Obligations and Contracts

Chapter 1

General Provisions

Art. 1156

An obligation is a juridical necessity

To give

To do or not to do

The juridical necessity to comply with a prestation

Civil obligations have binding force in law while natural obligations do
not.
Civil obligation is based on positive law while a natural obligation is
based on equity or natural law
The former is enforceable in law while the latter is not.

Requisites of an obligation

1. A juridical tie

2. An active subject or creditor, can demand the fulfillment of the obligation

3. A passive subject or debtor to whom obligation is juridically demandable

4. The prestation or service which constitutes the object of the obligation

Kinds of obligations

Pure and conditional 1179-1192

With a period 1193-1198

Alternative and facultative 1199-1206

Joint and solidary 1207-1222

Divisible and indivisible 1223-1225

With a penal clause 1226-1230

Secondary characters of the kinds of obligation

(1) Legal, conventional and penal

(2) Real and personal

(3) Determinate and generic

(4) Positive and negative

(5) Unilateral and bilateral

(6) Individual and collective

(7) Accessory and principal

(1) As to juridical quality

(a) Natural when the obligation is in accordance with natural law.

(b) Civil when the obligation is in accordance with positive law.

(c) Mixed when the obligation is in accordance with both natural and
positive law.

2. As to parties:

(a) Unilateral and bilateral unilateral, where only one party is bound, and
bilateral, where both parties are mutually or reciprocally bound.

(b) Individual and collective individual, where there is only one obligor,
and collective, where there are several obligors. The latter may be joint,
when each obligor is liable only for his proportionate share of the obligation,
or solidary, when each obligor may be held liable for the entire obligation.
3. As to object:

(a) Determinate and generic determinate, when the object is specifi c;

generic, when the object is designated by its class or genus.

(b) Simple and multiple simple, when there is only one undertaking;
multiple, when there are several undertakings. Multiple obligations may be
conjunctive, when all of the undertakings are demandable at the same time,
or distributive, when only one undertaking out of several is demandable.
Distributive obligations, on the other hand, may be alternative, when the
obligor is allowed to choose one out of several obligations which may be due
and demandable, or facultative, when the obligor is allowed to substitute
another obligation for one which is due and demandable.

(c) Positive and negative positive, when the obligor is obliged to give or do
something; negative, when the obligor must refrain from giving or doing
something.

(d) Real and personal real, when the obligation consists in giving
something; personal, when the obligation consists in doing or not doing
something.

(e) Possible and impossible possible, when the obligation is capable of

fulfillment in nature as well as in law; impossible, when the obligation is not
capable of fulfillment either in nature or in law.

(f) Divisible and indivisible divisible, when the obligation is susceptible of

partial performance; indivisible, when the obligation is not susceptible of
partial performance.

(g) Principal and accessory principal, when it is the main undertaking;

accessory, when it is merely an undertaking to guarantee the fulfillment of
the principal obligation.

4. As to perfection and extinguishment:

(a) Pure when the obligation is not subject to any condition or term and is
immediately demandable.

(b) Conditional when the obligation is subject to a condition which may be

suspensive, in which case the happening or fulfillment of the condition
results in the birth of the obligation, or resolutory, in which case the
happening or fulfillment of the condition results in the extinguishment of the
obligation.

(c) With a term or period (a plazo) when the obligation is subject to a

term or period which may be suspensive or from a day certain, in which case
the obligation is demandable only upon the expiration of the term, or
resolutory or to a day certain, in which case the obligation terminates upon
the expiration of the term.

Article 1157

Obligations arise from

Law
Contracts

Quasi- Contracts
Acts or omissions prohibited by law

Quasi-delicts
Article 1158

Obligations arising from law are not presumed

Only those expressly determined in this code

Or in special laws

Are demandable

And shall be regulated by the precepts of the law

Which establishes them

And as to what has not been foreseen

By the provisions of this book

-not demandable like obligations of the spouses

-Art. 2014 refund in gambling.

Article 1159

Obligations arising from contracts

Have the force of law

Between the contracting parties

And should be complied with

In good faith

A contract is a meeting of minds between two persons whereby one

binds himself, with respect to the other, to give something or to render
some service.
 As a rule, contracts are perfected by mere consent, and from that
moment the parties are bound not only to the fulfi llment of what has
been expressly stipulated but also to all of the consequences which
according to their nature may be in keeping with good faith, usage and
law.
These contracts are commonly called consensual contracts. Once the
contract is perfected, the valid contract has the force of law binding
the parties to comply therewith in good faith, where neither one may
renege therefrom without the consent of the other.
There are certain contracts, however, called real contracts, such as
deposit, pledge and commodatum, which are not perfected until the
delivery of the object of the obligation.
Whether the contract is consensual or real, the rule is that from the
moment it is perfected, obligations which may be either reciprocal or
unilateral arise. Reciprocal obligations are those where the parties are
mutually or reciprocally obliged to do or to give something; unilateral
obligations, on the other hand, are those where only one of the
parties, the obligor, is obliged to do or to give something.
Compliance in good faith means performance in accordance with
the stipulations, clauses, terms and conditions of the contract.
Consequently, the Code recognizes the right of such contracting
parties to establish such stipulations, clauses, terms and conditions as
they may deem convenient, provided they are not contrary to law,
morals, good customs, public order or public policy.
Article 1160 (Art 2142)

Obligations arising from quasi-contracts

Shall be subject

To the provisions

Of Chapter 1 Title 17 of this book

Quasicontracts are those juridical relations arising from lawful,

voluntaryand unilateral acts, by virtue of which the parties become
bound to each other, based on the principle that no one shall be
unjustly enriched or benefi ted at the expense of another.
Negtiorum Gestio and Solutio Indebiti
Negotiorum gestio is the juridical relation which arises whenever a
person voluntarily takes charge of the agency or management of the
business or property of another without any power or authority from
the latter
In this type of quasi-contract, once the gestor or officious manager has
assumed the agency or management of the business or property, he
shall be obliged to continue such agency or management until the
termination of the affair and its incidents, exercising such rights and
complying with such obligations as provided for in the Code.
Solutio indebiti, on the other hand, is the juridical relation which
arises whenever a person unduly delivers a thing through mistake to
another who has no right to demand it. In this type of quasi-contract,
once the delivery has been made, the person to whom the delivery is
unduly made shall have the obligation to return the property delivered
or the money paid
Article 1161 (Art. 19-36, Art 2195 -damages)

Civil obligations arising from criminal offenses

Shall be governed by the penal laws(Art 100 RPC)

Subject to the provisions of Article 2177(independent civil liability)

And of the pertinent provisions of Chapter 2

Preliminary title on human relations

And Title 18 of this book

Regulating damages

Obligations Arising from Criminal Offenses. As a rule, every person

liable for a felony is also civilly liable.53 This principle is based on the
fact that, generally, a crime has a dual aspect the criminal aspect
and the civil aspect. Although these two aspects are separate and
distinct from each other in the sense that one affects the social order
and the other, private rights, so that the purpose of the first is to
punish or correct the offender, while the purpose of the second is to
repair the damages suffered by the aggrieved party, it is evident that
the basis of the civil liability is the criminal liability itself.
Institution of criminal and civil actions. When a criminal action is
instituted, the civil action for recovery of civil liability arising from the
offense charged is impliedly instituted with the criminal action, unless
the offended party (i) expressly waives the civil action, or (ii) reserves
his right to institute it separately, or (iii) institutes the civil action prior
to the criminal action.
Independent civil action. In the cases provided in Articles 31, 32, 33,
34 and 2177 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, an independent civil
action entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action, may be
 brought by the injured party during the pendency of the criminal case,
provided the right is reserved. Such civil action shall proceed
independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall require only a
preponderance of evidence.
(3) Other civil actions arising from offenses. In all cases not included
in the preceding rules, the following rules are observed:
(a) Criminal and civil actions arising from the same offense may be
instituted separately, but after the criminal action has been
commenced, the civil action cannot be instituted until final judgment
has been rendered in the criminal action;
(b) If the civil action has been fi led ahead of the criminal action, and
the criminal action is subsequently commenced, the civil action shall
be suspended in whatever stage before final judgment it may be
found, until final judgment in criminal action has been rendered.
However, if no final judgment has been rendered by the trial court in
the civil action, the same may be consolidated with the criminal action
upon application with the court trying the criminal action. If the
application is granted, the evidence prevented and admitted in the civil
action shall be deemed automatically reproduced in the criminal
action, without prejudice to the admission of additional evidence that
any party may wish to present. In case of consolidation, both the
criminal and the civil action shall be tried and decided jointly;
(c) Extinction of the penal action does not carry with it extinction of
the civil, unless the extinction proceeds from a declaration in a fi nal
judgment that the fact from which the civil might arise did not exist. In
other cases, the person entitled to the civil action may institute it in
the jurisdiction and in the manner provided by law against the person
who may be liable for restitution of the thing and reparation or
indemnity for the damage suffered.
Pursuant to Sec. 2, Rule III of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure
2000, however, it is stated that except for civil actions provided for in
 Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code, the civil action which has
been reserved cannot be instituted until final judgment has been
rendered in the criminal action. The action contemplated, as pointed
out by Justice Oscar Herrera in his Treatise on Criminal Procedure, is a
civil action arising from a crime if reserved or fi led separately and a
criminal case is fi led if it has to be suspended to await final judgment
in the criminal action.
The rule clarifies that, During the pendency of the criminal action, the
period of prescription of the civil action which cannot be instituted
separately or whose proceeding has been suspended shall not run.
Otherwise stated, the period of prescription of the civil actions under
Section 3 of the aforementioned rules shall not be suspended because
they can be instituted separately. This refers to civil actions arising
from the offense charged which have not been reserved or civil actions
that have been fi led ahead of the criminal action but have been
suspended.
(4) Judgment in civil action not a bar. A final judgment rendered in a
civil action absolving the defendant from civil liability is no bar to a
criminal action.
(5) Suspension by reason of prejudicial question. A petition for
suspension of the criminal action based upon the pendency of a
prejudicial question in a civil action may be fi led in the offi ce of the fi
scal (prosecutor) or the court conducting the preliminary investigation.
When the criminal action has been fi led in court for trial, the petition
to suspend shall be filed in the same criminal action at any time before
the prosecution rests.
Elements of a prejudicial question. They are: (a) the previously
instituted civil action which involves an issue similar or intimately
related to the issue raised in the subsequent criminal action, and (b)
the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal
action may proceed.
 Under the present rule, only the civil liability arising from the offense
charged is deemed instituted with the criminal unless the offended
party waives the civil action, reserves his right to institute it separately,
or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action.
The reservation and waiver refers only to the civil action for the
recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged. This does not
include recovery of civil liability under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of
the Civil Code of the Philippines arising from the same act or omission
which may be prosecuted separately even without a reservation
The rule also incorporated Circular 57-97 on the fi ling of actions for
violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 mandating the inclusion of the
corresponding civil action for which the fi ling fee shall be paid based
on the amount of the check involved. In other cases, no fi ling fees
shall be required for actual damages.
Effect of acquittal. If the accused in a criminal action is acquitted of
the offense charged, can a civil action for damages based on the same
act or omission still be instituted? This question requires a qualified
answer. If the acquittal of the accused is based on the ground that his
guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt, a civil action to
recover damages based on the same act or omission may still be
instituted. In such case, mere preponderance of evidence shall be
sufficient in order that the plaintiff will be able to recover from the
defendant. On the other hand, if the acquittal is based on the ground
that he did not commit the offense charged, or what amounts to the
same thing, if the acquittal proceeds from a declaration in a final
judgment that the fact from which the civil liability might arise did not
exist, the subsequent institution of a civil action to recover damages is,
as a general rule, no longer possible.
Similarly, if a passenger in a certain bus institutes a civil action to
recover damages from the operator of the bus line for injuries
sustained in an accident, such action is separate and distinct from the
 criminal prosecution of the driver for criminal negligence and may,
therefore, be continued regardless of the result of the latter.
Consequently, he can still recover damages even if the driver is
acquitted in the criminal action, because it is clear that the action in
such case is based on culpa contractual and not on the act or omission
of the driver complained of as felony.
The same principle is also applicable if the offense charged constitutes
what is known as culpa aquiliana or quasi-delict under the Civil
Code.63 In such case, the injured party can always institute a civil
action to recover damages independently of the criminal action and
regardless of the result of the latter. This is so even granting that the
accused is acquitted in the criminal action either on the ground of
reasonable doubt or on the ground that he did not commit the offense
charged. The reason for this is that the basis of the civil action is no
longer the criminal liability of the defendant, but a quasi-delict or tort.
Art. 31 of the New Civil Code, where the law itself expressly grants to
the injured party the right to institute a civil action which is entirely
separate and distinct from the criminal action. They are: (1)
interferences by public officers or employees or by private individuals
with civil rights and liberties,65 (2) defamation,66 (3) fraud,67 (4)
physical injuries,68 and (5) refusal or neglect of a city or municipal
police officer to render aid or protection in case of danger to life or
property
In all of these cases or instances, although the act or omission may
constitute a criminal offense in accordance with our penal laws, the
injured party may institute a civil action to recover damages which is
entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action. Once the action
is instituted, then it may proceed independently of the criminal action,
and shall require only a preponderance of evidence
 Section 2 of Rule 111 of the New Rules of CourtThe proviso, which is
procedural, may also be regarded as an unauthorized amendment of
substantive law

Article 1162

Obligations derived from quasi-delicts

Shall be governed by the provisions

Of Chapter 2 Title 17 of the Book

And by special laws

Obligations Arising from Quasi-Delicts. As it is used in this part of

the Civil Code, the term quasi-delicts refers to all of those
obligations which do not arise from law, contracts, quasi contracts,
or criminal offenses. Thus, using Art. 2176 of the Civil Code and
decided cases as bases or anchors, it may be defined as the fault or
negligence of a person, who, by his act or omission, connected or
unconnected with, but independent from, any contractual relation,
causes damage to another person. It is, therefore, the equivalent of
the term tort in Anglo-American law.
Persons liable. Obligations arising from quasidelicts are
demandable not only from the person directly responsible for the
damage incurred, but also against the following:
(1) The father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother,
with respect to damages caused by the minor children who live in
their company;
(2) Guardians, with respect to damages caused by the minors or
incapacitated persons who are under their authority and who live in
their company;
 3) The owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise,
with respect to damages caused by their employees in the service
of the branches in which the latter are employed or on the occasion
of their functions;
(4) Employers with respect to damages caused by their employees
and household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned
tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any business or
industry;
(5) The State, when it acts through a special agent; but not when
the damage has been caused by the offi cial to whom the task done
properly pertains; and
(6) Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades,
with respect to damages caused by their pupils and students or
apprentices, so long as they remain in their custody It must be
noted, however, that the responsibility of the above persons or
entities shall cease if they can prove that they have observed all the
diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage.
Idem; Requisites of liability. In actions based on quasidelicts,
before the person injured can recover damages from the defendant,
it is necessary that he must be able to prove the following facts:
(1) The fault or negligence of the defendant;
(2) The damage suffered or incurred by the plaintiff; and
(3) The relation of cause and effect between the fault or negligence
of the defendant and the damage incurred by the plaintiff
Idem; Quasi-delicts and crimes. Quasi-delicts and criminal
offenses are sometimes difficult to distinguish from each other.
However, they may be distinguished from each other in the
following ways:
(1) Crimes affect the public interest, while quasi-delicts are only of
private concern;
 (2) The Penal Code punishes or corrects the criminal act, while the
Civil Code, by means of indemnification, merely repairs the
damages incurred;
(3) Generally, there are two liabilities in crime: criminal and civil. In
quasi-delict, there is only civil liability; and
(4) Crimes are not as broad as quasi-delicts, because the former are
punished only if there is a law clearly covering them, while the
latter include all acts in which any kind of fault or negligence
intervenes
The coverage of quasi-delicts which do not overlap with crimes
under the Revised Penal Code and special laws (and which we can
very well call the general rule) are: first, negligent acts or omissions
not punishable as criminal offenses; second, intentional quasi-
delicts or torts, such as those regulated by Arts. 19, 21, 22, 26, 27,
28 and 1314 of the Civil Code; and third, the so-called strict liability
torts where there is neither negligence nor intent to cause damage
or injury, such as in the case contemplated in Art. 23 of the Civil
Code or in the case of actionable nuisances under Arts. 694 and 705
of the Civil Code.
It is by now beyond all cavil, as to dispense with the citation of
jurisprudence, that a negligent act, such as that committed in this
case, gives rise to at least two separate and independent liabilities,
namely (1) the civil liability arising from crime or culpa criminal and
(2) the liability arising from civil negligence or the so-called culpa
aquiliana.
These two concepts of faults are so distinct from each other that
exoneration from one does not result in exoneration from the other.
Adjectively and substantively, they can be prosecuted separately
and independently of each other, although Article 2177 of the Civil
Code precludes recovery of damages twice for the same negligent
act or omission, which means that should there be varying amounts
 awarded in two separate cases, the plaintiff may recover, in effect,
only the bigger amount. That is to say, if the plaintiff had already
been ordered paid an amount in one case and in the other case the
amount adjudged is bigger, he shall be entitled in the second case
only to the excess over the one fi xed in the fi rst case, but if he had
already been paid a bigger amount in the fi rst case, he may not
recover anymore in the second case.
However, a closer study shows that such a concurrence of scope in
regard to negligent acts does not destroy the distinction between
the civil liability arising from a crime and the responsibility for cuasi-
delitos or culpa extra-contractual. The same negligent act causing
damages may produce civil liability arising from a crime under
Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, or create an action for cuasi-
delito or culpa extra-contractual under Articles 1902-1910 of the
Civil Code.

Chapter 2

Nature and Effect of Obligations

Art. 1163

Every person obliged to give something

Is also
Obliged to take care of it
 With the proper diligence

Of a good father of a family

Unless
1) The law

Or 2) the stipulation

Requires another standard of care

It is generic or indeterminate when the object is designated

merely by its class or genus without any particular designation or
physical segregation from all others of the same class.
It is determinate when the object is particularly designated or
physically segregated from all others of the same class.

Art. 1164

The creditor has a right to the fruits of the thing

From the time

The obligation to deliver

It arises

However he shall acquire

No real right

Over it

Until the same has been delivered to him

The question, however, is when does the obligation to deliver the

thing and the fruits arise? The answer to this question depends upon
the nature of the obligation itself. In case of obligations arising from
the law, quasi-contracts, criminal offenses, and quasi-delicts, the
obligation to deliver arises from the time designated by the provisions
of the Civil Code or of special laws creating or regulating them.
In case of obligations arising from contracts, the obligation to deliver
arises, as a general rule, from the moment of the perfection of the
contract.
Generalizing the provision of the latter article, we can, therefore, say
that the obligor or debtor is bound to deliver the thing which is the
object of the obligation as well as the fruits thereof from the moment
the contract is perfected. In other words, with respect to the thing
itself, the obligation to deliver arises from the time of perfection of the
contract; with respect to the fruits, the obligation to deliver also arises
from the time of the perfection of the contract. It must be noted,
however, that these rules are not absolute in character.
In case there is a contrary stipulation of the parties with respect to the
time when the thing or fruits shall be delivered, such stipulation shall
govern.
Hence, if the obligation is subject to a suspensive condition, the
obligation to deliver the thing as well as the fruits shall arise only from
the moment of the fulfi llment of the condition, and if it is subject to a
suspensive term or period, the obligation to deliver arises only upon
the expiration of the designated term or period.
a personal right is
a right
 pertaining to a person
to demand from another,
as a de nite passive subject,
the ful llment of a prestation
to give, to do or not to do.
It is a jus ad rem, a right enforceable only against a definite person or
group of persons, such as the right of a creditor to demand from the
debtor the delivery of the object of the obligation after the perfection
of the contract.
A real right, on the other hand, is a
right pertaining to a person
over a specic thing,
without a passive subject
individually determined
against whom
such right
may be personally enforced.
It is a jus in re, a right enforceable against the whole world, such as the
right of ownership, possession, usufruct or easement.

Art. 1165

When what is to be delivered

Is a determinate thing

The creditor

In addition

To the right granted him by article 1170

May compel the debtor

to make the delivery

If the thing is

Indeterminate or generic

He may ask the obligation

To be complied with

At the expense

Of the debtor

If the obligor delays

Or has promised

To deliver

The same thing

To two or more persons who do not have the same interest

He shall be responsible for fortuitous event

Until he has effected delivery

(1) To compel specic performance. This right is expressly recognized

by the fi rst paragraph of Art. 1165 of the Code which states that the
creditor may compel the debtor to make the delivery.
Consequently, if the debtor does not comply with his obligation at the
time when the obligation to deliver arises or if he insists on delivering
a different one, the remedy of the creditor is to fi le an action against
the debtor to compel specific performance.
In such case, the debtor cannot even plead pecuniary impossibility of
performance. It is an undisputed principle of equity jurisprudence, and
this is also true in this jurisdiction, that mere pecuniary inability to fulfi
 ll an engagement does not discharge the obligation, nor does it
constitute any defense to a decree for specific performance.
To recover damages for breach of the obligation. Besides the right to
compel specifi c performance, the creditor has also the right to recover
damages from the debtor in case of breach of the obligation through
delay, fraud, negligence or contravention of the tenor thereof.
It will be observed that the above remedies are not incompatible with
each other. Hence, the creditor may le an action against the debtor
for speci c performance under the rst paragraph of Art. 1165 and,
at the same time, avail of the action for damages against the said
debtor under Art. 1170.

Article 1169

Those obliged to deliver or to do somethings

Incur in delay
From the time

The oblige judicially or extrajudically demands from them

The fulllment of their obligation

However, the demand of the creditor shall not be necessary in order that
delay may exist:
1) When the obligation or the law expressly so declares
2) When from the nature and the circumstances of the obligation

It appears that the designation of the time

When the thing is to be delivered

Or service is to be rendered

Was a controlling motive

For the establishment of the contract

3) When demand would be useless

As when the obligor has rendered it

Beyond his power to perform

In reciprocal obligations,

Neither party incurs in delay

If the other does not comply

Or is not ready to comply

In a proper manner

With what is incumbent upon him

From the moment one of the parties fullls his obligation,

Delay by the other begins

Elcano and Elcano vs Hill and Hill

77 SCRA 98

Facts:
Reginald Hill, a minor, married at the time of the occurrence, and his father,
the defendant Marvin Hill, with whom he was living and getting subsistence,
for the killing by Reginald of the son of the plaintiffs, named Agapito Elcano,
of which, when criminally prosecuted, the said accused was acquitted on the
ground that his act was not criminal, because of "lack of intent to kill,
coupled with mistake.

Issue:

1. Is the present civil action for damages barred by the acquittal of Reginald
in the criminal case wherein the action for civil liability, was not reversed?

2. May Article 2180 (2nd and last paragraphs) of the Civil Code he applied
against Atty. Hill, notwithstanding the undisputed fact that at the time of the
occurrence complained of. Reginald, though a minor, living with and getting
subsistence from his father, was already legally married?

Ruling:

Regarding the 1st issue the Supreme Court ruled that the acquittal of
Reginald Hill in the criminal case has not extinguished his liability for quasi-
delict, hence that acquittal is not a bar to the instant action against him.

In relation to the 2nd issue the Supreme Court ruled that even if Reginald has
been previously emancipated by a previous marriage such emancipation is
not full or absolute, in effect Atty. Marvin Hill is liable for the damages his
son caused.

Culpa aquiliana includes voluntary and negligent acts which may be

punishable by law.
Acquittal from an accusation of criminal negligence, whether on reasonable
doubt or not, shall not be a bar to a subsequent civil action, not for civil
 liability arising from criminal negligence, but for damages due to a quasi-
delict or 'culpa aquiliana'. But said article forestalls a double recovery.
According to Art. 2176 a quasi-delict is an act or omission which caused
damage to another, there being fault or negligence provided that there is
no pre-existing contractual relationship between the parties.
Rule 111
Art 29-32
Art 2177
We do hold, that Article 2176, where it refers to "fault or negligencia covers
not only acts "not punishable by law" but also acts criminal in character,
whether intentional and voluntary or negligent. Consequently, a separate
civil action lies against the offender in a criminal act, whether or not he is
criminally prosecuted and found guilty or acquitted, provided that the
offended party is not allowed, if he is actually charged also criminally, to
recover damages on both scores, and would be entitled in such eventuality
only to the bigger award of the two, assuming the awards made in the two
cases vary. In other words, the extinction of civil liability referred to in Par.
(e) of Section 3, Rule 111, refers exclusively to civil liability founded on
Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, whereas the civil liability for the
same act considered as a quasi-delict only and not as a crime is not
estinguished even by a declaration in the criminal case that the criminal act
charged has not happened or has not been committed by the accused.
Briefly stated, We here hold, in reiteration of Garcia, that culpa aquiliana
includes voluntary and negligent acts which may be punishable by law.

Mendoza vs. Arrieta

91 SCRA 113

Facts:
Montoya, driver of the truck owned by Timbol hit the rear of the jeep owned and driven
by Salazar as a result, Salazars jeep then hit the rear of the Mercedez Benz car owned
and driven by petitioner Mendoza. The Court of First instance of Bulacan found Montoya
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of damage to property thru reckless imprudence and
acquitted Salazar of any liability, civil and criminal. However, petitioner Mendoza was not
awarded damages as he was not a complainant against truck-driver Montoya but only
against jeep-owner-driver Salazar. After the termination of the criminal cases Mendoza
filed a civil case against Salazar and Timbol which was dismissed because said complaint
is barred by prior judgement and because Mendoza did not reserve his right to file an
independent civil action.
Issue:

1. Whether or not prior said prior judgement bars Mendoza from pursuing an
independent civil action?

2. Whether or not failure to reserve the right to file an independent civil action is a bar
for civil action based on quasi-delict.

3. Whether or not Salazar is liable to pay for damages?

Ruling:

Regarding the 1st issue, the Supreme Court ruled that the right to file an independent
civil action is not barred because the 2 cases at hand are not identical with each other
hence only 3 of the 4 requisites of res judicata are satisfied.

In relation to the 2nd issue the Supreme Court ruled that no reservation need be made in
the criminal case.

With respect to the 3rd issue the Supreme Court ruled that Salazar is not liable for
damages.

Culpa Criminal Article 100 RPC

Culpa Aquiliana Article 2177 Civil Code

Mendoza Salazar Montoya

Mercedez Jeep Truck

Bricktown Development Corporation vs. Amor Tierra Development Corporation
239 SCRA 126

Facts:
Petitioner Bricktown Development Corporation executed two contracts to sell in favor of
private respondent Amor Tierra Development Corporation 96 residential lots for the total
price of P21,639,875.00 to be paid by the latter in 3 maturity dates. However private
respondent was only able to pay petitioner corporation the sum of P1,334,443.21.
Furthermore, there were re-negotiations between the two parties after the failure of private
respondent to pay within the agreed dates but nothing materialized.

Issue:

1. Whether or not the cancellation of the contract required a positive act on the part of
petitioners giving private respondent the sixty (60) day grace period provided in the
contracts to sell?

2. Whether or not the contracts to sell were validly rescinded or cancelled by Petitioner
Corporation?

3. Whether or not the amounts already remitted by private respondent under said contracts
were rightly forfeited by Petitioner Corporation?

Ruling:

Concerning the 1st issue, there is no positive act or demand required to the petitioner
corporation because under the terms of the contracts to sell the demand or positive act
became ipso facto operative from the moment the due payments were not met at their
stated maturities.

Regarding the 2nd issue the Supreme Court ruled that the contracts were still validly
rescinded.

In relation to the 3rd issue the amounts remitted by private respondent under said contracts
not rightly forfeited by petitioner corporation because of the re-negotiations between which
never materialized.

Therefore, the Supreme Court ordered the refund by petitioner corporation of

P1,334,443.21 with 12% interest per annum to commence only, however, from the date of
finality of this decision until such refund is effected.

Cangco vs. Manila Railroad

38 PHIL 763
Facts:

Jose Cangco attempted to step off to the platform of a dimly lighted railroad
station from a slowly moving train where he was perfectly familiar with to as
it was his daily custom to get on and off the train at this station but one or
both of his feet came in contact with a sack of watermelons as a result, his
feet slipped from under him and he fell violently on the platform. His body at
once rolled from the platform and was drawn under the moving car, where
his right arm was badly crushed and lacerated leaving him permanently
disabled from employment.
Issue:

Whether or not the plaintiff is guilty of contributory negligence?

Ruling:

The Supreme Court ruled that the plaintiff is not guilty of contributory
negligence by using the mode of exposition used by this court in Picart vs.
Smith. The court reasoned that as the defendant was bound by reason of its
duty as a public carrier to afford to its passengers facilities for safe egress
from its trains, the plaintiff had a right to assume, in the absence of some
circumstance to warn him to the contrary, that the platform was clear. There
could, therefore, be no uncertainty in his mind with regard either to the
length of the step which he was required to take or the character of the
platform where he was alighting. Our conclusion is that the conduct of the
plaintiff in undertaking to alight while the train was yet slightly under way
was not characterized by imprudence and that therefore he was not guilty of
contributory negligence.

Culpa aquilliana, substantive and independent, which of itself constitutes the

source of an obligation between persons not formerly connected by any
legal tie" and culpa contractual considered as an accident in the
performance of an obligation already existing.

One who places a powerful automobile in the hands of a servant whom he

knows to be ignorant of the method of managing such a vehicle, is himself
guilty of an act of negligence which makes him liable for all the
consequences of his imprudence. The obligation to make good the damage
arises at the very instant that the unskillful servant, while acting within the
scope of his employment causes the injury. The liability of the master is
personal and direct. But, if the master has not been guilty of any negligence
whatever in the selection and direction of the servant, he is not liable for the
acts of the latter, whatever done within the scope of his employment or not,
if the damage done by the servant does not amount to a breach of the
contract between the master and the person injured.

From this article two things are apparent: (1) That when an injury is caused
by the negligence of a servant or employee there instantly arises a
presumption of law that there was negligence on the part of the master or
employer either in selection of the servant or employee, or in supervision
over him after the selection, or both; and (2) that that presumption is juris
tantum and not juris et de jure, and consequently, may be rebutted. It
follows necessarily that if the employer shows to the satisfaction of the court
that in selection and supervision he has exercised the care and diligence of a
good father of a family, the presumption is overcome and he is relieved from
liability.

Whether negligence occurs an incident in the course of the performance of a

contractual undertaking or its itself the source of an extra-contractual
undertaking obligation, its essential characteristics are identical. There is
always an act or omission productive of damage due to carelessness or
inattention on the part of the defendant.
If one delivers a valuable watch to watchmaker who contract to repair it, and
the bailee, by a personal negligent act causes its destruction, he is
unquestionably liable. Would it be logical to free him from his liability for the
breach of his contract, which involves the duty to exercise due care in the
preservation of the watch, if he shows that it was his servant whose
negligence caused the injury? If such a theory could be accepted, juridical
persons would enjoy practically complete immunity from damages arising
from the breach of their contracts if caused by negligent acts as such
juridical persons can of necessity only act through agents or servants, and it
would no doubt be true in most instances that reasonable care had been
taken in selection and direction of such servants. If one delivers securities to
a banking corporation as collateral, and they are lost by reason of the
negligence of some clerk employed by the bank, would it be just and
reasonable to permit the bank to relieve itself of liability for the breach of its
contract to return the collateral upon the payment of the debt by proving
that due care had been exercised in the selection and direction of the clerk?

Circumstances surrounding the case should be considered such as the age

sex and physical well-being of the person as well as what the average
prudent man would have done.

Southeastern College vs. CA

292 SCRA 422

Facts:

Private respondents are owners of a house at 326 College Road, Pasay City,
while petitioner owns a four-storey school building along the same College
Road. On October 11, 1989, at about 6:30 in the morning, a powerful
typhoon Saling hit Metro Manila. Buffeted by very strong winds, the roof of
petitioners building was partly ripped off and blown away, landing on and
destroying portions of the roofing of private respondents house.

Issue:

Whether or not petitioner is liable for damages to respondents house?

Ruling:

The Supreme Court ruled that petitioner is not liable for the damages of
respondents house. In the present case, other than the said ocular
inspection, no investigation was conducted to determine the real cause of
the partial unroofing of petitioners school building. On the other hand
petitioner presented numerous proofs that petitioner was not negligent or
at fault regarding the construction and maintenance of its school building in
question and that typhoon Saling was the proximate cause of the damage
suffered by private respondents house.
Negligence, as commonly understood, is conduct which naturally or
reasonably creates undue risk or harm to others.

It may be the failure to observe that degree of care, precaution, and

vigilance which the circumstances justly demand

The omission to do something which a prudent and reasonable man, guided

by considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs,
would do.
Rakes vs. Atlantic Gulf
7 PHIL 359

Facts:

The plaintiff, one of a gang of eight Negro laborers in the employment of the
defendant, was at work transporting iron rails from a barge in the harbor to
the company's yard near the malecon in Manila. Plaintiff claims that but one
hand car was used in this work. The defendant has proved that there were
two immediately following one another, upon which were piled lengthwise
seven rails, each weighing 560 pounds, so that the ends of the rails lay upon
two crosspieces or sills secured to the cars, but without side pieces or guards
to prevent them from slipping off. According to the testimony of the plaintiff,
the men were either in the rear of the car or at its sides. According to that
defendant, some of them were also in front, hauling by a rope. At a certain
spot at or near the water's edge the track sagged, the tie broke, the car
either canted or upset, the rails slid off and caught the plaintiff, breaking his
leg, which was afterwards amputated at about the knee.
Issue:

1.) Whether or not the defendant is liable for damages?

2.) Whether or not plaintiff acted with contributory negligence?

Ruling:

The Supreme Court ruled that the defendant is partly liable for damages and
the plaintiff acted with contributory negligence. The judgement of the
Supreme Court deducted half of the damages granted by the trial court
which amounts to 2,500 pesos.
Necessito vs. Paras

104 PHIL 75

Facts:

Severina Garces and her one-year old son, Precillano Necesito, carrying
vegetables, boarded passenger auto truck or bus of the Philippine Rabbit Bus
Lines. Said auto-truck or bus entered a wooden bridge, but the front wheels
swerved to the right; the driver lost control, and after wrecking the bridge's
wooden rails, the truck fell on its right side into a creek where water was
breast deep. The mother, Severina Garces, was drowned; the son, Precillano
Necesito, was injured, suffering abrasions and fracture of the left femur. The
accident was caused by the fracture of the right steering knuckle, which was
defective a condition that could not be known or ascertained by the carrier
despite the fact that regular thirty-day inspections were made of the
steering knuckle.
Issue:

Whether or not defendant is liable for damages?

Ruling:

The Supreme Court ruled that defendant is liable for damages because it
failed to prove that it performed the diligence required by law as a carrier.
Due regard for the carrier's obligations toward the traveling public demands
adequate periodical tests to determine the condition and strength of those
vehicle portions the failure of which may endanger the safe of the
passengers, in the case at hand only a visual test was performed. A common
carrier's contract is not to be regarded as a game of chance wherein the
passenger stakes his limb and life against the carrier's property and profits.
Under Article 2220 of the new Civil Code, in case of suits for breach of
contract, moral damages are recoverable only where the defendant acted
fraudulently or in bad faith, and there is none in the case before us.

We are satisfied that the periodical visual inspection of the steering knuckle
as practiced by the carrier's agents did not measure up to the required legal
standard of "utmost diligence of very cautious persons" "as far as human
care and foresight can provide", and therefore that the knuckle's failure can
not be considered a fortuitous event that exempts the carrier from
responsibility

As to exemplary damages, the carrier has not acted in a "wanton, fraudulent,

reckless, oppressive or malevolent manner" to warrant their award.

a carrier is liable to its passengers for damages caused by mechanical defects

of the conveyance.

Tugade vs. CA
85 SCRA 226

Facts:

On June 12, 1980 at around 12:00 noon, Engr. Henry Tugade of the
Pangasinan Electric Cooperative, Inc. (Panelco) rode in a company rover jeep
together with four other employees bound from the Panelco compound in
Bani to Bolinao, Pangasinan. Somewhere in Tiep, Pangasinan, a Dagupan bus
that was also headed for Bolinao, began to follow the rover jeep. While the
bus was trying to overtake the jeep, the latter turned turtle and caused four
of its five occupants to fall out of the jeep causing the death of Tugade and
another passenger by the name of Consuelo Estolonio.
Issue:

Whether or not Panelco is liable for damages?

Ruling:

The Supreme Court ruled that Panelco is liable for primarily and subsidiarily
for the damage caused by their driver Areola. Panelco failed to prove that
they performed the diligence required to them by law which is the diligence
of a good father of a family.

Panelco meanwhile is liable both as owner of the mechanically defective vehicle under Art. 2176 and as
employer of the negligent driver under Art. 2180. Under Art. 2180, Panelco as employer of Areola is primarily
and solidarily liable for the quasi-delict committed by the latter. It is presumed to be negligent in the selection
and supervision of its employees by operation of law and may be relieved of responsibility for the negligent
acts of its driver, who at the time was acting within the scope of his assigned task, only if it can show that it
observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage.

The inconsistencies in the testimonies of [witnesses] do not render them incredible or their testimonies
barren of probative weight. It must be borne in mind that human memory is not as unerring as a photograph
and a persons sense of observation is impaired by many factors A truth-telling witness is not always expected
to give an error-free testimony considering the lapse of time and the treachery of human memory. What is
primordial is that the mass of testimony jibes on material points, the slight clashing of statements dilute
neither the witnesses credibility nor the veracity of his testimonyInconsistencies on minor and trivial matters
only serve to strengthen rather than weaken the credibility of witnesses for they erase the suspicion of
rehearsed testimony.

It is basic that findings of facts of trial courts are accorded by appellate courts with great, if not conclusive
effect. This is because of the unique advantage enjoyed by trial courts of observing at close range the
demeanor, deportment and conduct of witnesses as they give their testimonies.[23] Trial courts have the
unique advantage of being able to observe that elusive and incommunicable evidence of the witness
deportment on the stand while testifying --- the brazen face of the liar, the glibness of the schooled witness in
reciting a lesson, the itching over-eagerness of the swift witness, as well as the honest face of the truthful
one.[24] Indeed, assignment of values to declarations on the witness stand is best done by the trial judge
who, unlike appellate magistrates, can weigh firsthand the testimony of a witness.[25]

Based on net earnings and not gross earnings

However, we have consistently enunciated that we may review the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals:

(a) where there is grave abuse of discretion; (b) when the finding is grounded entirely on speculations,
surmises or conjectures; (c) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (d) when
the judgment of the Court of Appeals was based on a misapprehension of facts; (e) when the factual findings
are conflicting; (f) when the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case and
the same are contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee; (g) when the Court of Appeals
manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties and which, if properly considered,
would justify a different conclusion; and, (h) where the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are contrary to
those of the trial court, or are mere conclusions without citation of specific evidence, or where the facts set
forth by the petitioner are not disputed by the respondent, or where the findings of fact of the Court of
Appeals are premised on the absence of evidence and are contradicted by the evidence on record.

Juntilla vs Fontanar
136 SCRA 625
Facts:

The jeepney was driven by defendant Berfol Camoro. It was registered under
the franchise of defendant Clemente Fontanar but was actually owned by
defendant Fernando Banzon. When the jeepney reached Mandaue City, the
right rear tire exploded causing the vehicle to turn turtle. In the process, the
plaintiff who was sitting at the front seat was thrown out of the vehicle.
Upon landing on the ground, the plaintiff momentarily lost consciousness.
When he came to his senses, he found that he had a lacerated wound on his
right palm. Aside from this, he suffered injuries on his left arm, right thigh
and on his back. Because of his shock and injuries, he went back to Danao
City but on the way, he discovered that his "Omega" wrist watch was lost.
Upon his arrival in Danao City, he immediately entered the Danao City
Hospital to attend to his injuries, and also requested his father-in-law to
proceed immediately to the place of the accident and look for the watch. In
spite of the efforts of his father-in-law, the wrist watch, which he bought for
P 852.70 could no longer be found.
Issue:

Whether or not defendant is liable for damages?

Ruling:

The Supreme Court ruled that defendant is liable for damages because it
failed to prove that it exercised the diligence of a common carrier required
by law.
The rationale of the carrier's liability is the fact that the passenger has
neither choice nor control over the carrier in the selection and use of the
equipment and appliances in use by the carrier. Having no privity whatever
with the manufacturer or vendor of the defective equipment, the passenger
has no remedy against him, while the carrier usually has. It is but logical,
therefore, that the carrier, while not an insurer of the safety of his
passengers, should nevertheless be held to answer for the flaws of his
equipment if such flaws were at all discoverable. ...

In Lasam v. Smith (45 Phil. 657), we laid down the following essential
characteristics of caso fortuito:

xxx xxx xxx

... In a legal sense and, consequently, also in relation to contracts, a caso

fortuito presents the following essential characteristics: (1) The cause of the
unforeseen and unexpected occurrence, or of the failure of the debtor to
comply with his obligation, must be independent of the human will. (2) It
must be impossible to foresee the event which constitutes the caso fortuito,
or if it can be foreseen, it must be impossible to avoid. (3) The occurrence
must be such as to render it impossible for the debtor to fulfill his obligation
in a normal manner. And (4) the obligor (debtor) must be free from any
participation in the aggravation of the injury resulting to the creditor.

Austria vs. CA

39 SCRA 527
Facts:

In a receipt dated 30 January 1961, Maria G. Abad acknowledged having

received from Guillermo Austria one pendant with diamonds valued at
P4,500.00, to be sold on commission basis or to be returned on demand. On
1 February 1961, however, while walking home to her residence in at night
in Mandaluyong, Rizal, Abad was said to have been accosted by two men,
one of whom hit her on the face, while the other snatched her purse
containing jewelry and cash, and ran away. Among the pieces of jewelry
allegedly taken by the robbers was the consigned pendant.
Issue:

Whether or not Maria was negligent and responsible for the loss of the
pendant?
Ruling:

The Supreme Court ruled that Maria did not act with contributory
negligence in the fortuitous event and the contention of the petitioner that
prior conviction of the culprits is required to establish that a robbery did take
place is tantamount to demanding proof beyond reasonable doubt in a civil
case where preponderance of evidence is already sufficient.

We are with reference to such obligations, that culpa, or negligence, may

be understood in two difference senses; either as culpa, substantive and
independent, which on account of its origin arises in an obligation between
two persons not formerly bound by any other obligation; or as an incident
in the performance of an obligation; or as already existed, which can not
be presumed to exist without the other, and which increases the liability
arising from the already exiting obligation.

Of these two species of culpa the rst one mentioned, existing by itself,
may be also considered as a real source of an independent obligation, and,
as chapter 2, title 16 of this book of the code is devoted to it, it is logical to
presume that the reference contained in article 1093 is limited thereto and
that it does not extend to those provisions relating to the other species of
culpa (negligence), the nature of which we will discuss later.

And in his commentary on articles 1102 and 1104 he says that these two
species of negligence may be somewhat inexactly described as contractual
and extra-contractual, the letter being the culpa aquiliana of the Roman
law and not entailing so strict an obligation as the former.

This contractual obligation, implied from the relation and perhaps so

inherent in its nature to be invariable by the parties, binds the employer to
provide safe appliances for the use of the employee, thus closely
corresponding to English and American Law. On these principles it was the
duty of the defendant to build and to maintain its track in reasonably
sound condition, so as to protect its workingmen from unnecessary danger.
It is plain that in one respect or the other it failed in its duty, otherwise the
accident could not have occurred; consequently the negligence of the
defendant is established.

Vasquez vs. CA

138 SCRA 553

Facts:

When the inter-island vessel MV "Pioneer Cebu" left the Port of Manila in
the early morning of May 15, 1966 bound for Cebu, it had on board the
spouses Alfonso Vasquez and Filipinas Bagaipo and a four-year old boy,
Mario Marlon Vasquez, among her passengers. The MV "Pioneer Cebu"
encountered typhoon "Klaring" and struck a reef on the southern part of
Malapascua Island, located somewhere north of the island of Cebu and
subsequently sunk. The aforementioned passengers were unheard from
since then.
Issue:

Whether or not respondents are liable for damages despite presence of

typhoon Klaring?
Ruling:

The Supreme Court ruled that the respondents are liable for damages
because they did not perform the diligence of a common carrier as required
by law.