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IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE No. HC-2015-001906

CHANCERY DIVISION

Rolls Building

Wednesday, 24th May 2017

Before:

MRS JUSTICE ASPLIN

BETWEEN:

LEIGH RAVENSCROFT Claimant

- and -

CANAL & RIVER TRUST Defendant

__________

THE CLAIMANT appeared In Person together with his McKenzie Friend, Mr Nigel Moore.

MR C. STONER QC (instructed by Shoosmiths LLP) appeared on behalf of the Defendant.

__________

EXTRACTS FROM CLOSING SUBMISSIONS

 INDEX

Page No.

EXTRACTS FROM CLOSING SUBMISSIONS:

MR STONER 1
MR MOORE 8

_________________
 Wednesday, 24th May, 2017
(12.30 p.m.)

A
MR STONER: In relation to loss, I do not know if it is going to be pursued, but I have to deal
with it because it remains a live issue, but I simply do not accept the evidence about the sale.
There is no evidence, in my submission. My Lady heard Mr Ravenscroft in the witness box.
He said he had sold it. Then when I put it to him about eBay he said: Yes, I sold it on eBay
B a couple of days before it was taken. It sold very quickly. I had three people come round.
The difficulty with that argument is his witness statement says that he sold it on 30th
December, which was a month beforehand. The point is ultimately there is simply no
evidence in relation to losses in relation to the sale.

C I need to deal quickly with the legislation that is relied upon in various ways. I will start with
the Statute of Marlborough, which is still on the statute books although I suspect it does not
pay too many visits to the court. Of course, this really goes back to my point about I do not
accept that this Act applies because I do not accept, for the reasons I have articulated, that my
client has levied a distress. In any event, in my submission and I need to go to the Statute
D of Marlborough the submission that is made is confusing on the basis of the statute which
is found behind tab 13 of my bundle. As I understand it from what Mr Moore said, what is
said is the Canal & River Trust unlawfully distrained in breach of the Statute of Marlborough
and therefore they should be grievously immersed, and having looked immersed up I now
E know that is just simply fine, some form of financial penalty.
Why I say that is confusing is that ss.1 and 4 are mutually exclusive because s.1 deals with
the case where there is an illegal distress, and s.4 where the grievous immersement comes in
deals with an excessive distress, but the excessive distress has underpinning it the fact that it
was lawful for someone to distrain, the argument there being: Yes, you may have been able
F
to distrain, but what you could not do is distrain to that extent. As I understand it, the
complaint that is made is one of illegal distress in this case, not one of legitimate distress, but
then unreasonable. Therefore, if one looks at s.1, this being, of course I think this Act was
originally in Latin and has been translated but in the delightful way of old Acts it starts off
G with effectively some recitals explaining why the Act is to be enacted, and it is really in s.1
on p.2 of this clip and three lines down right against the right hand side there is a new
sentence beginning It is, and that is the operative part. That is where really the actual
section starts or the substance starts. It says:

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1
 it is provided, agreed, and granted, that all Persons, as well of high as of low
Estate, shall receive Justice in the Kings Court; and none from henceforth shall take
any such Revenge or Distress of his own Authority, without Award of [our] Court,
A
though he have Damage or Injury, whereby he would have amends of his Neighbour
either higher or lower.
THE DISTRICT JUDGE: No self-help.
MR STONER: Revenge is self-help, effectively, yes. In fact, I assumed that was the case and
B desperately sought around trying to find, and, in fact, in the Chengi litigation, Lord
Neuberger, there is I have not put a case in for that but he confirms, he refers to self-help.
So he confirms that.

Then it says:
C And upon the foresaid Article It is Provided and granted, that if any from henceforth
take such Revenges of his own Authority, without Award of the Kings Court as
before is said, and be convict thereof, he shall be punished by Fine, and that
according to the Trespass; and likewise if one Neighbour take a Distress of another
without Award of the Kings Court, whereby he hath Damage, he shall be punished in
D the same wise, and that after the Quantity of the Trespass; and nevertheless sufficient
and full Amends shall be made to them that have sustained Loss by such Distresses.

On the last point, of course, my submission is that Mr Ravenscroft hasnt suffered any loss,
but my main point is the fact that it is just not an illegal distraint because you have my
E submission on the fact that this was not distraint, this was a lawful possession of the vessel
pursuant to s.8 of the British Waterways Act 1983.
MRS JUSTICE ASPLIN: And s.4 you say is about excessive distraint where it was lawful.
MR STONER: Yes.
THE DISTRICT JUDGE: And in that case there is reference to fine as well.
F
MR STONER: It is the last two lines really. There are two points. If I can continue with what I
was saying, the last two lines, it says:

Moreover, Distresses shall be reasonable, and not too great; and he that
taketh [great] and unreasonable Distresses, shall be grievously amerced for the Excess
G of such Distresses.

THE DISTRICT JUDGE: And that you told me meant?

MR STONER: It is literally just fine, penalty. The first point, which in my submission shows
that s.8 certainly is not a question of levying distress, is that the section begins:
None from henceforth shall cause any Distress that he hath taken, to be driven out of
H the County where it was [taken]; and if one Neighbour do so to another of his own

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2
 Authority, and without Judgment, he shall make Fine, as above is said, as for a Thing
done against the Peace; nevertheless, if the Lord Presume so to do against his Tenant,
he shall be grievously punished by Amerciament.
A
There is a complaint that this boat was taken to Chester but, of course, that shows that s.8
certainly cannot be construed as levying any form of distraint because it would be rather
inconsistent with s.8 where the vessel can be removed and stored and also can be sold if that
all has to be done in the same county, and indeed one could see in terms of selling, because
B the section goes on to provide that if the money comes in, if my clients sell the boat, then if
someone comes along within still a certain period of time then there has to be an adjustment
and they have to do that. It wouldn't seem to be in that persons interest to have to sell it in a
particular location as opposed to the----
THE DISTRICT JUDGE: I can understand that, but I can also understand that if you are paying
C or having to pay the storage and removal charges, to have your boat removed to the furthest
point in the British Isles in order to rack up the costs and kept at the most expensive marina
you can find, would be something which would be excessive.
MR STONER: First of all, of course, this wasnt removed to the furthest corner of the British
Isles.
D THE DISTRICT JUDGE: No, no, but I am just using that as an example. Im not saying Chester
is that remote.
MR STONER: No, of course, a very lovely place, and, of course, it was not stored in a marina; it
was stored in----
THE DISTRICT JUDGE: Its just an example, Mr Stoner.
E MR STONER: Yes, of course, but the reason I mentioned that is that is relevant because that is
almost certainly going to be cheaper than keeping it in water where berths are very expensive
and rare, and there is no evidence on this but perhaps the way I can put it, certainly I know on
instructions, is that having a national contractor under a contract to remove vessels is not
necessarily and one can understand this as a matter of common sense a more expensive
F option than seeking to source in individual cases a local place for the boat to be kept.
THE DISTRICT JUDGE: And there is no evidence one way or the other whether it was cheaper
or more expensive.
MR STONER: No. I suppose another way of putting it, I am not accepting that actually
removing the vessel, even if it may be over a certain distance, by a lorry, we have no
G evidence if that lorry goes 20 miles or goes 200 miles how much more it is going to cost, but
there are still the costs of the lorry and matters of that sort.
THE DISTRICT JUDGE: But one could see that if distress had been levied and an excessively
expensive route had been used in the sense that the most expensive contractor had been used
to take the boat unnecessarily as far as possible and to store it in the most expensive place,
H then s.4 might have some moment.

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3
 MR STONER: I have made two points. One is we have no evidence on the relative----
THE DISTRICT JUDGE: No, no, I am not saying you have.
MR STONER: The other thing is that my understanding of s.4 is that it is and I go back to this
A
point the costs of removal are under s.8 so insofar as the distress, if there is a distress, and I
dont accept that as you know, but that is a fixed figure and its a different thing. My
understanding as a general proposition in any event is that to go back when this Act was
passed and having a background of being a property lawyer and thinking of distraint,
although we no longer have to think of that between landlords and tenants, if I have a debt of
B 1,000 as a landlord, the excessive distress is not whether and it is in London its not
whether I use enforcement officers from Newcastle who may be more expensive to travel
down, it is simply a question of if I go in and take 10,000 worth of goods for my 1,000
debt, thats the excessive point.
THE DISTRICT JUDGE: And you make a good point that, of course, the costs of removal, etc.,
C are recoverable under s.8 in any event.
MR STONER: Yes. So that is what I say about the Statute of Marlborough.
I can deal with the 2007 Act very simply and very quickly, because although it is relied upon,
in my submission it simply has no application. One can see that the rather hefty, even
passing it down, citation is behind tab 14 and it is common ground, I am sure, that a new
D procedure for taking goods was introduced by the 2007 Act, and again in landlord and tenant
terms now we do not have distress, we have something called CRAR, Commercial Rent
Arrears Recovery, so things have changed. But the important point, because I think the
complaint was: Aha, these werent enforcement officers, and, in fact, all sorts of allegations
have been made about criminal activity on my clients behalf and indeed I think my
E instructing solicitor, which is regrettable. Why I say it doesnt apply is if one looks at s.62,
so just the second page of that clip, it says:

Schedule 12 [which I have in there but I will not go right through, which is the new
enforcement procedure] applies where an enactment, writ or warrant confers power to
F use the procedure in that Schedule (taking control of goods and selling them to
recover a sum of money).

So Schedule 12 only applies where there is an enactment which actually provides that it does
apply, and then that is followed through. Section 63 at the bottom of the page, where the
G complaint was there were no enforcement agents, says: This section and section 64 apply for
the purposes of Schedule 12. Then it says: An individual may act as an enforcement agent
only if and then there are various things: certification. Then s.64 deals with certificates to
act as an enforcement agent. Then again following over the page to s.65 where it deals with
the replacement of common law rules, it says:
H

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4
 This Chapter replaces the common law rules about the exercise of the powers which
under it become powers to use the procedure in Schedule 12.

A
The under it is, of course, under the Chapter. So yes, this is a new regime, but it applies
only in relation to enactments where it is said that this regime would apply, and in fact I
will not go right through it but if I ask you to turn to p.334 at the top of the page, right hand
side, that is Schedule 13, and from there to the end of that clip there is a whole list of statutes
where this procedure is said to apply, so amendments are made to the statute to effectively
B invoke this, but none of the British Waterways Acts are in there and nothing has been put
forward of any relevance in relation to that, so it simply does not apply in this instance.
So that is that Act. What is also said is that there is a breach of the Torts (Interference with
Goods) Act. Again, I do not accept that. In fact, the relevant section is not in either of our
bundles, for which I apologise. I think I have one copy of the Act but I can always make a
C copy and provide it. But what is said in the skeleton argument is that the Torts (Interference
with Goods) Act 1977 applies because you detained the goods, and then critically it says
and they were detained when these proceedings started, but the issue is they were not.
These proceedings were started on 18th May and the boat was returned on 6th May. The
section that is relied upon is s.3(2) where it said a boat is unlawfully detained, and the first
D two provisions are about delivery up for goods. It does include a claim for damages in
s3(2)(c), but by the time these proceedings were started Mr Ravenscroft has his boat back.
There may just be a question of seeing a statutory provision and latching onto it. In my
submission it is not appropriate. What I have to accept, of course, is in my amended defence
I have said if I am wrong the maximum that and if you were not with me that my clients
E made an unmeritorious demand and there was some wrong then one is looking potentially at
a conversion or a damaged goods, a trespass to goods. I have included in my bundle again
the rather fine distinction between those but I think that that would not be a useful use of
court time; it would be a waste because there is such a fine distinction and, of course, the
ultimate point there is that that may give rise to a claim in damages, so I think Mr
F Ravenscroft and Mr Moore are wrong to go through the 77 Act, but my answer to it comes
back to this point of he simply has not established that he has suffered any loss.
So those are my submissions on the third point. If I may, I just want to briefly cover two
more and hopefully then I can finish by lunch. Im sorry Ive gone on slightly longer than I
indicated, albeit with the video this morning. I just want to make a few comments on the
G relief that is claimed and then I also just wish to make a few comments on why we are here
from my clients perspective in view of what was said. I am only going to deal with that very
briefly.
I think I ought to ask you to turn to bundle A, and behind tab 1 there is the relief that is
sought set out on p.8. In relation to the main navigable channel point, Im not sure that the
H declaration that is sought is correct in any event. That would very much depend on my

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5
 Ladys decision, because if I am right but you are against me you may decide, just looking at
the 71 Act, that I am wrong and therefore that would be inappropriate, but I say no more than
that other than to confirm from my clients point of view, of course, my client hasnt cross-
A
claimed for declaratory relief because, of course, its the judgment that will be important in
relation to moving forward from my clients perspective. So it is more really----
THE DISTRICT JUDGE: Im a bit surprised by that. I would have thought that you would have
cross-claimed for the declaration which you think is most appropriate here.
MR STONER: I think hopefully weve made our position clear in relation to what we say main
B navigable channel is, and in terms of moving forward, of course, whilst orders are appealed,
not that Im saying thats going to be the case, the reality of the situation is from my clients
perspective whats important here is that because this point is now a live point amongst
boaters, if its taken and theres a County Court hearing, as most of these cases will be, then
my clients obviously are not going to put an order necessarily in front of the County Court
C Judge. What they will do is put the judgment in front of the County Court Judge.
What I say in relation to para.B, that the powers under s.8 do not entitle seizure and keeping
of boats as a lien on prior debts.
THE DISTRICT JUDGE: You agree.
MR STONER: Well, I have accepted from the outset that licence arrears could not be claimed
D under s.8. Whether that is deserving of a declaration, given that that was an admitted point
from two years ago, and certainly I would rally against a lien on prior debts because thats
going further. What I accept is that my clients in my submission can seek to claim whats
within s.8 but not otherwise. Obviously insofar as a declaration that the taking of Grandma
Molly, Three Wise Monkeys, without court sanction and refusing to return unless the
E (inaudible) was unlawful, you have my point that my clients did not, in my submission, take
this vessel because of alleged arrears being unpaid. Then in relation to para.(c), exercising
the powers claimed under s.8 of the British Waterways Act to seize and hold Grandma Molly
in preference to exercising legitimate alternative powers to enforce compliance, and
obviously the monetary claim were unnecessary and disproportionate. In my submission,
F any relief, if you are against me on those submissions, should be a declaration reflecting the
facts of this case, as opposed to the rather dangerous scenario or a general statement which
might be very different, for example on the artificial waterways.
In terms of the damages claims, 31 and 32, if the court agrees with my principal claim then in
addition to the declaratory relief I ask for a full refund. I think I have already indicated that I
G cant oppose the return of that.
THE DISTRICT JUDGE: No.
MR STONER: Other damages, I do obviously, because I just say there are none. Then if the
court finds against me on the principle claim but agrees that the taking of my boat as a lien on
a debt was unlawful, and I think thats my primary point here, that again it is this general
H infection of Mr Ravenscrofts claim that the boat was taken because of the licence arrears it

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6
 was not. He says: In addition to the declaration to that effect I ask for a refund, and, of
course, I say no in relation to that because if my clients were right and this vessel needed to
be licensed, then they were entitled in my submission, for all the reasons I have given, to take
A
the vessel under s.8, especially in the circumstances. What Mr Ravenscroft should have done
is he should have responded to one of the letters.

The other point, and I have pleaded it and I can just mention it, is that what we say in relation
to the licence arrears, they are not actually separately claimed but if the court got to a
situation of saying: Well, actually the licence arrears should be paid back, what we have done
B
or what I have pleaded is a set-off in relation to costs orders that are unquestionably due. In
fact, since I have pleaded the case there is now an additional 9,000 costs in this hearing, and
also if my Lady determines that this vessel needed to be licensed, then what we have also
said is that under s.5(2) of the 83 Act there is a civil debt there and it would be something of
a nonsense to go off to the Nottingham County Court and issue separate proceedings, given
C
that my clients, on the face of it, would be entitled to summary judgment if you are with me
on the main point. We have sought a set-off against those sums. That is the way I deal with
that.
The only other point I wanted to make was just to say a few words as to why I have just made
all the submissions I have, and why we are here, lest there be any confusion from Monday.
D
The first point, of course, is that the Trust were sued, and the main navigable channel point is
an important point to the Trust. Now, this isnt a test case. This isnt a case where there are
a whole number of cases where this point is being taken where it can come forward.
THE DISTRICT JUDGE: It is and it isnt, Mr Stoner, and if it isnt, why are you here?
MR STONER: Its not a test case in the normal sense, but it is a test case or it is an important
E
case in the sense that, for example, there is another case involving a Mr Dunkley on the River
Trent who, I think I am right in saying, is being assisted by Mr Moore, and exactly the same
point is being taken. In fact, I will not take you to it but it is referred to in Mr Ravenscrofts
witness statement and his letter before action. Obviously that informs matters, because
although the sums are small in this case, my client is a charitable trust which is responsible
F
for the running, and its not a viable option, Im not suggesting that the court at any stage has
thought this, to look at this as simply saying: Well, proportionately, even if we disagree, we
will come to a settlement with a particular boater which results in a payment, or something of
that sort, because all that is going to encourage is the situation of what happens when the
point is taken again. The reality of the situation is if we had been able to settle this case on
G Monday, which we werent, or before and I know that my Lady knows that attempts were
made before I would have been my Lady or another judge of this division, or perhaps in a
County Court and then the Court of Appeal, arguing what Ive argued on the main navigable
channel, because the point is a live one amongst the boating community and its obviously an
important one from a management and revenue perspective.
H THE DISTRICT JUDGE: Well, you know what I think about it.

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7
 MR STONER: Yes.
THE DISTRICT JUDGE: Im not very impressed. But please could you tell me two things.
Could you take me back to what you say main means in navigable channel, because
A
surely it must have some separate meaning, otherwise you wouldn't use the word main.
Presumably, if I have it right, what you say is that main navigable channel differentiates
the main river from its tributaries, and thats how I discover what may means.
MR STONER: Any backwaters or----
THE DISTRICT JUDGE: Which may be navigable but they arent the main navigable channel.
B MR STONER: Exactly.
THE DISTRICT JUDGE: And thats the only----
MR STONER: Thats the reason for the main.
THE DISTRICT JUDGE: And what do you say, if anything and I dont think you covered the
1965 byelaws. I know you say they predate the section that were concerned with but I dont
C think youve covered it.
MR STONER: I expressly covered them yesterday because I accepted that if the 65 byelaw,
when it uses the term main navigable channel in context, must mean the main fairway, and
my Lady said to me: But you say that that doesnt provide any assistance----
THE DISTRICT JUDGE: Because its prior.
D MR STONER: Yes, and also I think rather ingloriously no doubt, but the point I made is that one
can have situations where in one situation and means and; and in another situation and
means or. In the context, I say the only thing one gets out of the 65 canal byelaws is the
fact that it shows the importance of context, because in context there it must mean the main
navigation fairway but it is of no assistance in relation to the 71Act or indeed, if one has to
E go to it, the 1968 Act.
(1 p.m.)
[Continuing]
(Adjourned for a short time)
(4.00 p.m.)
F
MR MOORE: That is their position and thats the position theyve taken in the County Court but
in an important sense the fact that theyre asking the court to issue an injunction to that effect
is a recognition that under s.8 of the 83 Act, if somebody turns up with the money to pay for
G the cost of removing it, then they shall return it. They dont have an option. So if somebody is
aware, you know, that theyre taking the boat and comes along and says: Well, Ive got the
money, heres your five grand, Ill take it back again, theyve got to release it. And this is, in
fact----

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8
 THE DISTRICT JUDGE: Then theres the question: They have to release it but do they have to
allow it to go back in the water? Thats a different question, isnt it?
MR MOORE: That is a different question and I dont think its the right time to go through here.
A
But if I can touch on some of the issues that he raised and that you sort of queried in terms of,
you know, the proportionality of what you do in removing the boats, I think it is important to
see in the 83 Act in Mr Stoners bundle, disintegrating bundle, in tab 4, and what I have taken
through is subsection (3).
B THE DISTRICT JUDGE: Of?
MR MOORE: Of s.8. So s.8 is the removal of vessels. Subsection (3) is dealing with the
reimbursability, to use a clumsy term, of the expenses incurred by the Board. There are
various options. Theres the removal, storage or destruction of the relevant craft. Im taking

C you to (c), which is marking, watching, buoying or otherwise controlling the relevant craft. So
what Im seeking to take out of this is that s.8 and the exercise of the power to remove a boat
does not have to be pulling it out of the water and putting it on a truck and driving it away
anywhere. They can accomplish the point by simply marking, watching, buoying or otherwise
controlling the relevant craft, and in the instance where we have Mr Ravenscroft, for example,
D almost directly opposite theres a marina. There is nothing stopping them if they were
legitimate, you know, if it was a legitimate exercise of s.8, which Mr Ravenscroft is denying,
but if it was a legitimate thing to take it, they could have minimised the financial impact by
simply arranging a berth in the marina and buoying it off in a section where, you know, they
E would have control over it, and so the option is there and the choice of going for the maximum
expense is theirs. They do have options even within s.8, is what Im trying to put across.
Certainly in a great many cases, especially when theyve got somebody jumping up and down
on the towpath, thats a desirable option, I would say, if youre going to be proportionate.
Essentially I think my main point is that if youre looking at the objectives, going through the
F
history of s.8 and its predecessor things is instructive, but I need to correct something that I did
say on the first day. I said that s.8 does apply universally across all the waterways. Im sorry
but that is wrong. Not that it affects the case, but just to correct something, it does not apply to
Scotlands waters. In fact, none of the 1983 Act applies to Scotland. Section 8 of 93 Act
G actually replaced s.19 of the British Transport Commission Act, which Scotland never used to
have but then I think in 74/75 they got it and thats what they keep, rather than s.8, and that is
purely for sunk, stranded or abandoned boats. Its one of the points that I think I could make
in the context of proportionality, is that Scotland have managed to get away without the power

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9
 to remove boats left or moored without lawful authority without, you know, theyve been able
to get along without this ever since they well, 62 and to this day.
THE DISTRICT JUDGE: Is there anything else on proportionality?
A
MR MOORE: Just having a quick look. Mr Stoner has already taken you to the bundle E tab 6
with the Environment Agency example, which I say is an exemplar that ought to be followed.
You did ask about the sorry, I just had a mental blank. (After a pause) Oh, thats right, the
comparative figures. As far as the prosecutions for either byelaw offences for not having a
B licence or the 71 Act Registration on Rivers, there never have been any as compared to the
nearly 260 successful ones on the Environment Agency equivalent. The removals are in the
hundreds; I dont have exact figures now because theyre constantly changing year-by-year,
but they are hundreds per year, according to the website figures that Canal & River Trust

C publish, so thats a very broad one. I mean, I would in the last year theyve taken of those
theyve gone to court I think 28 times in the last year because they were river boards and they
wanted a court process.
There was also point I think. Its probably out of context with proportionality but there was a
question you raised in terms of the main navigable channel and the definition of pleasure
D boats where you brought up the idea of punts, which I thought that was a good one.
However, I mean, I would have two answers for that. Im sorry its out of sequence, because
its all in my head. I thought that was necessary to answer. I would have said that in the first
place the definition of pleasure boats in that is trying to be as all-embracing as possible
E anyway and is giving a comprehensive list of as many as they can sensibly think of, of any
type of craft that you can propel, because thats navigation, whether its poling or paddling or
sailing or whatever. And in terms of the actual practicalities, what were dealing with,
pleasure boats across the whole range of the main navigable channels of the specified river
waterways, and some of those, especially the tail end, for example, of the River Trent, where
F
its strictly for pleasure use, the main navigable channel is going to be very much manageable
by punts. I can say from personal experience that I have punted narrowboats down deeper
rivers than the River Trent is, using a very large long bargepole, so it is possible, just to answer
that point. But I obviously would refer it to be an inclusive anything that you can propel on
G the water is going to be a pleasure boat basically, and so its yeah its part of the inclusive.
THE DISTRICT JUDGE: Is there anything else you want to say on proportionality before we
move on to distraint?
MR MOORE: I think we should move on.

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10
 THE DISTRICT JUDGE: Okay. Distraint: what do you want to say in response to what Mr
Stoner has said?
MR MOORE: Out of the several points there, I mean, Im going to be, I think, fairly brief. What
A
were saying is that even if you legitimately took possession of the vessel under the s.8
powers, that does not entitle you to use that possession by way of holding the boat to ransom
for, in this case, the alleged licence arrears, and a boat is not held lawfully under s.8 if that
shall return is disregarded. If somebody says: I will pay because I have to even though Im
B going to make a fuss about this later, but in order to get my boat back Im going to pay just
your removal and storage costs, then holding the boat beyond that point is unlawful under the
terms of s.8 itself. So if you turn around and say: I will release the boat on this plus this plus
this, or any sum in excess of those quoted removal and storage costs, then you are committing

C the offence of using even a lawful possession for an unlawful purpose.

Mr Stoner has made reference to the fact that no such offer was made, if I heard that correctly,
and Im not going to say that I did, but I would like to take you to Mr Garners evidence which
directly speaks to the position here. We do have this is Im starting off at p.38.
THE DISTRICT JUDGE: Page 38 of what?
D MR MOORE: Of tab 1.
THE DISTRICT JUDGE: I am sorry, I have gone to Mr Garners witness statement which is in
B1.
MR MOORE: B2? Oh, sorry, witness statement exhibits. I do apologise. The exhibits. Im
E sorry.
THE DISTRICT JUDGE: So you are at B2.
MR MOORE: Yes, B2 tab 1 p.38 to start off with. Now, the email thats exhibited here is just
Ms Thomass email to Paul Griffin. Well, shes called him Paul. Yes, Paul Griffin. Shes
called him Mr Griffiths. Shes making it clear there what the official policy is this is down
F
in her third paragraph on understanding on title of the boat being vested in the boat after six
weeks. You can understand Leighs worries over this. What hasnt been exhibited was the
response from Mr Griffin, which said: I acknowledge receipt of the below and will reply
asap. There was nothing. There never was a reply. There was a later reply from a solicitor
G in the Canal & River Trust, and she says: Thank you for your email which has been
forwarded----
THE DISTRICT JUDGE: Where are you reading from?
MR MOORE: Im sorry, Ive gone on to p.39.

H THE DISTRICT JUDGE: This is a reply of 9th March.

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 MR MOORE: Thats right, yeah.
THE DISTRICT JUDGE: Its a holding response.
MR MOORE: Yes.
A
THE DISTRICT JUDGE: Yes, and where do we go from there?
MR STONER: I was going to say, the express reference to 5th March, which was the first email,
was in the letter of 10th March, p.41 against the lower punch hole.
MR MOORE: Yes. Ive sort of skipped on. Yeah, 10th March in the centre was as an aside.
B In response to the query raised in your email of 5th March, the boat will not be
automatically vested in CaRT after six weeks.
Its later on 19th March where Lucy Grey replies and said: I have now had the opportunity to
take my----

C THE DISTRICT JUDGE: Where am I?

MR MOORE: Sorry, I beg your pardon. Page 48.
THE DISTRICT JUDGE: It is now 19th March.
MR MOORE: Its now 19th March and attached to it is a list of things. She says:
On payment of 12,676 to Canal & River Trust, CaRT will make arrangements to
D deliver the craft to Mr Ravenscroft.
Then on the same day but later in the evening this is on p.52----
THE DISTRICT JUDGE: And presumable the 12,000 therefore covers the licence fees as well.
MR MOORE: Yes, its all listed there. Commercial boat services, removal, storage costs,
E solicitors fees, CaRT labour, enforcement officer at five hours at 420, data collector, as Mr
Stoner has identified him, 330, and then youve got the four separate items of what theyre
calling the river-only licence, which has gone up each year a little bit from 390 to 446. Then
they say prior to the release of the boat he also has to demonstrate that the boat has a valid boat
safety certificate, insurance and a licence. What I want to do, go from there, is several hours
F
later when Ms Thomas responds to that. Thats p.52. She says: I want to know a number of
other things following your last email and the first is to do with the injunction proceedings.
Then she wants
your confirmation that you had advised your client that it is unlawful to demand
G extraneous costs other than those to do with the removal and storage before allowing
the boat to be collected.
So this was a very specific reference to the fact that they had to return it if the removal and
storage costs only were paid, not extraneous costs, and so that was the 19th March response.

H We dont have any such confirmation, according to what shes asked for, on record at all.

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 Then Ms Thomas decides that shes had enough and she goes off, so that the next
correspondence is in April, which is directly to Mr Ravenscroft, and thats at p.55. Essentially,
this is a repetition of the previous email that had been sent to Ms Thomas, and once again no
A
reference has been made or accommodation made in respect to what Ms Thomas had said
about the costs other than removal and storage at all. All of the other costs have been very
specifically itemised and included as whats going to be necessary for them to return the boat.
Then on p.56 its actually before page 55 as it happens---- Is that right? No. Im not quite
B sure how that date works out. But he writes: Dear Ms Grey, Thank you for your response but
I note you have still not supplied a copy of this alleged court order. This was to do with the
injunction proceedings. But then he says:

C I have been told that your client is obliged to return my boat only on payment of the
removal and storage costs and the legislation provides no room for holding the boat as
a lien on any other debts, alleged or otherwise.

I think that is a very specific putting them on notice that he also, following Ms Thomas, has
D made it clear to him what his understanding is. It is later when he had had no response on p.57
where he writes to Ms Grey:

I have received no reply from you in response to my email of last week and in order
E not to prolong matters further I would appreciate your early confirmation that your
client will deliver my boat on receipt of the full sum demanded less only the appealed
court costs, to be transferred to your designated account. I will then be in touch
promptly with details of where the boat is to be delivered. The sum youve demanded
is 12,676 less the court costs of 4,500. I propose to transfer 8,176 and it needs to be
F
clearly understood that I am making this payment under protest. I do not accept, with
respect to the disputed licence arrears, that your client has any right to hold the boat
as a lien over that debt, which is something which I believe you, as a solicitor, have to
be well aware of and which you have failed to advise your client of, as is your duty.
G
Of course, he cant know what Shoosmiths have advised the Canal & River Trust, but
whatever they advised or didnt, the outcome was he still had to pay. So there is nothing Mr
Ravenscroft is saying that indicates that this is inadvertent or they werent put on notice that it

H was against the terms of s.8, that they should have done it, and on p.59 he chased up saying: I

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 have received no reply from you in response to your email of last week so can I have your
early confirmation, and the response from Lucy Grey says:

A
I can confirm the contents of your below and previous email have been noted. I am
in the process of taking my clients instructions and will return to you as soon as I am
in a position to do so.

B This is now going on to the 26th. And then on p.60 she refers back to his email and says:

Ive now had the opportunity to obtain instructions from my client and confirm that
on receipt to our account of 8,176 CaRT will make arrangements to return your boat

C to you at the earliest opportunities. The comments of your email of 12th April are
noted.

So yet again theyre noting what he said as to what he is legally obliged to pay and that what
theyre demanding on top of that is wrong, and the solicitors having confirmed with CaRT
D they are still making that demand. So his position is that it is absolutely clear that there was
nothing inadvertent about it. Both he and his representative before him were making it clear
that hed been advised of the situation, he did understand, and there was a one of the first
emails; I wont take up the time where oh, yes, p.54. Sorry. Im making reference to this
E because I thought I understood Mr Stoner to say that there wasnt any offer to pay the sum of
removal and storage costs, but on p.54 Mr Ravenscroft sends to Lucy Grey of Shoosmiths
this is as Ms Thomas is no longer acting on my behalf and she says:

As weve been asking for details of this for some weeks now [about the details of
F
bank transfers, etc.] I do not expect to be billed for any extra weeks of storage and
will arrange to transfer the quoted sum of 6,630 when I know where to send it.

And the 6,630 is what he understood to be the removal and storage costs only, and its
G following that, of course, the very next day, where the response comes back and says: Oh, yes,
I note. Thank you for your email. In fact, well return it on 12,676.
THE DISTRICT JUDGE: Thank you.

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 MR MOORE: It is probably something that Im it has not been exhibited but Mr Griffin quite
some months after this exchange of correspondence in here was interviewed and the Canal &
River Trust asked the magazine whether they could reproduce it and----
A
THE DISTRICT JUDGE: If its not in evidence----
MR MOORE: It has not been put in evidence. So I think, my Lady, unless theres some
questions?
THE DISTRICT JUDGE: No, thats fine. Thank you very much.
B
(4.26 p.m.)
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