Paz Galvez v CA

Facts: Timotea Galvez died intestate on 28 April 1965. Her supposedly direct heirs are her children
Ulpiano and Paz Galvez. Ulpiano, who died 24 July 1959, predeceased Timotea and was survived by his
son, Porfirio Galvez. Timotea left a parcel of land in San Fernando, La Union with an area of 4,304.5
sq/m.

Considering that all the other compulsory heirs of Timotea already received their respective shares, the
property passed by succession, both to Timoteas daughter, Paz Galvez, and to the formers grandson,
Porfirio, the latter succeeding by right of representation as the son of Ulpiano.

Porfirio Galvez was surprised to discover that on 4 May 1970, az Galvez executed an affidavit of
adjudication stating that she is the true and lawful owner of the said property.

On 22 June 1992, without the knowledge and consent of Porfirio Galvez, Paz Galvez sold the property to
Carlos Tam for a consideration of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00) by way of a Deed of Absolute
Sale.Carlos Tam thereafter filed an application for registration of said parcel of land before the RTC

On 21 January 1994, OCT No. 0-2602 was issued in the name of Carlos Tam.

On 12 May 1994, Porfirio Galvez filed Civil Case No. 4895 before the RTC, Branch 26, of San Fernando,
La Union, for Legal Redemption with Damages and Cancellation of Documents against Paz Galvez and
Carlos Tam.

On 27 September 1994, Carlos Tam sold the property to Tycoon Properties, Inc. through a Deed of
Absolute Sale executed by the former in favor of the latter.

The Complaint was later amended to implead as additional defendant, Tycoon Properties, Inc.

RTC declared the nullification of the Affidavit of Adjudication executed by Paz Galvez, also declaring
null and void the Deed of Absolute sale executed by Paz in favor of Carlos Tam, cancelling the OCT of
Carlos, Cancelling the Sale between Carlos and Tycoon Properties.

CA affirmed RTC's decision.

Petitioners raised issues that the action has already prescribed and shall be barred by laches, also claiming
that Carlos Tam and Tycoon Properties are Buyers in Good Faith.

Issue: WON prescription may run between Paz and Porfirio.

Held: No. The court find the petition bereft of merit.

Ostensibly, this case is governed by the rules on co-ownership since both Paz Galvez and Porfirio Galvez
are obviously co-owners of the disputed property having inherited the same from a common ancestor.
Article 494 of the Civil Code provides that [a] prescription shall not run in favor of a co-owner or co-heir
against his co-owners or co-heirs as long as he expressly or impliedly recognizes the co-ownership.

It is a fundamental principle that a co-owner cannot acquire by prescription the share of the other co-
owners, absent any clear repudiation of the co-ownership. In Santos v. Santos, citing the earlier case of
Adille v. Court of Appeals, this Court found occasion to rule that:

Prescription, as a mode of terminating a relation of co-ownership, must have been preceded by

repudiation (of the co-ownership). The act of repudiation, in turn, is subject to certain conditions: (1) a co-
owner repudiates the co-ownership; (2) such an act of repudiation is clearly made known to the other
co-owners; (3) the evidence thereon is clear and conclusive; and (4) he has been in possession through
open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession of the property for the period required by law.

In Salvador v. Court of Appeals, it was held that the possession of a co-owner is like that of a trustee and
shall not be regarded as adverse to the other co-owner but in fact beneficial to all of them.

The case of Huang v. Court of Appeals is instructive on the creation of trust relationships.

Trust is a fiduciary relationship with respect to property which involves the existence of equitable duties
imposed upon the holder of the title to the property to deal with it for the benefit of another

A purchaser in good faith and for value is one who buys the property without notice that some other
person has a right to or interest in such property and pays its fair price before he has notice of the adverse
claims and interest of another person in the same property. So it is that the honesty of intention which
constitutes good faith implies a freedom from knowledge of circumstances which ought to put a person on
inquiry.

Suffice it to state that both the trial and appellate courts found otherwise as Tam did not exert efforts to
determine the previous ownership of the property in question, and relied only on the tax declarations in
the name of Paz Galvez. It must be noted that Carlos Tam received a copy of the summons and the
complaint on 22 September 1994. This notwithstanding, he sold the property to Tycoon Properties, Inc.
on 27 September 1994. Significantly, Carlos Tam is also an owner of Tycoon Properties, Inc. to the extent
of 45%. A notice of lis pendens dated 8 July 1997 filed with the Registry of Deeds of the Province of La
Union was inscribed on TCT No. T- 40390. Despite the inscription, Tycoon Properties, Inc. mortgaged
the land to Far East Bank and Trust Company for the sum of P11,172,600. All these attendant
circumstances negate petitioners claim of good faith.

Sps. Marcos v Heirs of Bangi and Diccion

Facts: On June 26, 1998, the heirs of Isisdro Bangi and Genoveva Diccion (respondents), filed with the
RTC a complaint for annulment of documents, cancellation of TCTs, restoration of OCT and recovery of
ownership plus damages against spouses Dominador Marcos and Gloria Marcos (petitioners). Likewise
impleaded in the same complaint are Spouses Jose and Pacita Dilla, Ceasaria Alap, and Spouses Emilio
and Zenaida Sumajit.

Respondents averred that on Nov. 5, 1943, their parents, Isidro and Genoveva bought the 1/3 portion of a
2,138 sq/m parcel of land situated in Pangasinan from Eusebio Bangi, as evidenced by a Deed of
Absolute Sale. OCT No. 22361 was registered in the name of Alipio Bangi, Eusebio's father. After the
sale, the respondents claimed that Isidro and Genoveva took possession of the subject property until they
passed away, then the respondents took possession of the said property.

Further, the respondents alleged that sometime in 1998, they learned that the subject title, including the
1/3 portion sold to Isidro and Genoveva, was transferred to Dominador, Primo Alap, Ceasaria's Husband,
Jose, and Emilio through a Deed of Sale dated August 10, 1995, supposedly executed by Alipio with the
concent of his wife. The respondents claimed that the deed of absolute sale is a forgery since Alipio Died
in 1918 while his wife passed away on June 13, 1957.

Consequently, the said property was sold to the Sps. Marcos by Dominador and co., wherein another TCT
was issued and cancelling the previous TCT and OCT.
Petitioners claims that they are the owners of the property including the 1/3 portion allegedly sold by
Eusebio. They averred that the property was originally owned by Alipio; that after his death, his children -
Eusebiom Espedita, and Jose Bangi inherited the same. That on May 8, 1995, Espedita and Jose executed
a deed of extrajudicial partition with quitclaim wherein they waived their rights over the property in favor
of Eusebio's Children - Ceasaria, Zenaida, Pacita, and Gloria Marcos.

They further claimed that their father Eusebio could not have validly sold the one-third portion of the
subject property to Isidro and Genoveva. They explained that Eusebio supposedly acquired the parcel of
land by virtue of a donation propter nuptias from his father Alipio when he married Ildefonsa Compay in
1928. They claimed that the donation propter nuptias in favor of Eusebio was fictitious since Alipio died
in 1918 and that, in any case, the said donation, even if not fictitious, is void since the same was not
registered.

RTC granted the petition: 1) declaring the deed of absolute sale to Dominador and co.,;, and the deed of
absolute sale to Sps. Marcoses as null and void; 2) declaring the TCTs as null and void; 3) declaring the
sale of the 1/3 portion to Isidro and Genoveva as valid and effective.

CA affirmed RTC's decision, CA found that Eusebio, at the time he executed the Deed of Absolute sale,
already owned the property, having inherited the same from his father Alipio who died in 1918.

Issue: WON the CA erred in affirming the RTC's Decision

Held. No. The petition is denied.

The appellate court upheld the validity of the sale of the one-third portion of the subject property to the
spouses Isidro and Genoveva mainly on the finding that, after the death of Alipio in 1918, an oral
partition was had between Eusebio and his siblings Espedita and Jose Bangi; that at the time of the said
sale on November 5, 1943 to the spouses Isidro and Genoveva, Eusebio was already the owner of the
subject property.

On the other hand, the petitioners maintain that the said sale of the one-third portion of the subject
property was not valid. They insinuate that the subject property, at the time of the sale, was still owned in
common by the heirs of Alipio; that Eusebio could not validly sell the one-third portion of the subject
property as there was no partition yet among the heirs of Alipio.

The Court does not agree.

Partition is the separation, division and assignment of a thing held in common among those to whom it
may belong. Every act which is intended to put an end to indivision among co-heirs and legatees or
devisees is deemed to be a partition. Partition may be inferred from circumstances sufficiently strong to
support the presumption. Thus, after a long possession in severalty, a deed of partition may be presumed.

Thus, in Hernandez v. Andal, the Court emphasized that:

On general principle, independent and in spite of the statute of frauds, courts of equity have enforced oral
partition when it has been completely or partly performed.

Regardless of whether a parol partition or agreement to partition is valid and enforceable at law, equity
will in proper cases, where the parol partition has actually been consummated by the taking of possession
in severalty and the exercise of ownership by the parties of the respective portions set off to each,
recognize and enforce such parol partition and the rights of the parties thereunder. Thus, it has been held
or stated in a number of cases involving an oral partition under which the parties went into possession,
exercised acts of ownership, or otherwise partly performed the partition agreement, that equity will
confirm such partition and in a proper case decree title in accordance with the possession in severalty.

xxxx

A parol partition may also be sustained on the ground that the parties thereto have acquiesced in and
ratified the partition by taking possession in severalty, exercising acts of ownership with respect thereto,
or otherwise recognizing the existence of the partition.

The evidence presented by the parties indubitably show that, after the death of Alipio, his heirs Eusebio,
Espedita and Jose Bangi had orally partitioned his estate, including the subject property, which was
assigned to Eusebio.

Accordingly, considering that Eusebio already owned the subject property at the time he sold the one-
third portion thereof to the spouses Isidro and Genoveva on November 5, 1943, having been assigned the
same pursuant to the oral partition of the estate of Alipio effected by his heirs, the lower courts correctly
nullified the Deeds of Absolute Sale dated August 10, 1995 and November 21, 1995, as well as TCT No.
T-47829 and T-48446.

LOPEZ v. ILUSTRE

G.R. No. 2426 January 24, 1906

FACTS:

Francisco Martinez and defendant Pedro Martinez-Ilustre, his son, were the owners as tenants in common
of two separate parcels of land, each being the owner of an undivided one-half of each of said tracts of
land. On December 1902, Francisco conveyed to the plaintiff Fernando Montano Lopez his undivided
half-interest in both said tracts of land. The deed contained a clause which gave Martinez the right to
repurchase the property within one year from December 26, 1902. He did not repurchase it, and on
December 28, 1903, Lopez caused the proper marginal entry to be made upon the books in the registry of
property in which registry the conveyance had been recorded, and afterwards brought this action in
March, 1904, asking for a partition of the two lots of land, between himself and Ilustre, and that the latter
should account for and pay to the plaintiff his part of the rents of the said properties from the 26th day of
December, 1903.

However, it appeared that before the expiration of the period of right to repurchase, Francisco Martinez
and Ilustre made a voluntary partition of the lands, which partition was approved by CFI of Manila.
Ilutsre claims that by this partition, Lopez lost all his interest in the property.

ISSUE:

WON the partition caused by Martinez and Ilustre affected Lopez

HELD:

NO. Lopez was the owner of an undivided one-half of the two lots in question.

Article 399 gives the owner of an undivided interest in the property the right to freely sell and dispose of
it - that is, of his undivided interest. He has no right to sell a divided part of the real estate. If he is the
owner of an undivided half of a tract of land, he has a right to sell and convey an undivided half, but he
has no right to divide the lot into two parts, and convey the whole of one part by metes and bounds. All
that Francisco Martinez undertook to do in this case was to convey his undivided interest in these two
properties. This he had a perfect right to do, in accordance with the terms of said article. There is nothing
in the last clause of the article inconsistent with this position. That declares simply that when the property
is divided the purchaser gets an interest only in that part which may be assigned to him. For the purposes
of this case we see no difference between it and a case in which the tenant in common makes an absolute
conveyance of his undivided interest in the property, without reserving the right to repurchase. In the case
of an absolute conveyance of that character, the relation between the grantor in the deed and his cotenant
is terminated. They are no longer cotenants. The grantee in the deed takes the place of the grantor, and he
and the other owner of the property become cotenants. In such a case the grantor loses all interest in the
property, and of course has no right to take any part in the partition of it. It would be absurd to say that
after such conveyance the grantor, who had lost all his interest in the property, could by agreement with
the other owner make a partition of property in which he had no interest that would be binding upon his
grantee.

We do not see how the fact that Francisco Martinez and his son were the owners of other pieces of
property as tenants in common can affect the question presented in this case. Each tract was separate and
distinct from all others. The parties had a right to deal with one lot without any reference to the other
twenty-seven.

Quijano v. Amante, G.R. 164277, October 8, 2014

Facts: Fe (petitioner) and her siblings, namely: Eliseo, Jose and Gloria, inherited from their father, the
late Bibiano Quijano, the parcel of land registered in the latter's name with an area of 15,790 square
meters, more or less. On April 23, 1990, prior to any partition among the heirs, Eliseo sold a portion of
his share, measuring 600 square meters, to respondent Atty. Daryll A. Amante.

On July 25, 1991, Eliseo, sickly and in need of money, sold an additional 1/3 portion of his share in the
property to the respondent, with their deed of absolute sale stating that the sale was with the approval of
Eliseos siblings.

On September 30, 1992, Fe, Eliseo, Jose and Gloria executed a deed of extrajudicial partition to divide
their fathers estate (consisting of the aforementioned parcel of land) among themselves. The partition
resulted in the portions earlier sold by Eliseo to the respondent being adjudicated to the petitioner instead
of to Eliseo.

Due to the petitioners needing her portion that was then occupied by the respondent, she demanded that
the latter vacate it. Despite several demands, the respondent refused to vacate, prompting her to file
against him on February 14, 1995 a complaint for ejectment in the Municipal Trial Court in Cities of
Cebu City (MTCC). She alleged therein that she was the registered owner of the parcel of land, a portion
of which was being occupied by the respondent, who had constructed a residential building thereon by the
mere tolerance of Eliseo when the property she and her siblings had inherited from their father had not yet
been subdivided, and was thus still co-owned by them; and that the respondents occupation had become
illegal following his refusal to vacate despite repeated demands.

The respondent denied that his possession of the disputed portion had been by mere tolerance of Eliseo.
He even asserted that he was in fact the owner and lawful possessor of the property, having bought it from
Eliseo; that the petitioner and her siblings could not deny knowing about the sale in his favor because they
could plainly see his house from the road; and that the deed of absolute sale itself stated that the sale to
him was with their approval, and that they had already known that his house and fence were existing; that
before he purchased the property, Eliseo informed him that he and his co-heirs had already orally
partitioned the estate of their father, and that the portion being sold to him was Eliseos share; and that
with his having already purchased the property before the petitioner acquired it under the deed of
extrajudicial partition, she should respect his ownership and possession of it.

Issue: To be resolved is the issue of who between the petitioner and the respondent had the better right to
the possession of the disputed property.

Held: The petitioner. The disputed property originally formed part of the estate of the late Bibiano
Quijano, and passed on to his heirs by operation of law upon his death. Prior to the partition, the estate
was owned in common by the heirs, subject to the payment of the debts of the deceased. In a co-
ownership, the undivided thing or right belong to different persons, with each of them holding the
property pro indiviso and exercising her rights over the whole property. Each co-owner may use and
enjoy the property with no other limitation than that he shall not injure the interests of his co-owners. The
underlying rationale is that until a division is actually made, the respective share of each cannot be
determined, and every co-owner exercises, together with his co-participants, joint ownership of the pro
indiviso property, in addition to his use and enjoyment of it.

Even if an heirs right in the estate of the decedent has not yet been fully settled and partitioned and is
thus merely inchoate, Article 493 of the Civil Code gives the heir the right to exercise acts of ownership.
Accordingly, when Eliseo sold the disputed property to the respondent in 1990 and 1991, he was only a
co-owner along with his siblings, and could sell only that portion that would be allotted to him upon the
termination of the co-ownership. The sale did not vest ownership of the disputed property in the
respondent but transferred only the sellers pro indiviso share to him, consequently making him, as the
buyer, a co-owner of the disputed property until it is partitioned.

As Eliseos successor-in-interest or assignee, the respondent was vested with the right under Article 497
of the Civil Code to take part in the partition of the estate and to challenge the partition undertaken
without his consent. Article 497 states:

Article 497. The creditors or assignees of the co-owners may take part in the division of the thing owned
in common and object to its being effected without their concurrence. But they cannot impugn any
partition already executed, unless there has been fraud, or in case it was made notwithstanding a formal
opposition presented to prevent it, without prejudice to the right of the debtor or assignor to maintain its
validity.

The respondent could not deny that at the time of the sale he knew that the property he was buying was
notexclusively owned by Eliseo. He knew, too, that the co-heirs had entered into an oral agreement of
partition vis--vis the estate, such knowledge being explicitly stated in his answer to the complaint, to wit:

12. That defendant, before he acquired the land from Eliseo Quijano was informed by the latter that the
portion sold to him was his share already; that they have orally partitioned the whole lot before defendant
acquired the portion from him.

His knowledge of Eliseos co-ownership with his co-heirs, and of their oral agreement of partition
notwithstanding, the respondent still did not exercise his right under Article 497. Although Eliseo made it
appear to the respondent that the partition had already been completed and finalized, the co-heirs had not
taken possession yet of their respective shares to signify that they had ratified their agreement, if any.

For sure, the respondent was no stranger to the Quijanos, because he himself had served as the lawyer of
Eliseo and the petitioner herself. In that sense, it would have been easy for him to ascertain whether the
representation of Eliseo to him was true. As it turned out, there had been no prior oral agreement among
the heirs to partition the estate; otherwise, Eliseo would have questioned the deed of extrajudicial partition
because it did not conform to what they had supposedly agreed upon. Had the respondent been vigilant in
protecting his interest, he could have availed himself of the rights reserved to him by law, particularly the
right to take an active part in the partition and to object to the partition if he wanted to.

It was only on September 30, 1992, or two years and five months from the time of the first sale
transaction, and a year and two months from the time of the second sale transaction, that the co-heirs
executed the deed of extrajudicial partition. Having been silent despite his ample opportunity to
participate in or toobject to the partition of the estate, the respondent was bound by whatever was
ultimately agreed upon by the Quijanos.

Note: The case was still dismissed since what the petitioner filed against the respondent was an unlawful
detainer suit. Considering that the allegation of the petitioners tolerance of the respondents possession of
the disputed property was not established, the possession could very well be deemed illegal from the
beginning. In that case, her action for unlawful detainer has to fail.

Adlawan v. Adlawan, G.R. 161916

Facts: The instant unlawful detainer ejectment suit stemmed from the parties dispute over Lot 7226 and
the house built thereon registered in the name of the late Dominador Adlawan. In his complaint, petitioner
(Arnelito Adlawan) claimed that he is an acknowledged illegitimate child of Dominador who already
died.

Claiming to be the sole heir of Dominador, he executed an affidavit adjudicating to himself Lot 7226 and
the house built thereon. Out of respect and generosity to respondents (Narcisa and Emeterio) who are the
siblings of his father, he granted their plea to occupy the subject property provided they would vacate the
same should his need for the property arise. Sometime in January 1999, he verbally requested respondents
to vacate the house and lot. Finally, upon respondents refusal to heed the last demand letter to vacate,
petitioner filed the instant case.

On the other hand, respondents Narcisa and Emeterio, 70 and 59 years of age, respectively, denied that
they begged petitioner to allow them to stay on the questioned property. They alleged that Lot 7226 was
originally registered in the name of their deceased father, Ramon Adlawan and the ancestral house
standing thereon was owned by Ramon and their mother, Oligia Maacap Adlawan.

The spouses had nine children including the late Dominador and herein surviving respondents Emeterio
and Narcisa. During the lifetime of their parents and deceased siblings, all of them lived on the said
property. Dominador and his wife, Graciana Ramas Adlawan, who died without issue, also occupied the
same. Petitioner, on the other hand, is a stranger who never had possession of Lot 7226.

MTC dismissed the complaint holding that since Dominador was survived by his wife, Graciana, who
died 10 years thereafter, her legal heirs are also entitled to their share in Lot 7226.

RTC reversed the decision of the MTC holding that petitioner is his acknowledged illegitimate son who
inherited ownership of the questioned lot.

CA set aside the decision of the RTC and reinstated the judgment of the MTC. It ratiocinated that
petitioner and the heirs of Graciana are co-owners of Lot 7226. As such, petitioner cannot eject
respondents from the property via an unlawful detainer suit filed in his own name and as the sole owner
of the property.

Issue: Whether or not petitioner can validly maintain the instant case for ejectment.
Held: No. Petitioner averred that he is an acknowledged illegitimate son and the sole heir of Dominador.
He in fact executed an affidavit adjudicating to himself the controverted property. In ruling for the
petitioner, the RTC held that petitioner is Dominadors acknowledged illegitimate son who inherited
ownership of the questioned lot. The Court notes, however, that the RTC lost sight of the fact that the
theory of succession invoked by petitioner would end up proving that he is not the sole owner of Lot
7226. This is so because Dominador was survived not only by petitioner but also by his legal wife,
Graciana, who died 10 years after the demise of Dominador on May 28, 1987.

By intestate succession, Graciana and petitioner became co-owners of Lot 7226. The death of Graciana on
May 6, 1997, did not make petitioner the absolute owner of Lot 7226 because the share of Graciana
passed to her relatives by consanguinity and not to petitioner with whom she had no blood relations. The
Court of Appeals thus correctly held that petitioner has no authority to institute the instant action as the
sole owner of Lot 7226.

Petitioner contends that even granting that he has co-owners over Lot 7226, he can on his own file the
instant case pursuant to Article 487 of the Civil Code which provides:

ART. 487. Any one of the co-owners may bring an action in ejectment.

This article covers all kinds of actions for the recovery of possession. Article 487 includes forcible entry
and unlawful detainer (accion interdictal), recovery of possession (accion publiciana), and recovery of
ownership (accion de reivindicacion). A co-owner may bring such an action without the necessity of
joining all the other co-owners as co-plaintiffs because the suit is presumed to have been filed to benefit
his co-owners. It should be stressed, however, that where the suit is for the benefit of the plaintiff alone
who claims to be the sole owner and entitled to the possession of the litigated property, the action should
be dismissed.

The renowned civilist, Professor Arturo M. Tolentino, explained

A co-owner may bring such an action, without the necessity of joining all the other co-owners as co-
plaintiffs, because the suit is deemed to be instituted for the benefit of all. If the action is for the benefit
of the plaintiff alone, such that he claims possession for himself and not for the co-ownership, the
action will not prosper. (Emphasis added)

In Baloloy v. Hular, it was held that if the action is for the benefit of the plaintiff alone who claims to be
the sole owner and entitled to the possession thereof, the action will not prosper unless he impleads the
other co-owners who are indispensable parties.

In this case, the respondent alone filed the complaint, claiming sole ownership over the subject property
and praying that he be declared the sole owner thereof. There is no proof that the other co-owners had
waived their rights over the subject property or conveyed the same to the respondent or such co-owners
were aware of the case in the trial court. The trial court rendered judgment declaring the respondent as the
sole owner of the property and entitled to its possession, to the prejudice of the latters siblings. Patently
then, the decision of the trial court is erroneous.

Limson v. Wack Wack Condominium, G.R. 188802

Facts: Revelina purchased from Benitez an apartment unit (Unit 703) at Wack Wack Apartments, Wack
Wack Road, Mandaluyong City. Upon moving in, Revelina noticed defects in the electrical main panel
located inside the unit, drawing her to report them to the Wack Wack Condominium Corporation
(respondent), a non-stock corporation organized for the purpose of holding title to and managing the
common areas of Wack Wack Apartments.

Revelina later sought professional assistance from a private electrical consultant, Romago, Incorporated.
It was concluded that the wirings in Unit 703 are unsafe, hazardous and did not comply with the
Philippine Electrical Code.

Also, on Revelinas request, the City Building Office of Mandaluyong conducted an inspection of Unit
703 following which a Report was accomplished recommending to: (1) replace fusible load center, (2)
replace embedded circular loom, (3) check all grounded circuit for water heater lad, (4) provide separate
circuit for water heater lad, and (5) submit As Built Electrical Plan.

The Report was sent by then Mayor Benjamin Abalos, Sr. to respondent. The latter wrote Revelina to
demand that repairs in line with the above-stated recommendation of the City Building Office be
undertaken within ten (10) days. Respondents Board of Directors also resolved to impose a daily fine of
P1,000.00 on Revelina and her husband Benjamin should the latter fail to comply.

Revelina and her husband refused to undertake the repairs and to pay the fine. They claimed that the
electrical main panel forms part of the common areas, citing Section 6 of Republic Act No. 4726, AN
ACT TO DEFINE CONDOMINIUM, ESTABLISH REQUIREMENTS FOR ITS CREATION AND
GOVERNMENT OF ITS INCIDENTS, the pertinent provision of which reads:

Sec. 6. Unless otherwise expressly provided in the enabling or master deed or the declaration of
restrictions, the incidents of a condominium grant are as follows:

a.) x x x The following are not part of the unit: bearing walls, columns, floors, roofs, foundations, and
other common structural elements of the buildings; lobbies, stairways, hallways and other areas of
common use, elevator equipment and shafts, central heating, central refrigeration and central air
conditioning equipment, reservoir, tanks, pumps and other central services and facilities, pipes, ducts,
flues, chutes, conduits wires and other utility installations, wherever located, except the outlets thereof
when located within the unit. (emphasis and underscoring supplied)

They argued that an electrical main panel is in the nature of a utility installation.

Issue: WON the electrical main panel forms part of the common areas.

Held: Yes. The pertinent provisions of the Wack Wack Apartments Master Deed follow:

Section 5. The Common Areas. The common elements or areas of the Project (herein referred to as the
Common Areas) shall comprise all parts of the Project other than the Units, including without limitation
the following:

xxxx

(e) All central and appurtenant equipment and installations for common facilities and utilities such as
power, light, sewerage, drainage, garbage chute, and water connections (including all outlets, pipes, ducts,
wires, cables and conduits used in connection therewith, whether located in Common Areas or in Units);
all elevators, elevator shafts, tanks, pumps, motors, fans, compressors, and control equipment; all
common utility spaces and areas;

(f) All other parts of the Project and all apparatus, equipment and installations therein which are for
common use or necessary or convenient for the existence, maintenance of safety of the Project. (emphasis
and underscoring supplied)
Section 3. Maintenance, Repairs and Alterations. (a) All maintenance of and repairs of any Unit (other
than the maintenance of and repairs to any of the Common Areas contained therein not necessitated by
the act or negligence of the owner, tenant or occupant of such Unit) shall be made [by], and at the
expense of, the owner of such unit. Each Unit owner shall be responsible for all damages to any other
Unit and to the Common Areas resulting from his failure to effect such maintenance and repairs. Each
Unit owner shall also be responsible for promptly reporting to the Condominium Corporation any defect
or need for repairs in any of the Common Areas in his Unit. (emphasis and underscoring supplied)

xxxx

Section 3 (e) of R.A. 4726 defines common areas as the entire project except all units separately granted
or held or reserved. Section 6 (a) of the same law provides:

a.) x x x The following are not part of the unit: bearing walls, columns, floors, roofs, foundations, and
other common structural elements of the buildings; lobbies, stairways, hallways and other areas of
common use, elevator equipment and shafts, central heating, central refrigeration and central air
conditioning equipment, reservoir, tanks, pumps and other central services and facilities, pipes, ducts,
flues, chutes, conduits wires and other utility installations, wherever located, except the outlets thereof
when located within the unit. (emphasis and underscoring supplied)

The electrical panels location inside the unit notwithstanding, it is not automatically considered as part of
it. The above-quoted pertinent provisions of the law and the master deed contemplate that common areas,
e.g. utility installations, may be situated within the unit.

Where a statute is clear, plain and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied
without attempt to interpret. Verba legis non est recedendum, index animi sermo est. There should be no
departure from the words of the statute, for speech is the index of intention.

PECSON v. CA

G.R. No. 115814 May 26, 1995

FACTS:

Petitioner Pedro P. Pecson was the owner of a commercial lot, on which he built a four-door two-storey
apartment building. For his failure to pay realty taxes, the lot was sold at a public auction to Mamerto
Nepomuceno, who in turn sold it to private respondents Nuguid spouses. Petitioner challenged the
validity of the auction sale, but the complaint was dismissed. In the same case, respondents argued that
since they now own the lot, the building constructed thereon should also belong to them by accession.
RTC and CA ruled that only the lot was sold to Nuguid spouses, for the building was not mentioned in the
auction sale. They filed a petition to review in SC but it was denied.

On November 1993, private respondents filed with the trial court a motion for delivery of possession of
the lot and the apartment building, citing Article 546 of the Civil Code. Petitioners did not file any
opposition to the motion. The trial court issued a writ of possession directing the deputy sheriff "to place
said movant Juan Nuguid in possession of subject property, with all the improvements thereon and to
eject therefrom all occupants therein, their agents, assignees, heirs and representatives." It also ruled that
since petitioner is a builder in good faith, he should be entitled to be paid the cost of construction. It was
found that three doors of the apartment are being leased, thus, being the uncontested owner of the
property, the rents should be paid to respondent instead of the petitioner collecting them. Petitioner filed
with CA a special civil action for certiorari assailing the ruling of trial court. CA affirmed in part the order
stating that, during the period of retention, petitioner as such possessor and receiving the fruits from the
property, is obliged to account for such fruits, so that the amount thereof may be deducted from the
amount of indemnity to be paid to him by the owner of the land. It also ruled that since the Deputy Sheriff
has enforced the Writ of Possession and the premises have been turned over to the possession of private
respondents, the quest of petitioner that he be restored in possession of the premises is rendered moot and
academic.

ISSUE:

WON Articles 448 and 546 are applicable in the case at bar

HELD:

NO. The parties agree that the petitioner was a builder in good faith of the apartment building on the
theory that he constructed it at the time when he was still the owner of the lot. However, Article 448
refers to a land whose ownership is claimed by two or more parties, one of whom has built some works,
or sown or planted something. Article 448 does not apply to a case where the owner of the land is the
builder, sower, or planter who then later loses ownership of the land by sale or donation. It does not apply
to a case where a person constructs a building on his own land, for then there can be no question as to
good or bad faith on the part of the builder.

Article 448 is not appropriate to the case at bar. Nevertheless, the provision therein on indemnity may be
applied by analogy considering that the primary intent of Article 448 is to avoid a state of forced co-
ownership and that the parties, including the two courts below, in the main agree that Articles 448 and
546 of the Civil Code are applicable and indemnity for the improvements may be paid although they
differ as to the basis of the indemnity.

In addition, it is the current market value of the improvements that should be made the basis of
reimbursement. The objective of Article 546 of the Civil Code is to administer justice between the parties
involved. It was formulated in trying to adjust the rights of the owner and possessor in good faith of a
piece of land, to administer complete justice to both of them.

Lastly, petitioner should not be ordered to pay rent to respondent. Since the private respondents have
opted to appropriate the apartment building, the petitioner is thus entitled to the possession and enjoyment
of the apartment building, until he is paid the proper indemnity, as well as of the portion of the lot where
the building has been constructed. This is so because the right to retain the improvements while the
corresponding indemnity is not paid implies the tenancy or possession in fact of the land on which it is
built, planted or sown.

MARIETTA N. BARRIDO vs. LEONARDO V. NONATO

FACTS: Leonardo Nonato and Marietta Barrido were spouses. During their marriage, they acquired a
property in Bacolod consisting of a house and lot. On 1996, their marriage was declared void on the
ground of psychology incapacity. Therafter, Nonato asked Barrido for partition of their property,
however, Barrido refused contending that the subject property have already been sold to their children.
Hence, Nonato filed a complaint for partition. The MTCC, applying Article 129 of the Family Code, ruled
in favor of Nonato, adjudicating the land into his name since majority of their common children remained
in his side. However, RTC reversed the ruling of the MTCC. It found that even though the MTCC aptly
applied Article 129 of the Family Code, it nevertheless made a reversible error in adjudicating the subject
property to Barrido. RTCs ruling was further affirmed by the CA. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE SUBJECT PROPERTY SOLELY BELONG TO NONATO, TO

WHOM MOST OF THE CHILDREN STAYED.

HELD: No, the Court affirmed the decision of the appellate court in which it ruled that the subject
property must be equally partitioned by the former spouses. During their marriage, the conjugal
partnership governed the spouses property. According to Article 147 of the Family Code, spouses
properties acquired while they lived together shall be presumed to have been obtained by their joint
efforts, work or industry, and shall be owned by them in equal shares. Hence, neither party can encumber
or dispose by acts inter vivos of his or her share in the property acquired during cohabitation and owned
in common, without the consent of the other, until after the termination of their cohabitation. It was
further explained that when only one of the parties to a void marriage is in good faith, the share of the
party in bad faith in the co-ownership shall be forfeited in favor of their common children. In case of
default of or waiver by any or all of the common children or their descendants, each vacant share shall
belong to the respective surviving descendants. In the absence of descendants, such share shall belong to
the innocent party. In all cases, the forfeiture shall take place upon termination of the cohabitation. This
applies only when a man and a woman, suffering no illegal impediment to marry each other, exclusively
live together as husband and wife under a void marriage or without the benefit of marriage. In the case at
bar, the former spouses both agree that they acquired the subject property during the subsistence of their
marriage. Thus, it shall be presumed to have been obtained by their joint efforts, work or industry, and
shall be jointly owned by them in equal shares. Therefore, the subject property remains to be owned in
common by Nonato and Barrido, which should be divided in accordance with the rules on co-ownership.

SUNSET VIEW CONDOMINIUM CORPORATION vs. HON. JOSE CAMPOS, JR.

FACTS: This case is a consolidated case. The first case was filed against Aguilar-Bernares Realty, the
assignee of the unit Solana in the Sunset View Condominium Project. Sunset filed a case for collection of
assessments levied on the unit against Aguilar-Bernares Realty. Aguilar, on the other hand, filed a Motion
to Dismiss the complaint on the grounds (1) that the complaint does not state a cause of action: (2) that
the court has no jurisdiction over the subject or nature other action; and (3) that there is another action
pending between the same parties for the same cause. The motion to dismiss was granted stating that the
case should be properly filed with the SEC.

The second case was filed against Lim Siu Leng, assignee of the unit Alegria of the Sunset View. The
case was also for the collection of overdue accounts on assessments and insurance premiums and the
interest thereon. Leng also filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, alleging that the
amount sought to be collected is an assessment. The case was also dismissed and the parties are directed
to ventilate their controversy with the Securities & Exchange Commission.

The private respondents in both cases argue that every purchaser of a condominium unit, regardless of
whether or not he has fully paid the purchase price, is a "holder of a separate interest" mentioned in
Section 2 of Republic Act No. 4726, otherwise known as "The Condominium Act" and is automatically a
shareholder of the condominium corporation.

ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT AGUILAR AND LENG, WHO WAS HAS NOT YET FULLY PAID ON
THEIR PURCHASE, IS AUTOMATICALLY A STOCKHOLDER OF THE CONDOMINIUM
CORPORATION

HELD: No. The share of stock appurtenant to the unit will be transferred accordingly to the purchaser of
the unit only upon full payment of the purchase price at which time he will also become the owner of the
unit. Consequently, even under the contract, it is only the owner of a unit who is a shareholder of the
Condominium Corporation. Inasmuch as ownership is conveyed only upon full payment of the purchase
price, it necessarily follows that a purchaser of a unit who has not paid the full purchase price thereof is
not the owner of the unit and consequently is not a shareholder of the Condominium Corporation. Further,
ownership of a unit is a condition sine qua non to being a shareholder in the condominium corporation. It
follows that a purchaser of a unit who is not yet the owner thereof for not having fully paid the full
purchase price, is not a shareholder. By necessary implication, the separate interest in a condominium,
which entitles the holder to become automatically a shareholder in the condominium corporation, as
provided in Section 2 of the Condominium Act, can be no other than ownership of a unit. This is so
because nobody can be a shareholder unless he is the owner of a unit and when he ceases to be the owner,
be also ceases to automatically be a shareholder. Hence, the respondents, being not fully paid, cannot be
considered as a shareholder of the Condominium.

DELIA BAILON-CASILAO, ET. AL., VS. CA AND CELESTINO AFABLE

FACTS: The subject land involved in this case were registered in the name of Rosalie, Gaudencio,
Sabina, Bernabe, Nenita and Delia, all surnamed Bailon, as co-owners, each with a 1/6 share. It appears
that on 1948, Rosalia Bailon and Gaudencio Bailon sold a portion of the said land to Donato Delgado. On
1949, Rosalia Bailon alone sold the remainder of the land to Ponciana V. Aresgado de Lanuza. On 1975,
John Lanuza, acting under a special power of attorney given by his wife, Ponciana V. Aresgado de
Lanuza, sold the two parcels of land to Celestino Afable, Sr.
In all these transfers, it was stated in the deeds of sale that the land was not registered under the
provisions of Act No. 496 when the fact is that it is. Hence, herein petitioners filed a case for recovery of
property and damages stating that the sale was void for not first obtaining their consent to the sale. On his
defense, Afable claimed that he had acquired the land in question through prescription and contended that
the petitioners were guilty of laches. The lower court ruled in favor of Afables, in which they ruled that
Afable is a co-owner of the land for validly having bought the 2/6 respective undivided shares of Rosalia
and Gaudencio Bailon. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the lower court insofar as it hold
that prescription does not lie against plaintiffs-appellees because they are co-owners of the original
vendors. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE SALE BY ONE OR MORE CO-OWNERS OF THE ENTIRE
PROPERTY HELD IN COMMON WITHOUT THE CONSENT OF ALL THE CO-OWNERS IS
VALID

HELD: The sale was valid but only with regard to the proportion owned by Rosalia and Gaudencio. The
Court ruled that even if a co-owner sells the whole property as his, the sale will affect only his own share
but not those of the other co-owners who did not consent to the sale. In the case at bar, by virtue of the
sales made by Rosalia and Gaudencio Bailon which are valid with their proportionate shares, and the
subsequent transfers which culminated in the sale to Celestino Afable, the latter thereby became a co-
owner of the disputed parcel of land as correctly held by the lower court since the sales produced the
effect of substituting the buyers in the enjoyment thereof. Further, the Court ruled that Afable, being a co-
owner, cannot resort to the argument that prescription nor laches run against the petitioners. It is a well-
settled rule that prescription will not lie in favor of the respondent as against the petitioners who remain
the registered owners of the subject land.

Wherefore, the subject land is not wholly owned by Afable, but only the 2/6 of which, as sold to him by
Rosalia and Gaudencio. Thus, he is considered as co-owner of the subject land.

Carinan vs. Cueto 738 SCRA 48, October 08, 2014

Facts: The spouses Gavino and Carmelita Cueto alleged that Carinan and her husband acquired from one
Roberto Ventura the rights over a parcel of land formerly covered by a TCT under the name of the
Government Service Insurance System (GSIS). Their transaction was covered by a Deed of Assignment
and Transfer of Rights with Assumption of Obligations. Carinan and her husband were to assume the
payment of the applicable monthly amortizations for the subject land to the GSIS.4

Several amortizations remained unpaid resulting in an impending cancellation in conditional sale of the
subject property to Roberto. It was then that Esperanza, then already a widow, sought financial assistance
from her brother, Gavino. The spouses Cueto then paid Carinans obligation from their conjugal savings.

The spouses Cueto alleged that Carinan and her son undertook to execute a Deed of Absolute Sale in
favor of them once the title over the subject property was transferred to their names. Later, spouses Cueto
demanded from Carinan and her son the fulfillment of their commitment to transfer the subject property
to the respondents names through the execution of a deed of sale. When the latter failed to comply
despite efforts for an amicable settlement,9 the spouses Cueto filed with the RTC a complaint for specific
performance with damages.

Carinans argued that there was neither a written or verbal agreement for the transfer of the disputed
property to the respondents names, nor a promise for the repayment of the amounts that were paid by the
respondents. Carinan believed that Gavino paid her outstanding balance with the GSIS out of sheer
generosity. She denied having borrowed the respondents money because given her financial standing,
she knew that she could not afford to pay it back. Furthermore, to require her to execute a deed of sale for
the propertys full conveyance would totally disregard the payments that she personally made for the
purchase.

Issue: Whether Carinans allegation of co-ownership can still be considered

Held: Esperanza's plea for a reversal of the lower courts' rulings upon her claim of co-ownership and
allegation that the respondents were builders in bad faith cannot be considered at this stage of the case.
These claims raise factual issues which are beyond the scope of a petition for review on certiorari. More
importantly, such defenses were not advanced by Esperanza during the proceedings with the trial and
appellate courts. Settled is the rule that "defenses not pleaded in the answer may not be raised for the first
time on appeal. A party cannot, on appeal, change fundamentally the nature of the issue in the case. When
a party deliberately adopts a certain theory and the case is decided upon that theory in the court below, he
will not be permitted to change the same on appeal, because to permit him to do so would be unfair to the
adverse party." [ito lang yung discussion about co-ownership]

Accordingly, the donation of money as well as its acceptance should be in writing. Otherwise, the
donation is invalid for non-compliance with the formal requisites prescribed by law. In this case, Carinan
did not present any written document evincing her claim of donation. The help accorded by the
respondents cannot amount to donation It did not follow that the respondents could no longer be allowed
to later demand the repayment.

Although the Court affirms the trial and appellate courts' ruling that, first, there was no donation in this
case and, second, the respondents are entitled to a return of the amounts which they spent for the subject
property, it still cannot sustain the respondents' plea for Esperanza's full conveyance of the subject
property. To impose the property's transfer to the respondents' names would totally disregard Esperanza's
interest and the payments which she made for the property's purchase. Thus, the principal amount to be
returned to the respondents shall only pertain to the amounts that they actually paid or spent.

Hagosojos vs. Court of Appeals, 155 SCRA 175, No. L-59690 October 28, 1987

FACTS: Anastacio Hagosojos contracted two marriages during his lifetime. His first marriage was with
Jacinta Jaucian which produced three off-springs, namely: the petitioner, Luis Hagosojos, and the two
other private respondents, Araceli and Lourdes. More than five years after the death of Jacinta, but
without the conjugal partnership assets of the first marriage having been partitioned and distributed,
Anastacio got married a second time to Araceli Hian. Out of the second marriage were born the other
private respondents, Fred, Heidi, and Henry, all surnamed Hagosojos. Anastacio donated to Henry, who
was then only seven years young, a lot - a portion of the property belonging to the conjugal partnership
assets of the first marriage. The donation was accepted on behalf of Henry by his mother, Araceli.

To compel the partition and distribution of the conjugal partnership assets of the first marriage, petitioner
Luis, together with his two sisters, filed a complaint against their father, Anastacio.

The parties tried to settle their conflict amicably. Araceli, assisted by her counsel, drew up a compromise
agreement . When Luis agreed, he and his stepmother, Araceli, together with their lawyers, signed the
Compromise Agreement. They submitted the same to the trial court for approval which rendered a
decision providing that the whole property shall pertain to the children of the first marriage, as stipulated
in the Compromise Agreement.

After the judgment had long become final, the private respondents Araceli and her children filed a
"Motion to Amend Decision Based On Mistake". They claimed that property could no longer be validly
given to the children of the first marriage, as the same had long been transferred to Henry by donation.

ISSUE: Whether Anastacio validly donated the property to Henry

HELD: NO.

A co-owner cannot donate specific lot by metes and bounds but only an aliquot part of the whole
properties on co-ownership.

Even in the unlikely event that the compromise agreement would be found to be a mistake, still Anastacio
could not have validly donated the lot to Henry. Considering that all the properties specified in the
Compromise Agreement were described conjugal partnership properties of the first marriage, it follows
that upon the death of Jacinta, the conjugal partnership evolved into a co-ownership between her
surviving spouse Anastacio, and her three children. Anastacio became the owner of 5/8 of the mass of
properties while each of the three children, of 1/8. Thus, even in such a situation, and pending the
partition of the properties owned in common, Anastacio could not validly donate the same at that time he
claimed he did within the purview of the law on co-ownership.

Torres Jr. vs. Lapinid

Facts:

Vicente, Mariano, and Carlos, herein petitioners, filed a complaint before RTC Cebu City praying to be
declared the sale of real property null and void by respondent Jesus in favor of Lapinid, recovery of
possession and ownership of the property, and payment of damages.

Petitioners alleged that they, including Jesus, are co-owners of several parcel of lands including the
disputed Lot No. 4389. Jesus filed an action for partition of the parcels of land against petitioners and
other co-owners. A judgment rendered based on compromise agreement wherein they agreed that Jesus,
Mariano, and Vicente were jointly authorized to sell the said properties and receive proceeds and
distribute them to all co-owners. However, the agreement was amended to exclude Jesus as an authorized
seller.

Petitioners inspected the property, and discovered that Lapinid was occupying a specific portion of the
3000 square meters of Lot 4389 by virtue of deed of sale executed by Jesus in favor of Lapinid. Hence, a
forcible entry case was filed against Lapinid. They prayed that a deed of sale be declared null and voild.
They argued that the sale of a definite portion of a co-owned property without notice to the other co-
owners is without force and effect.

RTC - dismissed the complaint.

CA - affirmed the lower courts decision. It ruled that the compromise agreement did not affect the
validity of the sale previously executed by Jesus and Lapinid.

Hence, this petition.

Issue:

WON Jesus, as a co-owner, can validly sell a portion of the property he co-owns in favor of another
person.

Held:

The answer is YES.

A co-owner has an absolute ownership of his undivided and proindiviso share in the co-owned property.
He has the right to alienate, assign and mortgage it, even to the extent of substituting a third person in its
enjoyment provided that no personal rights will be affected.

This is evident from the provision of the Civil Code:

Art. 493. Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part and of the fruits and benefits pertaining
thereto, and he may therefore alienate, assign or mortgage it, and even substitute another person in its
enjoyment, except when personal rights are involved. But the effect of the alienation or the mortgage,
with respect to the co-owners, shall be limited to the portion which may be allotted to him in the division
upon the termination of the co-ownership.

A co-owner is an owner of the whole and over the whole he exercises the right of dominion, but he is at
the same time the owner of a portion which is truly abstract. Hence, his co-owners have no right to enjoin
a coowner who intends to alienate or substitute his abstract portion or substitute a third person in its
enjoyment.

In this case, Jesus can validly alienate his co-owned property in favor of Lapinid, free from any
opposition from the co-owners. Lapinid, as a transferee, validly obtained the same rights of Jesus from the
date of the execution of a valid sale. Absent any proof that the sale was not perfected, the validity of sale
subsists. In essence, Lapinid steps into the shoes of Jesus as co-owner of an ideal and proportionate share
in the property held in common. Thus, from the perfection of contract on 9 November 1997, Lapinid
eventually became a co-owner of the property.

Also, the Court repeatedly held that no individual can claim title to a definite or concrete portion before
partition of co-owned property. Each co-owner only possesses a right to sell or alienate his ideal share
after partition. However, in case he disposes his share before partition, such disposition does not make the
sale or alienation null and void. What will be affected on the sale is only his proportionate share, subject
to the results of the partition. The co-owners who did not give their consent to the sale stand to be
unaffected by the alienation.

Thus, PETITION is DENIED.

Recio vs. Sps. Aguendo and Altamirano

Facts:

Nena Recio (Nena), the mother of Reman Recio (petitioner), leased from the respondents Alejandro,
Adelaida, Catalina, Alfredo, Franciso, all surnamed Altamirano, Violeta Altamirano Olfato, and Loreto
Altamirano Vda. De Maralit, a parcel of land with improvements. The Altamiranos inherited the subject
land from their deceased parents, spouses Aguedo Altamirano and Maria Valduvia.

Nena used the ground floor as retail store for grains, and upper floor as her familys residence.
Altamiranos offered to sell the subject property to Nena for P500,000.00. However, the sale did not
materialize at that time due to the fault of Altamiranos. Nonetheless, Nena continued to occupy and use
the property with the consent of Altamiranos.

There was a second negotiation between the petitioner and Alejandro who introduced himself as
representing the other heirs. After negotiations, Altamiranos through Alejandro entered into an oral
contract of sale with the petitioner over the subject property. In view of the said oral contract of sale, the
petitioner made a partial payments in the total amount of P110,000, and again made another payment in
the amount of P50,000. Subsequently, Nena offered in many instances to pay the remaining balance of the
agreed purchase price of the subject property in the amount of P340,000, but Alejandro Altamirano kept
on avoiding the petitioner. Hence, petitioner demanded from Altamiranos, through Alejandro, the
execution of the Deed of Absolute Sale in exchange for the full payment of the agreed price. Later on,
petitioner filed a complaint for Specific Performance with damages.

Later on, petitioner discovered that the subject property has been subsequently sold to respondents Lauro
and Marcelina Lajarca (Spouses Lajarca). Petitioner filed an amended complaint impleading the Spouses
Lajarca and adding as a cause of action the annulment of sale between Altamiranos and Spouses Lajarca.

RTC - rendered in favor of petitioner, declaring the sale between Altamiranos and Spouses Lajarcas as
nul and void, and directing the Altamiranos to execute a Deed of Absolute Sale to petitioner.

CA - affirmed the decision with modification. CA ruled that Alejandro Altamirano did not secure SPA
from co-owners when he sold the subject parcel of land to the petitioner, therefore the said sale of
Alejandro did not bind his co-owner. The sale between Alejandro and petitioner is VALID ONLY with
respect to the aliquot share of Alejandro Altamirano. CA declared petitioner a co-owner of the Spouses
Lajarca over the property, insofar as the aliquot shares of Alejandro Altamirano.

Issue:

WON CA gravely and seriously abused its discretion when it ruled that the sale entered into by other
Altamiranos and Alejandro Altamirano was valid despite the absence of SPA.

Held:

The answer is No.

Article 1874 and 1878 of the Civil Code provides that Special Powers of Attorney (SPA) or written
authority must be secured first by the agent or a co-owner before he could sell a piece of land or any
interest therein, but under the regime of co-ownership, a co-owner could sell his undivided interest or pro
diviso share in the property owned in common.

In the case at bar, Alejandro, being a co-owner, he can validly and legally dispose of his share even
without the consent of all the other co-heirs, hence, the sale entered into him and petitioner is valid insofar
as his aliquot shares only. Also, the sale of the lot of the other Altamiranos to the Spouses Lajarca valid
only insofar as their shares are concerned, excluded the portion of Alejandro

Fernandez vs. SPS Tarun

Facts:

The property in question is known as Lot No. 2991, 8,209 square meter of fishpond. The brothers
Antonio, Santiago, Demetria, and Angel Fernandez, together with their uncle, co-owned the property to
the extent of 1/6. It was increased to 1/5 upon the death of Amando. It was accrued in favour of the five
remainin co-owners.

Antonio sold his share of about 547. 27 square meters to the Spouses Tarun. Also, Demetria sold her
share on the same fishpond constituting 547.27 to the respondents. Later on, co-owners of the subject
fishpond and another fishpond executed a Deed of Extrajudicial Partition of two parcels of registered land
with exchange of shares. It was stipulated in the deed that the parties recognize and respect the sale of a
portion of lot 2991 which previously sold by Antonio and Demetria in favour of respondent.
By virtue of Deed of Extrajudicial Partition, Angel B. Fernandez exchanged in his share on the other
fishpond to the shares of his co-owners on he remaining portion of Lot 2991, making Angel B Fernandez
and respondents as co-owners.

Laer on, TCT was issued in favor of Angel and respondents. From the time the latter bought the 1094.54-
square meter portion of the fishpond, they had been paying the realty taxes thereon. However, it was
Angel B. Fernandez and later on his heirs, [petitioners], who remained in possession of the entire
fishpond.

When Angel B. Fernandez was still alive, [respondents] sought the partition of the property and their
share of its income. Angel Fernandez refused to heed their demand. After the death of Angel Fernandez,
[respondents] wrote [petitioners] of their desire for partition but this was rejected by [petitioners]. Hence,
this suit for partition and damages

Issue:

WON petitioners are entitled to exercise their right of legal redemption.

Held:

The answer is No.

The right to redeem is granted not only to the original co-owners, but also to all those who subsequently
acquire their respective shares while the community subsists. However, it must be stressed that this right
of redemption is available only when part of the co-owned property is sold to a third person. Otherwise
put, the right to redeem referred to in Article 1620 applies only when a portion is sold to a non-co-owner.

In this case, it is quite clear that respondents are petitioners co-owners. The sale of the contested property
to Spouses Tarun had long been consummated before petitioners succeeded their predecessor, Angel
Fernandez. By the time petitioners entered into the co-ownership, respondents were no longer third
persons, but had already become co-owners of the whole property. A third person, within the meaning of
Article 1620, is anyone who is not a co-owner.

Insofar as the sale is concerned, jurisprudence affirms the need for notice, but its form has been the
subject of varying interpretations. Furthermore, the co-owner may exercise the right of redemption within
30 days from the finality of the decision .

Applying the presently prevailing principles discussed above, petitioners predecessor -- Angel Fernandez
-- is deemed to have been given notice of the sale to respondents by the execution and signing of the Deed
of Extrajudicial Partition and Exchange of Shares. As correctly held by the CA, the law does not require
any specific form of written notice to the redemptioner. From such time, he had 30 days within which to
redeem the property sold under Article 1623. The Deed was executed November 4, 1969; hence, the
period to redeem expired on December 4, 1969. Consequently, the right to redeem was deemed waived,
and petitioners are bound by such inaction of their predecessor. The former cannot now be allowed to
exercise the right and adopt a stance contrary to that taken by the latter. Otherwise stated, the right to
redeem had long expired during the lifetime of the predecessor and may no longer be exercised by
petitioners who are his successors-in-interest.

Punsalan, et al. v Boot Liat, et al.

Facts: A Moro by the name of Tamsi saw from the Cawit-Cawit shores of Zamboanga, a big bulky object
in the distance which attracted his attention. Thereupon, together with another Moro named Bayrula, he
went in a small boat to investigate and found it to be a large fish. They then returned to shore, where they
met other Moros and they requested help to catch the fish. They went in 3 small boats, containing 22 men,
21 of whom are the plaintiffs herein, and the other one is Ahamad, a defendant.

Arriving where the fish was, which was found to be a whale, they pulled it towards the shore where they
quartered it, having found in its abdomen a great quantity of ambergris, which was placed in 3 sackes,
two of which were full and the other was only filled in half, and taken to the house of Maharaja Butu,
where they left it to the care of Ahamad.

All of them agreed that they were the sole owners of the ambergris and that none of them could sell it
without the consent of the rest.

They brought the half sack of amber for the purpose of ascertaining the marker price of the ambergris, in
order that they might dispose the rest accordingly. Some of them, with Tamsi in charge, went to sell the
half sack of amber where they did dispose to a China Man for the sum of P 2,700, which amoount was
distributed among all the parties in interest. Then they offered to sell for the sum of P12,000.00 to the
Chinamen, Cheong Tong and Lim Chiat, the rest of the amber contained in two sacks which was left in
the house of Maharaja Butu.

So they went back to Cawit-Cawit to get the amber.

Mr. Henry Teck who had knowledge of the existence of the amber in Cawit-Cawit, proposed to the
master of the revenue cutter Mindoro to go to Cawit-Cawit to sieze some supposedly contraband opium.
After transmitting the information to the Collector of Customs, he, the master of the Mindoro
immediately proceeded to Cawit-Cawit.

On board in the vessel, Mr. Teck, some Chinamen, among whom were C. Boon Liat, Ong Chua and Go
Tong, and some Moros who, according to Mr. Tech, were to assist in the arrest of the smugglers.

Upon the arrival, the master, accompanied by Mr. Teck and others, went to the house of Maharaja Butu,
and they searched for the supposed contraband opium, instead, they found three large trunks containing a
black substance which had a bad odor. Ahamad said it stated the contents of the trunks but the master said
that it was opium and told Ahamad the he would take the trunks on board the ship, wherein Ahamad and
other Moros accompanied on the voyage.

During the voyage, Mr. Teck offered to purchase the amber contained in the three trunks, but Ahamad
refused to sell it for the reason that he was not the sole owner thereof.

Mr. Teck, aided by his companions who wielded some influence in Zamboanga, insisted that Ahamad
should sell them the amber, telling him not to be afraid of his companions, as he would answer for
whatever might happen. With this promise of protection, Ahamad decided to sell the amber for P7,500
and received P2,500 as part payment on account of this price, a bill of sale having been signed by
Ahamad, Maharaja Butu and three Moros more. The balance of this price was paid later.

When Cheong Tong, Lim Chiat, and the Moros who had gone to Cawit-Cawit on board the launch Ching-
kangarrived at the house of Maharaja Butu, they found that the amber they had purchased from Tamsi and
his companions was no longer there.

The plaintiffs are twenty-one of the twenty-two Moros who had caught the whale claims the 80- kilos of
ambergris contained in three trunks, or its value in the amount to P60,000, and damages in the sum of
P20,000. This action is brought against C. Boon Liat, Ong Chua, Go Tong, Henry E. Teck, and the Moro,
Ahamad, the first four being the persons who purchased this same amber from the one last named while
on board the revenue cutter Mindoro.

Issue: WON the petitioners may recover the ambergris which was sold without their consent

Held: Yes. The Court granted the petition.

This common ownership was acquired by occupancy (arts. 609 and 610 of the Civil Code), so that neither
Tamsi, Imam Lumuyod, or Imam Asakil had any right to sell it, as they did, to Lim Chiat and Cheong
Tong, nor had the Moro Ahamad any right to sell this same amber, as he did, to C. Boon Liat, Ong Chua,
Go Tong, and Henry E. Teck. There was an agreement between the co-owners not to sell this amber
without the consent of all. Both sales having been made without the consent of all the owners, the same
have no effect, except as to the portion pertaining to those who made them (art. 399, Civil Code).

Although the original complaint filed in this case was entitled as one for replevin, in reality, from its
allegations, the action herein brought is the ordinary one for the recovery of the title to, and possession of,
this amber. It is no bar to the bringing of this action that the defendant Ahamad is one of the co-owners.
The action for recovery which each co-owner has, derived from the right of ownership inherent in the co-
ownership, may be exercised not only against strangers but against the co-owners themselves, when the
latter perform, with respect to the thing held in common, acts for their exclusive benefit, or of exclusive
ownership, or which are prejudicial to, and in violation of, the right of the community. He is not sued in
this case as a co-owner, for the cause of action is predicated upon the fact that he has acted not as a co-
owner, but as an exclusive owner of the amber sold by him.

Wherefore, it is the judgment and order of the court that the defendants C. Boon Liat, Henry E. Teck,
Ahamad Ong Chua, and Go Tong deliver to the plaintiffs, Emilio Punsalan, Bayrula, Daring Gumuntol,
Mohamad, Insael, Dunkaland, Tahil, Dambul, Dagan, Sabay, Sahibul, Pingay, Mujahad, Amilol, Baraula,
Saraban, Lim Chiat, and Cheong Tong twenty-twenty-first (20/21) of the amber in question, or, in default
thereof, to pay them its value of twelve thousand pesos (P12,000), less one-twenty-first of said amount.

Pardell v. Bartolome

FACTS:Plaintiff, Vicenta, and the defendant, Matilde, are the duly recognized natural daughters of the
spouses Miguel and Calixta Ortiz who died leaving no heirs by force of law. Therefore the only existing
heirs are Vicente and Matilde. Testatrix possessed at her death the real properties, which, among others is
the Calle Escota House.

Matilde and her husband, without judicial authorization, nor friendly or extrajudicial agreement, took
upon themselves the administration and enjoyment of the said properties and collected the rents, fruits,
and products thereof. Vicenta alleged that repeated refusal to the demands to extrajudicially divide the
properties with her and to deliver to the latter the one-half thereof, together with one-half of the fruits and
rents collected therefrom, were acts seriously detrimental of her(Vicentas) interest.

ISSUE: whether the defendant Matilde Ortiz, as coowner of the house on Calle Escolta, was entitled, with
her husband, to reside therein, without paying to her coowner, Vicenta Ortiz, who, during the greater part
of the time, lived with her husband abroad, one-half of the rents which the upper story would have
produced, had it been rented to a stranger.

HELD:
Article 394 of the Civil Code prescribes:

Each coowner may use the things owned in common, provided he uses them in accordance with
their object and in such manner as not to injure the interests of the community nor prevent the
coowners from utilizing them according to their rights.

Matilde Ortiz and her husband occupied the upper story, designed for use as a dwelling, in the house of
joint ownership; but the record shows no proof that, by so doing, the said Matilde occasioned any
detriment to the interest of the community property, nor that she prevented her sister Vicenta from
utilizing the said upper story according to her rights. It is to be noted that the stores of the lower floor
were rented and accounting of the rents was duly made to the plaintiffs.

Each co-owner of realty held pro indiviso exercises his rights over the whole property and may use and
enjoy the same with no other limitation than that he shall not injure the interests of his coowners, for the
reason that, until a division be made, the respective part of each holder cannot be determined and every
one of the coowners exercises, together with his other co-participants, joint ownership over the pro
indiviso property, in addition to his use and enjoyment of the same.

The defendant Matilde in voluntarily taking upon herself the administration of the common property
during the period where Vicenta cannot do so, and because one of the living rooms and the storeroom
thereof were used for the storage of some belongings and effects of common ownership between the
litigants, therefore, did not injure the interests of her coowner, her sister Vicenta, nor did she prevent the
latter from living therein, but merely exercised a legitimate right pertaining to her as coowner of the
property.

Notwithstanding, Gaspar de Bartolome, who occupied for four years a room or a part of the lower floor of
the same house, using it as an office, strict justice requires that he pay Vicenta, one half of the monthly
rent which the said quarters could have produced, had they been leased to another