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Kaiser Recabo vs COMELEC & Francisco Reyes, Jr. GR 134293 (June 21, 1999)

KAISER B. RECABO, JR. vs. COMELEC & FRANCISCO R. REYES, JR.

G.R. No. 134293; 308 SCRA 793
June 21, 1999

FACTS: On March 27, 1998, Francisco R. Reyes, Jr., filed his certificate of candidacy for vice-mayor of Mainit, Surigao
Del Norte under the LAKAS NUCD-UMDP. His nomination by said political party is evidence by the certificate of
nomination and acceptance dated March 27, 1998 signed by Fidel V. Ramos and Jose de Venecia, National Chairman and
Secretary General, respectively, of said political party.

However, on April 2, 1998, Kaiser B. Recabo, Jr., claimed to be the official candidate of LAKAS as vice-mayor of the same
municipality and also filed his certificate of candidacy. Recabo also submitted to the Commission a copy of the certificate
of his nomination and acceptance signed only by one representative of LAKAS, Francisco T. Matugas. The space of the
other representative (Robert Z. Barbers) is blank. It was further alleged that Recabo, Jr., is a SUBSTITUTE candidate of
MRS. CANDELARIA B. RECABO who filed her Certificate of Candidacy for VICE-MAYOR of Mainit, Surigao del Norte on
March 25, 1998.

Reyes submits the theory that since the certificate of nomination and acceptance in favor of Candelaria B. Recabo is not
signed by Robert Barbers, there is no valid nomination by LAKAS NUCD-UMDP in favor of Candelaria Recabo. Therefore,
Candelaria B. Recabo not having been validly nominated, should be deemed an independent candidate only. And since
Candelaria B. Recabo is an independent candidate, she cannot be validly substituted because under Sec. 11 of Comelec
Res. No. 2977 promulgated on January 15, 1998, no substitution shall be allowed for an independent candidate.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners certificate of nomination by LAKAS NUCD-UMDP is valid?

HELD: NO. COMELEC Resolution No. 2977 provides under Section 5 thereof: The certificate of nomination by registered
political parties of their official candidates shall be filed with the certificates of candidacy not later than the last day for
filing of certificates of candidacy as specified in Section 4 hereof, duly signed and attested under oath by the party
president, chairman, secretary-general or any other party officer duly authorized in writing to do so.

Be that as it may, the certificate of nomination of the petitioner as well as his mother did not comply with the
requirements of being official candidates of LAKAS NUCD-UMDP Party. For the reason, that the certificate of nomination
was invalid because it was signed only by one authorized party officer as compared to Reyes which was signed by the
National Chairman and Secretary General, respectively, of said political party. Therefore, Candelaria Recabo is considered
an independent candidate.
Page 2 of 13
 Page 3 of 13

VICTORINO SALCEDO II vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and ERMELITA CACAO SALCEDO

August 16, 1999

Facts: This is a petition for Certiorari filed by petitioner Victorino Salcedo II seeking to reverse the earlier Resolution
issued by its Second Division on August 12, 1998.

Neptali P. Salcedo married Agnes Celiz, which marriage was evidenced by a certified true copy of the marriage contract
issued by the Municipal Civil Registrar of Ajuy, Iloilo. Without his first marriage having been dissolved, Neptali P. Salcedo
married private respondent Ermelita Cacao in a civil ceremony. Two days later, Ermelita Cacao contracted another
marriage with a certain Jesus Aguirre, as shown by a marriage certificate filed with the Office of the Civil Registrar.

Petitioner Victorino Salcedo II and private respondent Ermelita Cacao Salcedo both ran for the position of mayor of the
municipality of Sara, Iloilo in the May 11, 1998 elections, both of them having filed their respective certificates of
candidacy However, petitioner filed with the Comelec a petition seeking the cancellation of private respondent's
certificate of candidacy on the ground that she had made a false representation therein by stating that her surname was
"Salcedo." Petitioner contended that private respondent had no right to use said surname because she was not legally
married to Neptali Salcedo. Private respondent was proclaimed as the duly elected mayor of Sara, Iloilo.

In her answer, private respondent claimed that she had no information or knowledge at the time she married Neptali
Salcedo that he was in fact already married; that, upon learning of his existing marriage, she encouraged her husband to
take steps to annul his marriage with Agnes Celiz because the latter had abandoned their marital home. Neptali Salcedo
filed a petition for declaration of presumptive death which was granted by the court that Neptali Salcedo and Jesus
Aguirre are one and the same person; and that since 1986 up to the present she has been using the surname "Salcedo"
in all her personal, commercial and public transactions.

Comelec's Second Division ruled that since there is an existing valid marriage between Neptali Salcedo and Agnes Celiz,
the subsequent marriage of the former with private respondent is null and void. Consequently, the use by private
respondent of the surname "Salcedo" constitutes material misrepresentation and is a ground for the cancellation of her
certificate of candidacy.

However, in its en banc Resolution, the Comelec overturned its previous resolution, ruling that private respondent's
certificate of candidacy did not contain any material misrepresentation. A Motion for Reconsideration filed by the
petitioner was affirmed by the division which gives rise to the petition to review such promulgation.

Issue:

1.Whether or not the use by respondent of the surname "Salcedo" in her certificate of candidacy constitutes material
misrepresentation under Section 78 in relation to Section 74 of the Omnibus Election Code.

Held: Private respondent did not commit any material misrepresentation by the use of the surname "Salcedo" in her
certificate of candidacy.

A false representation under section 78 must consist of a "deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact which
would otherwise render a candidate ineligible." It must be made with an intention to deceive the electorate as to one's
qualifications for public office. The use of a surname, when not intended to mislead or deceive the public as to one's
identity, is not within the scope of the provision. There is absolutely no showing that the inhabitants of Sara, Iloilo were
deceived by the use of such surname by private respondent. Petitioner does not allege that the electorate did not know
who they were voting for when they cast their ballots in favor of "Ermelita Cacao Salcedo" or that they were fooled into
voting for someone else by the use of such name.

The Court AFFIRMS the en banc Resolution of the Commission on Elections denying the petition to cancel private
respondent's certificate of candidacy.
 Page 4 of 13

G.R. No. 139357 May 5, 2000

ABDULMADID P.B. MARUHOM, Petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, HADJI JAMIL DIMAPORO, et. al., Respondent.

FACTS: Petitioner Maruhom and Respondent Dimaporo were both candidates for Mayor in the Municipality of Marogong, Lanao del Sur.
During the counting of votes, serious irregularities, anomalies and electoral frauds were committed at the instance of Maruhom or his
followers in that votes actually casted for the Dimaporo were not counted and credited in his favor thru the concerted acts, conspiracy
and manipulation of the Board of Election Inspectors, military, Election Officer and the Machine Operator who happens to be a nephew
of the Maruhom. Many official ballots were refused or rejected by the machine. As a result of the foregoing irregularities, anomalies and
electoral frauds, Maruhom was proclaimed as winner because he appeared to have obtained 2,020 votes while Dimaporo garnered 2,000
votes with a slight margin of only 20 votes.

Dimaporo then filed before COMELEC a petition to annul the proclamation of Maruhom docketed as SPC No. 98-226 and thereafter also
filed an ordinary "Protest ad Cautelam" before the Regional Trial Court and for manual judicial recount, revision and re-appreciation of
ballots docketed as Election Case No. 11-127. Maruhom filed an answer with counter-protest in Election Case No. 11-127 and prayed to
hold in abeyance further proceedings since the protest is subject to the petition of Dimaporo filed before the COMELEC. Before the
COMELEC could set the hearing on the petition, Dimaporo filed a motion to withdraw his petition in said SPC No. 98-228 and which was
granted by COMELEC.

On the case filed before the RTC of which a Revision Committee was already duly created and its membership duly appointed in open
court which committee. After the Revision Committee was directed by the RTC to commence the revision of ballots, Maruhom thru
counsel orally moved for the dismissal of the protest. Dimaporo through counsel opposed the said oral motion to dismiss and orally
argued that the motion is clearly dilatory having been made only after the Revision Committee has been ordered to commence the
revision of ballots. After the oral arguments of both parties, Maruhoms counsel asked that he be given ample time to file a written
Omnibus Motion to Dismiss and the RTC allowed the filing of the Omnibus Motion in substantiation of all the oral motions he made,
furnishing a copy thereof to Dimaporos counsel who was likewise given an equal period of time to comment. Maruhom then filed his
motion to dismiss to which Dimaporo filed a vigorous opposition to motion to dismiss. During the hearing on the motion to dismiss and
the opposition thereto, Maruhoms counsel requested for ample time to file a rejoinder to the vigorous opposition to motion to dismiss
submitted Dimaporo which was granted by the court so that Maruhom filed his rejoinder and Dimaporo filed his comment thereto and
thereafter all incidents were submitted for resolution of the court. Subsequently, the RTC issued the assailed order denying the
Maruhoms motion to dismiss for lack of merit and ordering the Revision Committee to report to the court for their oath taking and to
receive the instruction of the court in the revision of the ballots and other allied matters. Maruhom filed a Motion for Reconsideration
which the RTC denied for lack of merit.

As a diabolical scheme to cause further delay of the proceedings of the case more specifically the revision of ballots, Maruhom filed the
COMELEC an instant petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for preliminary injunction and also filed an urgent motion before
the RTC praying that further proceedings in Election Case No. 11-127 be deferred until after Maruhoms petition with COMELEC shall
have been finally resolved. Before Dimaporos counsel could file his opposition to said urgent motion and in the absence of a restraining
order or writ of preliminary injunction issued by the COMELEC, the RTC already issued an order granting the same motion and ordering
the Revision Committee to hold in abeyance the scheduled revision of ballots until further order from the court. Maruhoms petition was
later dismissed by the COMELEC, hence, the instant petition with the SC, on the grounds that COMELEC acted in excess of, or with grave
abuse of discretion, amounting to lack of jurisdiction in:

1.] holding that a motion to dismiss an election protest case filed in the Regional Trial Court is a prohibited pleading;
2.] holding that the motion to dismiss filed after the answer is not allowed;
3.] failing to resolve the issues raised in SPR No. 52-98 which are sufficient legal bases to dismiss Election Case No. 11-127.

ISSUE: Whether or not COMELEC abdicated its duty under its own rules of procedure and under the Constitution and the election laws
amounting grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the SPR No. 52-98 and thereby affirming the RTC decision denying the motion to
dismiss the election protest filed Dimaporo against Maruhom
HELD: NO. Section 2(1) of Article IX (C) of the Constitution gives the COMELEC the broad power "to enforce and administer all laws and
regulations relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum and recall" which intends to give the COMELEC all the
necessary and incidental powers for it to achieve the objective of holding free, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible elections.
The Commission on Elections, by constitutional mandate must do everything in its power to secure a fair and honest canvass of the
votes cast in the elections. In the performance of its duties, the Commission must be given a considerable latitude in adopting means
and methods that will insure the accomplishment of the great objective for which it was created to promote free, orderly and honest
elections. The choice of means taken by the Commission on Elections, unless they are clearly illegal or constitute grave abuse of
discretion, should not be interfered with.

As to the filing of the motion to dismiss, the Court found that the same appears to be part of a perfidious plot to prevent the early
termination of the proceedings in the election case as evidenced by a confluence of events clearly showing a pattern of delay employed
by Maruhom to avert the revision ballots. Furthermore, while the challenged COMELEC Resolution may not have been entirely correct in
dismissing the petition, the soundness of its discretion to accord unto the trial court the competence to resolve the factual issues raised
in the controversy cannot be doubted.

Verily, the Court held that the legal compass from which the COMELEC should take its bearings in acting upon election controversies is
the principle that "clean elections control the appropriateness of the remedy." In the same vein, the Court ruled that in applying
elections laws, it would be far better to err in favor of popular sovereignty than to be right in complex but little understood legalisms.

PETITION DENIED.
 Page 5 of 13

The term residence, as used in the law prescribing thequalifications for suffrage and for elective office, means the same
thing as domicile, which imports not only an intention to reside in a fixed place but also personal presence in that
place, coupled with conduct indicative of such intention. Domicile denotes a fixed permanent residence to which,
whenever absent for business, pleasure, or some other reasons, one intends to return.

Records show that petitioners domicile of origin was Candon, Ilocos Sur and that sometime in 1991, he acquired a new
domicile of choice in Quezon City, as shown by his certificate of candidacy for the position of representative of the Third
District of Quezon City in the May 1995 election. Petitioner is now claiming that he had effectively abandoned his
residence in Quezon City and has established a new domicile of choice in the Province of Sarangani.

A persons domicile, once established, is considered to continue and will not be deemed lost until a new one is
established. To successfully effect a change of domicile, one must demonstrate an actual removal or an actual change of
domicile; bona fide intentions of abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a new one and definite acts
which correspond with the purpose.

The contract of lease of a house and lot entered into sometime in January 1997 does not adequately support a change of
domicile. The lease contract may be indicative of Dominos intention to reside in Sarangani, but it does not engender the
kind of permanency required to prove abandonment of ones original domicile. The mere absence of individual from his
permanent residence, no matter how long, without the intention to abandon it does not result in loss or change of
domicile. Thus, the date of the contract of lease of a house and lot in Sarangani cannot be used, in the absence of other
circumstances, as the reckoning period of the one-year residence requirement. Further, Dominos lack of intention to
abandon his residence in Quezon City is strengthened by his act of registering as voter in Quezon City. While voting is
not conclusive of residence, it does give rise to a strong presumption of residence especially in this case where
Domino registered in his former barangay.
 Page 6 of 13

Benjamin Abella v. COMELEC and Adelina Larrazabal GR No. 100710, September 3, 1991

Doctrine: designation of domicile

Facts: This case is part of the consolidated petitions that center on who is the rightful governor of the province of Leyte;
Abella obtained the second highest number of votes for the position of governor but was not allowed by COMELEC to be
proclaimed as governor after the disqualification of Larrazabal, Larrazabal who obtained the highest number of votes in
the local elections but was disqualified due to her misrepresentation of residence, or the vice-governor of Leyte. Initially,
Silvestre dela Cruz (Benjamin Abella was allowed to intervene) filed a petition with the COMELEC to disqualify petitioner
Larrazabal from running as governor of Leyte on the ground that she misrepresented her residence in her certificate of
candidacy as Kananga, Leyte. It was alleged that she was in fact a resident of Ormoc City like her husband who was
earlier disqualified from running for the same office. COMELEC granted the petition. However, when the Commission
granted the decision, Larrazabal was already proclaimed the Governor, hence, when she was disqualified, Abella, who
gathered the second highest votes in the said area, sought to take his oath as governor of Kananga, Leyte. In the
petitions for certiorari are the resolutions of COMELEC dismissing the pre-proclamation and disqualification cases filed by
Abella against Larrazabal. Abella was the official candidate of the Liberal Party for provincial governor of Leyte in the local
election held on February 1, 1988. Adelina Larrazabal is the wife of Emeterio V. Larrazabal, the original candidate of the
Lakas ng Bansa-PDP-Laban who was disqualified by the Commission on Elections on January 18, 1988, for lack of
residence. On January 31, 1988, the day before the election, Adelina filed her own certificate of candidacy in substitution
of her husband. The following day, at about 9:30 o'clock in the morning, Silvestre de la Cruz, a registered voter of
Tacloban City, filed a petition with the provincial election supervisor of Leyte to disqualify her for alleged false statements
in her certificate of candidacy regarding her residence. De la Cruz then came to this Court, which issued a temporary
restraining order on February 4, 1988, enjoining the provincial board of canvassers of Leyte from proclaiming Adelina
Larrazabal as the winning candidate for the Office of the Governor in the province of Leyte, in the event that she obtains
the winning margin of votes in the canvass of election returns of said province. Abella, after raising various verbal
objections (later duly reduced to writing) during the canvass of the election returns, seasonably elevated them to the
Commission on Elections in ten separate appeals. The Law Department of the COMELEC charged Adelina with falsification
and misrepresentation of her residence in her certificate of candidacy. On February 3, 1989, this Division unanimously
upheld virtually all the challenged rulings of the provincial board of canvassers, mostly on the ground that the objection
raised were merely formal and did not affect the validity of the returns or the ballots, and ordered the proclamation of
the winner after completion of the canvass. On February 14, 1991, the second division in a 2-1 vote rendered a decision
disqualifying Larrazabal as governor. On July 18, 1991, the Commission issued a resolution which denied Larrazabal's
motion to declare decision void and/or motion for reconsideration and affirmed the second division's decision. In the
same resolution, the Commission disallowed Abella's proclamation as governor of Leyte.

Issue: WON Abella could replace Larrazabal as the governor due to being second highest in the votes

Held: No. It was alleged that Adelina was in fact a resident of Ormoc City like her husband who was earlier disqualified
from running for the same office. The Supreme Court held that while it is true that SPC No. 88-546 was originally a
petition to deny due course to the certificate of candidacy of Larrazabal and was filed before Larrazabal could be
proclaimed, the fact remains that the local elections of February 1, 1988 in the province of Leyte proceeded with
Larrazabal considered as a bona fide candidate. The voters of the province voted for her in the sincere belief that she
was a qualified candidate for the position of governor. Her votes were counted and she obtained the highest number of
votes. The net effect is that the petitioner lost in the election. He was repudiated by the electorate. The fact that the
candidate who obtained the highest number of votes is later declared to be disqualified or not eligible for the office to
which he was elected does not necessarily entitle the candidate who obtained the second highest number of votes to be
declared the winner of the elective office. The votes cast for a dead, disqualified, or non-eligible person may not be valid
the vote the winner into office or maintain him there. However the absence of a statute which clearly asserts a contrary
politics and legislative policy on the matter, if the votes were cast in the sincere belief that the candidate was alive,
qualified, or eligible, they should not be treated as stray, void or meaningless.
 Page 7 of 13

COQUILLA VS COMELEC
G.R. No. 151914, 31 July 2002

FACTS: Coquilla was born on 1938 of Filipino parents in Oras, Eastern Samar. He grew up and resided there until 1965,
when he was subsequently naturalized as a U.S. citizen after joining the US Navy. In 1998, he came to the Philippines
and took out a residence certificate, although he continued making several trips to the United States.

Coquilla eventually applied for repatriation under R.A. No. 8171 which was approved. On November 10, 2000, he took his
oath as a citizen of the Philippines.

On November 21, 2000, he applied for registration as a voter of Butunga, Oras, Eastern Samar which was approved in
2001. On February 27, 2001, he filed his certificate of candidacy stating that he had been a resident of Oras, Eastern
Samar for 2 years.

Incumbent mayor Alvarez, who was running for re-election sought to cancel Coquillas certificate of candidacy on the
ground that his statement as to the two year residency in Oras was a material misrepresentation as he only resided
therein for 6 months after his oath as a citizen.

Before the COMELEC could render a decision, elections commenced and Coquilla was proclaimed the winner. On July 19,
2001, COMELEC granted Alvarez petition and ordered the cancellation of petitioners certificate of candidacy.

ISSUE: Whether or not Coquilla had been a resident of Oras, Eastern Samar at least on year before the elections held on
May 14, 2001 as what he represented in his COC.

RULING: No. The statement in petitioners certificate of candidacy that he had been a resident of Oras, Eastern Samar
for two years at the time he filed such certificate is not true. The question is whether the COMELEC was justified in
ordering the cancellation of his certificate of candidacy for this reason. Petitioner made a false representation of a
material fact in his certificate of candidacy, thus rendering such certificate liable to cancellation. In the case at bar, what
is involved is a false statement concerning a candidates qualification for an office for which he filed the certificate of
candidacy. This is a misrepresentation of a material fact justifying the cancellation of petitioners certificate of candidacy.
The cancellation of petitioners certificate of candidacy in this case is thus fully justified.

LABO VS COMELEC
Page 8 of 13
Page 9 of 13
 Page 10 of 13

PRISCILA JUSTIMBASTE v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and RUSTICO B. BALDERIAN

572 SCRA 736 (2008), EN BANC (Carpio Morales, J.)

The use of a name other than that stated in the certificate of birth is not a material misrepresentation as the
same refers to "qualifications for elective office under the Omnibus Election Code.

FACTS: Priscila R. Justimbaste (Priscila) filed with the Leyte Provincial Election Supervisor a petition to disqualify
respondent Rustico B. Balderian (Rustico) as a candidate for mayor of Tabontabon, Leyte for falsification and
misinterpretation in his application for candidacy. Rustico denied Priscilas allegations. Rustico won and was proclaimed
as mayor.

The Second Division of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) denied the petition for disqualification. Priscila then filed
a Motion for Reconsideration to the COMELEC En Banc which subsequently denied the same.

ISSUE: Whether or not Rustico committed material misrepresentation and falsification in his certificate of candidacy

HELD: Material misrepresentation as a ground to deny due course or cancel a certificate of candidacy refers to the falsity
of a statement required to be entered therein, as enumerated in Section 74 of the Omnibus Election Code. Concurrent
with materiality is a deliberate intention to deceive the electorate as to ones qualifications.

Priscila asserts that private Balderian committed material misrepresentation when he stated in his certificate of candidacy
that he is a Filipino citizen and that his name is Rustico Besa Balderian, instead of Chu Teck Siao.

At all events, the use of a name other than that stated in the certificate of birth is not a material misrepresentation, as
"material misrepresentation" under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code refers to "qualifications for elective office."
It need not be emphasized that there is no showing that there was intent to deceive the electorate as to private
respondents identity, nor that by using his Filipino name the voting public was thereby deceived.

Priscila is reminded that a petition for disqualification based on material misrepresentation in the certificate of candidacy
is different from an election protest. The purpose of an election protest is to ascertain whether the candidate proclaimed
elected by the board of canvassers is really the lawful choice of the electorate.

LLUZ v. COMELEC G.R. No. 172840; June 7, 2007

FACTS: Private respondent was a candidate for the post of punong barangay of Barangay 2, Poblacion, Catubig, Samar
in the 15 July 2002 Synchronized Barangay and Sangguniang Kabataan Elections. In his certificate of candidacy, private
respondent misrepresented himself as a certified public accountant (CPA) as his profession or occupation. Private
respondent won in the elections. Thus, he was charged for an election offense before the COMELEC. In his Answer,
private respondent argued that he could not be held liable for an election offense because his alleged misrepresentation
of profession was not material to his eligibility as a candidate.

ISSUE: Is an alleged misrepresentation of profession or occupation on a certificate of candidacy punishable as an

election offense under Section 262 in relation to Section 74 of B.P. 881?

HELD: No elective office, not even the office of the President of the Republic of the Philippines, requires a certain
profession or occupation as a qualification. For local elective offices including that of punong barangay, Republic Act No.
7160 (R.A. 7160) or the Local Government Code of 1991 prescribes only qualifications pertaining to citizenship,
registration as a voter, residence, and language. Section 39 of R.A. 7160 states: x x x x Profession or occupation not
being a qualification for elective office, misrepresentation of such does not constitute a material misrepresentation.
Certainly, in a situation where a candidate misrepresents his or her profession or occupation in the certificate of
candidacy, the candidate may not be disqualified from running for office under Section 78 as his or her certificate of
candidacy cannot be denied due course or canceled on such ground.
 Page 11 of 13

G.R. No. 182369 December 18, 2008

MIKE A. FERMIN, petitioner, vs.COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and UMBRA RAMIL BAYAM DILANGALEN,
respondents.

FACTS: Mike A. Fermin, the petitioner in both cases, was a registered voter of Barangay Payan, Kabuntalan. On
December 13, 2006, claiming that he had been a resident of Barangay Indatuan for 1 year and 6 months, petitioner
applied with the COMELEC for the transfer of his registration record to the said barangay. In the meantime, the creation
of North Kabuntalan was ratified in a plebiscite on December 30, 2006, formally making Barangay Indatuan a component
of Northern Kabuntalan.

Thereafter, on January 8, 2007, the COMELEC approved petitioner's application for the transfer of his voting record and
registration as a voter of Barangay Indatuan, Northern Kabuntalan. On March 29, 2007, Fermin filed his Certificate of
Candidacy (CoC) for mayor of Northern Kabuntalan in the May 14, 2007 National and Local Elections. Private respondent
filed a disqualification case against petitioner. The petition alleged that the petitioner did not possess the period of
residency required for candidacy and that he perjured himself in his CoC and in his application for transfer of voting
record. Elections were held without any decision being rendered by the COMELEC in the said case. After the counting and
canvassing of votes, Dilangalen emerged as the victor. Fermin subsequently filed an election protest with the Regional
Trial Court (RTC), Branch 13 of Cotabato City.

On June 29, 2007, the COMELEC 2nd Division, disqualified Fermin for not being a resident of Northern Kabuntalan. It
ruled that, based on his declaration that he is a resident of Barangay Payan as of April 27, 2006 in his oath of office
before Datu Andal Ampatuan, Fermin could not have been a resident of Barangay Indatuan for at least one year.

Petitioner argues that he has been a resident of Barangay Indatuan long before the creation of Northern Kabuntalan. This
change of residence prompted him to apply for the transfer of his voters registration record from Barangay Payan to
Barangay Indatuan. Moreover, the one year residency requirement under the law is not applicable to candidates for
elective office in a newly created municipality, because the length of residency of all its inhabitants is reckoned from the
effective date of its creation.

ISSUE: Whether or not the COMELEC gravely abuse its discretion when it declared petitioner as not a resident of the
locality for at least one year prior to the May 14, 2007 elections

HELD: YES.

The Court finds the COMELEC to have gravely abused its discretion when it precipitately declared that Fermin was not a
resident of Northern Kabuntalan for at least one year prior to the said elections. COMELEC relied on a single piece of
evidence to support its finding that petitioner was not a resident of Barangay Indatuan, Northern Kabuntalan, i.e., the
oath of office subscribed and sworn to before Governor Datu Andal Ampatuan, in which petitioner indicated that he was a
resident of Barangay Payan, Kabuntalan as of April 27, 2006. However, this single piece of evidence does not necessarily
support a finding that petitioner was not a resident of Northern Kabuntalan as of May 14, 2006, or one year prior to the
May 14, 2007 elections. Petitioner merely admitted that he was a resident of another locality as of April 27, 2006, which
was more than a year before the elections. It is not inconsistent with his subsequent claim that he complied with the
residency requirement for the elective office, as petitioner could have transferred to Barangay Indatuan after April 27,
2006, on or before May 14, 2006.

Neither does this evidence support the allegation that petitioner failed to comply with the residency requirement for the
transfer of his voting record from Barangay Payan to Barangay Indatuan. Given that a voter is required to reside in the
place wherein he proposes to vote only for six months immediately preceding the election, petitioners application for
transfer on December 13, 2006 does not contradict his earlier admission that he was a resident of Barangay Payan as of
April 27, 2006.

The mere filing of a petition and the convenient allegation therein that a candidate does not reside in the locality where
he seeks to be elected is insufficient to effect the cancellation of his CoC. Convincing evidence must substantiate every
allegation.
 Page 12 of 13

Domino vs. Comelec

Facts: Domino filed his COC for representative in a district. He indicated that he resided in the constituency where he
seeks ti be elected for 1yr and 2mos. Immediatelypreceding the election. Private respondent filed a petition to see the
cancellation of Dominos COC on the ground that: is not a resident, much less a registered voter, of the province of
Sarangani where he seeks election.

Issues:

Whether or not the judgment of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City declaring petitioner as resident of Sarangani
and not of Quezon City is final,conclusive and binding upon the whole world, including the Commission on Elections.

Whether or not petitioner herein has resided in the subject congressional district for at least one (1) year immediately
preceding the May 11, 1998 elections; and

Whether or not respondent COMELEC has jurisdiction over the petition a quo for the disqualification of petitioner.

Ruling:

1. The COMELEC has jurisdiction as provided in Sec. 78, Art. IX of the Omnibus Election Code, over a petition
to deny due course to or cancel certificate of candidacy. In the exercise of the said jurisdiction, it is within the
competence of the COMELEC to determine whether false representation as to material facts was made in the certificate
of candidacy, that will include, among others, the residence of the candidate.

The determination of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City in the exclusion proceedings as to the right ofDOMINO
to be included or excluded from the list of voters in the precinct within its territorial jurisdicton, does not preclude the
COMELEC, in the determination of DOMINO's qualification as a candidate, to pass upon the issue ofcompliance with the
residency requirement.

The proceedings for the exclusion or inclusion of voters in the list of voters are summary in character. Thus, the factual
findings of the trial court and its resultant conclusions in the exclusion proceedings on matters other than the right to
vote in the precinct within its territorial jurisdiction are not conclusive upon the COMELEC. Although the court in inclusion
or exclusion proceedings may pass upon any question necessary to decide the issue raised including the questions of
citizenship and residence of the challenged voter, the authority to order the inclusion in or exclusion from the list of
voters necessarily caries with it the power to inquire into and settle all matters essential to the exercise of said authority.
However, except for the right to remain in the list of voters or for being excluded therefrom for the particular election in
relation to which the proceedings had been held, a decision in an exclusion or inclusionproceeding, even if final and
unappealable, does not acquire the nature of res judicata.In this sense, it does not operate as a bar to any future action
that a party may take concerning the subject passed upon in the proceeding.

Thus, a decision in an exclusion proceeding would neither be conclusive on the voter's political status, nor bar
subsequent proceedings on his right to be registered as a voter in any other election.

Moreover, the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City in its 18 January decision exceeded its jurisdiction when it declared
DOMINO a resident of the Province of Sarangani, approved and ordered the transfer of his voter's registration from
Precinct No. 4400-A of Barangay Old Balara, Quezon City to precinct 14A1 of Barangay Poblacion, Alabel, Sarangani. It is
not within the competence of the trial court, in an exclusion proceedings, to declare the challenged voter a resident of
another municipality. The jurisdiction of the lower court over exclusion cases is limited only to determining the right of
voter to remain in the list of voters or to declare that the challenged voter is not qualified to vote in the precint in which
he is registered, specifying the ground of the voter's disqualification. The trial court has no power to order the change or
transfer of registration from one place of residence to another for it is the function of the election Registration Board as
provided under Section 12 of R.A. No. 8189.

The only effect of the decision of the lower court excluding the challenged voter from the list of voters, is for the Election
Registration Board,upon receipt of the final decision, to remove the voter's registration record from the corresponding
book of voters, enter the order of exclusion therein, and thereafter place the record in the inactive file.

2. We hold in the negative.

Records show that petitioner's domicile of origin was Candon, Ilocos Sur and that sometime in 1991, he acquired a new
domicile of choice at 24 Bonifacio St. Ayala Heights, Old Balara, Quezon City, as shown by his certificate of candidacy for
the position of representative of the 3rd District of Quezon City in the May 1995 election. Petitioner is now claiming that
he had effectively abandoned his "residence" in Quezon City and has established a new "domicile" of choice at the
Province of Sarangani.
 Page 13 of 13

A person's "domicile" once established is considered to continue and will not be deemed lost until a new one is
established. To successfully effect a change of domicile one must demonstrate an actual removal or an actual change of
domicile; a bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a new one and definite acts
which correspond with the purpose. In other words, there must basically be animusmanendi coupled with animusnon
revertendi. The purpose to remain in or at the domicile of choice must be for an indefinite period of time; the change of
residence must be voluntary; and the residence at the place chosen for the new domicile must be actual.

The lease contract entered into sometime in January 1997, does not adequately support a change of domicile. The lease
contract may be indicative of DOMINO's intention to reside in Sarangani but it does not engender the kind of permanency
required to prove abandonment of one's original domicile. The mere absence of individual from his permanent residence,
no matter how long, without the intention to abandon it does not result in loss or change of domicile. 30 Thus the date of
the contract of lease of a house and lot located in the province of Sarangani, i.e., 15 January 1997, cannot be used, in
the absence of other circumstances, as the reckoning period of the one-year residence requirement.

Further, Domino's lack of intention to abandon his residence in Quezon City is further strengthened by his act of
registering as voter in one of the precincts in Quezon City. While voting is not conclusive of residence, it does give rise to
a strong presumption of residence especially in this case where DOMINO registered in his former barangay.

While, Domino's intention to establish residence in Sarangani can be gleaned from the fact that be bought the house he
was renting on November 4, 1997, that he sought cancellation of his previous registration in Qezon City on 22 October
1997, 34 and that he applied for transfer of registration from Quezon City to Sarangani by reason of change of residence
on 30 August 1997, 35 DOMINO still falls short of the one year residency requirement under the Constitution.

In showing compliance with the residency requirement, both intent and actual presence in the district one intends to
represent must satisfy the length of time prescribed by the fundamental law. 36 Domino's failure to do so rendered him
ineligible and his election to office null and void. 3

3. DOMINO's contention that the COMELEC has no jurisdiction in the present petition is bereft of merit.

As previously mentioned, the COMELEC, under Sec. 78, Art. IX of the Omnibus Election Code, has jurisdiction over a
petition to deny due course to or cancel certificate of candidacy. Such jurisdiction continues even after election, if for any
reason no final judgment of disqualification is rendered before the election, and the candidate facing disqualification is
voted for and receives the highest number of votes 38 and provided further that the winning candidate has not been
proclaimed or has taken his oath of office.

the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal's sole and exclusive jurisdiction over all contests relating to the election,
returns and qualifications of members of Congress as provided under Section 17 of Article VI of the Constitution begins
only after a candidate has become a member of the House of Representatives.

The fact of obtaining the highest number of votes in an election does not automatically vest the position in the winning
candidate. 41 A candidate must be proclaimed and must have taken his oath of office before he can be considered a
member of the House of Representatives.

DOMINO was not proclaimed as Congressman-elect of the Lone Congressional District of the Province of Sarangani by
reason of a Supplemental Omnibus Resolution issued by the COMELEC on the day of the election ordering the suspension
of DOMINO's proclamation should he obtain the winning number of votes.

Cosidering that DOMINO has not been proclaimed as Congressman-elect in the Lone Congressional District of the
Province of Sarangani he cannot be deemed a member of the House of Representatives. Hence, it is the COMELEC and
not the Electoral Tribunal which has jurisdiction over the issue of his ineligibility as a candidate.