Police, Politics and Culture in A Deeply Divided Society-Hasisi

Police, Politics, and Culture in a Deeply Divided Society
Author(s): Badi Hasisi

Source: The Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology (1973-), Vol. 98, No. 3, Symposium:
Redefining International Criminal Law: New Interpretations and New Solutions (Spring, 2008),
pp. 1119-1145
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0091-4169/08/9803-1119
THEJOURNAL OFCRIMINAL LAW& CRIMINOLOGY Vol. 98, No. 3
2008 byNorthwestern
Copyright SchoolofLaw
University, Printedin U.S.A.
CRIMINOLOGY
POLICE, POLITICS, AND CULTURE IN A

DEEPLY DIVIDED SOCIETY
BADI HASISI*
ThisArticledeals withminorities'
" perceptions ofthepolice in "deeply
dividedsocieties. Thesesocietiesare generallycharacterized bypolitical
disagreements, and the literature shows thatmost researchers emphasize
the centrality of the political variable in order to understand police-
minority interactions.This Articleacknowledgesthe centrality of the
political variable and adds a culturalvariable that may improvethe
understanding ofpolice-minority relationsin a deeplydividedsociety.In
some societies,thedisparityin theperceptionsof majorityand minority
groupscannotbe attributed solely to thepoliticalvariable,but also to
culturaldifferences.Thisis especiallyprominent in thecase of nativeor
immigrant minorities.Hence, it is reasonable to expectthatthiscultural
willbe in minorities ' interactionwithand itsperception
pluralism reflected
the
of police.
Findingsfroma surveyconductedin Israel indicatethatpolitical
disagreements betweenJewsand Arabshave negatively affectedtheArab
's
minorityperceptions the
of police. This Article
also shows thattheArab
minority groupis nothomogenous in regardto theirrelationship withthe
police; thereare significant politicaland culturaldifferences amongArab
sub-groups(Muslim, Christian, and Druze). The Druze hold similar
political orientations to the Jewish majority, and consequentlytheir
perceptionsof thepolice werefound to be morepositivethanthoseof
MuslimArabs. Nevertheless, bothDruze and MuslimArabs expressed
Dr. Hasisi is a lecturerat the Instituteof Criminologyat the Hebrew UniversityFaculty

of Law. Email: Hasisi@mscc.huji.ac.il.
1119

1120 BADIHASISI [Vol. 98
to contactwiththe police whenpolice practices

restrictedreceptivity
threatenedtheircommunity fromthisresearch
culturalcodes. Thefindings
callforbotha deeperanalysisoftherelationshipsbetweenminoritygroups
and thepolice, andfor a moreattentive probe of thedistinctions
among
minoritygroups.
I. Introduction
A reviewof the academicliterature in the fieldof police-minority
relationsin deeplydividedsocietiesrevealsthattenserelations betweenthe
minority and thepoliceare a frequent phenomenon.One ofthesourcesof
thistensionis thepoliticaland social marginality of theminority, whichis
mostoftenaccompaniedby unbalancedand unfairpolicing.1Researchers
emphasizethecentrality of thepoliticalvariablein understanding police-
minority interactionsin deeplydividedsocieties. In fact,oftenhovering
above deeplydivideddemocratic societiesis thequestionofthelegitimacy
ofthepoliticalregimeintheeyesoftheminority group.
The tenserelations betweentheArabminority in Israeland thepolice
are commonknowledge.Throughout thehistory of Arab-Jewish relations
in Israel, this tensionwas sharplybroughtinto reliefin several mass
politicalevents,withthe mostviolentexamplein October2000. Prime
Minister ArielSharonpaida visitto theTempleMountinJerusalem, an act
perceivedby the Arab minority as violatingthe sanctityof the Al-Aksa
Mosque. The visitincited eightdaysofviolentriotsthatendedwithtwelve
Arabcitizensdead,all of themby police gunfire.This eventemphasized
theinfluence of politicalvariableson minority relationswiththepolice in
Israel,andyetthisis notthesole variableon whichwe shouldfocus.
In deeplydividedsocietieswheredivisionsare also based on different
ethnicities,emphasisis puton theculturaldistinction betweenthemajority
and the minority.This distinction is liable to findits expressionin the
culturalperception of governmental institutions,including thepolice. The
impact of cultural on
pluralism police-minority relations is due
reinforced
to theunder-representation of membersof theminority in thepoliceforce.
The combination ofthesefactors exacerbates theculturaldisparity between
1 See JohnD.
Brewer,Black and Blue: Policing inSouth Africa (1994) [hereinafter
Brewer, Black and Blue]; Ronald Weitzer,Policing Under Fire: Ethnic Conflict
and Police-CommunityRelations in Northern Ireland (1995) [hereinafter Weitzer,
Policing Under Fire]; Ronald Weitzer, TransformingSettler States: Communal
Conflict and Internal Security in Northern Ireland and Zimbabwe (1990)
Weitzer, TransformingSettler States]; JohnD. Brewer,Policing in
[hereinafter
& Soc'Y 179(1991).
a TypeofPolicing,1 POLICING
DividedSocieties:Theorizing

2008] POLICE, POLITICS, AND CULTURE 1121
theservice-providers - police officers

who belongto themajority group -
-
and service-usersmembersof theminority group. We can assumethat
wherethereis greater culturaldisparity
betweenthemajority and minority,
therewill be greater tensionin minority-policerelations.The Israeli-Arab
minority is a native,traditional
minoritythatdiffers in culture
significantly
fromthe Jewishmajority,who are culturallyWestern-oriented. This
culturaldistinction, and notjust politicalvariables,will be reflectedin
minority attitudestowardthepolice.
This Articleaims to evaluatethe impactof politicaland cultural
variableson minority perceptionsof thepolice in deeplydividedsocieties.
First,I will tryto illustrate
the distinction
betweenpoliticaland cultural
variablesand explain how makingthis distinctionfacilitatesa better
understanding of police-minority relationsin deeply divided societies.
Then I will comparethe attitudesof IsraeliArabs and Jewstowardthe
police and turnto the core of this Article:an in-depthanalysisof the
attitudesof different Arab sub-groups(Muslims,Christians, and Druze)
towardtheIsraelipolice. In so doing,I wishto elaborateuponthecultural
explanations fortheexistingtension,alongwiththemoreobviouspolitical
reasons.
II. Politics Versus Culture

Whenanalyzingpolice-minority relations,the line betweenpolitical
and culturalvariablescan becomequitevague. Nevertheless, I will tryto
argue thatthereis an analyticaldistinction
between the two variablesthat
has significantramifications on police-minorityrelations. The political
aspect in police-minority relationsbecomes manifestwhen we ask the
followingquestions:How do minority groupsperceivetheroleofthepolice
in theconstructionofthe(controversial)socio-politicalorder?Whatis the
image of the police in society? What do the police representamong
minoritygroups?Arethepolicethere"toprotect andto serve"or"tochase
afterand repress"?Whatstylesof policingare practicedtowardminority
groups?Is it"high"or"low"policing?
Criminologicaland sociologicalscholarshave triedto answerthese
questionsby addressingthe socio-politicalvariablesthat characterize
severalminority groups. Manystudieshavepointedto thetenserelations
thatoftenexistbetweenpoliceandminorities in varioussocieties.Thereis
evidenceof highratesof minority arrestand incarceration,highratesof
policeviolencetowardminorities, and negativeattitudesamongminorities

towardthe police.2 Furthermore, stereotypicalimagesof minorities are

prevalentamongpolice officers.Most commonly, police view minority
members as a potential
criminal threat.3
Researchalso shows highratesof crimeamongminorities.These
crimeratesareinfluenced byvarioussocialfactors associatedwithminority
status.4 For example, evidence shows overrepresentation of broken
families,high rates of divorce,high residentialdensity,low economic
status,highlevels of unemployment, and highadolescentdrop-outrates.
These variablesincreasesocial disorganizationand affectcrimerates. In
addition,minority populations tendto be youngerand morelikelyto be
visiblein thestreets.5All of thesefactorscreatea supportiveenvironment
forthedevelopment of criminalbehaviorand,in turn,increasethecontact
2
See, e.g., David H. Bayley & Harold Mendelsohn, Minoritiesand the Police:
Confrontation in America (1969); Robert Blauner, Racial Oppressionin America
(1972); Randall Kennedy, Race, Crime, and the Law (1997); Austin T. Turk,
Criminalityand Legal Order (1969); Samuel Walker, The Police in America: An
Introduction (3d ed. 1999); Scott H. Decker,CitizenAttitudes Towardthe Police: A
ReviewofPast Findingsand Suggestions for FuturePolicy,9 J.Police Sci. & Admin.80
(1981); JoeR. Feagin,The Continuing Significance of Race: AntiblackDiscriminationin
Public Places, 56 Am.Soc. Rev. 101 (1991); SimonHoldaway,Police Race Relationsin
Englandand Wales: Theory,Policy,and Practice,1 POLICE& Soc'Y 49 (2003); David
Jacobs& RonaldHelms,CollectiveOutbursts, Politics,and PunitiveResources:Towarda
PoliticalSociologyofSpendingon Social Control,11 Soc. Forces 1497(1999); MichaelD.
Reisig & Roger B. Parks,Experience,Qualityof Life, and NeighborhoodContext:A
HierarchicalAnalysisof Satisfaction withPolice, 17 JUST.Q. 607 (2000); Tom R. Tyler,
Policing in Black and White:EthnicGroupDifferences in Trustand Confidencein the
Police,8 Police Q. 322 (2005); RonaldWeitzer& StevenA. Tuch,Race and Perceptions of
Police Misconduct, 51 Soc. Probs. 305 (2004).
3
E.g., Hubert M. Blalock, Jr.,Toward A Theory of Minority-GroupRelations
(1967); Pamela IrvingJackson,MinorityGroupThreat, Crime,and Policing: Social
Context and Social Control (1989); Lawrence Bobo & Vincent L. Hutchings,
Perceptions ofRacial GroupCompetition: Extending Bturner's TheoryofGroupPositionto
a MultiracialSocial Context,61 Am.Soc. Rev. 951 (1996); Feagin,supranote2; Malcolm
D. Holmes,MinorityThreatand Police Brutality: Determinants of Civil RightsCriminal
Complaintsin U.S. Municipalities, 38 Criminology343 (2000); KarenF. Parkeret al.,
Racial Threat,Concentrated Disadvantageand Social Control:Consideringthe Macro-
Level Sourcesof Variationin Arrests, 43 Criminology1111 (2005); LincolnQuillian&
Devah Pager, Black Neighbors,Higher Crime? The Role of Racial Stereotypesin
EvaluationsofNeighborhood Crime,107Am.J.Soc. 717 (2001).
4
See, e.g.,CliffordR. Shaw & HenryD. McKay, JuvenileDelinquency and Urban
Areas: A Study of Rates of Delinquents in Relation to Differential
Characteristics of Local Communities inAmericanCities (1942).
5 and ViolentCrime,17 CRIMINOLOGY 46
E.g., RichardBlock,Community, Environment,
(1979); RobertJ.Sampson& W. ByronGroves,Community Structureand Crime:Testing
Social-Disorganization Theory,94 Am.J.Soc. 774 (1989).

betweenminorities and thepolice. Police officers facemanyobstaclesin

policingunderclass minority neighborhoods becausecriminals andinnocent
citizensmaysharethesame socio-economic characteristics.6This,in turn,
increasescomplaints fromminority groupsregarding racial profilingbythe
police.7
Researchshowsthata tenseand alienatedrelationship betweenpolice
and the minority community stronglydiscouragespolice officersfrom
enforcing criminallawswhilealso dissuading minoritiesfromcollaborating
with police to preventand reportcrime.8 The primarycomplaintof
minority groupsis thattheyaresimultaneously over-policed as suspectsand
as
under-policed victims, which has reduced their confidence in and
willingness to collaborate withthepolice.9
The politicalexplanation ofpolice-minority relationsis quitecommon
in manyresearches;nevertheless, it lacks any reference to the impactof
societal-culturaldiversity on minority interactions and perceptions of the
police. The culturalexplanation ofpolice-minority relationsfocuseson the
impactof policeorganizational cultureand how it affectsinteractions with
minority groups. The pertinent questions are: How does the cultural
contextof police activityinteractwiththe culturalpluralismof some
minority groups?How do thecultural characteristicsoftheminority groups
affecttheirperceptions ofpoliceorganizational knowledge? To what extent
are police officersaware of the variousculturalcharacteristics of the
differentcommunities in society?
The culturalapproachfocuseson the interaction betweenthe formal
rulesofthepoliceandthesub-cultural valuesofminority groups.Some of
the disparitiesbetweenthe majorityand the minority are not merely
political,butcan also be attributedto culturaldifferences,suchas language,
religion, customs, family structure,informalsocial control, moral
perceptions, andgenderrelations.Somecultural minorities actaccording to
theirown culturalnormsand consequently may be accused of committing
crimesbecause the legal cultureof the statereflectsthe views of the
6 See
RodneyStark,DeviantPlaces: A TheoryoftheEcologyofCrime,25 CRIMINOLOGY
893(1987).
7 Ronald Weitzer& Steven A.
Tuch,Race and Policing inAmerica:Conflict and
Reform (2006); Brian L. Withrow,Racial Profiling: From Rhetoric to Reason
(2006).
H
E.g., Hung-EnSung,The Fragmentationof Policing inAmericanCities: Toward
an Ecological Theoryof Police-CitizenRelations (2002).
See Benjamin Bowling, Violent Racism: Victimization,Policing and Social
Context (1998); HarryBlagg & GiuliettaValuri,AboriginalCommunity Patrols in
Australia:Self-Policing, and Security,
Self-Determination 14 POLICING
& Soc'y 313 (2004).

1124 BADI HASISI [Vol. 98
dominantgroup. Examplesof such cases includebigamy,familyhonor

murder,spousal and child abuse, parent-child suicide, acts of blood
revenge,and celebratoryshooting. It is reasonableto expectthatthe
interactionsof the minority with the police will reflectthese cultural
differences.
Some studieshave claimedthatthepolice generally represent and act
in accordancewiththecultureof thedominantgroup,and thisis further
emphasizedby theunder-representation of minoritymembersin thepolice
force.10As a result,someactionstakenby thepolice mightbe viewedas
culturallyinappropriateby traditionalcommunities. Standardpolice
the
procedureamong majority groupmaycreateunpredictable reactionsin
theminoritycommunity due to cultural
differences.
III. Police-Minority Relations in a Deeply Divided Society

Thereis no bettercase thatdrawsattention to thedominanceof the
in
politicalexplanation police-minority relations
than theexampleofdeeply
dividedsocieties.11Thesearesocietiesdividedalongethniclineswherethe
statetraditionally withthe dominantgroup.12 Examplesof
is affiliated
thesesocietiesincludeNorthern Irelanduntil1969,Israel,Georgia,Estonia,
andLatvia.13The minority perceivesthestateas non-neutral,
andthisview,
as a result,decreasesthe legitimacy of thegovernment and police in the
eyes of theminority.The minority's perceptionof thepolice is notonly
influenced by police actions,butalso by whatthepolice represent to the
10Edna Erez et
Policinga Multicultural
al., Introduction: Society,7 Police & Soc'y
(Special Issue) 5 (2003); LorraineMazerolleet al., Policingthe Plightof Indigenous
Australians:Past Conflictsand PresentChallenges,7 Police & Soc'y (Special Issue) 77
(2003).
11
See, e.g.,MikeBrogden & Clifford Shearing,Policing for a New South Africa
(1993); Donatella Della Porta, Social Movements,Political Violence, and the
State: A Comparative Analysis of Italy and Germany(1995); JohnMcGarry &
Brendan O'Leary, Policing Northern Ireland: Proposals for a New Start (1999);
Richard Mapstone,Policing in a Divided Society: A Study of Part TimePolicing in
Northern Ireland (1994); Weitzer,Policing Under Fire, supra note 1; JohnWhyte,
InterpretingNorthern Ireland (1990); GrahamEllison & Greg Martin,Policing,
CollectiveActionand Social Movement Theory:TheCase ofNorthern IrelandCivilRights
Campaign,51 Brit. J.Soc. 681 (2000).
12For moreresearchon
deeplydividedsocieties,see Arend Lijphart,Patterns of
Democracy: GovernmentForms and Performancein Thirty-SixCountries (1999);
SammySmooha & TheodorHanf,The Diverse Modes of Conflict-Regulation in Deeply
Divided Societies,33 Int'l J. Comp. Soc. 26 (1992); Pierre L. Van Den Bereghe,
MulticulturalDemocracy:Can It Work?, 8 Nations & Nationalism 433 (2002).
13For further see The Fate of Ethnic Democracy in Post-Communist
elaboration,
Europe (SammySmooha& PriitJarveeds.,2005) (discussing"ethnicdemocracy").

people. Suchperceivedillegitimacy producesa threat to internal

security,
and thebulkofthestate'spolicingresourcesaretherefore consignedto the
of
management political offenses.15 Thispattern affectsthe natureofpolice
activitiesin deeplydividedsocietiesso thatwhenpolicingpublicevents,
forexample,thepolicegenerally practicea "zerotolerance"policytoward
minority groupprotesters and regardtheiractionsas politicalsubversion
againstthestate.16
At the same time,the policingof non-political crimesamongthe
minority is typicallyless effective. This is due to police neglectof
incidentsthatoccurintheminority community, particularly whenthecrime
bearsno threatto thedominant group.17 Weak police performance in the
minority community is also attributable
to the minority group'slack of
cooperation withthepolice. The literature showsthatthemainreasonthat
minoritygroupsin deeplydividedsocietiestendto avoid cooperation with
thepolice is due to politicaldisagreements betweenmajority and minority
communities.18
RonaldWeitzer,a sociologistat GeorgeWashington University,has
a
developed comprehensive model of the of
policing deeply divided
societiesbased on his researchin NorthernIrelandand Zimbabwe.19
Weitzer'smodel describespolice policies or practicesas institutionally
biased againstmembersof the subordinateminority group. There is
chronicover-representation of the dominantethnicgroupin the police
force,especiallyin thetopranks. The policetendto represstheregime's
14
Weitzer,Policing UnderFire,supranote1.
Graham Ellison & JimSmyth,The Crowned Harp: Policing NorthernIreland
(2000); Aogan Mulcahy, Policing Northern Ireland: Conflict, Legitimacy and
Reform(2006); Weitzer,Policing Under Fire,supranote1; AndrewGoldsmith,
Policing
WeakStates: CitizenSafetyand State Responsibility,13 POLICING& Soc'Y 3 (2003).
Della Porta, supra note 11; Mercedes S. Hinton, The State on the Streets:
Police and Politics in Argentinaand Brazil (2006); P. A. J.Waddington,Libertyand
Order: Public Order Policing in a Capital City (1994); Vince Boudreau,Precarious
Regimes and Matchup Problems in theExplanation of RepressivePolicy, in REPRESSIONAND
Mobilization 33 (Christian Davenportetal. eds.,2005); Ellison& Martin,
supranote11.
17See
Blalock, supranote3; Bowling, supranote9; Jackson,supranote3; Feagin,
supranote2; Holmes,supranote3; StephanieL. Kent& David Jacobs,Minority Threatand
Police Strength
from1980 to 2000: A Fixed-Effects AnalysisofNonlinearand Interactive
EffectsinLarge U.S. Cities,43 Criminology731 (2005); GustavoS. Mesch& IlanTalmud,
The Influenceof Community Characteristics
on Police Performance in a DeeplyDivided
Society:TheCase ofIsrael,31 Soc. Focus 233 (1998).
18See McGarry &
O'Leary, supra note 11; Mulcahy, supra note 15; Weitzer,
Policing Under Fire,supranote1; Weitzer,TransformingSettler States, supranote
1.
19
Weitzer,Policing UnderFire,supranote1.

opponents,holdingdual responsibility for ordinarycrime controland

homeland security. In the absence of effectivemechanismsof
accountability,thepolice in thesecountriesalso enjoylegal systemsthat
provide them with greatlatitudein theirabilityto controlthe minority
population,including withrespecttotheuse offorce.20
The Weitzermodeladdressesveryimportant politicaldimensionsin
police-minorityrelationsin deeply dividedsocieties,butlacksanyreference
to the culturalexplanation. The reason mightbe thatwhen Weitzer
developedthemodel,he focusedhis analysison Northern Ireland. There
are few culturaldissimilarities betweenthe Protestant majorityand the
Catholicminority in thiscountry thatmightinfluence therelationshipwith
the police. In contrast,in Israel thereare markedculturaldistinctions
betweentheArabnativeminority andtheJewishmajority thatmightaffect
relationswiththepolice. Arabsarepartofa Mediterranean, Islamic-Arabic
culture,while Jewish culture is oftenmore Western-oriented. These
differencesare manifestedin various culturalexpressions,including
languages (Hebrew versus Arabic), religion (Jewishversus Muslim,
Christian,and Druze), familystructure (nuclearfamilyversusextended
family), residential patterns (urban versus rural or patrilocal),21
among extendedfamily(weak versusstrong),
interrelations the theroleof
the clan as an informal social controlinstitution(amongArabs),gender
relationsandsegregation, andleisurepatterns.
Arab societyis stilllargelygovernedby traditional social structures
andhas notundergone radicalurbanization,witha significantpercentageof
Arabs livingin ruralvillages.22 Communities have preservedinformal
mechanisms ofsocialcontrol.23 The Arabsocietyin Israelexhibitssomeof
ofa statelesssociety,especiallywithregardto theculture
thecharacteristics
of lawlessness(towardsome Israelilaws) and community self-policing.24
20
Brewer,Black and Blue, supranote1; Weitzer,Policing Under Fire,supranote
1.
21A
patrilocalresidenceis one in whichthefamilyunitlives nearthemale relations.
Theconceptoflocationmayextendtoa largerareasuchas a village,town,orclanarea.
22
Majid al-Haj, Ethnic Relations in an Arab Town in Israel, in Studies in Israeli
Ethnicity:after the Ingathering(Alex Weingrod ed., 1985).
23Joseph
Ginat, Blood Revenge: Family Honor, Mediation and Outcasting
(1997); Brynjar Lia, A Police Force Withouta State: A History of the Palestinian
Security Forces in the West Bank And Gaza (2006); Manar Hasan, The Politicsof
Honor:Patriarchy, theStateand theMurderof Womenin theNameofFamilyHonor,21 J.
Israeli Hist. 1 (2002).
See Stanley Cohen,Int'l Centre for Peace inthe Middle East, Crime,Law, and
Social Control Amongthe Arabs inIsrael (1990); Lia, supranote23; Ginat,supranote
23.

The statelesscharacteristics oftheArabminority intensifyas a resultofthe

social and geographical segregation of Arabsand Jewsin Israel.25These
culturalcharacteristics are prevalentenoughto influencethe relations
betweentheminority andthepolice.
The culturalvariablein police-minority relationsis not applicable
to
solely deeply divided societies. It is relevant also to severalWestern
immigrant -
societies including the United States,Canada,New Zealand,
-
andAustralia wherenativeminorities stilllive in segregated communities
and hold different culturalcodes fromthe whitemajority, especiallyin
termsof traditionally informal social control.26 This makespolice worka
verycomplex task in these communities. Furthermore, severalWestern
countrieshostimmigrants fromnon-Westerncultures,and some of these
immigrant groupshave maintained culturalcodes fromtheirhomelands,
even creatinga Diaspora in theirhostcountries.27The immigrants are
generally unfamiliar with the culture of the host country, and their
vulnerability may make them targetsfor abuse by criminalsin the
community.28 These immigrants mayin facthesitateto contactthepolice
sincemanycomefromcountries orcultures thathadpoorrelationships with
thepolice.29To sumup,in thecase ofnativeandimmigrant minorities,the
political variable is quite important when analyzingpolice-minority
25See Smooha&
Hanf,supranote12; Ghazi Falah,LivingTogether Apart:Residential
Segregation inMixedArab-Jewish CitiesinIsrael,33 Urb. Stud. 23 (1996).
26See DennisP.
Forcese, Policing Canadian Society (1992); Jharna Chatterjee & Liz
Elliott,RestorativePolicingin Canada: TheRoyal CanadianMountedPolice, Community
JusticeForums,and the YouthCriminalJusticeAct,4 POLICEPrac. & Res. 347 (2003);
Mazerolleetal.,supranote10.
27
Wing Hong Chui & Lai-Kwan Regin Ip, Policing in a Multicultural Society:A
QueenslandCase Study,6 POLICEPrac. & Res. 279 (2005); Eric D. Poole & Mark R.
Pogrebin,Crimeand Law Enforcement in theKorean AmericanCommunity, 13 POLICE
Stud. Int'l Rev. Police Dev. 57 (1990).
28 Immigration and Crime:Race, Ethnicity,and Violence (RamiroMartinez, Jr.,&
Abel Valenzuela,Jr.,eds., 2006); StephenEgharevba,AfricanImmigrants '
Perceptionof
Police in Finland:Is It Based on theDiscourseofRace or Culture?,34 Int'l J.Soc. L. 42
(2006); Lars Holmberg& BrittaKyvsgaard,Are Immigrants and TheirDescendants
Discriminated Againstin theDanish CriminalJusticeSystem?, 4 J.Scandinavian Stud.
Criminology& CrimePrevention125(2003); David J.Smith,EthnicOrigins,Crime,and
CriminalJustice in England and Wales, in Ethnicity, Crime, and Immigration:
Comparativeand Cross-National Perspectives101(MichaelH. Tonryed., 1997).
29 RobertC. Davis et and theCriminalJusticeSystem:An Exploratory
al., Immigrants
Study,13 Violence & Victims 21 (1998); RobertC. Davis & Nicole J. Henderson,
Willingness to ReportCrimes:The Role of EthnicGroup Membership and Community
Efficacy, 49 Crime& Delinq. 564 (2003); Cecilia Menjivar& CynthiaL. Bejarano,Latino
'
Immigrants PerceptionsofCrimeand PoliceAuthorities in theUnitedStates:A Case Study
fromthePhoenixMetropolitan Area,27 ETHNIC & RACIAL STUD.120(2004).

relations.However,we missa significant

partofthepicturebyignoringthe
impactof culturaldifferences
on the majorityand theminorityand how
thesedifferences
mayaffect theminority's ofthepolice.
perceptions
IV. Arabs in Israel: Between Political Threat and Cultural

Estrangement
Arabs insideIsrael's "GreenLine" constitute about 17% of Israel's
population, or 1 . 1 millionpeople.30They are a nativeminorityand partof
the Palestiniannation. For morethan 100 years,the Palestinianpeople
have been engagedin a violentand ongoingnationalconflictwiththe
Jewishnationalmovement and, at a laterstage,withthe Stateof Israel.
Immediately upon itsestablishment following thewarin 1948,theStateof
Israelendorsedfull,formalcitizenship formembersof theArabminority
who continued to residein Israel. The nationalPalestinianidentity of the
Arabminority transformed them,in theeyesof theJewishmajority, intoa
group that was with
affiliated the enemy and which possessed "dual
loyalty." The solution to this threatwas to enforce militaryrule on the
minority community from1948to 1966. Thoughmilitary rulehas ended,it
has not reducedthe highthreatperceptioncurrently held by the Jewish
majoritytowardthe Arab minority.A recentsurveyhas shownthata
majorityof IsraeliJews(67%) believe thatthe Arab community's high
birthrateendangers thestate;thatArabsare intenton changingthestate's
Jewishcharacter (72%); thatArabsmightassistenemiesofthestate(78%);
and thatArabsmightlauncha popularrevolt(72%). It also showedthata
majority of IsraeliJews(84%) fearArabsbecause of theirsupportof the
Palestinian peopleandbelievethatmostIsraeliArabswouldbe moreloyal
to a Palestinianstatethanto Israel(66%).31
The majority of theIsraeli-Arabpopulationlives in threegeographic
areas:theGalilee,theTriangle,andtheNegev- areasat theperiphery (and
frontier)ofIsraelisociety.Although thereis an urbanmiddle-classsector,a
largenumber ofArabsliveinruraltownsandvillagesandcontinue to abide
by traditionalforms of social In
organization. fact, 90% of IsraeliArabs
30 The so-called Green Line is the 1949 Armisticeline established

followingthe war of
1948; laterit became known as the pre-1967 borderin orderto demarcate the Arab territories
occupied followingthe 1967 War (the West Bank, Gaza strip,East Jerusalem,and the Golan
Heights). My use of the term the "Arabs in Israel" excludes the Palestinians in East
Jerusalemand the Druze in the Golan Heights. If we chose to include these groups,thenthe
Arabs in Israel would constitute about 19.9% (1.43 million) of the State of Israel's
population. Cent. Bureau of Statistics, Annual Population Report, 2003 (2006).
31
Sammy Smooha, Index of Arab-Jewish Relations in Israel (2004).

live in smalltownspopulatedby Arabsexclusively.Onlyeightcitiesare

ethnicallymixed,and theseare extremely segregated Such
residentially.32
is
segregation acceptedby many Israelis; a
only minority of Jewsor Arabs
expresswillingness to liveina mixedneighborhood.33
The Arab minority is not a singlehomogenousgroup,but ratheris
characterized by an inner diversitythataffectsits relationship withthe
police. One of the features of thisdiversity is the divide
religious-ethnic
amongMuslims,Christians, Druze, and Bedouins.34Ethnicdistinctions
amongArabsin Israelare institutionalized; forexample,theStateof Israel
recognizesreligious-ethnic divides and finances separateinstitutionsfor
each oftheArabreligious-ethnic groups. The sub-ethnic distinctions
of the
Arab minority are not limitedsolelyto the religiousaspect,but are also
manifested in the politicalattitudesand behaviorsof the variousArab
groups.
Druze have a basic difference fromMuslimsand Christians in their
relationswiththe Stateof Israel.35The Druze are an Arab ethnicgroup
culturally. However,the Druze peoples' political identification with
Palestiniannationalmotifsis veryweak,andthustheyareperceivedas less
threateningbytheIsraelistate.36MembersoftheDruzegroupsharesimilar
politicalorientations withtheJewishmajority and are in factdrafted into
theIsraeliarmedforcesand thepolice.37In lightof this,we mayexpect
thatcomparedto otherArabsub-groups, theDruze will expressrelatively
morepositiveattitudes towardthepolice.
32
Falah,supranote25.
33
SammySmooha,TheArab Minority in Israel: Radicalizationor Politicization?
', in
Israel: State and Society, 1948-1988:Studies in ContemporaryJewry(Peter Y.
Meddinged., 1989);see also Smooha& Hanf,supranote12.
34 totheIsraeliCentralBureauofStatistics, theethnicdistributionoftheArab
According
population is as follows:a majority
(65%) arenon-Bedouin Muslims,9% areChristians, 9%
are Druze,and 17% are Bedouins. The majorityof the Bedouinsresidein the southern
police district,whilethemajority of Druze and Christians residein theNorthern District.
Central Bureau of Statistics,supranote30.
The Druze are a religiouscommunity, consideredto be an offshoot of the Ismaili
Islam,foundprimarily in Lebanon,Israel,and Syria. In Israel,theDruzearetheonlyArabs
whoareallowedto fightfortheIsraelDefenseForces,andmanyofthemservein theIsraeli
police.
36
SammySmooha,PartoftheProblemand PartoftheSolution:NationalSecurity and
theArab Minority, in National Security and Democracy in Israel 81 (Y. Avnered.,
1993).
37 Hillel
Frisch,TheDruze Minority in theIsraeli Military:Traditionalizingan Ethnic
Policing Role, 20 Armed Forces & Soc. 53 (1993).

Although theDruzesharesimilarpoliticalorientations withtheJewish

majority, theystillpreservethetraditional waysof lifein theirsegregated
communities, customsthatare verysimilarto thoseof theMuslimArabs.
Thisis quitesalientintheirpatterns ofpatrilocal residence, of
thecentrality
the extendedfamilyas an informalsocial controlmechanism, and their
maintenanceof social separation between the genders. These
characteristics indicatethattheDruzepolitically identifywiththeJews,but
culturally identify with the Muslim Arabs. In recentyears,few clashes
betweenthe police and the Druze have erupted,and thesemostlyhave
stemmedfromthedifference betweenthemodernand traditional cultures.
In October2007, a violentclash tookplace betweenthe police and the
Druze citizensof a small northern village called Pki'in. SeveralDruze
vigilantes from the community burned some new cellularantennasthat
wereinstalledin thevillage. The people of thevillagebelievedthatthe
cellularantennaswereresponsible fortheincreasein cancerratesin their
community. More than 200 police officerssentto arrestthevigilantes were
metwithharshcommunity resistance.The police used live ammunition
andmanycitizensandpoliceofficers werewounded.Someofthewounded
police officerswere Druze. This incidentemphasizesthe traditional
structure of Druze societyin Israel and its potentialconflictwithlaw
enforcement.
Whenaddressingthepopulationof theChristian Arabs,we face the
same complexity. Because theyidentifystronglywiththe Palestinian
nationalidentity and sharethe MuslimArabs' politicalorientation, one
mightassumetheChristian Arabs' attitudes towardthepolice to be more
negative.However,thelifestyle of mostChristian Arabsis moreWestern-
oriented, similar to that of the Jewish population. In addition,this
is
community largely urban, better situated economically,and in
consequencehighlyrepresented in the Israeli-Arabelite class.38 The
birthrateis significantly low amongChristian Arabs;it is even lowerthan
the rateamongJewsand significantly differsfromthatof Muslimsand
Druze. The practiceof namingchildrento reflecta European-Christian
heritageand the use of foreignlanguagesin daily speechare culturally
Westerncharacteristics of the ChristianArabs. Furthermore, Christian
Arabsoccupya higherclass positioncomparedto therestoftheArabsub-
groups,especially in termsof educationalattainment and income.39
38Amalia
Sa'ar, Carefullyon the Margins:ChristianPalestiniansin Haifa Between
NationandState,25 Am.ETHNOLOGIST 215,215-16(1998).
V. Kraus& Y. Yonay,ThePowerand LimitsofEthnonationalism: Palestiniansand
schoolsin
EasternJewsinIsrael,1974-1991,51 Brit. J.Soc'y 550 (2000). The Christian

Accordingly, we mayconcludethattheChristian Arabsare politicallyvery

close to theMuslimArabsbutculturally differentfromthem,and fromthe
Druze. Consequently, theystill view themselvesas a distinctcultural-
religiousminority amongArabsin Israel.40
I have severalresearchhypotheses forthisstudy. I expectthatthe
political and culturaldifferences within the Arab minority will createa
complexpicture of their perceptionstoward the police. For example,I
expectthattheDruzewillexpresspositiveattitudes towardthepoliceinthe
politicalcontext.At thesame time,I suspectthattheywill sharesimilar
(negative)attitudes to thoseof MuslimArabs whencommunity cultural
codesarethreatened bypolicepractices. I also expectthat ChristianArabs,
similarly to MuslimArabs,willexpressnegativeattitudes towardthepolice
in thepoliticalcontext,butat thesametime,theywill be morelikelythan
Muslimand Druze to contactthepolice forassistancedue to theirclass
positionandWesternized cultural
orientation.
V. Arab-Police Relations in Israel

The Or Commission - formedto investigatethe violent clashes
betweenthepolice(and theBorderPolice)41and theIsraeliArabminority
in Octoberof 2000- has notedthatmanyArabs do not believethatthe
policeservetheArabpopulation, butareinsteadthe"longarm"ofa regime
designedto controland Arab
suppress politicalactivities.Atthesametime,
manypolice officersview Arabs as disloyalcitizens. The police are
inconsistentin enforcingordinarycriminallaws in Arab communities, a
practicethat leads to a degree of uncheckedcrime withinminority
communities.42
Israelhave a reputation as eliteschoolsand of offeringa betterqualityof educationthan

publicArabschools. Sa'ar,supranote38, at 217-18.
40
Sa'ar,supranote38, at23 1.
41 The BorderPolice was establishedin 1953 withthe main functionof
preventing
terroristsabotageactivitiesand the infiltrationof Palestiniansfromneighboring Arab
countries.Cohen,supranote24. Overtheyears,thisunithas becomesemi-militaristic and
has cometo deal mostlywithpublicorderpolicing. Arabprotestin Israelhas a traumatic
and violenthistory of encounterswiththeBorderPolice. Furthermore, theBorderPolice is
veryactive in the Palestinianterritories,
especiallyin policingterrorism,patrolling,and
publicorderpolicing.Theseactivities havegivenita verynegativereputation amongArabs
in Israel. See Badi Hasisi & Ronald Weitzer,Police RelationswithArabs and Jewsin
Israel,47 Brit. J.Criminology728 (2007).
42 Or
Comm'n,Report of the State Commissionof Inquiry to Investigate the
Clashes betweenthe SecurityForces and Israeli CitizensinOctober 2000 (2003).

Thereis minimalresearchon police-minority relationsin Israel,most

of whichemphasizesthe negativeattitudesof Israeli Arabs towardthe
police.43In one poll,only53% of IsraeliArabsfeltthattheyshouldobey
thepolice,comparedto 85% of Jews.44Surveysconductedbetween2000
and 2002 showthatArabrespondents expressnegativeattitudes towardthe
police.45In the2001 poll, approximately 70% of Arabsthought thatthe
police forcewas not egalitarianin its attitude
toward all citizensof Israel,
whileonly35% ofJewsagreed.The violentclashesbetweenthepoliceand
Arabcitizensin theOctober2000 masseventssignificantly influenced this
disparityin views. Still,evenby thetimeof the2002 poll, a significant
majority of Arabrespondents (62%) maintained theirbeliefthatthepolice
arenotegalitarian towardall citizensofIsrael.
Takingintoconsideration the politicaland culturaldiversity among
IsraeliArabs(Muslim,Christian, and Druze),it is surprisingthatwe could
notfindevenone researcher who addressedtheimpactof thisdiversity on
theattitudes of Arabminority sub-groups toward thepolice. The current
researchis thereforequiteoriginal.
VI. Data and Methodology

Data for this studycomes froma telephonesurveywhich was
conductedovera periodof two weeksin March2003 amongadultArabs
and Jewsover the age of eighteenresidingin the Israelipolice force's
Northern District.The Northern Districtrangesfromthe HaderaValley
(Wadi Ara) to theLebanese border. The majority(70%) oftheIsraeli-Arab
populationlivesin theNorthern District, in communities
typically thatare
highlysegregated fromtheJewishpopulation.
Data was collectedfroma representative
telephone sampledrawnfrom
localesintheNorthern withmorethan1,000residents.The sample
District
included255 Jewishand471 Arabrespondents. The 471 Arabrespondents
included328 Muslims,77 Christians,and 66 Druze Arabs.46 Cluster
samplingwas usedto ensurethateach groupwas adequatelyrepresented in
43 Hasisi & The Marginsof

Weitzer,supra note41, at 740-42 (2007); AryeRattner,
Justice:Attitudes
TowardstheLaw and theLegal System AmongJewsandArabsinIsrael,4
Int'l J.Pub.OpinionRes. 358 (1994); David Weisburdetal., Community
PolicinginIsrael:
Resistanceand Change,25 Policing 80 (2002).
44 Ira Cahanman & Tamar
Tzemach, Israeli Police in the Eye of the Public:
Attitudeson Selected Issues (1991).
45 AryeRattner & Dana
Yagil, The Culture of Law: The CriminalJusticeSystem
inthe Eye of the Israeli Society (2002).
46 BedouinArabs were excludedfromthe
sampledue to theirsmall numberin the
Northern District.

the sample,and the responserate was 40% both forArab and Jewish
respondents.Interviewswere conductedbothin Arabicand Hebrewby
AraborJewishinterviewersmatchedtotherespondent's
background.
A. DEPENDENTVARIABLE
In thisstudy,twothemesin citizens'attitudes towardthepolicewere
examined:trustin thepolice and community receptivity to contactingthe
police. The trustvariableincludes fivemeasures in a five-pointLikert
scale
rangingfrom"stronglydisagree"to "stronglyagree" in regardto the
following statements:"I havetrustinthepolice;""I havetrustintheBorder
Police"(also knownas theBorderPatrol);"The policedo theirjob fairly;"
"Thepoliceworkto prevent crimenearmyresidence;"and"I wouldpermit
a memberof myfamilyto becomea police officer"(Cronbach'salpha=
.77).47 The receptivity variableincludesfourmeasuresin a five-point
Likertscale rangingfrom"strongly disagree"to "strongly agree"in regard
to thefollowing statements: "Reporting criminalsto thepolice in myview
is informing on them;""I feelthatpolice officers are notwelcomein my
community;" "In theeventthatI becomea victimofproperty crime,I will
reportthecrimeto thepolice;"and "In theeventthatI becomea victimof
violentcrime,I will reportthe crimeto the police."48 The receptivity
variableeventuallycombinedtwo items:willingnessto reportproperty
crimesand willingness to reporta violentcrimeto thepolice (Cronbach's
alpha= .66).
B. INDEPENDENTVARIABLES
The independentvariables in this study include the standard
demographicfactorsof age, gender,and social class, with the latter
measuredby educationalattainment. Most studies of police-citizen
relationsfindthatage is a significant
predictorof attitudestowardthe
police, with youngpeople more likelythan older age groupsto hold
negativeviews of the police.49 Genderand class, however,are less
consistentpredictors.
I suspectthatthefearof crimemayaffectthepublicperception ofthe
police.50Somestudieshavefoundthatpeoplewhoarefearful ofcrimemay
47See Table 1.
48See Table 3.
B. Brown& W. Benedict,Perceptionsof thePolice: Past Findings,Methodological
Issues,ConceptualIssues,andPolicyImplications,
25 POLICING 543, 554 (2002).
50AllenE. Liskaet Fears Crimeas a Social 60 Soc. FORCES760 (1982).
al., of Fact,

1134 BADIHASISI [Vol.98
blamethepoliceforthecrimetheyfear. Fearofcrimeis measuredin the

presentstudyby thefollowing question:"To whatextentare you afraidof
becoming a victim of violent crime?" Responseswereratedon a scale of 1
(not afraidat all) to 5 (veryafraid).
A significant partoftheIsraeli-Arab minorityholdsdissident political
attitudestowardtheregimeand rejectstheJewishidentity of thestate. I
expectthatthoseArabswho expressmoderateattitudes towardtheIsraeli
statewill be morefavorablein theirperceptions of the police and more
receptiveto contacting thepolice. This variablewas measuredby asking
Arabrespondents if Israel,as a Jewishand democratic state,can guarantee
equal rightsto its Israeli-Arab citizens.52
We knowthathighlycontroversial incidentsinvolvingthepolicemay
have an immediateand powerfuleffecton citizens'opinions,particularly
whentheincident involvesmembers ofone's ownethnicgroup.In Israel,it
is possiblethatArabcommunities thatexperienced a violentconflictwith
the police in October2000 would evaluatethe police negatively.Arab
respondents wereaskedwhether theircommunity had experienced suchan
incident.53Approximately half of ourArab respondents reported sucha
that
clashhadoccurred intheircommunity (scored1) andtheotherhalfreported
no such incident(scored 0). This variable was measuredfor Arab
respondents only.
In a societyas politicizedas Israel,a person'sethnicity mightbe
expectedto influence his or herevaluationsof thepolice. The variableof
ethnicitydistinguishes betweenArabs and Jewishrespondents, and also
among Arab sub-groups and
(Muslims,Christians, Druze).
VII. Analysis
I comparedtheattitudesandpreferencesofArabs,Jews,andArabsub-
and
groups(Muslims,Christians, Druze)regarding thetwokeydimensions
-
of police-citizenrelations trustand receptivity.Both bivariateand
multivariateanalyseswereconducted.In themultivariate models,a linear
regression was
analysis performed onlyfortheArab respondents on eachof
thetwoindicesreflecting themaindependent variables.The trustindexof
the police combinedfive items:trustin the police, trustin the Border
Police,the fairperformance of thepolice,theperceptionof police crime
51 See Brown&
Benedict,supra note49; MaryHollandBakeret al., TheImpactof a
CrimeWave:Perceptions, Fear, and Confidencein thePolice, 17 Law & Soc'y Rev. 319
(1983).
Thisvariablewas measuredforArabrespondents only.
53Thisvariableis labeled clash.
police-community

preventionefforts nearthe respondent's residence,and the likelihoodof

permittinga member of one's family become a police officer. The
to
scale
receptivity combined two items:
willingnessto report
property crimes
andwillingnessto reporta violentcrimetothepolice.
A. TRUST IN THE POLICE
Table 1
TrustinLaw Enforcement
Institutions
and PolicePerformance
PercentageAgreeing
Mean (StandardDeviation)
Jews Arabs
(Af=255) (#=471)
a
Trustthe Israel 59.6 44.8
Police*** 3.72 (1.10) 3.35 (1.32)
b
TrusttheBorder 82.1 39.3
Police*** 4.27 (0.97) 2.96 (1.60)
cThe police do theirjob 54.1 32.1
fairly*** 3.54 (1.12) 2.84 (1.43)
d
Police workto prevent
" "
crimenear your
residence*** _____
e
You would permita
memberof yourfamily 60.4 47.3
to become a police 3.65 (1.55) 3.06 (1.78)
officer***
Asterisks denotesignificancelevelsfromanalysisofvariance.* < .05 ** < .01 *** <.001
a
The respondents wereaskediftheyagreewiththestatement, "I havetrustin thepolice?"
The responseformat was ordinal;therangesfrom1 to 5: 1 = stronglydisagree;5 = strongly
agree.
b The wereaskedif theyagreewiththestatement, "I have trustin theBorder
respondents
Police?" Theresponseformat was ordinal;therangesfrom1 to 5: 1 = strongly disagree;5 =
strongly agree.
c The wereasked if theyagreewiththe statement, "The police do theirjob
respondents
fairly."The responseformat is ordinal;therangesfrom1 to 5: 1 = strongly disagree;5 =
strongly agree.
d The wereaskediftheyagreewiththestatement, "The policeworkto prevent
respondents
crimenearmyresidence." The responseformatis ordinal;therangesfrom1 to 5: 1 =
strongly disagree;5 = strongly
agree.
e The wereaskediftheyagreewiththestatement, "I wouldpermita member of
respondents
yourfamilyto becomea policeofficer."The responseformat is ordinal;therangesfrom1
to 5: 1 = strongly
disagree;5 = stronglyagree.

The findingsin Table 1 showthatthepoliceare highlytrusted among

Jewishrespondents in comparisonto relativelylow levels of trustamong
Arabrespondents - 59.6% and44.8%, respectively. A significantdisparity
betweenJews and Arabs was foundin relationto trustin the Border
Police- 82% and 39.3%, respectively. Jewishrespondents are morelikely
to evaluatetheperformance ofthepoliceas fairandare also moresatisfied
withpolice crimecontrolthanare Arabrespondents.The data in Table 1
also showthatJewishrespondents aremoreinclinedthanArabrespondents
topermit a member oftheirfamily tojoin thepoliceforce.
Table 2
Means(StandardDeviation)ofTrustinLaw Enforcement Institutions
and Police
Performance, byArabSub-Ethnic Group
ArabSub-Ethnicity
Percentage Agreeing
Mean (StandardDeviation)
Muslims Christians Druze
N =328 N=ll N=66
TrusttheIsrael 40.2 41.6 63.6
Police** 3.25 (1.33) 3.30 (1.34) 3.74 (1.25)
TrusttheBorder 31.4 41.7 75.8
Police*** 2.70 (1.58) 3.04 (1.60) 4.09 (1.28)
Thepolicedo 32.2 26 41
theirjob fairly*** 2.84 (1.45) 2.75 (1.38) 3.05 (1.43)
Policeworkto
prevent crime 30 39 32.2
nearyour 2.88 (1.33) 3.06 (1.35) 2.92(1.38)
residence
You wouldpermit
a member ofyour
^ ^ g4 g
famdytobecome
a police 265(171) 3.35(1.76) 4.35(1.33)
officer***
Asterisks
denote levelsfrom
significance ofvariance.
analysis * < .05 **< .01 ***< .001
Table 2 presentsthe attitudesof Arab sub-groups(Muslims,

Christians,and Druze). Findingsfromthe table show that Druze
respondentsholdmorepositiveattitudestowardthepolicethando Muslim
and ChristianArabs. The Druze's level of trustin thepolice and Border

Police is verysimilarto thatof Jewishrespondents.54More thanMuslim

and ChristianArabs,the Druze tendto evaluatethe performance of the
police as fair. Furthermore,theDruze are even moreenthusiastic
than the
Jewsabouta memberof theirfamilyjoiningthepolice (84.8%), and they
significantlydifferin theirviewson thisissue fromMuslimand Christian
Arabs.
B. RECEPTIVITY TO THE POLICE
Table 3
tothePolice
Receptivity
Percentage
Agreeing
Mean(StandardDeviation)
Jews Arabs
N=255 N=47\
a
Reportingcriminalsto the
police in my view is informing Lg? ( ^ (
on them***
bI
feel thatpolice officersare
'
notwelcome in my
,
community***
c
Willingnessto reportproperty 85.8 68.4
crimeto police*** 4.49 (1.07) 4.01 (1.40)
d
Willingnessto reportviolent 8 1.6 65.6
crimeto police*** 4.41 (1.07) 3.89 (1.45)
Asterisks denotesignificancelevelsfromanalysisofvariance.* < .05 ** < .01 *** <.001
a
The respondents wereaskediftheyagreewiththestatement, "Reporting criminals to the
policein myviewis informing on them."The responseformat is ordinal;therangesfrom1
to 5: 1 = stronglydisagree;5 = stronglyagree.
bThe wereaskediftheyagreewiththestatement, "I feelthatpoliceofficers are
respondents
notwelcomein mycommunity." The responseformat is ordinal;therangesfrom1 to 5: 1 =
strongly disagree;5 = stronglyagree.
cThe wereaskediftheyagreewiththestatement, "In case youbecomea victim
respondents
ofproperty crime,youwillreportthecrimeto thepolice." The responseformat is ordinal;
therangesfrom1 to 5: 1= strongly 5 =
disagree; strongly agree.
dThe wereaskediftheyagreewiththestatement, "In case youbecomea victim
respondents
ofviolentcrime,youwillreport thecrimeto thepolice." Theresponseformat is ordinal;the
rangesfrom1 to 5: 1 = strongly disagree;5 = strongly agree.
54See Table 1.

A receptiverelationshipbetweenthe police and the community is

crucial for effectivepolice performance. Table 3 shows that Arab
respondents are morecautiousthanJewishrespondents in theirinteraction
withthepolice. In comparison withJewishrespondents, Arabsgenerally
endorsethestatement, "Reporting criminals to thepolice is likeinforming
on them." Similarviews are also shownby theresponseindicating that
police officersare not welcome in the community. Furthermore, this
dynamic is observedin the case of reporting bothproperty and violent
crimes,as Arab respondents seem to feelrestricted fromeitherreporting
crimesor complaining.This constrained relationshipbetweenthepolice
and the Arab minority may be best explainedby the politicalvariable.
Similarfindings weredocumented among non-dominant groupsinNorthern
IrelandandSouthAfrica.55
Table 4
to thePolice,byArabSub-Ethnic
Receptivity Group
ArabSub-Ethnicity
Percentage Agreeing
Mean(StandardDeviation)
Muslims Christians Druze
W=328 N=ll N=66
Reporting criminalstothe
3Q4 ^ 4 ^ Q
police in my view is
^ ( ^ ( ^ (
informing on them
I feelthatpoliceofficersare
, . 36.o 32.5 30.o
notwelcomein my
^ ^ ^
community
Willingness toreport 67.7 83.1 60.6
property crimetopolice*** 3.97 (1.43) 4.44 (1.09) 3.73 (1.51)
Willingness toreport violent 63.7 75.0 66.7
crimetopolice* 3.81 (1.50) 4.28 (1.18) 3.92(1.38)
Asterisksdenote levelsfrom
significance * < .05 **< .01 ***<.001
ofvariance.
analysis
As notedearlier,theDruze hold similarpoliticalattitudes

to thoseof
Jews,so iftheexplanation
forpolicereceptivityweresolelypolitical,thenI
wouldexpecttheDruzeto expressmorereceptivity to thepolice. Findings
in Table 4 show thatthisis not the case. In reality,the Druze express
55John
Brewer,Policing,in The Elusive Search for Peace: South Africa, Israel,
and Northern Ireland (H. Gilomee& J.Gagianoeds., 1990); see Brewer, Black and
Blue, supranote1; Weitzer,Policing UnderFire,supranote1.

similarattitudes to thoseof Muslimsin all aspectsof police receptivity.

They even endorse,more than Muslims,the statement that reporting
criminals to thepolice is likeinforming on them(40%). Thirty percentof
Druze respondents thinkthatpolice officersare not welcome in their
communities, and the Druze expressan unwillingness, similarto thatof
Muslims,toreport property andviolentcrimestothepolice.
These findingssuggestthatthe politicalexplanationis not entirely
adequateto explaintheArab minority's lack of receptivityto thepolice.
However,thatthe Druze sharea similarpoliticalorientation withIsraeli
Jewswhile maintaining culturalsimilarities withthe Muslims,and this
mightbe theexplanation.The culturalexplanation is also manifest when
focusingon Christian Arabs' receptivity to thepolice. Table 4 showsthat
althoughChristian Arabssharea similarpoliticalorientation withMuslim
Arabs(as expressedintheirnegativeattitudes towardthepoliceinTable 2),
theystillare significantlymorewillingto contactthepolicein theeventof
property and violentcrimes,and in thistheyare moresimilarto Israeli
Jews.
The datapresented abovepointto differences amongArabsub-groups.
The Druzeexpresspositiveperceptions ofthepoliceinthepoliticalcontext,
but like MuslimArabs,theyare morerestricted in theirwillingnessto
contact the police. Conversely,ChristianArabs express negative
perceptions of thepolice in thepoliticalcontext, butalso expresspositive
in to
perceptions regard making contactwith thepolice. Atthisstage,I will
firsttryto determineif these differences persist,independent of the
influenceof othervariables. The surveyincludedquestionsregarding
respondents'demographicattributesand other potentiallyrelevant
predictors.Second,I willtryto determine whatotherfactors, in additionto
ethnicbackground, predicttheArabminority's perceptionsof thepolicein
Israel.
I conducteda multivariate analysisto estimatethe effectof several
predictorson thepublic'sperceptions of thepolice. This was donein two
stages. First,I used thecompletesurveysampleincludingIsraeliJewsas
thereference category.By conditioning outthisvariable,I could estimate
the impactof the independent variablesand focus on the differences
betweeneach Arab minority grouprelativeto Israeli Jews. Second, I
estimatedthe model solely for the Israeli Arab minoritysub-groups,
excludingJewishrespondents sincesomeoftheindependent variableswere
measured only for Arab respondents - e.g., endorsingthe Jewish-

democratic statein Israeland experiencingviolentclasheswiththepolice

duringtheOctober2000 events.56
In general,thepolicetrustmodelin Table 5 is morepowerfulthanthe
community receptivitymodel,as indicatedbytheadjustedR2figuresinthe
models.57We can see in thepolicetrustmodelthateducationhas a strong
effecton predictingthepublic'strustin thepolice:thehighertheeducation
of therespondents, thelowertheirsupportof thepolice. This findingcan
be explainedby the effectof educationon the politicization of public
awarenessofpoliceperformance.
Table 5
Estimates
Regression ofPredictors
forEffects on PublicPerceptions
ofthePolice
TrustModel Model
Receptivity
Mg) Mg)
Education -.34(-.25)*** .02 (.03)
Gender(1= male) -.60(-.07)* -.69(-.15)**
FearofCrime .31 (.11)** .21 (.14)***
Ethnicity
Jewish(ref.)
Muslim -4.25(-.48)*** -1.15(-.25)***
Christian -2.68(-.19)*** -.21(-.03)
Druze -.77(-.05) -1.33(-.17)***
R2(AdjustedR2) .22 (.21) .10 (.09)
_N_ 654 712
Asterisks
denote levelsfrom
significance analysis ofvariance.< .05 < .01 ***<.001
* **
Genderhas significant impactbothon the trustand the receptivity

model. Womentendto expressmoretrustand be morereceptivein their
interactionwiththepolicethanmen. One reasonthatIsraeliwomenhold
positiveviewsofthepolicemayhaveto do withthefactthattheyaremore
concerned thanmenaboutbecomingvictimsofcrime.58
Fearof crimemayaffectone's perceptions ofthepoliceinsofaras the
policeareevaluatedfortheirperformance inpreventingor solvingcrimes.59
The findings affects
indicatethatfearofviolentvictimization boththetrust
56See Table 6.
57VarianceInflationFactor(VIF) was conducted ifanyindependent
to verify variablein
themodelis a linearfunction variables.VIF valueswereless thantwo
ofotherindependent
amongall variablesinthemodels.
58See Hasisi&
supranote41.
Weitzer,
59See Brown&
Benedict,supranote49.

and the receptivity models;the greaterthe fearof crime,the higherthe

evaluationofthepoliceandthegreater theinclinationto contactthepolice.
As suggestedabove,thisfinding might be affectedby thefactthatthefear
ofcrimeis moreprominent among women.
Finally,I examinedthe effectof Arab sub-ethnicity in bothmodels
using Israeli Jews as the reference group. The results show thatethnic
differences persist.Net of the other Muslim
factors, and ChristianArabs
are morelikelythanDruze (and Jews)to holdnegativeperceptions of the
policein thetrustmodel. Reviewingthereceptivity model,we can see that
Druze are moresimilarto Muslimsin theirrestricted to the
receptivity
police,whereas ChristianArabs expressreceptive attitudessimilarto those
expressedby Jewish in to the
respondents regard contacting police.
In thesecondstage,I estimated thetrustandreceptivity modelssolely
forArabrespondents.In thepolicetrustmodelwe can see thateducation
has a strongeffecton predicting Arabtrustof thepolice. The higherthe
educationofan Arabindividual, thelowertheirsupport ofthepolice. One
reasonthathighlyeducatedArabsmightbe criticalofthepoliceis thatthey
typicallylive,notwithmiddle-class Jews,butwithpoorand working-class
Arabs, and thereforeexperience the same kind of treatment fromthe
police.60Educationhadno significant effecton thereceptivity
model.
Table 6
RegressionEstimates
forEffectsofPredictors
on
IsraeliArabPerceptions
ofthePolice
TrustModel Model
Receptivity
Mg) b(P)
Education -.46 (-.27)*** -.05 (-.06)
Gender(1= male) -.71 (-.06) -.64 (-.13)**
FearofCrime .40 (.12)** .32 (.21)***
Community-Police Clash(Oct.2000) -1.00 (-.10)* -.15 (-.03)
Israelas a Jewish-democraticstatecan
guarantee totheIsraeliArabs
equal rights 1.2 (.19)*** .13 (.09)*
Ethnicity
Druze(ref.)
Muslim -3.12 (.27)*** .21 (.04)
Christian -1.80 (-.13)* 1.20(.18)**
R2(AdjustedR2) .25 (.24) .11 (.10)
_N_ 425 454
Asterisks *
levelsfromanalysisofvariance. < .05
denotesignificance ** < .01 *** <.001
60Noh Lewin-Epstein& Moshe

Semyonov, The Arab Minority in Israel's
Economy:Patterns of EthnicInequality (1993).

Fearofcrimemayaffectone's perceptions ofthepoliceinsofaras the

policeareevaluatedfortheirperformance inpreventing or solvingcrimes.61
The findings indicatethatfearofviolentvictimization affectsboththetrust
and the receptivity models; the greater the fear of crime, higherthe
the
evaluationofthepoliceandthegreater theinclination to contactthepolice.
Genderhad no significant impact on the trustmodel, buttherewas
some impacton the receptivity model. Arab womentendto be more
receptivein theirinteraction withthepolice thanArabmen. One reason
thatArab womenmightbe morereceptiveto contacting the police may
haveto do withthefactthattheyare moreconcerned thanArabmenabout
becomingvictimsof crime,especiallywhentraditional social controlsin
theArabcommunity are gender-biased.62 Anotherreasonmayhave to do
withthe negativepoliticalimage of the police amongArab men,who
frequently- more than Arab women - experienceviolentclashes with
policeatpoliticalevents.63
Police-community conflictduringthe riotsof October2000 had a
significanteffecton thetrustmodelofpolicing.Arabswhoreport thattheir
had
community experienced a violent clash with police officers are more
inclinedto expressnegativeattitudes towardthe police. This findingis
consistentwith other studies that documentthe effectsof highly
controversial policingincidentson citizens'perceptionsof the police.64
Thisvariablehasno significant effectinthecase ofthereceptivity model.
I expectedthatArabswhoagreethatIsrael,as a Jewishanddemocratic
state,can guaranteeequal rightsto its Arab citizenswould be more
supportive of the police. This was confirmed in the two models:Arab
who
respondents agree with the statement expressmorepositiveattitudes
towardthepoliceandaremoreinclinedto contactthepolice. The effectof
thisvariableis,however, moresalientinthe(political)trustmodel.
Finally, I examined the effectof Arab sub-ethnicity in bothmodels.
The resultsshow thatethnicdifferences persist;net of the otherfactors,
Muslimand Christian ArabsweremorelikelythanDruzeto holdnegative
61See Brown&
Benedict,supranote49.
62See WomenAgainst
Violence, Attitudes Towards the Status and Rights of
Palestinian Womenin Israel (2006); Hasan,supranote23; NaderaShalhoub-Kevorkian,
Law, Politics,and ViolenceAgainstWomen:a Case StudyofPalestiniansinIsrael,21 Law
&Pol'y 190, 196(1999).
63See Hasisi&
Weitzer,supranote41.
64 RobertJ. Kaminski& Eric S. The Effectof a ViolentTelevisedArreston
Jefferis,
Public Perceptionsof thePolice, 21 POLICING683 (1998); RonaldWeitzer& StevenA.
Tuch, Perceptionsof Racial Profiling:Race, Class, and Personal Experience,40
Criminology435 (2002).

ofthepoliceinthetrustmodel. Whenreviewing
perceptions thereceptivity
model,we can see thatDruzearemoresimilarto Muslimsintheirrestricted
to thepolice,whereasChristian
receptivity Arabsexpressmorereceptive
thanMuslimandDruzeinregardto contacting
attitudes thepolice.
VIII. Discussion
Most of the researchon police-minority relationsin deeplydivided
societieshas emphasizedthepoliticalexplanation, yetverylittleresearch
has addressedthe influenceof culturalpluralismon police-community
relations.In thisarticleI have triedto elaborateon the influenceof the
culturaldiversity and resistance of theArabnativeminority in Israelupon
policeperformance, alongsidepolitical variables.
The majorcontribution of thisArticleis thatit sheds lighton the
differences withinminoritygroups and theirramifications on police-
minority relations. We usually refer to minority groups as a coherent,
homogeneousgroup. By doing so, we may miss important distinctions
withinthe minority groupthathave an effecton theirrelationswiththe
police. This Article shows that,dependingupon politicaland cultural
affiliations, theArab minority has differentperceptions towardthepolice.
Arabswho hold similarpoliticalattitudes to theJewishmajority (i.e., the
Druze) expressedpositiveattitudes towardthepolice. By thesametoken,
Arabswitha culturalsimilarity to theJewishmajority (i.e., theChristians)
expressed a more openreceptivity to thepolice. Both politicaland cultural
variablescontributed to a betterunderstanding of police-minority relations
in Israel.
This researchcan be extendedto explorethe relationship between
police and minoritiesin other countries. Native-aboriginal populations
residein severalWesterncountries, and recentstudieshave revealedthe
tenserelationship betweenthepoliceandtheaboriginal populationin these
countries.65Furthermore, thisresearchcan also be extendedto several
Westerncountrieswho hostimmigrants fromdifferent cultures. Several
studieshaveshownthetenserelations betweentheseimmigrant groupsand
thepolice. ThisArticlesuggeststhata deeperanalysisoftherelationships
betweenminority groupsand the police shouldbe conducted,and that
researchers shouldbe moreattentive in theiranalysisof the differences
withinminority groups.
Thisresearchcan also be extendedto exploretherelationship between
thepolice and othersocial groupsin Israelisociety. Indeed,theJewish
65
Blagg& Valuri,supranote9.

population is nota homogenous groupin culturalterms.Forinstance,ultra-

OrthodoxJews are culturallydistinguishable fromthe secular Jewish
majority.Consequently, theyholdsignificant negativeattitudes
towardthe
police.66 Further researchshould be directedtoward analyzingpolice
performance as perceivedby ultra-Orthodox Jews,whichmightclarifythe
impactof culturaldiversityon theircriminalbehaviorand attitudestoward
thepolice.
Thereare some limitations to thisresearchthatshouldbe mentioned.
Less than25% of thestatistical varianceis explainedin each model,and
thisraisesthequestionof whatfactorsare nottakenintoaccountand how
theymightaffectthe findings.The suggestedmodelstake intoaccount
manypossiblevariablesthathave confounded otherstudies.Nonetheless,
as in all multivariateanalyses, we should be cautious in drawing
conclusions.67Futurestudiesshould even more closely specifytheir
modelsofminority attitudes
towardthepolice.
IX. Conclusion
ThisArticleoffers a framework foranalyzing police-minorityrelations
in deeplydividedsocieties. In thesekindsof societies,the regimehas
severeproblemswithits legitimacy amongthe minority group,whichin
turnaffectsthegroup'srelationship withthepolice. Researchshowsthat
betweenArabsandJewsin Israelhave
thepoliticaland culturaldisparities
reducedthetrustand thewillingness of IsraeliArabsto cooperatewiththe
police. The politicalexplanations assume thatthe major sourceof the
tensionbetweenthe police and the minority groupstem frompolitical
variables,and in orderto improvethisrelationship, reforms
socio-political
the
regarding minority group are necessary. The cultural explanations
assumethatthetensionsbetweenthepoliceandtheminority grouparealso
influenced factors.Thus,
by culturalvariables,and notjust socio-political
in orderto improvetherelationship betweentheminority and thepolice,
culturalreforms are requiredin orderto changethepolice culturebothin
66 Ministryof Pub.
Sec, State of Israel, Public Attitudes Towards the Israeli
Police (2002); Ministryof Pub. Sec, State of Israel, Public Attitudes Towards the
Israeli Police (2001); Rafi Smith,Keren Sharvit & SmithConsulting & Research
Inc., Public Attitudes Towards the Israeli Police: Executive Summary(2000);
Ministryof Pub. Sec, State of Israel, Public Attitudes Towards the Israeli Police
(1999).
67 David on
Models:Reflecting
Weisburd, Magicand Sciencein Multivariate Sentencing
theLimitsofStatistical
Methods, 35 Israel L. Rev. 225 (2001).

themakingof management-level and street-level decisionswithrespectto

minority groups.68
The cultural andpoliticaldifferences betweenJewsandArabsin Israel
pose a challengeforpoliceperformance in theminority community. While
thepoliceare focusedon law enforcement, theymustalso be awareof and
sensitiveto the culturaldistinctiveness of the minority community and
suitablyadjust themselves to it when providing servicesto Arab citizens.
Increaseddistribution of community police stationsin Arab communities
would createbetteraccess to police and facilitate theprocedureof filing
complaints. In order to improveArab-police relations,a multicultural
approach is needed. This approach could be putinto practiceby recruiting
moreArabpolicemenandpolicewomen, especiallynon-Bedouin Muslims69
and, at the same time,by creatingstrongties betweenthe local political
leadershipand thechiefsof police stations, ties whichhave provento be
valuableintimesofcrisis.70
However,a multicultural approachis notwithoutrisk. A policyof
culturalrelativity thatis too flexiblein thepolicingof a minority groupis
liableto createa differential enforcement of laws and mayevenperpetuate
criminal behaviors.I concludethata balancedapproachto policepresence
is necessaryand that greaterconsiderationand judgmentshould be
exercisedwhenenforcing thelaw. The complextaskof policingtheArab
minority in Israel must take into accountthe population'spoliticaland
culturalcomposition, balancingits particular and diverseneeds withthe
needto maintain theruleofthelaw.
68Janet
Chan,ChangingPolice Culture, 36 Brit.J.Criminology109 (1996).
69
Althoughnon-Bedouin Muslimscomposeabout 12% of theIsraelipopulation, their
inthepoliceforceis lessthan2%. See Hasisi& Weitzer,
representation supranote41.
70 Indep.Comm'non Policing for Northern
Ireland, A New Beginning:Policing in
NorthernIreland 81-90(1999).


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