Dehumanization outweighs all other impacts

Berube, 1997
(Berube, David. Professor. English. University of South Carolina. Nanotechnological
Prolongevity: The Down Side. 1997.
http://www.cas.sc.edu/engl/faculty/berube/prolong.htm.)

Assuming we are able to predict who or what are optimized humans, this entire
resultant worldview smacks of eugenics and Nazi racial science. This would involve
valuing people as means. Moreover, there would always be a superhuman more
super than the current ones, humans would never be able to escape their treatment
as means to an always further and distant end. This means-ends dispute is at the
core of Montagu and Matson's treatise on the dehumanization of humanity. They warn:
"its destructive toll is already greater than that of any war, plague, famine, or natural calamity
on record -- and its potential danger to the quality of life and the fabric of civilized society is
beyond calculation. For that reason this sickness of the soul might well be called the
Fifth Horseman of the Apocalypse.... Behind the genocide of the holocaust lay a
dehumanized thought; beneath the menticide of deviants and dissidents... in the
cuckoo's next of America, lies a dehumanized image of man... (Montagu & Matson,
1983, p. xi-xii). While it may never be possible to quantify the impact dehumanizing ethics
may have had on humanity, it is safe to conclude the foundations of humanness offer
great opportunities which would be foregone. When we calculate the actual losses
and the virtual benefits, we approach a nearly inestimable value greater than any
tools which we can currently use to measure it. Dehumanization is nuclear war,
environmental apocalypse, and international genocide. When people become things, they
become dispensable. When people are dispensable, any and every atrocity can be justified. Once
justified, they seem to be inevitable for every epoch has evil and dehumanization is
evil's most powerful weapon.
The 1ac sustains the referent object of security - this makes warfare, threat
construction and human insecurity inevitable. Be suspect of their specific scenarios -
national security is a ploy created through a culture of fear.
Lal 7 - Master of Arts in International Relations (Preerna, 2007,
http://gwu.academia.edu/PrernaLal/Papers/646118/Critical_Security_Studies_Deconstructing_the_National_Secu
rity_State)

security is a
Under the lens of critical theory, there are many problems with the current framework of national security. First,
paradox for the more we add to the national security agenda, the more we have to fear. As Barry Buzan
(1991, 37) points out in People, States and Fear, the security paradox presents us with a cruel irony in that to be secure ultimately, would
mean being unable to escape. Thus, to
secure oneself, one would need to be trapped in a timeless state, for
leaving this state would incur risks. The current neo-realist realization of national security is quite narrow and
does not take into account threats to human welfare, health, social problems, and domestic sources of
insecurity. However, in Security: A New Framework of Analysis, several CSS theorists put forward the case for widening the field of
security studies and separating these into five different sectors under state control: military, politics, environment, society and economy
(Buzan, De Wilde and Waever 1998, 21-23). But, since these wideners
leave the referent object of security as the state,
widening the field of security studies becomes even more troubling because it
risks more state control over our lives, the
militarization of social issues such as drugs and crime, which would further legitimize and justify state
violence, leaving us all the more insecure. Accordingly, it becomes clear that a mere re-definition of security
away from its current neo-realist framework does not solve the security dilemma if the referent object of security
is left unchanged. This goes to prove that it is the state as the referent object that requires questioning in
terms of its supposed provision of security rather than the problems with widening the field of security. Without a
state-centric concept of security, there would be no national security agenda left to widen, as our security
concerns would be human-centered, hence, the paradox of security would dissipate. A second part of the security paradox
is that security and insecurity are not binary opposites. On a micro-level, if security is the state of being secure, than
insecurity should be the state of not being secure. However, what we do feel secure about is neither part of the national security agenda
nor a conscious thought or feeling. The state of being secure is thus, not conceptualized as an absence of insecurity. On a policymaking
level, Robert Lipschutz (1995, 27), Associate Professor of Politics at University of California, Santa Cruz, notes in On Security that our

desire to achieve security through the acquisition of arms and a national missile defense system, serves to
insecure those whom we label and treat as threats. This encourages the
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and offensive posturing by those we
wish to secure ourselves against, causing us to feel more insecure as the end
result of our search for security. More recently, when George W. Bush included North Korea in his
illogical Axis of Evil and named it as a threat to the United States, the peripheral state had no nuclear capability
and would never have thought to use the threat of weapons of mass destruction to blackmail Western powers into giving aid. However,
alarmed at the thought of being the next Afghanistan or Iraq, North Korea retaliated within a year by
revealing its nuclear arsenal. The United States watched helplessly as one more previously benign nation became a real security
problem. As a consequence, imagined enemies become real threats due to the ongoing threat construction by
the state, and this poses the security dilemma of creating self-fulfilling prophecies in the current
framework of security. Our notion of security is what the state says it is, rather than what we feel it is. Yet, this
entrenched view of security is epistemologically flawed, which is our second dilemma; meaning that
our knowledge of security as it is defined is based in certain realist assumptions that do not hold up under
scrutiny. Our perception of what and from whom we need to be secured is not based on the actual threats that exist, but on the threats
that we are told to perceive by the state. Thus, terrorists, drugs, illegal immigrants, Third World dictators, rogue states,
blacks, non-Christians, and the Other, are considered as threats to the national security apparatus, and
consequently, as threats to the individual American. This
state construction of threats
pervades our minds, causing a trickle-down effect that encourages a culture
of fear, where the only limit to the coming danger is our imagination. Lipschutz
(2000, 44-45) concludes in After Authority: War, Peace, and Global Politics in the 21st Century, the national security state is brought
down to the level of the household, and each one arms itself against the security dilemma posed by its neighbor across the hedge of
fence. Lipschutz seems to be saying that it
is national security that eventually encourages the creation of a
dichotomy between the self and the Other in our everyday lives. Indeed, it is the discourse of security by the rulers
and elites, which creates and sustains our bipolar mindset of the world. A final dilemma presented by the current
security framework is that security is ontologically unstable, unable to exist on its own, requiring the creation of certain conditions and
categories, specifically, the creation of the Other. James Der Derian (1995, 25), Associate Professor of Political Science at U Mass
(Amherst), notes in On Security that we are taught to consider security as an a priori argument that proves the existence and necessity
of only one form of security because there currently happens to be a widespread belief in it. Yet, national
security is a highly
unstable concept and changes over time, with the construction of new threats and enemies. Due to its
unstable nature, security can then, be considered as a constant fluid that is constructed and re-defined
by the discourse of the state and security elites. Ole Waever, a senior researcher at the Center for Peace and Conflict
Research, contends that the very act of uttering security places it on the security agenda, thereby giving the state and its elite, power
that in naming a certain development a security problem,
over the issue. In On Security, he notes

the state can claim a special right, one that in the final instance, always be defined
by the state and its elites (1995, 55). This process is termed as securitization, which simply means treating
an event or issue as a problem of national security rather than first questioning whether it should even
be treated as a security issue. Such an act serves the interests of the state and its elites, starting with
security discourse by the state, which constructs and perpetuates state identity and existence.

No risk you outweigh: the threat of terrorism is used to obscure our military,
economic, and ecological violence, this will always be comparatively worse than the
effects of terrorism
Said 1 (Edward, university professor of English and Comparative Literature at Columbia University,
International Socialist Review, Aug/Sep 2001

http://www.thirdworldtraveler.com/Terrorism/Resistance_Terrorism_Said.html) JPG

FIRST OF all, this relentless

pursuit of terrorism is, in my opinion, almost criminal. It allows the United States
to do what it wishes anywhere in the world. Take, for example, the 1998 bombing of Sudan. That was done because
Bill Clinton was having trouble with Monica Lewinsky. There was a paper-thin excuse that they were bombing a terrorist factory, which
turned out to be a pharmaceutical factory producing half the pharmaceutical supply for the country, which a few weeks later was in
the grip of a plague. Hundreds of people died as a result of the plague because there were no pharmaceuticals to treat them because
of the willful bombing by the United States. Terrorism has become a sort of screen created since the end of
the Cold War by policymakers in Washington, as well as a whole group of people, like Samuel Huntington and Steven
Emerson, who have their meal ticket in that pursuit. It is fabricated to keep the population afraid and insecure,
and to justify what the United States wishes to do globally. Any threat to its interests, whether it's oil in
the Middle East or its geostrategic interests elsewhere, is labeled as terrorism, which is exactly what the Israelis have been
doing since the mid-1970s in response to Palestinian resistance to their policies. It's very interesting that the whole history of terrorism
has a pedigree in the policies of imperialists. The French used the word "terrorism" for everything that the Algerians did to resist their
occupation, which began in 1830 and didn't end until 1962. The British used it in Burma and in Malaysia. Terrorism is anything that
stands in the face of what we want to do. Since the United States is the global superpower and has or pretends to have interests
everywhere-from China to Europe to southern Africa to Latin America and all of the Americas-terrorism becomes a handy instrument
 to perpetuate this practice. Terrorism is also now viewed as a resistance to globalization. That connection has to
be made. I notice, by the way, Arundhati Roy made that connection, as well, that people's movements of resistance
against deprivation, against unemployment, against the loss of natural resources, all of that is
termed "terrorism. " Into this vicious cycle feed a few groups like bin Laden's and the people he commands, whether they are in
Saudi Arabia or Yemen or anywhere else. They're magnified and blown up to insensate proportions that have
nothing to do with their real power and the real threat they represent. This focus obscures the enormous damage
done by the United States, whether militarily, environmentally, or economically, on a world scale,
which far dwarfs anything that terrorism might do. Lastly, very little is said about homegrown terrorism, the militias
and armed groups in this country, or Timothy McVeigh. I remember very clearly after the blowing up of the federal building in
Oklahoma City, my office was deluged with phone calls because I think Steven Emerson, who was instantly called an expert on
terrorism, said this has all the marks of Middle Eastern terrorism. That cycle of connections is deeply damaging to individuals of Arab
and Muslim origin in this country. During the 2000 election campaign, anything having to do with Islam or Muslims was used as a way
of discrediting your opponent. Hillary Clinton returned a $50,000 contribution from the Muslim Alliance, which is a very conventional,
quite politically neutral group, because they smacked of terrorism, she said. Those kinds of labels can be like racial
profiling that involves not only African Americans and Latin Americans but also Arab Americans. Interestingly, the State Department
report you cited shows conclusively that the Islamic world is number 10 on the list. The greatest source of terrorism is
the U.S. itself and some of the Latin American countries, not at all the Muslim ones. But they're used, partly manipulated by
the Israeli lobby, partly by Defense and State Department interests, to keep America in its policies and to intimidate
people.

Apocalyptic nuclear or terror rhetoric justifies violence and limitless government

intervention, and demonizes the other. Only the alts emancipatory politics allows a
release from incapacitation
Gay 6 [William C. Gay, UNC Charlotte Philosophy professor with a PhD in Philosophy, and associate at the Center of Professional and
Applied Ethics; Apocalyptic Rhetoric Versus Nonviolent Action pg 45-47; Spiritual & Political Dimensions of Nonviolence & Peace; January
2006; accessed 07/20/2015; <http://www.philosophy.uncc.edu/wcgay/ApocalypticThinkingversusNonviolentAction.pdf>.]

Since 11 September 2001, many people, especially in the United States, have come to regard terrorism as if it
represents a comparably grave moral problem. In fact, some people are so afraid that they are willing to let
government go to virtually any limits to reduce this threat. This time, governments are the ones using fear; they
are using fear to motivate the public to accept as necessary and justified the military responses employed to
counter terrorism. Apocalyptic thinking and exaggerated fears face factual, psychological, political, and moral pitfalls. First, because
the claims are so extreme, they are often not credible. For example, when scientists raised solid factual objections, scientists
and government officials dismissed the prophets of nuclear apocalypse as misinformed extremists. The scientists and government officials
belittled the fear that the nuclear prophets sought to exploit when they exaggerated their portrayals. But some people do not want
to let facts get in the way of a good argument. For some, persuasion is a more important goal than truth. If
you believe that exaggeration, especially when it generates fear, can bring about a good result, you may throw prudence to the wind. You
may justify your lapse into distortion as benevolent deception, but the fact remains that it is like Platos royal lie and
may be exposed. Are we now seeing a similar phenomenon with respect to how government is using public fear of
terrorism? Critics of the current policy are doing little to counter governmental exaggerations about the international terrorist threat. Are
their exaggerations benevolent deceptions or something much less noble? Beyond the prospect for factual rebuttal, apocalyptic
thinking and exaggerated fears run a psychological risk. Compare the responses to the nuclear threat and the
terrorist threat. Regardless of whether the big boom will bring on global doom, does belief in nuclear war as apocalyptic
motivate people to eliminate this threat? Much of the public protest against governmental plans relied on the myth of the
motivating power of fear to spur otherwise apathetic citizens to rally around the anti-nuclear cause. But as we well know, the antinuclear
bandwagon is not exactly overflowing these days. Initially
after the events of 11 September 2001, many people were
motivated to act. Unfortunately, already many people are beginning to suppress their fear. Suppressing negative
emotions or entering a state of denial represents the psychological risk that faces apocalyptic thinking and
exaggerated fears. The saying that the main responses to fear are fight or flight is instructive. We have no way to guarantee
that people frightened by accounts of the horrors of nuclear war or terrorist attacks will fight back. Many
people take flight, especially when they feel disempowered in the political arena and see how limited the success of
past efforts has been. These persons may suffer from psychic numbing. When fear is suppressed, the call to action is avoided. Even when fear
is not suppressed, it can be misdirected. The political risk resulting from apocalyptic thinking and exaggerated fears is that these
concerns can get co-opted. How are we to fight off apocalyptic or global terrorism? Nuclear prophets like Jonathan Schell say we must rid the
world of nuclear weapons. Current anti-terrorist politicians say we must rid the world of terrorists; we must wage
a war against terrorism. Ironically, political leaders argue that the possession of nuclear weapons is the means for preventing the
apocalyptic horrors of nuclear war. Just in case deterrence fails, government officials now tell us a missile defense system should be in place.
Six months after the attacks of 11 September 2001, the George W. Bush administration announced plans to use
modified nuclear weapons to destroy terrorist stronghold stashes of weapons of mass destruction, or to respond to terrorist
attacks that make use of biological, chemical, or nuclear weapons. Officials have told us for quite some time that governmental possession of
chemical and biological weapons is one of the means of preventing evil governments or terrorist organizations from using weapons of mass
destruction. Now, the claim is also made that the modified nuclear weapons being urged by the Bush administration for possible use in the
war on terrorism will also function to deter terrorism. In the past, and again currently, governmental leaders, by preying
on public
fears, achieve acquiesce to an ideology that portrays international adversaries as totally diabolical and
completely untrustworthy. Under these conditions, and supposedly in order to save their citizens from the absolute evils, military and
political leaders present military preparedness and military actions as the only, or best, insurance against nuclear apocalypse and terrorist
attacks. The final risk facing apocalyptic thinking and exaggerated fears is moral. Apocalyptic thinking and exaggerated fears
are too farsighted. Farsightedness or hyperopia is the pathological condition in which vision is better for distant than near objects. For
example, nuclear prophets do bring into sharp focus a hopefully distant objectthe prospect that somewhere down the road we will reach an
omega point where the destructiveness of war will in fact be apocalyptic. The judgment is surely correct that the precipitation of global doom
would be a profoundly immoral act. But people who are farsighted fail to bring nearby objects into sharp focus. Even
if nuclear apocalypse or
further terrorist attacks of the magnitude of 11 September might not be very far down the road,
numerous other war-like objects are much closer to us. In fact, they surround us. Since World War II, no year has passed in
which fewer than four wars were being waged somewhere on this planet. When we devote too much of our attention to
imagining the worst that could happen, we risk inflicting moral hyperopia on ourselves. Just as we are
being myopic when we focus primarily on crime in the streets when confronting the problem of human
violence, even so we are being hyperopic to focus predominantly on the threats of nuclear apocalypse and global terrorism
when confronting the problems of large-scale violence. Apocalyptic thinking and exaggerated fears risk leaving us morally
shortchanged when they lead us to fail to fight against the horrors of violence that are not distant or possible threats but everyday realities. We
need to respond to on-going atrocities in Eastern Europe, the Middle East, and Africa that are on a scale quite adequate for moral outrage, and
we need to seek feasible protection from devastating harms such as AIDS, hunger, and environmental
degradation that actually are currently afflicting us.

Language used in the war on terror dehumanizes the other creating a cycle of violence
that culminates in genocide
Steuter and Wills 8 (Erin and Deborah, both prof of sociology @ Mt. Allison U, Canada, 2008, At
War With Metaphor: Media, Propaganda, and Racism in the War on Terror, pp. xvii-xviii) JPG

The Massacres and genocides that comprise our most painful historical moments are
characterized by a persistent dehumanization of the enemy. The language that has emerged in the
twenty-first century as part of the public face of the war on terror has helped to fundamentally define that
enemy, just as the metaphors we use reflect and reflexively shape our thinking. When we repeatedly represent our
enemies as essentially different in substance from us, as less than human, we extend ourselves permission to
 behave in ways that often echo the very violence we condemn. If metaphors affect the way we think and act
We cannot break the
we must take extraordinary care, individually and collectively, with the metaphors we choose to adopt.
cycle of violence by responding to physical violence with violence of speech or image. We may,
however, begin to change that cycle by breaking down and examining the metaphors we employ , by
working to understand the reverberations of race and propaganda that come to us from earlier historical conflicts, and by resisting
those metaphors that urge us towards actions we would otherwise condemn. This resistance is
profoundly important,
not only for the sake of the enemy, but for our own. If we ally ourselves to a rhetoric that strips
others of their humanity it is inevitable that in the process our own will suffer. The multiple costs of the
war on terror mask a broader expense of spirit and community: when we systematically reduce others, we are
ourselves reduced. When we diminish others, we are diminished. It is important to analyze the metaphors
that move us dangerously closer to solutions of eradication and extermination; in doing so, we can
choose to change the direction of this movement through heightened critical awareness of
metaphors processes and power.

Terrorists are constructed to be enemies of civilization a never ending fear woven

into society that necessitates elimination of these rogues for the sake of global
freedom
Puar and Rai 2004 *assistant professor of women's and gender studies at Rutgers University AND
** teacher in the English department at Florida State University (Jasbir K. and Amit S., The Remaking
of a Model Minority Perverse Projectiles under the Specter of (Counter)Terrorism. Social Text 22.3
(2004) 75-104, Project MUSE)

The "National Strategy for Combating Terrorism," released in February 2003 as part of the State
Department's ongoing "war of ideas" on counterterrorism, outlines the major strands of the Bush
administration's global aspirations for a new American empire.30 Let us reconstruct the image of
counterterrorism that is put into circulation through this document. First, central to the image is a
prior construction that legitimates it and directs its forces: civilization. "The world must respond and
fight this evil that is intent on threatening and destroying our basic freedoms and our way of life.
Freedom and fear are at war." The current war on terrorism is in fact a war in defense of our way of life,
which is constituted by freedom, civilization, truth, and the "good." The procedures and strategies of
counterterrorism will actualize "the power of our values to shape a free and more prosperous world."
These universal values, like the innocuous "democracy," mobilize a dyadic chain that wraps itself tighter
and tighter around the globe, obliterating any opportunity for terrorism to develop: We seek to
integrate nations and peoples into the mutually beneficial democratic relationships that protect against
the forces of disorder and violence. By harnessing the power of humanity to defeat terrorism in all its
forms, we promote a freer, more prosperous, and more secure world and give hope to our children and
generations to come. Ultimately, our fight against terrorism will help foster an international
environment where our democratic interests are secure and the values of liberty are respected around
the world. Note that it is not a relativist questionthe document is clear that we are not talking about
plural civilizations with equally viable value systems, clashing in the night of unreason. Thus: "We cannot
tolerate terrorists who seek to combine the powers of modern technology and WMD to threaten the
very notion of civilized society. The war against terrorism, therefore, is not some sort of 'clash of
civilizations'; instead, it is a clash between civilization and those who would destroy it." A transparent
syllogism: the United States is a free democracy; civilization is constituted by the values of freedom and
democracy; therefore the United States is civilization. Modern terrorism, our abjected other, is a
fundamentally new threat to world civilization. In that sense, we (as Americans, as civilized peoples, as
the democratic world, as truthful, good people) are faced with something as old as evil and the
absolutely new, the unknown, the specter of an absolute risk. This corresponds to the two explanatory
models of terrorism forever sliding into each other in this discourse: terrorism as a pyramid and the
terrorist organization as a network. Although not commented on in this document, one is clearly
hierarchical, familiar, stable, and analyzable (mobilizing all the scholarly resources of policy studies and
social psychology),31 while the other is diffuse, shifting, crosshatched by multiple historical forces and
social dynamics, and for that reason unspecifiable, ungraspable, even monstrous. There is a constant
sliding from pyramid to network, from the security of an absolute and instrumentalist knowledge to the
precarious anxiety of a fearful monster tentacling out of control.32 Thus, according to the State
Department report: At the top of the structure, the terrorist leadership provides the overall direction
and strategy that links all these factors and thereby breathes life into a terror campaign. The leadership
becomes the catalyst for terrorist action. The loss of the leadership can cause many organizations to
collapse. Some groups, however, are more resilient and can promote new leadership should the original
fall or fail. Still others have adopted a more decentralized organization with largely autonomous cells,
making our challenge even greater. The terrorist threat is a flexible, transnational network structure,
enabled by modern technology and characterized by loose interconnectivity both within and between
groups. . . . The terrorist threat today is both resilient and diffuse because of this mutually reinforcing,
dynamic network structure. The importance for counterterrorism of this necessary and panicked
sliding between a fixed explanatory framework (that manages the crisis of monstrous terrorism) and a
transnational, hypertechnologized, shifting terror network (constantly escaping the crosshairs of
counterterrorist power) cannot be overstated: it is a productive machine, creating desires (for
surveillance, for security, for the other, for knowledge, for unveiling and deturbaning), legitimation
crises and techniques for their management, academic discourses, and new subjective and bodily forms
(the citizen, the civilized, the terrorist-fag, the monster, the spy, the suicide bomber, the alien). The
sliding from pyramidal structure to tentacling network generates perverse subjective, affective, and
disciplinary forms (in)adequate to the new security state. Again, this sliding is not a metaphor: what is
productive in it, what effects are produced through it is in fact the question of an articulated machine.33
This machine organizes representations (discourses of civilizations, sexuality, races, nations, democracy,
good, evil), temporalities (present modernity and archaic other), spaces (both the familiarizing
techniques of military occupation of other nation-states and the uncanny otherness of the always
receding "casbah," the new politics of "sovereign verticality" contending with the undulating folds of the
camouflage-burka),34 and modulated intensities (the differential speed of the news, the triumph of
victorious revenge, the pain of defeat, "IraqThe Video Game," the burden of freedom's defense, the
anxiety of an ever-spreading virus). Thus counterterrorism constantly slides between the mobilization of
uncertain affects (the blurring between patriotism, heroism, betrayal, fear, cruelty, pain, and pleasure
through the encasing and knitting together of modulated rhythms of the mediatized body of
technoscience) and the production of affects of uncertainty (anxiety, fear, vertigo). This terrifying sliding
from always already mastered fixity to the untrackable diffuseness of terrorism is a machinic assemblage
in itself. Fixity and diffuseness are not two metaphors for terrorism and counterterrorism. They name an
interminable movement constituted by a set of specifiable practices and colonial histories immanent to
the hegemonic project of counterterrorism itself: "Trajectories by which the state of exception and the
relation of enmity have become the normative basis of the right to kill. In such instances, power (and
not necessarily state power) continuously refers and appeals to exception, emergency, and a
fictionalized notion of the enemy."35 Counterterrorism and its supposed Other, terror networks, are
locked in a transnational struggle that in fact draws on all the strengths of the nation. In that sense, the
new global alliance against the terrorist threat and the national security state function in tandem,
developing a joint strategy (in other words, structure sliding into network) that at once reterritorializes
once exotic lands of the Near and Far East (not to mention Southeast Asia, South Asia, North Africa, and
South America) and deterritorializes the now always vulnerable borders and already contaminated
territories of the American nation-state.36 The overall goals of this "4D strategy (Defeat, Deny,
Diminish and Defend)," developed in conjunction with the National Security Council and the Department
of Homeland Security, are "to destroy terrorist organizations, win the 'war of ideas,' and strengthen
America's security at home and abroad." American domestic and international security will be achieved
through both violent and ideological (in the strict sense of this term) means.37 All branches of the state,
new and old, will be deployed in these goals, which overall seek to delegitimate terrorist activity, link
terrorism to historically superseded forms of extrastate violence (all tied to histories of colonization and
white supremacy), and construct and hegemonize a new international norm concerning violence (and,
implicitly, civilization and the human). According to the "National Strategy for Combating Terrorism," we
must use the full influence of the United States to delegitimize terrorism and make clear that all acts of
terrorism will be viewed in the same light as slavery, piracy, or genocide: behavior that no respectable
government can condone or support and all must oppose. In short, with our friends and allies, we aim to
establish a new international norm regarding terrorism requiring non-support, non-tolerance, and active
opposition to terrorists. Therefore, a new mission for the American state emerges, one that Bush has
christened America's "calling": The United States, with its unique ability to build partnerships and
project power, will lead the fight against terrorist organizations of global reach. By striking constantly
and ensuring that terrorists have no place to hide, we will compress their scope and reduce the
capability of these organizations. By adapting old alliances and creating new partnerships, we will
facilitate regional solutions that further isolate the spread of terrorism. Concurrently, as the scope of
terrorism becomes more localized, unorganized and relegated to the criminal domain, we will rely upon
and assist other states to eradicate terrorism at its root. The strategy has many prongs, and in that
sense actualizes the sliding between the pyramid and the networks of the terrorists themselves: building
international alliances and "partnerships" (and it is significant here that the United Nations, as a political
body, is only mentioned once throughout the text); projecting a world-dominant American power to the
far reaches of the globe; striking constantly at the nodes of terrorist networks; developing transnational
ties that map out local, radical solutions to terrorism (assassinations, torture, disappearances,
extortion); and strengthening policing functions and processes of criminalization around the world. But
perhaps most crucial is the very grammar involved: the obsessive use of the future tense signals both a
founding anxiety of (and in) this discourse and the drawing of the subject of counterterrorism to the
pleasures of the always as yet unimagined. As if projecting itself into an always already mastered future,
where the risk of terrorism is neutralized before actualization, the time of counterterrorism discourse is
always in a future that is continuous with a fixed and romanticized national past. Derrida once said, "The
future can only be anticipated in the form of an absolute danger. It is that which breaks absolutely with
constituted normality and can only be proclaimed, presented, as a sort of monstrosity."
Counterterrorism is a technology that dreams of managing and mastering this monstrosity by targeting
subjectivities, communities, countries, and, indeed, time itself. Thus, if "the United States will confront
the threat of terrorism for the foreseeable future," the counterterrorism imaginary aspires to the total
management of this "foreseeable" political risk.38
The Intelligence community is the reason we fear terror today, every so called terror
plot is started by them
Sageman 14 (marc sageman, independent consultant on national security, The Stagnation in Terrorism Research,
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/09546553.2014.895649, 3/28/14)

This alarmist bias generated by the IC is fed through leaks to journalists who disseminate them, fueling a
peculiar American hysteria on terrorism, which forces politicians to be responsive and show that they
are tough on terrorism, continuing a vicious spiral of continuous terror. The alarmist bias is self-protective. Usually IC
products follow the rule that the recent past42 is the best predictor of the future, and their estimate is often that, with a caution that negative
events can happen. If nothing bad happens, then their authors can celebrate being right for the most part. If things improve, they wont be
blamed for a conservative estimate. However, if bad things happen, they can always point out that their caution anticipated such outcomes. In
truth, people are more likely to get blamed for not anticipating bad things than for not foreseeing good things. The result is that most
This bias is then also
intelligence estimates play it safe and, with rare and courageous exceptions, build in a negative and alarmist bias.
directly communicated to policy makers, who, in turn, perpetuate the politics of fear, which is amplified
by the press and government friendly experts. Rather than calming the public, politicians are generally
alarmists, both as a need to respond to their constituents fears and as a result of the bias of their
advisers.

Fear of terror has caused us to ignore systemic structural violence

LoCicero 14(Alice LoCicero, practicing psychologist at the Boston Medical Center, Domestic Consequences of US Counter-Terrorism
Efforts: Making it Harder to Prevent Homegrown Terrorism, http://benthamopen.com/contents/pdf/TOPSYJ/TOPSYJ-8-32.pdf, 12/18/14)

Over the years since 9/11, fear of terrorism has morphed into what might be called hysteria. By hysteria, I
refer to two elements: Excessive fear, and inability to assess the fear rationally. While the so-called Islamic State
deliberately engenders fear, Americans fear of the so-called Islamic State group is disproportionate to the
actual risk. That is not to suggest that there is no danger from terrorism. Consider, however, that there is
much less palpable panic, much less news reporting, and much less money invested in the dangers of
smoking, alcohol use, automobile accidents, firearms, poverty, or obesity, all of which kill far more
Americans than terrorism. Terrorism hysteria is just what terrorists want to create: Confusion, panic,
paralysis, inability to create an effective response.

War
Fear of terror used to justify war Iraq proves
Weiss 15 (Leonard Weiss, scholar at the center for international security, On fear and nuclear terrorism,
http://bos.sagepub.com/content/71/2/75.full.pdf+html, February 13, 2015)

Insiders in the George W. Bush administration have revealed that when the administration was seeking
internal support for the decision to attack Saddams Iraq, there were disagreements over how the
decision should be framed. Saddam had been tagged as a supporter of terrorism, and he had begun a nuclear program that was
halted as a result of the Desert Shield campaign in 1991 but whose status of dismantlement required more verification following 9/11, a task
being carried out by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). In a 2003 Vanity Fair telephone interview conducted by Sam Tannenhaus
with Paul Wolfowitz, transcribed by the Defense Department, in which the reasons for going to war again with Iraq were raised, Wolfowitz
states: The
truth is that for reasons that have a lot to do with the US government bureaucracy, we settled
on the one issue that everyone could agree on, which was weapons of mass destruction as the core
reason. He then elaborates, saying that among fundamental concerns the overriding one was the connection between weapons of mass
destruction and support for terrorism (Defense Department, 2009). Recall also Condoleezza Rices comment of not waiting for a mushroom
cloud as a threat warning. So the IAEA investigation was shoved aside, President Bush made his speech, and the war was
launched, ostensibly to prevent Saddam from manufacturing nuclear weapons that he might turn over to terrorists. The war has
resulted in the deaths of hundreds of thousands of civilians, exceeding the number who died at
Hiroshima or Nagasaki, and has spawned the rise of offshoots of Al Qaeda like the Islamic State, whose brutality
matches or exceeds that of the original. All this has occurred even though-as revealed by the failure to find
weapons of mass destruction following the war-Saddams nuclear program had been completely shut down in the wake of
the 1991 Persian Gulf War.

Democracy
Governmental policies of fear that build support for the War on Terror become
autocratic and kill the potential for democracy
Weiss 15 (Leonard Weiss, scholar at the center for international security, On fear and nuclear terrorism,
http://bos.sagepub.com/content/71/2/75.full.pdf+html, February 13, 2015)

Human history displays many examples of political

leaders who manipulate public fears to gain support for policies
that, in the end, produce disastrous outcomes for large numbers of people. Racist fears helped Nazis obtain
support for the oppression and ultimate murder of millions of Jews, Slavs, homosexuals, and Roma. Eliminating Nazi
predations required a war that cost 50 million lives. Excessive fear of communism built support for a war in
Vietnam that resulted in two million lives lost in that country and another two million lost on the killing fields
of a destabilized Cambodia. Today, the fear of terrorism brought on by 9/11, coupled with the fear of
nuclear weapons, has become the source of policies that threaten the destruction of American
democracy because of a lack of perspective in the public discussion of these issues.