did not have let us say a ... you don't have records of your meetings with these
people?
WITNESS
a With the Citizens Traffic Action, your honor?
COURT
a Yes.
WITNESS
a I don't have, your honor.
COURT
q Because you are familiar, I was just thinking this is an activity which requires planning etc.,
what I was thinking when you said this was never done in any part of the world but all activities it
has to be planned. There must be some planning, now are you saying that in this particular case
you had no written plan or check list of activities what activities have to be implemented on a
certain point and time, who are the persons whom you must meet in a certain point and time.
WITNESS
a Normally, we did not have that, your honor, except the check list of all the things that should
be ready at a particular time prior to the race and the people to be involved and we have a
check list to see to it that everything would be in order before the start of the race.
COURT
Proceed.
ATTY. VINLUAN
q Following the question of the Court Mr. Castro, did you meet with Lt. Depano of the Police
Department who were supposed to supervise the police officers assigned to help during the
race?
a I did not meet with him, sir.
q You did not meet with him?
a I did not meet with him.
q In fact, ever before or during the race you had no occasion to talk to Lt. Depano. Is that
correct?
a That is correct, sir.
ATTY. VINLUAN
Based on the question of the Court and your answer to the question of the Court, are you trying
to say that this planning before any race of all these groups who have committed to help in the
race, this is not done in any part of the world?
WITNESS
a In the latter years when your race became bigger and bigger, this is being done now slowly.
ATTY. VINLUAN
q But for this particular race you will admit that you failed to do it when you have to coordinate
and even have a dry run of the race you failed to do all of that in this particular race, yes or no?
a Because there was ...
COURT
It was already answered by him when I asked him. The Court has ... Everybody has a copy how
of this time planner. Any activity or even meeting a girlfriend or most people plan.
A TTY. F .M. LOMBOS
If your honor please, before we proceed ...
WITNESS
In the latter years, your honor, when your race became bigger and bigger, this is being done
now slowly.
q For this particular race you will admit that you failed to do it?
a Because there was no need, sir.59
Probably sensing that he might have thereby contradicted himself, Castro, Jr. clarified on re-
direct examination:
ATTY. LOMBOS
Q Now, you also responded to a question during the same hearing and this appears on page 26
of the transcript that you did not hold any rehearsal or dry run for this particular marathon. Could
you tell the Court why you did not hold any such rehearsal or dry run?
A Because I believe there was no need for us to do that since we have been doing this for many
years and we have been the same people, same organization with us for so many years
conducting several races including some races in that area consisting of longer distances and
consisting of more runners, a lot more runners in that areay (sic) so these people, they know
exactly what to do and there was no need for us to have a rehearsal. I believe this rehearsal
would only be applicable if I am new and these people are new then, we have to rehearse.
ATTY. LOMBOS
q You also stated Mr. Castro that you did not have any action plan or brochure which you would
indicate, an assignment of each of the participating group as to what to do during the race. Will
you please explain what you meant when you said you have no action plan or brochure?
WITNESS
a What I mean of action plan, I did not have any written action plan but I was fully aware of what
to do. I mean, those people did not just go there out of nowhere. Obviously, there was an action
on my part because I have to communicate with them previously and to tell them exactly what
the race is all about; where to start; where it would end, and that is the reason why we have the
ambulances, we have the Boy Scouts, we have the CT A, we have the police, so it was very
obvious that there was a plan of action but not written because I know pretty well exactly what to
do. I was dealing with people who have been doing this for a long period of time.60
While the level of trust Intergames had on its volunteers was admirable, the coordination among
the cooperating agencies was predicated on circumstances unilaterally assumed by Intergames.
It was obvious that Intergames' inaction had been impelled by its belief that it did not need any
action plan because it had been dealing with people who had been manning similar races for a
long period of time.
The evidence presented undoubtedly established that Intergames' notion of coordination only
involved informing the cooperating agencies of the date of the race, the starting and ending
points of the route, and the places along the route to man. Intergames did not conduct any
general assembly with all of them, being content with holding a few sporadic meetings with the
leaders of the coordinating agencies. It held no briefings of any kind on the actual duties to be
performed by each group of volunteers prior to the race. It did not instruct the volunteers on how
to minimize, if not avert, the risks of danger in manning the race, despite such being precisely
why their assistance had been obtained in the first place.
Intergames had no right to assume that the volunteers had already been aware of what exactly
they would be doing during the race. It had the responsibility and duty to give to them the proper
instructions despite their experience from the past races it had organized considering that the
particular race related to runners of a different level of experience, and involved different
weather and environmental conditions, and traffic situations. It should have remembered that
the personnel manning the race were not its own employees paid to perform their tasks, but
volunteers whose nature of work was remotely associated with the safe conduct of road races.
Verily, that the volunteers showed up and assumed their proper places or that they were
sufficient in number was not really enough. It is worthy to stress that proper coordination in the
context of the event did not consist in the mere presence of the volunteers, but included making
sure that they had been properly instructed on their duties and tasks in order to ensure the
safety of the young runners.
It is relevant to note that the participants of the 1st Pop Cola Junior Marathon were mostly
minors aged 14 to 18 years joining a race of that kind for the first time. The combined factors of
their youth, eagerness and inexperience ought to have put a reasonably prudent organizer on
higher guard as to their safety and security needs during the race, especially considering
Intergames' awareness of the risks already foreseen and of other risks already known to it as of
similar events in the past organizer. There was no question at all that a higher degree of
diligence was required given that practically all of the participants were children or minors like
Rommel; and that the law imposes a duty of care towards children and minors even if ordinarily
there was no such duty under the same circumstances had the persons involved been adults of
sufficient discretion.61 In that respect, Intergames did not observe the degree of care necessary
as the organizer, rendering it liable for negligence. As the Court has emphasized in Corliss v.
The Manila Railroad Company,62 where the danger is great, a high degree of care is necessary,
and the failure to observe it is a want of ordinary care under the circumstances. 63
The circumstances of the persons, time and place required far more than what Intergames
undertook in staging the race. Due diligence would have made a reasonably prudent organizer
of the race participated in by young, inexperienced or beginner runners to conduct the race in a
route suitably blocked off from vehicular traffic for the safety and security not only of the
participants but the motoring public as well. Since the marathon would be run alongside moving
vehicular traffic, at the very least, Intergames ought to have seen to the constant and closer
coordination among the personnel manning the route to prevent the foreseen risks from
befalling the participants. But this it sadly failed to do.
II
The negligence of Intergames as the organizer
was the proximate cause of the death of Rommel
As earlier mentioned, the CA found that Rommel, while running the marathon on Don Mariano
Marcos A venue and after passing the Philippine Atomic Energy Commission Building, was
bumped by a passenger jeepney that was racing with a minibus and two other vehicles as if
trying to crowd each other out. As such, the death of Rommel was caused by the negligence of
the jeepney driver.
Intergames staunchly insists that it was not liable, maintaining that even assuming arguendo
that it was negligent, the negligence of the jeepney driver was the proximate cause of the death
of Rommel; hence, it should not be held liable.
Did the negligence of Intergames give rise to its liability for the death of ommel notwithstanding
the negligence of the jeepney driver?
In order for liability from negligence to arise, there must be not only proof of damage and
negligence, but also proof that the damage was the consequence of the negligence. The Court
has said in Vda. de Gregorio v. Go Chong Bing:64
x x x Negligence as a source of obligation both under the civil law and in American cases was
carefully considered and it was held:
We agree with counsel for appellant that under the Civil Code, as under the generally accepted
doctrine in the United States, the plaintiff in an action such as that under consideration, in order
to establish his right to a recovery, must establish by competent evidence:
(1) Damages to the plaintiff.
(2) Negligence by act or omission of which defendant personally or some person for whose acts
it must respond, was guilty.
(3) The connection of cause and effect between the negligence and the damage." (Taylor vs.
Manila Electric Railroad and Light Co., supra, p. 15.)
In accordance with the decision of the Supreme Court of Spain, in order that a person may be
held guilty for damage through negligence, it is necessary that there be an act or omission on
the part of the person who is to be charged with the liability and that damage is produced by the
said act or omission.65 (Emphasis supplied)
We hold that the negligence of Intergames was the proximate cause despite the intervening
negligence of the jeepney driver.
Proximate cause is "that which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any new
cause, produces an event, and without which the event would not have occurred."66 In Vda. de
Bataclan, et al. v. Medina,67 the Court, borrowing from American Jurisprudence, has more
extensively defined proximate cause thusly:
"* * * 'that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient
intervening cause, produces the injury and without which the result would not have occurred.'
And more comprehensively, 'the proximate legal cause is that acting first and producing the
injury, either immediately or by setting other events in motion, all constituting a natural and
continuous chain of events, each having a close causal connection with its immediate
predecessor, the final event in the chain immediately effecting the injury as a natural and
probable result of the cause which first acted, under such circumstances that the person
responsible for the first event should, as an ordinarily prudent and intelligent person, have
reasonable ground to expect at the moment of his act or default that an injury to some person
might probably result therefrom."68
To be considered the proximate cause of the injury, the negligence need not be the event
closest in time to the injury; a cause is still proximate, although farther in time in relation to the
injury, if the happening of it set other foreseeable events into motion resulting ultimately in the
damage.69 According to an authority on civil law:70"A prior and remote cause cannot
be made the basis of an action, if such remote cause did nothing more than furnish the
condition or give rise to the occasion by which the injury was
made possible, if there intervened between such prior or remote cause and the injury a distinct,
successive, unrelated and efficient cause, even though such injury would not have happened
but for such condition or occasion. If no damage exists in the condition except because of the
independent cause, such condition was not the proximate cause. And if an independent
negligent act or defective condition sets into operation the circumstances which result in injury
because of the prior defective condition, such act or condition is the proximate cause."
Bouvier adds:
In many cases important questions arise as to which, in the chain of acts tending to the
production of a given state of things, is to be considered the responsible cause. It is not merely
distance of place or of causation that renders a cause remote. The cause nearest in the order of
causation, without any efficient concurring cause to produce the result, may be considered the
direct cause. In the course of decisions of cases in which it is necessary to determine which of
several causes is so far responsible for the happening of the act or injury complained of, what is
known as the doctrine of proximate cause is constantly resorted to in order to ascertain whether
the act, omission, or negligence of the person whom it is sought to hold liable was in law and in
fact responsible for the result which is the foundation of the action.71
xxxx
The question of proximate cause is said to be determined, not by the existence or non-existence
of intervening events, but by their character and the natural connection between the original act
or omission and the injurious consequences. When the intervening cause is set in operation by
the original negligence, such negligence is still the proximate cause; x x x If the party guilty of
the first act of negligence might have anticipated the intervening cause, the connection is not
broken; x x x. Any number of causes and effects may intervene, and if they arc such as might
with reasonable diligence have been foreseen, the last result is to be considered as the
proximate result. But whenever a new cause intervenes, which is not a consequence of the first
wrongful cause, which is not under control of the wrongdoer, which could not have been
foreseen by the exercise of reasonable diligence, and except for which the final injurious
consequence could not have happened, then such injurious consequence must be deemed too
remote; x x x.72 (bold underscoring supplied for emphasis)
An examination of the records in accordance with the foregoing concepts supports the
conclusions that the negligence of Intergames was the proximate cause of the death of
Rommel; and that the negligence of the jeepney driver was not an efficient intervening cause.
First of all, Intergames' negligence in not conducting the race in a road blocked off from
vehicular traffic, and in not properly coordinating the volunteer personnel manning the marathon
route effectively set the stage for the injury complained of. The submission that Intergames had
previously conducted numerous safe races did not persuasively demonstrate that it had
exercised due diligence because, as the trial court pointedly observed, "[t]hey were only lucky
that no accident occurred during the previous marathon races but still the danger was there."73
Secondly, injury to the participants arising from an unfortunate vehicular accident on the route
was an event known to and foreseeable by Intergames, which could then have been avoided if
only Intergames had acted with due diligence by undertaking the race on a blocked-off road,
and if only Intergames had enforced and adopted more efficient supervision of the race through
its volunteers.
And, thirdly, the negligence of the jeepney driver, albeit an intervening cause, was not efficient
enough to break the chain of connection between the negligence of Intergames and the
injurious consequence suffered by Rommel. An intervening cause, to be considered efficient,
must be "one not produced by a wrongful act or omission, but independent of it, and adequate
to bring the injurious results. Any cause intervening between the first wrongful cause and the
final injury which might reasonably have been foreseen or anticipated by the original wrongdoer
is not such an efficient intervening cause as will relieve the original wrong of its character as the
proximate cause of the final injury."74
In fine, it was the duty of Intergames to guard Rommel against the foreseen risk, but it failed to
do so.
III
The doctrine of assumption of risk
had no application to Rommel
Unlike the R TC, the CA ruled that the doctrine of assumption of risk applied herein; hence, it
declared Intergames and Cosmos not liable. The CA rendered the following rationalization to
buttress its ruling, to wit:
In this case, appellant Romulo Abrogar himself admitted that his son, Rommel Abrogar,
surveyed the route of the marathon and even attended a briefing before the race. Consequently,
he was aware that the marathon would pass through a national road and that the said road
would not be blocked off from traffic. And considering that he was already eighteen years of age,
had voluntarily participated in the marathon, with his parents' consent, and was well aware of
the traffic hazards along the route, he thereby assumed all the risks of the race. This is precisely
why permission from the participant's parents, submission of a medical certificate and a waiver
of all rights and causes of action arising from the participation in the marathon which the
participant or his heirs may have against appellant Intergames were required as conditions in
joining the marathon.
In the decision of the trial court, it stated that the risk mentioned in the waiver signed by Rommel
Abrogar only involved risks such as stumbling, suffering heatstroke, heart attack and other
similar risks. It did not consider vehicular accident as one of the risks included in the said
waiver.
This Court does not agree. With respect to voluntary participation in a sport, the doctrine of
assumption of risk applies to any facet of the activity inherent in it and to any open and obvious
condition of the place where it is carried on. We believe that the waiver included vehicular
accidents for the simple reason that it was a road race run on public roads used by vehicles.
Thus, it cannot be denied that vehicular accidents are involved. It was not a track race which is
held on an oval and insulated from vehicular traffic. In a road race, there is always the risk of
runners being hit by motor vehicles while they train or compete. That risk is inherent in the sport
and known to runners. It is a risk they assume every time they voluntarily engage in their sport.
Furthermore, where a person voluntarily participates in a lawful game or contest, he assumes
the ordinary risks of such game or contest so as to preclude recovery from the promoter or
operator of the game or contest for injury or death resulting therefrom. Proprietors of
amusements or of places where sports and games are played are not insurers of safety of the
public nor of their patrons.
In Mc Leod Store v. Vinson 213 Ky 667, 281 SW 799 (1926), it was held that a boy, seventeen
years of age, of ordinary intelligence and physique, who entered a race conducted by a
department store, the purpose of which was to secure guinea fowl which could be turned in for
cash prizes, had assumed the ordinary risks incident thereto and was barred from recovering
against the department store for injuries suffered when, within catching distance, he stopped to
catch a guinea, and was tripped or stumbled and fell to the pavement, six or eight others falling
upon him. The comi further said: "In this (the race) he was a voluntary participant. x x x The
anticipated danger was as obvious to him as it was to appellant (the department store). While
not an adult, he was practically 17 years of age, of ordinary intelligence, and perfectly able to
determine the risks ordinarily incident to such games. An ordinary boy of that age is practically
as well advised as to the hazards of baseball, basketball, football, foot races and other games of
skill and endurance as is an adult
x x x."
In the case at bar, the "1st Pop Cola Junior Marathon" held on June 15, 1980 was a race the
winner of which was to represent the country in the annual Spirit of Pheidippides Marathon
Classic in Greece, if he equals or breaks the 29-minute mark for the 19-km. race. Thus,
Rommel Abrogar having voluntarily participated in the race, with his parents' consent, assumed
all the risks of the race.75
The doctrine of assumption of risk means that one who voluntarily exposes himself to an
obvious, known and appreciated danger assumes the risk of injury that may result therefrom.76 It
rests on the fact that the person injured has consented to relieve the defendant of an obligation
of conduct toward him and to take his chance of injury from a known risk, and whether the
former has exercised proper caution or not is immaterial.77 In other words, it is based on
voluntary consent, express or implied, to accept danger of a known and appreciated risk; it may
sometimes include acceptance of risk arising from the defendant's negligence, but one does not
ordinarily assume risk of any negligence which he does not know and appreciate.78 As a
defense in negligence cases, therefore, the doctrine requires the concurrence of three
elements, namely: (1) the plaintiff must know that the risk is present; (2) he must further
understand its nature; and (3) his choice to incur it must be free and voluntary.79 According to
Prosser:80 "Knowledge of the risk is the watchword of assumption of risk."
Contrary to the notion of the CA, the concurrence of the three elements was not shown to exist.
Rommel could not have assumed the risk of death when he participated in the race because
death was neither a known nor normal risk incident to running a race. Although he had surveyed
the route prior to the race and should be presumed to know that he would be running the race
alongside moving vehicular traffic, such knowledge of the general danger was not enough, for
some authorities have required that the knowledge must be of the specific risk that caused the
harm to him.81 In theory, the standard to be applied is a subjective one, and should be geared to
the particular plaintiff and his situation, rather than that of the reasonable person of ordinary
prudence who appears in contributory negligence.82 He could not have appreciated the risk of
being fatally struck by any moving vehicle while running the race. Instead, he had every reason
to believe that the organizer had taken adequate measures to guard all participants against any
danger from the fact that he was participating in an organized marathon. Stated differently,
nobody in his right mind, including minors like him, would have joined the marathon if he had
known of or appreciated the risk of harm or even death from vehicular accident while running in
the organized running event. Without question, a marathon route safe and free from foreseeable
risks was the reasonable expectation of every runner participating in an organized running
event.
Neither was the waiver by Rommel, then a minor, an effective form of express or implied
consent in the context of the doctrine of assumption of risk. There is ample authority, cited in
Prosser,83 to the effect that a person does not comprehend the risk involved in a known situation
because of his youth,84 or lack of information or experience,85 and thus will not be taken to
consent to assume the risk.
Clearly, the doctrine of assumption of risk does not apply to bar recovery by the petitioners.
IV
Cosmos is not liable for the negligence
of Intergames as the organizer
Nonetheless, the CA did not err in absolving Cosmos from liability.
The sponsorship of the marathon by Cosmos was limited to financing the race. Cosmos did
nothing beyond that, and did not involve itself at all in the preparations for the actual conduct of
the race. This verity was expressly confirmed by Intergames, through Castro, Jr., who declared
as follows:
COURT
q Do you discuss all your preparation with Cosmos Bottling Company?
a As far as the Cosmos Bottling Company (sic) was a sponsor as to the actual conduct of the
race, it is my responsibility. The conduct of the race is my responsibility. The sponsor has
nothing to do as well as its code of the race because they are not the ones running. I was the
one running. The responsibility of Cosmos was just to provide the sponsor's money.
COURT
q They have no right to who (sic) suggest the location, the number of runners, you decide these
yourself without consulting them?
a Yes, your honor.86
We uphold the finding by the CA that the role of Cosmos was to pursue its corporate
commitment to sports development of the youth as well as to serve the need for advertising its
business. In the absence of evidence showing that Cosmos had a hand in the organization of
the race, and took part in the determination of the route for the race and the adoption of the
action plan, including the safety and security measures for the benefit of the runners, we cannot
but conclude that the requirement for the direct or immediate causal connection between the
financial sponsorship of Cosmos and the death of Rommel simply did not exist. Indeed,
Cosmos' mere sponsorship of the race was, legally speaking, too remote to be the efficient and
proximate cause of the injurious consequences.
V
Damages
Article 2202 of the Civil Code lists the damages that the plaintiffs in a suit upon crimes and
quasi-delicts can recover from the defendant, viz.:
Art. 2202. In crimes and quasi-delicts, the defendant shall be liable for all damages which are
the natural and probable consequences of the act or omission complained of. It is not necessary
that such damages have been foreseen or could have reasonably been foreseen by the
defendant.
Accordingly, Intergames was liable for all damages that were the natural and probable
consequences of its negligence. In its judgment, the RTC explained the award of damages in
favor of the petitioners, as follows:
As borne by the evidence on record, the plaintiffs incurred medical, hospitalization and burial
expenses for their son in this aggregate amount of 28,061.65 (Exhibits "D'', "D-1" and "D-2").
In instituting this case, they have paid their lawyer 5,000 as initial deposit, their arrangement
being that they would pay attorney's fees to the extent of 10% of whatever amount would be
awarded to them in this case.
For the loss of a son, it is unquestionable that plaintiffs suffered untold grief which should entitle
them to recover moral damages, and this Court believes that if only to assuage somehow their
untold grief but not necessarily to compensate them to the fullest, the nominal amount of
l00,00.00 should be paid by the defendants.
For failure to adopt elementary and basic precautionary measure to insure the safety of the
participants so that sponsors and organizers of sports events should exercise utmost diligence
in preventing injury to the participants and the public as well, exemplary damages should also
be paid by the defendants and this Court considers the amount of 50,000.00
as reasonable.87
Although we will not disturb the foregoing findings and determinations, we need to add to the
justification for the grant of exemplary damages. Article 2231 of the Civil Code stipulates that
exemplary damages are to be awarded in cases of quasi-delict if the defendant acted with gross
negligence. The foregoing characterization by the RTC indicated that Intergames' negligence
was gross. We agree with the characterization. Gross negligence, according to Mendoza v.
Spouses Gomez,88 is the absence of care or diligence as to amount to a reckless disregard of
the safety of persons or property; it evinces a thoughtless disregard of consequences without
exerting any effort to avoid them. Indeed, the failure of Intergames to adopt the basic
precautionary measures for the safety of the minor participants like Rommel was in reckless
disregard of their safety. Conduct is reckless when it is an extreme departure from ordinary
care, in a situation in which a high degree of danger is apparent; it must be more than any mere
mistake resulting from inexperience, excitement, or confusion, and more than mere
thoughtlessness or inadvertence, or simple inattention.89 The RTC did not recognize the right of
the petitioners to recover the loss of earning capacity of Rommel. It should have, for doing so
would have conformed to jurisprudence whereby the Court has unhesitatingly allowed such
recovery in respect of children, students and other non-working or still unemployed victims. The
legal basis for doing so is Article 2206 (l) of the Civil Code, which stipulates that the defendant
"shall be liable for the loss of the earning capacity of the deceased, and the indemnity shall be
paid to the heirs of the latter; such indemnity shall in every case be assessed and awarded by
the court, unless the deceased on account of permanent physical disability not caused by the
defendant, had no earning capacity at the time of his death."
Indeed, damages for loss of earning capacity may be awarded to the heirs of a deceased non-
working victim simply because earning capacity, not necessarily actual earning, may be lost.
In Metro Manila Transit Corporation v. Court of Appeals,90 damages for loss of earning capacity
were granted to the heirs of a third-year high school student of the University of the Philippines
Integrated School who had been killed when she was hit and run over by the petitioner's
passenger bus as she crossed Katipunan Avenue in Quezon City. The Court justified the grant
in this wise:
Compensation of this nature is awarded not for loss of earnings but for loss of capacity to earn
money. Evidence must be presented that the victim, if not yet employed at the time of death,
was reasonably certain to complete training for a specific profession. In People v. Teehankee,
no award of compensation for loss of earning capacity was granted to the heirs of a college
freshman because there was no sufficient evidence on record to show that the victim would
eventually become a professional pilot. But compensation should be allowed for loss of earning
capacity resulting from the death of a minor who has not yet commenced employment or
training for a specific profession if sufficient evidence is presented to establish the amount
thereor.91 (bold underscoring supplied for emphasis)
In People v. Sanchez,92 damages for loss of earning capacity was also allowed to the heirs of
the victims of rape with homicide despite the lack of sufficient evidence to establish what they
would have earned had they not been killed. The Court rationalized its judgment with the
following observations:
Both Sarmenta and Gomez were senior agriculture students at UPLB, the country's leading
educational institution in agriculture.1wphi1 As reasonably assumed by the trial court, both
victims would have graduated in due course. Undeniably, their untimely death deprived them of
their future time and earning capacity. For these deprivation, their heirs are entitled to
compensation. xxxx. However, considering that Sarmenta and Gomez would have graduated in
due time from a reputable university, it would not be unreasonable to assume that in 1993 they
would have earned more than the minimum wage. All factors considered, the Court believes that
it is fair and reasonable to fix the monthly income that the two would have earned in 1993 at
8,000.000 per month (or 96,000.00/year) and their deductible living and other incidental
expenses at 3,000.00 per month (or 36,000.00/year).93 (bold underscoring supplied for
emphasis)
In Perena v. Zarate,94 the Court fixed damages for loss of earning capacity to be paid to the
heirs of the 15-year-old high school student of Don Bosco Technical Institute killed when a
moving train hit the school van ferrying him to school while it was traversing the railroad tracks.
The RTC and the CA had awarded damages for loss of earning capacity computed on the basis
of the minimum wage in effect at the time of his death. Upholding said findings, the Court
opined:
x x x, the fact that Aaron was then without a history of earnings should not be taken against his
parents and in favor of the defendants whose negligence not only cost Aaron his life and his
right to work and earn money, but also deprived his parents of their right to his presence and his
services as well. x x x. Accordingly, we emphatically hold in favor of the indemnification for
Aaron's loss of earning capacity despite him having been unemployed, because compensation
of this nature is awarded not for loss of time or earnings but for loss of the deceased's power or
ability to earn money.
The petitioners sufficiently showed that Rommel was, at the time of his untimely but much
lamented death, able-bodied, in good physical and mental state, and a student in good
standing.95 It should be reasonable to assume that Rommel would have finished his schooling
and would turn out to be a useful and productive person had he not died. Under the foregoing
jurisprudence, the petitioners should be compensated for losing Rommel's power or ability to
earn. The basis for the computation of earning capacity is not what he would have become or
what he would have wanted to be if not for his untimely death, but the minimum wage in effect
at the time of his death. The formula for this purpose is:
Net Earning Capacity = Life Expectancy x [Gross Annual Income less Necessary Living
Expenses ]96
Life expectancy is equivalent to 2/3 multiplied by the difference of 80 and the age of the
deceased. Since Rommel was 18 years of age at the time of his death, his life expectancy was
41 years. His projected gross annual income, computed based on the minimum wage for
workers in the non-agricultural sector in effect at the time of his death,97 then fixed at l4.00/day,
is 5,535.83. Allowing for necessary living expenses of 50% of his projected gross annual
income, his total net earning capacity is l13,484.52.
Article 2211 of the Civil Code expressly provides that interest, as a part of damages, may be
awarded in crimes and quasi-delicts at the discretion of the court. The rate of interest provided
under Article 2209 of the Civil Code is 6% per annum in the absence of stipulation to the
contrary. The legal interest rate of 6% per annum is to be imposed upon the total amounts
herein awarded from the time of the judgment of the RTC on May 10, 1991 until finality of
judgment.98 Moreover, pursuant to Article 221299 of the Civil Code, the legal interest rate of 6o/o
per annum is to be further imposed on the interest earned up to the time this judgment of the
Court becomes final and executory until its full satisfaction.100
Article 2208 of the Civil Code expressly allows the recovery of attorney's fees and expenses of
litigation when exemplary damages have been awarded.1wphi1 Thus, we uphold the RTC's
allocation of attorney's fees in favor of the petitioners equivalent to 10% of the total amount to
be recovered, inclusive of the damages for loss of earning capacity and interests, which we
consider to be reasonable under the circumstances.
WHEREFORE, the Court PARTLY AFFIRMS the decision promulgated on March 10, 2004 to
the extent that it absolved COSMOS BOTTLING COMPANY, INC. from liability; REVERSES
and SETS ASIDE the decision as to INTERGAMES, INC., and REINSTATES as to it the
judgment rendered on May 10, 1991 by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 83, in Quezon City
subject to the MODIFICATIONS that INTERGAMES, INC. is ORDERED TO PAY to the
petitioners, in addition to the aw3:rds thereby allowed: (a) the sum of l13,484.52 as damages
for the loss of Rommel Abrogar's earning capacity; (b) interest of 6% per annum on the actual
damages, moral damages, exemplary damages and loss of earning capacity reckoned from
May 10, 1991 until full payment; (c) compounded interest of 6% per annum from the finality of
this decision until full payment; and (d) costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 222740, September 28, 2016

ST. LUKE'S COLLEGE OF MEDICINE-WILLIAM H. QUASHA MEMORIAL FOUNDATION,
DR. BRIGIDO L. CARANDANG, AND DR. ALEJANDRO P. ORTIGAS Petitioners, v.
SPOUSES MANUEL AND ESMERALDA PEREZ AND SPOUSES ERIC AND JURISITA
QUINTOS, Respondents.
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
Assailed in the present petition for review on certiorari is the Decision1 dated September 30,
2015 and the Resolution2 dated February 2, 2016 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV
No. 103529, which rulings reversed the Decision dated July 7, 20143 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 84, Malolos City, Bulacan in Civil Case No. 145-M-2012 and remanded the case
to the trial court for reception of evidence on the amount of damages to be awarded.
As a backgrounder, in 2006, the Commission on Higher Education issued Memorandum Order
No. 10, series of 2006 which required medical students to undergo rotating clinical clerkship in
their fourth year. As such, petitioner St. Luke's College of Medicine (St. Luke's) entered into a
Memorandum of Intent with the Municipality of Cabiao, Nueva Ecija for the construction of a
community clinic. The said facility consisted of a six-bed medical facility in the ground floor, and
a residential space for the medical staff in the second floor.

The undisputed facts, as amply summarized by the CA, are as

follows:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
In February 2010, St. Luke's sent four (4) of its 4th year medical students to the clinic, namely:
plaintiffs-appellants Spouses Perez's daughter Jessa, plaintiffs-appellants Spouses Quintos'
daughter Cecille, Jerillie Ann Murillo (Murillo) and Miguel Rafael Ramos (Ramos). They were
tasked to complete a four-week clerkship rotation at the clinic and like the previous batches,
they were housed in the second floor of the clinic.

According to Ramos, he and his groupmates reported for duty at the Cabiao clinic at
approximately 10 o'clock in the morning of February 8, 2010. When their shift ended at 5 o'clock
that afternoon, the group went for a jog and returned to the clinic at around 7 o'clock in the
evening. They again went out at 9 o'clock in the evening to buy beverages, cooking oil and other
items needed for their breakfast the next day and went to sleep sometime after midnight.
Ramos admitted that one of the beverages they bought was an alcoholic beverage called The
Bar, which consisted of either vodka or gin. He also admitted that only he and Cecille drank the
alcoholic beverage which they mixed with the soda and that they did not consume the whole
bottle.

Ramos was awakened sometime between 3 o'clock and 3:30 in the morning of February 9,
2010 when he heard Murillo shouting from the other side of the room that there was a fire.
Ramos immediately ran to the door which led to the living room and when he opened the same,
he saw thick smoke coming from the left portion of the living room where there was a glow. He
also felt extreme heat, prompting him to run to the bathroom to get a pail of water with which he
tried to extinguish the fire. The girls, who had followed him to the bathroom, stayed behind.
When Ramos' attempt to put out the fire proved to be futile, he went back to the bathroom and
poured water on the girls in an attempt to alleviate the extreme heat coming from the fire.

According to Ramos, the smoke started to seep through the bathroom door and the group had
started shouting for help. After a considerable amount of time, he heard somebody outside
instructing him to get back from the window. When he did so, somebody broke the window and
started to dismantle the iron grills barring the same. By that time, Ramos had started losing
consciousness due to smoke inhalation and only remembered that he was being pulled out of
the building through the window.

Unfortunately, the fire resulted in the deaths of the female medical students, including the
daughters of plaintiffs-appellants due to smoke inhalation resulting" to asphyxia.
As a result of the deaths, defendant-appellee St. Luke's compensated the parents of the three
deceased students in the amount of PhP300,000.00 each from insurance proceeds. (Citations
omitted)
The Bureau of Fire Protection (BFP) conducted an investigation on the incident, and in a
Certification dated April 18, 2011, it certified that the fire was "purely accidental in nature due to
unattended cooking," to wit:4
THIS IS TO CERTIFY THAT as appearing on The Blotter Book No. 0304-0287, pages 17 and
18, the two storey Institutional building owned by Local Government Unit (LGU) Cabiao, Nueva
Ecija was partially razed by fire including all the contents of the second floor that transpired on
or about 090245H February 2010. The estimated cost of damage is two Million pesos
(P2,000,000.00) more or less.

Result of investigation conducted by the Investigator on Case of this station, Bureau of Fire
Protection, Cabiao, Nueva Ecija, disclosed that the fire was purely ACCIDENTAL IN NATURE
due to UNATTENDED COOKING that occurred at the kitchen of said floor and no evidence
were gathered to show that the fire was intentionally, deliberately or maliciously set.
Respondents had their doubts. Thus:5
xxx. xxx, plaintiffs-appellants, requested for a meeting with defendant-appellee Dr. Alejandro
Ortigas, Associate Dean for Faculty and Student Affairs of St. Luke's. During the meeting,
plaintiffs-appellants were surprised by the presence of defendants-appellees Dr. Brigido
Carandang, St. Luke's Dean of Medicine, the Municipal Health Officer of Cabiao Dr. De Leon, as
well as Municipal Fire Marshall of Cabiao Baby Boy Esquivel, a Cabiao police officer and its
barangay captain.

The officials informed plaintiffs-appellants that the fire was caused by the gas burner left open
by the victims which greatly disturbed plaintiffs-appellants. In a subsequent meeting, they were
informed that there was also evidence that the victims were drinking alcoholic beverages on the
night of the fire which plaintiffs-appellants refused to accept.

Convinced that there was a cover-up, plaintiffs-appellants continued to question individual

defendants-appellees. Exasperated, defendant-appellee Dr. Carandang allegedly asked "Ano
pa bang gusto ninyo sa amin? Nakiramay na kami."
Offended and still unconvinced, respondent Spouses Manuel and Esmeralda Perez, the parents
of Jessa, and respondent Spouses Eric and Jurisita Quintos, the parents of Cecille, sought the
help of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI). In its Resolution dated August 3, 2010, the
existence of which is expressly admitted by petitioners, having quoted the contents6 and having
attached a copy thereof to the present petition,7 the NBI declared that the construction of the
Cabiao Community Clinic building was in violation of the provisions of Republic Act No. 9514
(R.A. No. 9514) or the Revised Fire Code of the Philippines, that the cause of the fire was due
to faulty electrical wiring, and that St. Luke's negligence is criminal in nature. The pertinent parts
of the said Resolution reads:8
xxxx

2. The building structure of Cabiao Community Center

The Cabiao Community Clinic/Center is a two-storey concrete building. The ground floor is used
as the municipality's lie-in clinic or hospital during day time. The students and in particular the
victims use this facility together with the. medical complement of the municipality for their
community medical service.

On the 2nd floor was the office of Dr. LEON DE LEON, Cabiao Municipal Health Officer, adjacent
was a storage room for office and medical supplies and documents, the bedrooms for the
medical students rendering community service, a dining area, a kitchen, and the living-room.
The second floor, it may be said, is virtually dedicated for the board and lodging of the students
while on mission. These rooms and areas are separated from each other by wood panels made
of plywood including the wall in which the gas stove was located. All the windows at the
second floor are also covered by permanent iron grills. There are no fire exits, fire
alarms, fire extinguishers, sprinklers, emergency lights.

The community center is a virtual fire/death trap. During night time, medical students
were left alone inside the 2nd floor with the main gate locked from the outside and with
no apparent signs of fire alarms, fire sprinklers, fire exit plan, emergency lights,
provisions of confining the fire to its source, among others, for the occupants fire safety
and protection system. They were on their own at the second floor, without anyone (maid or
security guard) to attend to their needs while the ground floors and the adjoining building were
uninhabited.

3. The electrical system of Cabiao Community Clinic;

Engr. DAVID R. AOANAN, Chief Electrical Section of the (sic) and member of the NBI
investigating team observed that the facility has a main circuit breaker and the two distribution
panels, located at the ground floor, just above the comfort room of the 2nd floor. The main
breaker has a 500 amp capacity while the two distribution panels serving the 1st floor and the
2nd floor has 200 amp capacity, each, as against the main electrical service wire with the size 14
mm.

The ratio between the capacity of the circuit breaker and the electrical service wire is out
of proportion and became electrically insensitive to overload and wire short circuits;
thereby negating the very purpose the circuit breaker was designed.

The size of service wire is Small, suitable only for lighting purposes and not to supply two
buildings, dedicated for public use. Six years of use in overload capacity would have worn
out the wire and its strength and vitality, hence it will readily overheat, notwithstanding at
the time short circuits, only few bulbs were in use.

The electrical meter used is appropriate only to residential units and not to service the two
buildings intended for public which are [equipped] with modern medical equipment; the old NFA
and the [Cabiao] Community Clinic.
Both live service wire and secondary electrical wires were bundled together inside the same
tube. At the 2nd floor, visible signs of cut wires were found inside a tube, including the
service wire as it pass through going down to the main panel board and several cut wires
of the secondary breaker going to the second floor for power distribution.

The main and secondary panel boards were wrongly situated at the ground floor, above
which is the location of a comfort room, where water could easily slip to the panel
boards.

The installation of the secondary panel board at the ground floor distributing power to
the 2nd floor defeats its purpose, considering that if electrical trouble happens at the 2nd
floor one has to go to the 1st floor to shut off the power.

4. The construction of the Cabiao Community Center building was in violation of the provision of
Republic Act No. 9514 (Revised Fire Code of the Philippines)

Owners, occupants or administrator of buildings or structures are required to incorporate and

provide fire safety construction, protective and warning systems. Investigation shows that a)
there were no fire protection features such as sprinkler systems, hose boxes, hose reels or
standpipe systems and other firefighting equipment; fire alarm systems; b) no fire exit, fire exit
plan for each floor of the building showing the routes from each other [sic] room to appropriate
exits, displayed prominently on the door of such room; c) no properly marked and lighted exits
with provision for emergency light to adequately illuminate exit ways in case of power failure,
and d) no provisions for confining the fire at its source such as fire resistive floors and walls.

5. The Cabiao Bureau of Fire Protection failed to perform its mandate pursuant to RA
9514.

Under the Fire Code, the Bureau of Fire Protection is required to conduct fire safety inspections
as pre-requisite to the grant of licenses and permits for the use and occupancy of buildings,
structures, facilities and their premises including the installation of fire protections and fire safety
equipment and electrical systems in any building structure or facility; and the storage of
explosives or combustible, flammable, toxic and other hazardous materials.

The BFP is likewise responsible for designating fire inspectors who shall inspect every building
at least once a year, and every time the owner, administrator or occupant [renews] its business
permit or permit to occupy; to issue a business permit or permit to operate only after securing a
Fire Safety Inspection Certification (FSIC); require the building owner occupant to submit plans
and specifications and other pertinent documents of building/structure in order to ensure
compliance of applicable codes and standards and issue a written notice to the owner and/or
contractor to stop work on portion of any work due to absence or in violation of approved plans
and specifications; to inspect at reasonable time, any building, structure or premises and order
the owner/occupant to remove hazardous materials and/or stop operation if the standards are
not met; to declare and summarily abate hazardous conditions of the buildings or structures
and/or declare the same as fire hazards.
It is worthy to note that despite the long period of time from the occurrence of the fire until the
termination of this investigation, the Cabiao BFP headed by FO3 ESQUIVEL has yet to submit
its report and findings. However, inasmuch as FO3 ESQUIVEL has bungled the
investigation of the fire by removing items from the scene of the fire and his failure to
explain the disappearance of other electrical debris, the opening and enlargement of the
iron grill where the sole survivor passed, the back door broken, and the non-recording of
the investigations, FO3 Esquivel's action and behaviors are highly suspect of a massive
cover up of the real cause of the fire.

xxxx

7. St. Luke's negligence is criminal in nature.

St. Luke's College of Medicine - William H. Quasha Memorial, Inc., being the owner and
operator of the Cabiao Community Clinic is not without liability for the fate of the fire victims. As
a learning institution, which sends out its students to rural areas to comply with its
curriculum requirement, St. Luke's has the duty and responsibility to see to it that the
premises to where it sends its students are safe. It is significant to stress that the Cabiao
Community Clinic was established by the Municipality of Cabiao and the St. Luke's College of
Medicine in line with the latter's expansion of its Community Medicine undertaking to the rural
areas in order to train its students in health promotion and disease prevention as well as to
provide medical service to deserving population and to undertake clinical research on various
health practices.

The victims were sent there as part of their community medicine module in the curriculum and
their assignments were determined by the officials of the College of Medicine.

8. The origin of fire.

The Cabiao BFP has manifested its prejudice and bias and thus, cannot be an
independent, reliable and credible investigator of this fire incident. They could not even
entertain any theory, other than the gas burner, because in doing so would place themselves in
jeopardy. They even resorted to tampering of premises by removing all electrical wire
debris, thinking that in its absence, fire caused by short circuits cannot be proven.

It is highly probable that the origin of fire is electrical based on the Electrical Report No.
04-10-001 submitted by Engr. DAVID R. AOANAN, Chief, Electrical Section, NBI because of the
following.
i Presence of thick black smoke that indicates heat caused by short-circuit
ii
iii Explosion or tripping off of the transformer, then a black out - showing therefore that the
circuit breaker did not trip off
iv
 v Inspection of the main circuit breaker and the secondary breakers show that these did
not trip off
vi
vii Presence of short circuited wires located at the 2nd floor, where buddle wires were found
viii
ix Presence of numerous spliced wires or jumped wires in three different convenient outlets
x
xi Mainboard panel is mismatched with the service wire
xii
xiii Other defective wirings
It is a well done theory that the cause of the fire was due to faulty electrical wiring with
two reasons to support it, first is the physical manifestation as mentioned by Engr. DAVE
AOANAN who conducted evaluation/investigation on what is left on the building of the
Cabiao Community Clinic; second is the personal experience of MIGUEL RAFAEL
RAMOS y DAVID the lone survivor of the incident [who] narrated what he perceived
during last hour before he was rescued. MIGUEL['s] narration contradict the theories laid
down by Fire Marshall BABY BOY ESQUIVEL that the fire was by the negligence of the victims
[whom] he suspect[s] to have left [burning a] gas stove. MIGUEL'S narration specifically pointed
out that the fire was primarily coming from the living room and not at the kitchen which is directly
in front of their door way. (Emphasis supplied.)
Respondents then filed a Complaint for damages against petitioners St. Luke's College of
Medicine-William H. Quasha Memorial Foundation, Dean of Medicine Brigido L. Carandang,
and Associate Dean for Faculty and Student Affairs Alejandro P. Ortigas, claiming that their
negligence caused the deaths of respondents' daughters. Respondents maintained that, as a
learning institution which sends out its medical students to rural areas to comply with its
curriculum requirement, St. Luke's has the contractual duty and legal responsibility to see to it
that the premises to where it sends its students are safe and that, in the case at bar, St. Luke's
refused to recognize its obligations/liabilities.9 Respondents thus prayed as follows:10
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that judgment be rendered in
favor of plaintiffs -
1. Finding the defendants negligent and liable under their contractual and legal obligations to
Jessa and Cecille;

2. Directing defendants to pay plaintiffs, jointly and severally, actual, moral and exemplary
damages; and cralawlawlibrary

3. Ordering defendants to pay the cost of suits and attorney's fees.

Plaintiffs further pray for such other reliefs as the Honorable Court may deem just and equitable
under the premises.
The RTC dismissed the complaint for lack of merit.11 It held that the Cabiao Community Clinic
was not a fire trap as there were two (2) fire exits, and that respondents failed to present any
report or finding by a competent authority that the said Clinic was not a safe and secure place
for the conduct of St. Luke's clerkship program. The RTC did not take into consideration the NBI
Report as it was allegedly not presented.12chanrobleslaw
The RTC further held that the Clinic is owned by the Municipality of Cabiao, and that the latter
and/or its responsible officials should have been impleaded as indispensable parties.
13chanrobleslaw

The RTC summarized its findings in this manner:14

Albeit the Court is saddened by what happened with the untimely death of Perez and Quintos
who are both very bright with promising future in the field of medicine, it cannot however close
its eyes on the evidence submitted before it by placing the blame on the cause of their death[s]
to the defendants just to put the fault on anybody in order to appease their grieving love[d] ones.
For in the mind of the Court, the omission of the defendants to secure a copy of the fire safety
license of the Clinic or verify if it has one prior to its construction before allowing their senior
medical students to occupy and reside therein is not per se a negligent act. Neither is the failure
of the defendants to orient their senior medical students, who obviously are of legal ages
already such as the deceased, on how to take the necessary measures for their safety and
security before retiring to sleep in the night considered negligent. Likewise, the failure of the
dialogue between the parties is not a legitimate ground to declare the defendants negligent. Put
differently, the Court is not persuaded that there is basis or justification to adjudge the
defendants negligent for the accidental death of Perez and Quintos.
Upon appeal, the CA reversed the RTC Decision and remanded the case to the RTC for
reception of evidence on the amount of damages to be awarded.15 Addressing the .preliminary
issues, the CA held that the Municipality of Cabiao was not an indispensable party as the
Complaint was one for damages based on the allegations in the enrollment contract. It
explained that:16
While there was indeed an allegation of St. Luke's ownership of the clinic, bulk of the arguments
in the complaint were based on St. Luke's duty to ensure its students' safety based on its
obligation as a school. Not being contractually obligated to keep plaintiffs-appellants' children
safe from any risk as a result of school-sanctioned activities, the Municipality of Cabiao cannot
be considered an indispensable party to the action as it was not a participant in the contract of
enrollment.
Moreover, the CA held that although schools cannot be insurers of its students against all risks,
in the case at bar, the safety of the victims was within the reach of petitioners and the hazard of
a fire was not unforeseeable.17 Also, while the fire was beyond the control of petitioners, their
decision to house their students in a place where there are no means of escape in case of such
an emergency shows a blatant disregard for the students' welfare.18chanrobleslaw

The CA elucidated as follows:19

The testimonies of Dr. Ortigas, Dr. Carandang and Dr. Macabulos all show a lack of effort on
their part to thoroughly inspect the conditions of the building in relation to the safety of their
enrolled medical student-clerks.

According to Dr. Ortigas and Dr. Macabulos,20 they considered the doors leading out from the
pantry and the bedrooms as fire exits. However, as doctors who presumably have a wider
degree of foresight than most, they failed to consider that a fire might break out in areas which
would block these doors that are merely ordinary exits. Further, Dr. Ortigas himself testified that
permits are not part of their consideration for safety and that they do not specifically look for the
same [xxx.]

xxxx

Dr. Ortigas admitted that, as a doctor, he was not concerned with the permits issued regarding
the construction and safety of the building. However, at the time he conducted the inspections of
the clinic, he was also the Associate Dean of St. Luke's College of Medicine with the duty to
ensure that the building was safe for the security of the enrolled students of St. Luke's College
of Medicine who would be assigned to the clinic during their clerkship and he admittedly did not
consider the same.

As Associate Dean for Student Affairs, it would be reasonable to expect Dr. Ortigas to show
concern for the safety and security of the students enrolled in the institution thus, ensure that
the premises they were to reside in would be properly equipped in case of fires and other
calamities. He himself stated that his position as such put him "in charge of student and student
affairs, xxx and in general, the non-academic matters involving students and the faculty."
Consequently, it is safe to conclude that his task included the safety and welfare of the students
enrolled at St. Luke's College of Medicine, one which he miserably failed to discharge.

Defendants-appellees also made a big deal out of the procedure of asking feedback from
students which led to the assumption that the clinic was safe and habitable. However, it must be
remembered that the students that gave the feedback were more concerned with passing their
course and presumably trusted that the school would not send them to a location which it has
independently determined to be unsafe.

xxxx

In relation, defendants-appellees defend their judgment to send plaintiffs-appellants' daughters

to the community clinic by contending that there has been no untoward incident since the
program began in 2004. xxx.

xxxx

The same argument also runs contrary to defendants-appellees' acceptance of the construction
of iron grills on the second floor windows of the clinic. According to Dr. Ortigas, the same were
constructed in order to prevent people from using the same to enter the building and not
designed to prevent egress therefrom. Dr. Ortigas was specificallly questioned if there were
prior incidents of intrusion into the clinic to which he replied in the negative. If defendants-
appellees' logic of "no untoward incident has happened" is to be applied then, the presence of
the grills was unnecessary in the same way that they found the inspection of fire safety permits
to be unnecessary. It baffles the Court, therefore, that defendants-appellees would accept the
precaution against an admittedly unlikely intrusion but ignore any safety measures against a fire
which was a great possibility given that the clinic had flammable equipment such as a gas
burner for cooking. (Citations omitted)
Hence, the present petition for review on certiorari alleging that the CA committed reversible
error when it: (a) held that the Municipality of Cabiao was not an indispensable party,21 (b)
disregarded the findings of the BFP that the fire was purely accidental and caused by
unattended cooking,22 and (c) ruled that petitioners were negligent.23chanrobleslaw

We deny the petition.

A perusal of the Complaint readily shows that respondents base their cause of action on
petitioners' breach of the contractual obligation, as an educational institution, of ensuring that
their students, in the performance of a required school activity, would be safe and secure. The
Municipality of Cabiao, not being a party to said enrollment contract, is not an indispensable
party to the case.

An indispensable party is defined by the Rules of Court as a party-in-interest without whom no

final determination can be had of an action.24 In the present case, respondents premise
petitioners' liability on their contractual obligation to their students and, certainly, complete relief
and a final judgment can be arrived at by weighing the claims and defenses of petitioners and
respondents, without need of evaluating the claims and defenses of the Municipality of Cabiao.
If at all, the Municipality of Cabiao is a necessary party25cralawred whose non-inclusion in the
case at bar shall not prevent the court from proceeding with the action.

Indeed, the present case is one between a school and its students, with their relationship being
based on the enrollment contracts. In the illuminating case of PSBA, et al. v. CA, et al.,26 the
Court had the opportunity to lay down the principle that:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
When an academic institution accepts students for enrollment, there is established a contract
between them, resulting in bilateral obligations which both parties are bound to comply with. For
its part, the school undertakes to provide the student with an education that would presumably
suffice to equip him with the necessary tools and skills to pursue higher education or a
profession. On the other hand, the student covenants to abide by the school's academic
requirements and observe its rules and regulations.

Institutions of learning must also meet the implicit or "built-in" obligation of providing their
students with an atmosphere that promotes or assists in attaining its primary undertaking of
imparting knowledge. Certainly, no student can absorb the intricacies of physics or higher
mathematics or explore the realm of the arts and other sciences when bullets are flying or
grenades exploding in the air or where there looms around the school premises a constant
threat to life and limb. Necessarily, the school must ensure that adequate steps are taken to
maintain peace and order within the campus premises and to prevent the breakdown thereof.
Indubitably, institutions of learning have the "built-in" obligation of providing a conducive
atmosphere for learning, an atmosphere where there are no constant threats to life and limb,
and one where peace and order are maintained.

In the case at bar, the Cabiao Community Clinic is to be considered as part of the campus
premises of St. Luke's. In the course description of the clerkship program in preventive and
community medicine, it is stated that the Cabiao Community Clinic serves as the base operation
of the clerkship program.27 As such, petitioner had the same obligation to their students, even
though they were stationed in the Cabiao Community Clinic, and it was incumbent upon
petitioners to ensure that said Clinic was conducive for learning, that it had no constant threats
to life and limb, and that peace and order was maintained thereat. After all, although away from
the main campus of St. Luke's, the students were still under the same protective and
supervisory custody of petitioners as the ones detailed in the main campus.

In the performance of its contractual and inherent obligations, the Court is mindful of the
attendant difficulties on the part of institutions of learning, and the Court recognizes that the
latter cannot be an insurer of its students against all risks. Thus, as also laid out in the PSBA
case, "the school may still avoid liability by proving that the breach of its contractual obligation to
the students was not due to its negligence, here statutorily defined to be the 'omission of that
degree of diligence which is required by the nature of the obligation and corresponding to the
circumstances of persons, time and place."28chanrobleslaw

Our next query, then, is, in relation to the fire incident, did petitioners commit a breach of
contract through negligence?

A review of the records compels the Court to answer in the affirmative.

In Mendoza, et al. v. Sps. Gomez,29 we defined negligence as "the failure to observe for the
protection of the interests of another person, that degree of care, precaution and vigilance which
the circumstances justly demand, whereby such other person suffers injury."

In Gaid v. People,30 we enumerated the elements of simple negligence as follows: (1) that there
is lack of precaution on the part of the offender, and (2) that the damage impending to be
caused is not immediate or the danger is not clearly manifest. We explained
that:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
The standard test in determining whether a person is negligent in doing an act whereby injury or
damage results to the person or property of another is this: could a prudent man, in the position
of the person to whom negligence is attributed, foresee harm to the person injured as a
reasonable consequence of the course actually pursued? If so, the law imposes a duty on the
actor to refrain from that course or to take precautions to guard against its mischievous results,
and the failure to do so constitutes negligence. Reasonable foresight of harm, followed by the
ignoring of the admonition born of this provision, is always necessary before negligence can be
held to exist.31chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
In the case at bar, it is well to remember that the victims were in the Cabiao Community Clinic
because it was a requirement of petitioners. The students were complying with an obligation
under the enrollment contract they were rendering medical services in a community center as
required by petitioners. It was thus incumbent upon petitioners to comply with their own
obligations under the enrollment contract - to ensure that the community center where they
would designate their students is safe and secure, among others.

Petitioners failed to take the necessary precautions to guard their students against foreseeable
harm. As correctly found by the CA, petitioners were remiss in inspecting the premises of the
Cabiao Community Clinic and in ensuring that the necessary permits were in order. These
precautions could have minimized the risk to the safety of the victims. Indeed, the CA had basis
in making the following pronouncement:32
In the instant case, as previously emphasized, defendants-appellees were aware that its
medical students were residing at the second floor of the clinic. At the very least, during
inspection, they should have thoroughly inspected the building's physical appearance and the
documents pertinent to the premises to make sure that the same minimized the risk to the
safety of the students. There is no record that any inquiry on the condition of the premises was
even made by defendants-appellees prior to the implementation of the program. In addition to
such failure, defendants-appellees would have this Court believe that their participation in the
clinic was limited to providing the same with medical personnel without considering that such
personnel also included its students which St. Luke's was obliged to protect from unnecessary
danger.
The petitioners were obviously negligent in detailing their students to a virtual fire trap. As found
by the NBI, the Clinic was unsafe and was constructed in violation of numerous provisions of the
Revised Fire Code of the Philippines. It had no emergency facilities, no fire exits, and had no
permits or clearances from the appropriate government offices.

Petitioners additionally aver that the Clinic was built under the direction, supervision,
management and control of the Municipality of Cabiao,33 and that it ensured that there was an
agreement for the Municipality of Cabiao to provide 24-hour security to the Clinic.
34chanrobleslaw

Petitioners, however, cannot escape liability based on these arguments. As held in Saludaga v.
FEU, et al.,35 a learning institution should not be allowed to completely relinquish or abdicate
matters of safety and security to a third party as to do so would result to contracting away its
inherent obligation of ensuring a safe learning environment for its students.

In Saludaga, the Court chastised therein respondent Far Eastern University (FEU) for its total
reliance on a security agency as to the qualifications of its security guards, viz:36
Respondents also failed to show that they undertook steps to ascertain and confirm that the
security guards assigned to them actually possess the qualifications required in the Security
Service Agreement. It was not proven that they examined the clearances, psychiatric test
results, 201 files, and other vital documents enumerated in its contract with Galaxy. Total
reliance on the security agency about these matters or failure to check the papers stating the
qualifications of the guards is negligence on the part of respondents. A learning institution
should not be allowed to completely relinquish or abdicate security matters in its premises to the
security agency it hired. To do so would result to contracting away its inherent obligation to
ensure a safe learning environment for its students.
Similarly, we cannot turn; a blind eye on petitioners' total reliance on the Municipality of Cabiao
in ensuring the safety and security of their students. The enrollment contract is between
petitioners and the victims, and petitioners cannot abdicate' on their contractual obligation to
provide their students a safe learning environment, nor can it pass or contract away such
obligation to a third party.
Moreover, as to the stipulation of 24-hour security in the Clinic, petitioners failed to present
evidence that this stipulation was actually enforced or that they took measures to ensure that it
was enforced. This, once more, shows petitioners' propensity of relying on third parties in
carrying out its obligations to its students.

It is settled that in culpa contractual, the mere proof of the existence of the contract and the
failure, of its compliance justify, prima facie, a corresponding right of relief.37 In Gilat Satellite
N e t w o r k s , L t d . v. U C P B G e n e r a l I n s u r a n c e C o . , I n c . , 38 t h e C o u r t
expounded:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
xxx. The law, recognizing the obligatory force of contracts, will not permit a party to be set free
from liability for any kind of misperformance of the contractual undertaking or a contravention of
the tenor thereof. A breach upon the contract confers upon the injured party a valid cause for
recovering that which may have been lost or suffered. The remedy serves to preserve the
interests of the promissee that may include his "expectation interest," which is his interest in
having the benefit of his bargain by being put in as good a position as he would have been in
had the contract been performed, or his "reliance interest," which is his interest in being
reimbursed for loss caused by reliance on the contract by being put in as good a position as he
would have been in had the contract not been made; or his "restitution interest," which is his
interest in having restored to him any benefit that he has conferred on the other party. Indeed,
agreements can accomplish little, either for their makers or for society, unless they are made the
basis for action. The effect of every infraction is to create a new duty, that is, to make
RECOMPENSE to the one who has been injured by the failure of another to observe his
contractual obligation unless he can show extenuating circumstances, like proof of his exercise
of due diligence x x x or of the attendance of fortuitous event, to excuse him from his ensuing
liability. xxx. (Emphasis omitted)
In the case at bar, it was amply shown that petitioners and the victims were bound by the
enrollment contracts, and that petitioners were negligent in complying with their obligation under
the said contracts to ensure the safety and security of their students. For this contractual
breach, petitioners should be held liable.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court resolves to DENY the petition for review on
certiorari and AFFIRM the Court of Appeals' Decision and Resolution.
G.R. No. 218014, December 07, 2016
EDDIE CORTEL Y CARNA AND YELLOW BUS LINE, INC., Petitioners, v. CECILE GEPAYA-
LIM, Respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:

The Case

Petitioners Eddie Cortel y Carna (Cortel) and Yellow Bus Line, Inc. (Yellow Bus Line) assail the
16 October 2014 Decision1 and 21 April 2015 Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals Cagayan de
Oro City in CA-G.R. CV No. 02980. The Court of Appeals affirmed with modification the
Judgment,3 dated 27 April 2012, of the Regional Trial Court of Midsayap, Cotabato, Branch 18
(trial court), finding petitioners jointly and severally liable to the heirs of SP03 Robert C. Lim
(Lim) for the latter's death.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

The Antecedent Facts

The Court of Appeals narrated the facts as follows:cralawlawlibrary

On 29 October 2004, Cartel was driving a bus, operated by Yellow Bus Line, which was on its
way from Marbel, Koronadal to Davao City. At around 9:45 in the evening, as the bus was
traversing Crossing Rubber in the Municipality of Tupi, South Cotabato, Cortel noticed two
trucks with glaring headlights coming from the opposite direction. Cortel stated that he was
driving at a speed of 40 to 50 kilometers per hour. He claimed that upon noticing the trucks, he
reduced his speed to 20 kilometers per hour. However, the bus hit a black motorcycle which
allegedly had no tail light reflectors. The impact dragged the motorcycle at a distance of three
meters before it came to a full stop. Lim, who was riding the motorcycle, was thrown upward
and then slammed into the bus, hitting the base of its right windshield wiper. The motorcycle got
entangled with the broken bumper of the bus. According to Cortel, Lim was wearing a black
jacket and was riding without a helmet at the time of the accident.

Felix Larang (Larang), the bus conductor, alighted from the bus to aid Lim. Larang gave
instructions to Cortel to move back to release Lim and the motorcycle from the front bumper of
the bus. Two bystanders proceeded to the scene to assist Lim. After reversing the bus and
freeing Lim and the motorcycle, Cortel drove the bus away and went to a nearby bus station
where he surrendered to authorities. Cortel claimed that he left the scene of the incident
because he feared for his life.

Respondent Cecile Gepaya-Lim, Lim's widow, filed a complaint for damages against petitioners.
The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 05-010.

During trial, SPO4 Eddie S. Orencio (SPO4 Orencio), the officer who investigated the incident,
testified that Lim was driving a DT Yamaha 125 black motorcycle when the accident took place.
Cortel's bus and the motorcycle were going in the same direction. SPO4 Orencio testified that
that the bus bumped the motorcycle from behind. The motorcycle's engine and chassis were
severely damaged, while its rear rim was totally damaged by the accident.

Yellow Bus Line presented and offered in evidence photographs showing that the bus' right front
windshield and wiper were damaged. The bus' lower right side bumper was also perforated.
During the preliminary conference, Yellow Bus Line also presented Cortel's certificates showing
that he attended the following seminars: (1) Basic Tire Care Seminar; (2) Basic Tire Knowledge
and Understanding Retreading; and (3) Traffic Rules and Regulations, Defensive Driving and
Road Courtesy Seminar.

However, the certificates were not offered in evidence during trial.

The Decision of the Trial Court

In its 27 April 2012 Judgment, the trial court established that Cortel was at fault. The trial court
found that the bus was running fast when it bumped the motorcycle ridden by Lim. The trial
court ruled that the accident is the proximate cause of Lim's death. The trial court also ruled that
Yellow Bus Line failed to present sufficient evidence to prove that it exercised due diligence in
the selection and supervision of Cortel.

The dispositive portion of the trial court's decision reads:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court hereby renders judgment against Defendants
Eddie Cortely Carna and likewise against the owners of the Yellow Bus Line, Inc., numbered
bus with Body No. A-96, and bearing Plate No. LWE-614, with PDL No. L05-30-002730; thus
pursuant to [A]rticles 2176 and 2180 of the Civil Code of the Philippines[,] said Defendants are
ordered to pay jointly and severally to the plaintiffs the following amount:cralawlawlibrary

In favor of the heirs of Robert C. Lim represented by Cecil[]e Gepaya Lim as the surviving
spouse, and with [a] living child, the death compensation of One Hundred Fifty Thousand Pesos
(P150,000.00), plus x x x[:]

a) Funeral and burial expenses of Fifty Thousand Pesos

(P50,000.00);ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

b) [C]ompensation for loss of earning capacity in the amount of

P100,000.00;ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

(c) x x x Damages [to] the motorcycle in the amount of [Fifteen Thousand Pesos]
(P15,000.00);ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

d) Attorney's fees of Fifteen Thousand Pesos (P15,000.00);ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

e) Costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.4
chanrobleslaw
Petitioners appealed from the trial court's decision.

The Decision of the Court of Appeals

In its 16 October 2014 Decision, the Court of Appeals applied the doctrine of res ipsa loquitor.

The Court of Appeals ruled that Lim died because of the collision between the bus driven by
Cortel and the motorcycle Lim was riding. The Court of Appeals ruled that both vehicles were
driving in the same lane and were headed towards the same direction. The Court of Appeals
noted that vehicles running on highways do not normally collide unless one of the drivers is
negligent. The Court of Appeals further ruled that Cortel had exclusive control and management
of the bus he was driving. The Court of Appeals found no evidence that Lim had any
contributory negligence in the accident that resulted to his death. The Court of Appeals ruled
that petitioners failed to prove that the motorcycle had no headlights or that Lim was not wearing
a helmet. The Court of Appeals stated that even if the motorcycle was black and Lim was
wearing a black jacket, these were not prohibited by traffic rules and regulations. The Court of
Appeals noted that upon impact, Lim's body was thrown upward, indicating that Cortel was
driving at high speed. The damages to the motorcycle and the bus also disproved Cortel's
allegation that he was only driving at the speed of 20 kilometers per hour.

The Court of Appeals ruled that Yellow Bus Line failed to exercise the care and diligence of a
good father of a family in its selection and supervision of its employees. The Court of Appeals
ruled that the certificates presented by Yellow Bus Line were not admissible in evidence
because the police officer who allegedly signed them was not presented before the trial court. In
addition, Yellow Bus Line did not offer the certificates as evidence during trial.

The Court of Appeals modified the amount of damages awarded to the heirs of Lim. Using the
formula set by this Court in The Heirs of Poe v. Malayan Insurance Company, Inc.5 and Villa
Rey Transit, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,6 the Court of Appeals recomputed Lim's lost earning
capacity, as follows:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Life expectancy =
2/3 x [80- age of deceased at the time of death]

2/3 x (80-41]

2/3 x [39]

FORMULA NET EARNING CAPACITY (NEC)

Age at time of death of Robert Lim = 41
Monthly Income at time of death = 13,715.00
Gross Annual Income (GAI)= [(P13,715.00) (12)] = P164,580.00
Reasonable/Necessary Living Expenses (R/NLE) 50% of GAI = P82,290

NEC
= [2/3 (80-41)] [164,580-82,290]
= [2/3 (39)] [82,290]

= [26] [82,290]

= P2,139,540.00[7]
chanrobleslaw
Thus, the Court of Appeals found that the award of 100,000 as death compensation given by the
trial court to the heirs of Lim was inadequate. However, the Court of Appeals reduced the
amount of death indemnity from 150,000 to 50,000. The Court of Appeals deleted the 15,000
awarded by the trial court for the damages to the motorcycle for absence of proof but awarded
25,000 for funeral and burial expenses. In addition, the Court of Appeals awarded 100,000 as
moral damages to the heirs of Lim. The dispositive portion of the Court of Appeals' decision
reads:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
WHEREFORE, the Judgment dated 27 April 2012 of the Regional Trial Court (Branch 18), 12th
Judicial Region, Midsayap, Cotabato, is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Defendant[]-
appellants Eddie Cortel and Yellow Bus Line, Inc. are hereby ordered to pay jointly and severally
plaintiff-appellee Cecile Gepaya-Lim the following:cralawlawlibrary

(1) Funeral and burial expenses of P25,000.00;

(2) Actual damages for loss of earning capacity of P2,139,540.00;
(3) Moral damages amounting to P100,000.00;
(4) Death indemnity of P50,000.00; and
(5) Attorney's fees of P15,000.00

After this decision becomes final and executory, interest at 12% per annum shall additionally be
imposed on the total obligation until full payment.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.8
chanrobleslaw
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration. The Court of Appeals denied the motion in its 21
April 2015 Resolution.

Hence, the recourse before this Court.

The Issue
Whether the Court of Appeals committed a reversible error m affirming with modifications the
decision of the trial court.

The Ruling of this Court

We deny the petition.

Petitioners want this Court to review the factual findings of both the trial court and the Court of
Appeals. Petitioners allege that the trial court and the Court of Appeals erred in concluding that
the bus driven by Cortel was running fast when the accident occurred and in applying the
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur in this case.

The rule is that the factual findings of the trial court, when affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are
binding and conclusive upon this Court.9 It is also settled that questions regarding the cause of
vehicular accident and the persons responsible for it are factual questions which this Court
cannot pass upon, particularly when the findings of the trial court and the Court of Appeals are
completely in accord.10 While there are exceptions to this rule, the Court finds no justification
that would make the present case fall under the exceptions.

As pointed out by the Court of Appeals, the result of the collision speaks for itself. If, indeed, the
speed of the bus was only 20 kilometers per hour as Cortel claimed, it would not bump the
motorcycle traveling in the same direction with such impact that it threw its rider upward before
hitting the base of its right windshield wiper. If Cortel was driving at 20 kilometers per hour, the
bus would not drag the motorcycle for three meters after the impact. The Court of Appeals
likewise considered the damages sustained by both the motorcycle and the bus which indicated
that Cortel was driving fast at the time of the accident. As regards petitioners' allegation that Lim
was equally negligent because he was riding without a helmet and the motorcycle had no tail
lights, the Court of Appeals correctly found that it was self-serving because petitioner did not
present any evidence to prove this allegation.

We agree that res ipsa loquitur applies m this case. The Court explained this doctrine as
follows:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
While negligence is not ordinarily inferred or presumed, and while the mere happening of an
accident or injury will not generally give rise to an inference or presumption that it was due to
negligence on defendant's part, under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, which means, literally,
the thing or transaction speaks for itself, or in one jurisdiction, that the thing or instrumentality
speaks for itself, the facts or circumstances accompanying an injury may be such as to raise a
presumption, or at least permit an inference of negligence on the part of the defendant, or some
other person who is charged with negligence.

x x x [W]here it is shown that the thing or instrumentality which caused the injury complained of
was under the control or management of the defendant, and that the occurrence resulting in the
injury was such as in the ordinary course of things would not happen if those who had its control
or management used proper care, there is sufficient evidence, or, as sometimes stated,
reasonable evidence, in the absence of explanation by the defendant, that the injury arose from
or was caused by the defendant's want of care.

xxxx

The res ipsa loquitur doctrine is based in part upon the theory that the defendant in charge of
the instrumentality which causes the injury either knows the cause of the accident or has the
best opportunity of ascertaining it and that the plaintiff has no such knowledge, and therefore is
compelled to allege negligence in general terms and to rely upon the proof of the happening of
the accident in order to establish negligence. The inference which the doctrine permits is
grounded upon the fact that the chief evidence of the true cause, whether culpable or innocent,
is practically accessible to the defendant but inaccessible to the injured person.11
chanrobleslaw
The elements of res ipsa loquitur are: (1) the accident is of such character as to warrant an
inference that it would not have happened except for the defendant's negligence; (2) the
accident must have been caused by an agency or instrumentality within the exclusive
management or control of the person charged with the negligence complained of; and (3) the
accident must not have been due to any voluntary action or contribution on the part of the
person injured.12

In this case, Cortel had the exclusive control of the bus, including its speed. The bus and the
motorcycle were running in the same traffic direction and as such, the collision would not have
happened without negligence on the part of Cortel. It was established that the collision between
the bus and the motorcycle caused Lim's death. Aside from bare allegations that petitioners
failed to prove, there was nothing to show that Lim had contributory negligence to the accident.

The rule is when an employee causes damage due to his own negligence while performing his
own duties, there arises a presumption that his employer is negligent.13 This presumption can
be rebutted only by proof of observance by the employer of the diligence of a good father of a
family in the selection and supervision of its employees. In this case, we agree with the trial
court and the Court of Appeals that Yellow Bus Line failed to prove that it exercised due
diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of its employees. Cortel's
certificates of attendance to seminars, which Yellow Bus Line did not even present as evidence
in the trial court, are not enough to prove otherwise.

We sustain the Court of Appeals in its award of loss of earning capacity and damages to
respondent. The increase in the award for loss of earning capacity is proper due to the
computation of the award in accordance with the following formula:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Net earning capacity Life Expectancy x [Gross Annual Income- Living Expenses (50% of gross
annual income)], where life expectancy 2/3 (80 - the age of the deceased).14
chanrobleslaw
We note that the Court of Appeals clearly intended to award to respondent temperate damages
amounting to P25,000 for burial and funeral expenses, instead of the P15,000 representing the
actual damage to the motorcycle awarded by the trial court, because no evidence was
presented to prove the same. However, the term "temperate damages" was inadvertently
omitted in the dispositive portion of the Court of Appeals' decision although it was stated that the
amount was for funeral and burial expenses. We reduce the interest rate to 6% per annum on
all damages awarded from the date of finality of this Decision until fully paid.

WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM with MODIFICATION the 16 October 2014
Decision and 21 April 2015 Resolution of the Court of Appeals Cagayan de Oro City in CA-G.R.
CV No. 02980. We ORDER petitioners Eddie Cortel y Carna and Yellow Bus Line, Inc. to pay
jointly and severally respondent Cecile Gepaya-Lim the following:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
(1) Award for loss of earning capacity amounting to P2,139,540;
(2) Temperate damages amounting to P25,000;
(3) Death indemnity amounting to P50,000;
(4) Moral damages amounting to P100,000; and
(5) Attorney's fees amounting to P15,000
chanrobleslaw
We impose an interest rate of 6% per annum on all damages awarded from the date of finality of
this Decision until fully paid.

G.R. No. 192914

NAPOLEON D. SENIT, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
REYES, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
assailing the Decision2 dated November 20, 2009 and the. Resolution3 dated June 17, 2010 of
the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 00390-MIN which affirmed with modification the
Dedision4 dated April 26, 2006 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malaybalay City, Bukidnon,
Branch 10, in Criminal Case No. 10717-00 convicting Napoleon D. Senit (petitioner) guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of Reckless Imprudence resulting to Multiple Serious Physical Injuries
and Damage to Property.
The Antecedents
The facts as narrated are culled from the Comments5 of the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG) and from the assailed decision of the CA:
In the morning of September 2, 2000, private complainant Mohinder Toor, Sr. was driving north
along Aglayan from the direction of Valencia on board his Toyota pick-up with his wife Rosalinda
Toor, their three-year-old son Mohinder Toor, Jr., and househelper Mezelle Jane Silayan. He
turned left and was coming to the center of Aglayan when a speeding Super 5 bus driven by
petitioner and coming from Malaybalay headed south towards Valencia, suddenly overtook a big
truck from the right side. Petitioner tried to avoid the accident by swerving to the right towards
the shoulder of the road and applying the brakes, but he was moving too fast and could not
avoid a collision with the pick-up. The bus crashed into the right side of private complainants
pick-up at a right angle.
All passengers of the pick-up were injured and immediately brought to Bethel Baptist Hospital,
Sumpong, Malaybalay City. However, because of lack of medical facilities, they were transferred
to the Bukidnon Doctors Hospital in Valencia City, Bukidnon. Rosalinda Toor sustained an open
fracture of the humerus of the right arm and displaced, closed fracture of the proximal and distal
femur of the right lower extremity which required two surgical operations. She was paralyzed as
a result of the accident and was unable to return to her job as the Regional Manager of
COSPACHEM Product Laboratories. Mohinder Toor, Sr. spent about P580,000.00 for her
treatment and P3,000.00 for Mezelle Jean Silayan, who suffered frontal area swelling as a result
of the accident. Mohinder Toor, Sr. suffered a complete fracture of the scapular bone of his right
shoulder while his son Mohinder Toor, Jr. sustained abdominal injury and a wound on the area
of his right eye which required suturing. The damage sustained by the pick-up reached
P106,155.00.
Thus, on May 30, 2001, Carlo B. Mejia, City Prosecutor of Malaybalay City, charged petitioner
with Reckless Imprudence Resulting to Multiple Serious Physical Injuries and Damage to
Property in an Amended Information which was filed with Branch 10 of the [RTC] in Malaybalay
City. The information reads:
"That on or about September 2, 2000 in the morning at [sic] Barangay Aglayan, Malaybalay City,
Province of Bukidnon, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and criminally in violation of the Land
Transportation and Traffic Code, in negligent, careless, imprudent manner and without
precaution to prevent accident [to] life and property, drive a Super Five Nissan Bus, color white/
red bearing plate No. MVD-776 owned by PAUL PADAYHAG of Rosario Heights, Iligan City, as
a result hit and bumped the [sic] motor vehicle, Toyota Pick-up color blue with plate No.
NEF-266 driven and owned by MOHINDER S. TOO[R,] SR., and with his wife Rosalinda Toor,
son Mohinder Toor, Jr., 3 years old and househelp Mezelle Jane Silayan, 17 years old, riding
with him. The Toyota pick-up was damaged in the amount of [P]105,300.00 and spouses
Mohinder Toor[,] Sr. and Rosalinda Toor, Mohinder Toor[,] Jr[.] and Mezelle Jane Silayan
sustained the following injuries to wit:
MOHINDER TOOR[,] SR.
= complete fracture of superior scapular bone right shoulder
MOHINDER TOOR[,] JR.
= MPI secondary to MVA r/o Blunt abdominal injury
= Saturing [sic] right eye area
ROSALINDA TOOR
= Fracture, open type 11, supracondylar, humerus right
= Fracture, closed, Complete, displaced, subtrochanter
= and supracondylar femur right
MEZELLE JANE SILAYAN
= Frontal area swelling 20 vehicular accident
to the damage and prejudice of the complainant victim in such amount that they are entitled to
under the law.
CONTRARY TO and in Violation of Article 365 in relation to 263 of the Revised Penal Code. IN
RELATION TO THE FAMILY CODE."6 (Citations omitted)
Upon being arraigned on June 21, 2001, the petitioner, with the assistance of his counsel,
pleaded not guilty to the Information in this case.7
Trial ensued. However, after the initial presentation of evidence for the petitioner, he resigned
from his employment and transferred residence. His whereabouts allegedly became unknown
so he was not presented as a witness by his new counsel.8
On April 26, 2006, the RTC rendered its Decision in absentia convicting the petitioner of the
crime charged. The fallo of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered and finding the accused NAPOLEON SENIT y
Duhaylungsod guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime as charged, he is hereby sentenced
to an imprisonment of an indeterminate penalty of Four [4] months and One [1] day of Arresto
Mayor maximum as minimum and to Four [4] years and Two [2] months Prision Correc[c]ional
medium as maximum. The accused is further ordered to indemnify the private complainant the
amount of Fifty Thousand [P50,000.00] Pesos as moral damages, the amount of Four Hundred
Eighty Thousand [P480,000.00] [Pesos] for the expenses incurred in the treatment and
hospitalization of Rosalinda Toor, Mohinder Toor, Jr[.] and Mezelle Jean Silayan and the amount
of Eighty Thousand [P80,000.00] [Pesos] for the expenses incurred in the repair of the damaged
Toyota pick-up vehicle.
SO ORDERED.9
The RTC issued a Promulgation10 dated August 4, 2006, which included an order for the arrest
of the petitioner.
The petitioner then filed a motion for new trial via registered mail on the ground that errors of
law or irregularities have been committed during trial that are allegedly prejudicial to his
substantial rights. He claimed that he was not able to present evidence during trial because he
was not notified of the schedule. Likewise, he mistakenly believed that the case against him has
been dismissed as private complainant Mohinder Toor, Sr. (Toor, Sr.) purportedly left the country.
11

On September 22, 2006, the public prosecutor opposed the motion for new trial filed by the
petitioner.12
On October 26, 2006, the motion for new trial was denied by the lower court pronouncing that
notices have been duly served the parties and that the reason given by the petitioner was self-
serving.13
Dissatisfied with the RTC decision, the petitioner filed his Notice of Appeal dated November 6,
2006 by registered mail to the CA, on both questions of facts and laws.14
Ruling of the CA
On November 20, 2009, the CA affirmed the decision of the RTC with modification as to the
penalty imposed, the dispositive portion thereof reads:
ACCORDINGLY, with MODIFICATION that [the petitioner] should suffer the penalty of three (3)
months and one (1) day of arresto mayor, the Court AFFIRMS in all other respects the appealed
26 April 2006 Decision of the [RTC] of Malaybalay City, Branch 10, in Criminal Case No.
10717-00.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.15
In affirming with modification the decision of the RTC, the CA ratiocinated as follows: first, the
evidence presented by OSG overwhelmingly points to the petitioner as the culprit. A scrutiny of
the records further reveals that the pictures taken after the accident and the Traffic Investigation
Report all coincide with the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, which are in whole
consistent and believable thus, debunking the claim of the petitioner that he was convicted on
the mere basis of allegedly biased and hearsay testimonies which do not establish his guilt
beyond reasonable doubt. In addition, there was no existing evidence to show that there was an
improper motive on the part of the eyewitnesses.16
Second, it found the arguments of the petitioner to move for a new trial as baseless.17
Lastly, it rendered that the proper imposable penalty is the maximum period of arresto mayor in
its minimum and medium periods that is imprisonment for three (3) months and one (1) day of
arresto mayor since the petitioner has, by reckless imprudence, committed an act which, had it
been intentional, would have constituted a less grave felony, based on the first paragraph of
Article 365 in relation to Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC).18
The petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied by the CA, in its Resolution19
dated June 17, 2010.
As a final recourse, the petitioner filed the petition for review before this Court, praying that the
applicable law on the matter be reviewed, and the gross misappreciation of facts committed by
the court a quo and by the CA be given a second look.
The Issues
I. WHETHER OR NOT THE RTC AND THE CA ERRED IN DENYING THE MOTION FOR NEW
TRIAL OR TO RE-OPEN THE SAME IN ORDER TO ALLOW THE PETITIONER TO PRESENT
EVIDENCE ON HIS BEHALF; AND
II. WHETHER OR NOT THE RTC ERRED IN CONVICTING THE PETITIONER DESPITE THE
APPARENT FAILURE ON THE PART OF THE PROSECUTION TO PROVE THE GUILT OF
THE PETITIONER BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.20
Ruling of the Court
The petition lacks merit.
The RTC and CA did not err in denying the petitioners motion for new trial or to re-open
the same.
The Court finds that no errors of law or irregularities, prejudicial to the substantial rights of the
petitioner, have been committed during trial.
The petitioner anchors his motion for new trial on Rule 121, Section 2(a) of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure, to wit:
Sec. 2. Grounds for a new trial. The Court shall grant a new trial on any of the following
grounds:
(a) That errors of law or irregularities prejudicial to the substantial rights of the accused
have been committed during the trial;
(b) That new and material evidence has been discovered which the accused could not with
reasonable diligence have discovered and produced at the trial and which if introduced and
admitted would probably change the judgment. (Emphasis ours)
To sum up the claims of the petitioner, he theorizes that there was an error of law or
irregularities committed when the RTC promulgated a decision in absentia and deemed that he
had waived his right to present evidence resulting to denial of due process, a one-sided decision
by the RTC, and a strict and rigid application of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure
against him.
First, it must be noted that the petitioner had already been arraigned and therefore, the court a
quo had already acquired jurisdiction over him. In fact, there was already an initial presentation
of evidence for the defense when his whereabouts became unknown.
The petitioners claims that he had not testified because he did not know the schedule of the
hearings, and mistakenly believed that the case had already been terminated with the departure
of Toor, Sr., do not merit our consideration.21
The holding of trial in absentia is authorized under Section 14(2), Article III of the 1987
Constitution which provides that after arraignment, trial may proceed notwithstanding the
absence of the accused provided that he has been duly notified and his failure to appear is
unjustifiable.22 It is established that notices have been served to the counsel of the petitioner
and his failure to inform his counsel of his whereabouts is the reason for his failure to appear on
the scheduled date. Thus, the arguments of the petitioner against the validity of the proceedings
and promulgation of judgment in absentia for being in violation of the constitutional right to due
process are doomed to fail.23
In Estrada v. People,24 the Court ruled that:
Due process is satisfied when the parties are afforded a fair and reasonable opportunity to
explain their respective sides of the controversy.
In the present case, petitioner was afforded such opportunity. The trial court set a hearing on
May 14, 1997 for reception of defense evidence, notice of which was duly sent to the addresses
on record of petitioner and her counsel, respectively. When they failed to appear at the May 14,
1997 hearing, they later alleged that they were not notified of said setting. Petitioners counsel
never notified the court of any change in her address, while petitioner gave a wrong address
from the very beginning, eventually jumped bail and evaded court processes. Clearly, therefore,
petitioner and her counsel were given all the opportunities to be heard. They cannot now
complain of alleged violation of petitioners right to due process when it was by their own fault
that they lost the opportunity to present evidence.25 (Citation omitted)
Similarly in the present case, the petitioner clearly had previous notice of the criminal case filed
against him and was given the opportunity to present evidence in his defense. The petitioner
was not in any way deprived of his substantive and constitutional right to due process as he was
duly accorded all the opportunities to be heard and to present evidence to substantiate his
defense, but he forfeited this right, through his own negligence, by not appearing in court at the
scheduled hearings.26
The negligence of the petitioner in believing that the case was already terminated resulting to
his failure to attend the hearings, is inexcusable. The Court has ruled in many cases that:
It is petitioners duty, as a client, to be in touch with his counsel so as to be constantly posted
about the case. It is mandated to inquire from its counsel about the status and progress of the
case from time to time and cannot expect that all it has to do is sit back, relax and await the
outcome of the case. It is also its responsibility, together with its counsel, to devise a system for
the receipt of mail intended for them.27 (Citations omitted)
The Court finds that the negligence exhibited by the petitioner, towards the criminal case against
him in which his liberty is at risk, is not borne of ignorance of the law as claimed by his counsel
rather, lack of concern towards the incident, and the people who suffered from it. While there
was no showing in the case at bar that the counsel of the petitioner was grossly negligent in
failing to inform him of the notices served, the Court cannot find anyone to blame but the
petitioner himself in not exercising diligence in informing his counsel of his whereabouts.
The Court also agrees with the Comment of the OSG that there is neither rule nor law which
specifically requires the trial court to ascertain whether notices received by counsel are
sufficiently communicated with his client.28
In GCP-Manny Transport Services, Inc. v. Judge Principe,29 the Court held that:
[W]hen petitioner is at fault or not entirely blameless, there is no reason to overturn well-settled
jurisprudence or to interpret the rules liberally in its favor. Where petitioner failed to act with
prudence and diligence, its plea that it was not accorded the right to due process cannot elicit
this Courts approval or even sympathy. It is petitioners duty, as a client, to be in touch with his
counsel so as to be constantly posted about the case. x x x.30 (Citations omitted)
Even if the Court assumed that the petitioner anchors his claim on Section 2(b) of Rule 121 of
the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, the argument still has no merit.
"A motion for new trial based on newly-discovered evidence may be granted only if the following
requisites are met: (a) that the evidence was discovered after trial; (b) that said evidence could
not have been discovered and produced at the trial even with the exercise of reasonable
diligence; (c) that it is material, not merely cumulative, corroborative or impeaching; and (d) that
the evidence is of such weight that, if admitted, it would probably change the judgment. It is
essential that the offering party exercised reasonable diligence in seeking to locate the evidence
before or during trial but nonetheless failed to secure it."31 The Court agrees with the CA in its
decision which held that "a new trial may not be had on the basis of evidence which was
available during trial but was not presented due to its negligence. Likewise, the purported errors
and irregularities committed in the course of the trial against [the petitioners] substantive rights
do not exist."32
In Lustaa v. Jimena-Lazo,33 the Court ruled that:
Rules of procedure are tools designed to promote efficiency and orderliness as well as to
facilitate attainment of justice, such that strict adherence thereto is required. Their application
may be relaxed only when rigidity would result in a defeat of equity and substantial justice,
which is not present here. Utter disregard of the Rules cannot just be rationalized by harking on
the policy of liberal construction.34 (Citations omitted and italics in the original)
In the instant case, the Court finds no reason to waive the procedural rules in order to grant the
motion for new trial of the petitioner. There is just no legal basis for the grant of the motion for
new trial. The Court believes that the petitioner was given the opportunity to be heard but he
chose to put this opportunity into waste by not being diligent enough to ask about the status of
the criminal case against him and inform his counsel of his whereabouts.
The RTC did not err in convicting the petitioner.
The law applicable to the case at bar is Article 365 of the RPC, which provides that:
Art. 365. Imprudence and negligence. x x x.
xxxx
Reckless imprudence consists in voluntary, but without malice, doing or failing to do an act from
which material damage results by reason of inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the
person performing or failing to perform such act, taking into consideration his employment or
occupation, degree of intelligence, physical condition and other circumstances regarding
persons, time and place.
xxxx
The elements of reckless imprudence are: (1) that the offender does or fails to do an act; (2)
that the doing or the failure to do that act is voluntary; (3) that it be without malice; (4) that
material damage results from the reckless imprudence; and (5) that there is inexcusable lack of
precaution on the part of the offender, taking into consideration his employment or occupation,
degree of intelligence, physical condition, and other circumstances regarding persons, time, and
place.35
All elements for the crime of reckless imprudence have been established in the present case.
The petitioner questions the credibility of the prosecution witnesses and claims that their
testimonies are biased. He also claims that Toor, Sr. is the real culprit when he turned left
without looking for an incoming vehicle, thus violating traffic rules resulting to the mishap.
The Court believes that the RTC and CA correctly appreciated the evidence and testimonies
presented in the instant case.
The Court agrees with the OSG that not only were the witnesses narrations of the accident
credible and worthy of belief, their accounts were also consistent and tallied on all significant
and substantial points.36 These witnesses testimonies are as follows:
PO3 Jesus Delfin testified that he investigated the accident at Aglayan. He made the following
findings in his accident report: the pick-up owned and driven by Toor, Sr., together with his
family and a househelper as his passengers, was turning left along Aglayan when it was hit at a
right angle position by a Super 5 bus driven by the petitioner. He noted skid marks made by the
bus and explained that the petitioner was overtaking but was not able to do so because of the
pick-up. The petitioner could not swerve to the left to avoid the pick-up because there was a ten-
wheeler truck. He swerved to the right instead and applied breaks to avoid the accident. The
investigator clearly testified that, on the basis of data gathered, the collision was due to the error
of the bus driver who was driving too fast, as evinced by the distance from the skid marks
towards the axle.37
Albert Alon testified that he saw Toor, Sr.s pick-up turn left along Aglayan. He also saw a big
truck and a Super 5 bus both coming from Malaybalay. The truck was running slowly while the
Super 5 bus was running fast and overtaking the big truck from the right side. The bus crashed
into the pick-up and pushed the smaller vehicle due to the force of the impact. He went nearer
the area of collision and saw that the four passengers of the pick-up were unconscious.38
Mezelle Jane Silayan testified that while moving towards the center of Aglayan on board her
employers pick-up, she saw a Super 5 bus overtaking a big truck from the right side. Their
vehicle was hit by the bus. She was thrown out of the pick-up and hit her head on the ground.39
Toor, Sr. testified that while he was driving his pick-up at the corner of the center of Aglayan, a
Super 5 bus, moving fast, overtook a big truck from the right side. The bus then hit the pick up,
injuring him and all his passengers.40
Taken all together, the testimonies of the witnesses conclusively suggest that: (1) the Super 5
bus was moving fast; (2) the bus overtook a big truck which was moving slowly from the right
side; and (3) when the petitioner saw the pick-up truck turning left, he applied the brakes but
because he was moving fast, the collision became inevitable.
"Well-entrenched is the rule that the trial courts assessment of the credibility of witnesses is
entitled to great weight and is even conclusive and binding, if not tainted with arbitrariness or
oversight of some fact or circumstance of significance and influence. This rule is based on the
fact that the trial court had the opportunity to observe the demeanor and the conduct of the
witnesses."41 The Court finds in the instant case that there is no reason for this Court to deviate
from the rule.
The Court finds the testimonies of the witnesses not biased. There was no evidence of ill motive
of the witnesses against the petitioner.
Lastly, the petitioner claims that Toor, Sr. committed a traffic violation and thus, he should be the
one blamed for the incident. The Court finds this without merit.1wphi1
The prosecution sufficiently proved that the Super 5 bus driven by the petitioner recklessly
drove on the right shoulder of the road and overtook another south-bound ten-wheeler truck that
slowed at the intersection, obviously to give way to another vehicle about to enter the
intersection. It was impossible for him not to notice that the ten-wheeler truck in front and
traveling in the same direction had already slowed down to allow passage of the pick-up, which
was then negotiating a left turn to Aglayan public market. Seeing the ten-wheeler truck slow
down, it was incumbent upon the petitioner to reduce his speed or apply on the brakes of the
bus in order to allow the pick-up to safely make a left turn. Instead, he drove at a speed too fast
for safety, then chose to swerve to the right shoulder of the road and overtake the truck,
entering the intersection and directly smashing into the pick-up. In flagrantly failing to observe
the necessary precautions to avoid inflicting injury or damage to other persons and things, the
petitioner was recklessly imprudent in operating the Super 5 bus.42
In Dumayag v. People,43 the Court held:
Section 37 of R.A. No. 4136, as amended, mandates all motorists to drive and operate vehicles
on the right side of the road or highway. When overtaking another, it should be made only if the
highway is clearly visible and is free from oncoming vehicle. Overtaking while approaching a
curve in the highway, where the driver's view is obstructed, is not allowed. Corollarily, drivers of
automobiles, when overtaking another vehicle, are charged with a high degree of care
and diligence to avoid collision. The obligation rests upon him to see to it that vehicles
coming from the opposite direction are not taken unaware by his presence on the side of
the road upon which they have the right to pass.44 (Citations omitted and emphasis ours)
Thus, the petitioner cannot blame Toor, Sr. for not noticing a fast-approaching bus, as the cited
law provides that the one overtaking on the road has the obligation to let other cars in the
opposite direction know his presence and not the other way around as the petitioner suggests.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. Accordingly, the Decision dated November 20, 2009 and
the Resolution dated June 17, 2010 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 00390-MIN are
AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 172778 November 26, 2012
SABINIANO DUMAYAG, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking the reversal
of the November 26, 2004 Decision1 and the May 10, 2006 Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals
(CA), in CA-G.R. CR No. 26513, which affirmed the June 24, 2002 Decision3 of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 21, Cebu City (RTC). The RTC decision upheld with modification the
Decision4 of the Municipal Trial Court of San Fernando, Cebu City (MTC), finding accused
Sabiniano Dumayag (petitioner) guilty of the complex crime of reckless imprudence resulting in
multiple homicide and reckless imprudence resulting in physical injuries.
The Facts:
On July 6, 1995, at around 11:30 oclock in the morning, along the national highway in
Magtalisay, Sangat, San Fernando, Cebu, a passenger bus of Petrus Bus Liner (passenger
bus), driven by petitioner, collided with a tricycle driven by Elsie Genayas (Genayas), resulting in
the death of four (4) persons and causing physical injuries to five (5) others, who were all
passengers of the tricycle.5 The passenger bus was bound for Dalaguete, Cebu, while the
tricycle came from the opposite direction, going towards Cebu City. At the time of the mishap,
the tricycle was overtaking a Mitsubishi pick-up when it collided with a passenger bus coming
from the opposite direction.6
Petitioner was charged before the MTC with reckless imprudence resulting in multiple homicide
for the deaths of Genayas, Orlando Alfanta (Alfanta), Grace Israel (Israel), and Julius Amante
(Amante); and with reckless imprudence resulting in serious physical injuries sustained by
Crispin Caeda, Jannette Bacalso, Carmela Lariosa, Fediliza Basco (Basco), and Nelfe Agad
(Agad) and damage to property.7
During the trial, one of the witnesses presented by the prosecution was Rogelio Cagakit
(Cagakit), a driver of Badian Island Resort. He testified that on July 6, 1995, at around 11:30
oclock in the morning, he was driving a Mitsubishi Pajero with tourist passengers bound for
Cebu City; that along the national highway somewhere in Barangay Magtalisay, Balud, San
Fernando, Cebu, he was trailing a tricycle bearing a total of 8 passengers; that upon reaching
the first blind curve of the road, he noticed the tricycle following a Mitsubishi pick-up; that when
the Mitsubishi pick-up slowed down upon reaching the second blind curve, the tricycle tried to
overtake the pick up and, while overtaking, a fast moving vehicle from the opposite direction hit
the tricycle which was thrown towards his direction; and that two passengers of the tricycle died
on the spot.8
Senior Police Officer 3 Gregorio Patalinghug (SPO3 Patalinghug) was also presented as a
witness and he narrated that on the said date and time he and Senior Police Officer 2 Felipe
Yap (SPO2 Yap) responded to a report about a traffic accident somewhere in Magtalisay, Balud,
San Fernando, Cebu. When they arrived at the place, SPO2 Yap immediately boarded the
injured victims in a vehicle and brought them to the hospital. He noticed two lifeless bodies lying
on the road, later identified as those of Alfanta and Genayas. He then inspected the place of the
incident; measured the relative positions of the tricycle, the Mitsubishi Pajero and passenger
bus; and drew a sketch. From the sketch, he identified the point of impact, which was one (1)
foot away from the centerline of the road, crossing the lane occupied by the passenger bus. He
also pointed to the skid mark, about sixty (60) feet in length, produced by the bus when its driver
stepped on the brake pedal. Based on his observation from the point of impact and on the
information he gathered from several persons present at the time of the accident, he was of the
opinion that the driver of the tricycle was at fault.9
The prosecution also presented Caeda, Agad and Basco, who related the collision they
witnessed. The parents of the victims and the owner of the tricycle, meanwhile, both testified on
their respective claims for damages; while Dr. Rolando Anzano, reported his findings on the
injuries sustained by the victims.
In his defense, petitioner testified that he was a professional driver for 26 years and worked for
five (5) different employers, the fifth of which was the Petrus Bus Liner; that his everyday route
was from Dalaguete, Cebu to Cebu City and back, with two (2) round trips a day; that he was
familiar with the road since he had been traversing it for around 20 years; that the road where
the accident happened had two (2) blind curves and upon approaching the first blind curve, he
slowed down by stepping on the brakes; that while negotiating the second blind curve, he
noticed that his lane was clear and so he stepped on the accelerator in order to gain
momentum; that it was at this moment that the tricycle while in the process of overtaking a
vehicle ahead of it, suddenly occupied his lane; that he tried to avoid hitting the tricycle but to no
avail; that he could not swerve the bus to the left because there was another vehicle occupying
the same; and he could not also swerve the bus to the road shoulder on the right side of the
lane because it was sloping down and there was a canal. He posited that the accident would not
have taken place at all if the tricycle driver had not attempted to overtake another vehicle and
occupied his lane.10
On March 18, 1999, the MTC found petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
reckless imprudence resulting in multiple homicide.11 It explained:
Taking into account the circumstances and condition of the road there being two (2) blind curves
involved, the length of the skidmark produced at sixty (60) feet in length clearly speaks for itself
that the accused drove and operated the passenger bus negligently without taking the
necessary precautions and without due regard to the road condition.
Simply stated, if in the exercise of reasonable care as contended by the accused, the speed of
the passenger bus at that time was commensurate and corresponds with the demands of the
circumstances and conditions of the road where as is obtaining, the conditions are such as to
increase the danger of accident, no matter how sudden the tricycle appeared at the bus front,
indisputably, the skid mark produced would not have reached that much or the accident may
have been avoided and if not, the damage or injuries caused could only be slight and
manageable.12
The dispositive portion reads:
WHEREFORE, finding the accused, Sabiniano Dumayag, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of reckless imprudence resulting in multiple homicide, he is sentenced to suffer the
penalty of imprisonment of two (2) years and one (1) day minimum to three (3) years, six (6)
months and twenty (20) days maximum and to pay the following civil liabilities:
1. To the surviving heirs of deceased Orlando Alfanta:
a. P50,000.00 death Indemnity;
b. P50,000.00 for wake, funeral, burial and other related miscellaneous expenses; and
c. P20,000.00 moral damages for the agony, mental anguish and sorrow suffered by the
surviving heirs;
2. To the surviving heirs of deceased Julius Amante;
a. P50,000.00 death Indemnity;
b. P50,000.00 for wake, funeral, burial and other related miscellaneous expenses; and
c. P20,000.00 moral damages for the agony, mental anguish and sorrow suffered by the
surviving heirs;
3. To the surviving heirs of deceased Grace Israel:
a. P50,000.00 death Indemnity;
b. P50,000.00 for wake, funeral, burial and other related miscellaneous expenses; and
c. P20,000.00 moral damages for the agony, mental anguish and sorrow suffered by the
surviving heirs;
plus P50,000.00 by way of attorneys fees and P20,000.00 exemplary damages.
With costs against the accused.
SO ORDERED.13
On appeal, the RTC affirmed with modification the decision of the MTC.14 The modified
judgment reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, the appealed decision is hereby AFFIRMED
but modified as follows:
1. For the complex crime of reckless imprudence resulting in multiple homicide of Alfante, Israel
and Amante, accused is sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of TWO (2) YEARS and
FOUR (4) MONTHS (of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its
minimum period), as minimum, to SIX (6) YEARS (of prision correccional in its medium and
maximum periods), as the maximum thereof, with all the accessory penalties thereto.
2. For reckless imprudence resulting in slight physical injuries accused is sentenced to PUBLIC
CENSURE for the injuries sustained by each of the private complainants, to wit, Canieda,
Bacalso, Lariosa, Bascon and Agad. In other words, accused is sentenced to said penalty for as
many private complainants as were injured.
3. For his civil liabilities, accused is directed
3.1 To pay the surviving heirs of each of the deceased tricycle passengers, namely, Alfante,
Amante and Israel the following:
3.1.1 Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) for the death each of the defendant;
3.1.2 Thirty Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00) for the wake, funeral, burial and other related
expenses in connection with the said death;
3.1.3 Twenty Thousand (P20,000.00) pesos for moral damages
3.1.4 Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00) for exemplary damages;
3.1.5 Twenty Thousand (P20,000.00) pesos as attorneys fees.
3.2 To pay Beethoven Bernabe, the owner of the damaged tricycle, EIGHTY
THOUSANDS PESOS (P80,000.00) as compensatory damage representing the value of the
said property after deducting therefrom its salvage value and allowance for depreciation; and
3.3 The costs.
SO ORDERED.15
The CA affirmed in toto the decision of the RTC. It found the petitioner and the tricycle driver
equally guilty of negligence, the former for failing to observe the precautionary measure when
approaching a blind curve and the latter for unsuccessfully overtaking a vehicle. The CA stated
that the petitioner should have been more careful considering that the area had blind curves and
there could be oncoming vehicles from the other side. The fact that petitioner was driving on the
right side of the road did not relieve him of the obligation of exercising due and ordinary care to
prevent collision and avoid injury to persons or property, including others who may be on the
wrong side of the road.16
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was denied in a Resolution, dated May 10,
2006.
Hence, this petition raising the following issues:
WHETHER OR NOT NEGLIGENCE, IMPRUDENCE AND RECKLESSNESS WAS
CORRECTLY ATTRIBUTED TO PETITIONER BY THE COURTS BELOW WHEN THE
VEHICULAR MISHAP COMPLAINED OF IN THIS PROCEEDING OCCURRED LAST 6 JULY
1995;
IF INDEED PETITIONER WAS NEGLIGENT, RECKLESS AND IMPRUDENT WHEN THE
MISHAP LITIGATED IN THIS PROCEEDING OCCURRED LAST 6 JULY 1995, WHETHER OR
NOT SAID NEGLIGENCE, RECKLESSNESS AND IMPRUDENCE, WAS THE PROXIMATE
CAUSE OF THE SAME;
WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONERS CONVICTION, AS SUSTAINED BY THE COURT OF
APPEALS, IS VIOLATIVE OF HIS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS TO DUE PROCESS OF LAW
AND TO BE PRESUMED INNOCENT OF THE CRIME CHARGED AT BAR.17
Petitioner argues that his guilt was not proven beyond reasonable doubt, claiming that the
vehicular mishap was purely an accident. He insists that he was not negligent, reckless and
imprudent in the operation of the motor vehicle at the time of the accident and that he was
driving the bus on the lane properly belonging to him at a moderate speed.
He asserts that the proximate cause of the accident was the negligent, reckless and imprudent
act of the tricycle driver, who suddenly overtook another vehicle while approaching a blind
curve. He stresses that had the tricycle driver not attempted to suddenly overtake another
vehicle while approaching a blind curve, the accident would not have taken place.
Petitioner further avers that, at the time of the accident, the tricycle was overloaded with eight
passengers, in addition to the driver; that the driver of the tricycle was operating along the
national highway, a route specifically prohibited under the franchise; and that the tricycle driver
also violated Section 41 (a) and (b) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 4136,18 as amended, otherwise
known as the Land Transportation and Traffic Code of the Philippines when he tried to overtake
another vehicle while approaching a blind curve of the highway. Therefore, due to serious
violations committed by the tricycle driver, the resulting deaths and injuries arising from the
vehicular accident should be his sole responsibility.19
The Court finds merit in the petition.
Well-settled is the rule that findings of fact of the trial court, especially when affirmed by the CA,
are binding and conclusive upon this Court.20 The Court, however, recognizes several
exceptions to this rule, to wit: (1) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or
impossible; (2) when there is grave abuse of discretion; (3) when the findings are grounded
entirely on speculations, surmises or conjectures; (4) when the judgment of the CA is based on
misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) when the CA, in
making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case and the same is contrary to the
admissions of both appellant and appellee; (7) when the findings of fact are conclusions without
citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (8) when the CA manifestly overlooked
certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties and which, if properly considered, would justify
a different conclusion; and (9) when the findings of fact of the CA are premised on the absence
of evidence and are contradicted by the evidence on record.21 Several exceptions obtain in this
case; hence, a departure from the general rule is warranted.
The MTC, the RTC and the CA found petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of reckless
imprudence resulting in homicide and physical injuries and damage to property. They all
concluded that petitioner was guilty because he was driving fast at the time of the collision.
Consequently, he was sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment and ordered to pay the
victims civil indemnity.
Reckless imprudence, as defined by our penal law, consists in voluntarily, but without malice,
doing or failing to do an act from which material damage results by reason of inexcusable lack
of precaution on the part of the person performing or failing to perform such act, taking into
consideration his employment or occupation, degree of intelligence, physical condition and other
circumstances regarding persons, time and place.22 In order to establish a motorists liability for
the negligent operation of a vehicle, it must be shown that there was a direct causal connection
between such negligence and the injuries or damages complained of.23 Thus, to constitute the
offense of reckless driving, the act must be something more than a mere negligence in the
operation of a motor vehicle, and a willful and wanton disregard of the consequences is
required.24
After going over the records of this case, the Court is unable to sustain the findings of fact and
conclusion reached by the courts below. The totality of the evidence shows that the proximate
cause of the collision was the reckless negligence of the tricycle driver, who hastily overtook
another vehicle while approaching a blind curve, in violation of traffic laws.
Proximate cause is defined as that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken
by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would not
have occurred. And more comprehensively, the proximate legal cause is that acting first and
producing the injury, either immediately or by setting other events in motion, all constituting a
natural and continuous chain of events, each having a close causal connection with its
immediate predecessor, the final event in the chain immediately effecting the injury as a natural
and probable result of the cause which first acted, under such circumstances that the person
responsible for the first event should, as an ordinary prudent and intelligent person, have
reasonable ground to expect at the moment of his act or default that an injury to some person
might probably result therefrom.25
The evidence indubitably shows that before the collision, the passenger bus was cruising along
its rightful lane when the tricycle coming from the opposite direction suddenly swerved and
encroached on its lane. The accident would not have happened had Genayas, the tricycle
driver, stayed on his lane and did not recklessly try to overtake another vehicle while
approaching a blind curve. Section 37 of R.A. No. 4136, as amended, mandates all motorists to
drive and operate vehicles on the right side of the road or highway. When overtaking another, it
should be made only if the highway is clearly visible and is free from oncoming vehicle.
Overtaking while approaching a curve in the highway, where the drivers view is obstructed, is
not allowed.26 Corollarily, drivers of automobiles, when overtaking another vehicle, are charged
with a high degree of care and diligence to avoid collision. The obligation rests upon him to see
to it that vehicles coming from the opposite direction are not taken unaware by his presence on
the side of the road upon which they have the right to pass.27
The MTC opined that the accident could have been avoided or damage or injuries could only be
slight and manageable, if the speed of the passenger bus was commensurate with the demands
of the circumstances and the condition of the road. The Court, however, cannot subscribe to the
conclusion that petitioner was driving fast and without regard to the condition of the road at the
time of the collision.
The testimony of Cagakit that the passenger bus was running fast at the time of the collision
lacks probative value. The actual speed of the bus was not established because he merely
stated that when the tricycle was trying to overtake the Mitsubishi pick-up, a fast moving vehicle
hit it. Also, it was not indubitably shown that petitioner was driving at a speed beyond the rate
allowed by law.28 In a similar case, Vallacar Transit, Inc. v. Catubig,29 the Court, in adopting the
conclusion of the RTC, wrote:
Based on the evidence on record, it is crystal clear that the immediate and proximate cause of
the collision is the reckless and negligent act of Quintin Catubig, Jr. and not because the Ceres
Bus was running very fast. Even if Ceres Bus is running very fast on its lane, it could not have
caused the collision if not for the fact that Quintin Catubig, Jr. tried to overtake a cargo truck and
encroached on the lane traversed by the Ceres Bus while approaching a curve. As the driver of
the motorcycle, Quintin Catubig, Jr. has not observed reasonable care and caution in driving his
motorcycle which an ordinary prudent driver would have done under the circumstances.
Recklessness on the part of Quintin Catubig, Jr. is evident when he tried to overtake a cargo
truck while approaching a curve in Barangay Donggo-an, Bolisong, Manjuyod, Negros Oriental.
x x x.
Furthermore, it was undisputed that the tricycle was overloaded, with a total of eight (8)
passengers (excluding the driver), which is a clear violation of traffic rules and regulation. It was
likewise admitted by the owner of the tricycle, Beethoven Bernabe (Bernabe), that his driver
violated the conditions specified in the tricycle franchise which prohibited all tricycles to travel
along the national highway. In fact, he admitted that Genayas was only the alternate driver of his
son and that he did not interview him anymore when he applied as a company driver because
he was a neighbor and a nephew of his wife. For said reason, the award of damages to
Bernabe by the courts below has no justifiable basis.
The immediate and proximate cause being the reckless and imprudent act of the tricycle driver,
petitioner should be acquitted. Nevertheless, he is civilly liable. The rule is that an "acquittal of
the accused, even if based on a finding that he is not guilty, does not carry with it the extinction
of the civil liability based on quasi delict."30
Under the proven circumstances, there was contributory negligence on the part of petitioner.
1wphi1 It is to be noted that there were two blind curves along the national highway. Having
travelled along it for the past 20 years, he was aware of the blind curves and should have taken
precaution in operating the passenger bus as it approached them. In the situation at hand, he
did not exercise the necessary precaution. After negotiating the first curve, he claimed to have
stepped on the accelerator pedal because his lane was clear. According to SPO2 Patalinghug,
he found skid marks produced by the passenger bus. It could only mean that petitioner had
slammed on the brake brought about by the sudden emergence of the tricycle in front of him.
Notwithstanding, it was still short of reckless or criminal negligence as he was driving along his
rightful lane.
Considering that the proximate cause was the negligence of the tricycle driver and that
negligence on the part of petitioner was only contributory, there is a need to mitigate the
amounts of the civil liability imposed on the latter. The determination of the mitigation of the civil
liability varies depending on the circumstances of each case.31 The Court allowed the reduction
of 50% in Rakes v. Atlantic Gulf & Pacific Co.,32 20% in Phoenix Construction, Inc. v. IAC33 and
LBC Air Cargo, Inc. v. CA, 34 and 40% in Bank of the Philippine Islands v. CA 35 and Philippine
Bank of Commerce v. CA.36
In this case, a reduction of 50% of the actual damages is deemed equitable considering that the
negligence of the tricycle driver was the proximate cause of the accident and that of petitioner
was merely contributory. Moreover, under the circumstances, petitioner cannot be made liable
for moral and exemplary damages for lack of basis. The award of attorney's fees is not
warranted either.
WHEREFORE, the petition 1s PARTLY GRANTED. Petitioner Sabiniano Dumayag is hereby
ACQUITTED of the crime of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide and damage to property.
He is, however, civilly liable and, accordingly, ORDERED to pay each of the surviving heirs of
Orlando Alfanta, Grace Israel and Julius Amante the following:
1 P25,000.00 as civil indemnity; and
2 Pl5,000.00 for funeral expenses.
The award of damages to Beethoven Bernabe, the owner of the tricycle, is DELETED.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 191033

THE ORCHARD GOLF & COUNTRY CLUB, INC., EXEQUIEL D. ROBLES, CARLO R.H.
MAGNO, CONRADO L. BENITEZ II, VICENTE R. SANTOS, HENRY CUA LOPING, MARIZA
SANTOS-TAN, TOMAS B. CLEMENTE III, and FRANCIS C. MONTALLANA, Petitioners,
vs.
ERNESTO V. YU and MANUEL C. YUHICO, Respondents.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court (Rules) seeks to
reverse the Resolutions dated September 16, 20091 and January 21, 20102 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 106918, which reconsidered and set aside its Resolution
dated January 15, 20093 granting petitioners a 15-day period within which to file a petition for
review under Rule 43 of the Rules.
The present case is a continuation of Yu v. The Orchard Gold & Country Club, Inc.4 decided by
this Court on March 1, 2007. For brevity, the relevant facts narrated therein are quoted as
follows:
On May 28, 2000, a Sunday, [respondents] Ernesto Yu and Manuel Yuhico went to the Orchard
Golf & Country Club to play a round of golf with another member of the club. At the last minute,
however, that other member informed them that he could not play with them. Due to the "no
twosome" policy of the Orchard contained in the membership handbook prohibiting groups of
less than three players from teeing off on weekends and public holidays before 1:00 p.m.,
[respondents] requested management to look for another player to join them.
Because [Orchard] were unable to find their third player, [respondent] Yu tried to convince
Francis Montallana, Orchards assistant golf director, to allow them to play twosome, even if
they had to tee off from hole no. 10 of the Palmer golf course. Montallana refused, stating that
the flights which started from the first nine holes might be disrupted. [Respondent] Yu then
shouted invectives at Montallana, at which point he told [respondent] Yuhico that they should
just tee off anyway, regardless of what management's reaction would be. [Respondents] then
teed off, without permission from Montallana. They were thus able to play, although they did so
without securing a tee time control slip before teeing off, again in disregard of a rule in the
handbook. As a result of [respondents] actions, Montallana filed a report on the same day with
the board of directors (the board).
In separate letters dated May 31, 2000, the board, through [petitioner] Clemente, requested
[respondents] to submit their written comments on Montallanas incident report dated May 28,
2000. The reportwas submitted for the consideration of the board.
Subsequently, on June 29, 2000, the board resolved to suspend [respondents] from July 16 to
October 15, 2000, and served notice thereof on them.
On July 11, 2000, [respondents] filed separate petitions for injunction with application for
temporary restraining order (TRO) and/or preliminary injunction with the Securities Investigation
and Clearing Department (SICD) of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), at that
time the tribunal vested by law with jurisdiction to hear and decide intra-corporate controversies.
The cases, in which [respondents] assailed the validity of their suspension, were docketed as
SEC Case Nos. 07-00-6680 and 07-00-6681. They were eventually consolidated.
After a joint summary hearing on the aforesaid petitions, the SEC-SICD, on July 14, 2000,
issued a TRO effective for 20 days from issuance, restraining and enjoining [petitioners], their
agents or representatives from implementing or executing the suspension of [respondents].
On August 1, 2000, the SEC en banc issued its "Guidelines on Intra-Corporate Cases Pending
Before the SICD and the Commission En Banc of the Securities and Exchange
Commission" (guidelines). Sections 1 and 2 of these guidelines provided:
Section 1. Intra-corporate and suspension of payments or rehabilitation cases may still be filed
with the Securities and Exchange Commission on or before August 8, 2000. However, the
parties-litigants or their counsels or representatives shall be advised that the jurisdiction of the
Commission over these cases shall be eventually transferred to the Regional Trial Courts upon
effectivity of The Securities Regulation Code by August 9, 2000.
Section 2. Prayers for temporary restraining order or injunction or suspension of payment order
contained in cases filed under the preceding section may be acted upon favorably provided that
the effectivity of the corresponding order shall only be up to August 8, 2000. Prayers for other
provisional remedies shall no longer be acted upon by the Commission. In all these cases, the
parties-litigants or their counsels or representatives shall be advised that the said cases will
eventually be transferred to the regular courts by August 9, 2000. (Emphasis ours)
After hearing [respondents] applications for preliminary injunction, the SEC-SICD issued an
order dated August 2, 2000 directing the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction enjoining the
individual [petitioners], their agents and representatives from suspending [respondents], upon
the latter's posting of separate bonds of P40,000. This [respondents] did on August 4, 2000.
On August 7, 2000, the SEC-SICD issued a writ of preliminary injunction against [petitioners]
directing them to strictly observe the order dated August 2, 2000.1wphi1
On October 31, 2000, the board held a special meeting in which it resolved to implement the
June 29, 2000 order for the suspension of [respondents] in view of the fact that the writs of
injunction issued by the SICD in their respective cases had already [elapsed] on August 8, 2000
under the SEC guidelines.
In separate letters dated December 4, 2000 addressed to each [respondent], [petitioner]
Clemente informed them that the board was implementing their suspensions.
On December 12, 2000, [respondents] filed a petition for indirect contempt against [petitioners]
in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Dasmarias, Cavite, docketed as Civil Case No. 2228-00.
In an order dated December 13, 2000, the Dasmarias, Cavite RTC, Branch 90, through Judge
Dolores [L.] Espaol, directed the parties to maintain the "last, actual, peaceable and
uncontested state of things," effectively restoring the writ of preliminary injunction, and also
ordered [petitioners] to file their answer to the petition. [Petitioners] did not file a motion for
reconsideration but filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with the CA, docketed as CA-
G.R. SP No. 62309, contesting the propriety of the December 13, 2000 order of Judge Espaol.
They also prayed for the issuance of a TRO and writ of preliminary injunction.
The CA reversed the Dasmarias, Cavite RTC in the x x x decision dated August 27, 2001.
In view of the CA's decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 62309, [petitioners] finally implemented
[respondents] suspension.
In the meantime, [respondents] filed a motion ad cautelam dated August 30, 2001 in the RTC of
Imus, Cavite, Branch 21, praying for the issuance of a TRO and/or writ of injunction to enjoin
[petitioners] from implementing the suspension orders. They alleged that neither the CA nor this
Court could afford them speedy and adequate relief, hence[,] the case in the RTC of Imus,
Cavite. The case was docketed as SEC Case Nos. 001-01 and 002-01.
On September 7, 2001, the Imus, Cavite RTC issued a TRO. [Petitioners] filed a motion for
reconsideration on September [11,] 2001.
It was after the issuance of this TRO that [respondents] filed, on September 12, 2001, a motion
for reconsideration of the CAs decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 62309. In a resolution dated October
10, 2001, the CA denied [respondents] motion, prompting them to elevate the matter to this
Court via petition for review on certiorari, docketed as G.R. No. 150335.
In an order dated September 21, 2001, the Imus, Cavite RTC denied [petitioners] motion for
reconsideration and directed the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction. This prompted
[petitioners] to file another petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals [docketed as CA-G.R.
SP No. 67664] which x x x issued [on March 26, 2002] a TRO against the Imus, Cavite RTC,
enjoining it from implementing the writ of preliminary injunction.
At this point, [respondents] filed their second petition in this Court, this time a special civil action
for certiorari, docketed as G.R. No. 152687, which included a prayer for the issuance of a TRO
and/or the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction to restrain the enforcement of the CA-
issued TRO.
On May 6, 2002, the Court issued a resolution consolidating G.R. No. 152687 and G.R. No.
150335.
In G.R. No. 150335, the issue for consideration [was] whether Sections 1 and 2 of the SEC
guidelines dated August 1, 2000 shortened the life span of the writs of preliminary injunction
issued on August 7, 2000 by the SEC-SICD in SEC Case Nos. 07-00-6680 and 07-00-6681,
thereby making them effective only until August 8, 2000.
At issue in G.R. No. 152687, on the other hand, [was] whether or not the CA committed grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction by issuing a TRO against the Imus, Cavite
RTC and enjoining the implementation of its writ of preliminary injunction against [petitioners].5
On March 1, 2007, the Court denied the petitions in G.R. Nos. 150335 and 152687. In G.R. No.
150335, it was held that the parties were allowed to file their cases before August 8, 2000 but
any provisional remedies the SEC granted them were to be effective only until that date. Given
that the SEC Order and Writ of Injunction were issued on August 2 and 7, 2000, respectively,
both were covered by the guidelines and the stated cut-off date. As to G.R. No. 152687, We
ruled that the petition became moot and academic because the TRO issued by the CA on March
26, 2002 already expired, its lifetime under Rule 58 of the Rules being only 60 days, and
petitioners themselves admitted that the CA allowed its TRO to elapse.
Meanwhile, per Order dated September 24, 2002 of the Imus RTC, SEC Case Nos. 001-01 and
002-01 were set for pre-trial conference.6 Trial on the merits thereafter ensued.
On December 4, 2008, the Imus RTC ruled in favor of respondents. The dispositive portion of
the Decision7 ordered:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision of the Clubs Board of Directors suspending
[respondents] Ernesto V. Yu and Manuel C. Yuhico is hereby declared void and of no effect, and
its (sic) enforcement permanently enjoined. The writ of preliminary injunction is hereby declared
permanent.
[Petitioners] are hereby directed to jointly and severally pay each of the [respondents] the
following amounts:
(a) P2,000,000.00 as moral damages;
(b) P2,000,000.00 as exemplary damages;
(c) P500,000.00 as attorneys fees[;] and
(d) P100,000.00 as costs of litigation.
SO ORDERED.8
Upon receiving a copy of the Imus RTC Decision on December 22, 2008, petitioners filed a
Notice of Appeal accompanied by the payment of docket fees on January 5, 2009.9
Respondents then filed an Opposition to Notice of Appeal with Motion for Issuance of Writ of
Execution,10 arguing that the December 4, 2008 Decision already became final and executory
since no petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules was filed before the CA pursuant to
Administrative Matter No. 04-9-07-SC.
Realizing the mistake, petitioners filed on January 13, 2009 an Urgent Motion for Extension of
Time to File a Petition.11 Before the Imus RTC, they also filed a Motion to Withdraw the Notice of
Appeal.12
On January 15, 2009, the CA resolved to give petitioners a 15-day period within which to file the
petition, but "[s]ubject to the timeliness of the filing of petitioners Urgent Motion for Extension of
Time to File Petition for Review Under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court dated January 13,
2009."13 Afterwards, on January 21, 2009, petitioners filed a Petition for Review.14
In the meantime, respondents filed an Opposition to Petitioners Urgent Motion.15 Subsequently,
they also filed a motion for reconsideration of the CAs Resolution dated January 15, 2009.16
Before the Imus RTC, respondents motion for execution was granted on February 17, 2009.
The trial court opined that the proper appellate mode of review was not filed within the period
prescribed by the Rules and that the CA issued no restraining order.17 On March 2, 2009, the
Writ of Execution was issued.18 Eventually, on March 30, 2009, the Sheriff received the total
amount of P9,200,000.00, as evidenced by two managers check payable to respondents in the
amount of P4,600,000.00 each, which were turned over to respondents counsel.19
On September 16, 2009, the CA granted respondents motion for reconsideration, setting aside
its January 15, 2009 Resolution. It relied on Atty. Abrenica v. Law Firm of Abrenica, Tungol &
Tibayan (Atty. Abrenica)20 and Land Bank of the Philippines v. Ascot Holdings and Equities, Inc.,
(LBP),21 which respondents cited in their Opposition to the Urgent Motion and Motion for
Reconsideration. Petitioners moved to reconsider,22 but it was denied on January 21, 2010;
hence, this petition.
The Court initially denied the petition, but reinstated the same on October 6, 2010.23
We grant the petition.
The cases of LBP and Atty. Abrenica are inapplicable. In LBP, the Court affirmed the CAs denial
of the banks motion for extension of time to file a petition for review. Examination of said case
revealed that the bank filed a motion for reconsideration of the trial courts adverse judgment
dated March 15, 2006, in violation of Section 8(3), Rule 1 of the Interim Rules of Procedure
Governing Intra-Corporate Controversies under Republic Act No. 8799. It was held that the filing
of such prohibited pleading did not toll the reglementary period to appeal the judgment via a
petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules. Thus, the CA already lacked jurisdiction to
entertain the petition which the bank intended to file, much less to grant the motion for extension
of time that was belatedly filed on July 25, 2006.
Also, in Atty. Abrenica, We found no compelling reasons to relax the stringent application of the
rules on the grounds as follows:
First, when petitioner received the trial courts consolidated decision on December 16, 2004,
A.M. No. 04-9-07-SC was already in effect for more than two months.
Second, petitioner had known about the new rules on the second week of January, 2005 when
he received a copy of respondents Opposition (To Defendants Notice of Appeal) dated January
6, 2005. In their opposition, respondents specifically pointed to the applicability of A.M. No.
04-9-07-SC to the instant case.
Third, petitioner originally insisted in his Reply with Manifestation (To the Opposition to
Defendants Notice of Appeal) that the correct mode of appeal was a "notice of appeal."
Petitioner reiterated in his Opposition to respondents motion for execution dated January 14,
2005 that a notice of appeal was the correct remedy.
Finally, petitioner filed his Motion to Admit Attached Petition for Review only on June 10, 2005,
or almost eight months from the effectivity of A.M. No. 04-9-07-SC on October 15, 2004, after
he received the trial courts Order of May 11, 2005.24
Unlike LBP and Atty. Abrenica, petitioners in this case committed an excusable delay of merely
seven (7) days. When they received a copy of the Imus RTC Decision on December 22, 2008,
they filed before the CA an Urgent Motion for Extension of Time to File a Petition on January
13, 2009. Meantime, they exhibited their desire to appeal the case by filing a Notice of Appeal
before the Imus RTC. Upon realizing their procedural faux pax, petitioners exerted honest and
earnest effort to file the proper pleading despite the expiration of the reglementary period. In
their urgent motion, they candidly admitted that a petition for review under Rule 43 and not a
notice of appeal under Rule 41 ought to have been filed. The material dates were also indicated.
Hence, the CA was fully aware that the 15-day reglementary period already elapsed when it
granted the time to file the petition.
In general, procedural rules setting the period for perfecting an appeal or filing a petition for
review are inviolable considering that appeal is not a constitutional right but merely a statutory
privilege and that perfection of an appeal in the manner and within the period permitted by law is
not only mandatory but jurisdictional.25 However, procedural rules may be waived or dispensed
with in order to serve and achieve substantial justice.26 Relaxation of the rules may be had when
the appeal, on its face, appears to be absolutely meritorious or when there are persuasive or
compelling reasons to relieve a litigant of an injustice not commensurate with the degree of
thoughtlessness in not complying with the prescribed procedure.27
Notably, under A.M. No. 04-9-07-SC (Re: Mode of Appeal in Cases Formerly Cognizable by the
Securities and Exchange Commission),28 while the petition for review under Rule 43 of the
Rules should be filed within fifteen (15) days from notice of the decision or final order of the
RTC, the CA may actually grant an additional period of fifteen (15) days within which to file the
petition and a further extension of time not exceeding fifteen (15) days for the most compelling
reasons. This implies that the reglementary period is neither an impregnable nor an unyielding
rule.
Here, there is also no material prejudice to respondents had the CA allowed the filing of a
petition for review. When the Imus RTC declared as permanent the writ of preliminary injunction,
the injunction became immediately executory. Respondents suspension as Club members was
effectively lifted; in effect, it restored their rights and privileges unless curtailed by a temporary
restraining order or preliminary injunction.
More importantly, the substantive merits of the case deserve Our utmost consideration.
In the present case, Yu acknowledged that there was an offense committed.29 Similarly, Yuhico
admitted that he was aware or had prior knowledge of the Clubs "no twosome" policy as
contained in the Clubs Membership Handbook and that they teed off without the required tee
time slip.30 Also, while Yu recognized telling Montallana "kamote ka," Yuhico heard him also say
that he (Montallana) is "gago."31
Respondents assert that the "no twosome" policy was relaxed by the management when a
member or player would not be prejudiced or, in the words of Yu, allowed when "maluwag."32
Yet a thorough reading of the transcript of stenographic records (TSN) disclosed that such claim
is based not on concrete examples. No specific instance as to when and under what
circumstance the supposed relaxation took place was cited. Yuhico roughly recollected two
incidents but, assuming them to be true, these happened only after May 28, 2000.33 Further, the
tee pass or control slip and the Clubs Palmer Course Card,34 which was identified by
respondents witness, Pepito Dimabuyo, to prove that he and another member were allowed to
play twosome on June 13, 2004, a Sunday, indicated that they were allowed to tee off only at
1:45 p.m.35 Lastly, granting, for the sake of argument, that the "no twosome" policy had been
relaxed in the past, Montallana cannot be faulted in exercising his prerogative to disallow
respondents from playing since they made no prior reservation and that there were standing
flights waiting for tee time. Per Cipriano Santos Report, May 28, 2000 was a relatively busy day
as it had 200 registered players to accommodate as of 8:00 a.m.
It was averred that respondents teed off without the required tee time slip based on the thinking
that it was no longer necessary since Santos, the Clubs Manager, allowed them by waving his
hands when Yuhicos caddie tried to pick up the slip in the registration office. Such excuse is
flimsy because it ignored the reality that Santos, a mere subordinate of Montallana who already
earned the ire of Yu, was practically more helpless to contain the stubborn insistence of
respondents.
Definitely, the contentions that respondents were not stopped by the management when they
teed off and that they did not cause harm to other members playing golf at the time for absence
of any complaints are completely immaterial to the fact that transgressions to existing Club rules
and regulations were committed. It is highly probable that they were tolerated so as to restore
the peace and avoid further confrontation and inconvenience to the parties involved as well as
to the Club members in general.
With regard to the purported damages they incurred, respondents testified during the trial to
support their respective allegations.1wphi1 Yuhico stated that he distanced himself from his
usual group (the "Alabang Boys") and that he became the butt of jokes of fellow golfers.36 On
the other hand, Yu represented that some of his friends in the business like Freddy Lim, a
certain Atty. Benjie, and Jun Ramos started to evade or refuse to have dealings with him after
his suspension.37 Apart from these self-serving declarations, respondents presented neither
testimonial nor documentary evidence to bolster their claims. Worse, Yu even admitted that
Freddy Lim and Atty. Benjie did not tell him that his suspension was the reason why they did not
want to transact with him.38
Records reveal that respondents were given due notice and opportunity to be heard before the
Board of Directors imposed the penalty of suspension as Club members. Respondent Yu was
served with the May 31, 2000 letter39 signed by then Acting General Manager Tomas B.
Clemente III informing that he violated the "no twosome" policy, teed off without the required tee
time slip, and uttered derogatory remarks to Montallana in front of another member and the
caddies. In response, Yus counsel asked for a copy of Montallanas report and a formal hearing
to confront the complainant and all the witnesses.40 Subsequently, on June 13, 2000, Yu,
through counsel, submitted his explanation that included an admission of the "no twosome"
policy.41 Finally, on September 15, 2000, Yu was advised of the Board resolution to give him
another opportunity to present his side in a meeting supposed to be held on September 20,
2000.42 It appears, however, that Yu refused to attend.43
Likewise, respondent Yuhico was given by Clemente a letter dated May 31, 2000 informing him
of violating the "no twosome" policy and teeing off without the required tee time slip.44 After
receiving the same, Yuhico called up Clemente to hear his side.45 Like Yu, however, Yuhico later
refused to attend a meeting with the Board.46
Respondents were suspended in accordance with the procedure set forth in the Clubs By-laws.
There is no merit on their insistence that their suspension is invalid on the ground that the
affirmative vote of eight (8) members is required to support a decision suspending or expelling a
Club member. Both the provisions of Articles of Incorporation47 and By-Laws48 of the Club
expressly limit the number of directors to seven (7); hence, the provision on suspension and
expulsion of a member which requires the affirmative vote of eight (8) members is obviously a
result of an oversight. Former Senator Helena Z. Benitez, the Honorary Chairperson named in
the Membership Handbook, could not be included as a regular Board member since there was
no evidence adduced by respondents that she was elected as such pursuant to the Corporation
Code and the By-laws of the Club or that she had the right and authority to attend and vote in
Board meetings. In addition, at the time the Board resolved to suspend respondents, the
affirmative votes of only six (6) Board members already sufficed. The testimony of Jesus A.
Liganor, who served as Assistant Corporate Secretary, that Rodrigo Francisco had not attended
a single Board meeting since 1997 remains uncontroverted.49 The Court agrees with petitioners
that the Club should not be powerless to discipline its members and be helpless against acts
inimical to its interest just because one director had been suspended and refused to take part in
the management affairs.
Lastly, contrary to respondents position, the recommendation of the House Committee50 to
suspend a Club member is not a pre-requisite. Section 1, Article XIV,51 not Section 2 (b), Article
XI,52 of the By-Laws governs as it outlines the procedure for the suspension of a member. Even
assuming that the recommendation of the House Committee is mandatory, respondents failed to
prove, as a matter of fact, that petitioners acted in bad faith in relying on the subject provision,
which employs the permissive word "may" in reference to the power of the House Committee to
recommend anytime the suspension of a Club member.
Way different from the trial courts findings, there is, therefore, no factual and legal basis to grant
moral and exemplary damages, attorneys fees and costs of suit in favor of respondents. The
damages suffered, if there are any, partake of the nature of a damnum absque injuria. As
elaborated in Spouses Custodio v. CA:53
x x x [T]he mere fact that the plaintiff suffered losses does not give rise to a right to recover
damages. To warrant the recovery of damages, there must be both a right of action for a legal
wrong inflicted by the defendant, and damage resulting to the plaintiff therefrom. Wrong without
damage, or damage without wrong, does not constitute a cause of action, since damages are
merely part of the remedy allowed for the injury caused by a breach or wrong.
There is a material distinction between damages and injury. Injury is the illegal invasion of a
legal right; damage is the loss, hurt, or harm which results from the injury; and damages are the
recompense or compensation awarded for the damage suffered. Thus, there can be damage
without injury in those instances in which the loss or harm was not the result of a violation of a
legal duty. These situations are often called damnum absque injuria.
In order that a plaintiff may maintain an action for the injuries of which he complains, he must
establish that such injuries resulted from a breach of duty which the defendant owed to the
plaintiff a concurrence of injury to the plaintiff and legal responsibility by the person causing it.
The underlying basis for the award of tort damages is the premise that an individual was injured
in contemplation of law. Thus, there must first be the breach of some duty and the imposition of
liability for that breach before damages may be awarded; it is not sufficient to state that there
should be tort liability merely because the plaintiff suffered some pain and suffering.
Many accidents occur and many injuries are inflicted by acts or omissions which cause damage
or loss to another but which violate no legal duty to such other person, and consequently create
no cause of action in his favor. In such cases, the consequences must be borne by the injured
person alone. The law affords no remedy for damages resulting from an act which does not
amount to a legal injury or wrong.
In other words, in order that the law will give redress for an act causing damage, that act must
be not only hurtful, but wrongful. There must be damnum et injuria. If, as may happen in many
cases, a person sustains actual damage, that is, harm or loss to his person or property, without
sustaining any legal injury, that is, an act or omission which the law does not deem an injury, the
damage is regarded as damnum absque injuria.
xxxx
The proper exercise of a lawful right cannot constitute a legal wrong for which an action will lie,
although the act may result in damage to another, for no legal right has been invaded. One may
use any lawful means to accomplish a lawful purpose and though the means adopted may
cause damage to another, no cause of action arises in the latters favor. Any injury or damage
occasioned thereby is damnum absque injuria. The courts can give no redress for hardship to
an individual resulting from action reasonably calculated to achieve a lawful end by lawful
means.54
"One who makes use of his own legal right does no injury. Qui jure suo utitur nullum damnum
facit. If damage results from a person's exercising his legal rights, it is damnum absque
injuria."55 In this case, respondents failed to prove by preponderance of evidence that there is
fault or negligence on the part of petitioners in order to oblige them to pay for the alleged
damage sustained as a result of their suspension as Club members. Certainly, membership in
the Club is a privilege.56 Regular members are entitled to use all the facilities and privileges of
the Club, subject to its rules and regulations.57 As correctly pointed out by petitioners, the mental
anguish respondents experienced, assuming to be true, was brought upon them by themselves
for deliberately and consciously violating the rules and regulations of the Club. Considering that
respondents were validly suspended, there is no reason for the Club to compensate them.
Indeed, the penalty of suspension provided for in Section 1, Article XIV of the By-Laws is a
means to protect and preserve the interest and purposes of the Club. This being so, the
suspension of respondents does not fall under any of the provisions of the Civil Code pertaining
to the grant of moral and exemplary damages, attorneys fees, and litigation costs.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED. The Resolutions dated
September 16, 2009 and January 21, 2010 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 106918,
which reconsidered and set aside its Resolution dated January 15, 2009, granting petitioners a
fifteen-day period within which to file a petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules, is
ANNULLED AND SET ASIDE. SEC Case Nos. 001-0l and 002-0l filed and raffled before the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 21 of Imus, Cavite are hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.
Respondents are ORDERED TO RETURN to petitioners the total amount of P9,200,000.00 or
P4,600,000.00 each, within THIRTY (30) DAYS from the time this decision becomes final and
executory. Thereafter, said amount shall earn legal interest of six percent (6%) per annum until
fully paid.
SO ORDERED.