APRIL 1, 2017 Vol LII No 13

` 80

A SAMEEKSHA TRUST PUBLICATION www.epw.in

EDITORIALS Diversity of Faculty at IIMs

Parliament sans Democracy Two articles argue why the Indian Institutes of
Paving the Way for Ram Lalla? Management should recruit more faculty members
Drawing Blood from underprivileged sections. pages 12 and 15
50 YEARS OF EPW
Thoughts on a Unique Institution
Shadow Prison(s) in Tamil Nadu
COMMENTARY
Faculty Diversity at the IIMs:
Successive state governments have continued to
A Preliminary Snapshot maintain horrible special camps for Tamil Eelam
IIMs and Reservations
refugees. page 21
Gujarat State Higher Education Council Bill

Shadow Prison(s) in Tamil Nadu

Right to Recall in Madhya Pradesh

Poverty and Deprivation among the Katkari
BOOK REVIEWS
The Globalisation of Inequality
Education and Empowerment in India
Was Gandhi Casteist?
Gandhi's views on the caste system are sought to be
understood not only through his writings but his
personal practices. page 42

PERSPECTIVES
Safai Karamcharis in a Vicious Cycle
SPECIAL ARTICLES
Was Gandhi a Champion of the Caste
System? Reflections on His Practices
Waste-to-Energy and Recycling:
Waste-to-Energy and Recycling
Incineration-based waste disposal methods are not
working but government authorities remain adamant,
thereby further marginalising waste-picking
communities. page 51

Competing Systems of Waste Management

Land Acquisition and Beyond:

The Farmers Perspective Right to Recall in Madhya Pradesh

Diasporic Resources and Development:
Reflections from a Punjab Village
CURRENT STATISTICS
The experience of recalling elected representatives in
local bodies has been a mixed one: it has been arbitrary
and vulnerable to political opportunism. page 24
 april 1, 2017 | vol LII No 13
My Thoughts on a Unique Institution: Lage Raho EPW
10 The writer maps out a history of the debates and discussions he encountered
in EPW during the course of his academic life. S Mahendra Dev
Faculty Diversity at the Indian Institutes of Management
12 A preliminary snapshot of the social composition of faculty at the Indian
Institutes of Management reveals that the faculty body is drawn from a very
narrow spectrum of Indian society. Siddharth Joshi, Deepak Malghan
IIMs and Reservations
15 The Indian Institutes of Management are not fulfilling their mandate of acting
as socially responsible public institutions. Manish Thakur, R Rajesh Babu
Gujarat State Higher Education Council Bill
17 The Gujarat State Higher Education Council Bill, 2016 further erodes the
already compromised autonomy of universities by way of academic atrophy
and atrophy of homogeneity. Dhananjay Rai
Shadow Prison(s) in Tamil Nadu
21 An account of the awful conditions of the Tamil Eelam inmates of refugee camps
throws light on the wide-ranging violations of their rights. N Malathy
Right to Recall Reform Experience in Madhya Pradesh
24 The experience of the reform in local bodies in Madhya Pradesh has revealed
how the Right to Recall could be vulnerable to political opportunism and
arbitrariness of process. K Neelima
Poverty and Deprivation among the Katkari
27 An examination of the dimensions of the disparities between three ethnic
groups within the Scheduled Tribes in Jawhar and Mokhada talukas of
Palghar district, Maharashtra is carried out. Rohit Mutatkar
Safai Karamcharis in a Vicious Cycle
37 A study of 360 safai karamcharis employed with the Municipal Corporation
of Greater Mumbai suggests that policies aimed at uplifting conservancy
work may actually be institutionalising caste-based occupations.
Pradeep S Salve, Dhananjay W Bansod & Hemangi Kadlak
Was Gandhi a Champion of the Caste System?
42 Mohandas Karamchand Gandhis views on the caste system are sought to be
understood through his personal practices, the community life in his ashrams
and the inconsistencies between his practices and writings, where he
explicitly defends caste. Nishikant Kolge
Competing Systems of Waste Management in Urban India
51 Not only are incineration-based waste-to-energy technologies unsuitable for
Indian waste, they are in competition with contemporary urban recycling
systems over the same set of waste material. Aman Luthra
Land Acquisition and Beyond: The Farmers Perspective
59 A survey of the original inhabitants of Maan, a village near Pune, found
that the land acquisition process for information technology parks and
industrial estates was both attractive and scary for the farmers involved.
Dhanmanjiri Sathe
Diasporic Resources, Community Interventions and Development
65 Diasporic leadership has been as important as diasporic resources in effecting
the transformation of Chakar village in Punjab, now recognised as a model for
rural development. Jaswinder Singh Brar
EDITORIALS
Parliament sans Democracy.................................7
Paving the Way for Ram Lalla? ................................ 8
Drawing Blood ....................................................... 9
FROM 50 YEARS AGO............................................. 9
50 YEARS OF EPW
My Thoughts on a Unique Institution:
Lage Raho EPW
S Mahendra Dev............................................. 10
COMMENTARY
Faculty Diversity at the Indian Institutes of
Management: A Preliminary Snapshot
Siddharth Joshi, Deepak Malghan...................12
IIMs and Reservations
Manish Thakur, R Rajesh Babu .......................15
Gujarat State Higher Education Council Bill:
An Atrophied Autonomy
Dhananjay Rai ................................................17
Shadow Prison(s) in Tamil Nadu
N Malathy .......................................................21
Right to Recall Reform Experience
in Madhya Pradesh
K Neelima ...................................................... 24
Poverty and Deprivation among the Katkari
Rohit Mutatkar .............................................. 27
BOOK REVIEWs
The Globalisation of Inequality
Liberal Approach to Inequality
Paramjit Singh ............................................... 30
Education and Empowerment in India:
Policies and PracticesUnderstanding Education
and Its Role in Empowerment
Mihika Shah .................................................. 33
PERSPECTIVES
Safai Karamcharis in a Vicious Cycle:
A Study in the Perspective of Caste
Pradeep S Salve, Dhananjay W Bansod,
Hemangi Kadlak ................................................ 37
SPECIAL ARTICLES
Was Gandhi a Champion of the Caste System?
Reflections on His Practices
Nishikant Kolge ............................................. 42
Waste-to-Energy and Recycling: Competing
Systems of Waste Management in Urban India
Aman Luthra ..................................................51
Land Acquisition and Beyond:
The Farmers Perspective
Dhanmanjiri Sathe ........................................ 59
Diasporic Resources, Community Interventions
and Development: Reflections from a Village
in Indian Punjab
Jaswinder Singh Brar .................................... 65
CURRENT STATISTICS .......................................... 71
appointments/programmes
announcements .................................................73
Letters .................................................................4
 LETTERS
Issn 0012-9976
Ever since the first issue in 1966,
EPW has been Indias premier journal for Remembering Javeed Alam way of relating to the lives of the people
comment on current affairs of Himachal Pradesh, among whom he
and research in the social sciences.
It succeeded Economic Weekly (19491965),
which was launched and shepherded
by Sachin Chaudhuri,
I t is not surprising that a multifaceted
personality should have attracted a tri-
bute of respect and love from eminent
spent his life as a communist activist. I
remember a story he told me about his
experience in leading a group of Demo-
who was also the founder-editor of EPW.
As editor for 35 years (19692004) philosophers and social scientists such as cratic Youth Federation of India activists to
Krishna Raj
gave EPW the reputation it now enjoys. Akeel Bilgrami (A Life of Commitment an all-India conference in Rajasthan. Some
editor
and Inquiry, EPW, 31 December 2016), of these comrades drank on the train.
Paranjoy Guha Thakurta Partha Chatterjee, and Nivedita Menon The president of the conference came to
EXECUTIVE Editor (Social Scientist, JanuaryFebruary 2017). know about this and complained to
Lina Mathias I also knew Javeed well. He was one of Javeed. Javeeds reply was that if he did
Deputy Editor
the most upright and lovable human not like the Himachal Pradesh comrades
Bernard DMello
beings I have ever known, which is why I drinking, he might as well forget any idea
SENIOR Assistant editorS
lubna duggal am prompted to write this letter. Unlike of spreading communism among them,
ABHISHEK SHAW many Marxists, Javeed was a firm believer for, drinking was part of their daily living.
copy editor in formal democracy. He was the man who They regularly drank the local brew and
jyoti shetty
wrote articles like What Is So Bourgeois offered it to the devi they worshipped.
Assistant editorS
P S Leela about Bourgeois Democracy, or a book Amiya Kumar Bagchi
SANGEETA GHOSH like Who Wants Democracy (2012). Kolkata
ANISHA GEORGE
While remaining a totally committed
ASSISTANT Editor (DIGITAL)
SHIREEN AZAM member of the Communist Party of India Whither Punjab Politics?
EDITORIAL Assistant (Marxist) all his life, he was not afraid to
Advait Rao Palepu
production
u raghunathan
question its dogmas. He wrote, for example,
critically about the principle of democratic
centralism which governs all Leninist
T he Congress party under Amarinder
Singh has secured a landslide victory in
the Punjab legislative assembly elections.
s lesline corera
suneethi nair parties from the Communist Party of India Riding on a popular anti-incumbency wave
Circulation MANAGER to the Revolutionary Socialist Party (Can against the Shiromani Akali Dal (SAD)
B S Sharma Democratic Centralism Be Conducive to and Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) coalition
Advertisement Manager Democracy?, EPW, 19 September 2009). government, it has also warded off the
Kamal G Fanibanda
For him, of course, formal democracy had challenge of the Aam Aadmi Party (AAP).
General Manager
Gauraang Pradhan to be layered with substantive and com- The victory is high in symbolism: it restores
Publisher munitarian democracy, allowing people popular governance by the Congress in a
K Vijayakumar to live with dignity with their cherished state where its history is chequered with
editorial identities unviolated. That does not mean the victimisation of the majority Sikh com-
edit@epw.in
that he had any romantic illusions about munity and, perhaps, more importantly,
Circulation
circulation@epw.in communities as such. He wrote on the provides a bridgehead for the revival of the
Advertising problems of caste and religious identi- grand old partys fortunes in the central
advertisement@epw.in ties in EPW (Is Caste Appeal Casteism?, states. Masterminded by Prashant Kishor,
Economic and Political Weekly 27 March 1999; The Contemporary an ex-Narendra Modi strategist and his
320321, A to Z Industrial Estate Muslim Situation in India: A Long-term 7,000-strong Indian Political Action Com-
Ganpatrao Kadam Marg, Lower Parel
Mumbai 400 013 View, 12 January 2008). He knew that mittee (I-PAC), the Congress succeeded in
Phone: (022) 4063 8282 communities, religious or otherwise, could capturing a majority of the rural Sikh,
FAX: (022) 2493 4515
be horribly oppressive, disallowing any urban Hindu and Dalit votes. It has once
EPW Research Foundation
EPW Research Foundation, established in 1993, conducts
entry into or exit from those ascribed iden- again emerged as a catch-all party with
research on financial and macro-economic issues in India. tities (Public Sphere and Democratic Gov- 38.4% of the popular vote, though its
Director ernance in Contemporary India in Multi- overall vote share actually declined by
J DENNIS RAJAKUMAR
C 212, Akurli Industrial Estate culturalism, Liberalism and Democracy, 1.5% in 2012.
Kandivali (East), Mumbai 400 101 1999). For him, of course, the best identity The AAP failed to make a decisive
Phones: (022) 2887 3038/41
Fax: (022) 2887 3038 was a constructed identity, an identity he breakthrough as a third force in the state.
epwrf@epwrf.in shared with his fellow scholars and fellow Although it captured 23.9% of the vote,
Printed by K Vijayakumar at Modern Arts and Industries,
151, A-Z Industrial Estate, Ganpatrao Kadam Marg,
activists. But when challenged he would the party secured only 20 seats and almost
Lower Parel, Mumbai-400 013 and assert his identity as a Muslim, however one-third of these were from reserved
published by him on behalf of Sameeksha Trust
from 320321, A-Z Industrial Estate,
unbelieving he might have been. constituencies (for Scheduled Castes). The
Ganpatrao Kadam Marg, Lower Parel, Mumbai-400 013. For him, drinking in moderation was failure to replicate its May 2014 Lok Sabha
Editor: Paranjoy Guha Thakurta.
a part of civilised living. But it was also a election performance in the assembly
4 april 1, 2017 vol lII no 13 EPW Economic & Political Weekly

elections, has been attributed to a high
level of factionalism in the partys cam-
paign, mismanagement, and insensitivi-
ties to regional interests. AAPs high voltage
media campaign drew dividends in the
Malwa belt but its overall impact was to
transfer the anti-SAD vote to the advan-
tage of Congress. AAP has gained a foot-
hold but not an instant capture of the
state that it was anticipating. It remains to
be seen, as with the communist vote in the
past, whether AAP fizzles out.
For the SAD, this is a humiliating set-
back. Besieged by charges of nepotism,
corruption, fiscal mismanagement, the
collapse of the agrarian economy, and the
proliferation of drugs in the state under
its watch, the party put up a brave front
but has lost most of its front-line leaders.
Nonetheless, its vote share has not col-
lapsed entirely, with only a 10% decline
since 2012. Doubtless, the SAD will be
rebuiltwith or without the Badal clan
but the real challenge before the party is,
what kind of leadership is likely to emerge
from the Sikh political systemthe
Shiromani Gurdwara Parbandhak Com-
mittee (SGPC) which oversees the manage-
ment of Sikh shrinesthat the Badals
have astutely managed thus far? A round
of bloodletting and a possible turn to
militancy cannot be ruled out.
The otherwise triumphant BJP is prob-
ably the most disappointed by the out-
come. The partys vote share declined from
7.5% to 5.2% and the number of seats from
12 to three. Urban Hindu voters shifted in
large numbers to the Congress. As a mi-
nor partner in the coalition government,
the BJPs relationship with the SAD worked
best when they were both fighting Con-
gress. Post-May 2014, the BJPs senior
leaders remained at arms length from
the SAD during the election campaign.
The Punjab election result is interesting
not for the outcome but what it portends.
Amarinder Singh is unlikely to be willing
to play a bigger role in national politics, if
it means devoting less energy to the press-
ing challenges in the state. Punjabs mas-
sive fiscal deficit, consuming almost a
third of the states revenue expenditure, is
likely to limit the new governments room
for manoeuvre. Measures to make the
fiscal adjustment necessary are unlikely
to be popular at a time when industry and
Economic & Political Weekly EPW april 1, 2017
LETTERS
investors have found Punjab an unattrac- may really not be a good one if it
tive destination. Real economic imagina- is construed as a permanent solution
tion will be required to take difficult deci- to address the menace of increasing
sions. The collapse in agricultural prices, non-performing assets (NPA s) of public
moreover, is likely to produce a significant sector banks.
backlash which will be difficult to deflect The practice of reckless spending con-
in any anti-Haryana posturing over the tinued from the First to the Eighth Five
SutlejYamuna Link canal decision of Year Plan. This resulted in a situation of
the Supreme Court. acute fiscal mismanagement and con-
Yet, perhaps, the real challenge facing tributed to inflationary pressures. This
the new Congress government is likely to can continue even with the establish-
be how it will manage the Sikh political ment of the Public Sector Asset Rehabil-
system. The SAD is down but not out. Whilst itation Agency (PARA) or the bad bank.
in government the SAD deflected many Once this arrangement comes into force
challenges which emerged from Sikh poli- and the bad loans get transferred to
tics by maintaining a rigid control of the PARA, it is reasonable to expect that the
party and the SGPC. It is extremely unlikely banks may become lax and complacent in
that the Badals will be able to maintain this lending matters. Banks may come to
monopoly for much longer. No doubt, new think that even if some loans do not get
voices and formations are likely to emerge. recovered, the government will ultimately
The main paradox of the result is that bail out such NPAs.
in order to address the governance crisis Even as one agrees that a large part of
created by the SADBJP, the Congress party the present problem is not attributable
will have to shed its national pretentions to poor governance and mismanage-
and behave like a regional party. For too ment of banks as pointed out by the
long, Congress has viewed Punjab as its recent Economic Survey, there is no
backyard where political excesses can be guarantee that banks will not be lured
justified. If it is truly to rebuild its trust to misuse this facility in a highly competi-
with the citizens of the state, it will have tive environment to boost their profit-
to fight broader battles with the national ability. What is really required is a long-
government on centrestate relations. In term solution.
this respect, the challenges before the Banks need to exercise due diligence
Congress government are not too dis- when giving large loans to a particular
similar from the SADBJP government. sector or industry. Sector- or industry-
The real difference is having raised ex- specific characteristics need to be con-
pectations, can the party deliver where sidered carefully. Banks should also avoid
in the past it has failed so miserably? taking large exposures enticed by a short-
Gurharpal Singh lived boom in the economy. Long-term
University of London, economic forecasts need to be properly
London factored in their analysis. Importantly,
the government should not put unneces-
Bad Bank, a Bad Idea sary pressure on the banks in lending
matters. Bankers need to learn a lesson
T he idea of floating a bad bank in
the context of the twin balance sheet
problem faced by the Indian economy
or two from economic history.
Ketan K Shah
AHMEDABAD
Web Exclusives
The following articles have been published in the past week in the Web Exclusives section of the
EPW website.
(1) Defying Fundamental Rights with ImpunityGopal Krishna
(2) Misuse of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act Susan Abraham
(3) Re-reading the Field in Conflict Zones: Experiences from Kashmir ValleyAdfer Rashid Shah
(Articles posted before 25 March 2017 remain available in the Web Exclusives section.)
vol lII no 13 5
LETTERS
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Email: edit@epw.in, epw.mumbai@gmail.com

6 april 1, 2017 vol lII no 13 EPW Economic & Political Weekly

 april 1, 2017
Parliament sans Democracy
The Finance Bill, 2017 lands a body blow to the ethos of our democracy.
A
fter introducing a slew of last-minute amendments, the
governments decision to amend 40 central statutes as
part of the Finance Bill, 2017, sent out a clear message. It
does not believe in consultation with its political opponents. It
does not have faith in independent judicial oversight. Having
decried tax terrorism by its predecessor regime, it is unwilling
to debate the powers of search and seizure by income tax officials.
Above all, having waxed eloquent about the need for greater
transparency in political funding it has acted in precisely the
opposite manner and made Indias democracy more subservient
to corporate interests.
The Finance Bill, 2017 was introduced in the Lok Sabha as a
money bill, which in our bicameral system of governance is a type
of legislation over which the lower house of Parliament has
supreme authority. The government decided to make substantial
and wide-ranging amendments to various laws even as the
Supreme Court is yet to resolve a petition by the Rajya Sabha
Member of Parliament, Jairam Ramesh, questioning the Lok Sabha
Speakers classification of the Aadhaar Bill, 2016 (now Aadhaar
Act, 2016) as a money bill. Without the caveat of Article 110(3) of
the Constitution that authorises the Lok Sabha Speaker to have
the final word on what constitutes a money bill, it would be difficult
to justify such a classification of the Finance Bill, 2017. Article 110(1)
of the Constitution states that a money bill can be classified as
one only if it deals with taxation, government borrowings and
guarantees, government expenditures, or any matters incidental
to these. As a part of the annual budgetary exercise, finance
bills usually fit this classification. However, the Finance Bill,
2017 far exceeded such a purview on a number of counts.
For one, it significantly amends the provision of Section 182
of the Companies Act, 2013, by which non-government companies
that could contribute up to 7.5% of the average of their net profits
over three financial years to political parties, can now donate as
much as they like. Earlier, companies could contribute 5% of the
same to political parties. The law also requires companies to
disclose the amount of contributions and the names of the
political parties. The present amendments not only remove the
limit, but also the necessity to disclose the name of the political
parties to which a contribution is made.
Before the 1985 amendment to the Companies Act, 1956
allowing companies to contribute to political parties, there was
Economic & Political Weekly EPW april 1, 2017 vol lII no 13
a ban on such financing in India (except between 1960 and
1969). Various committees on electoral reforms were quite clear
that corporate funding of political parties would mean that the
promoters of companies would consider their contributions as
investments from which benefits could be reaped in the
future. Such funding, it was argued, would influence govern-
ment decisions in favour of the concerned companies. The cur-
rent amendment essentially takes the country in a diametrically
opposite direction and strengthens the nexus between business
and politics. By allowing anonymous contributions, corporate
funding of political parties will become more opaque, and will
end oversight and accountability. Although the Rajya Sabha
passed amendments to undo the governments proposals to al-
ter the Companies Act, 2013, they were rejected by the Lok Sab-
ha. This move is in keeping with what the government earlier
did when it quietly introduced an amendment in the Finance
Bill, 2016, to change the definition of a foreign corporate entity
after a court ruled that illegal donations had been made by
groups such as the London-based Vedanta to parties like the
Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) and the Congress.
Also of concern are the amendments to merge certain tribunals
with others. This change will conflate the role of specialised
tribunals without paying heed to their areas of expertise while
overburdening existing ones. Importantly, the government
now seeks to have an overarching involvement in the recruit-
ment, terms of service, and termination of members of the
tribunals. This will necessarily undermine the independence
of quasi-judicial bodies that have similar powers and functions
as the high courts. The appointments to these bodies need
to be free of executive involvement as the Supreme Court
had noted in 2014. The government is itself often a litigant
before them. It is shocking, therefore, that this government re-
fuses to recognise such a blatant conflict of interest. Although
the finance minister assured the Rajya Sabha that the govern-
ment will consult the judiciary in the matter, this is clearly
not enough.
Another aspect of the Finance Bill that is worrying are the
amendments to the Income Tax Act, 1961 seeking to expand the
powers of income tax officials in an arbitrary manner. Now em-
powered officials only need to be armed with a reason to believe
to conduct a search and seizure of property, even retrospectively
7
EDITORIALS
from 1962. If challenged, the official need not disclose the
reasoning to any authority or the appellate tribunal. In essence,
this is a draconian move by which officials are given arbitrary
powers which could be used to selectively harass and intimi-
date. All these amendments sought by the Rajya Sabha on this
aspect were rejected by the Lok Sabha.
While the nitty-gritty of the amendments can be debated, its
significance is the manner in which it has debased the working
of Indias bicameral system of government and the constitutional
Paving the Way for Ram Lalla?
The Supreme Courts preference of negotiations over adjudication presages an unfair outcome.
T
he 30 September 2010 judgment of the Lucknow Bench
of the Allahabad High Court in the Babri MasjidRam
Janmabhoomi case was resolute that what Hindu funda-
mentalists believed was indeed fact. Those beliefs were the
articles of faith of those who had engaged in great painstaking
preparation and pre-planningaccording to the official inquiry
of the Liberhan Ayodhya Commissionto demolish the mosque
on 6 December 1992. These were also the beliefs of the top leaders
of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) and the other Hindu funda-
mentalist organisations linked to the Rashtriya Swayamsevak
Sangh (RSS) who had addressed the mobs on that date, calling
upon them to demolish the mosque. So all of usirrespective
of our identity in terms of religious denominations or even as
atheistswho think of ourselves as equal citizens of India and
believe that the Indian state has to guarantee the rights that
come with such citizenship, have been hoping the Supreme
Court will scrupulously uphold the Constitution and the rule of
law in the Babri MasjidRam Janmabhoomi case.
But instead of going ahead in fulfilling the Courts primary
responsibility of adjudication, the chief justice of the Supreme
Court, J S Khehar, has advised the parties to the dispute to negoti-
ate an out-of-court settlement, even offering himself as a mediator
in the process of such negotiations. Give a bit, take a bit. Make an
effort to sort it out ... if the parties want me to sit with mediators
chosen by both sides for negotiations, I am ready to take up the
task, Justice Khehar is reported to have said. In his view, the
issues are related to sentiments and religion. The Court should
come in the picture only if you cannot settle it, he maintained.
But should negotiations between what are, quite obviously,
unequal partieswith one side backed by the Hindutvavadis in
power at the centre and in the state of Uttar Pradesh, the site of
the illegally demolished Babri Masjidbe even considered a
fair way of settling the dispute? One would have thought that
it was precisely in such a case that the chief justice of Indias
highest court would have preferred not the relative political
power behind each of the parties to the dispute to determine the
outcome but instead, the evidence and the facts related to the
case, and the correct interpretation and upholding of the rele-
vant laws related to it. Is the belief that lord Ram was born
under the central dome of the masjid pertinent to the case, as
8 april 1, 2017
role envisaged for the upper house of Parliament. The passage
of laws by using the money bill route, and thereby skirting the
Rajya Sabha where the BJP does not yet have a majority, is now
becoming the norm with this government. Essentially, this lays
out a stratagem for any party with a brute majority in the Lok
Sabha to deflect the power of the Rajya Sabha to act as a neces-
sary check. By using virtually any means to achieve their own
ends, the government is not just violating democratic norms but
also defiling the ethos of the Constitution.
the Allahabad High Court averred? And even if one were to con-
cede this, does that give him proprietary rights over the land on
which the mosque came up in 1528? Was a temple razed to con-
struct that mosque? Apart from there being no concluding evi-
dence to establish this contention as fact, would not the Limita-
tion Act apply to reject the assertion that the land could not be
possessed adversely?
It is evident that the BJP and Prime Minister Narendra Modi
are waiting to get the required numbers in the Rajya Sabha to
make a law for the construction of the Ram Temple on the site of
the demolished mosque, as proposed in the BJPs manifesto. But
before that, they have to find a way to get the judiciary out of
the picture. Does this explain the sudden entry of Subramanian
Swamy (of the BJP and the RSS), who has never been a party to the
case, being permitted by the Supreme Court bench to intervene
with his plea seeking construction of the Ram Temple at the site
of the demolished mosque? And how does one explain the
underserved attention to him by the chief justice?
Right from the night of 2223 December 1949, when some 50
people led by three persons entered the mosque and installed
three statues under its central dome, to 30 September 2010
when the Lucknow Bench of the Allahabad High Court handed
over the land on which the demolished mosque once stood to
Ram Lalla, the executive and the legislaturethe latter enacted
the Acquisition of Certain Area at Ayodhya Act, 1993of the
Indian state have willy-nilly aided Ram Lallas appropriation of
the mosque. The judiciary in the form of the Lucknow Bench of
the Allahabad High Court, of course, gave legal sanction to Ram
Lallas acquisition. And now, the highest court of the land,
instead of going by the evidence and the facts related to the
case, and correctly interpreting and upholding the relevant
laws related to it, prefers the unequal contending parties to
negotiate an out-of-court settlement.
The Ram Temple might indeed rise on the ruins of the Babri
Masjid, but this will be at the cost of secularism, for the Indian
state will have thereby derived its sanction from faith and from
deitymore to the point, from Ram Lalla. And the Ram Temple
will then have risen at the cost of democratic functioning;
democracy will be the victim, for secularism is a necessary
condition for democracy.
vol lII no 13 EPW Economic & Political Weekly
 EDITORIALS

Drawing Blood
Poor public health services are pitting doctors and patients against each other.

D
octors are under siege; patients are aggrieved. This is
essentially what is being played out in public hospitals, most
recently in Maharashtra where last month, in five sepa-
rate incidents, doctors in public hospitals were assaulted by angry
relatives of patients alleging negligence. Similar incidents have
been reported from Delhi, Surat, Ahmedabad, Bulandshahr and
Chennai in the last couple of years. Such violence against doctors is
not peculiar to India. Lancet and the British Medical Journal report
increasing attacks on doctors in the Indian subcontinent and China.
The common thread running through these incidents is that
most attacks occur in public hospitals where the resources are
stretched thin to cover a large section of the population and the
doctors (mostly junior) are too overworked to deal empathetically
with anxious and tense patients relatives. An Indian Medical
Association 2015 survey of 500 doctors found that nearly 75% of
the respondents had faced attacks and intimidation.
While doctors are overworked, patients and their relatives
overwhelmingly point to discourteous doctors and uncooperative
hospital staff, insufficient diagnostic equipment and essential
drugs and lack of information about the patients condition and
the prognosis. Together these exacerbate their anxiety. They are
also frustrated with being asked to buy medicines and services
from private agencies outside the hospital.
From the perspective of doctors, especially in public hospitals,
there is the pressure to provide emergency treatment even as the
patients family and friends surround them expecting miracles.
In many of the cases of assault, so-called local leaders demand-
ing immediate attention for their patient led the charge. And
after working back-breaking hours in resource-poor conditions
one of the doctors attacked in Mumbai recently had worked for
36 hours almost non-stop when the incident occurredtheir
only rest is in hostels with abysmal amenities.
Public perception of doctors as life-givers has also drastically
changed with the increasing privatisation and commercialisation of
medical healthcare and the stories of crass insensitivity by private
doctors towards patients who cannot afford their high rates. As a
result, even doctors doing their best in difficult conditions are per-
ceived as indifferent. Public hospitals have to bear the brunt of this
lack of trust as often patients are taken there after their condition
has deteriorated in private hospitals and the family is resentful
about the heavy expenditure incurred and poor treatment given.
Fourteen states have enacted laws to protect doctors and prevent
such violence but enforcement is uniformly weak. For example,
Maharashtra Medicare Service Persons and Medicare Service Insti-
tutions (Prevention of Violence and Damage or Loss to Property)
Act, 2010, makes offences against doctors non-bailable with im-
prisonment up to three years and a fine of `50,000. The offender
could also be asked to pay twice the amount of damage caused to
the institutions property. However, in the last three years, 53 cases
of doctors being beaten up were registered but there has not been
a single conviction. According to media reports, almost all those
arrested for the recent acts of violence have been granted bail.
Apart from laws, many hospitals resort to increasing security
immediately after such incidents. For example, the Deen Dayal
Upadhyay Hospital, the largest government hospital in Delhi,
hired bouncers after witnessing one attack a month and after
the staff stopped work in protest 20 times in the last six years.
Yet increased security is at best a piecemeal measure. It could
backfire and drive a deeper wedge between the community and
doctors. Senior doctorssensitive to the worsening state of
affairshave initiated steps to teach their younger colleagues to
communicate better with patients relatives. A few public hospi-
tals have taken the lead in doing this. Medical education pays
little attention to this aspect and even if it did, the inability of
the doctors to understand the socio-economic backgrounds of
their patients ends up making a bad situation worse.
At the same time, while empathetic and communicative
doctors are needed, that alone will not suffice. The sheer volume
of patients thronging the countrys public hospitals calls for
deeper structural changes. India has a pathetically low budget
allocation for health services. Also the patientdoctor ratio of 7:1
(Maharashtra and Bihar have the worst ratios in the country) is
far from adequate. When a crisis looms, as provoked by the
recent clash between doctors and patients in Maharashtra, piece-
meal measures are taken. However, unless the larger questions
of spending on health and enhancing the capacity of public
hospitals to deliver more effective healthcare are addressed,
doctors and patients will continue to be viewed as adversaries.

From 50 Years Ago
Vol II, No 13 april 1, 1967
WEEKLY NOTES
Last Days of Konkan Shipping
Our Maharashtra Correspondent writes:
The Konkan shipping service, which accounts
for nearly two-thirds of the entire coastal passen-
ger traffic in India, is in a bad way again. Last
month saw the exit from the scene of Bombay
Steam Navigation Company (BSN) which, estab-
lished in 1845, was perhaps the first scheduled
passenger shipping service in the country.
Many factors are responsible for this decline in
coastal traffic. Land reforms and rent control meas-
ures have reduced the frequency of trips from
Bombay to the villages to supervise agricultural
property. Development of road transport has also
made deep inroads into steamer traffic. Whereas
road transport fares have increased by only 18 per
cent during the last 20 years, the increase in steam-
er fares over the same period has been as much as
75 per cent. With the completion of the Bombay-
Konkan-Goa highway and the Thana Creek Bridge,
and the conversion of the Poona-Murmugao
Harbour and Miraj-Kolhapur railway lines from
meter gauge to broad gauge in the next five years,
steamer traffic will suffer further.
Any attempt to tackle the problem will have
to bear in view the fact that the Konkan shipping
service was started to fulfill the historic need of
feeding the industries in Bombay with the idle
manpower in Konkan at a time when surface
transport was yet to be developed. But condi-
tions have changed and now that surface trans-
port is fast improving steamer transport will be-
come more and more uneconomical and will
eventually have to be closed down. On the
whole it does not appear that Konkan shipping
will survive the Fourth Plan.

Economic & Political Weekly EPW april 1, 2017 vol lII no 13 9

50 YEARS OF EPW
My Thoughts on a
Unique Institution
Lage Raho EPW
S Mahendra Dev
L
et me congratulate this remarkable
journal on the occasion of its 50th
anniversary. The first thing that
comes to mind when one thinks of EPW
is the undeniable impact it has had on
informing and shaping discussions across
the social sciences. It caters to various
sections of the population within India
and globally. The unique format of a
combination of academic articles and a
commentary section on current affairs
was designed by Sachin Chaudhuri in its
earlier avatar, Economic Weekly. Succes-
sive editors have refined, expanded, and
maintained its fairness and scholarly work.
R K Hazari, apart from editorial inputs,
provided a strong organisational and fina-
ncial base to EPW. Krishna Raj dedicated
nearly 40 years of his life to make it one of
the most prestigious and high-standard
journals of our times. Similarly, C Ram-
manohar Reddy spent nearly 12 years do-
ing outstanding work, ushering in pro-
fessionalism and modernisation, includ-
ing moving towards the digital era.
EPW now contains peer-reviewed arti-
cles, commentaries, research notes from
young scholars, perspectives, discussions,
the Margin Speak column, book reviews,
and so on. The discussion section provides
a space for debate on various issues and
policies. Archives on the website contain
articles from the Economic Weekly for the
194965 period and from 1966 onwards
for EPW. I am sure the current editor,
Paranjoy Guha Thakurta, will continue
the good work done by his predecessors
and also face new challenges ahead. One
has to acknowledge the EPW Research
Foundation too for its contribution to
data and research under S L Shetty and
subsequent directors.
In the last 50 years, it has been a re-
sourceful forum for a variety of subjects
10
such as economics, political science, his-
tory, sociology, women studies, literature,
environment, and, occasionally, natural
sciences. Themes of special issues have
expanded over time. A unique feature of
the EPW is its fraternity, or community,
or extended family. Everyone has a sense
of co-ownership of this journal. It is
considered a most inclusive institution.
Another feature of EPW during Krishna
Rajs time was its decision to not publish
institutional affiliations of authors. He
probably avoided publishing affiliations
in order to encourage authors from lesser-
known institutions, and in doing so was
successful in bringing in a diverse set
of opinions. Later, the journal started
publishing affiliations.
The world and India were very differ-
ent in 1966, when EPW started publish-
ing, as compared to today. The worlds
gross domestic product (GDP) steadily
increased for two decades after World
War II. Lyndon B Johnson escalated Amer-
ican involvement in the Vietnam War. In
China, Mao Tse-tung began the Cultural
Revolution to purge and reorganise Chinas
Communist Party. South East Asia em-
barked on a policy of outward-oriented
growth in the early 1960s.
India was in a difficult position with
the drought of 196566 and the war with
Pakistan. The GDP growth rate during
the Third Five Year Plan (196166) was
2.8% per annum against the target
growth rate of more than 5%. Per capita
GDP growth was very low during this
period. Indira Gandhi took over as
Prime Minister after the death of Lal
Bahadur Shastri. The rupee was deval-
ued by 57%; the value of the rupee be-
came `7.50 per dollar from `4.76 per
dollar. The first issue of EPW contains an
editorial (Miles to Go, 20 August 1966)
APRIL 1, 2017
that was critical of the Nehru era.
It says,
The Nehru era is gone, something else must
take its place and something is aborning,
however unconscionable the time taken by
it. There are elements in the present situa-
tion which point to it. The nation can no
longer be activised by an incantation of
Nehrus ideas and Nehrus policies. But the
forces released during that era have by no
means worked themselves out. The task
before the country today is to free these
forces from the dead weight which is hold-
ing them back.
This discussion is relevant even now.
The first issue contains special articles by
K N Raj on foodgrain prices, V M Dandekar
on agriculture, and Uma Datta Roy Cho-
udhury on the Indian economy. Dande-
kars paper was a critique of Theodore
Shultzs concept of traditional agricul-
ture. Raj dealt with regional variations
in prices. Roy Choudhury indicated that
only the large-scale manufacturing sec-
tor adopted advanced modern tech-
niques to affect its capital structure,
while in other sectors the overall capital
output structure remained largely unaf-
fected. The issues raised by the three
articles are highly relevant even today.
In the last 50 years, there have been
significant changes in the world, and in
the Indian economy and society. The world
is much more globalised now than before.
In the case of India, it was successful in
terms of high economic growth and in-
creasing use of technology in the post-
reform period, although there are signi-
ficant inequalities across sectors, rural
urban, gender, and social groups. Social
inequalities are being discussed much
more now than before. EPW has been in
the forefront to document, analyse, and
act as a forum for public debate by people
of all ideologies on the progress and
policies in the 25 years of the pre-reform
period and 25 years of the post-reform
period. It also acted as a voice of dissent
when policies went against the poor and
vulnerable sections of society.
It means a lot to India, South Asia and
the world. In the words of Lloyd I Rudolph
and Susanne Hoeber Rudolph,
Economic and Political Weekly has been the
social science cornucopia that has supplied
vol lIi no 13 EPW Economic & Political Weekly

us with the ideas, the tables, the fresh theo-
ries, the ethnography, the knowledge that
have enabled us all these years to keep with
the social, economic, historical and political
world of India ... [R]esearch in our large
South Asia Centre has profited so much from
the knowledge and insights the EPW made
available week after week, month after
month and year after year.
EPW also has the unique quality of
presenting scholarship that is profession-
ally outstanding while remaining rele-
vant to the world of policy and action
(Reminiscences, 31 January 2004).
It is read widely throughout the world.
As Anand Chandavarkar and Deena
Khatkhate say,
One has only to scan reputable journals like
the American Economic Review, the Quarter-
ly Journal of Economics and the Review of
Economics and Statistics, the Journal of
Economic Perspectives, etc, to see at least
three to four citations of articles from the
EPW in every issue. ... The EPW today is read
widely in libraries of the leading universities
in the US, UK, India as well as on the Conti-
nent, not to speak of the developing world.
The late Joan Robinson used EPW articles
for her lectures at Cambridge. Micheal Lipton
(Sussex University) held it up as a model of its
kind. Today, the EPW occupies a unique niche
as a quality journal run by a non-profit trust.
(Krishna Raj: Editor of Eloquent Silence,
6 March 2004)
Publication of quality research and
providing a platform for dissenting voices
give the journal its unique character and
high standing in India, South Asia, and
the world.
What EPW Means to Me
Like many other researchers, my debut
in research started with EPW, with my
first research paper published when I
was a doctoral student at the Delhi
School of Economics. Over time, I pub-
lished my research work in this journal
because of its wide readership and credi-
bility. If you publish the same thing in
international journals, it may look good
on your CV, but your readership may be
limited; the peer group will decide on
the quality of the work when they read
your research papers. In any article on
the Indian economy and society, you
will invariably find citations from EPW.
There has been a discussion that all spe-
cial articles in EPW be peer-reviewed.
The contrarian view is that we should
Economic & Political Weekly EPW APRIL 1, 2017
maintain the unique character of EPW,
and that there is no need to fix it when
there is no problem.
Over the last 40 years or so, I have
published and used EPW articles exten-
sively. I provide here my experience
briefly in the last few decades with the
journal. One can only be selective given
the wide range of subjects covered by
EPW. References to personal chronology
are inevitable here. As a PhD student
at the Delhi School of Economics, I used
to refer to EPW quite frequently. Some
of the popular topics in development
economics in the journal at that time
were the mode of production debate
(Agrarian Relations and Accumulation:
The Mode of Production Debate in India
edited by Utsa Patnaik, published by
Sameeksha Trust), farm size and pro-
ductivity (Amartya Sen, Ashok Rudra,
Krishna Bharadwaj, C H Hanumantha
Rao, Prannoy Roy), industrial stagnation
(K N Raj, Deepak Nayyar; also see Indus-
trial Growth in India: Stagnation Since
the Mid-Sixties by Isher Judge Ahluwalia
[1985]), poverty debates (V M Dandekar
and N Rath, P V Sukhatme), and economic
growth and constraints (T N Srinivasan,
A Vaidynathan).
Articles by Sukhamoy Chakravarty in
EPWOn the Question of Home Mar-
ket and Prospects for Indian Growth
(11 August 1979) and Aspects of Indias
Development Strategy for 1980s (1926
May 1984)were quite popular. In
these articles, Chakravarty stressed,
among other things, the importance of
home market and demand deficien-
cy. Jagdish Bhagwati and T N Srini-
vasan (Indian Development Strategy:
Some Comments, 24 November 1984)
were critical of Chakravartys ideas rely-
ing heavily on demand constraints and
export pessimism.
After joining the Indira Gandhi Insti-
tute of Development Research (IGIDR),
Mumbai in the late 1980s, my reliance
on EPW articles continued. It was also an
exciting time as the economic reforms
started in 1991. The IGIDR started pub-
lishing the India Development Report
(IDR) in the late 1990s. The IDRs, among
other things, also concentrated on eco-
nomic and social development in the
post-reform period. Research articles
vol lIi no 13
50 YEARS OF EPW
from EPW were useful references for the
IDRs. For example, the debates on poverty,
inequality and nutrition (by Angus Dea-
ton and Jean Drze, Suresh Tendulkar
and K Sundaram, Abhijit Sen, T N Srini-
vasan, R Radhakrishna, Arvind Pana-
gariya) were interesting. I continued to
publish several articles on agriculture,
poverty, inequality, employment, social
sector, and poverty alleviation pro-
grammes in EPW. When I sent Krishna
Raj a 30,000-word article, Economic
Reforms and Employment in South
Asia, he immediately published it in
two parts (8 and 15 January 2000).
When I shifted to the Centre for Eco-
nomic and Social Studies, Hyderabad,
the focus of a lot of my research was at
the state level, particularly on what was
taking place in undivided Andhra Pradesh.
My request to bring out a special issue
was readily agreed to (Andhra Pradesh:
Economic Reforms and Challenges Ahead,
2229 March 2003). My stint as chair-
man of the Commission for Agricultural
Costs and Prices, Ministry of Agriculture
did not disturb my relationship with the
journal. I published a research paper on
profitability of rice and wheat using cost
of cultivation data.
My association with the journal con-
tinued after returning to the IGIDR in
2010. The Reserve Bank of India and
IGIDR have a special relationship with
EPW and EPW Research Foundation. We
are now preparing the IDR 2017, and the
articles in EPW, particularly on the 25
years of economic reforms by Montek
Singh Ahluwalia, Prabhat Patnaik and
others (16 July 2016) will be handy.
To conclude, the personal chronology
shows how I have benefited from EPW in
the last 40 years or so. I grew up learn-
ing the social sciences in general and
development economics in particular
from the special articles, commentaries
and discussions in EPW. This journal has
a special niche and must continue like
so. I am sure it will be an important
journal for India, South Asia and other
parts of the world in the next 50 years
and beyond too. Lage raho EPW!
S Mahendra Dev is Director and Vice Chancellor,
Indira Gandhi Institute of Development
Research, Mumbai.
11
COMMENTARY
Faculty Diversity at the Indian
Institutes of Management
A Preliminary Snapshot
Siddharth Joshi, Deepak Malghan
A look at the social composition
of faculty members at the Indian
Institutes of Management reveals
that the faculty body at these
institutions is drawn from a
very narrow spectrum of Indian
society. The recently proposed
legislation that will convert IIMs
into full-fledged universities
offers a canvas for public
deliberation on the question
of social diversity at these
institutions of higher learning.
We thank Amit Basole and Gopal Guru
for insightful discussions. The authors are
solely responsible for the data and their
interpretation presented here. All opinions
expressed here are wholly personal and do
not reflect the institutional position(s) of IIM
Bangalore.
Siddharth Joshi (siddharth.joshi09@iimb.
ernet.in) is a doctoral candidate at the
Centre for Public Policy, Indian Institute of
Management Bangalore. Deepak Malghan
(dmalghan@iimb.ernet.in) teaches at the
Centre for Public Policy, Indian Institute of
Management Bangalore.
12
The data on faculty composition that
we present here is collated from respon-
ses obtained under the Right to Informa-
tion Act 2005 (RTI). At the time we filed
our RTI requests, 13 IIMs were fully func-
tional with an autonomous and perma-
nent faculty body (June 2016). The data
that we obtained using RTI requests from
both the Ministry of Human Resource
Development (MHRD) of the Government
O
n 24 January 2017, the union of India and individual IIMs is presented
cabinet cleared the way for the in Table 1. We have data for 233 faculty
introduction of the Indian Insti- members across six IIMs. The four leading
tutes of Management Bill in Parliament IIMs in the country, established before
(Press Information Bureau 2017). An ear- 1985, in their respective RTI responses,
lier version of this draft legislation that noted that they do not maintain data on
was first mooted in 2015 had run into the social groups that their faculty mem-
controversy over potential breach of in- bers belong to. The two newer IIMs (Shil-
stitutional autonomy. The Indian Insti- long and Tiruchirappalli) did not respond
tutes of Management (IIMs) argued that to our RTI applications. IIM-Udaipur skirt-
the 2015 draft amounted to regulatory ed our request for data, but confirmed
overreach that could stifle the academic that they do not have an affirmative
environment at the IIMs.1 In the ensuing action policy for faculty recruitment.
public debate, a central predicament for While we have actual data for only six out
contemporary universities (especially of the 13 IIMs, anecdotal evidence, in-
public institutions)ensuring social cluding informal consultations with col-
diversityhas received scant attention leagues at the remaining seven institu-
even as the larger public discourse in the tions, suggests that the diversity deficit at
past year has focused on making our uni- those institutions is at least as acute.
versities more diverse, accessi- Table 1: Census-category Distribution of Faculty at IIMs
ble, and inclusive. In this brief Institution (Year of Establishment) SC ST OTH Total
snapshot, we present data det- IIM Indore (1996) 0 0 92 92
ailing the lack of social diver- IIM Kozhikode (1996) 1 0 62 63
IIM Rohtak (2009) 1 0 17 18
sity in faculty composition at
IIM Raipur (2010) 0 0 13 13
the IIMs. Institutional autono- IIM Ranchi (2010) 0 0 16 16
my is necessarily tied to social IIM Kashipur (2011) 0 0 31 31
accountability, and we argue IIM Calcutta (1961) These institutions do not maintain
here that the neglect of social IIM Ahmedabad (1961) faculty social group data
diversity at IIMs severely un- IIM Bangalore (1973) (RTI response, June 2016).
IIM Lucknow (1984)
dermines their social legitima-
IIM Udaipur (2011) We were unable to determine if
cy as public institutions. In this IIM-Udaipur collects such data. The
brief commentary, we do not original, and the appellate response to
offer specific prescriptions, or authors RTI requests neither included
data on census caste categories nor a
even strategies for ameliora- confirmation that the institute does
tion. A deliberation on specific not collect such data (June 2016).
interventions is perhaps futile IIM Shillong (2007) These institutions have not responded
and certainly premature in the IIM Tiruchirappalli (2011) to authors RTI request made in
May 2016 (as of 25 January 2017).
absence of a clear normative Total (excluding no-data,
commitment to faculty diversi- and no-response) 2 0 231 233
ty at the IIMs. We defend facul- (1) The census of India categories (SC = Scheduled Castes; ST = Scheduled
ty diversity as an important Tribes; OTH = All other social groups) have been used.
(2) Out of the 231 faculty members reported as belonging to OTH, the six
constituent of the IIMs aca- institutions that provided social group data also reported a total of five faculty
demic mission as well as their members (across these six institutions) as belonging to the OBC category.
Source: Generated by the authors using data obtained through a RTI
larger social compact. request filed in May/June 2016.
april 1, 2017 vol lIi no 13 EPW Economic & Political Weekly

The IIMs that maintain faculty social
group data and responded to our RTI
requests also provided incidence data on
faculty belonging to the Other Backward
Classes (OBC). However, we have used the
threefold classification of social groups de-
fined by the decennial national census with
OBC numbers added to others. We make
this choice for normative as well as empiri-
cal reasons. Briefly, the historical trajecto-
ries as well as contemporary circumstances
of the OBC groups are fundamentally dif-
ferent from social groups classified as
Scheduled Caste (SC) or Scheduled Tribe
(ST). We present a general defence of fac-
ulty diversity at the IIMs and our broad ar-
guments are not limited to amelioration of
a particular type of diversity deficit. How-
ever, any programme to correct the lack of
social diversity at the IIMs must begin by
addressing the near total absence of SC or
ST representation among IIM faculty.
Future Faculty Pipeline
The doctoral programmes at the IIMs
(offered at all 13 institutions listed in
Table 1, p 12) serve as crucibles where fu-
ture faculty members are forged. A majority
of these programmes do not have a stated
policy on diversity or affirmative action.
As of academic year 201718, the IIMs at
Ahmedabad and Bengaluru (both of which
have been a significant source of faculty
members recruited at newer IIMs in the past
several years) do not use any affirmative ac-
tion mechanisms to inform their admission
decisions. To be sure, a traditional reserva-
tion model with inflexible numerical quotas
is perhaps not desirable and in any case cer-
tainly impossible to implement, when no
more than one to three students per year
(or sometimes even every alternate year)
are admitted into each department. Even
when a well-qualified student seeks doc-
toral admission, she or he is offered a
place only when her or his broad research
Table 2: Government of India Grants to Doctoral
Programmes at Three IIMs (in lakhs of rupees per
financial year)
Financial Year IIM Ahmedabad IIM Bangalore
201213 100.96 80.36
201314 63.4 0.00
201415 70.11 199.18
201516 NA 53.92
Data for 201516 at IIM, Ahmedabad was not available at
the time of RTI responses from MHRD (Ministry of Human
Resource Development, Government of India) and
IIM-Ahmedabad (June 2016).
Source: Table generated by the authors.
Economic & Political Weekly EPW april 1, 2017
interests intersect with the current compe-
tence and interests of faculty members.
However, neither the central govern-
ment that provides partial funding for
these doctoral programmes (Table 2) nor
the individual institutions have an alter-
nate affirmative action programme in
place.2 While we do not have data on the
social composition of doctoral students at
the IIMs, anecdotal evidence suggests that
in the absence of a strong commitment
to diversity, these programmes mirror
the monochromatic composition of the
faculty body. Fourteen new IIMs have
been set up in the last eight years, and
the six older IIMs set up in the 20th cen-
tury are expanding their student intake.
The doctoral programmes at the three
oldest IIMs will continue to be one of the
most important sources of scholars who
will support this expansion. The lack of
social diversity in these doctoral pro-
grammes will result in continued propa-
gation of the status quo as the IIM sys-
tem expands over the next several years.
Diversity Deficit as
a Wicked Problem
An extended meditation on the means to
address the diversity deficit described by
the data presented here is beyond the
scope of this brief commentary. However,
what is clear from the data presented in
Table 1 is that the status quo is patently
indefensible. The snapshot described
above represents over half a century of
neglectwilful or otherwiseand needs
urgent redressal. While being agnostic
about the methods that can potentially
begin to reverse the acute diversity deficit,
we defend the imperative to do so. We
briefly address some of the fundamental
theoretical presuppositions related to the
nature of caste categories and boundaries
that have provided cover for the neglect
of social diversity questions at the IIMs.
Unlike wholly uncritical platitudes in
defence of some imagined notion of pris-
IIM Calcutta tine meritocracy, these are serious objec-
89.2 tions to both the desirability and possi-
0.00 bility of universities being able to ade-
0.00
quately address certain forms of diversity
81.27
deficit. These are conundrums that de-
mand sustained and serious deliberation
and cannot be resolved by partisan grand-
standing. Our purpose here is more
vol lIi no 13
COMMENTARY
modestwe merely want to outline why
the diversity deficit at the IIMs is a wicked
problem, but one that should not be
wished away (Rittel and Webber 1973).
Following the triumph of the construc-
tivist paradigm in the social sciences, we
find ourselves in a position where instead
of describing how an ethnic community
travels down the road of history, we now
outline how it came into being and later
dissolves; instead of observing the everyday
workings of an ethnic culture, the varying
claims to cultural difference are studied
(Wimmer 2012). To be sure, both short-
term and long-term evolutionary trajecto-
ries of societies share a dialectical relation-
ship with the social and political construc-
tion of ethnic categories like caste (for ex-
ample, categories used by colonial censuses
to classify Indian society). However, it is
important to recognise that constructivism
is an epistemological strategy (or even
merely an empirical choice) rather than an
ontological statement about the nature of
empirical reality (Wimmer 2012).
Liberal opponents of using caste as a
legitimate diversity marker argue that any
form of caste-based affirmative action only
undermines their project of transcend-
ing, if not completely erasing, these cate-
gories. It is argued that any such affirma-
tive action programme opens the door for
narrow identity-centred parochial interests
to overrun a deliberative academic space.
The evident decay and decline of some of
Indias finest state universities is held up
as a cautionary tale. In the hyper-construc-
tivist scheme of things, caste is an entirely
constructed category with no ontological
stability. To the extent that annihilation
of caste is a widely shared normative
goal, an argument is made that modern
institutions like universities can help the
cause by diluting caste identities and
constructing modern ones that are not
as ethnic a category, or as pernicious.
In response to the relative decline of the
salience of caste in modern urban settings
that is offered as evidence by hyper-con-
structivists, other social theorists have
emphasised that such a transformation is
a result of the conversion of traditional
caste capital into secular modern caste-
less capital [by specific caste groups in]
previous generations (Deshpande 2013).
This Bourdieusian argument has been
13
COMMENTARY
deployed to shed light on the co-evolution
of the social life of caste and modern no-
tions of merit (Subramanian 2015).
In his seminal essay, The Forms of Capi-
tal, Pierre Bourdieu had first emphasised
how various forms of social and cultural
capital are transmutable (Bourdieu 1986).
Bourdieu specifically signals out creden-
tialed educational qualification as the in-
stitutionalised state of cultural capital
that is a product of conversion of other
forms of capital (Bourdieu 1986). In this
view, caste is invisible only to those sec-
tions of society that have successfully
transformed their traditional caste advan-
tages into modern forms of social, cultur-
al, and economic capital. In Bordieus
memorable opening phrase, [t]he social
world is accumulated history and it has
been argued that modern institutions, in-
cluding universities, must address the ge-
nealogical trajectories of how traditional
caste advantages (and disadvantages) are
translated in modern settings.
The Bourdieusian capital transmutation
diagnosis does not immediately pave the
way for resolution of the constructivist di-
lemma even as it unpacks the inequities
underlying the liberal argument. Many
belonging to Indias diverse social groups
have for long internalised the forms of
capital logic. As the doyen of Indian politi-
cal science Rajni Kothari presciently ob-
served, where caste itself becomes a politi-
cal category, it is futile to argue whether
caste uses politics or politics uses caste
(Kothari 1970). The liberal anathema to
caste-based affirmative action is predicat-
ed on the assertion that academic spaces
ought not to become sites for identity bat-
tles that punctuate electoral politics.
Duplicity of Autonomy Argument
Beyond broader theoretical objections to
any affirmative action policy that uses
caste identity as a criterion, a potential
loss of institutional autonomy is the cen-
tral argument that the IIMs have articulat-
ed. Affirmative action is immediately
equated to state-mandated numerical quo-
tas and seen as a slippery slope towards
even greater state control over other
aspects of the functioning of the IIMs. We
are at least as sceptical of state encroach-
ment of academic autonomy as any of our
colleagues at the IIMs. An institution of
14
higher learning is not, and never should be
constituted as an organ of the state.
However, autonomy from an interven-
tionist state has seldom been used by the
IIMs to advance critical academic enga-
gement with business practices or business
environments, including larger political
and societal contexts within which busi-
nesses operate. The duplicity of the auton-
omy argument advanced by activist faculty
bodies at the IIMs is at least partially driven
by broader structural forces in the political
economy. The construing of the universi-
ties as profit centres has resulted in a cor-
rosive culture at several IIMs. The power-
ful faculty bodies and boards led by corpo-
rate honchos with implicit support from
the well-heeled urban class have subverted
autonomy for largely self-fulfilling ends.
The IIMs have been among the first
institutions of higher learning in India to
fully endorse a fundamental category er-
ror that universities around the world
have been forced to live withmiscon-
struing complex integrity problems as in-
centive design problems. A direct result of
this confusion between integrity and in-
centives is that the IIMs are perhaps the
only public institutions in the country
where faculty demand that they be bribed
(incentivised) to do what is definitional to
being an academicthinking about the
world around us and producing new
knowledge. Every peer-reviewed article
published by an IIM faculty is rewarded by
a purse that can in some instances dwarf
the annual faculty salaries at other public
universities in the country.3
The substantive autonomy that the IIMs
have enjoyed has not translated into a
steadfast commitment to social diversity or
inclusion. Institutional autonomy at public
universities is not an unfettered right but a
social compact between the institution and
the society at large. A fundamental norma-
tive commitment to social inclusion is a
central legitimating principle underlying
any such social compact. Surely, there can
be (indeed should be) differences in the
means to making institutions inclusive,
and a single prescription cannot possibly
even cover all the IIMs that are disparate in
terms of their age, location, focus, legacy,
etc. However, the moral fabric underpin-
ning the social compact will have to be
twisted, turned, and stretched in scarcely
april 1, 2017
believable ways to not recognise the status
quo as anything but illegitimate.
Today the IIMs stand at the cusp of
becoming full-fledged degree-granting
public institutions with unmatched auto-
nomy for any Indian university. Any
such autonomy must be firmly yoked to
a flexible but effective affirmative action
programme that can reverse the acute
diversity deficit reported here. In ab-
sence of such a programme, any further
autonomy granted to the IIMs can only
translate into reproduction of the domi-
nance of entrenched classes.
Notes
1 For example, see Bijapurkar (2015).
2 According to information available on respective
doctoral admissions web portals, IIMs at Kashipur,
Shillong, and Raipur are the only three IIMs with
some form of a publicly stated affirmative action
policy for doctoral admissions. In its 201516
announcement of doctoral admissions (and un-
like 201617), IIM Calcutta had also publicised
its compliance with the governments reservation
policy (admissions websites of IIMC, accessed
24 January 2017). In 201617, both the authors of
this article worked with the academic administra-
tion at IIM Bangalore (IIMB) on crafting a work-
able affirmative action policy for IIMBs doctoral
programme. However, as of January 2017, the
institute is yet to draft such a policy. The official
admissions announcement for academic year
201718 continues with the practice of previous
years, where the social or economic background
of the applicant is not considered during admis-
sions, http://www.iimb.ernet.in/sites/default/
files/fpm-adm-process.pdf, accessed on 25 Janu-
ary 2017. However, we are grateful to the fac-
ulty committee that oversees the doctoral pro-
gramme at IIMB for insightful discussions on
increasing doctoral student diversity at IIMB.
3 Disclosure: One of the authors, Deepak Malghan,
has been a recipient of these incentives.
References
Bijapurkar, Rama (2015): IIM Bill: Degree of
Unfreedom, Indian Express, 13 July.
Bourdieu, P (1986): The Forms of Capital, Handbook
of Theory and Research for the Sociology of Edu-
cation, J Richardson (ed), Westport: Greenwood
Press, pp 24158.
Chandra, K (2006): What Is Ethnic Identity and
Does It Matter?, Annual Review of Political
Science, Vol 9, pp 397424
Deshpande, S (2013): Caste and Castelessness:
Towards a Biography of the General Category, Eco-
nomic & Political Weekly, Vol 48, No 15, pp 3239.
Kothari, R (1970): Politics in India, Boston, MA:
Little, Brown and Company.
Press Information Bureau (2017): IIMs to be Declared
as Institutions of National Importance: Cabinet Ap-
proves Indian Institute of Management Bill, Gov-
ernment of India, http://pib.nic.in/newsite/ere-
lease.aspx?relid=157623, accessed on 24 January.
Rittel, H W J and M M Webber (1973): Dilemmas in a
General Theory of Planning, Policy Sciences, 4,
pp 15569.
Subramanian, A (2015): Making Merit: The Indian
Institutes of Technology and the Social Life of
Caste, Comparative Studies in Society and His-
tory, Vol 57, No 2, pp 291322.
Wimmer, A (2012): Ethnic Boundary Making: Insti-
tutions, Power, Networks, New York: Oxford
University Press.
vol lIi no 13 EPW Economic & Political Weekly

IIMs and Reservations
Manish Thakur, R Rajesh Babu
By resisting the implementation
of reservations in their doctoral
programmes and faculty
appointments, the Indian
Institutes of Management are
not fulfilling their mandate of
acting as socially responsible
public institutions.
The views expressed are personal.
Manish Thakur (mt@iimcal.ac.in) and
R Rajesh Babu (rajeshbabu@iimcal.ac.in)
teach at the Indian Institute of Management
Calcutta.
Economic & Political Weekly EPW april 1, 2017
T
he issue of reservation in faculty
appointments and in doctoral
progammes (fellowship progra-
mmes) has brought the Indian Institutes
of Management (IIMs) back to the centre
of public discourse. Though the IIMs are
a minuscule part of the higher education
landscape in the country, they have
always occupied a disproportionately
large space in the public imagination.
The IIMs, though public institutions,
have emerged as centres of excellence in
professional education with appreciable
global recognition. Of late, their num-
bers have increased to 19. By covering a
wide geographical area, they cater to the
felt needs of access to management edu-
cation by the increasing numbers of as-
piring youth. In this sense, the IIMs can
be seen as trendsetters in an otherwise
not so encouraging scene of higher edu-
cation in India. Expectedly, what hap-
pens in the IIMs has wider ramifications
for higher education in particular and
the country in general. This is equally
applicable in the present case of reser-
vations. The way the IIMs respond to
this pressing issue would be a test case
for addressing the larger issue of social
access and inclusion in elite educational
institutions in our country.
It is not that the IIMs have been totally
indifferent to the practice of reservations.
At present, the IIMs have the Government
of India mandated 49.5% quota in place.
The quotas of 15% for the Scheduled
Castes and 7.5% for the Scheduled Tribes
in the postgraduate programme have
been there since the 1970s. The 27%
quota for the non-creamy layer of the
Other Backward Classes is in operation
since 2008. In effect, the reservation de-
bate about IIMs boils down to extending
similar reservations to their fellowship
programmes and faculty appointments.
As a matter of fact, the IIMs have man-
aged to do without reservation despite
continuing demand from the govern-
ment and other stakeholders. Recently,
the enduring issue of reservation has
vol lIi no 13
COMMENTARY
been brought to the centre stage by
none other than the minister of human
resource development, who reminded
the IIMs of their constitutional obli-
gations at the 20 September 2016
coordination committee meeting of the
chairpersons and directors of IIMs at
Shillong. It would be interesting to see
how the IIMs respond to this renewed
demand for openness that they have
historically circumvented.
Reproduction of Inequality
The IIMs are not politically and ideolo-
gically neutral institutions reeling out
innocuous professional managers and
business leaders for the furtherance of
the efficiency needs of business and
related organisations. Undoubtedly, grad-
uates coming out of the IIMs form an
elite group. They share a set of values or
understandings that are definitional to
an identifiable elite group to protect
their sectional interests. And the IIMs do
bestow status and credentials to individ-
uals and preselect and socialise them for
certain kinds of elite roles. Through
their socialisation process they contrib-
ute to the production of a shared cultur-
al code that is the hallmark of an elite.
The years spent at an IIM, and the result-
ant membership of an alumni network,
are a valued form of cultural capital. In-
deed, in contemporary times, ones alma
mater does provide privileged access to
resources that matter for elite reproduc-
tion. Today, the mobility functions of
caste and property have been replaced
to a large extent by these exclusive boys
(and girls) clubs and the coveted aca-
demic pedigree that institutions like the
IIMs offer.
These new elites do not comprise a
sectional interest group alone. They are
the new role models for the aspiring
youth. They are part of the new intelli-
gentsia which drives the general dis-
course of society on critical issues of
national importance. They preside over
important governmental committees, serve
on advisory groups, and act as glamorous
consultants to various ministries, besides
occupying cultural space in the media.
Gone are the days when opinion-makers
would invariably come from the civil
services or the worlds of politics and
15
COMMENTARY
academics. The changing culture of pub-
lic opinion bears testimony to the advan-
taged presence of business leaders and
iconic professional managers in the pub-
lic policy domain as well. Not surpris-
ingly, the National Knowledge Commis-
sion (2009) recommends a much wider
role for such elites by enlarging the
scope of management education. It does
not want management education to re-
main narrowly focused on the large, for-
profit mainstream sort of organisations
so as to benefit only individuals from eco-
nomically wealthy classes.
However, the IIMs do not appear to
have done much to fulfil their mandate
of acting as socially responsible public
institutions. For most of them, it is busi-
ness as usual. They operate in a self-con-
tained cycle of virtuous excellence
where much of energy is expended on
maintaining their so-called brand value.
They appear to be convinced of the
longevity of the brand image and are
reluctant to come out of their institu-
tional comfort. Such complacency propels
the IIMs to be scattered islands of excel-
lence amidst general mediocrity that
characterises much of higher education
in India. This probably explains their
studied indifference to the ideals of
social justice and equity.
Merit in Elite Institutions
The historical resistance towards reser-
vations in the IIMs emanates from the
old hackneyed argument that the intro-
duction of reservations will dilute quality
and standards that they have so assidu-
ously promoted. Very often, they bring
up the much-debated issues of quality,
merit, and excellence in elite higher
educations institutions to bypass the
constitutional mandate of affirmative
action for the backward classes. They
also have a tendency to cry hoarse about
their loss of academic autonomy as and
when such demands for reservations
in faculty appointments are made. In
the contemporary context of increased
global integration, the IIMs are also
likely to use the possible decline in their
ability to compete globally if such
undesirable social constraints are im-
posed on them. Some of the older IIMs
may equally advance the glib argument
16
of their financial independence and
non-dependence on government grants
to evade reservations.
On closer scrutiny, all these possible
arguments to counter the idea of reser-
vations can be shown to be lopsided.
They reveal complete indifference to
the larger context which the IIMs are a
part of. It goes without saying that IIMs
are embedded in wider structures of
social inequality and elite reproduction.
Over the years, they have provided a
potent avenue of upward mobility to
such people who even otherwise have
had the requisite resources to access the
valued (howsoever limited) public
good. The IIMs have historically accom-
plished this task of elite reproduction
and have got laurels for doing so. In
fact, upper caste groups are preponder-
ant in the IIMs at all levels. Moreover, a
disproportionate percentage of students
belonging to the reserved categories fail
to graduate, and those who graduate
end up getting jobs at the lower rungs of
the corporate ladder.
Amidst these arguments, very often
we tend to forget that IIMs are public
institutions. They were endowed with
scarce public resources at a time when
these resources could have been pro-
ductively employed elsewhere. Even
when some of them have ceased to re-
ceive grants from the government, it
does not necessarily mean that they can
abdicate their larger national goals and
their foundational mandate. The argu-
ment about the decline of quality and
standards owing to reservations also
does not stand to empirical test. To em-
phasise the point, the Indian Institutes
of Technology (IITs) which are as pres-
tigious as the IIMs, if not more, have al-
ready implemented reservations in their
faculty appointments since 2008. Res-
ervations in their doctoral programmes
precede this. Likewise, some of the best-
known universities in the country do
have reservations at all levels. And in no
way can reservations be held responsi-
ble for the deterioration of academic
standards in these institutions. On the
contrary, these institutions are academ-
ically vibrant precisely because their
governance structures have internal-
ised an ethos of inclusiveness.
april 1, 2017
IIMs and the New Elites
Higher education is a powerful mecha-
nism for upward mobility. It allows peo-
ple an opportunity to better their life
chances irrespective of their social ori-
gins. It also helps expand the social base
of elites in a given society. Even if reser-
vations are not the sole and the best way
of dealing with existing inequalities,
they do hold the promise of making our
public institutions more representative
and inclusive. After all, as the Mandal
Commission report reminds us, reserva-
tions are not about the distribution of
a handful of government jobs across
different social groups. It is about politi-
cal empowerment and representational
justice. Access to some of the most cher-
ished jobs by the disadvantaged has
demonstrably been a great morale booster
for the other members of disadvantaged
communities. It is a way of giving stakes
to those who otherwise may not have
any stakes in the system. In a way, it is in
our own interest that we create socially
just public institutions.
The IIMs must partake of this socially
responsive ethos of our times. They
should proactively implement reserva-
tions in their doctoral programmes and
faculty appointments. Rather than
squandering their energy on mere tech-
nicalities or waiting endlessly for the ul-
timate directive of the ministry, they
could very well take the lead. This is a
historic opportunity for the IIMs for
course correction. As more and more
sections of Indian society come to these
institutions, their diversity and plurality
of world views will impart the IIMs an
epistemological vitality that they sorely
lack at present. In the ultimate analysis,
reservations are not going to be a drag
on the IIMs. Instead, reservations are a
pathway towards an effervescent future
for the IIMs.
Attention ContributorsI
The EPW has been sending reprints of articles to
authors. We are now discontinuing the practice.
We will consider sending a limited number of
reprints to authors located in India when they
make specific requests to us.
We will, of course, continue to send a copy of the
print edition to all our authors whose contributions
appear in that particular edition.
vol lIi no 13 EPW Economic & Political Weekly

Gujarat State Higher Education
Council Bill
An Atrophied Autonomy
Dhananjay Rai
The Gujarat State Higher
Education Council Bill, 2016
proposes a centralised system to
govern and control institutions of
higher learning by taking implicit
recourse to the Central Universities
of India (Teaching, Research and
Administration) Bill, 2013 and
explicit recourse to the Rashtriya
Uchchatar Shiksha Abhiyan. The
proposed bill avoids discussing
any imperilment of the prevalent
academics atrophy while
ensuing academic atrophy and
atrophy of homogeneity. This is
followed by atrophy of episteme
by way of deciding a priori
research topics in universities.
Dhananjay Rai (dhananjay@cug.ac.in)
teaches at the Central University of Gujarat,
Gandhinagar.
Economic & Political Weekly EPW april 1, 2017
T
he Gujarat assembly passed the
Gujarat State Higher Education
Council Bill (Gujarat Bill No 27 of
2016) on 31 March 2016. The bill is aimed
at covering institutions of higher learning,
including universities and colleges affili-
ated to them in Gujarat. The University
Grants Commission (UGC) and Rashtriya
Uchchatar Shiksha Abhiyan (RUSA) are ex-
plicitly stated in the bill. However, the bill
does not discuss the actual mandate of
either the UGC or the RUSA. This article
discusses the bill and the actual mandate
of the UGC and RUSA on which the entire
edifice of the bill is built imprudently.
Over-the-Top Council
The bill envisages the creation of the
Gujarat State Higher Education Council
(GSHEC) for planned, coordinated, and
integrated development of higher edu-
cation. The GSHEC will also observe and
control higher educational institutions,
and advise the state government. The
council is to have a 32-member governing
council, which includes 15 ex officio mem-
bers and 17 other members. The chief min-
ister will be the president of the council.
The chairperson of the proposed executive
committee within the council will also be
a member. The 17 other members include
five vice chancellors, one selected vice
chancellor of a private university, two
persons from institutes of national im-
portance located in Gujarat, five persons
from specified fields (arts, science, com-
merce, law, engineering, management,
medicine, journalism, film and television,
theatre, games/sports, public administra-
tion, and finance), three members from
universities or affiliated colleges who have
15 years of experience, and a member
secretary appointed by the government.
The aim of the council is to connect insti-
tutions, observe and control institutions,
prepare a database, take action against
vol lIi no 13
COMMENTARY
unauthorised acts, allot resources and as-
sess financial needs, establish social parity,
and modernise and improve institutions to
the scale of world-class universities. The
councils work includes implementation of
directives of the state and UGC along with
evaluation of the institutions and sugges-
tions on collaboration with the industry. On
the academic front, the council will promote
a common syllabus and interdisciplinary
mobility (read transfer) of students and
teachers. Some of the advisory functions
are also noteworthy, like advising universi-
ties on consolidation of research activities,
and statutes/ordinances and regulations.
The crucial component of the council is
a 22-member executive committee, includ-
ing the chairperson and three ex officio
members. The state government will ap-
point all members. A three-member search
committee will be constituted for the ap-
pointment of the chairperson of the execu-
tive committee. The state government will
appoint the search committees chairper-
son. Within one month, the committee will
suggest and submit three names to the
government. Out of the three, the state
government will appoint one eminent
educationalist as the chairperson of the
executive committee for three years.
The chairperson will be the CEO, educa-
tional head, chief-in-charge of the coun-
cils functioning, and will also look after
supervision. Other members are three
vice chancellors, one vice chancellor from
a private university, one person from the
institutes of national importance located
in Gujarat, five persons based on their dis-
tinguished contributions as stated above,
and three professors or principals having
10 years of teaching experience.
The powers and functions of the execu-
tive committee are exceptionally broad
and comprehensive. It can take policy de-
cisions under the broad guidelines of the
council on expenditure, planning, and
coordination, and provide advice related
to statutes and ordinances, and sugges-
tions on quality improvement. The bill
also seeks to address the issue of protection
of the autonomy of the state universities.
The status of autonomy takes a different
turn as soon as Articles 14 and 15 of the bill
are bared. Article 14 empowers the council
extraordinarily. It states that the council
will retain its power to act even in the case
17
COMMENTARY
where posts are vacant or any lacunae are
discovered in the constitution of the coun-
cil. Notwithstanding some people who are
not even eligible for the membership and
remain present in the meeting of the coun-
cil, and have cast their vote or participated
in any other work of the council, the meet-
ing as well as the decision taken will be
valid. Article 15 takes the matter further
with a far-reaching consequence. The state
government can order any change or
amendment and direct any process for
reformative action either on the recom-
mendation of the council, or of its own
volition. Notwithstanding any regulation
or law, a university has to fulfil the orders
of the state government, and inform the
state and council on the action taken. The
council will review periodically the steps
taken by the university to follow the state
governments orders.
Imitating a Rejected Apotheosis
The impact of the Central Universities of
India (Teaching, Research and Adminis-
tration) Bill, 2013 (CUI bill) is writ large
on the GSHEC bill. The GSHEC bill refers to
the CUI bill by way of the UGC. Interest-
ingly, the UGC had no direct role in for-
mulating the draft of the CUI bill except
circulating it for soliciting general public
opinion (No F1510/2013). The draft was
prepared by a committee constituted by
the Ministry of Human Resource Devel-
opment, Department of Higher Education
(Reference No F2006/2010-Desk U,
dated 12 April 2013; MHRd 2013).
Two distinct features of the CUI bill are
impenitent centralisation and unconcealed
homogeneity. Both have squarely influ-
enced the GSHEC bill. The CUI bill advo-
cates repealing of all acts of central univer-
sities and replacing them with one single
act. Impenitent centralisation is also envis-
aged through advocating centralisation of
administrative decisions. A Vice-Chancel-
lors Council (VCC) is proposed to be set up,
whose chairperson will be the human re-
source development minister. The VCC is
mandated to coordinate all academic ac-
tivities of central universities. Providing
policy advice on academic matters, syn-
chronising academic calendars, recruit-
ment and exchange of faculty members,
and setting up of higher education stan-
dards are assigned functions of the VCC.
18
Instead of making academic councils,
executive councils and vice chancellors
more democratic, a top-down mega sys-
tem is imposed. Unconcealed homogene-
ity is envisaged through inter-university
mobility of faculty. This has a devastating
consequence. The university is a unique
institution that takes years to develop.
The transfer of faculty mars the unique
needs and growth of a university. Immense
diversities of universities are replaced by
unconcealed homogeneity, while making
academics a vocation and a fleeting entity.
Impenitent centralisation, unconcealed
homogeneity, and commodification have
been the reasons to oppose the CUI bill.
Barring finding a space in the Retreat of
Vice Chancellors at Chandigarh (1213
September 2014), the CUI bill could not
become a policy guideline. It is astonish-
ing to see the impact of the defunct and
outright anti-academic CUI bill 2013 on
the GSHEC bill. It is also appalling that
the CUI bill 2013, which has no legal
validity, advisory role, or academic value
in any form, has disingenuously become
the role model for the GSHEC bill.
Structure without Autonomy
The RUSA is no role model. It provides,
however, unambiguous and unflinching
guidelines on structure and autonomy. It
proposes the establishment of a State
Higher Education Council (SHEC) in this
particular context. Purposefully, the GSHEC
bill takes the structure and neglects both
the context of the SHEC and a substan-
tive concern on autonomy. Since the UGC
cannot fund all state universities and
affiliated colleges under the provisions
of Sections 2(f) and 12B of the UGC Act
that lays down certain conditions to
receive assistance, the RUSA plans to fund
all state universities and affiliated colleges
(both compliant and non-compliant),
including private ones, to achieve access,
equity and excellence. The SHEC becomes
a primary structure wherefrom funding
is released (MHRD 2013).
The SHEC, being a planning unit
through the State Higher Education Plans
(SHEPs), will be responsible for the fund-
ing of all the higher educational institu-
tions in the state. The funding ratio for
the SHECs by the centre and state is 90%
and 10% for special category states
april 1, 2017
(north-eastern states, Sikkim, Jammu
and Kashmir, Himachal Pradesh and
Uttarakhand), and 65% and 35% for other
states and union territories, respectively.
Funding to state universities is crucial be-
cause 94% of students are either en-
rolled in government-funded universities
(48% overall) or government-controlled
private universities, and are a part of the
state education system. Besides, 52% of
the private educational institutions come
under state universities for administra-
tive and financial control. Funding be-
comes imperative to attract good teaching
staff and improve the teacherstudent ra-
tio. Since higher education is a public
good that produces valuable externali-
ties, it requires liberal funding against
the commercialisation of education.
Against the backdrop of reports of the
Radhakrishnan Commission, Kothari
Commission and Yash Pal Committee,
the RUSA envisions SHECs as promoting
greater autonomy. Increased funding,
fostering institutional autonomy and
meaningful academic autonomy are cru-
cial concerns. The RUSA lays emphasis on
administrative, academic, and financial
autonomy. It also warns the universities
from becoming administration- and ad-
ministrator-oriented. The primary func-
tion of the administration is to serve the
academic interests of the university. The
universities are witnessing centralisation
in the decision-making process. The im-
portance given to ideas must be based on
objectivity and intrinsic merit.
The departments are perceived as the
main operational unit of academic auto-
nomy, and teachers as the most crucial
components of the universitys autonomy.
They are the pivot on which the excellence
of the university will depend. The partici-
pation of teachers and students must be
ensured in the decision-making process.
Financial autonomy is ensured through
the provision for funding to individual
universities in a manner untied to actuali-
sation of prioritisation. This is also crucial
to maintain a good teacherstudent ratio,
that is, 15:1 for undergraduate courses
and 12:1 for postgraduate courses.
The RUSA highlights five key substantive
concerns to enforce university autonomy.
First, revisiting the acts of various state
universities is necessary to do away with
vol lIi no 13 EPW Economic & Political Weekly

the detrimental clauses, which are a hin-
drance to autonomy. These clauses must
be replaced by such clauses that would
enhance the autonomy of universities.
Second, universities must have the auton-
omy to recruit faculty as per procedures.
Third, governing bodies must not be
filled with ex officio members and govern-
ment nominees. Fourth, the vice chan-
cellor must be a leader on academic and
administrative fronts to safeguard the
autonomy of the university. Fifth, public
representatives and civil servants should
not interfere in the administration or
day-to-day affairs of the universities.
Autonomy is inseparable from accounta-
bility. The RUSA underlines accountability
to the future of the students and the
country, the generation of new knowledge
and establishment of the truth.
Against the micromanagement of the
universities by the government, the RUSA
proposes a buffer body, like the SHEC, to
ensure government withdrawal and fulfil
the function of planning, monitoring, qual-
ity control and coordination at the state
level while maintaining an arms length
from the state and the centre. It will have
an eminent academic/public intellectual
with proven leadership qualities as the
chairperson. The member-secretary will
be an eminent academician of the rank of
professor. There should be few ex officio
members in this council. The chairperson
will be selected by a committee comprising
the chief minister, the speaker, and leader
of the opposition on the basis of recom-
mendations of shortlisted candidates by
the search-cum-selection committee. Two
members of the committee will be nomi-
nated by the council and one by the state
government. The state government nomi-
nee will be the chair of the committee.
Arrival of an Atrophied Autonomy
According to the RUSA, Gujarat lags far
behind other states in higher education,
particularly in terms of gross enrolment
ratio, institutional density, and gender
parity. Instead of mitigating these along
with commercialisation, the GSHEC bill
further erodes the already compromised
autonomy of universities by way of two
sets of compromised autonomy. In the first
set, academics atrophy is a pre-GSHEC
bill phenomenon that has not been
Economic & Political Weekly EPW april 1, 2017
addressed in it. In the state, upon selection
as an assistant professor in government
universities or an affiliated college, the
higher education commissioner issues a
letter of appointment, which itself high-
lights the abysmal state of affairs. After
joining the service, the selected candidate
receives a fixed payment of `25,000 for
five years. The probation period is of five
years. During this period, the candidate
will not receive any increment in salary,
benefits of the pay commission, medical
reimbursement, bonus or any kind of
financial benefits. After evaluation of
service after five years, if found satisfac-
tory, she or he will get full employment.
Work experience will be counted only for
the full employment period. The first five
years services will not be counted.
In the second set, three ensuing atro-
phied autonomies are more precarious
for the health of higher education. The
first is academic atrophy where insti-
tutional autonomy is highly compro-
mised by making the head of the state
government the head of the council.
This compromises the councils autonomy
squarely since there is no provision of
appeal against the councils decision. The
number of ex officio members remains
abnormally high in the proposed council.
The leader of opposition is to be consulted
for the selection of the chairman of the
executive committee, but is given a miss in
the GSHEC bill. Due to absolute compliance
of the government order, the GSHEC bill
makes the vice chancellors, senate,
syndicate and academic councils effete
individuals or bodies.
The second is the atrophy of hetero-
geneity. Homogeneity is envisaged in
three ways, that is, transfer of teaching
and non-teaching staff, advocacy for com-
mon syllabus, and direct intervention in
statutes and ordinances of the universi-
ties. This will deaden the idea of each
university as a distinct entity. The RUSA
proposes an alliance of the universities,
but the GSHEC bill stresses on integration.
The RUSA empowers the SHEC on statutes
and ordinances of universities only to rec-
tify anomalies that may hinder the auto-
nomous functioning of the universities.
The third is the atrophy of episteme.
The possibility of conversion of universities
into public relations offices looms large.
vol lIi no 13
COMMENTARY
The recent government order on PhD
topics is an outcome of the GSHEC bill.
The state governments order provides
82 research topics that are related to vari-
ous schemes of the state government and
the central governments. The university
has to ensure that a minimum of five
topics are chosen for doctoral research
(Yagnik and Chauhan 2016). This is a
violation of academic ethics where both
research and outcome cannot be a priori
by design. Indeed, research in the uni-
versities should challenge policies if these
turn out to be antithetical to the peoples
cause, not brazenly endorse them.
In a nutshell, it needs to be reiterated
that centralisation is not a sublime ap-
proach to accomplish excellence in higher
education. This crucial universal academic
value needs unconditional reclamation.
Postscript
The Raj Bhavan, amidst widespread oppo-
sition and heterogeneous submission of
petitions to the Governor of Gujarat urg-
ing him to not give his consent to the
GSHEC bill becoming an act, had issued
the following statement on 1 June 2016:
Taking cognisance of seriousness of all the
above representations, Governor O P Kohli
had called concerned ministers and higher of-
ficials of education department at Raj Bhavan,
Gandhinagar, held detailed discussion on pro-
visions of the Gujarat State Higher Education
Council Bill, 2016 with them and sought clari-
fications of the state government on certain
provisions of the Bill. (Indian Express 2016)
The bill was subsequently approved by the
governor to become an act on 1 February
2017 (Dave and Yagnik 2017).
References
Dave, Kapil and Bharat Yagnik (2017): Controversial
Education Bill Gets Gujarat Governors Nod,
Times of India, 4 February, Ahmedabad, viewed on
4 February 2017, http://m.timesofindia.com/city/
ahmedabad/controversial-education-bill-gets-gu-
jarat-governors-nod/articleshow/56964171.cms.
Indian Express (2016): Higher Education Council Bill:
Gujarat Governor O P Kohli Seeks Clarification,
2 June, viewed on 31 January 2017, http://indian-
express.com/article/cities/ahmedabad/higher-
education-council-bill-gujarat-governor-o-p-kohli-
seeks-clarification-2829649/.
MHRD (2013): Rashtriya Uchchatar Shiksha Abhiyan:
National Higher Education Mission, Ministry of
Human Resource Development, Government
of India, New Delhi, September.
Yagnik, Bharat and Ashish Chauhan (2016): Gujarat
Govt Gives Universities List of Topics for PhD
Theses, Times of India, 26 April, http://time-
sofindia.indiatimes.com/india/Gujarat-govt-g-
ives-universities-list-of-topics-for-PhD-theses/
articleshow/51986510.cms.
19
COMMENTARY

20 april 1, 2017 vol lIi no 13 EPW Economic & Political Weekly


Shadow Prison(s) in Tamil Nadu
N Malathy
Over a period of more than
20 years, successive state
governments of Tamil Nadu, even
as they have claimed to be
politically in favour of the Tamil
Eelam cause, have continued to
maintain horrid special camps
for certain Tamil Eelam refugees,
one of which is still in existence.
This is an account of the awful
conditions and the wide-ranging
violations of the rights of the
inmates of these camps.
N Malathy (n.malathy@gmail.com) is a writer
based in Wellington, New Zealand.
Economic & Political Weekly EPW april 1, 2017
T
he Tamil Nadu government is host
to many refugees from Sri Lanka
and Tibet. Yet, it is the Eelam
Tamils from the island that dominate the
refugee scene in the state. Tamil Eelam
refugees, though concentrated in Tamil
Nadu, also live in Kerala and other states
of India in smaller numbers. (Tamil Eelam
is a proposed independent state for
Tamils in Sri Lanka.)
These Tamil Eelam refugees are cate-
gorised into three typesnon-camp ref-
ugees, open camp refugees, and special
camp refugees. Non-camp refugees are
people with sufficient resources to live
on their own in rented places. They have
received little attention from activists,
researchers or the media, perhaps justi-
fiably. Open camp refugees live in more
than a hundred camps scattered across
Tamil Nadu. These camps have received
some attention, the conditions therein
described in terms ranging from inade-
quate to horrid. This article intends to
throw some light on the so-called special
camps, which have received very little
attention.
India is not a signatory to the United
Nations Convention Relating to the Status
of Refugees. It manages its refugee intake
under the Foreigners Act, 1946, enacted
before India gained independence from
Britain, and the Foreigners Order, 1948.
The Foreigners Act, 1946 states: The
Central Government may by order make
provision for prohibiting, regulating
or restricting the entry of foreigners into
India or their departure there from or
their presence or continued presence
therein, including requiring him to re-
side in a particular place, and impos-
ing any restrictions on his movements.
All three types of Tamil Eelam refugees
are managed under this law but with
differing levels of restriction on their
freedom of movement. The special camp
refugees face the most restricted freedom
of movement. Radhakrishnan, a lawyer
from Tamil Nadu, commenting on the
law that governs refugees in India, says:
vol lIi no 13
COMMENTARY
It is a serious shortcoming that India has no
special law for refugees. Only a refugee law
can rectify this. In 2000, the Justice Bhagwa-
ti Committee recommended provisional citi-
zenship for refugees but that is still on hold.
The flow of Tamil Eelam refugees into
Tamil Nadu began with the 1983 pogrom
against Tamils in Sri Lanka. At that
time, the Tamil Eelam refugees were ac-
cepted with sympathy and were given
extensive benefits in education and oth-
er facilities. This changed in 1990 when
the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF)
was asked to leave the island following a
three-year long operation in the Tamil
homeland of the island. Following the
exit of the IPKF, the open camp refugees
faced severe restrictions on their move-
ment. Also, the very first special camp
was created in Vellore in Tamil Nadu
following the IPKF episode, purportedly
to hold Tamil Eelam militants. Our story
starts at this juncture.
The manner in which the Eelam Tamils
suspected of being militants were brought
to this Vellore special camp did not bode
well for what was to follow. The first batch
of inmates was taken there on a fake
promise of employment and locked up.
The Eelam Tamils, in captivity, began pro-
testing. When their hunger strike did not
lead to talks, the angry inmates set fire
to the prison gate and threw stones at
the police who arrived. The police opened
fire killing two of them. Thus began the
25-year long history of special camps for
the Eelam Tamils. Following the assassi-
nation of Rajiv Gandhi, successive Tamil
Nadu governments continued to open
more special camps, in Chengalpattu,
Poonamallee, Pudukkottai, Meloor, Thir-
uchchi, Thiruvaiyaru, Athipatti, and Palani
and in other areas. All of these special
camps, except one, have been closed
over the years. Today, one camp exists in
Thiruchchi with 21 Tamil Eelam refu-
gees, many of whom have been held for
many years. This Thiruchchi special
camp is located within the Thiruchchi
prison complex.
Courts and Special Camps
Given that no regulations existed with
respect to management of the special
camps, in a ruling in 1991, the Madras
High Court laid down the administrative
21
COMMENTARY

guidelines for managing the special camps.
According to these guidelines: (i) An as-
sistant tehsildar should be appointed to
manage and ensure regular food supplies.
(ii) Other than restrictions on their move-
ment, the natural rights of the special camp
refugees are not to be denied. (iii) The
refugees, if they wish, should be allowed
to have their families with them at the
expense of the state. (iv) The refugees
should not be locked up in cells and should
be allowed to move freely inside the camp
premises. (v) Visitors should be allowed to
visit the inmates without any time restric-
tion and can give the inmates materials
for their personal use. (vi) Police should
be placed outside the premises for guard-
ing the camps, but all other matters
should be in the hands of the tehsildar.
(vii) If the refugees wish to return to
their homeland, they should be permit-
ted to do so, and the expenses for this
may be borne by the state, if necessary.
According to many activists and lawyers
in Tamil Nadu who have worked on the
cases of the special camp inmates, the
guidelines of the Madras High Court have
not been respected by successive Tamil
Nadu governments. Pugalenthi, a promi-
nent Tamil Nadu lawyer, who takes up
cases on behalf of the special camp in-
mates to the courts, says:
All the courts all the way to the Supreme
Court are maintaining that special camps
are living spaces. Yet, these living spaces
do not allow families to stay together. Fam-
ily members can only visit them after getting
permission from an administrative office
that is not near the camp. This can take up
to a day to obtain. The family members must
leave the camp before 5.00 pm. Even law-
yers have to go through this procedure.
Pugalenthi says that the Poonamallee
special camp was indeed a prison com-
plex set up to hold the accused in the Rajiv
Gandhi assassination case, which was lat-
er renamed a special camp. The ground
of this special camp is cemented and the
roof is low; the inmates feel cramped and
one cannot even play inside. Many Eelam
Tamils were held here for many years.
Over the years, the special camp refu-
gees have gone on a number of protest
fasts demanding improvements to their
living conditions, but their protests were
simply ignored. Instead, some of them
were charged with attempted suicide.
According to Pugalenthi, nearly 50 such
charges had been brought against the
Eelam Tamils held in these special
camps. Pugalenthi cites several examples
when they were punished for protesting
against the way they were kept inside
the camp.
On many occasions the inmates chal-
lenged their detention before courts of
law. Among the 21 inmates presently
held, there are two who were released
by the courts but are still being held in
the special camp.
The case of Balachandran, who was
eventually released after eight years, is
illustrative of the plight of special camp
refugees. Balachandran published an
account on the special camps in 2015.1 He
had arrived in India legally in 1990 with

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22 april 1, 2017 vol lIi no 13 EPW Economic & Political Weekly


the intention of proceeding to Canada to
join his brother. One year after arriving
in India, while waiting for his Canadian
visa, he was arrested by the Qbranch,
the intelligence division of the Tamil Nadu
police. He was not told the reason for his
arrest. According to Balachandran, he
was asked to cooperate with the Qbranch
intelligence agents to tarnish the then
Tamil Nadu chief minister, M Karunanidhi,
whose government was sacked by the
central government. Balachandran refused.
A friend brought a habeas corpus case to
the courts, at which stage Balachandran
was framed on fake charges. He was
brought to the courts and remanded to
prison. He was then shunted from prison
to special camp to prison and was even-
tually released with no conviction.
Conditions in the Special Camps
Protests by the special camp refugees
over the years since the early 1990s have
received some coverage in certain lesser-
known dailies of Tamil Nadu. In 1991,
inmates in the Vellore camp went on a
protest fast demanding that they should
not be locked up in tiny cells, be given
sufficient food, be allowed to live with
their families, and be allowed to meet
their visitors. None of their demands were
met. In 1994, media reports say that the
inmates in the Thiruchchi special camp
with 40 inmates went on a protest fast
with similar demands. In 1996, media
reports say that in the Meloor camp
with 30 inmates, including five children
and five women, the inmates went on a
protest fast with very similar demands.
They demanded that they be allowed to
move freely inside the camp, that they
be allowed to live with their families, that
visitors be allowed to meet them, and
that female police officers be appointed
to manage the five females in the camp.
The children could not attend school.
When the chief government officer in
charge did not come to meet them, they
threatened to commit suicide, and four
of the inmates cut themselves with
broken bottles and fainted. Yet the officers
who were contacted responded by say-
ing that only the governments decision
can change their conditions. Such pro-
tests and fasting by inmates have con-
tinued to this date with little or no
Economic & Political Weekly EPW april 1, 2017
redressal of grievances by the Tamil
Nadu government.
In another case in 2015, Maheswaran,
the husband of an Tamil Eelam woman,
married only for two years, was impri-
soned. He was released on bail but as he
walked out, he was apprehended and
put in a special camp. The family of his
wife, Prasanthi, decided to marry her
off to someone else because no one
comes out of special camps in a short
time. The wife visited the husband in
the camp and they both committed sui-
cide together in frustration about their
future. This was widely reported in the
Tamil Nadu media.
In 2010, when Eelam Tamils in the
Chengalpattu special camp went on a
protest fast, about 200 police entered the
camp at night and severely assaulted the
30 protesters. Fifteen of the inmates were
severely injured. They were taken to the
hospital and then produced before the
courts on the charge that they assaulted
the policemen. They were put in Vellore
prison. When they were released on bail
10 days later, they were again locked up
in the Poonamallee special camp, but
eventually they were released.
Even as late as 2015 and 2016, special
camp refugees have gone on protest
fasts. The 2015 protest was ignored by
the special camp authorities, politicians,
activists and the media. In December
2016, 11 of them went on a protest fast
yet again, demanding that they be sent
back to Sri Lanka. According to the fasting
protesters, some of them had arrived on
tourist visas but had been thrown in the
special camp on false accusations. Some
are accused of trying to leave India ille-
gally by boat. The 2016 fast had been
called off after the authorities promised
that action will be taken. The inmates
are still waiting for redress.
Pugalenthi says that only Tamil Eelam
refugees are held in such cruel camps.
He cites the example of 12 Nigerians who
were held in a special camp in Thirupoor.
Eventually, unable to manage the pro-
tests of the Nigerians, they were sent
back to Nigeria at state expense. The
Tamil Eelam refugees who protested
demanding similar rightsto be able to
live with their families and to expedite
the court cases pending against them
vol lIi no 13
COMMENTARY
were, however, slapped with criminal
charges. Radhakrishnan, also a lawyer,
says that India treats different groups of
refugees differently.
It has always been hard for Tamil Eelam
women to come forward and report sexual
abuse and rape. One therefore needs to
rely on the statements of other inmates to
get a glimpse of this type of abuse in the
camps. The police and even the higher
authorities have been accused of sexu-
ally abusing the women detained in the
camps. Women have been taken from
the camp on the pretext of medical
treatment and then raped by police and
others in authority.
Balachandran states several cases in
his book about women being taken out
and sexually abused. In one case, even
the tehsildar in charge of the camp was
taking a woman inmate out and sexually
abusing her. Even non-camp refugee
women did not escape the sexual preda-
tion of police personnel, including, in
one case, a senior officer of the Qbranch
of the Tamil Nadu police. He is said to have
framed charges against the womans
husband and thrown him in a special
camp after which he demanded sexual
favours from her as a precondition for her
husbands release. Another police officer
who came to know of this also demanded
the same from her. When she refused, he
threw her in another special camp on a
fake charge of narcotics trafficking.
Threats to Silence
Pugalenthi gives an example of how open
camp refugees are silenced from protest-
ing by throwing them in special camps.
One non-camp refugee, referred to as
Eelanehru, is respected for his efforts to
raise funds to enable the open camp
children to continue with their tertiary
education. He would raise the funds from
cinema celebrities and other wealthy
people in Tamil Nadu. Around this time
four Eelam Tamils from the refugee camp
were thrown into a special camp. Two of
them were badly assaulted and brought
back to the open camp. Eelanehru raised
this issue with the media. The next day
he was thrown into the special camp.
In another example, four Tamil Eelam
refugees, who had come to Tamil Nadu
to take some medicines and blood bags
23
COMMENTARY
to the war-affected people, were thrown
into the central prison. When they were
released on bail they were thrown in
Chengalpattu and Poonamallee special
camps. This was just four months prior to
the end of the war in 2009 in Mullivaikkal
where thousands were killed and injured.
Subsequently, another man who had
gained British citizenship came from
London to Tamil Nadu to get married.
He had already visited India twice. He
brought a laptop for a friend who hap-
pened to be one of the four arrested
in the medicine-related incident. The
visitor from London was traced through
this friend and he too was put in the
special camp. All of them were released
only after five years.
Right to Recall Reform
Experience in Madhya Pradesh
K Neelima
The Right to Recall has been
often seen as a way to make
elected representatives more
accountable to voters. However,
the experience of the reform in
local bodies in Madhya Pradesh,
where it has been in force since
2000, has revealed how, in its
present form, it could be vulnerable
to political opportunism and
arbitrariness of process.
K Neelima (kotaneelima@hotmail.com) is a
doctoral student at the Department of Political
Science, University of Delhi.
24
Some Common Threads
The special camps have been entirely
under the control of the Tamil Nadu
government. This is the same govern-
ment that is supposedly confronting the
central government in the courts re-
garding the release of the seven accused
in the Rajiv Gandhi assassination case.
It is a contradiction and a puzzle that
needs to be reflected upon.
More than seven years after the end of
the war in Sri Lanka, these cruel special
camps are continuing. The views among
the lawyers and activists who have agi-
tated for the release of the Eelam Tamils
from the special camps have some com-
mon threads. It is seen as an easy way of
muzzling the open camp refugees who
T
he Right to Recall (RTR) had been
perceived as a suitable solution
to enhance accountability among
elected representatives, as it allows voters
to seek re-election of the representative
before the scheduled end of tenure of
the incumbent. To give one example,
voter surveys have found support for the
reform to be applied nationally in legis-
lative assemblies and Parliament, with a
higher degree of support among the
urban and literate youth than others
(Sardesai 2014). To assess whether this
Table 1: Provisions for RTR at Municipal Level
in India
Madhya Pradesh, Section 24 of the Madhya Pradesh
2000 Municipal Corporation Act, 1956
and Section 47 of the Madhya
Pradesh Municipalities Act, 19611
Chhattisgarh, Section 47 (recall of President)
2007 of the Chhattisgarh Nagar Palika
Act, 19612
Rajasthan, 2011 Section 53 of the Rajasthan
Municipalities Act, 20093 was
amended in 2011 as the Rajasthan
Municipalities (Amendment)
Bill, 20114
Bihar, 2007 Section 17 of Bihar Municipal Act,
20075
Source: Authors compilation based on data from state
election commissions.
april 1, 2017
may protest about abuse and inadequacies
in the open camps as has been described
in one case. Activists also believe that
the central and the state governments
use the existence of special camp inmates
as proof that Tamil Tigers are still active in
India and therefore, their proscription
must continue. The Indian authorities may
be unable to provide evidence to main-
tain the proscription of Tamil Tigers in the
Supreme Court, and so the continuation
of the proscription on Tamil Tigers is
ruled by a special tribunal appointed by
the central government.
Note
1 Concentration Camps of Tamil Nadu: The So-
called Special Camps, by Tholar Balan (trans-
lated by M S Thambirajah), Tholar Press, 2015.
perception was justified, research was
undertaken to record the experience of
RTR where it was provided at the munici-
pal levels in various states of the country
(Table 1).
Among the given states, Madhya
Pradesh (MP) was chosen for research on
the RTR experience for three reasons.
One, it had the longest experience of
RTR in the country, one that has been
implemented since 2000.6 Two, it had
the most recent recall elections at the
time this research was conducted. And
three, there were relatively recent cases
in the state where incumbents survived
the recall and where they did not. The
RTR was introduced in MP to Sections 24
and 47 of the acts that applied to recall
of the mayor of a corporation and presi-
dent of a council, respectively, through a
secret ballot and a majority of more than
half of the total votes in the area.7 This
direct election was initiated through a
proposal for recall supported by three-
fourths of the elected council. The RTR
under Section 47 came with various safe-
guards like, the recall proposal would
be verified by the collector and that
such a proposal would be initiated only
after two years of the mayoral election.
Following verification of the signatures
on the recall proposal, the collector
would send the proposal to the state
government, which would then refer it
to the State Election Commission (SEC)
to begin the process of election on the
vol lIi no 13 EPW Economic & Political Weekly

Figure 1: Sample of Gender-specific Ballot Paper
For Recall
Source: SEC, MP.
recall question.8 The process was similar
in Chhattisgarh.9
Reform Experience
There have been mixed impressions
about the impact of the reform in MP,
(Ghatwai 2011) where the first recall
election was held in 2001 in Anuppur in
Shahadol district. The most recent recall
elections were held in 2015 against the
Congress-backed Nagar Palika Parishad
president in Harda district, and the inde-
pendent president of Nagar Parishad in
ChhaneraNew Harsud in Khandwa dis-
trict. While Harda had seen 59.7% voting,
ChhaneraNew Harsud had witnessed
57.36%, according to media reports (Times
of India 2015). The recall election for
both candidates was held on 4 February
2015, and while the former was removed
from the post, the latter had retained it.
Since 2000, there had been 33 recall
elections held at the municipal level in
the state, of which the incumbent was
recalled in 17 instances and not recalled
in 16 instances. The present Election
Commissioner of the SEC since 2013,
R Parasuram10 considered this a low num-
ber as there were a large number of mu-
nicipalities in the state, and said that the
RTR encouraged elected representatives
from different parties to work together
for development of their constituencies.
Economic & Political Weekly EPW april 1, 2017
However, he did not support the view
that the RTR should be extended to legis-
lative assemblies and argued that RTR
should be exercised only where executive
functions are discharged and not legisla-
tive functions. To implement the RTR,
the SEC had designed a unique ballot
paper to make the recall concept more
accessible to less-educated voters. The
recall ballot paper had two images, one
of an empty chair and another of a chair
occupied by a gender-specific image. The
voters were asked if they would like the
president to continue in position or vacate
the chair (Figure 1).
On the thinking behind the ballot
paper, A V Singh,11 the Election Commis-
sioner from 2006 to 2010, said that it
was designed to signify the recall with
symbols and not words. It could not be
a yes or no question. We had to consider
the limitation of education and the limit-
ation of understanding, he said. The
recall ballot paper, significantly, did not
contain the names of the possible candi-
dates who might replace the incumbent
in case the recall succeeded. The choice
of the next candidate was done in a
separate election held after a successful
recall election.
The Harda and ChhaneraNew Harsud
municipal recalls were chosen for study
as the recall in Harda had succeeded
and the recall in ChhaneraNew Harsud
had failed. The recall elections in both
places were held on 31 January 2015 and
counting was done on 4 February 2015.
While the president of the Harda Muni-
cipal Council or Nagar Palika Parishad,12
Sangeeta Bansal was recalled from her
post, the president of the Municipal Coun-
cil or Nagar Parishad13 of ChhaneraNew
Harsud, Kamalkant Bhardwaj retained
his post by defeating the recall move.
In Harda, while the municipal elections
in 2012 had taken place through the
electronic voting machines, the recall
election was held through the paper
ballot and ballot boxes. Of the total
22,346 valid votes, the recall of Bansal
was supported by 13,044 and those
against the recall were 9,302. The recall
process was completed with the elec-
tion of a new president to the municipal
council on 16 July 2015. Of the total
valid votes of 29,085, Sadhana Jain
vol lIi no 13
COMMENTARY
gathered 18,815 and won the election,
defeating Usha Goyal who had received
10,270 votes. There were also 466 NOTA
(None of the Above) votes in this re-
election for the president.
Recall in Harda and Harsud
Speaking on the experience of reform,
Bansal14 listed several shortcomings of
RTR. First, the grounds for recall were
arbitrary as there had been no charges
of corruption or irregularities against
her. Second, the ballot paper of one va-
cant chair and one chair occupied by an
image had confused the voters. Third,
the question arose on whether the presi-
dent of the council was to be considered
a councillor or not. Fourth, there was
political tension between the president
and the councillors, who belonged to a
different political party, which led to
strife and facilitated the recall proposal.
Fifth, Bansal argued that the president
should have been given a chance to
counter the reasons for the no-confi-
dence motion before the recall was pro-
posed. Sixth, new voters who had not
participated in the municipal elections
in 2011 when Bansal was elected, had
now voted in the recall elections in 2015.
It must be ensured that only those who
voted for a candidate earlier, partici-
pated in the recall election, she said.
Seventh, the recall campaign was targeted
against her, and all the councillors were
against her. Twenty-three councillors,
campaigning in their own wards, could
not have been matched single-handedly
by me, she explained. She had taken
the matter to the high court but lost the
legal challenge.
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with the articles, EPW can be contacted
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25
COMMENTARY
In ChanneraNew Harsud, the district
collector, Khandwa, was the returning
officer for the election and issued the
final results, which showed that of the
total valid votes (8,463) polled, 5,632
votes were polled against the recall and
2,831 were polled in favour. A majority
of voters in all the 15 polling stations had
voted in favour of Bhardwaj retaining
the post. In the municipal election in
2012, he had polled 3,210 votes and his
nearest opponent had polled 2,998 votes.
The margin of victory for Bhardwaj in
2012 had been 212 votes, while in the
recall election in 2015, the margin was
2,801. Clearly, Bhardwaj had succeeded
in not only consolidating his supporters
but also winning over supporters of
other contenders who had been in the
fray in 2012.
Speaking about the reform experience,
Bhardwaj15 listed the problems he had
noticed in the recall elections. First, the
recall was facilitated because of a sharply
divided house where, of the 15 members
in the council, eight were affiliated with
the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), three
with the Congress and others were non-
affiliated independents. Bhardwaj won
the post of the president as an independ-
ent, the reason both parties had been
ranged against him. Second, the recall
proposal against Bhardwaj was signed
by 12 of the 15 councillors, and was sub-
mitted to the district collector on 23 July
2014. They signed the affidavit that
they did not trust me, he said, and ex-
plained that there had been no investi-
gation or evidence to support this view.
Third, he felt that it was difficult for
the collector to verify whether or not the
councillors had signed on the recall
proposal under pressure. The collector
should conduct secret voting to find out
whether the councillors meant their
support from their heart, Bhardwaj
suggested. Fourth, he objected to the fact
that he was not asked for any explanation.
I should have been given a chance to
defend myself against the complaints
raised. Fifth, Bhardwaj found the sym-
bols of the vacant and the filled chair on
the ballot paper confusing as people
were used to voting for party symbols.
There was an the incident when a voter
asked who she should vote for because
26
the chair was empty, he stated. Sixth,
the campaign before the recall election
was dominated by the councillors united
against him. He believed that he sur-
vived the recall mainly because of his
own contribution to his constituency.
Despite the complaints, Bhardwaj felt
the RTR was an important reform and it
should be extended to the members of
the assembly and Parliament as well.
Speaking on the defeat of his recall pro-
posal, Mukesh Verma,16 the councillor
affiliated with the BJP, said the message
was not conveyed well to the voters and
that the negative campaign during the
election had failed.
Conclusions
It was found that both losing and win-
ning candidates in recent recall elec-
tions in MP shared similar views on the
reform. First, the grounds for recall were
arbitrary. Second, the signature verifica-
tion procedure by the district collector
was unsatisfactory. Third, the ballot pa-
per for recall elections was confusing to
voters. Fourth, new voters who partici-
pated in recall elections had not voted in
the general elections. Fifth, the recall
election campaign was targeted by all
councillors against one president. The
losing candidate in Harda had moved
the Jabalpur High Court to challenge the
recall election, terming it bad in law
and that the state governments actions
were illegal (Sangeeta Bansal v State of
Madhya Pradesh and Others 2014: 14819).
The court had dismissed her claim stating
that there had been no error in law. The
winning candidate in Harsud evaluated
his experience to state that the recall elec-
tion against him had been unnecessary.
To sum up, the experience with RTR in
MP revealed functional problems with
the reform, including at the point of
inception of the recall proposal and at
the point of culmination of the ballot. At
the inception, the political motivation
for recall could be neutralised if the
proposal was moved by the voters them-
selves seeking recall elections and not
through a no-confidence motion by
councillors. At the culmination point,
the ballot could be redesigned in a way
in which voters are not confused. As dis-
cussed, the RTR is not a suitable reform
april 1, 2017
in its present form and could be forced
upon an electorate.
NOTES
1 The Madhya Pradesh Municipal Corporation
Act, 1956 and the Madhya Pradesh Municipali-
ty Act, 1961 (Amendment of 1999), Madhya
Pradesh Nagar Palika Nirvachan Niyam, 1994,
Madhya Pradesh State Election Commission.
2 The Chhattisgarh Municipal Corporation Act,
1956 and the Chhattisgarh Nagar Palika Act,
1961 (Gazette notification of 2007), State Elec-
tion Commission, Chhattisgarh, viewed on 30
January 2017, https://www.legalcrystal.com/
act/134620/the-chhattisgarh-municipalities-
act-1961-complete-act.
3 The Rajasthan Municipalities Act, 2009
(Rajasthan) s53, viewed on 29 January 2016,
http://www.lsg.urban.rajasthan.gov.in/conte-
nt/dam/raj/udh/lsgs/lsg-jaipur/pdf/Other %-
20Pdf/37%20Rajasthan_Municipal_Act-2009.pdf.
4 The Rajasthan Municipalities Act, 2011 (Rajas-
than) s53, viewed on 29 January 2016, http://
rajassembly.nic.in/BillsPdf/Bill16-2011.pdf.
5 The Bihar Municipal Bill, 2007 (Bihar) s17,
viewed on 29 January 2016, http://urban.bih.
nic.in/Acts/AR-01-29-03-2007.pdf.
6 The Madhya Pradesh Municipalities Act, 1961
(MP) s47.
7 The Madhya Pradesh Municipal Corporation
Act, 1956 and the Madhya Pradesh Municipality
Act, 1961.
8 The Madhya Pradesh Municipalities Act, 1961.
9 The Chhattisgarh Municipal Corporation Act,
1956 (Chhattisgarh) s24 and the Chhattisgarh
Municipality Act, 1961 (Chhattisgarh) s47.
10 R Parasuram, personal interview, 2 November
2015, 9.16 am, State Election Office, Bhopal.
11 A V Singh, personal interview, 2 November 2015,
12.05 pm, Bhopal.
12 According to SEC, MP, nagar nigam parishad is
a municipal council elected by a population of
about 10 lakh population or more, nagar palika
parishad by population of over one lakh, while
a Nagar Parishad by 50,000 or less population.
13 Same as note 12.
14 Sangeeta Bansal, personal interview, 3 Novem-
ber 2015, 2.47 pm, Harda.
15 Kamalkant Bhardwaj, personal interview, 4 Nov-
ember 2015, 11.43 am, Nagar Parishad Chhannera
New Harsud.
16 Mukesh Verma, personal interview, 4 November
2015, 12.45 pm, Nagar Parishad Chhannera
New Harsud.
REFERENCES
Ghatwai, Milind (2011): Madhya Pradesh a Lab for
10 Years, with Mixed Results, Indian Express,
31 August, accessed on 28 January 2016, http://
archive.indianexpress.com/news/madhya-pr-
adesh-a-lab-for-10-yrs-with-mixed-results/83-
9660/.
Sardesai, Shreyas (2014): Chapter 5: Issues of
Electoral Reforms, Indian Youth and Electoral
Politics: An Emerging Engagement, Sanjay
Kumar (ed), Sage Publications, pp 79113.
Sangeeta Bansal v State of Madhya Pradesh and
Others, W P No 14819/2014, accessed on 3 Feb-
ruary 2016, http://www.mphc.in/upload/ja-
balpur/MPHCJB/2014/WP/14819/WP_ 14819_
2014_FinalOrder_20-Dec-2014.pdf.
Times of India (2015): 61.26% Get Inked in Civic
Polls Phase III, 1 February, accessed on 28 Jan-
uary 2015, http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com
/city/bhopal/61-26-get-inked-in-civic-polls-
phase-III/articleshow/46084093.cms.
vol lIi no 13 EPW Economic & Political Weekly

Poverty and Deprivation
among the Katkari
Rohit Mutatkar
This article examines evidence for
disparities between three ethnic
groups within the Scheduled
Tribes category in the Jawhar
and Mokhada talukas of Palghar
district in Maharashtra in order
to understand the dimensions of
these disparities.
This article is based upon an unpublished
background note submitted for the
Maharashtra Human Development Report
2012 (Government of Maharashtra 2014).
The author gratefully acknowledges comments
and suggestions from an annonymous referee.
Rohit Mutatkar (rohit.mutatkar@gmail.com)
is with the Centre for Study of Social Exclusion
and Inclusive Policies, Tata Institute of Social
Sciences, Mumbai.
Economic & Political Weekly EPW april 1, 2017
T
he Scheduled Tribes (STs) of India
are known to be among the most
deprived social groups in the coun-
try, across a range of socio-economic
indicators. However, there are variations
across ethnic groups even within the ST
category with the most deprived among
them being identified as particularly vul-
nerable tribal groups by the government.
The Katkari tribal group is categorised
as a particularly vulnerable tribal group
in Maharashtra. As per the 2011 Census,
they have the lowest literacy rate (41.7%)
and the lowest proportion of cultivators
(around 5%) among all the tribal groups in
the state (TISS 2015). This article profiles
the deprivation in this tribal group, based
on a field study in a Katkari hamlet in
Jawhar taluka, Palghar district. The pur-
pose of the field study was to examine
evidence for disparities between three
ethnic groups within the ST category
(Katkari, Ka Thakur and Kokna) and
understand the dimensions of these dis-
parities (Mutatkar 2010). The article also
includes selected observations from field
visits to Katkari hamlets in Jawhar and
Mokhada talukas in Palghar district be-
tween July and September 2014. These
visits were carried out as part of a pilot
study on childhood poverty among STs.
Profile of Deprivation
The Katkari hamlet in the field study area
consisted of 90 households living in either
a kuccha house, or a pucca house con-
structed through a government scheme.
There were no self-constructed pucca
houses. The population here did not have
any sanitation facilities and engaged in
open defecation. They were dependent
on a well for drinking water. However, in
situations of water shortage, they used
water from open ditches particularly in
the monsoon season for other household
purposes. They used wood for cooking fuel
and had no electricity connections, though
a facility for the same did exist in the
vol lIi no 13
COMMENTARY
area. The high cost involved in installing
electricity metres as well as the irregular
and erratic tariffs they would have to pay
when a metre was installed, acted as a
disincentive. These households depended
on kerosene lamps, to be used sparingly
during meal times at night. A notable
feature of these houses was that they had
no fitted doors. When asked the reason
for this, a woman replied, there are no
doors, because there is nothing to steal.
The houses were almost bare inside,
without any consumer durables, except
for a couple of utensils, some clothes
hanging on a rope and hunting and fish-
ing equipment.
The Katkaris are a predominantly land-
less group dependent on wage labour for
their livelihoods. When asked about the
reason for their landlessness, a key infor-
mant among them replied,
Our people were historically never at-
tracted to agriculture, since in agriculture
you get returns only after a period of time,
as compared to wage labour, where you
get daily returns. By the time we realised the
importance of agriculture, it was too late
and all the land had already been taken up
by others.
They worked as agricultural labourers
for other landed ST ethnic groups in the
area, with the male members working as
attached labourers (known as gadi in the
local language, implying farm servants),
and women as daily wage labourers.
Even children worked in activities such as
cattle grazing as soon as they became
physically capable of working as agricul-
tural labourers.
Rice was the main crop cultivated in the
field study area along with other crops
such as ragi, udid (pulses) and khurasni
(a local variety of oilseed). Due to the
absence of irrigation facilities, agricultural
activities were dependent on rainfall and
there was no double-cropping. Due to lack
of adequate livelihood opportunities in the
region, the Katkaris migrated seasonally
in search of livelihood. The periods of
seasonal migration were between the
cultivation and harvesting periods for
rice and again in the post-agricultural
season. They pointed out that this was
migration for survival or food, as com-
pared to migration for cash wherein only
the males migrate. In the post-agricultural
season most households leave after the rice
27
COMMENTARY
harvesting operations and return only in
summer, before the onset of the next
monsoon season. During this period they
usually work for private contractors in
construction, stone-breaking and brick
kilns. They stay at the worksite during
these months, in a temporary shelter
constructed by them or in the under-
construction buildings in unhygienic living
conditions. Children who are physically
able to do so also assist their parents in
the work.
The Katkaris borrow for consumption
purposes either in the form of cash or
foodgrains, in situations of food shortage.
They purchased food items in piecemeal
quantities before every meal. During the
field study, I observed a Katkari woman
asking a grocer to sell her edible oil of
worth `1. The shopkeeper expressed his
inability to do so. I found that the Katkaris
depended on the public distribution
system (PDS) for their foodgrain require-
ments and purchased wheat, rice and
kerosene whenever they were available.
Their coping mechanisms for food short-
ages included liquefying and grinding the
food, so that a larger number of persons
can have it; consuming plant food grow-
ing in the wild, especially in the monsoon
period; borrowing food; and seasonal
migration. Data on anthropometric indi-
cators obtained from a voluntary organi-
sation disclosed that three-fourths of the
children in the hamlet were undernour-
ished. Morbidity among the Katkaris was
reported to be the highest during the
monsoon season, which was also the agri-
cultural season, when absence from work
due to any illness results in loss of wages
for daily wage labourers. They also faced
work-related injuries due to stone break-
ing without any protective gear. Many of
them reported splinters of stone lodging
in their limbs and even eyes in some cases
and said there was lack of healthcare
facilities in the region, especially spe-
cialised care for women and children.
A Vicious Cycle
The Katkari hamlet was exclusive in terms
of its demographic composition and the
social interaction with other tribal groups
was limited. They were regarded as lowest
in the social hierarchy by other STs in the
region, with people from other groups
28
even refusing to accept water and food
from them. The social atmosphere with-
in the hamlet was characterised by an
addiction to drinking and gambling.
The Katkaris attributed their initiation
into these activities to a life of continu-
ous struggle and misery from which
they saw no escape. It was observed that
they had a narrow geographical spread
of kinship networks, with no permanent
migration by anyone in the hamlet. Their
exposure to the mass media was also very
limited. As a result they were not even
aware of people from their own commu-
nity living in the neighbouring districts
of Maharashtra. This limited world view
also contributed to their perceptions and
attitudes regarding education.
The maximum education level in the
hamlet was below middle school level in
two-thirds of the households. The gross
enrolment ratio indicated that only
about half of the children in the school-
going age group were actually attending
school, with not much difference between
boys and girls. Qualitative data on per-
ceptions regarding education suggested
that the Katkaris were unable to relate
education to their immediate survival
concerns. An ascribed status of wage
labour also contributed towards a per-
ception that education had no utility value.
There were no success stories regarding
completion of education and as an instru-
ment of upward mobility among them.
Most of the children attended the zilla
parishad primary school in the hamlet,
and not the ashram shalas (residential
schools) set up by the government for
tribal children. During the field study I
came across cases of Katkari children
who had been enrolled in the residential
schools, running away to return home in
the hamlet. Other constraints to education
among the Katkaris included an opp-
ortunity cost of wage labour of children;
dropping out or low school attendance
due to seasonal migration; having to care
for younger siblings due to both parents
working; peer group effect of other
dropout children; and the low quality of
education in the government primary
school. The landed farmers of other ethnic
groups from the surrounding hamlets were
exclusively dependent on the Katkaris for
their labour requirements. Education and
april 1, 2017
upward mobility of the Katkari tribal
group went against the interest of such
farmers, as it would lead to a shortage
of labour.
The following are case studies to illus-
trate some of the points mentioned earlier.
N M (age 50) is one of the few persons in
the Katkari hamlet who perceives the
importance of education. He tried to
educate his son and daughter in the zilla
parishad school, but they dropped out in
the Class 7. N M says:
My father was a good man. But could not
afford to educate us. I really wanted to
educate my children and was willing to
incur any kind of debt for that. My children
attended the local zilla parishad school, but
due to the influence of the other children
who had dropped out they too stopped
going to school. Now I am facing the same
problem with my grandchildren. Children
who drop out are neither in a position to
get any job nor are they willing to work as
wage labourers. It would have been better
if we had been able to live outside this
hamlet among other educated ethnic groups.
At least our children would have imbibed
good values.
R B (age 45) owns a shop in the hamlet.
He is financially relatively better off than
other persons in the hamlet and abstains
from drinking alcohol or eating meat.
His elder son studied up to Class 4 in the
zilla parishad school, and up to Class 7 in
the neighbouring hamlets zilla parishad
school. He was later enrolled in an ashram
shala for further education. However,
within a month the boy ran away from
there and returned home. R B says:
My son refuses to say what has happened
and why he has returned home. I cannot
even beat him and force him to return. If his
mother asks him to do household work he
readily agrees, but he refuses to go back to
school. I do not know what to do.
The Katkari hamlets zilla parishad
primary schoolteacher illustrates some
of the problems relating to quality of
education in the school:
Earlier there were two teachers in the
Katkari zilla parishad school but one was
posted elsewhere since the number of chil-
dren was less than the minimum number
required for two teachers. So, I alone teach
all children in one classroom. Children are
provided textbooks and uniforms by the
school, but the school is not supposed to
provide notebooks or writing equipment.
This year uniforms have not arrived and
vol lIi no 13 EPW Economic & Political Weekly

children are wearing old clothes. Parents
often do not buy writing equipment for the
children and these children just come and
sit here unable to write anything. Due to
seasonal migration children are often ab-
sent even for examinations. But I am forced
to maintain at least a 50% pass ratio since I
am accountable to the higher authorities for
the studentss performance.
The government provides numerous
programmes and schemes for tribal deve-
lopment which are supposed to give prio-
rity to particularly vulnerable tribal groups.
The field study and subsequent field visits
to the region indicated that the Katkaris
have not been able to take advantage of
these programmes. During the field study
(when the Mahatma Gandhi National
Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme
or MGNREGS was yet to be implemented
in the region), the Katkari households
reported access to the state Employment
Guarantee Scheme (EGS) only in stone-
breaking activity and not in agriculture-
related work. They said that the number
of workdays available in the EGS was too
little to address their livelihood concerns.
Delays in receiving wage payments was
also perceived as a drawback of work in
the scheme, due to which people pre-
ferred to work for a private contractor.
Further field visits indicated that the
MGNREGS was now in operation in the
area, but for the Katkari households
this was not yet a dependable livelihood
option. This was because of their per-
ception regarding the uncertainty of the
timing and duration of work if provided
at all and also their past experiences in
delays in receiving payments due to not
having a bank account.
They were not yet aware of the demand-
based nature of the scheme based on a
rights approach and did not have confi-
dence in it being better than their past
experiences of working in public works
programmes. They feel that government
schemes are biased in favour of the landed
households and cited the example of the
EGS works, where only landed households
were eligible for horticulture schemes or
of the well irrigation scheme where a
household was eligible only if it possessed
a specified minimum quantity of land.
The Katkaris were categorised as
antyodaya (poorest among the poor) under
the governments poverty classification.
Economic & Political Weekly EPW april 1, 2017
The ration card certifying them to be
antyodaya and the tribe verification
certificate, certifying them to be STs were
perceived by them to be the most impor-
tant documents required for their survival.
They told me that the PDS had weakened
over time, since earlier it used to provide
pulses, edible oil and sugar, which was no
longer the case. They were not represented
in the local gram panchayat and they
firmly believed that government schemes
intended for them were diverted else-
where and taken advantage of by people
from other ST ethnic groups, including
those landowners for whom they were
working as attached labourers.
However, there was one in a nearby
hamlet with a smaller population which
was inhabited by those belonging to an-
other ST ethnic group. Later field visits
indicated that Katkari hamlets in the re-
gion now have mini-anganwadis, though
their activities remain confined to distri-
bution of occasional morning food sup-
plements. During the agricultural season,
since the parents are engaged in wage
labour there is no one to accompany the
children to the anganwadi. The seasonal
migration too affects the childrens at-
tendance at the anganwadi.
During the field study, key informants
from the Katkari community and their
local leaders expressed their perceptions
on development. Some of the quotes are
given below and provide insights into
the causes of their poverty, intergenera-
tional transmission of poverty and also
the required interventions.
Our forefathers were engaged in occupation
of catechu (kath) making. Then we started
making charcoal from forests working for
private contractors and now we break stones
for a living. We have always led a life of
dependency on others.
People from other ethnic groups call us
backward. But without land and without
education, how can we come forward?
Some people from other ethnic groups have
lot of uncultivated land. Even if our families
were to be given one acre each, we would
have something to live by.
Education is the only way for the landless to
come out of poverty.
The problem in our hamlet is that every-
one is a wage labourer. Even if one person
becomes a teacher, it will lead to spread of
education in the hamlet.
Katkari children attending ashram schools
are taunted by fellow students from other
vol lIi no 13
COMMENTARY
tribal groups. There should be a separate
ashram school for Katkari children.
Conclusions
The profile of deprivation among the
Katkari tribal group, based on the field
study, indicates the range of social and
economic processes because of which the
group has remained trapped in chronic
poverty. These processes have resulted in
ascribed deprivation among the children
with them being more likely to lead a life
of poverty and deprivation, because of
being born in that particular tribal group.
There are many ethnic groups in India
similar to the Katkaris, who are leading
a life of extreme poverty and deprivation
and are socially excluded from the deve-
lopment mainstream. These groups are
trapped in a vicious cycle of social, edu-
cational and economic backwardness.
Integrating them into the development
mainstream and preventing ascribed dep-
rivation among the children of such
groups will constitute a major challenge
in policy objectives. Classifying a particular
ethnic group as backward or a particular
household as poor will by itself not help
them to come out of poverty. What the
poor require are relief interventions to ad-
dress their immediate survival concerns
together with sustainable development in-
terventions which would reduce their de-
pendence on relief interventions. Develop-
ment interventions for the most deprived
sections of society, such as the Katkaris,
should be viewed from this perspective.
References
Government of Maharashtra (2014): Maharashtra
Human Development Report 2012: Towards
Inclusive Human Development, Sage Publications.
Mutatkar, Rohit (2010): Ethnic Group Identity and
Socio-Economic Outcomes among Scheduled
Tribes, Journal of the Indian Anthropological
Society, Vol 45, No 1, pp 737.
TISS (2015): A Tribal Atlas for Maharashtra, Tata
Institute of Social Sciences, Mumbai and
UNICEF, Maharashtra.
available at
Ideal Books
26/2082, Tutors Lane
Secretariat Statue
Thiruvananthapuram 695001,
Kerala
29
Liberal Approach to Inequality
Paramjit Singh
S
ince the 1980s growing inequality
has become a dominant political
and economic issue. During the
beginning of the present decade, the
Occupy Wall Street movement was one
of the major reactions against widening
inequality. Prior to Francois Bourguignons
book, there were two important books,
The Price of Inequality: How Todays Divided
Society Endangers Our Future (2012) by
Joseph Stiglitz and Capital in the Twenty-
First Century (2014) by Thomas Piketty.
These books have intensified the debate
around inequality. The Globalisation of
Inequality is another contribution to this
great debate. In this book, Bourguignon
is mainly concerned with the question of
whether globalisation is a cause of ine-
quality or not. Is the globalisation that
we see today sounding the death knell of
equality? If it continues, will it destroy
any hope of social justice? (p 2) In order
to address these questions, Bourguignon
makes a distinction between inequality
of standards of living between countries
and standards of living within countries.
Regarding globalisation, Stiglitz (2012)
pointed out that the problem, however,
is not that globalisation is bad or wrong,
but that governments are managing it so
poorly; largely for the benefit of special
interest groups. The interconnectedness of
people, countries, and economies around
the globe is a development that can be
used to promote prosperity, so as to
spread both greed and misery. The same
is true for the market economy. The
power of the market is enormous, but
has no inherent moral character. Like
Stiglitz, Bourguignon also agrees that
the poor management of globalisation is
one of the sole reasons behind widening
inequality. Excessive inequality has nega-
tive effects on economic efficiency and
individual welfare. More fundamentally,
however, the exclusive appropriation of
economic progress by small elite groups
will, after a point of time, and beyond a
30
book reviewS
The Globalisation of Inequality by Francois
Bourguignon, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2015;
pp 210, $27.95.
specific threshold, necessarily undermine
the stability of societies. If inequality keeps
increasing, there is a point at which even
a minor economic recession is likely to
trigger major social disruptions.
Great Inequality
Globalisation has caused two parallel
processes during the last 30 years or so.
The decline in inequality among the
average living standard developed and
emerging economies, along with a spec-
tacular rise in inequality within countries.
As far as global inequality is concerned,
the poorest 600 million in the world
have an average of $270 in disposable
income per year, while the richest 600
million have a standard of living above
$25,000. According to the World Bank,
the number of persons living on less than
$1.25 a day, the threshold of extreme
poverty was 1.3 billion in 2008, which is
approximately 20% of the world popula-
tion. With a less extreme definition of
poverty, $2.5 per day, the number is
three billion people in poverty; almost
half of humanity. Bourguignon writes:
examining the inequality at the global level
reveals a world that appears profoundly
unjust from the perspective of the implicit
criteria of social justice frequently invoked
in national policies. Economic inequality
has reached to a level far above what exists
today within most national communities. Is
it possible to imagine that a tenth of a na-
tions population could enjoy a standard of
living ninety times higher than other tenth?
Whats more, this inequality condemns
nearly half of humanity to poverty and has
made survival itself precarious for more
than a fifth of humanity. (p 24)
Quite interestingly and contrary to
many researchers on economic inequality,
Bourguignon points out that there is a
APRIL 1, 2017
narrowing of the gap between the richest
10% and poorest 10% from the 1990s
onwards, as compared to 1820 and 1980.
He tries to justify his argument with the
fact that, due to higher growth in China
and India (particularly during the 1990s
and afterwards),
the relative gap between rich 10 per cent and
poorest 10 per cent in the world as a whole
has shrunk from above ninety in 1990 to below
seventy in 2008. Whereas, the absolute dif-
ference in standard of living between these
two subgroups has grown about $10000 and
today stands at around $50000. (p 32)
One explanation for the decline in the
relative gap of average inequalities among
the countries, which the author largely
ignores, is that of capitalist globalisation.
Due to the globalisation of capital, capital
has rapidly moved towards developing
economies and has resulted in the accel-
eration of economic growth in some
select economies. No doubt, this move-
ment of capital has caused the decline in
inequality between countries. But the
other implication of this movement is
that the moved capital is highly concen-
trated in select areas and sectors, and
most of this capital is speculative in
nature. This has resulted in the rapid
growth of income for a small group,
leaving a majority of the population
either unaffected or negatively affected
by this process.
Regarding national inequality, Bour-
guignon argues that inequality within
countries increased slightly over the
course of the 19th century. It then dec-
lined between the end of World War I
and the post-World War II period until
the early 1950s. The real causes of the
decline in inequality have not been
properly addressed by Bourguignon. The
impressive reduction of inequality during
the 1950s was largely due to controlled
capitalism (based on the economic phi-
losophy of Keynes) in the United States
(US) and in Western Europe. The impor-
tant reason behind controlled capitalism
and declining inequality was the rise of
communist power in the Soviet Union
and China that forced capitalist countries
to initiate policies towards more egalit-
arianism. But after the 1970s onwards,
vol liI no 13 EPW Economic & Political Weekly

due to the rise of neo-liberal economic
thinking in the US and England, to solve
the problem of stagflation, a reverse move-
ment was set in motion. The disintegra-
tion of the Soviet Union, and Chinas move
towards a market economy strengthened
the belief in the market. The uncon-
trolled growth of capitalism along with
the internationalisation of capital played
a role in accelerating the process of ine-
quality. The rise in inequality has led to
striking disparities in the distribution of
the gains from growth. More specifically,
as Bourguignon points out, the top 10%
captured almost half of all the gains
from growth over the period of 30 years.
The situation in most high-income Organi-
sation for Economic Co-operation and
Development (OECD) countries is similar
to the U-shape curve observed for the US
during the 1970s and thereafter.
Inequality in standard of living also
went up in a large number of developing
countries. There was a rise in inequality
in China, where the Gini coefficient
increased from 0.28 to 0.42 between the
mid-1980s and the end of the 2000s. The
case is the same with India, Indonesia,
and Bangladesh. One common cause of
inequality among these economies was
the introduction of pro-market reforms.
Capitalist globalisation has caused the
retreat of the state from the distributional
sphere or in other words, market-driven
distribution caused the rise in inequality
in these countries. The share of gross
domestic product (GDP) that comes from
income from property or capital gains
has risen significantly over the course of
the last 30 years in most large developed
countries.
Taking the G7 countries as a whole, it has in-
creased almost continuously since 1970s. It
was 34 per cent in 1970 and rose to 38 per
cent by 2005. (p 56)
However, the evolution of wealth ine-
quality showed that the concentration of
wealth far exceeds that of income. In the
US, the richest 10% receives 40% of total
primary household income, but possesses
71% of total wealth. For the richest 1%,
the numbers are 15% and 35%. Looking
solely at the manufacturing sector of the
big emerging economies, we can none-
theless observe a rising trend in the
share of income from capital over the
Economic & Political Weekly EPW APRIL 1, 2017
last 20 years in China, India, South
Korea, Mexico, Turkey and several other
developing economies (p 57). The other
important and non-monetary aspect of
inequality, which most countries in the
world experienced is employment pre-
cariousness or the lack of decent jobs.
Fixed-term employment contracts, tem-
porary work or part-time work in devel-
oped countries and informalisation of
work with irregular working hours, low
earnings, and uncertain futures in de-
veloping countries are the signs of such
precariousness.
Unregulated Capitalism as Cause
The advocates of neo-liberalism contin-
uously propagate laissez-faire policies,
and justify that any re-distributional and
corrective measures against inequality
will cause economic inefficiency and
lower economic growth. They present
the trade-off between equality and eco-
nomic efficiency, and justify the rise in
inequality in the developing stage in
order to get higher more equal benefits
in the future. The growing openness in
the name of globalisation and economic
growth has caused the unregulated
movement of capital that has dramatically
transformed national economies across
the globe. These changes then would
seem to have played a primary role in
bringing about rising inequality in
national economies. The other factor
behind rising inequality in developed
and developing countries is all directly
tied to the market mechanism. The insti-
tutional change in the last quarter of the
20th century in the US by Ronald Reagan
and in the United Kingdom by Margaret
Thatchers government, and which later
spread to the rest of the world has signi-
ficantly contributed to the rise in level
of inequality.
The policy package of globalisation,
which developed countries introduced,
included the lower tax rate on big private
capital in developed countries. For exam-
ple, the highest marginal tax rate fell
from 70% to 40% in the US during the
Reagan administration. The effective
tax rate on the richest 1% dropped by
around 15 percentage points between
1970 and 2014. Along with this, there
were serious cuts in social protection in
vol liI no 13
BOOK REVIEW
the US and the United Kingdom and
other developed countries. All these re-
forms led to the rise in inequality. Along
with these reforms, privatisation and
deregulation in the name of efficiency
has contributed positively to the level
of inequality.
Bourguignon specifically discussed two
areas in which the introduction of dereg-
ulation has significantly contributed to
the level of inequality. First is deregula-
tion and globalisation of finance during
the 1980s, which resulted in the signifi-
cant rise in very high-income earners and
emerged as one of the dominant factors
for the current levels of inequality. The
other is the deregulation of the labour
market that has caused the drop in real
minimum wages and the weakening of
the power of labour and trade unions.
These changes have resulted in the rise in
wage inequality and, with certain spe-
cific types of income inequality as well.
During the 1980s, developing economies
have also undertaken important reforms
to their economic institutions, which were
imposed from the outside, notably in the
context of the structural adjustment
policies conditioned by international
financial institutions (the International
Monetary Fund or IMF and the World
Bank) in the aftermath of the debt crisis
of the 1980s (p 109). These structural
adjustment policies had higher social
costs in these countries. The introduc-
tion of unregulated market mechanisms
resulted in a substantial rise in the levels of
inequality in these countries. The trans-
formation of the public sector monopolies
into poorly regulated private monopolies
also allowed for the creation of new rent-
seeking and sometimes even the accu-
mulation of immense fortunes.
According to Bourguignon, globalisa-
tion and markets are not working in the
way that their proponents have claimed.
Globalisation is supposed to be fair and
markets are supposed to be efficient. But
both failed to deliver the desired results.
The uncontrolled spread of globalisation
policies and market mechanisms through-
out the world have resulted in the pro-
cess of polarisation of income and wealth.
Inequality between countries is surpassed
by the inequality within countries. The
internationalisation of global capital
31
BOOK REVIEW

(regardless of nationality) has divided
the global population into two classes
the super-rich and the masses. If the pre-
sent institutional framework remains,
Bourguignon like Piketty points out that
there will be a further increase in inequa-
lity in advanced countries due to contin-
uous increase of the wealth/income ratio.
Globalisation along with technological
revolution has strongly influenced income
distribution within nations and this is
likely to continue.
The Liberal Solution
Bourguignon like Stiglitz and Piketty
has suggested some liberal measures to
reduce inequality without questioning
its real roots. His research is usually ori-
ented towards finding means of fixing
capitalism rather than replacing it with
a more egalitarian system. Although
Piketty (2014) does agree with the fact
that capitalism automatically generates
arbitrary and unsustainable inequalities
that radically undermine the meritocratic
values on which democratic societies are
based, like Bourguignon, he also be-
lieves that democracy can regain control
over the uncontrolled working of capi-
talism and ensures that the general
interest takes precedence over private
interests, while preserving economic
openness and avoiding protectionist and
nationalist reactions. In order to reduce
inequality among countries, Bourguignon
identifies some liberal channels. Devel-
opmental aid from rich countries to the
poor ones is considered a direct instru-
ment of international redistribution. But
he does agree with the fact that it is not
an effective measure as rich countries
allocate only about 0.35% of their gross
national income of around $130 billion
in total, towards developmental aid or
official development assistance to poor
countries. The other problem with deve-
lopment aid is its efficient utilisation,
which is dependent on governance and
administration in poor countries. Besides
international aid, there are certain other
channels of redistribution. The indirect
modes of transfers such as trade, migra-
tion, and movement of capital can play a
positive role for convergence between
rich and poor countries. But the discrim-
inatory policy of developed countries
against the products of poor countries
emerges as one of the important con-
straints of fair globalisation. The restric-
tions placed by the rich countries have
a negative effects on the standard of liv-
ing in poor countries. The World Trade
Organization continues to fail to provide
favourable market access to products
from poor countries. The other constraint
to fair globalisation is restrictions on
the free movement of labour into rich
countries, which can play a positive role
to reduce poverty in poor countries.
In the next part of the book, Bourgui-
gnon explains some popular measures
to reduce national inequalities. Like
Piketty, he also explained redistribution
through taxation and transfers as one
of the effective instruments to reduce
national inequality. The higher tax rate
on dividend and capital gains can play
an important role to reduce the gap betw-
een the rich and poor. In the present
phase of globalisation, international co-
ordination for taxation is necessary to
help correct for rising inequalities. Re-
ducing the intergenerational transmission
of wealth through adequate taxation

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32 APRIL 1, 2017 vol liI no 13 EPW Economic & Political Weekly


should prevent the perpetuation of
inequalities from one generation to the
next. According to Bourguignon, taxing
inheritance would be a useful instru-
ment to enable equality of opportunities.
But emerging economies like China,
India, Argentina and Mexico do not tax
inheritance even though the distribu-
tion of wealth is far more unequal in
these countries than in many developed
countries.
The other measure to enhance equality
along with efficiency and growth is equal-
ity of opportunities, particularly educa-
tional opportunities. In developing or
emerging economies, a significant corre-
lation exists between the level of educa-
tion and level of living. Educational poli-
cies can play a significant role to enhance
equality among these economies. But the
retreat of the state under the guidance
of international institutions (World Bank
and IMF) and government of developed
countries has serious implications for the
equality of educational opportunities.
Uncontrolled privatisation has resulted
Understanding Education and
Its Role in Empowerment
Mihika Shah
E
ducation plays a catalytic role in
the socio-economic development
of a nation. It enables the uplift-
ment and transformation of a society by
empowering weaker sections to take
hold of their circumstances, overcome
limitations, and change their life for the
better. Education has acquired a place of
importance in the development agenda
of India. India has toiled to increase its
literacy rate from approximately 18% in
1951 to 74% in 2011 (GoI 2011). While there
has been a surge in the rate of literacy, it
is pertinent to note that opportunities for
both education and development have
not been distributed evenly across the
country. While education enables the
oppressed to get empowered and over-
come inequalities in society, the process
of education has by itself internalised
Economic & Political Weekly EPW APRIL 1, 2017
in the commoditisation of education and
health facilities, which has further deep-
ened the extent of inequality.
Bourguignon, Stiglitz and Piketty,
more or less, belong to the same eco-
nomic tradition. They do not accept the
inherent nature of the working of capi-
talism as the real cause of inequality
and other evils. Rather, they refer to the
uncontrolled working of capitalism as
the real cause. They agree that there is
a need to control the working of capita-
lism through active state and institu-
tional interventions, and that this is the
best solution to build an equal society.
But in reality, problems such as inequality,
unemployment, informalisation, depri-
vation, and commoditisation are not
temporary, but structural ones. These
problems are an integral part of the ac-
cumulation process of capitalist globali-
sation. If we really want to build an
egalitarian society, instead of fixing capi-
talism, efforts are required to search for
an alternative economic system. Intel-
lectuals, who believe that state and
Education and Empowerment in India: Policies
and Practices edited by Avinash Kumar Singh,
Routledge: South Asia, 2016; pp 403, ` 1,050, hardcover.
some of these inequalities, thereby rein-
forcing and reproducing them (Bourdieu
and Passeron 1977). Thus, the relation-
ship between education and empower-
ment is not linear.
Education and Empowerment in India:
Policies and Practices, edited by Avinash
Kumar Singh, is a rich and thought-
provoking volume that explores the link-
ages between education and empowerment
of the disadvantaged sections of Indian
society, including women, minorities,
Scheduled Castes (SCs) and Scheduled
Tribes (STs). It examines changes in educa-
tional policies pertaining to the margin-
alised sections, since independence, and
vol liI no 13
BOOK REVIEW
institutional interventions can serve to
control the inequality and other evils of
capitalist society must remember Joan
Robinsons (1936) comment
any government which has the power and
will to remedy the major defects of the capi-
talist system would have the will and power
to abolish it altogether, while governments
which have power to retain the system lack
the will to remedy its defects.
While dealing with the structural problems
of capitalist system one must remember
this insight.
Paramjit Singh (paramjiteco@yahoo.com)
teaches at the Department of Economics,
Panjab University, Chandigarh.
References
Piketty, T (2014): Capital in the Twenty-First Century,
Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard Uni-
versity Press.
Robinson, J (1936): The Trade Cycles by R F Har-
rod, Book Review, Economic Journal, Vol 46,
No 184.
Stiglitz, J (2012): The Price of Inequality: How Todays
Divided Society Endangers Our Future, London:
Penguin Books.
analyses some innovative educational
projects in India aimed at spreading edu-
cation among them. The book is a com-
pilation of papers authored by distin-
guished academics and scholars in the
field of education and presented at a re-
search seminar named after Anil Bordia,
a strong advocate of and contributor to
the empowerment of the marginalised
through education.
The volume comprises 20 chapters
classified into five parts. It covers theo-
retical perspectives and empirical find-
ings to highlight the linkages between
education and empowerment. The volume
opens with a survey of the important
thinkers of education and empowerment,
including Karl Marx, John Dewey, and
Paulo Freire. This is followed by a sec-
tion which demonstrates inequalities in
access to education in India, specifically
faced by the girl child, minorities and
Adivasis. The book traces changes in
educational policies pertaining to the
weaker sections of society, and raises
concerns over the challenges in enhanc-
ing adolescent and adult education in
the country. The volume also presents
33
 Call for Papers
BOOK REVIEW

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Conference Organizer: ICEFR-2017 Co- Conference Organizer: ICEFR-2017
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Cochin University of Science and Technology
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Productivity Household Behavior and Family Economics Human Resource Industrial and Manufacturing Engineering Information Management Information Systems
Information Technology Management Innovation and management issues within multinational corporations Innovation and Management of Renewable Resources Innovation
and Technology Management Innovation for low-income markets and social innovation Innovation for sustainable development Innovation in services, logistics and supply-
chain management Innovation Policy and Management Innovation, Management and Technology Intellectual property and knowledge management Intellectual Property
Right and Patent International Business International Economics International Finance Islamic Finance and Banking Knowledge Management Labor Economics Labor
Relations & Human Resource Management Law and Economics Law and Economics Logistics and Scheduling Management Information Systems Management Science
Market Structure and Pricing Marketing Research and Strategy Measurement of Economic and Social Performance Operations Research Organizational Behavior &
Theory Organizational Communication Prices, Business Fluctuations, and Cycles Product Management Production and Organizations Production/Operations Management
Public Administration and Small Business Entrepreneurship Public Choice Public Economics Public Economics and Finance Public Finance Public Relations Public
Responsibility and Ethics Regional Economic Development Regulatory Economics Resource Management Risk and Security Management Six Sigma and Quality
Management Strategic Management Strategic Management Policy Stress Management Supply Change Management Sustainable Innovation and Technology Incubation
Systems Management Systems Thinking Taxes (related areas of taxes) Technological Change; Research and Development Technology & Innovation Time Management
Total Quality Management Tourism and Hospitality Management Transparency and Accountability Travel/Transportation/Tourism Welfare Economics
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International Journal of Applied Business and Economic Research ISSN: 0972-7302 International Journal of Economic Research ISSN: 0972-9380
University Grant Commission, Govt. of India: UGC Approved Journal 2017
MR. VIJAY JHA PROF. P. ARUNACHALAM
Conference Organizer: ICEFR-2017 Co- Conference Organizer: ICEFR-2017
Academic Research Foundation
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www.arfc.co.in Department of Applied Economics
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New Delhi 110 002, India KOCHI 22 (Kerala)

34 APRIL 1, 2017 vol liI no 13 EPW Economic & Political Weekly


directions in which future policies need
to be oriented, so as to enable weaker
sections to access education and benefit
from it. The volume elaborates on some
innovative educational programmes con-
ducted in India, including the Shiksha
Karmi Project and Lok Jumbish Project.
Comparisons of the provisions of some
of these programmes have been made
with the Right of Children to Free and
Compulsory Education (RTE) Act, 2009,
highlighting the scope to enhance RTE
provisions and increase their efficacy.
Educational Policies
The volume discusses the limitations of
educational policies for the marginalised
and the amendments made in them over
time, providing a temporal flow to the
understanding of the development of edu-
cation in India. In Chapter 8 (pp 14056),
Ratna M Sudarshan discusses several
policy documents pertaining to girls edu-
cation since independence. What clearly
emerges is a gradual shift, in time, in
policymakers perspectives towards the
relevance of education for girls. Policy
documents of the late 1940s and 1950s
reveal a differentiated curriculum for boys
and girls wherein education for girls, as
distinct from boys, should be aimed at
nurturing them to perform domestic
duties. This continued until 1978 when
the report of the committee for adult
education programmes for women ap-
pointed by the Ministry of Education
and Social Welfare was released. The
report highlighted the discrimination
practised by communities and planners/
administrators towards girls education,
and recognised the economic and pro-
ductive roles of women in the labour
force. Further, the National Policy on
Education 1986 brought about a radical
change by declaring that education
would be used as an agent for improving
the condition of women.
In order to overcome the vast disparities
in access to educational opportunities, a
need for affirmative policies has been
raised in different contexts. In Chapter 7
(pp 12639), Zoya Hasan describes the
difficulties faced by Muslim youth in
access to education as well as in securing
employment. In order to facilitate their
education, she asserts that affirmative
Economic & Political Weekly EPW APRIL 1, 2017
policies targeting Muslims would be most
beneficial. Affirmative policies have sur-
vived judicial scrutiny and are the need
of the hour to bridge inequalities in op-
portunities to education among Muslims.
The need for affirmative action in higher
education, to benefit the disadvantaged
sections is further raised by Kumar
Suresh in Chapter 18 (pp 34562).
It can be argued at this point that the
disadvantaged sections cannot be com-
pletely demarcated along the lines of
geospatial setting, gender, religion or
caste, as has been done in the volume. At
the micro level, several social (dis)privi-
leges run deep into the demographic
terrain and it is important to look beyond
these common indicators of social dis-
advantage to locate other kinds of diffi-
culties faced by students, not belonging
to the commonly identified disadvan-
taged sections. For example, the lack of
guidance and information about avail-
able educational opportunities, family
problems like disharmony at home, ab-
sence of parental guidance/support are
some difficulties that hamper the progress
of students.
To overcome such difficulties an impor-
tant step had been taken by the Kendriya
Vidyalaya Sangathan (KVS) Board of
Governors in 2013. A circular was issued
by the KVS to the central schools to ap-
point an educational counsellor for sec-
ondary and senior secondary sections of
every school. Such counsellors should
be able to reach out to both low as well as
high-scoring students, help them man-
age their time and study habits, manage
stress and fear of exams, and help them
work on communication skills. The coun-
sellor is also expected to give career
counselling to the students (Nair 2013).
The volume should have captured such
initiatives and their outcomes.
Concerns over Quality
In order to promote talent at the nation-
al level it is important to ensure quality
in education delivery and infrastructure
at all levels. Although a separate chap-
ter has not been devoted to this aspect,
concerns have been raised in different
chapters in this regard. In Chapter 1,
Dipankar Gupta (pp 2332) has high-
lighted the inadequacy of the provisions
vol liI no 13
BOOK REVIEW
under the RTE Act 2009 for restricting
the liability of the state on the enrolment
of children into schools and not taking it
forward to ensure quality of education.
K L Sharma, in Chapter 2 (pp 3453)
highlights that today we live in a glo-
balised and liberal world, and thus, edu-
cational content should be drafted to in-
clude global/comprehensive knowledge
and critical evaluation, in order to be
concurrent and relevant.
Educational Programmes
The volume explains the challenges to the
even spread of education and solutions
generated by some of the most innovative
educational programmes in the country
the Bihar Education Project Council, Lok
Jumbish Project, Shiksha Karmi Project,
Mahila Samakhya Programme to quote a
few. These programmes and their ap-
proaches are analysed contextually to
identify factors that contributed to their
success as also the challenges that hin-
dered progress.
The Shiksha Karmi Project of Rajasthan
has been discussed in Chapter 10 (pp 179
204) by Vimala Ramachandran, and in
Chapter 11 (pp 20523) by Shobhita
Rajagopal. The project, funded by the
Swedish International Development
Agency (SIDA), achieved a balance be-
tween government legitimacy and auto-
nomy in operations and worked towards
spreading literacy to the backward and
remote areas of Rajasthan. It was suc-
cessful in mobilising the community on
the issue of unavailability of teachers in
rural areas, by educating and nurturing
local people with basic education, to
become teachers or Shiksha Karmi to
teach in rural schools. The project was
reviewed biannually and necessary
changes were incorporated. Many inno-
vative programmes were conducted under
the Shiksha Karmi ProjectMuktangan
(a flexible programme for education of
available at
Gyan Deep
Near Firayalal, H. B. Road
Ranchi 834 001,
Jharkhand
Ph: 0651-2205640
35
BOOK REVIEW

tribal children), Mahila Shikshan Vihar
(residential course for out-of-school girls/
women above 15 years of age), Balika
Shikshan Shivir (residential course for
out-of-school girls above nine years of age,
to facilitate their re-entry into formal
education), strengthening of madrasas,
and institutionalisation of Sahaj Shiksha
Kendra (a non-formal education pro-
gramme to cater to the needs of working
children) (p 186).
An important segment of education
programmes which has not been men-
tioned in the volume is that of open
schools, and universities/institutions of
open and distance learning. These have
an advantage over full-time educational
institutions as they provide education to
the remotest regions in the country. As
per 2010 statistics, about 5,24,000 stu-
dents appeared for Class X examinations,
and 3,05,000 appeared in Class XII ex-
amination through open schooling. The
passing percentage of students at both
these levels was a little above 50%, but
below the overall national percentage by
25 percentage points (GoI 2016). There is
a need to study the reasons for poor
performance, and bring about necessary
improvements to help enhance students
learning and achievements under open
schooling.
Similarly, open education at the univer-
sity level is offered by the Indira Gandhi
National Open University, in addition to
numerous regular universities offering
distance education in addition to their
normal full-time courses. As of 201415,
out of the total number of students pur-
suing higher education, nearly 11% stu-
dents were enrolled in distance education
programmes numbering 3.8 million ap-
proximately (GoI 2016). This indicates that
distance education programmes play a
significant role at the national level in
reaching out to students who cannot
pursue full-time higher education. In the
context of understanding educational
programmes to enhance the education
of the weaker sections, the segment of
open schools and distance learning is an
important area which caters to a consid-
erable proportion of the population, but
has not received due attention in the
volume.
In recent times, use of technology seems
promising in overcoming the hurdles
to access education. Use of electronic
media as a channel to dissipate know-
ledge has been identified as a means to
spread education, and a few steps have
been taken in this direction, including
making textbooks published by the
National Council of Educational Research
and Training, and educational videos
available on the internet and on the
Gyan Darshan television channel. There
is a huge potential to further explore the
digital media space to further the cause
of education.
Mihika Shah (mihikashah.93@gmail.com) is
a chemical engineer by training and former
researcher of science education.
References
Bourdieu, P and J C Passeron (1977): Reproduction
in Education, Society and Culture, London: Sage.
GoI (2011): Census 2011: Provisional Population
Totals, New Delhi: Office of the Registrar Gen-
eral and Census Commissioner, Ministry of
Home Affairs, Government of India.
(2016): Educational Statistics at a Glance
(201415), New Delhi: Department of School
Education and Literacy, Ministry of Human Re-
source Development, Government of India.
Nair, P V (2013): KV Schools to Appoint Career
Counsellors, Times of India, 10 April, http://
timesofindia.indiatimes.com/home/education/
news/KV-schools-to-appoint-career-counsel-
lors/articleshow/19468691.cms, on 27 March
2017.

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36 APRIL 1, 2017 vol liI no 13 EPW Economic & Political Weekly
PERSPECTIVES
Safai Karamcharis in a
Vicious Cycle
A Study in the Perspective of Caste
Pradeep S Salve, Dhananjay W Bansod, Hemangi Kadlak
A study of 360 safai karamcharis
employed with the Municipal
Corporation of Greater Mumbai
suggests that policies aimed at
uplifting conservancy work may
actually be institutionalising
caste-based occupations. This
article describes the situation
that keeps generations of safai
karamcharis in this occupation,
and recommends practical
solutions to break the
vicious cycle.
The authors are grateful to Anand Teltumbde,
writer and civil rights activist with the
Committee for the Protection of Democratic
Rights, Mumbai, for his useful suggestions.
Pradeep S Salve (pradeep8889@gmail.com) is
a doctoral fellow at the International Institute
for Population Sciences, Mumbai; Dhananjay
W Bansod is an associate professor at IIPS; and
Hemangi Kadlak is a PhD scholar at the Tata
Institute of Social Sciences, Mumbai.
Economic & Political Weekly EPW APRIL 1, 2017
T
his article explores contemporary
structural problems facing safai
karamcharis,1 revealing the ways in
which government policy itself keeps
generations of workers in this occu-
pation. The article also demonstrates
the governments inadequate implemen-
tation of social welfare laws and policies
developed for the upliftment of safai
karamcharis.
The occupation of safai karamchari
exists in every town and city in India.
The Municipal Corporation of Greater
Mumbai (MCGM) has 28,821 safai karam-
charis listed as regular employees. Their
work involves manually cleaning roads
and footpaths, collecting waste from
community dustbins and disposing it in
garbage compactors or dumping grounds
and landfill sites. This article is based on
data collected from a survey conducted
among 360 safai karamcharis in six of
the 24 municipal wards of the MCGM
between March and September 2015.
It details the different but interlinked
components of the vicious cycle that
keeps generations of safai karamcharis in
the same profession. The first component
is caste. The second is addiction, with
almost all safai karamcharis addicted to
tobacco chewing, smoking, alcohol or
other substances in order to cope with
their work. Health is the third component.
Deterioration of health results in absen-
teeism at the workplace, which causes
indebtedness, the fourth component. The
fifth component is government policies,
and the final component is the attitude of
safai karamcharis towards themselves and
their occupation. Government policies
prompt new generations of safai karam-
charis to take up this occupation, and
the other factors give them a further
push. Thus, the vicious cycle continues.
vol liI no 13
The article concludes by recommending
measures to break this vicious cycle to
liberate future generations of safai karam-
charis from this work.
Caste
Caste is the primary factor contributing
to the vicious cycle. History offers evidence
of caste pushing marginalised commu-
nities (the lower castes) into serving the
upper castes through menial occupations
such as sweeping, cleaning and sanitation
work (Enthoven 1920; Shyamlal 1997).
This work is performed by different caste
groups and communities throughout
India. For instance, the Bhangi, Mehtar,
Chohra/Chura castes in Gujarat, Maha-
rashtra, Madhya Pradesh, Himachal
Pradesh, Jammu and Kashmir and
Rajasthan; the Chachati and Paky castes
in Andhra Pradesh and Puducherry; and
the Halalkhor, Lalbegi and Mehtar
castes in Assam, Bihar, Uttar Pradesh,
Odisha, West Bengal and Nagaland
(Sarkar 1984). The names may sound
different, but all of them are at the bottom
of the caste hierarchy.
This study reveals that almost 90% of
safai karamcharis in the MCGM belong to
the Scheduled Castes (SCs) and Other
Backward Classes. Castes like the Mahar,
Matang, Meghwal, Harijan, Valmiki and
Chambhar dominate, whereas others
like Kathewadi, Kunbi, Vadar and Dev-
endrakulathan are found in smaller
numbers.
Safai karamcharis in Mumbai come
from various parts of India, including
Rajasthan, Uttar Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh,
Gujarat, Andhra Pradesh and Maharash-
tra. It is believed that they came to the
city at the beginning of the 19th century
during the famine of 1803, which drove
a vast number of people from the
Konkan and Deccan to Bombay to seek
employment (Darokar 2009). Migration
during this period was mainly based on
caste and religion. The majority of the
SCs who migrated to Mumbai were avail-
able as cheap labourers to do dehuman-
ising conservancy work. Our study re-
veals that the majority of safai karam-
charis in Mumbai are from Maharashtra,
followed by Gujarat, Tamil Nadu and
37
PERSPECTIVES
Uttar Pradesh. A large number of safai
karamcharis come from Marathwada
and the western region of Maharashtra,
followed by Vidarbha. Districts like
Ahmednagar, Ratnagiri, Jalna, Beed,
Nanded and Sangli in Maharashtra rep-
resent the highest number of safai kara-
mcharis in the MCGM.
Conservancy work in many municipal
corporations in Maharashtra has become
a hereditary occupation, continued from
one generation to another through the
varsa hakka (a phrase that means
hereditary right in Marathi) system.
The LadPage Committee recommended
in 1972 that municipal corporations should
adopt preferential treatment in recruit-
ment of conservancy staff in order to
empower safai karamcharis economically.
Under this system, a conservancy work-
er can nominate his wife, son/brother,
unmarried or widowed daughter/sister,
or any other dependent to the post of
safai karamchari after his retirement,
death or permanent disability. This sys-
tem has been fiercely debated on many
public forums, with proponents of varsa
hakka holding that the system secures
the safai karamcharis economic welfare
while some social activists strongly con-
demn it as a casteist and regressive move
that perpetuates the centuries-old caste
system. This system has been in place
since 1975, resulting in generations of
workers doing this stigmatised and haz-
ardous work without adequate protec-
tive gear. Critics of the varsa hakka system
allege that the casteist mindset of the
government has institutionalised conserv-
ancy work and not led to the economic
and social empowerment of safai karam-
charis. In our study, we found that more
than three-fourths (77.2%) of safai karam-
charis are second- or third-generation
workers. Nine out of 10 have adopted
this occupation after their fathers re-
tirement or death and only 5% took their
mothers place.
Addiction
The nature of work, the places of work and
the lack of basic facilities at the work-
place affect safai karamcharis physically
and psychologically, and substance abuse
is a way of coping with their situation.
Large numbers of karamcharis reported
38
unavailability of essential amenities at
the workplace. More than half (53%) of
the karamcharis reported that there is
no potable water, toilet, and adequate
seating at the reporting places (called
chowkis). The absence of water at the
workplace makes it difficult to maintain
hygiene. Often, there is no water availa-
ble for the karamcharis to clean them-
selves after returning from work. Some
of the workplaces have facilities but these
are grossly inadequate. For example,
79% of workers reported that they had
toilet facilities, but the condition of the
toilets was awful. Once karamcharis
leave the chowki, they work for eight
hours without a break. They do not have
a proper lunch break, and eat only after
finishing work. Consumption of tobacco
and alcohol is very high among safai
karamcharis. Alcohol provides an an-
aesthetic and the majority of them drink
early in the morning. As many as 61% of
karamcharis were found to be habitual
or daily drinkers. Around 45% are smok-
ers, while 46% chew tobacco. It is
necessary for us to have alcohol before
engaging in our work; otherwise it is not
possible to work continuously, said a
45-year-old sweeper.
Health
The nature of work and the addictions
make safai karamcharis vulnerable to
communicable and non-communicable
diseases. Official data of deaths during
service was obtained from the MCGM.
Interviews were conducted to obtain
the socio-economic and health informa-
tion of the 360 safai karamcharis. To
identify the diagnosed causes of death,
100 family members who had lost their
breadwinners in the previous three
years were interviewed at their place
of residence.
Safai karamcharis contract bacterial
infections that affect the skin, eyes, limbs
and respiratory and gastrointestinal sys-
tems. The survey covered self-reported
diseases. More than one-third (34.2%)
of the karamcharis reported lacerations
caused by needles and broken glass in the
garbage bins in the previous six months.
Almost one-fifth (18.6%) had suffered a
skin disease in the previous six months,
19.2% eye infections, and 23.3% respiratory
APRIL 1, 2017
tract infections. A large number of karam-
charis had suffered from musculoskeletal
disorders (45.5%) during the previous
12 months. Musculoskeletal pain in the
lower back, shoulders, wrists/hands,
and hips/thighs was common. With
advancing age and years of service, the
risk of non-communicable diseases among
the safai karamcharis increased: 18 karam-
charis were diagnosed with diabetes, 29
had high blood pressure, and 19 were
diagnosed with tuberculosis (TB).
Officially reported data show that
sanitation work is turning into a death-
trap for safai karamcharis in Mumbai.
According to data, between 1996 and
2006, 2,039 safai karamcharis died dur-
ing service in 14 out of 24 municipal wards
(Times of India 2006) and 1,940 deaths
were reported from 2006 to 2014 in 24
municipal wards. Thus, over 18 years,
3,979 safai karamcharis of the MCGM
died. In 2004, 288 karamcharis died in
service. In 2009, this number was 299,
and in 2014 it came down to 107 (Table 1).
The mean age of workers at the time
of death was recorded as 58 years. The
absolute number of deaths has been
decreasing among safai karamcharis over
the years, but is still high when com-
pared to other occupations. The average
annual death rate among safai karam-
charis is 9 per 1,000 compared to 6.7
deaths per 1,000 among the general
population (Registrar General 2016).
Table 1: Number of Deaths of Safai Karamcharis
in Mumbai Municipal Corporation over a 10-year
Period
Year Deaths
2004 288
2005 246
2006 247
2007 246
2008 294
2009 299
2010 322
2011 264
2012 222
2013 186
2014 107
Total 2,721
Source: Compiled by the authors from official data of the
Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai.
Safai karamcharis suffer the dual
burden of communicable and chronic
non-communicable diseases. TB, heart
disease, cancer and liver diseases are
the leading causes of death among safai
vol liI no 13 EPW Economic & Political Weekly

karamcharis (Table 2). The nature of
work, irregular eating schedules and al-
coholism enhance the risk of TB and
other diseases. Given that they begin
work early in the morning, the safai
karamchari hardly gets time for break-
fast and goes to work with just a glass of
water or tea.
Table 2: Reported Causes of Death among
Safai Karamcharis
Cause of Death Number
Tuberculosis 34
Heart disease 21
Liver disease 10
Cancer 10
Stroke 7
Road accident 5
AIDS 5
Hepatitis B 3
Kidney disease 3
Suicide 2 is due to the repayment of formal or
Total 100
Source: Analysed by authors from certified causes of death
as reported by families of the deceased.
While the nature of work adversely
affects their health, few safai karam-
charis seek treatment. Government hos-
pitals and doctors are supposed to give
priority attention to safai karamcharis,
but this does not happen. The lack of
proper health facilities and overcrowd-
ing at these hospitals result in delayed
provision of healthcare. We go to the
municipal hospital for treatment, but the
doctors dont pay attention to us as they
think we dont have any option. There is
no use going to these hospitals because
we often have to buy all the medicines
from external pharmacies and get the
diagnostic tests done from an external
lab. Why should we go there? Only to
save the doctors fee?, says a 42-year-old
safai karamchari, cured of TB. The mu-
nicipal corporation earlier organised an-
nual medical check-ups for safai karam-
charis, but roughly two-thirds (61%) of
the karamcharis surveyed reported not
having gone for any medical check-up
organised by the corporation over the
previous five years.
Debt
Illiteracy or low levels of education are
high among safai karamcharis. About
12% of the surveyed population have
never gone to school at all and only 40%
have more than 10 years of schooling. A
Economic & Political Weekly EPW APRIL 1, 2017
majority of workers said they had to take
up sanitation work because they had
little or no education. During data collec-
tion, we observed that many young peo-
ple with a higher education have entered
this occupation. Addiction and health
problems cause high rates of absenteeism
at work, which means less salary for the
safai karamcharis. To meet family and
social commitments, they often take loans
from formal (banks) or informal (money-
lenders) sources. This pushes them into
debt. Despite earning a regular salary,
we found a considerable gap bet ween
the gross and net salary of safai karam-
charis. While 48% of workers have a
gross salary of more than `20,000, almost
three-fourths (73%) reported that they
get less than `12,000 net salary. This gap
informal loans. Almost 39% of safai
karamcharis reported having borrowed
money from the makadwallas (commu-
nity of moneylenders) for their own or a
family members marriage. To maintain
their social status in the community,
safai karamcharis tend to spend more
than they earn. Hence, they borrow
from the makadwallas or any local
moneylender. Neither the makadwallas
nor the safai karamcharis maintain
written records of their transactions.
We learnt that safai karamcharis are
frequently harassed or beaten by money-
lenders because of delays in repayment.
Sometimes the situation turns life-thre-
atening. A 40-year-old widow of a safai
karamchari, who also lost her son, said,
After the accidental death of my husband at
the workplace, my 22-year-old son took his
place as a safai karamchari. He was threat-
ened by the makadwallas to repay the loan
taken by his father. He took a loan from an-
other makadwalla to repay the first loan,
which was a big one so we could not manage
to repay it at once. Then both makadwallas
started harassing him for payment of in-
terest. I was not aware of any of this until I
visited his work chowki one day. I told both
the makadwallas that only if you allow him
to work will we be able to repay your loans.
If you continue to trouble him, I will go to
the police. He worked hard for more than six
months, but he was troubled by them every
day. He wanted to go to college to complete
his graduation, but I convinced him to go
for the job as we had no option. One day he
came late from work and was tense as there
had been a dispute at the workplace. That
vol liI no 13
PERSPECTIVES
same night, he committed suicide. These
makadwallas murdered him. They should
have understood our situation.
Policy
The fifth component of the vicious cycle
in which safai karamcharis are trapped
is the institutionalisation of conservancy
work by the government. There are three
elements involved in this. The first is
caste-based recruitment. The second is
the system of varsa hakka. The third is
temporary ownership of a house. The
recruitment process is based on caste
and varsa hakka further ensures that
this work is carried out only by certain
castes. This argument is supported by
the decision of the social justice depart-
ment of Maharashtra which ordered all
its municipal corporations to recruit only
Mehtar, Bhangi, Valmiki, and other SCs as
safai karamcharis under the varsa hakka
policy (Government of Maharashtra 2015).
Housing is a critical constraint in a city
like Mumbai. The government provides
safai karamcharis temporary housing
during their tenure, and they have
to surrender the house on retirement.
Even though these houses lack proper
amenities, the karamcharis prefer them
because most of them are migrants who
find it difficult to arrange better shelter
in the city. In order to retain the house
even after retirement, they usually get
another family member to join this oc-
cupation. However, since very few (only
4%) lived in government housing, this
factor is not so significant in pushing
people into sanitation work.
Some other policies also compound
the problems of sanitation workers. The
Obituaries
The EPW has started a section, Obituaries,
which will note the passing of individuals
who have made a difference to society,
including teachers, researchers and social
activists.
The announcements will be in the nature
of short notices about the work and
careers of those who have passed away.
Readers could send brief obituaries to
edit@epw.in.
39
PERSPECTIVES
provision of protective gear to safai
karamcharis under the Prohibition of
Employment as Manual Scavengers and
Their Rehabilitation Act, 2013 exists only
on paper (Government of India 2013).
The municipal corporation fails to pro-
vide protective gear regularly. The safai
karamcharis surveyed reported that the
equipment provided is of poor quality,
wrong sizes and uncomfortable to use
while working. Delay in providing pro-
tective gear is a common problem across
all municipal corporations. For example,
karamcharis reported that rain suits are
delivered when the monsoon season is
over. Municipal officials told us that under
various social welfare schemes, safai
karamcharis are entitled to medical
claims for family, housing facilities and
scholarships for children every year.
However, the implementation of these
welfare programmes is poor. Besides, a
majority of the karamcharis were found
to be unaware of, or outside the ambit
of, these schemes because of the difficult
paperwork required. This study found
New in EPWRF India Time Series
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40
that only 4% of karamcharis reported
that they were availing the housing
facility and only 3% agreed that they
had benefited from scholarships for their
children. To access the housing facility, a
safai karamchari has to fulfil the condi-
tion of working for at least 25 years in a
municipal corporation, which excludes
the majority of workers.
It appears that the government does
not want the continued liability of full-
time safai karamcharis. Therefore, it has
introduced the practice of outsourcing
this work. The condition of safai karam-
charis working as contract labourers in
the municipal corporation through non-
governmental organisations (NGOs) is
worse than that of the permanent karam-
charis. Contract workers are paid as
little as `250 per day. They have no guar-
antee of regular work, as they are often
required only to fill in for regular work-
ers. Irregular work, low wages and
cleaning of hazardous waste affect the
life of the contract worker. The perma-
nent staff and the contract labourers do
APRIL 1, 2017
the same job for eight hours, but they are
not eligible for similar benefits.
Safai karamcharis appreciate recent
government initiatives like the Swachh
Bharat Abhiyan to raise peoples aware-
ness of cleanliness. In India, cleanliness
has more to do with cultural notions of
purity and impurity than with poverty.
As long as these cultural notions prevail,
the stigma attached to this occupation will
continue. The caste system ensures that
the contribution of the safai karamcharis
remains unrecognised. The Swachh Bharat
Abhiyan, for instance, may increase con-
sciousness of cleanliness in society, but
it has not changed the governments
indifference to the safai karamcharis. As
a 43-year-old second-generation safai
karamchari said,
Nothing has changed after this abhiyan.
The media highlighted it because of the
prime minister. We have been working in
this filthy occupation for decades in this
country. Have you ever seen us on the me-
dia? Nobody appreciates us. Our occupation
is stigmatised. This stigma needs to be
cleaned first. Safai karamcharis are barred
Features
Presents All-India
and state-wise
annual data from
1980 onwards.
Structured in six
major sections :
Demography
Health Status
Infrastructure
Human Resources
Health Education
Health Finance
vol liI no 13 EPW Economic & Political Weekly

from entering hotels with their uniforms on.
We are not allowed to drink water. People
taunt and abuse us. You will find many cases
of karamcharis being beaten up. Our occu-
pation of safai kaam should be recognised
and respected.
Attitudes and Mindsets
This aspect is critical as it interacts with
all the other components discussed above
and contributes to the vicious cycle. The
attitude or mindset of safai karamacharis
about their work prepares them to do (or
quit) this work. It influences the way
they think about themselves, their caste,
and their occupation. From the survey, it
appears that safai karamcharis believe
that cleaning is their obligation (hamara
kaam or our work), determined by their
caste status, and because of this attitude
they are ready to do the dirtiest work.
Their government job gives them a sense
of security with a regular salary, hous-
ing and pension. They say their working
hours (6 am to 1 pm) are good as they
are free by lunchtime. The varsa hakka
policies of the government assure their
progeny employment.
Breaking the Vicious Cycle
Based on the data collected from the
survey and its analysis, we make the
following recommendations to break
this vicious cycle and liberate future
generations of safai karamcharis:
(i) Stop caste-based recruitment: Rec-
ruitment should be open to all and not
based on the caste of applicants. The
Uttar Pradesh government, for instance,
recruits employees irrespective of caste
background (Tripathi 2012), and all state
governments can emulate this example
to break the linkage between caste and
occupation of safai karamcharis.
(ii) Reform government policies: There
is a need to reform government policies
related to recruitment and working con-
ditions of safai karamcharis. The gov-
ernment should offer minimum wages
for contract labourers and provide them
with adequate protective measures akin
to permanent employees. The varsa
hakka system allows the next genera-
tion to continue the work and due to
this policy, even well-educated children
Economic & Political Weekly EPW APRIL 1, 2017
of safai karamcharis join this occupa-
tion. This policy must be discontinued to
encourage the coming generations to get a
job commensurate with their education-
al qualifications. At the same time, the
government should lay more emphasis
on mechanisation of solid waste man-
agement, which can minimise the health
risks of safai karamcharis.
(iii) Focus on education and holistic
development of children of safai karam-
charis: The government should emphasise
standardisation of education so that every
child gets the same quality of education.
Special financial assistance should be
provided to the children of safai karam-
charis from the primary level to higher
levels of education. Education is one of
the key interventions for breaking this
vicious cycle. Awareness of the impor-
tance of education needs to be spread
among karamcharis.
(iv) Promote financial literacy: Despite
getting a regular salary, workers are
unable to manage their finances due
to financial illiteracy. The majority of
employees spend a considerable part of
their salary on alcohol and personal fin-
ancial needs, saving little and becoming
dependent on their children after re-
tirement. Financial management skills
could help.
(v) Provide medical benefits after retire-
ment: The health of safai karamcharis
deteriorates after retirement, but they
have no health cover from the government
at this stage. Therefore, medical benefits
should continue after retirement. Along-
side free treatment, younger generations
of safai karamcharis should be made
aware of occupational hazards and com-
municable diseases. Mechanisation of
solid waste management will help to
reduce deaths among safai karamcharis.
(vi) Bring down the number of years of
service to claim housing: The municipal
corporation requires safai karamcharis
to have 25 years of service in order
to apply for housing. The karamcharis
also have to vacate their quarters after
retirement. These conditions lead to
housing insecurity. Often, karamcharis
vol liI no 13
PERSPECTIVES
ask a family member to join this occupa-
tion just to keep their accommodation.
Either this condition should be relaxed
or support should be provided for alter-
native housing.
(vii) Increase the accountability of
labour unions: More than 50 labour un-
ions are working in MCGM to improve
the working conditions of municipal em-
ployees. However, the safai karamcharis
are not optimistic about their contri-
bution. A 47-year-old second-generation
karamchari said:
My father used to tell me that earlier, union
leaders were like us. They stayed with us and
travelled by cycle from one ward to other.
Now the leaders have four-wheelers and air-
conditioned offices. The union manipulates
us because the majority of safai karamcharis
are illiterate and cannot participate actively
in meetings with municipal officials. Union
leaders children get higher education and
become doctors, engineers or advocates. Our
generation is where our parents were and we
are working as safai karamcharis just as our
parents did.
It is, therefore, important to increase the
accountability of the labour unions.
note
1 Safai karamchari is a Hindi term for sanitation
(safai) worker (karamchari).
References
Darokar, S (2009): Social Exclusion, Ghettoisation
and Identity, Critical Enquiry, Vol 2, No 1,
pp 98113.
Enthoven, R E (1920): The Tribes and Castes of
Bombay, Bombay: Government Central Press.
Government of India (2013): Prohibition of Employ-
ment as Manual Scavengers and Their Reha-
bilitation Act, New Delhi: Ministry of Law and
Justice.
Government of Maharashtra (2015): Sanitation
Workers in Maharashtra Can Nominate Kin for
Job, Social Justice and Special Assistance
Department, Government of Maharashtra,
https://sjsa.maharashtra.gov.in/en/sanitation-
workers-maharashtra-can-nominate-kin-job.
Registrar General (2016): Sample Registration
System, Office of the Registrar General &
Census Commissioner, Ministry of Home
Affairs, New Delhi.
Sarkar, J (1984): Caste, Occupation and Change,
Delhi: B R Publications.
Shyamlal (1997): From Higher Caste to Lower
Caste: The Processes of Asprashyeekaran and
the Myth of Sanskritization, Jaipur: Rawat
Publications.
Times of India (2006): BMC Conservancy Workers
Are Caught in a Death Trap, Mumbai,
11 December.
Tripathi, T (2012): Safai Karmi Scheme of Uttar
Pradesh: Caste Dominance Continues, Economic
& Political Weekly, Vol 47, No 37, pp 2629.
41
SPECIAL ARTICLE
Was Gandhi a Champion of the Caste System?
Reflections on His Practices
Nishikant Kolge
Mohandas Karamchand Gandhis views on the caste
system is sought to be understood through three
approaches: by exploring his personal practices with
regard to caste; by studying how community life was
organised in Gandhis ashrams, since the way of life in
these ashrams reflects his philosophy of life; and by
reflecting on some explanations that have been put
forward to explain the inconsistencies between
Gandhis practices and his writings, where he explicitly
defends caste.
The author is grateful to Rajmohan Gandhi for his valuable comments on
first draft of the paper.
Nishikant Kolge (nishikantkolge@tripurauniv.in) is an assistant
professor in the Department of History, Tripura University, Agartala.
42
I am a much misrepresented man if I am also a somewhat esteemed man.
(Gandhi 1958: Vol 95, p 169)
T
here is no dearth of work on Mohandas Karamchand
Gandhi and the caste systema vast literature is al-
ready available on this subject but, with some varia-
tions, most of these works can be roughly divided into two
groups. The first group includes the works of those scholars
who believe that Gandhi accepted the caste system in toto as
the natural order of societyas a system that promotes con-
trol and discipline and is sanctioned by religion. The second
group includes the works of those scholars who believe that
Gandhis attitude towards caste evolved over time. However,
the common limitation of both these views is that they are
largely derived from some of Gandhis writings or speeches,
and in the process of reaching these conclusions, Gandhis
practices are neglected. But as Raghavan N Iyer (2000: 4) sug-
gests, political thinkers cannot be properly studied without
paying attention to their personalities and practice but when
we turn to Gandhi, we find it peculiarly difficult to study his
nature and activities. Gandhi also very categorically says, What
you do not get from my conduct, you will never get from my
words (1958: Vol 73, p 145). He goes one step further and sug-
gests, As a matter of fact my writings should be cremated with
my body. This does not mean, however, that Gandhis writings
are not to be carefully examined; he wanted his writings to be
taken seriously, but what he meant was that he can be best
judged or understood by his conduct rather than his writings;
and if some contradictions or inconsistencies appear in his
writings, then they should be resolved in light of his practices.
Gandhi himself says, To understand what I say one needs to
understand my conduct (1958: Vol 51, p 352). Hence, in this
paper, his approach towards caste restrictions and ritual
obligations will be examined to better understand his views
on caste.
This paper is divided into three parts. The first part explores
Gandhis personal practices with regard to caste restrictions
and religious obligations; the second part explores how com-
munity life in Gandhis different ashrams was organised, since
it reflected the basic principles of Gandhis philosophy of life
and can be seen as an extension of his own practices; the third
part reflects on some explanations that are generally put
forward to clarify some of Gandhis writings in which he
explicitly defends and validates caste, varna, and some of its
restrictions. This paper argues that there are inconsistencies
between Gandhis writings and practices, and writings that
APRIL 1, 2017 vol liI no 13 EPW Economic & Political Weekly

fail to do justice to his general philosophical outlook must be
rejected.
Gandhis Personal Practices
Lavanam Gora and Mark Lindley (2007: 105) write that in
Gandhis days, traditional Hindu caste distinctions involved
four basic rules:
(i) Untouchability: to avoid touching or, in Malabar, avoid
even looking at untouchables if you were not one yourself.
(ii) Restriction on commensality: to avoid eating with anyone
of a lower caste than oneself.
(iii) Endogamy: to marry within ones own caste.
(iv) Hereditary occupation: to follow ones parents vocation.
Gandhis personal attitude towards the practice of such
caste restrictions, as well as his observance of other religious
obligations, will be analysed in this section.
Untouchability: The Hindu masses practised untouchability
as part of their caste obligations. In general, the practice
revolved around avoiding physical contact with particular
groups to save oneself from being polluted. Gandhi, at a
conference in Ahmedabad on 13 April 1921, narrated an
incident from his childhood when he was hardly 12 years
old. The story was of Ukaa scavengerwho used to visit
Gandhis house to clean the latrines. Gandhi recounted that
although he (Gandhi) had been a very dutiful and obedient
child when it came to respecting his parents, he had often
had tussles with them when they asked him to perform
ablutions after accidently touching Uka (1958: Vol 19,
pp 56975). Referring to this story, Pyarelal Nayyar, Gandhis
personal secretary and biographer, writes that this event
planted in Gandhis soul a seed of rebellion against the insti-
tution of untouchability (1965: 217). Another story which
brings to light Gandhis attitude towards the practice of
untouchability is contained in his autobiography. When his
wife refused to clean the chamber-pot of his Christian clerk,
a man born to untouchable parents, he declared that he
would not stand this nonsense in his house and caught her
by the hand and dragged her to the gate with the intention of
pushing her out (Gandhi 2001: 225). In his autobiography,
he also writes that In South Africa untouchable friends used
to come to my place and live and feed with me (Gandhi
2001: 360).
A different kind of untouchability related to menses is
generally practised among many Hindu orthodox communities.
Here, women are treated as untouchable during their periods.
During this time, they are not allowed to enter places of
worship or even the kitchen. Also, their touch is considered
to be polluting. In one of his letters to Mirabhen, Gandhi
described his views on these practices: I think I told you that
so far as I am concerned, I never respected the rule even with
reference to Ba herself. And when I began to see things clearer,
I never felt the call to have the rule observed (1958: Vol 34,
p 401). Several of his letters to different persons show that he
did not practise this kind of menstruation-related untouchabil-
ity with other women either.
Economic & Political Weekly EPW APRIL 1, 2017 vol liI no 13
SPECIAL ARTICLE
Apart from all this, it is important to know that when he
returned to India from South Africa, he brought with him an
untouchable boy name Naiker. He also adopted an untouch-
able girl, Lakshmi, as his daughter. She used to live in his
ashram and often travelled with him. Therefore, it can be
argued that Gandhi showed a remarkable irreverence towards
the practice of untouchability based on notions of purity and
pollution from a very young age.
Inter-dining and inter-caste marriage: Hindus also ob-
served several rules pertaining to endogamy and commensali-
ty. Endogamy forbids marriages among persons of different
castes. One could only marry within ones own caste. Com-
mensality restrictions stipulated that neither should the mem-
bers of one caste eat in the company of any other caste, nor
should they eat food cooked by any person of a lower caste.
Gandhis family belonged to the Vaishnava sect of Gujarat, which
followed strict restrictions with regard to meat-eating. How-
ever, in his autobiography, Gandhi writes that in his childhood
days he had had not more than half a dozen meat-feasts in
the company of a friend, a Muslim boy identified as Sheikh
Mehtab by many of his biographers (Tendulkar 1960: 2627;
Nayyar 1965: 20910). Also, he admitted that during his stay
in England, he had eaten at restaurants as well as at the home
of an Englishman. He declared that he had no objections to
eating food prepared at European hotels or by a Christian or a
Mohammedan, as long as it consisted of ingredients eatable by
him (Gandhi 1964: 92100). In his autobiography, Gandhi says
that he used to invite English friends and Indian co-workers to
eat at his home. He would also regularly visit a Christian fam-
ily for dinner and eat his vegetarian food in their company
while they ate their non-vegetarian food. When Gandhi started
living in Segaon near Wardha, Govind, a man who was an
untouchable by caste, generally prepared food for him (Sinha
1962: 93). All these examples reveal that from the very early
years of his life, Gandhi disregarded caste restrictions that
dictated that one should dine only within ones own caste.
They also reveal that throughout his life, he ate with people of
different faiths and castes, including untouchables. In his
autobiography, Gandhi states: I had no scruples about inter-
dining (Gandhi 2001: 96).
While in South Africa, Gandhi was instrumental in orches-
trating the marriage of Henry Polak, a Jew, with Millie
Graham Downs, a Scottish Christian. After their marriage, the
couple lived in Gandhis Johannesburg house for almost a year.
They also shifted to the Phoenix settlement when Gandhi
moved with his family there (Weber 2011: 156). Recalling their
marriage in his autobiography, Gandhi writes: They needed
no religious rites to seal the bond. Mrs Polak was a Christian
by birth and Polak a Jew. Their common religion was the
religion of ethics (Gandhi 2001: 282). It is worth noting that
Gandhi not only allowed his son Ramadas1 to marry someone
from a different sub-caste, but also allowed his son Devadas2 to
marry a girl who was from another varna altogether. He also,
by design, married off his adopted daughter Lakshmi, who
was untouchable by birth, to a Brahmin boy3 in 1933. On many
43
SPECIAL ARTICLE
occasions, Gandhi expressed his support for inter-caste
marriages.4
Hereditary occupations: Hereditary occupations are under-
stood to be one of the most important characteristics of the
caste system. Each caste is assigned a particular type of work,
and every Hindu is expected to follow his hereditary occupa-
tion. In the first paragraph of his autobiography, Gandhi writes
that over the last three generations, his family has not been
pursuing their hereditary or traditional duties. He himself
never earned his bread and butter by following his ancestors
calling. He also let his children choose their own professions
and never pressed them to follow any pursuits prescribed by
their caste. Moreover, he tried to learn skills associated with
activities prohibited to his caste, such as the work of a scavenger,
barber, washerman, cobbler, tiller, and tailor. He also taught
many of these skills to his children, wife, and co-workers. It is
also interesting to note that at two occasions when Gandhi
was arrested (first on 10 March 1922 and second on 1 August
1933) and asked about his occupation, he replied saying, I am
by occupation a spinner, a weaver and a farmer.
In 1908, Gandhi opened a school for the children in the
Phoenix settlement as well as for Indian children from outside
the settlement. In the school curriculum, there was no emphasis
on teaching children their ancestors calling. On the other
hand, every student had to learn to perform and respect manual
labour. After returning to India from South Africa in 1917,
Gandhi started a national school at his Indian ashram where
every student was taught agriculture, hand-weaving, carpen-
try and metalcraft. In this school too, there was no emphasis
on preserving ones hereditary occupation. Around 1937,
Gandhi introduced a plan for basic education that Congress
was expected to implement if it came to power after the
general elections held under the Indian Act, 1935. Though
Gandhis basic education scheme was craft-centred, there was
no insistence that one follows ones hereditary craft. On the
other hand, every individual, irrespective of their caste and
religion, was expected to learn more than one craft depending
on the individuals circumstances and environment. In short,
Gandhis educational scheme promoted respect for manual
labour without promoting the idea of hereditary professions.
Sacred books or the question of religious authority: In gen-
eral, the Hindu masses accept the authority of the shastras,
which include the four vedas, the upanishads, the puranas,
and the two great epics, Ramayana and Mahabharatha. In Hin-
duism, the shastrasespecially the vedasare considered to
be the word of god, and thus, are thought to be sanatani (eter-
nal) and are accepted as the highest authority to determine
truth. However, Gandhi, who proclaims himself a sanatani
Hindu says, No one can convince me, with the help of quota-
tions from Shastras (1958: Vol 27, p 21). He also says, Early in
my childhood I had felt the need of a scripture that would
serve me as an unfailing guide through the trials and temptations
of life. The vedas could not supply that need (1958: 271).
Though Gandhi has said on several occasions that he believed
44
in the shastras, it is true that he did not accept them as the
ultimate authority or the word of god. When he was asked,
Where do you find the seat of authority? Gandhi, pointing to
his breast, said, It lies here. He also explains:
I exercise my judgment about every scripture, including the Gita. I
cannot let a scriptural text supersede my reason. Whilst I believe that
the principal books are inspired, they suffer from a process of dou-
ble distillation. Firstly, they come through a human prophet, and then
through the commentaries of interpreters. Nothing in them comes
from God directly. (1958: Vol 64, p 75)
It appears that although Gandhi speaks very highly of different
religious scriptures and had great faith in the Hindu shastras,
he never accepted them as the ultimate authority on life and
never let them override his rationality and morality. On the
other hand, When Gandhi turned to Hindu (Vaishnava)
texts, Ananya Vajpeyi writes, what he [Gandhi] sought from
them was a moralpossibly even a didacticvision that could
help an individual to cultivate self-mastery and acquire self-
knowledge (2012: xix).
Some other caste restrictions and Gandhis practices: Gandhi,
who at the age of 12 years opposed the doctrine of untoucha-
bility, also opposed other codes of the caste system at a very
early age. His autobiography tells us that during his time, his
caste was prohibited from travelling abroad. Although his fel-
low caste members were agitated and the caste head
Shethdeclared that if he went to England for studies he
would be treated as an outcaste, he still sailed for England to
study law. In Hinduism, every man of the upper three varnas is
expected to wear the sacred threadupavitaafter going
through a religious ceremony. Gandhi, as a boy belonging to
one of the three upper varnas, had had such a religious ceremony
in his childhood and had worn this sacred thread. But in his
autobiography, he writes, Later, when, the thread gave way, I
do not remember whether I missed it very much. But I know
that I did not go for a fresh one (Gandhi 2001: 335). Gandhis
family belonged to the Vaishnava sect of Hinduism, and in his
childhood, he had worn the shikha and the tulasi-kanthi
(necklace of tulasi beads) that were considered obligatory. He
writes, On the eve of my going to England, however, I got rid
of the shikha. He also says, I got my cousin Chhaganlal
Gandhi, who was religiously wearing the shikha, to do away
with it (Gandhi 2001: 335). While in South Africa, he also
gave up his tulasi-kanthi.
Temple visits, idol worship, and public prayer: Regular tem-
ple visits and idol or image worship are a part of the religious
activities of a regular Hindu. Usually, Hindus visit a temple
close to their homes and worship an idol of their individual
preference. Joseph Lelyveld (2011: 194), in his recent biogra-
phy of Gandhi, notes that Gandhi hardly ever prayed in tem-
ples. Gora and Lindley (2007: 91) also state that Gandhi was
not the kind of Hindu who accepts the authority of priests or
even attends temple. Gandhi explains his thoughts on temple
worship in his autobiography:
Being born in the Vaishnav faith, I had often to go the haveli (temple).
But it never appealed to me. I did not like its glitter and pomp. Also I
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heard rumours of immorality being practised there, and lost all inter-
est in it. Hence I could gain nothing from the haveli. (2001: 45)
This does not mean that he never visited temples later in
life, but that his attitude towards them remained the same.
Later, in 1933, he also very explicitly said, I do not visit
temples. I feel no need to go to temples; hence I do not visit
them (Gandhi 1958: Vol 54, p 129). His approach to idol
worship was similar. He never used idols or images during his
prayers. He once said, An idol does not excite any feeling of
veneration in me (Gandhi 1958: Vol 21, p 249).
It appears that the only caste restriction he observed
consistently was vegetarianism, and the only traditional ritual
he performed regularly was prayer. He was no doubt a man of
prayer, and he was very particular and sincere about his prayers
which followed a very strict timetable. However, his way of
praying was his own creation and does not match anything in
the Hindu tradition. No images or idols were used in Gandhis
prayer meetings, which were held not in a temple or any special
place, but more often than not under the open sky. Devotional
songs from different religions and readings from a variety of
religious holy books made up the core of his public prayers.
Gandhi would make a prayer address instead of a sermon
which would usually dwell on the political events of the day or
the social challenges that needed to be met (Chatterjee 1983:
11113). It should be remembered that his numerous public
prayers were part of his political struggle; and for him, politi-
cal struggle was part of his search for god. As far as religious
practice is concerned, Gandhi was neither a temple-goer nor
an idol-worshipper. And though he used to pray every day, his
style of prayer was very different from the traditional manner
of prayer.
Gandhi did not practise vegetarianism because of religious
or caste-based obligations. Although a vegetarian, Gandhi com-
fortably ate in the company of meat-eaters. In his autobiography,
he confesses that he had gone to London as a convinced meat-
eater, but had all along abstained from actually eating meat in
the interest of truth and keeping in mind the vow he had made
to his mother. However, he wished at the same time that every
Indian were a meat-eater, and he declared that he looked
forward to being one openly some day and to enlisting others
in the cause. He tells the reader that after reading Salts book,
Plea for Vegetarianism, he became a vegetarian by choice (Gan-
dhi 2001: 59). At another point in his autobiography, he writes
that his views on vegetarianism were not influenced by any
religious texts (Gandhi 2001: 297). Hence, though he practised
very strict vegetarianism, it was a personal commitment for
him rather than a matter of religion or caste.
In this section, this paper has presented an analysis of Gan-
dhis personal practices and his attitude towards several caste
restrictions and other important Hindu religious observations
and beliefs. It can also be seen that Gandhis practices cannot
be considered signs of orthodoxy in any way. He seems to be a
reformer if not a revolutionary in breaking caste restrictions
and other Hindu religious traditions and beliefs. To emphasise
the same point further, a brief account of how life was organ-
ised in Gandhis ashrams is presented in the next section.
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SPECIAL ARTICLE
Life in Gandhis Ashrams
Another way to examine if Gandhi was a reformer or an orthodox
Hindu is to look at the way of life practised in Gandhis different
ashrams. Here, life was organised along the basic principles of
Gandhis philosophy, and the ashrams can be seen as an exten-
sion of Gandhis personal practices. Once Gandhi himself said,
The Ashram is the measuring rod by which people can judge
me (1958: Vol 53, p 291). In his lifetime, Gandhi founded four
ashrams at different times and at different places and with dif-
ferent objectives. The first was the Phoenix settlement founded
in 1904 near Phoenix station, South Africa; the second was
Tolstoy Farm established in 1910 near Johannesburg, South
Africa; the third, Satyagraha Ashram (also known as
Sabarmati Asram), was set up in 1915 near Ahmedabad, India;
and the fourth, Sevagram Ashram was founded in 1936 near
Wardha, India. Gandhis own writings as well as other biogra-
phies reveal that the first ashram, Phoenix, was set up to save
money to ensure the success of India Opinion, a weekly journal
published by Gandhi. The secondTolstoy Farmwas meant
to be a home for imprisoned satyagrahis and their families. The
thirdSatyagraha Ashramaimed at training young men,
women, and children to serve the motherland. It appears that
initially there had been no plans for a fourth ashram, but
Wardha came up spontaneously and can be considered an ex-
tension of Satyagraha Ashram, its objective being similar.
While each ashram had its own objectives, they shared a com-
mon aim of experimenting with living a simple life to realise
the dignity of human labour, as explained in John Ruskins Unto
This Last. These ashrams were clearly not established with the
aim of building an ideal community along the principles of the
Hindu caste system or varnashrama dharma.
Not only were the settlers at each of Gandhis ashrams a
heterogeneous group consisting of individuals from different
castes and religions, but there was also no strict division of
labour amongst them. Every settler, irrespective of caste, religion,
or gender had to do daily manual labour. Everyone had to
perform every kind of work including cooking, gardening,
cleaning, scavenging, shaving, and cutting hair on a rotational
basis. Untouchability was not practised in any form in the
ashrams; even the common practice of treating women as
untouchable during their menses was not practised in the ashram
(Gandhi 1958). Though every inmate had to observe the vow of
celibacy, many inter-caste marriages were organised in the
ashrams. At Sabarmati Ashram, on the occasion of his son
Ramadass marriage, Gandhi said,
The wedding just celebrated would perhaps be for the Ashram the last
as between parties belonging to the same caste. It behoved people in
the Ashram to take the lead in this respect, because people outside
might find it difficult to initiate the reform. The rule should be on the
part of the Ashram to discountenance marriages between parties of
the same caste and to encourage those between parties belonging to
different sub-castes. (1958: Vol 35, p 500)
Gandhi also allowed the solemnising of the wedding of a
Brahmin, A G Tendulkar, and an untouchable woman, Indumati,
at Sevagram Ashram on 19 August 1945.5
In all of Gandhis ashrams, there was a single kitchen, and
all dined in a single row. The food was simple and strictly
45
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vegetarian. But at Tolstoy Farm, Gandhi was determined that
If the Christians and Musalmans asked even for beef, that too
must be provided for them. However, Gandhi was happy
because neither the women nor the men ever asked for meat
(Gandhi 2003: 216). Just as there was a common kitchen at
every ashram, there were also common prayers. All the ashram
inmates were expected to participate in the common prayer,
which was held in the morning from 5:00 am to 5:30 am and in
the evening from 6:30 pm to 7:00 pm. Devotional songs and
readings from the holy books of different religions constituted
the core of the prayer sessions. No idols or images were used
during these prayers. Therefore, it is clear that Gandhis
experiments with simple living and community life cannot be
seen as a sign of religious orthodoxy. In no way can they be
interpreted as an effort to organise human life along the basic
principles of the caste system or varanshrama dharma. On the
contrary, the experiments are to be seen as an effort to break
caste, community, and religious arrogance and discrimination.
The above exploration of Gandhis personal practices and of
cooperative life in his ashrams shows that from a very young
age, Gandhi revolted against the practice of caste restrictions.
He himself violated every restriction assigned to his own caste.
In no way can his actions be seen as a sign of orthodoxy or
conservativeness. However, some of his writings, where he
explicitly defends and validates some aspects of caste and the
restrictions that come with it, reveal an entirely different
picture of Gandhis attitude towards caste. However, no proper
and final conclusion about this can be drawn without provid-
ing an appropriate explanation for it.
Overview of Literature/Mystery of Gandhis Writings
There are many scholars who have contemplated and wondered
about some of Gandhis writings where he defends and validates
caste and some of the practices associated with it. Some of them
have seen it as evidence of Gandhis faith in the caste system;
they have also tried to provide possible justifications for why
Gandhi finds caste, varna, and some of its restrictions useful.
Some other scholars believe that the inconsistencies in his
writings reveal that there were gradual changes or a slow develop-
ment in his ideas on such subjects. There are also some schol-
ars who have argued that Gandhis defence of the caste system
in some of his writings is part of a larger strategy. Here, in this
section, an effort is made to examine some of such explanations
of Gandhis writings in which he defends and validates the
caste system. This paper argues that explanations that fail to
not only explain the inconsistencies between Gandhis practices
and some of his writings, but which also fail to do justice to his
general philosophical outlook, must be rejected. This section
presents a reflection on the following explanations.
Gandhis belief in the caste system in toto: There are a good
number of scholars who sincerely hold that Gandhi believed in
the caste system in toto. These scholars can be further divided
into two groups for our analysisthe first are Dalit scholars
and the second are Gandhian scholars. Most Dalit scholars
argue that Gandhi was an outstanding product of the Hindu
46
orthodox milieu. According to them, he resisted any change in
the basic social structure of Hindu society, and he was the one
who, more than anyone else, defended and validated the caste
system when its legitimacy was being seriously challenged
and its existence seemed precarious. For instance, Parimala V
Rao writes Gandhi inherited a Congress which already had a
powerful pro-caste group. Added to this was the personal com-
mitment that Gandhi himself had vis--vis the defence of the in-
stitution of caste (2009: 6470). Another scholar, Braj Ranjan
Mani, writes
He [Gandhi] was a bania more brahmanised than Brahmans; his
world-view and life philosophy were moulded and shaped by the
age-old brahmanic values and way of life. [], he never gave up his
basic belief in the brahmanic fundamentalism which is evident form
his constant evocation of varnashrama, Ram-rajya and trusteeship.
(2008: 348)
One of the important limitations of this view held by Dalit
scholars is that the primary objective of their study is not to
understand Gandhi and his views on caste and other related
issues; their primary field of study is Ambedkar or the Dalit
movement and they see Gandhi and his movement in relation
to it or in contrast against Ambedkar to better understand
Ambedkar and his contribution to the upliftment of the Dalits.
For instance, Kancha Ilaiah writes, The fundamental difference
between these two thinkers lies in positioning themselves
from their own communities. He adds further that Ambedkar
was not only born in an untouchable Mahar family but all
through his life stood for the suppressed, oppressed and ex-
ploited masses. Gandhi on the other hand, was born in a Ban-
iya family and stood for the oppressor and exploiting upper
castes (Ilaiah 2001: 126). Therefore, most Dalit scholars stud-
ies assume that Gandhi believed in the caste system because of
his personal belief in the Brahmanical world view which he
inherited by virtue of being born in an upper caste Hindu family.
However, these views appear problematic when we consider
Gandhis personal practices which show that he openly violated
most of the important restrictions of the caste system, and that
he built ashrams which were founded on principles that
rejected all the basic rules of varnashrama dhrama. It is also
important to note that the purpose of the present study is not
to engage with the Dalit scholars critique of Gandhis ap-
proach to caste. This section aims to identify the different jus-
tifications given by different scholars to vindicate their claims
regarding Gandhi views on the caste system. This paper
argues that in the light of Gandhis actual practice, the Dalit
scholars view that Gandhi believed in the caste system
because he personally believed in the Brahmanical world view
seems to be problematic. In contrast to Dalit scholars, Gandhian
scholars focus on Gandhis life and provide different reasons
for holding the view that Gandhi believed in the caste system.
The following sub-section analyses some of the justifications
offered by Gandhian scholars to argue that Gandhi believed in
the caste system in toto.
Caste provides a livelihood for millions of villagers: Promi-
nent Gandhian scholar, Margaret Chatterjee, makes some
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passing references to Gandhis views on caste and the possible
justifications for it. She writes:
Gandhi spoke in favour of following ones hereditary occupation.
What was behind it, I believe, was his perception of the undoubted
fact that industrialisation would gradually erode the network of tra-
ditional occupations that had provided a livelihood for villagers for
centuries. [] Industrial civilisation would never be able to provide a
livelihood for the teeming millions of India. (Chatterjee 1983: 1920)
Although it seems to be a very unorthodox and fairly
convincing argument, both of Chatterjees claimsfirst, that
Gandhi rejected industrialisation because he believed that it
would not be able to provide a livelihood for millions of Indians;
and second, that he preferred and propagated hereditary
modes of occupation over industrialisation for resolving Indias
economic problemsneed to be examined before they may be
accepted as appropriate explanations for Gandhis defence of
the caste system and hereditary occupations in his writing.
It is a fact that on many occasions Gandhi criticised industri-
alisation because he was afraid that it would lead to unemploy-
ment in India. It is also a fact that for more than two decades,
Gandhi had sought to persuade the masses to adopt the charkha
and khadi, which he hoped would serve as an alternative to
industrialisation and would provide a livelihood to millions in
India. But in 1944, Gandhi altered his position somewhat and
proposed a New Khadi Philosophy. This new philosophy was
based on the principle that rural production must be primarily
for self-consumption and not for sale. He says:
At least this much should be clear to all that khadi is not an occupation
or a craft merely for earning a livelihood. None of us should harbour
this idea. For, if khadi is an industry it would have to be run purely
on business lines. The difference between khadi and mill-cloth would
then be that while a mill provides employment to a few thousand peo-
ple in a city, khadi brings a crore of rupees to those scattered about in
fifteen thousand villages. Both must then be classified as industries,
and we would hardly be justified in asking anybody to put on khadi
and boycott mill-cloth. Nor can such khadi claim to be the herald of
swaraj. (Gandhi 1958: Vol 78, p 192)
Indeed, what Gandhi suggested was completely different
from the idea that spinning would provide a livelihood to mil-
lions of Indians. Instead, he made an attempt to immediately
stop the spinning of yarn for sale. He believed that khadi work-
ers should persuade and educate people to spin for their own
use. Moreover, when Srikrishandas Jaju, secretary of the All
India Spinners Association (AISA), pointed out that this would
mean the khadi stores in cities would have to close down and
that three lakh spinners connected with the khadi organisation
would lose their income, Gandhi insisted, Close them down.
It is obvious now that for Gandhi, the danger of industriali-
sation was not that it would gradually erode the network of
traditional occupations that had provided a livelihood for
villagers for centuries, but that it would destroy values and
create alienated individuals in an industrial society. He was
afraid that industrialisation would turn a person into a
mechanical part in the production machine. He writes,
It is beneath human dignity to lose ones individuality and become a
mere cog in the machine. I want every individual to become a full-
blooded, fully developed member of society. (1958: Vol 68, p 266)
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It seems that the issue of unemployment was a practical
argument that he used to persuade those who did not share his
moral presuppositions. But he fundamentally viewed industri-
alisation with suspicion because it destroyed the autonomy of
the individual and the dignity of individual labour. Since he
was also aware that hereditary occupations could crush indi-
viduality,6 he did not advocate for their continuance as an al-
ternative to industrialisation to solve the economic problems
of India. Defining caste or varna as hereditary occupations and
appreciating it for several reasons is one thing, and proposing
that it could solve the economic problems of India is quite an-
other. There is hardly any evidence that suggests that Gandhi
advocated for traditional hereditary occupations (caste or var-
na) to resolve Indias economic problems. He did not set up any
organisations to persuade people to follow their hereditary oc-
cupations. In addition, there are no references to hereditary
occupations in his constructive programme to create an ideal
village. As argued above, Gandhi used the charkha to chal-
lenge the belief of educated Indians that industrialisation would
solve all of Indias economic problems; the charkha was not a
symbol of hereditary occupations for Gandhi, as he did not ask
a particular caste alone to spin, but tried to persuade everyone
across caste, religion, gender, and economic boundaries to
spin every day. For him, the charkha was a symbol of self-suffi-
ciency and dignity of labour. Therefore, Chatterjees argument
that Gandhi was in favour of hereditary occupations because it
would provide a livelihood for the teeming millions of India is
problematic.
Caste as outcome of belief in rebirth and karma: Bhikhu
Parekh is another scholar who attempts to explain Gandhis
views on caste and offers possible reasons for why Gandhi may
have defended caste in his writings. He writes,
Since Gandhi believed in rebirth and the law of karma, he thought
that the characteristic occupation of an individuals caste correspond-
ed to his natural abilities and dispositions and represented a necessary
moment of his spiritual evolution. (Parekh 1989: 226)
If it is true that Gandhi in his writings expresses his faith in
the doctrine of karma, it is also true that it is difficult to dem-
onstrate that his interpretation matched the orthodox version
where the occupation practised by a caste is thought to neces-
sarily correspond to their natural abilities and dispositions due
to their past karma. A close look at his writings where he
evokes the doctrine of karma reveals that he does it often for
pragmatic reasons and that, most of the time, it goes against
the orthodox interpretation. The following quote from Gan-
dhi, defending temple entry for untouchables, is one of the
best examples of his pragmatic interpretation of the doctrine
of karma. He writes,
If you believe that Harijans are in their present plight today as a result of
their past sins, you must concede that they have the first right of worship
in temples. God has been described by all the scriptures of the world
as a Protector and Saviour of the sinner. (Gandhi 1958: Vol 55, p 304)
On other occasions, Gandhi simply rejects the orthodox un-
derstanding of the doctrine of karmathat ones destiny is the
fruit of ones past karma. He writes,
47
SPECIAL ARTICLE
The law of karma is no respector of persons, but I would ask you to
leave the orthodoxy to itself. Man is the maker of his own destiny, and
I therefore ask you to become makers of your own destiny. (Gandhi
1958: Vol 26, p 294)
Not only his writings, but his practices also confirm his rejec-
tion of the belief that ones present suffering is a result of
ones past karma. For instance, his decision to end the life of
an incurable calf to cut short its agony is a clear rejection of
the belief that one has to suffer to atone for ones past karma.
In 1928, Gandhi euthanised an incurable calf in his ashram,
and when some people objected to this, he vigorously defend-
ed his act and argued that he would apply the same principle
to human beings in similar circumstances (Gandhi 1958:
Vol 37, p 297). It is evident that although Gandhi for some
reason did not reject the doctrine of karma, he did not believe
in its orthodox interpretation either. And even if Gandhi
believed in rebirth, Parekhs argument that Gandhi defended
caste because he believed that ones past karma is linked to
ones natural abilities and dispositions which represent a
necessary moment of ones spiritual evolution, seems to be
problematic.
Arrangements for self-realisation and social harmony:
Ramashray Roy is another scholar who has examined Gandhis
views on caste and has proffered possible reasons why Gandhi
may have advocated for the retention of the varnas or heredi-
tary occupations. He holds that Gandhi advocates retention of
the varna vyavastha because in his view, varna vyavastha is
natural and affords greater opportunities than other arrange-
ments for self-realisation and social harmony (Roy 1984: 111
12, 2006: 140). Roy argued that Gandhis rejection of modern
civilisation is total, and this was because he believed that the
goal of modern civilisation, especially in its most utilitarian
forms, is simply the satisfaction of one human desire after an-
other. Self-gratification is not only accepted but encouraged,
and the higher purpose of life, which for Gandhi was self-real-
isation, gradually becomes obsolete. On the other hand, A
social order, Roy adds, of Gandhis conception must be treat-
ed as a yajna. As an instance of yajna, society signifies an order
that is based on the phenomenon of extended selves; it must
reflect the values that promote harmony, non-exploitation,
equality, and participation. Roy adds, He [Gandhi] finds this
possibility to exist only in a social order that is based on varna
vyavastha. Given the ultimate end of life, that is, self-realisa-
tion, and yajna as the exclusive means of realising this end,
Roy reminds the reader that It is in this context that we can
understand why Gandhi lays so much emphasis on varna
vyavastha, in general, and the caste system grounded in it, in
particular (2006: 140).
There are different levels of misunderstanding in such an
analysis of Gandhis views. First, though it is true that Gandhi
criticises modern civilisation because it encourages the
proliferation of human wants and desires and makes the
acquisition of more and more goods and material comforts
the core of human life and renders obsolete the idea of self-
realisation, it does not mean that Gandhi completely rejected
48
modern civilisation and uncritically advocated for the reten-
tion of varna vyavastha. Second, Gandhis conception of
society was based on the concept of extended selvesit must
reflect values that promote harmony, non-exploitation, equal-
ity, and participation. However, Roys argument that Gandhi
believed that this form of social harmony could exist only in a
social order that is based on varna vyavasthagiven the
ultimate end of life, which is self-realisationneeds to be
examined properly.
Indeed, Gandhi attacked all kinds of violence and domina-
tion, irrespective of whether he discovered it in the traditional
(varna vyavastha) or the modern (modern civilisation) way of
life. However, his criticism of modern civilisation was more
explicit than his censure of traditional practices due to the his-
torical contextIndians struggle against colonialismin
which he found himself. He also chose to idealise the tradi-
tional way of life for the same reason, and argued that it is the
path to individual dignity and social harmony. But this does
not mean that he rejected modern civilisation entirely and ad-
vocated a return to varna vyavastha.
Gandhis criticism of modern civilisation shows that he
believed that individual dignity, social harmony, and the
ultimate end of lifeself-realisationcan be achieved within
the boundaries of modern civilisation. As A J Pareal observes,
The correct Gandhian metaphor for modern civilisation is not disease
but curable disease: civilisation is not an incurable disease. Hind
Swaraj, in this respect, is a short treatise on the malaise of modernity
and Gandhi is one of its physicians. (1995: 62)
Gandhis efforts to reform modern civilisation should not be
understood as him preferring modern civilisation to a traditional
society that is organised on the basic principles of varna. For
Gandhi, it was not a matter of preference; being a practical
man, he accepted that modern civilisation is going to stay
here, and hence needs to be improved. Indeed, the dominant
passion of Gandhis life was neither improving modern civili-
sation nor retaining varna vyavastha through the rejection of
modern civilisation. He firmly believed man to be a finite be-
ing incapable of developing social arrangements that are per-
fect for self-realisation; therefore, he saw no value in hankering
after any specific arrangement. He had also learnt from Indian
tradition that there were and will be different yuga, and there-
fore for Gandhi, the real work was defining yougadharma (self-
realisation) that is relevant to and practicable within the context
of the modern yuga. As Parekh writes:
If we were to pick out the one dominant passion, the central organising
principle of his [Gandhis] life, it would have to be his search for and
his struggle to establish dharma appropriate to India in the modern
age. (1989: 11)
Hence, to hold that Gandhi rejected modern civilisation in to-
tal and was in favour of retaining a social order that is based
on varna vyavastha, because he found that it is natural and
affords greater opportunities for self-realisation and social
harmony, may not be appropriate.
Moreover, it is also not correct to say that Gandhi empha-
sised varna vyavastha in general, and the caste system
grounded in it, in particular. Replying to a question, Gandhi
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himself said, If varnashrama goes to the dogs in the removal
of untouchability, I shall not shed a tear (1958: Vol 35, p 522).
Responding to another question at a different point, he ex-
plains that his adherence to the idea of varnashrama should
not be taken very seriously:
I have gone nowhere to defend varnadharma, though for the remov-
al of untouchability I went to Vikom. I am the author of a Congress
resolution for propagation of Khadi, establishment of HinduMuslim
unity, and removal of untouchability, the three pillars of swaraj. But
I have never placed establishment of varnashrama dharma as the
fourth pillar. You cannot, therefore, accuse me of placing a wrong em-
phasis on varnashrama dharma. (1958: Vol 35, p 523)
Likewise, Gandhi can be neither be accused ofnor appre-
ciated foran emphasis on varnashrama dharma, as his prac-
tices speak otherwise. It is known that Gandhi was a man of
action, and if he really believed that a society based on varna
would be conducive to self-realisation, he would have lived a
life in alignment with the basic principles of varna and would
have organised his ashrams too along those lines. But as exp-
lained above, Gandhi neither lived his life, nor organised the
way of life in any of his ashrams, on the principles of varna.
One can thus conclude that Gandhi did not place undue emphasis
on varna vyavastha nor on the caste system grounded in it.
Changes in Gandhis opinions on caste: Bipan Chandra, in
his paper Gandhiji, Secularism and Communalism, makes
some passing remarks on Gandhis views on caste. He writes,
Many quote his [Gandhis] statements on the caste system, inter-caste
and inter-religious dining and marriages [], and so on, from his ear-
ly writings. But the fact is that, while his basic commitment to human
values, truth and non-violence remained constant, his opinions on all
these and other issues underwent changessometimes drasticand,
invariably, in more radical directions. (2004: 34)
To justify his point, Chandra quotes from two of Gandhis
writings, one from 1933 and the other from 1938. In the first,
Gandhi says:
In my search after Truth I have discarded many ideas and learnt many
new things and, therefore, when anybody finds any inconsistency
between any two writings of mine, if he has still faith in my sanity,
he would do well to choose the later of the two on the same subject.
(Quoted in Chandra 2004: 4)
It is a fact that on more than one occasion Gandhi has men-
tioned that he is not at all concerned about appearing to be
consistent and suggests that his last opinion be taken as final.
Therefore, many scholars like Chandra have argued that there
was a gradual evolution or radical changes in Gandhis opinion
on caste and other related issues. Navajivan Publishing House,
Ahmedabad, which had the copyright on Gandhis writings,
prints this quote in many of its collections of Gandhis writings
and speeches (Gandhi 1964: 2; Gandhi 1951: 2), to make the read-
er aware that there were considerable changes in Gandhis
views over time. But surprisingly enough, Gandhi never
accepted that there were inconsistencies or changes in his
opinions, not to speak of radical changes in his position. Before
he made the above-mentioned comment, In my search after
Truth I have discarded many ideas and learnt many new
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things, in the same piece of writing Gandhi also says, As I
read them [own writings] with a detached mind, I find no con-
tradiction between the two statements, especially if they are
read in their full context (1958: Vol 55, p 60). Indeed, when-
ever Gandhi was charged with inconsistency in his writings
although he said that he was not at all concerned about ap-
pearing consistent and suggested that his readers take his last
opinion as finalhe made it very clear that he personally did
not find any inconsistencies and this suggestion was for those
friends who did find inconsistencies in his writings. He also
suggested that before making their choice, these friends
should try to perceive an underlying or abiding consistency
bet ween his two seemingly inconsistent statements at different
times. He wrote:
Whenever I have been obliged to compare my writing even of fifty
years ago with the latest, I have discovered no inconsistency between
the two. But friends who observe inconsistency will do well to take the
meaning that my latest writing may yield unless, of course, they prefer
the old. But before making the choice they should try to see if there is
not an underlying and abiding consistency between the two seeming
inconsistencies. (1958: Vol 70, p 203)
Gandhi seems to be right in denying any inconsistencies in
his position on caste because he, from a very young age, vio-
lated most caste restrictions. His attitude towards the caste
system remained more or less consistent throughout his life. It
is obvious that any inconsistencies in his writings were delib-
erate and conscious and were not due to any changes in his
opinion. Hence, it may not be appropriate to say that there
were gradual changes or a line of development over a period of
time in Gandhis opinions on caste and other related issues.
Gandhis Defence of Caste Was a Matter of Strategy
B R Nanda, a biographer and Gandhian scholar writes,
Gandhis reluctance to make a frontal assault on the caste
system in the early years may have been a matter of tactics
(1950: 36). Apart from Nanda, there are other scholars like
Ramchandra Guha (2001: 94), Judith M Brown (1990: 205),
and Joseph Lelyveld (2011: 185) who have argued that Gandhi
was a strategist in his approach to the caste system. They
argue that in South Africa, as early as 1909, Gandhi had pub-
licly decried the caste system, but shortly after returning to
India, he understood that a conservative but powerful section
of Hindus was not yet ready for radical reforms. And, for
strategic reasons alone, he emphasised on the generally beneficial.
As Judith M Brown writes:
Though he had rejected the whole idea far earlier and inveighed and
worked against it even in South Africa, once home in India, having
tested the temper of public opinion, he was aware of the strength of
Hindu orthodoxy and he took care not to equate his campaign against
untouchability with the question of caste as a whole. (1990: 205)
At this juncture, it seems to be a more convincing justifica-
tion than any of the others cited above. Apart from this, the
argument that Gandhi was a strategist in his approach to caste
resolves the seeming contradiction between Gandhis personal
practices where he violates several caste restrictions, and his
emphasis on some of the positive aspects of the caste system in
49
SPECIAL ARTICLE

some of his writings and speeches. Therefore, this paper of his long-term strategy to combat caste, because unlike other
argues that the best way to understand Gandhis writings explanations, it does not contradict either his practices or his
where he defends and validates casteis to see them as a part general philosophical outlook.

notes
1 On 27 January 1928, Ramdas married Nirmala
who belonged to a different sub-caste.
2 Devadas married Lakshmi, a Brhama girl who
belonged to a different varna, in 1933.
3 Lakshmi married Marui, a Bhaman orphan boy
on March 1933.
4 Though it is a fact that Gandhi did not force his
children to marry within their own caste, he
did not allow one of his sons to marry a
Muslim girl.
5 See Gandhis letter to Nagesh V Gunaji dated 17
July 1944 (Gandhi 1958: Vol 84, p 202). See also
the letter to Indumati Gunaji.
6 Nicholas F Gier writes, Gandhi wants to
protect the individual from dissolution either
in a pre-modern totality or the modern bureau-
cratic state (2004: 22).
REFERENCES
Brown, M Judith (1990): Gandhi: Prisoner of Hope,
Delhi: Oxford University Press.
Chandra, Bipan (2004): Gandhiji, Secularism and
Communalism, Social Scientist, Vol 32, (),
329, pp 34.
Chatterjee, Margaret (1983): Gandhis Religious
Thought, Indiana: University of Notre Dame
Press.
Gandhi, M K (1951): Basic Education, Ahmedabad:
Navajivan Publishing House.
(1958): The Collected Works of Mahatma Gandhi,
New Delhi: Publication Division, Government
of India.
(1964): Caste Must Go and the Sin of Untouchabil-
ity, Ahmedabad: Navajivan Publishing House.
(2001): An Autobiography or the Story of My Ex-
periments with Truth, Trans Mahadev Desai,
London: Penguin Classics.
(2003): Satyagraha in South Africa, Trans Vaji
Govindji Desai, Ahmedabad: Navajivan Pub-
ishing House.
Gier, F Nicholas (2004): The Virtue of Nonviolence:
From Gautama to Gandhi, Albany: State Uni-
versity of New York Press.
Gora, Lavanam and Mark Lindley (2007): Gandhi
as We Have Known Him, New Delhi: National
Gandhi Museum in Association with Gyan
Publishing House.
Guha, R (2001): An Anthropologist Among the Marxist
and Other Essays, New Delhi: Permanent Black.
Ilaiah, Kancha (2001): Dalitism vs Brahmanism:
The Epistemological Conflict in History, Dalit
Identity and Politics: Cultural Subordination
and the Dalit Challenge, Vol 2, New Delhi: Sage
Publications.
Iyer, Raghavan (2000): The Moral and Political
Thought of Mahatma Gandhi, New Delhi:
Oxford University Press.
Vajpeyi, Ananya (2012): Righteous Republic: The
Lelyveld, Joseph (2011): Great Soul: Mahatma Gan-
dhi and His Struggle with India, New Delhi:
HarperCollins India.
Mani, Braj Ranjan (2008): Debrahmanising History:
Dominance and Resistance in Indian Society,
New Delhi: Manohar Publishers.
Nanda, B R (1950): Gandhi and Critics, Delhi: Oxford
University Press.
Nayyar, Pyarelal (1965): Mahatma Gandhi: Vol 1,
The Early Phase, Ahmedabad: Navajivan Pub-
lishing House.
Pareal, A J (1995): The Doctrine of Swaraj, Gandhis
Philosophy in Crisis and Change in Contempo-
rary India, U Baxi and B Parekh (eds), New
Delhi: Sage Publications.
Parekh, Bhikhu (1989): Colonialism, Tradition and
Reform: An Analysis of Gandhis Political
Discourse, New Delhi: Sage Publications.
Rao, P V (2009): Gandhi, Untouchability and the
Postcolonial Predicament: A Note, Social Scien-
tist, Vol 37, (1/2), pp 6470.
Roy, Ramashray (1984): Self and Society: A Study in
Gandhian Thought, New Delhi: Sage Publica-
tions in collaboration with United Nations
University, Tokyo.
(2006): Gandhi and Ambedkar: A Study in Con-
trast, Delhi: Shipra Publications.
Sinha, Balvant (1962): Under the Shelter of Bupu,
Ahmedabad: Navajivan Publishing House.
Tendulkar, D G (1960): Mahatma Life of Mohandas
Karamchand Gandhi, Vol I, New Delhi: The
Publication Division, Ministry of Information
and Broadcasting, Government of India.
Political Foundation of Modern India, Cambridge:
Harvard University Press.
Weber, Thomas (2011): Going Native: Gandhis
Relationship with Western Women, New Delhi:
Lotus Role.

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50 APRIL 1, 2017 vol liI no 13 EPW Economic & Political Weekly

SPECIAL ARTICLE
Waste-to-Energy and Recycling
Competing Systems of Waste Management in Urban India
Aman Luthra
Incineration-based waste-to-energy technologies have
recently emerged as the preferred policy option for
managing the growing problem of waste in India. These
technologies require a continuous supply of waste
inputs of sufficient quantity and qualityhigh calorific
value and low moisture contentto be viable.
Government and industry proponents suggest that WtE
and recycling are compatible systems of managing
waste while their critics disagree. This article argues two
main points. First, the governments preference for WtE
contradicts the empirical evidence, which suggests that
the physical, chemical and biological characteristics of
Indian waste render it technically unsuitable for
incineration. Second, to be viable, WtE technologies will
require end-to-end control over the entire waste
management chain, thus displacing those in the
informal recycling sector from their means of
subsistence. Far from being compatible, the two systems
are in fact in competition with each other over the same
set of material resources.
Research for this article, which is a part of the authors dissertation,
was funded by the National Science Foundation Doctoral Dissertation
Research Improvement Grant, the Social Science Research Council
International Dissertation Research Fellowship, the Wenner-Gren
Foundations Dissertation Fieldwork Grant, and the Johns Hopkins
Universitys Environment, Energy, Sustainability and Health Institute
Fellowship. Chintan Environmental Research and Action Group was
the authors host institution for his dissertation fieldwork. Manisha
Anantharaman, Justin Berry, Beau Bothwell, Shanna Salinas, Erica
Schoenberger and Francisco Villegas provided valuable comments on
earlier versions of this article.
Aman Luthra (aman.luthra@kzoo.edu) is an assistant professor,
Department of Anthropology and Sociology, Kalamazoo College,
Michigan, US.
Economic & Political Weekly EPW APRIL 1, 2017 vol liI no 13
M
unicipalities across India are looking for alternatives
to landfilling in order to better manage increasing
waste quantities in cities across the country. One
emerging popular alternative to landfills is waste-to-energy
(WtE), which refers to a broad range of waste processing tech-
nologies including biochemical conversion (biomethanation),
thermochemical conversion (incineration, pyrolysis, and gasifi-
cation), and thermo-mechanical conversion (refuse-derived
fuel [RDF]) technologies. Despite widespread support in policy
circles, critics argue that uncontrolled toxic emissions from in-
cinerators are hazardous to environmental and public health
(Demaria and Schindler 2015; Toxics Link 2013). Other critics
argue that incineration competes against recycling and thus
poses a threat to those who depend on extracting recyclables
from waste materials (Chintan 2012; Demaria and Schindler
2015; Tangri 2010). Estimates of the number of people engaged
in the informal recycling sector in Delhi alone are as high as
2,00,000 (Chaturvedi and Gidwani 2011). Yet, the government is
pushing for the establishment of WtE facilities across the country
(Planning Commission 2014). Proponents of WtE technologies
often draw upon the European experience to argue that ther-
mal treatment and recycling are not incompatible (Porteous
2005; Rao 2013). In fact, these proponents suggest that WtE
technologies need to be adopted if cities in India are to better
manage their waste (Bhada and Themelis 2008). Potential in-
vestors see this as an untapped business opportunity valued at
almost $1.5 billion in 2017 and expected to grow to approxi-
mately $11.7 billion by 2052 (ASSOCHAM and cKinetics 2015: 44).
This debate hinges on two interrelated questions: Is waste
generated in India suitable for thermal treatment? Are recycling
and incineration-based WtE technologies compatible? To answer
these questions I employ two main methods: (i) discourse
analysis of key documents published by Indian government
and international development agencies; and (ii) an analysis
of empirical data from six waste characterisation studies
focused on Delhis waste.
Incineration technologies require a continuous supply of waste
that has a sufficiently high calorific value and low moisture con-
tent. I will argue that the governments preference for WtE
technologies is inconsistent with the body of empirical evidence
that clearly demonstrates that Indian waste is not suitable for
incineration. In support of the adoption of WtE technologies, the
government is proposing a vision for urban waste management
system which assumes that WtE and recycling are compatible.
In other words, the government is suggesting that the adoption
51
SPECIAL ARTICLE
of WtE technologies will not adversely impact recyclers and the
associated recycling industry (both primarily informal). I will
argue that contemporary urban recycling systems and WtE
technologies are in competition over the same set of waste ma-
terials. Certain recyclable materials, such as paper, cardboard
and plastics are also combustible and hence, coveted by both
systems of managing waste.
One might attribute current and planned investment in
these technologies to the governments lack of knowledge about
their technical suitability (waste characteristics) and socio-
economic consequences (impact on the recycling industry).
Yet, as I argue in this article, knowledge is not the issue. The
Indian government is pushing for these technologies in spite of,
not due to a lack of, information about their appropriateness in
the Indian context. Although I use Delhi as a case study, my
argument is applicable to cities across the country struggling
with a similar set of policy choices.
Emerging Popularity of WtE Technologies
Shah (2011) aptly describes Delhis relationship with WtE tech-
nologies as an obsession. Delhi leads the country in imple-
menting WtE incineration projects, boasting three of the eight
WtE facilities across India (Planning Commission 2014). Officially
estimated as generating 8,360 tonnes per day (TPD), the city is
among the largest waste generators in the country, both in terms
of total quantity, as well as on a per capita basis (CPCB nd).
Although the citys landfills have far exceeded their designed
capacities, they continue to be used due to lack of alternatives
(Talyan et al 2008). Reports of Delhi and India, more generally,
drowning in its own waste, are not uncommon in the news
media (see for instance, Banerjee 2016 and Singh 2013). As the
Planning Commission (2014) bemoans, urban wastes have
unfortunately become both identifiers of our progress and degree of segregation. For instance, inert wastes need to be
badges of shame in India.
WtE appears to offer a quick fix, promising modern ways of
dealing with unsightly garbage that otherwise mar the image
of aspiring world-class cities in India. WtE industry proponents
often highlight the successes of incineration technologies in
Europe to bolster their claim that India also needs them (Brun-
ner 2013). Such a discourse is reflected in Indian policymakers
imaginations. About a new WtE facility, Delhis deputy chief
minister said, It is undoubtedly expensive but we need to do
such experiments to make Delhi a world-class city (Bhatnagar
2015). The Planning Commission (2014: ii2) recommended
WtE facilities so that India deals with its waste scientifically
and makes modern life possible for its citizens. Other than an
abstract aspiration towards an imagined modernity, what pre-
cisely is the allure of WtE as a technological fix to the growing
problem of waste? In what follows, I describe five reasons that
explain WtEs emerging popularity in contemporary India.
First, WtE technologies promise to reduce waste volumes
significantly. The total quantum of waste generated in India is
expected to increase fivefold by 2030 and per capita waste
generation rates are expected to double by 2025 (Hoornweg
and Bhada-Tata 2012; Sankhe et al 2010). Thermal treatment
technologies can reduce waste quantities by 85% to 95%
52
(Tchobanoglous et al 1993: 291). A substantial reduction in the
volume of waste that needs to be disposed is an attractive
proposition, especially in light of waste generation forecasts.
Second, reduced waste volumes also reduce the need for
landfill space. Land is already scarce, especially in urban areas
(MoF 2009; NGT 2015). In peri-urban areas, where land might
be more easily available, attempts to identify new landfills
often face severe opposition from those who live in their vici-
nity. WtE not only requires less land than its alternatives (for
example, composting or landfills), it also reduces the future
need for landfill space (Planning Commission 2014). At a con-
ference in Delhi, a representative of a WtE technology provider
said, Lack of space for landfills is a market expansion oppor-
tunity for incineration in India (Vogler 2013).
Third, the prospect of generating electricity from waste
holds promise. The estimated energy potential from urban
waste is approximately 511 megawatts (MW) or about 3% of the
total renewable power generation potential (Planning Com-
mission 2014; MoSPI 2013). In Delhi, all three WtE plants com-
bined could generate 52 MW of electricity. Compared to the
citys electricity demand of 5,925 MW in 2015, the contribution
of WtE would be less than 1% (BSES 2015). Nonetheless, the
power generation potential from waste holds sway, especially
because electricity shortages are commonplace.
Fourth, proponents claim that WtE does not rely on waste
generators or municipalities ability to segregate wastes. Inci-
neration-based WtE technologies claim to be able to process un-
segregated wastes, at least to a greater degree than biological
and biochemical treatment technologies such as composting and
biomethanation. This proposition is attractive because waste
segregation at source is a challenge. However, proponents ignore
the fact that even incineration-based WtE facilities require some
removed from the waste stream before thermal treatment and
the inability to do so, has led to problems with the functioning
of existing and past WtE plants. Nonetheless, the theoretical
promise that a facility can handle unsegregated waste to a
greater degree than other treatment alternatives is appealing.
Fifth, waste management technologies need to plan not just
for today but for the future. Waste quantity and composition is
expected to change with economic growth and development
(Khan and Burney 1989). The hope is that even if Indian waste
might not be perfectly suitable for thermal treatment techno-
logies today, it will become so, in the near future.
The extent to which these promises can be realised is debat-
able. My purpose here is to not analyse their potential efficacy.
Instead, it is to point out the ideological sway they hold in the
minds of planners and bureaucrats who are charged with finding
solutions to an ever-growing problem of waste in urban India.
In light of these promises and their ideological power, let us
examine Delhis history with WtE.
Delhis experiments with WtE incineration technologies
started in the 1980s. Commissioned by the Government of
India in 1984, a Danish firm built the citys first facility in 1987
that was designed to incinerate 300 TPD and produce 3.75 MW of
electricity. The plant failed and was shut down shortly after it
APRIL 1, 2017 vol liI no 13 EPW Economic & Political Weekly

started operating in 1991 (Shah 2011). The most commonly cited
reason for failure was a mismatch between the plants waste
input requirements and the quality of waste it received in
terms of calorific value, moisture content and its physical com-
position. Some suggest that the plant failed because it needed
waste with higher calorific values (1,2001,500 kcal/kg) than it
was supplied with (550850 kcal/kg) (Shah 2011; Talyan et al
2008). Others claim that the failure was due to a miscalcula-
tion of the moisture content in waste; the plant would not
work unless diesel was added as auxiliary fuel to dry it first
(Forsyth 2006). Yet others blame the physical material itself.
For some, it was the dust in the garbage that was jamming tariffs and ensuring compulsory purchase of the power gen-
and wearing out the conveyor screws (MacLaren and Thu
2003: 6). For others, it was unscreened garbage that affected
the performance of the equipment (MoF 2009: 58).
Twenty-two years later, in early 2012, another plant with a
capacity to treat 1,950 TPD and generate 16 MW of electricity
became operational (ASSOCHAM and cKinetics 2015). Unlike
the previous Timarpur facility, this plant faces a slightly differ-
ent set of challenges. The problem of waste inputs of appropri-
ate quality still lingers: mixed wastes containing large amounts
of inert wastes (construction and demolition waste and waste
from street sweeping (dust and drain silt)) do not burn and pose a
problem to the plants machinery (Planning Commission 2014).
The main challenge, however, has been on environmental
grounds, that the plant emits toxic gases (dioxins and furans)
that are damaging the health of those who live in its vicinity
(Planning Commission 2014). Residents of the nearby commu-
nities filed a public interest litigation (PIL) in the Delhi High
Court, which was subsequently transferred to the National Green
Tribunal (NGT) in February 2013 (Bhatnagar 2015). Even as this
plant was mired in controversy, Delhi had already embarked
upon two new WtE projectsone in Ghazipur and another in
Narelawith capacities to process 1,300 and 3,000 TPD and gen-
erate 12 MW and 24 MW of electricity respectively (GNCTD nd).
The announcement in the 201314 union budget was the
governments first systematic effort to consolidate financial
support for WtE projects by providing viability gap funding,
repayable grant and low cost capital (Chidambaram 2013).
WtE projects were eligible to apply for a capital subsidy of `20
million (approximately $3,00,000) per MW of energy that
the facility proposes to generate, up to a ceiling of `1 billion
(approximately $15 million) per project (MNRE 2013).
In June 2013, the Planning Commission commissioned a task
force to assess the feasibility of WtE technologies. This task force
submitted its final report in May 2014 recommending stand-
alone WtE facilities for large cities with populations above two
million, and pooled or regional facilities for smaller cities, esti-
mating that India could support 88 WtE facilities in the next five
to seven years, 215 by 2031 and 556 by 2050 (Planning Commis-
sion 2014: xiv). In October 2014, Prime Minister Narendra Modi
announced a nationwide campaign to clean IndiaSwachh
Bharat Mission. One of its components is to improve solid waste
management capacities and infrastructure in cities. For this, the
mission provides an incentive from the central government in
the form of a 20% grant or viability gap funding (VGF) for each
Economic & Political Weekly EPW APRIL 1, 2017 vol liI no 13
SPECIAL ARTICLE
project to encourage publicprivate partnerships (PPPs) (MoUD
2014). While the guidelines suggest that states are free to
choose the technology for waste management projects, WtE is
especially encouraged (MoUD 2014: 12).
Meanwhile, deliberating on a case related to the establish-
ment of a WtE plant for a cluster of cities in Haryana, the NGT
approved the project as a pilot, noting that its performance will
allow the NGT to issue further directions for implementation
of waste management systems in other urban clusters across
the country (NGT 2015). Recently released rules governing solid
waste also promote WtE technologies by guaranteeing fixed
erated from such plants, mandating that industrial units within
a 100 km radius of an existing RDF plant replace at least 5% of
their fuel requirement with refuse-derived fuel (RDF), and
banning the landfilling of waste that has calorific value higher
than 1,500 kcal/kg (MoEFCC 2016). There is little doubt that
the regulatory and legal framework around wastepolicies,
rules, and court interventionsis promoting WtE projects in
India. But is Indian waste suitable for WtE technologies? The
following section examines this question.
Characterising Delhis Waste from 1982 to 2006
Characterising the physical, chemical and biological proper-
ties of waste is essential for planning and developing systems
and technologies to manage it (Tchobanoglous et al 1993;
UNEP 2009). Decision-makers often bemoan the lack of stand-
ardised data on quantities and properties of waste in India.
The Ministry of Finance notes that there is a conspicuous lack
of accuracy regarding estimation of municipal solid waste
which poses a serious problem in technology assessment and
feasibility studies (MoF 2009: 3132). For WtE technologies,
lack of knowledge poses an even greater risk because they
must have waste inputs of specific qualities and quantities in
order to function. The properties that help determine the suit-
ability of waste for incineration include the proportions of bio-
degradable and recyclable materials, lower and higher calorific
value (LCV and HCV), and moisture content of waste.
Table 2 (p 54) reports these properties of Delhis waste from six
studies, dating between 1982 and 2006, conducted by govern-
ment agencies, academic and research institutions. While I was
able to access primary sources in three cases (CPCB nd; MCD 2004;
Mor et al 2006), summary tables cited in secondary research
were used in the other three cases (MCD 2004; Talyan et al 2008)
(Table 1, p 54). Of these, government institutions, including the
All India Institute of Hygiene and Public Health (AIIHPH), the
Central Pollution Control Board (CPCB), the National Environ-
mental Engineering Research Institute (NEERI) and the erst-
while Municipal Corporation of Delhi (MCD), conducted four.
Academics and development consultancies conducted the other
two: Mor et al (2006) and Infrastructure Professionals Enterprise
(IPE). A major problem in comparing the results of these studies
was that researchers used different categories for reporting the
physical characteristics of waste. Some used relatively broad
categories (compostable, recyclable and other waste), while
others used more detailed classification systems (Table 1).
53
SPECIAL ARTICLE

The challenge was to reconcile the disparate categorisation and 30%40% is other waste. Third, changes in waste composi-
systems used in these studies to allow for comparison between tion over time are not easily discernible. Undoubtedly, certain
them. I use three broad categories for reporting physical com- kinds of wastes such as plastics have increased considerably
position: biodegradable (or compostable), recyclable, and other over this time period. The difference in the recyclable fractions
waste.1 The values that were not reported in the sources are might attest to this increase. Fourth, moisture content varies
labelled as N/A. The numbers in parentheses represent the range widely depending on where waste is collected. Results from
of calorific values and moisture content as reported in the sources. MCD (2004) show that while the moisture content of waste at
Although there is significant variation in the results reported source ranges between 54% and 65%, it reduces to 47% at the
in Table 2, we can draw the following broad conclusions. First, landfill. Fifth, estimates of calorific value vary widely. MCDs
the location of sampling influences the waste characteristics. In (2004) HCV estimates are more than twice as high as those esti-
two of the eight studies, waste was sampled both at source and mated by CPCB and NEERI (2006). This could be partially be-
at the disposal point (MCD 2004; NEERI 1996). In both cases, cause MCDs samples from trucks entering landfills had been
the percentage of recyclable materials was found to be much selected for low inert content (2004: 131). Further, although
lower at the disposal point than at source, attributable to the calorific value of waste may have increased over time, whether
upstream extraction of those materials from the waste stream or not it is adequate as feedstock for WtE incineration plants is
by informal recycling sector. No patterns emerged in the pro- not evident. But what do these results mean for the technical
portions of compostable and other waste however. Second, suitability of Delhis waste for incineration? The following sec-
even though waste characteristics depend crucially on sam- tion describes the generally accepted waste quality require-
pling location, in general there is consensus that roughly 40% ments for incineration technologies, the conclusions that vari-
60%, of the waste is biodegradable, 10%20%, is recyclable, ous government and non-governmental organisations have drawn
Table 1: Categorisation of Waste Materials from the results of waste characterisation studies, and the reasons
Source Original Study Waste Categories Used for the observed quality of waste in Delhi.
Talyan et al (2008) AIIHPH (1982), Biodegradable, paper, plastic,
NEERI (1996) metal, glass and crockery, The Technical (Im)possibility of Incineration
non-biodegradable (leather,
rubber, bones, synthetic material), Calorific value and moisture content both play a key role in
and inert (stones, bricks, ashes) determining wastes suitability for thermal treatment techno-
CPCB (nd) CPCB and NEERI (2006) Compostable, recyclable and other logies. The Ministry of Urban Developments (MoUD) guidance
MCD (2004) IPE (2004) Biodegradable, recyclable and other manual recommends that the calorific value of waste be great-
NEERI (1996), Biodegradable, recyclable, inert,
er than 1,200 kcal/kg and moisture content be less than 45%
MCD (2004) and other
Mor et al (2006) Mor et al (2006) Compostable, paper, plastic, metal,
for thermochemical conversion processes (MoUD 2000: 264).
cloth, and stone (stones, bricks, Other sources, however, recommend even higher calorific
construction material) values. A World Bank report recommends an average annual
Table 2: Composition of Delhi's Waste
Study Sampling Point Compostable (%) Recyclable (%) Other (%) LCV (kcal/kg) HCV (kcal/kg) Moisture (%)
AIIHPH (1982) Landfill inputs 57.7 6.58.3 34.035.8 6611,200 N/A 1540
NEERI (1996) Community bin and landfill inputs 38.0 5.912.9 48.855.8 712 (528895) N/A 44 (2545)
High-income area 44.5 15.4 40.1 N/A N/A N/A
Med-income area 40.0 12.6 47.4 N/A N/A N/A
Low-income and slum area 36.4 12.0 51.6 N/A N/A N/A
Commercial area 38.5 20.2 41.3 N/A N/A N/A
Landfill 30.6 9.8 59.6 N/A N/A N/A
IPE (2004) Household (low income) 62.0 22.0 16.0 N/A N/A N/A
Household (med income) 61.0 33.0 6.0 N/A N/A N/A
Household (high income) 64.0 28.0 8.0 N/A N/A N/A
MCD (2004) Household (high income) 71.9 23.1 5.0 1,623 (1,3001,887) 4,907 (4,5035,359) 59 (5165)
Household (med income) 76.6 21.2 2.2 1,339 (7311,939) 4,942 (3,4156,307) 65 (5975)
Household (low income) 58.4 15.7 25.9 1,398 (7542,226) 3,446 (2,2384,844) 54 (3976)
Household (slum) 69.4 14.1 16.5 884 (2041,548) 3,429 (1,5824,912) 63 (5971)
Vegetable markets 97.2 2.3 0.5 497 (01,309) 3,827 (3,0834,442) 76 (6282)
Institutional areas 59.7 33.8 6.5 1,693 (1293,778) 4,159 (2,642 5,459) 50 (584)
Streets 28.4 12.0 59.6 1,598 (1,0072,041) 2,199 (1,1883,289) 19 (533)
Commercial areas 15.6 68.0 16.4 3,532 (1,8154,593) 4,576 (3,3726,185) 18 (252)
Landfill inputs 73.7 9.2 17.1 1,777 (1914,495) 3,927 (2,0425,315) 47 (882)
Compost plant inputs 76.8 7.8 15.4 1,767 (8962,838) 4,076 (3,1534,582) 50 (3465)
Compost plant rejects 25.6 12.8 61.6 2,148 (1003,501) 2,527 (1533,996) 13 (717)
CPCB and NEERI (2006) Community bin 54.0 16.0 30.0 N/A 1,802 49
Mor et al (2006) Landfill (09 m) 59.2 6.413.7 26.633.9 N/A N/A 40
Landfill (03 m) 49.0 9.123.4 26.240.5 N/A N/A 29
Landfill (36 m) 59.6 7.615.0 24.832.2 N/A N/A 46
Landfill (69 m) 68.9 2.3 28.8 N/A N/A 45

54 APRIL 1, 2017 vol liI no 13 EPW Economic & Political Weekly


LCV of at least 1,672 kcal/kg, with 1,433 kcal/kg as the thresh-
old below which it should never drop (Rand et al 2000: 6). An-
other World Bank report recommends an annual LCV of 1,300
kcal/kg for self-sustained incineration, and 2,200 kcal/kg if
significant energy recovery is desired (Cointreau 2006: 8).
Broadly, there seems to be some consensus that calorific val-
ues for incineration without energy recovery range bet ween
1,200 kcal/kg and 1,400 kcal/kg (Talyan et al 2008).
Not surprisingly, almost everyone is in agreement that Indian
waste is suitable for composting and not for incineration.
International institutions have long pointed out the problem of
calorific value and the consequent unsuitability of incineration
technologies in waste of developing countries in general
(Cointreau-Levine 1994; Rand et al 2000; UNEP 2010). Many
Indian government agencies have themselves at various points
in time, taken on the task of making their own assessments
based on the results of waste characterisation studies de-
scribed in the previous section. These reports conclude that
low calorific values combined with high moisture and inert
content, and the subsequent necessity of adding auxiliary fuel
all limit the technical and economic feasibility of the applica-
tion of thermal technologies (IMaCS nd; MoF 2009; MoUD
2000; Planning Commission 1995, 2014).
A Planning Commission report concluded that urban Indian
waste is generally unsuitable for thermal technologies because it
has low calorific value and high moisture content with high
percentage of non-combustible materials (1995: 5). The report,
however, was not totally dismissive of thermal technologies,
suggesting that these technologies be further evaluated for
their applicability. The MoUD, in its solid waste management
guidance manual, agreed that self-sustaining combustion was
unlikely for Indian waste and the addition of auxiliary fuel
would be required, if incineration technologies were to be
adopted (2000: 285). However, the ministry also suggested
that the adoption of advanced, scientific methods, including
incineration, is imperative for dealing with the growing prob-
lem of waste case in India (2000: 285). While agreeing that
thermal treatment technologies are unsuitable for Indian
waste, these documents also recommended composting as the
most suitable waste treatment option in India.
The most comprehensive study among the ones analysed
above is MCD (2004) which sampled waste from a range of dif-
ferent sources and recommended the most feasible treatment
options for each source. This study recommended biochemical
treatment (methanisation and composting) for most waste
streams (households in all four socio-economic groups, vege-
table markets, institutional areas, and landfill inputs). For
waste from streets, commercial areas and for compost plant
rejects, it recommended RDF production but only if inert waste
could be reduced and warned that waste quantities might be
too low for such a facility to be feasible. Only for one waste
streamcompost plant rejectsdid the study recommend in-
cineration as a treatment technology. Yet, despite this studys
recommendations, Delhi has built three WtE facilities.
At this point, one might ask the question: why is the calorific
value of Indian waste so low? Government agencies, international
Economic & Political Weekly EPW APRIL 1, 2017 vol liI no 13
SPECIAL ARTICLE
development institutions, and even the waste management in-
dustry have all known the reason for a long time (Furniturewala
2012; MoUD 2000; Planning Commission 1995, 2014; UNEP 2010).
Most but not all recyclables (paper, cardboard and plastics, for
instance) are highly combustible. Nandy (2015) notes that
more than 90% of what doorstep waste collectors typically extract
from household waste for recycling, is combustible (178). Waste
pickers are extremely efficient at extracting these recyclable
materials thereby reducing the calorific value of waste. For
instance, the Planning Commission notes that the reason for
low calorific value of urban Indian waste is because paper,
plastic and wood have already been removed and used for
recycling (1995: 4). The UNEP suggests that Indias experi-
ments with thermal treatment technologies have been unsuc-
cessful because the informal recycling sector recovers much
of the dry, high calorific material leaving a moist residue
with high green waste content unsuitable for production of
combustible fluff without considerable pre-treatment (that is,
drying) (2010: 23). A waste management firm operator sug-
gested that waste management companies have been unable
to succeed in India because around 500,000 ragpickers
across the country extract recyclables, leaving behind waste of
very low content quality (Furniturewala 2012: 21).
Despite agreement onthe facts of and reasons forwastes
unsuitability for incineration, these technologies are being
pushed for large-scale implementation across India, and Delhi
is leading the way. But the question of the mismatch between
inputs available and inputs required by those technologies
remains unresolved. In other words, how will those techno-
logies be viable if the informal sector continues to extract high
calorific value materials from it? To find the answer, the fol-
lowing section examines how proponents of these techno-
logies envision a future system for making WtE viable in the
Indian context, specifically the Planning Commission (2014)
report that has advocated for large-scale adoption of these
technologies even as it agreed that Indian waste is not suita-
ble as raw material for them because of the informal recy-
cling sector (Planning Commission 2014: 51).
Making Incineration Possible
Embracing the internationally accepted waste management
hierarchy, the Planning Commission (2014) does not expect that
all waste will be treated using thermochemical technologies,
acknowledging the importance of the existing informal recy-
cling sector and the need for biochemical treatment methods:
The waste that can be recycled should be recycled to manufacture
new products saving natural resources, the wet wastes that can pro-
duce biogas or compost, should be processed and the wastes that are
non recyclable and yet have high calorific value should be used for
[W tE] projects. (Planning Commission 2014: x; NGT 2015)
In this scenario, on an average about 10% of the waste is
expected to continue to be recovered for recycling by the infor-
mal sector, 65% could be treated using either biological or thermal
treatment technologies and the remaining 25% is inert mate-
rial that cannot be treated using either biological or thermal
treatment technologies. Of the 65% treatable material, 40%
(or 26% of total) could be thermally treated, 10% (or 6.5% of
55
SPECIAL ARTICLE

total) treated using biomethanation technologies, and the re- and bureaucrats against an uncritical adoption of these tech-
maining 50% (or 32.5% of total) composted (Planning Commis- nologies. In other words, if recyclable waste is recycled and bio-
sion 2014: 130). On the surface, it appears that there is no conflict degradable waste is biochemically treated as the Planning
between informal recycling sector and WtE incineration tech- Commission recommends, then there will not be sufficient
nologies. As this section shows, however, this is largely because waste for thermal treatment technologies to be viable.
of the way the Planning Commission (2014) chose to estimate Thermal treatment technologies need a continuous supply
and present waste composition data. Comparing the Planning of waste inputs of sufficient quality and quantity to be able to
Commissions estimates to the results of Delhis waste charac- work (Cointreau-Levine 1994: 17). One way to assure a reliable
terisation studies reveals its detachment from ground realities. supply of waste materials is to control the end-to-end process,
Table 3 compares the proportion of waste suitable for vari- from collection at source to final treatment or disposal (Forsyth
ous treatment options as recommended by the Planning Com- 2005). Government agencies and international development
mission (2014) against the results of the six waste characteri- institutions know how important control of the waste stream is
sation studies. To do this, I re-categorised the data from the six for the viability of WtE facilities. A World Bank report calls for
studies to determine the proportions of waste that can be carefully managing scavenging and other recycling activities
channeled into each of the four treatment categories.2 so as to maintain the composition and combustibility of waste
The Planning Commissions treatment recommendations apply arriving at an incineration plant (Rand et al 2000: 56).
to waste generated at source. Table 3 shows that their recom- Government reports also call for streamlining the entire end-
mendations underestimated the recyclable and biodegradable to-end waste management process so that the waste collected
fractions, and overestimated the thermally treatable fraction of at source is what arrives at processing facilities (IMaCS nd; MoF
waste generated. In household waste, estimates of the recycla- 2009; Planning Commission 2014). The Planning Commission
ble fractions range between 12% and 33%, biodegradable frac- task force advises municipal authorities to introduce door-to-
tions between 36% and 77%, and thermally treatable fractions door collection, transportation of bio degradable and recycla-
between 1% and 15% (IPE 2004; MCD 2004; NEERI 1996). Fur- ble as well as high calorific value of waste directly to processing
ther, an empirical estimate of informal recycling suggests that facility (2014: xxv).
the informal sector recycles over 17% of Delhis waste (Agarwal The MoF recommends that private partners (waste manage-
et al 2005). The discrepancy between the Planning Commis- ment firms) be assigned long-term rights to waste and guar-
sions estimates and the results of waste characterisation stud- anteed [waste] volumes and characteristics to mitigate risks
ies puts into question the accuracy of the reports analysis, (waste supply and waste quality) of PPPs in solid waste man-
undermining the degree to which WtE technologies are appropri- agement (2009: 34). Commenting on the failure of an RDF
ate in the Indian context, and thus should caution policymakers plant, a MOUD report recommends an inflexible door-to-door
Table 3: Suitability of Waste Streams for Treatment Alternatives (%) collection system in the city and ensure that all the waste col-
Study Recyclable Inert Thermal Biochemical lected is transported to the processing facility (IMaCS nd: 82).
Planning Commission (2014) 10.0 25.0 26.0 39.0 Government and international development agencies are well
AIIHPH (1982) 7.4 28.929.2 5.16.6 57.7
aware that implementing such a system would entail denying
NEERI (1996)
High-income area 15.4 25.3 14.8 44.5 many in the informal sector access to their means of livelihood. A
Medium-income area 12.6 34.0 13.4 40.0 report by the Deutsche Gessellschaft fr Internationale Zusam-
Low-income and slum area 12.0 38.3 13.3 36.4 menarbeit (GIZ) acknowledges that if WtE technologies are im-
Commercial area 20.2 24.8 16.5 38.5
plemented on a large scale, facility operators and waste pickers
Landfill 9.8 32.7 26.9 30.6
IPE (2004)
will find themselves in competition over recyclable waste materi-
Low-income households 22.0 16.0 62.0 als of high calorific value (Gerdes and Gunsilius 2010). To ad-
Medium-income households 33.0 6.0 61.0 dress this, government reports often nominally recognise the
High-income households 28.0 8.0 64.0 contribution of the informal sector and suggest that they need to
MCD (2004)
High-income households 23.1 0.3 4.7 71.9
be included in proposed future systems. The Planning Commis-
Medium-income households 21.2 0.5 1.7 76.6 sion task force, for instance, proposes that municipal authorities
Low-income households 15.7 22.8 3.1 58.4 set up waste sorting facilities at suitable locations and permit the
Slum households 14.1 15.8 0.7 69.4 informal sector to use the facility for segregation of recyclables
Vegetable markets 2.3 0.5 0.0 97.2
(Planning Commission 2014: xi; NGT 2015). A nominal discourse
Institutional areas 33.8 4.0 2.5 59.7
Streets 12.0 56.1 3.5 28.4
of inclusion serves a rhetorical purpose of placating protests from
Commercial areas 68.0 0.0 16.4 15.6 social activists and organisations who advocate for the interests of
Landfill inputs 9.2 10.8 6.3 73.7 the informal sector. The real questions, however, remain unan-
Compost plant inputs 7.8 9.5 5.9 76.8 swered: How would waste pickers have access to waste/recycla-
Compost plant rejects 12.8 45.9 15.7 25.6
bles if the municipality or a WtE facility operator tightly controls
CPCB and NEERI (2006) 16.0 30.0 54.0
Mor et al (2006) 10.1 3.3 23.330.6 59.2
the entire waste management process? Assuming the informal
Landfill (03m) 16.3 1.3 24.939.2 49.0 sector has access and is able to extract recyclables, would WtE
Landfill (36m) 11.3 6.6 18.225.6 59.6 facilities have a sufficient supply of the quality and quantity of
Landfill (69m) 2.3 2.1 26.7 68.9 waste inputs to sustain operations?
56 APRIL 1, 2017 vol liI no 13 EPW Economic & Political Weekly
 SPECIAL ARTICLE

Thus far, this hope for an end-to-end control of the process
has not been realised. Nonetheless, it signals a potential future
that does not bode well for the informal waste sector. In Delhi,
this future might even be close. In March 2014, the New Delhi
Municipal Council (NDMC) announced its plans to introduce
an integrated waste management system by collecting waste
from doorsteps and sending it for disposal in a scientific and
mechanised manner at the TimarpurOkhla Waste Manage-
ment Co Ltd (TOWMCL) plant (PTI 2014). Although this plan
has not yet been fully implemented, it remains a real possibili-
ty, as does the consequent displacement of informal waste sec-
tor workers. As two other WtE incineration facilities begin
operations, the impacts of a system that privatises ownership
of the entire waste management process, will undoubtedly be
disastrous for workers in the informal recycling economy
(Schindler et al 2012). Further, implicit in the governments
discourse of compatibility between recycling and WtE is a tacit
acceptance that the only landfill scavengers are likely to be
displaced if WtE technologies are adopted. Indeed, earlier
research has demonstrated that where WtE facilities are opera-
tional, scavengers at landfills have lost access to their means of
subsistence (Chintan 2012). As I have shown however, the via-
bility of WtE hinges upon controlling the entire waste manage-
ment chain, therefore impacting every informal sector actor
along the way, and not just at the landfill.
Conclusions
WtE incineration technologies are unlikely to work unless
materials are diverted away from recycling and towards incin-
eration. Much of what is recycled is also combustible. WtE
technologies and the informal recycling sector are competing,
not compatible systems of managing waste.
In the internationally accepted waste management hierarchy,
recycling is preferred over incineration (with or without energy
recovery). But the problem is that recycling alone does not ad-
dress the problem of what to do with other waste, particularly
biodegradable waste that forms the largest component of Indian
waste, as shown in Section 3 of this article. Most government
agency reports that concluded that incineration was unsuitable
for Indian waste, also suggested that composting was the most
appropriate solution. Although composting is almost one
third as cheap as WtE technologies, it requires more land, seg-
regated wastes that do not contaminate the end product, and
support for the marketing of the end product (Planning Com-
mission 2014). The MoCF (2016) has recently addressed the latter
problem by announcing assistance of `1,500 per tonne of com-
post and other support for the marketing of city compost in
order to encourage more composting projects in urban areas.
Similarly, the new solid waste rules encourage composting
through various means including mandating that local author-
ities phase out the use of chemical fertilisers in urban parks,
substituting it with city compost (MoEFCC 2016). Yet, although
WtE technologies have invigorated an interest among private
firms eager to invest, this has not been the case with compost-
ing. A significantly lower financial investment potential in
composting as compared to WtE is likely the reason (ASSOCHAM
and cKinetics 2015). Gandy (1994) and Newsday (1989) have
shown how corrupt alliances between waste industry and
powerful state actors led to the adoption of incineration in cer-
tain cities in the United States and Europe. Though it is well
worth examining the influence of private industry interests
over the emergence of WtE as a policy choice in India, it is
beyond the scope of this article.
Large-scale investment in WtE technologies may solve the
problem of reducing Indian cities increasing waste burden.
But in doing so, it will likely create an entirely different socio-
economic problem of increased poverty, and under- and unem-
ployment for workers in the informal waste economy. These
will not be unintended consequencesunexpected by prod-
ucts of improvements in waste management systems in India.
Instead, as this article has shown, these consequences are, in
fact, fairly well-known, acknowledged and subsequently
ignored in policy circles in India. The emerging popularity of
WtE betrays the priorities of the Indian government: privileging
expensive, high-tech, quick fixes that appear to be modern
and scientific over a vibrant recycling economy and cheaper,
low-tech solutions such as composting that are socially,
economically, and environmentally just.

Notes
1 To arrive at this simplified categorisation system,
it was necessary to allocate certain materials into
one of two categoriesrecyclable or other
wastewhere waste had not already been cate-
gorised in this manner. All six studies reported
biodegradable (or compostable) waste as a sepa-
rate category; therefore this did not need to be
re-categorised. To re-categorise certain materials,
I started with the assumption that paper, metal,
glass and plastics are some of the most commonly
recycled materials (Agarwal et al 2005; Nandy
et al 2015). First, I assumed that paper and metals
are almost always recycled and thus re-categorised
them as recyclable. Second, plastics and glass/
crockery are not always recyclable, depending
on the type of material. In order to account for
their potential recyclability or non-recyclability,
they were included and excluded from both cat-
egories (recyclable and other). The propor-
tions in these two categories are therefore re-
flected as a range rather than a discrete number
(Table 2). For instance, the minimum value in
the recyclable category only includes paper and
metal and the maximum value includes plastics
and glass as well. Third, although other items
such as textiles/cloth, leather, rubber, bones and
construction debris are also often recycled, they
do not form a significant portion of what waste
pickers typically collect and sell onwards in the
informal recycling economy (Posada 2010).
Their recyclability is highly dependent on the
condition of the material. For this reason, I ex-
cluded them from recyclable and instead cate-
gorised them as other waste. Fourth, I cate-
gorised inert wastes as other.
2 Two of the six studies had categorised using the
following three categories: compostable, recycl-
able and other (CPCB and NEERI 2006; IPE
2004). In these two cases, it was not possible to
determine the proportions of inert and thermally
treatable waste separately and therefore these
have been reported as an aggregate. In the rest of
the cases, I made the following assumptions about
the treatment and recycling potential of different
waste materials. First, paper and metal were
always assumed to be recyclable. Second, plastic
waste may or may not be recyclable but was as-
sumed to be thermally treatable. Third, glass waste
may or may not be recyclable, is inert and there-
fore not thermally treatable. Fourth, textile/cloth
and leather are both thermally treatable. Thus, the
re-categorised data is presented as a range, where
the maximum value includes all material that
could be possibly be in that category and the min-
imum as only the material that could definitively
be ascribed to that category (Table 3). For instance,
the minimum value in the recyclable category
contains only metals and paper while the maxi-
mum value includes glass and plastic as well.
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vol liI no 13 EPW Economic & Political Weekly
SPECIAL ARTICLE
Land Acquisition and Beyond
The Farmers Perspective
Dhanmanjiri Sathe
Farmers have a complex relationship with their land:
losing it means losing an entire way of life. A survey of
the original inhabitants of Maan, a village near Pune
where land was acquired for an information technology
park and industrial estates, found that the process of
acquisition was both attractive and scary for the farmers
involved. Almost 70% of the respondents were willing to
sell their land under different conditions. They were
bitter about the escalation of land values after
acquisition. What farmers want is a share in the future
appreciation of land.
Research assistance by Atul Kotagal and funding from the Centre for
Social Sciences and Humanities, Savitribai Phule Pune University, are
gratefully acknowledged.
Dhanmanjiri Sathe (dhan.sathe@gmail.com) teaches at the Savitribai
Phule Pune University.
Economic & Political Weekly EPW april 1, 2017 vol liI no 13
L
and acquisition, arguably a major issue in Indias political
economy, needs to be examined from all angles. In this
paper, we study the process of land acquisition in Maan
village, around 20 km from Pune. Almost half the land in this
village was acquired between 2000 and 2006. In 2006, follow-
ing a protest movement, acquisition came to a standstill. We
discuss how much land was acquired, how many families lost
how much land, the compensation paid, the willingness or
otherwise of the farmers to sell the land, and how the compen-
sation money was used. Then we review the protest movement
in Maan and the reasons behind it.
Farmers have a layered and complex relationship with their
land. Not surprisingly then, acquisition of land is an important
event in a farmers life and in the history of a village. More
often than not, it means either partial or complete annihilation of
the villagethe village simply ceases to exist as land acquisition
proceeds. Hence, the term commonly used for land acquisition
by the villagers is loss of land. Losing ones land implies losing
an entire way of life. No wonder there is a tone of wretchedness
when the term is used. Strictly speaking, this phrase can be
used only when absolutely no compensation has been paid.
However, a no-compensation situation has become rare in India,
making the phrase loss of land a bit of a misnomer. Nonethe-
less, we will stick to this terminology and use the phrase as the
villagers use it.
We study this village that is about to disappear because its
journey into extinction may be a revealing one. Further, there
could be policy implications for the manner in which land
could be acquired and compensation paidfrom the viewpoint
of the villagers themselves.
The story of Maan begins with the establishment of an infor-
mation technology (IT) park in the adjacent village of Hinjewadi,
2.9 km away from Maan. Infosys was the first occupant of the
Hinjewadi IT park and has its second largest facility worldwide
there. The land (100 acres of gairan or grazing grounds) was
acquired in 2000, after the MumbaiPune Expressway was
built, and the project was called the Rajiv Gandhi Infotech
(RGIT) Park Phase I (Sathe 2014). This development took place
under the Maharashtra governments special economic zone
(SEZ) policy, passed in 2001. The SEZ policy was a part of larger
changes in perception at the central and state levels. The Indian
government had started to favour the policy of promoting such
zones. In 2000 the government replaced the old EPZ [Export
Processing Zone] regime by a new scheme of Special Economic
Zones (SEZs) with several lucrative incentives/benefits that
59
SPECIAL ARTICLE
were not available in the earlier scheme (Agarwal 2006: 4533).
The purpose was to give a big push to exports, employment
and investment in the SEZs. The development of a village was
never an objective of the SEZ policy.
In Maharashtra all land for the purpose of industrialisation
is acquired by one government body, namely, the Maharashtra
Industrial Development Corporation (MIDC). This is different
from some other states such as Uttar Pradesh that have more
than one government agency acquiring land. MIDC officials in-
formed us that the process of land acquisition is not affected
by the final use of land: there is no difference between acquisi-
tion of land for an SEZ or an industrial park, for instance.
The distance between Hinjewadi and Maan being small, as
RGIT Park Phase I was completed, more phases were announced
following demand from investors, say MIDC officials. Thus,
RGIT Park Phases II, III and IV reached Maan one after the
other. RGIT Phase I in Hinjewadi was an SEZ. Phase II was not
an SEZ, and Phase III is again an SEZ. Phase IV is expected to
be an SEZ but acquisition has not proceeded in this phase.
Phase I has companies like Infosys, Tata Consultancy Services
(TCS) and Tech Mahindra; Phase II is dedicated to manu-
facturing industrial products such as automobiles, chemicals
and pharmaceuticals. Phase III is mainly focused on IT
companies and housing.
In 2015, Maan had one five-star hotel, and 15 middle- and
lower-level hotels. Two big residential complexes have come
up in Maan called Megapolis and Le Royale. Megapolis is
sprawled over 150 acres, with a Pawar Public School (owned
by Supriya Sule, politician Sharad Pawars daughter), a hospi-
tal and other amenities, built by two major local builders
(Bhosale Builders and Kumar Builders).
The land acquired in Maan was physically contiguous to the
land acquired in Hinjewadi. There was no other criterion for
acquisition. As a result, the families were randomly affected
by land acquisition: there was no purposiveness in their selec-
tion and they may or may not have economic or social charac-
teristics in common. There was no other design, either on the
part of MIDC that acquired the land, or the villagers themselves.
Further, landownership in Maan showed some typical features
of landholdings in India. First, a single plot was found to have
many owners. Second, a farming family had land not in just one
place in the village but spread over various parts of the village.
This phenomenon is known as divisionsubdivision and
fragmentation of land. This pattern of landownership had
important implications as acquisition proceeded.
The acquisition in Maan occurred under the Maharashtra
Industrial Development (MID) Act 1961, passed in 1962.
Data from Sample Survey
To answer the questions that we have raised above, we con-
ducted a survey of all original inhabitants of Maanabout
805 families. However, 27 families refused to respond1 and, so
our sample size became 778 families, which had 4,081 people.
The survey was conducted from June 2013 to August 2013 by
teams consisting of one male and one female investigator,
both with rural backgrounds, to decrease respondent bias. The
60
interviews were held in the privacy of the respondents homes.
Our purpose was to get quantitative as well as qualitative data.
We also used the personal interview method. A large number
of visits to Maan threw up several observations. The author
made around 50 to 55 trips to Maan from 2011 to 2015. We
interacted with the local inhabitants, the sarpanchs (past and
present) and various officials at the gram panchayat, including
the gram sevak or village development officer.
Findings on Land Acquisition
According to the gram panchayat website (www.grampan-
chayatmaan.org), the total area of Maan is 5,200 acres, of
which the MIDC area constitutes around 30%. The villagers say
that almost 50% of the land has been acquired, which means
that the remaining 20% of land has been acquired by private
entities (builders, industrial units, retail food outlets, shop-
keepers). However, some senior knowledgeable people from
the village say that around 2,981 acres (57%) have been ac-
quired by the MIDC and private entities. The sale to private en-
tities has been occurring even after the protest movement of
2006 (explained below). It is somewhat difficult to get an ac-
curate estimate of land that is not with the villagers as the
gram panchayat data are not updated and different people
have different estimates. As a rough estimate, we can say that
around half the land is not with the villagers.
Focusing on our sample, we can see from Table 1(A) (p 61)
that around 11.6% of the families lost all their land, while 34%
lost some part of their landholdings. Hence, almost half the fami-
lies (46%) have lost all or some part of their land. However,
34% still have some land. This is because of the pattern of
landownership in any village in India, where most families
have portions of land scattered over various locations in a vil-
lage. Table 1(B) (p 61) shows that for our sample as a whole,
land lost was equal to 1,850 acres. This is 61% of what the villag-
ers themselves say they have lost, and more than what MIDC
has acquired. There is some discrepancy here and in the above
paragraph with respect to the total land sold, but we presume
that this is inevitable because people remember and recall dif-
ferently and sometimes they also deliberately avoid providing
accurate information.
Most of the families in our sample (around 88%) sold their
land to MIDC (Table 1C, p 61). The remaining sold it to private
companies or private builders. This is how it happened: when
the land to be acquired under RGIT Phases II and III was declared,
some builders approached the owners of the land which was
contiguous to these phases. The owners of these plots decided
to sell their land to these private entities. Further, the average
land lost per family turned out to be 5.16 acres.
The compensation paid by MIDC was `6,40,000 per acre and
this matches farmers responses (Table 1D, p 61). For an addi-
tional payment, a house of 200 sq ft was also available to those
who had lost their home. The average price paid by the private
entities was somewhat higher at `7,40,000 per acre than that
paid by MIDC (but there was no option of buying a house in this
deal). Discussions with the villagers revealed that the real price
of an acre of land was around `8,000 `10,000 in 1999. In view
april 1, 2017 vol liI no 13 EPW Economic & Political Weekly
 SPECIAL ARTICLE

of this, the price paid by MIDC can be called very handsome is clear from Table 2(B) that almost 90% were pressurised by
more than six times the market price (not deflated due to stamp MIDC or the governmentthe gram sevak or others.
duty or other considerations). This is actually higher than Next, we tried to find out how they were pressurised. We
the four times the market rate stipulated under the Right to tried to look into the pressurising techniques that the MIDC/
Fair Compensation and Transparency in the Land Acquisi- government used. We asked, How were you pressurised? We
tion, Rehabilitation and Resettlement (LARR) Act, Govern- also tried to probe with questions such as How exactly was it
ment of India, 2013. done? What channels were used to pressurise you? and there
However, 41 families got no compensation at the time of the were multiple answers to each of the questions.
survey. This happened because either their ownership papers There are several ways in which the land losers recount the
were not in order or some families refused to take the stipu- same phenomenon. Many villagers said they were not asked,
lated amount and approached the court for enhanced settle- but notices were sent to them. These notices stated that this
ment (as the MID Act allows). Not surprisingly, most of the land has been earmarked for an SEZ, and villagers will have to
respondents knew that the amount paid by MIDC was less than sell their land. Then some villagers said that the 7/12 utara
the amount paid by private entities. However, it needs to be (land record) was stamped without them knowing about it. A
pointed out that the value of land increased only after MIDC section responded that one day our land was measured and
acquired the land and started developing the infrastructure within a few days cheques were sent to us; we did not even
on it. Further, we can note from Table 1(F) that around 63% of know what was happening. Another response was that
the land was dry, which reflects the fact that agriculture was everyone was selling land, so we thought that we should also
quite poor in this village. However, the acquisition of dry land sell or later on we could lose. The first part of the statement
happened more by chance than by design as the only criterion implies that we have to be with the group. The second part of this
used in acquisition of this land was its proximity to RGIT statement is more important because it shows the fear that if
Phase I. left alone they would suffer even more. There is herd behaviour
here. We did not have any idea what was happening, was
Were the Landholders Intimidated into Selling Their Land? another common response. Finally, some people were prom-
Now we turn to issues related to loss of land. We find from ised jobs and this was what made them agree to sell the land.
Table 2(A) that almost 90% say they sold their land unwillingly. It However, there is another side to this narrative. In our per-
Table 1: Loss of Land and the Compensation sonal discussions with the land losers we
(A) Effect of Land Acquisition (B) Quantity of Land Sold (in acres) found that a large number of them felt that
Lost/Sold All Lost/Sold a Own Some Never Owned Not Given Total Average Land Total Land
Part/Parts Now and Any Sold Per Family Sold land acquisition would bring development to
Never Sold the village. Since most had some contact with
91 267 306 112 2 778 5.16 1,850 Pune, they felt that the village would become
(11.69) (34.31) (39.33) (14.39) (0.25) (100)
like Pune. Therefore, the allure of moving
(C) Sold Land to Whom (D) Average Compensation Received for
Land Per Acre (`)
ahead was also present. The assurance of jobs
Govt/ Midc Private Entity Any Other Dont Know Total MIDC Private Entity made the proposition attractive.
317 35 5 1 358 6,67,480 7,40,000 Interestingly but not surprisingly, almost 50%
(88.50) (9.8) (1.4) (0.3) (100) did not feel they were being cheated of good
(E) Whether Compensation Paid by Govt-MIDC Is Less (F) Category of Land Sold compensation at that time (Table 2C). Equally
than Private Entity
Yes No Dont Know Total Dry Wet Fallow Total unsurprisingly, more than 80% now feel (at the
301 41 `16 358 242 136 6 384 time of the survey) that they were cheated of a
(84.1) (11.45) (4.45) (100) (63) (35.4) (1.6) (100) good compensation (Table 2D). From Table 2(E)
Figures in brackets indicate percentages. we can perceive that around 77% did not fully
grasp the meaning of loss of land at the time.
Table 2: Responses to Acquisition of Land
(A) Did You Sell the Land on Your Own? (B) Who Presurrised You to Sell Land? In some ways, we could senseand many
Yes, Sold on No, Not Given Total Govt MIDC Not Given/ Total reported explicitlythat they did not know
My Own Pressurised Not Applicable
what was happening at the time, and what
due to Govt Rules
36 321 1 358 161 158 39 358
would happen in the future. Since they were
(10.1) (89.6) (0.3) (100) (44.97) (44.13) (10.9) (100) encountering this kind of phenomenon for the
(C) Households That Felt Cheated of Good (D) Households That Feel Cheated of Good
first time and they were not aware of anything
Compensation at That Time Compensation Now like it elsewhere, there was a kind of non-
Yes No Not Given Total Yes No Not Given Total comprehension of the process and its implica-
181 176 1 358 297 59 2 358
tions. Over the years, as the author has been
(50.56) (49.16) (0.28) (100) (82.96) (16.48) (0.56) (100)
visiting the village since 2011, one can discern
(E) Households That Comprehended Full Meaning of Land Loss Then
that the understanding of the phenomenon
Yes No Not Given Total
80 276 2 358
has substantially improved in Maan (and pos-
(22.35) (77.09) (0.56) (100) sibly across India). This can be considered a
Figures in brackets indicate percentages. significant achievement of various protest
Economic & Political Weekly EPW april 1, 2017 vol liI no 13 61
SPECIAL ARTICLE

movements across India, the role of non-governmental organi- daughters, sisters and sons, with 54 families spending under
sations (NGOs), and media coverage of these issues. this head. Next came family expenses and family consump-
As news of the acquisition spread in the village, the atmos- tion, with 27 families spending on this. Around nine families
phere changed. There was apprehension, hope and fear about had to spend on account of illnesses in the family. Nineteen
what was to happen. Everyone started saying, We are going families spent on a vehicle (four-wheeler, two-wheeler or rick-
to lose our land. shaw). One person responded that he bought vehicles for his
Quite disturbingly, very few of the landowners felt they daughters. Vehicles can be used for consumption purposes or
could do anything about it. This implies a one-way relationship for productive purposes. Five respondents said they had spent
between citizens and the government, with the former accept- a certain amount of the money they received on the education
ing whatever the government decrees. At that stage, there was of sons and daughters.
no idea that farmers could reject acquisition. The impression Interestingly, 37 families had used some money to buy land
we got was that the situation was one of fait accompli. in nearby villages. Nine families had used the money to
This perception was not entirely wrong. Legally, they did improve the land they were holding in other parts of Maan,
not have the right to refuse the land acquisition, but they and this took the form of buying a tractor, installing a pipeline,
could, under the MID Act, approach the court (as 41 families sinking a bore well, and so on. Two families had started busi-
did) for higher compensation. Most did not even think going nesses (it was not clear what kind of business had been start-
to court was an option. They had little experience of these ed), while one person had started an eatery. Two families had
matters at the time. This became clear as we talked to the land bought a tanker each and an excavator and these were being
losers. On the other hand, it is also true that they were happy used for construction activities going on in the village. Two
with the compensation package then and so there was no need families had started brick kilns. Ten families reported that
to go to court. they had built rooms with the compensation money received
On the whole, it was a tricky situation that elicited ambivalent and were getting rents on those rooms. However, this may be
responses. The land acquisition was attractive and scary at the an underestimate, as there were many instances when we felt
same time. Attractive because the compensation offered was that the families were not willing to talk about room renting
perceived to be satisfactory then, and modern jobs were (while their neighbours were giving information). Seventeen
promised, and scary because the future was unknown and families had repaid their loans, while only four families said
land which is very crucial for various reasons, was being lost. they had invested the money in a bank. Eleven families said
From Table 3 we can further discern the views of respondents they had lost money in court cases and two said they were
about the future sale of land. We see that around the same duped by local leaders or agents. Only one person admitted
percentage (41% to 44%) agree and disagree with the 2006 that he had lost money gambling. In the village, we were told
gram sabha resolution about not selling the land. Interestingly, repeatedly that compensation money has been squandered in
69% say they are willing to sell land under better conditions. gambling, drinking and dance bars, but this was explicitly ac-
This is a clinching argument in favour of what has happened cepted, not surprisingly, in only one case in the formal survey.
in Maan since the acquisition. However, what did not emerge in the formal survey was re-
Table 3: Views on Future Sale of Land
vealed in many personal interactions, and in
(A) Agree with Gram Sabha Resolution That No More (B) Will Sell Land under Better Conditions many cases such squandering of resources
Land Should Be Sold caused great personal suffering and anguish,
Yes No Cant Say Not Given Total Yes No Na Not Given Total
especially to women.
320 347 104 7 778 538 49 186 5 778
We also note at this stage that the use of
(41.13) (44.60) (13.37) (0.90) (100) (69.15) (6.30) (23.91) (0.64) (100)
Figures in brackets indicate percentages. money by willing sellers of land was the same
as non-willing sellers.
How Was the Money Used? Personal interactions gave us the impression that the bigger
On the whole, 358 families lost all or part of their land. Of farmers had probably benefitted more than smaller ones. This,
these, 41 (11%) have still not received either partial or full of course, stands to reason as they owned more land, had more
compensation. This is mainly because the ownership of the social capital, and could use the compensation money to increase
land is disputed, or they have approached the courts for better their future income streams. Their consumption needs, such
compensation. We have analysed the manner in which the as for housing, weddings or healthcare, were possibly already
compensation amount was used. First, we find that it was used taken care of and so they could invest in economic activities.
in different ways, so we cannot arrive at a percentage distri-
bution with respect to end-use of the money. As expected, Protest Movement and Later
there were consumption and production demands on the money In 2005 alone, official data suggest that China had over 60,000 local dis-
received. Of the consumption activities, the highest share was turbances, often provoked by attempts to put agri-land into industrial or
residential use. (Banerjee et al 2007: 1487)
taken up by 189 respondents, who had used the money for
building a house. This underlines the dire need for housing Since then the Chinese government has not published any
schemes for the rural poor such as the Indira Awaas Yojana. The data. This reveals that land acquisition is a contested issue not
second largest use of money was for the wedding expenses of only in India but also in China.
62 april 1, 2017 vol liI no 13 EPW Economic & Political Weekly

Protest movements against land acquisition have spread
across India, though we do not have any numerical estimates
of such movements. Almost all political parties, when they
have been in opposition, have tried to make an issue of land
acquisition. Congress leader Rahul Gandhi, even when his
party was in power at the centre, tried to agitate against land
acquisition at locations such as Niyamgiri and Bhatta Parsaul.
Some interesting studies in this area are Jenkins et al (2014)
where they have put forth results from 11 states, Nilsen (2010),
Ray (2008), Kumar (2011), and Mohanty (2007).
We have earlier discussed some aspects of the protest move-
ment of Maan in detail (Sathe 2014). In that article, we have
put forth the genesis of the movement, strategies used by the
agitators, and the fallout of the protests on the villagers. Due
to the protest movement, land acquisition was stopped in 2006
and RGIT Phase IV has not commenced since then.
In Maan, we have seen that landowners were initially
not completely against land acquisition, but as Phase III was
completed, there was a lot of disgruntlement over the compen-
sation package and lack of jobs. This happened over a period
of time. The monetary compensation that seemed high for
Phase II started to look very meagre later. As mentioned earlier,
the price of one acre of land was `8,000 `10,000 in 1999 and
the compensation was more than `6 lakh. However, MIDC was
selling land to industry at even higher rates. Further, there
were hardly any jobs available in Table 4: Households That Got a
return for land (Table 4). There- Job in Return for Land
fore, the farmers agitated in 2006, Yes No Not Given Total
5 351 2 358
and since then acquisition for (1.4) (98.04) (0.56) (100)
Phase IV of RGIT has been stalled. Figures in brackets indicate
We have argued that the story of percentages.
Maan has unfolded in three phases (Sathe 2014: 77). In the first
phase, we find that the farmers were not particularly unwill-
ing to sell land. In the second phase, farmers protested and
were unwilling to sell their land. In the third phase, farmers
wanted to sell the land but asked for much better compensa-
tion packages. They also spoke of wanting to develop the land
on their own. This is a new development, wherein landowners
say they will build rooms, apartments or warehouses on their
own and give them on rent. This is true not only of Maan;
there are many other cases where such a trajectory is apparent
(for example, Bhatta Parsaul in Uttar Pradesh and Khed
Shivapur in Maharashtra).
When we discussed this issue with officials at MIDC, we got
some interesting responses. The junior officers said that MIDC
would go ahead and acquire land for RGIT Phase IV, but senior
officials felt that the issue had been politicised and so MIDC
may prefer not to acquire the land. In any case, Maan is
expected to be joining the Pune Municipal Corporation soon,
and then the rest of the remaining land would become non-
agricultural and all kinds of industrial units and housing can
come up on it.
In our personal interactions with the villagers, one could
sense their strong antagonistic sentiments. The villagers said
that MIDC is more an agent for the builders than an intermedi-
ary. They felt betrayed by the government and added that the
Economic & Political Weekly EPW april 1, 2017 vol liI no 13
SPECIAL ARTICLE
government is a cheat, they say one thing and do another. At
that stage, we could not imagine what would happen to us and
to the village. Now we know better. They buy in acres from us
and sell in square feet. We have become bekar [a term that
literally means unemployed but also signifies of no worth]
from all sidesno land, no jobs, no satisfactory work.
The villagers also felt that there is too much money in the
village. Relationships have weakened. Unemployment is high
even amongst the educated (the money comes out of rents
that the families earn from the rooms they have built for mi-
grant labour, an issue not covered here).
The acquisition of land for Phase IV was stalled after agita-
tions in 2006. This has meant a lot of trouble for the farmers.
Since the land has been stamped with the 7/12 utara, banks
and credit societies refuse to advance any loan against it. So,
farmers have to take loans from private moneylenders, who
charge extremely high interest rates. If farmers are unable to
repay the loan, the land can fall into the hands of the money-
lender. Further, as the land has been earmarked for an SEZ, the
farmers have lost the right to dig wells or to build makeshift
structures on their land. In frustration, some also said, Take
the stamps from the 7/12 utara and put it on us, then you [the
government] will be happy.
If 7/12 is not stamped, the price of land increases. Some
people have reportedly got the stamps removed by paying
bribes of roughly `6 lakh. Stamps can be removed as the land
has not been acquired for two years after notification, but the
government does not want to do it. Technically, after two years, if
the land is not acquired, it reverts to the owner. The current
market price of land varies between `2 crore and `3 crore per
acre, while the government rate is `88 lakh (Biswas 2013 and
personal interviews).
When examining compensation issues, Banerjee et al (2007)
suggest that we look at the size and form of compensation,
eligibility for compensation, and the credibility of the process.
Applying these parameters to the acquisition in Maan, we
find that the size and form of compensation was probably
acceptable to the people of Maan at the time. Eligibility for
compensation was limited, as only landowners were paid the
amount. The worst performance was probably in the area of
credibility. There was no engagement with communities even
in the beginning. Engagement decreased further in the later
stages, and there was a complete breakdown in communica-
tion by 2006.
On 16 October 2013, the then Union Agriculture Minister
and Nationalist Congress Party (NCP) President Sharad Pawar
visited Maan to inaugurate the new gram panchayat office and
the new building of the zilla parishad school which had been
developed by IT major Infosys (Times of India 2013). In his
speech to the villagers, he said that the village had lost favour
with the state government because of the agitation of 2006
and refusal to give land. However, since the land has been
stamped, the farmers are also stuck as they cannot get loans or
do anything with the land. He suggested a way out of this
limbo: he would help the farmers get back control over their
land, but the farmers had to promise not to sell their land to
63
SPECIAL ARTICLE

builders. He said that Maan should be developed along the
lines of Magarpatta and Nanded city. However, it is not at all
clear why the land should not be sold to builders, in principle.
Most villagers expected that the government would do
something for them before the general elections of April
May 2014 and the assembly election of October 2014. However,
no relief was given to the landowners. As the situation stood in
2015, the landholdings earmarked for Phase IV have their 7/12
utara stampedwhich means that the land is going to be
acquired. On the ground though, the land has not been acquired.
Consequently, the farmers who own these lands cannot mort-
gage them to get loans from banks. The farmers face hardships
on this account. The value of the remaining land has risen
sharply. Very high amounts are being offered for these lands,
but the gram sabha has passed a resolution that no more land
is going to be sold. Nevertheless, we found that some owners
were selling their land for as much as `3 crore per acre in
October 2014 (this land is not developed by MIDC; farmers are
selling to private entities).
In the case of Maan, none of the political parties in the state
took any interest or supported the agitations. They have been
silent on this issue. This can happen due to certain constraints,
as Mody (2014) has explained quite perceptively in the case of
Karnataka. She argues that the local leaders may want to sup-
port the agitators for some political mileage. However, if the
state-level politicians have decided to go ahead with the project,
local leaders will not defy them (Mody 2014: 213). This could
be the reason for lack of support to the agitation in Maan.
What the farmers want is a share in the future appreciation
of land. This can be achieved if a certain percentage of the
developed land is given back to the farmers. On this developed
land, they want to have a house of their own; and they can start
any economic activity like a shop, eatery, or just build rooms
and rent them out. This ensures them a continuous source of
income which is inflation adjusted. In such a scenario, they do
not become redundant and also have some work to do.
Conclusions
From our discussions with the farmers, we learnt that before
the land was acquired, agricultural activity was of an inferior
quality as the village was rain-fed. Despite this, land means a
great deal to the farmer (Sathe 2011).
We find from our fieldwork and survey that farmers were
somewhat apprehensive about the acquisition of land. Since
they did not know what the scenario would be after acquisi-
tion, they had to be coerced into selling land. However, we
also find that compensation was perceived to be adequate at
the time of initial acquisition. Also, farmers sold their land
with certain expectations (of jobs in the companies, for in-
stance). These expectations were not fulfilled.
As acquisition proceeded, the farmers began to feel that
they had been cheated of a fair compensation. This was
mainly because they did not have any share in the apprecia-
tion of the value of the land. At the time of the survey, farmers
were willing to sell land under better compensation packages.
Farmers have also come up with alternatives like wanting to
develop the land on their own.
As already stated, the situation has been such as to elicit
ambivalent responses from the farmers. They have been at-
tracted by the prices offered and also scared. There is anger
and discomfort at what happened to land prices after land ac-
quisition. Much of their negativity stems from that. Hence, the
andolan in 2006 and the continuing deadlock.
It is not that farmers do not want to sell land at all. As we
have argued elsewhere, farmers want to partake of the bene-
fits of industrialisation and urbanisation (Sathe 2011). In fact,
farmers from industrially-advanced regions like Maharashtra
or Haryana are quite keen to shift to a non-agricultural way of
life. We also found that almost 70% of the respondents are
willing to sell their land under different conditions. This is a
clinching argument in favour of land acquisition. Thus, the
manner in which land is acquired, and the compensation
package, is what is important.
One important policy conclusion that emerges from this
study is that a share in the future appreciation of land should
be made available to the farmer. This can be done by giving
a certain percentage of developed land back to the farmer.
The MIDC officers opined that this may not be practical. If
farmers were to be given back 15%, and if around 30%35%
is required for infrastructure development (like roads and
public amenities), then only 45%50% would be available for
industrial development. If this assumption is correct, the sug-
gestion given is ethically right and would buy peace in the
long run.

Note
1 The reasons for not responding were varied.
Most of the respondents said they were fed up
of answering questions. Some were angry with
the process of land acquisition as they felt they
had got a raw deal.
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64 april 1, 2017 vol liI no 13 EPW Economic & Political Weekly

SPECIAL ARTICLE
Diasporic Resources, Community Interventions
and Development
Reflections from a Village in Indian Punjab
Jaswinder Singh Brar
Diasporic leadership was as important as diasporic
resources in effecting the transformation of Chakar
village in Punjab, now recognised as a model for rural
development. Credibility, trust and constant mentoring
by emigrants from the village inspired community
participation, conflict-resolution, the creation of new
institutions and the sustainability of development works.
An earlier version of this paper was presented at the Fourth Conference
of the India Network for Learning, Innovation and Competence-Building
Systems on Innovation and Sustainability: Lessons from the History of
India and Hopes for the Future at Colorado College, US in June 2016.
Jaswinder Singh Brar (brar_ jas@yahoo.co.in) is Professor of Economics,
Centre for Research in Economic Change, Punjabi University, Patiala.
Economic & Political Weekly EPW april 1, 2017 vol liI no 13
D
iasporic resources have begun to have a substantial
impact on the development of societies that receive
such remittances with a fair degree of continuity.
Development literature, particularly from countries with
sizeable emigrant populations, demonstrates the multilay-
ered contribution of diasporic resources. The efficiency of di-
asporic resources increases when they are tailored to local
requirements with the involvement of native communities.
Over the last two decades, India has adopted a proactive policy
to involve its huge overseas population spread across the
globe and to make maximum use of its diasporic resources.
The state of Punjab has seen its inhabitants emigrate for more
than a century. Several generations of non-resident Punjabis
have been involved in social and economic activities in their
ancestral places.
The overseas population has been more involved in rural
development, as the majority of those who have emigrated
from Punjab are from peasant backgrounds. A quest to uplift
rural society has made them go beyond financial aid for their
immediate families and undertake the building of social and
physical infrastructure for entire villages. Local committees
and associations have been set up to handle overseas funds
and the projects the funds support. Such associations have
gradually become a new level and form of local governance,
affecting social and political relations among residents be-
longing to different layers of society.
The involvement of the diasporic community in the develop-
ment trajectory of a village named Chakar is the subject of
this study. The study material has been generated by repeated
visits to the village and interactions with diverse groups
proactive residents, volunteers, youth, women, village lead-
ers and passive participants. Detailed information has been
collected and cross-checked on projects executed, monetary
resources involved, channelisation of funds, determination of
priorities, settlement of local disputes, advocacy with locals
on the benefits of activities undertaken, and the management
of disputes and interactions with government systems. Against
this backdrop, the first section of this article attempts to dis-
entangle the processes of engagement of the diasporic com-
munity in the rural transformation of the village and to high-
light their specific contribution. The second section describes
the context in which diasporic resources were absorbed and
found their place in the rural set-up of the state. The third
65
SPECIAL ARTICLE
section details the forms and extent of contribution of diaspor-
ic resources in the development of villages. The fourth section
focuses on the factors and forces that prompted diasporic
contribution. The fifth section captures the wider impact and
benefits of diasporic resources. The sixth section explores the
possibility of replicating the experience of one village in other
rural settings. The last section sums up the discussion.
Diasporic Resources in the Rural Sector
Inclusive economic transformation is a challenging task. The
tempo of development is often influenced by localised institu-
tions and responses, intermingled with forces unleashed by
the market and state structures. With differential intensities of
state intervention, rural Punjab has witnessed periods of fast
and moderate change in economic structures. The first major
and noticeable change in the state economy began in the mid-
1960s, with the advent of the green revolution initiated under
the national policy framework to address food scarcity. The
fast-paced overall economic growth resulted in higher levels
of prosperity in the region and rising levels of per capita
income and consumption. The period also witnessed wider
state involvement in social infrastructure, including health
and education, the strengthening of cooperative credit and
other agricultural input institutions, and assured agricultural
produce purchase systems. The cumulative impact of all these
processes paved the way for a structural transformation of the
state economy, with a decline in the proportionate share of
agriculture in state income and with the service sector surpassing
the secondary sector by a decisive margin. The state had the
highest level of per capita income in the country for a consider-
able length of time, from the advent of the green revolution up
to the early 1990s when Punjab was gradually overtaken by
some other states.
The rural transformation that was a natural concomitant of
faster economic growth has produced serious distortions in
the social and economic life of local inhabitants. The situation
changed with the flattening of economic growth and the adop-
tion of new economic policies during the last decade of the
20th century. The state economy that had evolved under a pro-
tective policy regime based on planned development and deep
state involvement could not adjust to the liberalised environ-
ment of free markets. Consequently, the state began to with-
draw from crucial areas like education and health (Gill, Singh
and Brar 2010). Meanwhile Punjabs agricultural sector slowed
down with the near exhaustion of the yield potential of green
revolution technology. Rural income in a sector dominated by
small agriculture producers and landless agriculture work-
force was affected adversely. Things got worse with 15 years of
militancy in the state, which jeopardised systems of govern-
ance and made rural public services dysfunctional. The off-
farm and non-farm sectors of the rural economy could not take
off due to a policy vacuum and state apathy.
International migration from the state has been rising, with
deeper familial ties and mutually supporting flows. Several
factors, ranging from the purely economic to the completely
emotional, have been working to increase international
66
migration from the state. Close family ties and connections
amongst emigrants and the families left behind in their
native villages paved the way for the involvement of the im-
migrant communitysettled in large numbers in developed
countries, particularly Britain, America and Canada as well
as West Asiain the development of their native places. A
large proportion of first- and second-generation immigrants
experienced a rise in economic status in their newly adopted
countries. Punjabis gradually excelled in all fields, be it medi-
cine or agriculture, politics or trade, information technology
or education. Many of them have prospered in their chosen
activities (Saroya 2012). The immigrants were motivated to
display their riches, boost their social and political status in
the native community, play a stronger role in local decision-
making, and fulfil their spiritual and religious duties towards
the development of their motherland. They also built busi-
nesses in their places of origin, fostered the attachment of
their offspring to their villages, kept their assets and lands
secure by building local connections, donated to charity,
protected their culture and identity, perpetuated the family
name and stature, and cleaned up their villages (Dhesi 2008,
2009). The sustainability of diasporic funds depends upon
several factors, including networks of social capital and trust
and relations between the diaspora and homeland (Thandi
2008). There are strong indications that over time, the di-
asporic communities of Punjab, which earlier donated largely
for religious purposes, have begun to contribute for develop-
ment projects (Brar 2015).
India has an estimated 25 million-strong expatriate commu-
nity (MOIA 201415: 4). The country received remittances
worth roughly $69.6 billion during 201314 (MOIA 201415:
33). Bet ween 2010 and 2014, India granted work clearance to
as many as 36,36,495 persons, of which the share of Punjab
was 1,97,579 persons, or 5.44% (MOIA 201415: 49). Overseas
remittances have made a noticeable contribution to the rural
development of the state (Kaur et al 2011). The economic
capacity and motivation of those belonging to the diasporic
community, along with poor conditions in their native places,
contributed to the percolation of overseas funds into rural
Punjab. The funds were absorbed into activities and areas
marginalised by markets and the state for a variety of reasons.
The developmental void caused by state inaction was a matter
of concern for natives and immigrants. Socially responsible
individuals with an entrepreneurial bent of mind took the
lead, with some worthwhile proposals in limited areas to
begin with. The dysfunctional and unregulated education
and health sectors emerged as the main concern in many
areas. The richer sections of society had begun using highly
priced quality services in the private sector, while others were
forced to use public institutions or substandard private ones,
thereby intensifying the process of large-scale social exclu-
sion in many sectors. Diasporic philanthropy not only deep-
ened but also widened beyond the religious, health and
education sectors to social, cultural and sports activities,
cremation grounds, old age centres, sanitation and water
supply. These were areas where state efforts were unplanned,
april 1, 2017 vol liI no 13 EPW Economic & Political Weekly

uncoordinated and inadequate, and which markets had
not penetrated.
Reach and Types of Diasporic Contribution
International migration from the state essentially remained
subregion specific, with a big chunk originating from the Doaba
region, situated between the Sutlej and Beas rivers. Gradually,
migration also commenced from the rest of the state with a
shrinking of employment opportunities, dwindling family in-
comes and rising levels of general and technical education.
Punjabs links with Britain during colonial times saw the
peasantry joining the IndoBritish Army and taking part in
the world wars on European lands. Diasporic resources also
initially made their presence felt in the Doaba region where
almost all the villages have a large number of expatriates,
as international migration has almost become a way of life
(Brar and Gill 2001). The overseas community has made sub-
stantial philanthropic contributions to the development of
some villages (Chana 2009).
The village of Chakar is in the Malwa region, which joined
the emigration stream at a relatively late stage. However, this
village belongs to the Ludhiana and Moga districts in Malwa,
from which a large number of persons emigrated. The village
has a population of about 8,000 in 1,200 households, with a
geographical area of 5,700 acres. The village population is
quite diverse in terms of family lineage, surnames, social and
class formations. The village economy is not diversified, and
agriculture is the principal source of livelihood. The off-farm
sector is confined to the production and sale of milk at the
household level. Some tiny workshops and repair centres cater
to the daily requirements of residents.
The diasporic contribution in the village under study is visi-
ble and pronounced. The village looks quite different from
others in the state. It has converted three stinking common
ponds, which were used as reservoirs for collection of village
household waste water through open drains, into extraordi-
narily beautiful lakes after laying a network of underground
pipes. The water collected via the new pipes is first recycled
by an improvised technique of chain wells, without use of any
motorised energy. Every household in the village, irrespective
of socio-economic status, has been connected to the under-
ground water pipe system, with proper levelling and cleaning
outlets running concurrent to village streets. These lakes and
treatment plants were financed and guided by expatriates.
The treated water is supplied to nearby fields through lift
irrigation on modest payment that covers maintenance of the
system, cleaning and desilting. Boating has been developed on
the lakes. The village also generates some income from fishing
(Dhaliwal 2016).
This is an excellent model of water conservation in a state
that has replaced traditional water conservation systems with
modern water supply and irrigation methods that remain
largely dysfunctional on account of the weak accountability of
government departments. The integrated water conservation,
preservation and recharging was managed and governed
locally with the participation of stakeholders. About `10 crore
Economic & Political Weekly EPW april 1, 2017 vol liI no 13
SPECIAL ARTICLE
has been spent on development works by approximately 400
villagers settled abroad (Dhaliwal 2016). The governments
contribution accounts for just 2% of the overall expenditure on
development (Sandhu 2016).
Rainwater is channelled directly into the lakes through a
separate underground water piping system. Importantly, water-
recharging wells have been created amidst the lakes to raise
the water table as the declining water table has emerged as the
most serious problem in the state after it started widespread
cultivation of paddy irrigated by submersible motor systems
fetching water from deep aquifers. This seems to be the first such
initiative in rural Punjab.
A large-scale project of greening the village was initiated,
with a social forestry plantation of 35,000 trees (Sandhu
2016). The social sector also got a big boost with the establish-
ment of a sports academy in the village with modern facilities
and coaching systems to channelise the energies of the youth
in a state where young people have been abusing drugs. Cash
prizes were announced as an incentive and sportspersons
trained at the academy have done well at the national level.
Village commons, with cool drinking water and shady areas,
have been developed for elders. Walled yards have been
created to handle the waste generated by large-scale cattle
rearing. The waste is used as manure at specific intervals.
Vigilante groups have been set up to discourage the burning
of crop residues after harvesting. The groups are authorised
to impose penalties. The village education system has been
supplemented by non-profit schools set up by charitable insti-
tutions. Cleaning, greening and general development projects
have fructified with a combination of overseas funding and
local participation and supervision.
Factors and Forces in Diasporic Initiative
This diasporic initiative and deep involvement of the overseas
community in village development provides a case study to
understand the factors that enable speedy development with
unbelievable results. Discussions with stakeholders point to
the importance of the leadership and the credibility of those at
the helm of affairs. The diasporic initiatives actually began
with the establishment of the sports academy in 200506.
Amongst the first to leave the village were Ajmer Singh and
Baldev Singh, two brothers who emigrated to England as early
as 1967 for higher education. They settled in Canada in 1981,
and are involved in the transport business (Jagga 2012). Some
emigrants from the village have earned their doctorates from
top universities in the US. Other prominent families of the village
have settled in Canada. As they prospered, these immigrants
from Chakar began setting up associations to give something
back to their ancestral village. A close friend and co-worker of
one immigrant family, a person of English origin, donated
quite liberally, and Morgan Lake is named after him. The
development of the village, as told by Ajmer Singh, began thus:
When my father was very sick, he told me to use the money in his ac-
count for welfare works at the village rather than transferring it into our
accounts. This really moved me and my brother. With all that money,
we started planning to turn Chakar into a model village. (Jagga 2012)
67
SPECIAL ARTICLE
Before development could happen, however, local conflicts
had to be resolved. Violent conflicts and litigation raged among
prominent families, but expatriates in distant lands were per-
ceived as neutral and were in a position to play the role of arbiter.
This worked and created the preconditions for development
to take off. A village welfare club was registered with large mem-
bership from the local and immigrant communities. A family
trusted by villagers over generations was entrusted the job of
managing the entire fund. An open bank account system was
set up and donations invited. The movement gathered such
momentum and social acceptability that people donated money
even without disclosing their names in order to prevent discord
over who should take the credit. Meanwhile, the success of
the sports academy catalysed new project activities.
The rural sanitation project was executed first by cleaning
and converting the smallest pond, virtually a sewage reservoir,
into a treatment plant and ultimately a clean-water lake. The
sanitation project involved the least dislocation of lifestyles
and probably the least resistance and adverse propaganda.
Moreover, its success would prompt other residents to clean
and develop waterbodies in their localities. This project gradu-
ally grew into a movement, with environmentalists from the
region who had a reputation of having cleaned the most
polluted rivulets of the state, joining in. Their expertise and
goodwill helped in bringing skilled persons for the task. The
popularity of the project also encouraged the concerned par-
liamentarian to provide money for the cause out of his discre-
tionary funds. The village body was tasked with recovering
the village commons that had been encroached by influential
local groups.
The demarcation of certain pieces of land was necessary
before any development activity was undertaken. It also
seemed as if the villagers, discouraged at the economic stagna-
tion and limited job opportunities for their children, found
new motivation in the overseas initiative. Village youth, men-
tored by the overseas leadership, got involved in a big way in the
execution of various projects, including laying sewage systems,
constructing treatment plants and recharging wells. This
saved on the cost of labour, both skilled and manual. The
declared policy of excluding no one from development works
proved very helpful in completing the projects quickly. The
social dividend generated created the preconditions for the
larger involvement of all sections of society, which resulted in
a pooling of material and non-material resources. The in-
volvement of the community, including women, made the
projects simultaneously personal and social in nature. Village
youth volunteered in large numbers for improvement of vil-
lage life in an environment based on trust and cultivated
solidarity. Local residents perform more voluntary work in
their respective locales when the preconditions of trust and
solidarity are met (Svendsen and Svendsen 2016). The volun-
teer effort proved very successful in delivering projects on
schedule, blending cooperation with competition.
This form of small group-based micro-decentralisation released
latent energies with clear-cut goals backed by responsibility,
decision-making based on close interaction and discussion,
68
and willingness to perform and earn social recognition.
Those with land and other financial resources contributed
money while those without provided manual labour for the
execution of projects.
Wider Benefits and Impact
International remittances have been recognised as the most
stable form of global capital movement. The macro impact of
remittances in the form of availability of foreign exchange, in-
dustrialisation and employment has received wide attention.
While the profit-driven movement of capital by investors is
governed by a different set of factors, the investment of hard-
earned resources by communities with a social objective is
guided by altruism. Any investment activity backed by philan-
thropic considerations is expected to bring about social good,
as compared with the generation of profits for private use.
The externality component was found to be quite strong not
only in the sphere of activities undertaken but also in the larg-
er social sphere, in terms of strengthening brotherhood and
fraternity among residents. Many villagers feel that enor-
mous time and litigation costs have been saved because of a
reduction or end of hostility. They feel that mentoring by
overseas elders has changed their attitudes completely. One
member of the development club said, Now tit for tat is the
last thing on our minds. Development is now the top priority.
Another important benefit is that the poorest sections of
the village were also covered by the schemes for water supply,
drainage and sewage systems, which was not the case with
government-sponsored initiatives. Large sections of the land-
less and other manual workers living below the poverty line
could not afford to install such systems earlier. The impact of
the expatriate leadership was so strong that those who had
encroached on village commons voluntarily gave up land to
build the sewage system. Some people even gave a portion of
their own land free of cost to streamline sewage and drain
flows. The upholding of the principle of equity played a crucial
role in reaching those sections of rural households that never
got directly involved in state-supported programmes. Improved
sanitation and waste management will definitely translate
into improvements in the health of residents, and water- and
vector-borne diseases have reduced. The weaker sections of
society seem to have gained the most because earlier, those
with resources could opt for private providers of basic utilities
whereas the poor were forced to wait for state funds, which
were simply not forthcoming.
The changed scenario has even influenced second-generation
immigrants. They have increased the frequency of their visits
to the village, with some of them building their own houses in
the village, a practice that had almost stopped before these
projects were undertaken. The flow of foreign funds has had
multiplier benefits. The operation and maintenance of assets
has generated direct employment. It has also been reported that
the channelisation of youth energy into development activities
and sports has resulted in a decline of drug abuse which other-
wise is a big problem in rural Punjab. The social mobility of
young girls has improved as new avenues have come up in the
april 1, 2017 vol liI no 13 EPW Economic & Political Weekly
 SPECIAL ARTICLE

domain of sports and with villagers start taking pride in the
achievement of girls in the village. Gender differences have
narrowed, as both young boys and girls practice in the com-
mon stadium, which had never happened in this patriarchal
society. The distance between classes and castes has also re-
portedly decreased with the interaction of youth from differ-
ent strata in social, cultural, sports and other activities.
The village is now recognised as a model of water manage-
ment and rural development. Schoolchildren and elected
representatives have begun to visit the village. Even state
government officials and civil society organisations are stud-
ying Chakars rural development model. Villagers reported
that the administrative response has also improved and
things are beginning to work now that the administrators are
citing the villages development and progress.
Scope for Generalisation and Replication
The philanthropic model that has evolved in Chakar has been
acclaimed in social, academic, administrative and policy
circles. Almost all the villages in the state have been facing a
serious problem of checking waste water from households ac-
cumulating in village ponds, creating a stink and polluting
subsoil water by deep seepage. In fact, this problem has
emerged in Punjab because of piecemeal policies. Village
ponds were the lifeline of communities for generations, and
were managed well and kept very clean. Modern waterworks
introduced piped water to households, but with no equivalent
drainage systems. Public pressure led to the laying of open
drains to channel household water into nearby ponds without
any treatment. This has created a filthy environment for near-
by settlements. In a knee-jerk response, government began
providing grants for the cleaning of such ponds, but they
would inevitably get polluted again.
Punjab has witnessed the creation of community assets in
many villages with a dense presence of emigrants. The sus-
tainability of expatriate-sponsored projects has always been a
matter of debate as they are governed by a different set of
motivations. Water management systems are undoubtedly
required in all villages in the state in order to save the
precious resource. Water conservation campaigns managed by
the administration, social welfare organisations and public-
spirited persons, including religious leaders have been going on.
However, the expectation that the state is responsible for
solving all problems is unrealistic. The administration dealing
with rural affairs is divided along political lines. Frequent
transfers and litigation do not allow any real connect between
rural dwellers and the administration. No formula for the
devolution of funds to rural bodies has been adopted because
the political leadership wants to exercise its discretion in
every matter. Populist and ad hoc measures have left no space
for a systematic and serious approach to the resolution of
genuine and long-pending problems of rural society.
Punjabs rural society has been fractured, with over-politi-
cisation leaving little scope for community action. The use of
money power, combined with the patronage of political lead-
ers in village elections, has caused socially responsible indi-
viduals to opt out of development initiatives. Those who want to
join the bandwagon are not trusted by locals, leaving the status
quo unaltered. Thus, there are real problems in replicating any
successful model. Another factor which deserves mention is
that the diaspora from the state, particularly the Sikhs who
form a dominant part of the emigrants from the state, have
sometimes become actively involved in local politics. There
was a time when the immigrant community was investing in
local property assets in rural and urban Punjab, but now with
the decline in property prices and because of security issues

Review of Urban Affairs

February 18, 2017
Safe and Inclusive Cities: Pointers towards a Research Agenda Amita Bhide, Anant Maringanti, Darshini Mahadevia
Resistance and Its Limits: Protesting Urban Violence in Lyari, Karachi Nida Kirmani
Water and Conflict in Bombay Hotel, Ahmedabad: Urban Planning, Governance and Infrastructural Violence Renu Desai, Shachi Sanghvi
Ecology vs Housing and the Land Rights Movement in Guwahati Darshini Mahadevia, Aseem Mishra, Yogi Joseph
The Violence of Worlding: Producing Space in Neo-liberal Durban, Mumbai and Rio de Janeiro Himanshu Burte, Lalitha Kamath
Colonising the Slum: Changing Trajectories of StateMarket Violence in Mumbai Amita Bhide
Urban Planning and Violence: Cause or Catalyst for Change? Alison Brown
For copies write to:
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Economic & Political Weekly EPW april 1, 2017 vol liI no 13 69

SPECIAL ARTICLE

related to safeguarding assets, diasporic interest in investing in
property has waned, affecting philanthropic activities as well.
The kind of development that has taken place in Chakar is
much-needed in rural Punjab. However, the huge diasporic re-
sources of the state remain underutilised because there is no
coordinating framework. With the administrative machinery
remaining preoccupied with political priorities, it is the village
leadership, which commands moral authority over elected vil-
lage bodies, that can take such initiatives. The Chakar model,
however successful, cannot be generalised, as a substantial
number of villages in the state lack effective overseas connec-
tions. In villages where such resources are available, some
trigger is needed to set the ball rolling. An institutional frame-
work and policy guidelines are required to encourage and en-
able village organisations to replicate the model with local
variations. Political parties frequently try to gain political
mileage from diasporic activities, and this makes diasporic
initiatives controversial.
Conclusions
This study has tried to develop insights from immigrant
involvement in the development of their ancestral villages. A
dynamic leadership among the emigrants is required to con-
vince both fellow emigrants from the village as well as village
inhabitants about the value and feasibility of such activities.
The leadership has successfully utilised its credibility, objec-
tivity, impartiality and transparency in giving practical shape
to rural development through community participation. The
credibility factor is instrumental in solving local conflicts, a
prerequisite for the success of any activity in the public domain.
It helped prepare and unite the youth, releasing their energy
blocked by petty conflicts, and generating a team spirit to
tackle huge societal tasks. The most formidable challenge for
the immigrant community is that it must conduct itself in a
way that enables locals to perceive it as a non-political devel-
opmental force. The hint of a political hue can drag the di-
asporic projects into controversy.
The results of collective action are visible over a large
spectrum of social and economic life. Chakar has emerged as
a classic model for rural sanitation, water supply, water treat-
ment, conservation and environmental restoration, creation
of social and community assets, as well as social harmony
and goodwill. All of this emerged from a multipronged
diasporic involvement that went much beyond financial
transfers. The point to underscore is that in spite of a prosper-
ous diasporic community in many other villages in Punjab,
village development on this scale has not occurred. Such
diasporic contributions are reportedly available, but the initi-
ative is lacking. The loss of credibility of the government
apparatus is one factor: the village leadership believes that
their initiatives will be mired in government procedures and
lose momentum and focus. Socially conscious formations of
beneficiary communities and overseas residents must come
forward together to catalyse meaningful change.

References
Brar, J S (2015): Punjabi Immigrants and Rural
Development in the Doaba Region of Indian
Punjab, International Migration and Develop-
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Brar, J S and S S Gill (2001): Tenancy Reversal and
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Chana, S (2009): NRI Investment in Social Devel-
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D S Tatla (eds), New Delhi: Oxford University
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Dhaliwal, S S (2016): Two Brothers Want Change:
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(eds), New Delhi: Oxford University Press,
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Gill, S S, S Singh and J S Brar (2010): Globalisation
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press, Chandigarh, 18 November.
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G Singh (eds), New Delhi: Serial Publications, P S Sahai, K Chand and P Kumar (eds), Centre
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Saroya, D S (2012): Indian Diaspora: Migration bution of the Punjabi Diaspora to Rural Devel-
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EPWRF India Time Series
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(State-wise Data)
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data to the existing Banking Statistics module of its online India Time Series (ITS) database.
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are provided for deposits, credit (sanction and utilisation), credit-deposit (CD) ratio, and
number of bank offices and employees.
Data on bank credit are given for a wide range of sectors and sub-sectors (occupation) such
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group and by population group (rural, semi-urban, urban and metropolitan).
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basis thereafter. These data have been sourced from the Reserve Bank of Indias publication,
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70 april 1, 2017 vol liI no 13 EPW Economic & Political Weekly

 CURRENT STATISTICS EPW Research Foundation

Wholesale Price Index Foreign TradeMerchandise

The year-on-year (y-o-y) inflation rate based on WPI rose to a three-year high to
6.6% in February 2017 from 5.3% in February 2016 and -0.9%, a year ago. The
index of primary articles increased by 5% in January 2017 compared to 1.3%, a
month ago and 2.0% in February 2016. The index for food articles was higher by
2.7% against -0.6% in January 2017, however, lower than 3.9%, reported a year
ago. The index for fuel and power increased substantially by 21% in February
2017 against -7.1% in February 2016. The index for manufactured products rose
by 3.7% in February 2017 compared to -0.5%, last year.
The merchandise trade deficit stood at $8.9 billion (bn) in February 2017 compared
to $6.5 bn, reported a year ago. Exports rose by 17.5% to $24.5 bn and imports by
21.8% to $33.4 bn in February 2017 against $20.8 bn and $27.4 bn, registered in
February 2016. Oil imports increased substantially by 60.0% to $7.7 bn and the non-oil
imports by 13.7% to $25.7 from $4.8 bn and $22.6 bn, respectively, in the corresponding
period of the previous year. Cumulative exports increased by 2.5% to $245.4 bn
and imports declined by (-)3.7% to $340.7 bn during AprilFebruary 201617
compared to $239.4 bn and 353.7 bn, respectively, in the same period last year.

Consumer Price Index Index of Industrial Production

The CPI inflation rate rose to 3.7% in February 2017 compared to 3.1% in January 2017,
however, lower than 5.3% reported a year ago. Consumer food price inflation
increased to 2% in February 2017 from 0.6% in January 2017, but lower than 5.3% in
February 2016. The CPI-rural inflation rate and CPI-urban inflation rate stood higher
at 3.7% and 3.6%, respectively, in February 2017 compared to 3.4% and 2.9%,
respectively, in January 2017. As per the Labour Bureau data, the CPI inflation rate for
agricultural labourers decreased to 3.1% in February 2017 from 5% in February 2016
and that of industrial workers to 1.9% in January 2017 from 5.9%, a year ago.
The y-o-y growth rate of IIP increased to 2.7% in January 2017 against -0.1% in December
2016 and -1.6%, a year ago, with growth in manufacturing segment rising to 2.3% in
January 2017 compared to -1.7% and -2.9% in January 2016. Growth in the mining sector
rose to 5.3% in January 2017 from 1.5% last year, while that in electricity generation
decreased to 3.9% from 6.6% in January 2016. As per use-based classification, the
capital goods segment expanded by 10.7% in January 2017 against -21.6% registered in
January 2016. Growth in consumer durable goods slowed to 2.9% in January 2017 from
5.6%, a year ago and that in consumer non-durables stood at -3.2% in January 2017.

Movement of WPI Inflation April 2015February 2017 Merchandise Trade February 2017
February 2017 Over Month Over Year (AprilFebruary)
($ bn) (%) (%) (201617 over 201516) (%)
Year-on-Year in %
Exports 24.5 10.7 17.5 2.5
8
Imports 33.4 4.5 21.8 -3.7
201617 6.6%
Trade Deficit 8.9 -9.6 35.3 -16.6
4
Data is provisional. Source: Ministry of Commerce and Industry.

0
201516 -0.9% Components of Trade February 2016 and February 2017
-4
30 $25.7 billion
$22.6 billion $24.5 billion
$20.8 billion Non-oil Imports
-8 Exports
Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Jan Feb

* Data (2017) is provisional. $4.8 billion $7.7 billion

Oil Imports

Trends in WPI and Its Components February 2017* (%)

Financial Year (Averages)
Weights Over Month Over Year 201314 201415 201516 $6.6 billion
All commodities 100 0.5 6.6 6.0 2.0 -2.5 Trade Deficit $8.9 billion
-15
Primary articles 20.1 0.9 5.0 9.9 3.0 0.3
Food articles 14.3 0.1 2.7 12.9 6.1 3.4 2016 FEBRUARY 2017 FEBRUARY
Fuel and power 14.9 1.3 21.0 10.3 -0.9 -11.7
Manufactured products 65.0 0.0 3.7 3.0 2.4 -1.1 Oil refers to crude petroleum and petroleum products, while non-oil refers to all other commodities.
* Data is provisional; Base: 200405=100; Source: Ministry of Commerce and Industry.
Movement of IIP Growth AprilJanuary
Year-on-Year in %
Movement of CPI Inflation January 2016February 2017
12
Year-on-Year in %

9 8
201516
4
Consumer Food 2.7%
6
0
CPI 4.8% -1.6%
201617
3.7% -4
Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Jan
3
Miscellaneous * January 2017 are quick estimates; Base: 200405=100.
2.0%

Industrial Growth: Sector-wise January 2017* (%)

0 Weights Over Over Year Financial Year (Avgs)
Jan F M A M J J A S O N Dec Jan Feb* Month 201415 201516
2016 2017
* Data is provisional. General index 100 4.0 2.7 2.8 2.4
Source: Central Statistics Office (CSO), Ministry of Statistics and Programme Implementation, Base: 2012=100. Mining 14.2 0.9 5.3 1.5 2.2
Manufacturing 75.5 4.9 2.3 2.3 2.0
CPI: Rural and Urban February 2017* (%) Electricity 10.3 0.5 3.9 8.4 5.6
Latest Over Over Financial Year (Avgs)
Month Index Month Year 201415 201516 Industrial Growth: Use-based
Basic goods 45.7 1.5 5.3 7.0 3.6
Rural (2012=100) 132.6 0.2 3.7 6.2 5.6
Capital goods 8.8 11.3 10.7 6.4 -2.9
Urban (2012=100) 128.2 0.3 3.6 5.7 4.1
Intermediate goods 15.7 -0.1 -2.3 1.7 2.5
CPI: Occupation-wise Consumer goods 29.8 7.2 -1.0 -3.4 3.0
Industrial workers (2001=100) # 274.0 -0.4 1.9 6.3 5.6 Consumer durables 8.5 21.4 2.9 -12.6 11.3
Agricultural labourers (198687=100) 869.0 -0.1 3.1 6.6 4.4 Consumer non-durables 21.3 0.0 -3.2 2.8 -1.8
# January. * Provisional; Source: CSO (rural and urban), Labour Bureau (IW and AL). * January 2017 are quick estimates; Base: 200405=100; Source: Central Statistics Office.
Comprehensive current economic statistics with regular weekly updates are available at: http://www.epwrf.in/currentstat.aspx.

Economic & Political Weekly EPW APRIL 1, 2017 vol lII no 13 71

 CURRENT STATISTICS EPW Research Foundation
Indias Quarterly Estimates of Final Expenditures on GDP
201415 201516 201617
` crore | at 201112 Prices Q1 Q2 Q3 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q1 Q2 Q3
Private final consumption expenditure 1424854 (9.6) 1427794 (9.7) 1513178 (2.7) 1495290 (4.9) 1522765 (6.7) 1615790 (6.8) 1602632 (7.2) 1600012 (5.1) 1778353 (10.1)
Government final consumption expenditure 286020 (5.9) 313839 (12.3) 254581 (29.5) 287477 (0.5) 325987 (3.9) 264070 (3.7) 332106 (15.5) 375626 (15.2) 316595 (19.9)
Gross fixed capital formation 812203 (5.7) 808473 (-0.3) 823732 (1.3) 889781 (9.6) 908449 (12.4) 849912 (3.2) 870650 (-2.2) 860150 (-5.3) 879763 (3.5)
Change in stocks 61248 (53.8) 60666 (51.1) 56288 (44.8) 64888 (5.9) 65312 (7.7) 61988 (10.1) 76970 (18.6) 76013 (16.4) 73070 (17.9)
Valuables 46596 (26.4) 41514 (9.0) 40404 (20.5) 39168 (-15.9) 47795 (15.1) 45574 (12.8) 27049 (-30.9) 31123 (-34.9) 28079 (-38.4)
Net trade (Exportimport) -41023 -55579 -45759 -41475 -58298 -33387 -12292 -14857 -41201
Exports 621494 (11.7) 626487 (1.2) 636698 (2.0) 586330 (-5.7) 599544 (-4.3) 579567 (-9.0) 598705 (2.1) 594123 (-0.9) 599231 (3.4)
Less Imports 662517 (-0.5) 682066 (4.7) 682457 (5.7) 627805 (-5.2) 657842 (-3.6) 612954 (-10.2) 610997 (-2.7) 608980 (-7.4) 640432 (4.5)
Discrepancies -55908 -40945 4845 -3432 -42752 26813 30645 45378 -6767
Gross domestic product (GDP) 2533991 (7.4) 2555761 (7.8) 2647270 (6.1) 2731697 (7.8) 2769256 (8.4) 2830760 (6.9) 2927761 (7.2) 2973444 (7.4) 3027893 (7.0)

Indias Overall Balance of Payments (Net): Quarterly

201516 ($ mn) 201617 ($ mn) 201516 (` bn) 201617 (` bn)
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2
Current account -8559 -7121 -338 -291 -3411 -7919 -556 [-1.7] -469 [-1.4] -23 [-0.1] -19 [-0.1] -228 [-0.6] -534 [-1.4]
Merchandise -37173 -33975 -24755 -23835 -25643 -33277 -2415 -2240 -1671 -1594 -1717 -2244
Invisibles 28614 26854 24417 23544 22231 25358 1859 1770 1648 1575 1489 1710
Services 17835 18013 16077 15745 16274 17639 1159 1187 1085 1053 1090 1189
of which: Software services 18058 18556 17328 17569 17699 18021 1173 1223 1170 1175 1185 1215
Transfers 16263 15250 14961 14002 13902 13894 1057 1005 1010 937 931 937
of which: Private 16421 15305 15146 14161 14048 13996 1067 1009 1022 947 941 944
Income -5484 -6408 -6621 -6203 -7944 -6176 -356 -422 -447 -415 -532 -416
Capital account 8121 10915 3455 7124 12788 6155 528 [1.6] 720 [2.1] 233 [0.6] 477 [1.3] 856 [2.3] 415 [1.1]
of which: Foreign investment 3150 11256 7259 5931 22979 -1527 205 742 490 397 1539 -103
Overall Balance -856 4056 3274 6969 8512 -1242 -56 [-0.2] 267 [0.8] 221 [0.6] 466 [1.3] 570 [1.5] -84 [-0.2]
Figures in square brackets are percentage to GDP.

Foreign Exchange Reserves Variation

17 March 18 March 31 March Over Over Financial Year So Far Financial Year
Excluding gold but including revaluation effects 2017 2016 2016 Month Year 201516 201617 201112 201213 201314 201415 201516
` crore 2257500 2213630 2229020 -28860 43870 203230 28480 108086 82800 251570 322660 218620
$ mn 344547 334004 337605 3383 10543 12695 6941 -14361 -485 16769 40486 16297

Monetary Aggregates Variation

Outstanding Over Month Over Year Financial Year So Far Financial Year
` crore 2017 201516 201617 201314 201415 201516
Money Supply (M3) as on 3 March 12430820 131480 (1.1) 817890 (7.0) 1062770 (10.1) 813210 (7.0) 1127560 (13.4) 1032780 (10.9) 1067450 (10.1)
Components
Currency with public 1130900 150600 (15.4) -438480 (-27.9) 183200 (13.2) -466350 (-29.2) 104760 (9.2) 140360 (11.3) 211070 (15.2)
Demand deposits 1195020 8320 (0.7) 237360 (24.8) 66030 (7.4) 205190 (20.7) 58760 (7.8) 79650 (9.8) 98200 (11.0)
Time deposits 10086710 -30040 (-0.3) 1013690 (11.2) 815250 (9.9) 1071630 (11.9) 965330 (14.9) 800150 (10.7) 757310 (9.2)
Other deposits with RBI 18190 2600 (16.7) 5320 (41.3) -1720 (-11.8) 2740 (17.7) -1270 (-39.2) 12620 (640.6) 860 (5.9)
Sources
Net bank credit to government 4173510 107590 (2.6) 740620 (21.6) 425500 (14.1) 935020 (28.9) 335850 (12.4) -37480 (-1.2) 231100 (7.7)
Bank credit to commercial sector 8077230 36770 (0.5) 301220 (3.9) 726280 (10.3) 274160 (3.5) 777430 (13.7) 604440 (9.4) 753340 (10.7)
Net foreign exchange assets 2621020 -15060 (-0.6) 159800 (6.5) 210570 (9.4) 87300 (3.4) 287280 (17.6) 326710 (17.0) 283070 (12.6)
Banking sectors net non-monetary liabilities 2465550 -2180 (-0.1) 386650 (18.6) 301870 (17.0) 485990 (24.6) 275010 (16.8) -137040 (-7.2) 202530 (11.4)
Reserve Money as on 17 March 2017 1752640 146620 (9.1) -333590 (-16.0) 157760 (8.2) -428100 (-19.6) 217860 (14.4) 195720 (11.3) 252270 (13.1)
Components
Currency in circulation 1280270 148860 (13.2) -379570 (-22.9) 211530 (14.6) -383190 (-23.0) 110090 (9.2) 147240 (11.3) 215150 (14.9)
Bankers deposits with RBI 456370 -2610 (-0.6) 43510 (10.5) -52700 (-11.3) -45460 (-9.1) 109020 (34.0) 35860 (8.3) 36270 (7.8)
Other deposits with RBI 15990 360 (2.3) 2480 (18.4) -1070 (-7.3) 540 (3.5) -1280 (-39.5) 12620 (643.9) 870 (6.0)
Sources
Net RBI credit to Government 595970 103800 (21.1) 166070 (38.6) 65380 (17.9) 170980 (40.2) 108120 (18.3) -334180 (-47.8) 60470 (16.6)
of which: Centre 590810 99510 (20.3) 161770 (37.7) 68000 (18.8) 166240 (39.2) 107150 (18.1) -336610 (-48.2) 63530 (17.6)
RBI credit to banks & commercial sector -415470 10110 (-2.4) -640030 (-285.0) 22060 (10.9) -720010 (-236.4) 14070 (32.4) 145020 (0.0) 102040 (0.0)
Net foreign exchange assets of RBI 2404620 -29490 (-1.2) 41950 (1.8) 235390 (11.1) 21140 (0.9) 244460 (15.7) 324760 (18.0) 256200 (12.0)
Govts currency liabilities to the public 24620 0 (0.0) 2710 (12.4) 2480 (12.8) 2710 (12.4) 2000 (13.0) 2090 (12.1) 2480 (12.8)
Net non-monetary liabilities of RBI 857100 -62200 (-6.8) -95720 (-10.0) 167550 (21.3) -97070 (-10.2) 150810 (21.8) -58050 (-6.9) 168900 (21.5)

Scheduled Commercial Banks Indicators ( ` crore) Variation

Outstanding Over Month Over Year Financial Year So Far Financial Year
(As on 3 March 2017) 2017 201516 201617 201314 201415 201516
Aggregate deposits 10542750 -19680 (-0.2) 1187680 (12.7) 821790 (9.6) 1215460 (13.0) 955110 (14.1) 827720 (10.7) 794010 (9.3)
Demand 1081500 9010 (0.8) 223260 (26.0) 64210 (8.1) 192500 (21.7) 51620 (7.8) 80110 (11.2) 94970 (12.0)
Time 9461260 -28680 (-0.3) 964420 (11.4) 757580 (9.8) 1022970 (12.1) 903480 (14.8) 747620 (10.7) 699030 (9.0)
Cash in hand 57350 -1110 (-1.9) -570 (-1.0) 4570 (8.6) -90 (-0.2) 5380 (13.3) 7480 (16.3) 4090 (7.7)
Balance with RBI 432210 -5470 (-1.2) 41680 (10.7) 17460 (4.7) 44770 (11.6) 34080 (12.1) 56730 (17.9) 14370 (3.9)
Investments 3330790 -144490 (-4.2) 612650 (22.5) 226310 (9.1) 705280 (26.9) 206720 (10.3) 279010 (12.6) 133680 (5.4)
of which: Government securities 3329110 -142050 (-4.1) 612630 (22.6) 226730 (9.1) 705170 (26.9) 207540 (10.4) 278560 (12.6) 134190 (5.4)
Bank credit 7516070 37080 (0.5) 295610 (4.1) 684050 (10.5) 266460 (3.7) 733640 (13.9) 542310 (9.0) 713200 (10.9)
of which: Non-food credit 7454620 82980 (1.1) 341540 (4.8) 671080 (10.4) 310260 (4.3) 731610 (14.2) 546350 (9.3) 702360 (10.9)

Capital Markets 24 March Month Year Financial Year So Far 201516 End of Financial Year
2017 Ago Ago Trough Peak Trough Peak 201314 201415 201516
S&P BSE SENSEX (Base: 197879=100) 29421 (16.1) 28893 25338 (-10.0) 24674 29649 22952 29044 22386 (18.8) 27957 (24.9) 25342 (-9.4)
S&P BSE-100 (Base: 198384=100) 9418 (20.6) 9240 7808 (-9.8) 7656 9465 7051 8980 6707 (18.1) 8607 (28.3) 7835 (-9.0)
S&P BSE-200 (198990=100) 3954 (21.8) 3875 3245 (-8.6) 3193 3970 2938 3691 2681 (17.2) 3538 (31.9) 3259 (-7.9)
CNX Nifty (Base: 3 Nov 1995=1000) 9108 (18.0) 8940 7717 (-9.7) 7546 9160 6971 8834 6704 (18.0) 8491 (26.7) 7738 (-8.9)
Net FII Investment in equities ($ Million)* 173245 (4.8) 169797 165285 (-1.6) - - - - 149745 (9.9) 168116 (12.3) 166107 (-1.2)
* = Cumulative total since November 1992 until period end. | Figures in brackets are percentage variations over the specified or over the comparable period of the previous year. | (-) = not relevant | - = not available. | NS = new series. | PE = provisional estimates.
Comprehensive current economic statistics with regular weekly updates are available at: http://www.epwrf.in/currentstat.aspx.

72 APRIL 1, 2017 vol lII no 13 EPW Economic & Political Weekly

APPOINTMENTS/PROGRAMMES/ANNOUNCEMENTS ADVERTISEMENTS

GIRI INSTITUTE OF DEVELOPMENT STUDIES

V.V. Giri National Labour Institute, NOIDA
Course on Research Methods in Labour Studies
May 29- June 09, 2017
Applications are invited from young teachers and
researchers from universities/colleges/research
institutions and professionals in government
organisations who intend to pursue their interests in
the above areas. No programme fee will be charged
and institute will provide to and fro sleeper class
fare and free boarding and lodging in the institutes
campus. Applications must be accompanied by
no objection certificates/recommendations of
employers/research supervisors. The last date for
receiving the applications: May 09, 2017. Details
of the courses are available on institutes website:
vvgnli.org. Application alongwith the bio-data
and a brief statement of the participants research
interests on the subject may be sent to: Mr. Amitabh
Khuntia, Associate Fellow, V. V. Giri National
Labour Institute, Sector-24, NOIDA-201301, Email:
p.amitav.vvgnli@gov.in.
LUCKNOW
Two-week Capacity Building Programme for
SC/ST/OBC & Minority
Faculty Members in Social Science
(22 May to 04 June, 2017)
Call for Participation
Giri Institute of Development Studies, Lucknow is
organizing a Two-week Capacity Building Programme
for SC/ST/OBC & Minority Faculty Members in
Social Sciences of Universities/Colleges/Research
Institutions of the country during 22 May to 04 June
2017. The programme is sponsored by the Indian
Council of Social Science Research, New Delhi.
Interested candidate may apply on the Performa given
on the Institute website. Preference will be given to
women, SC/ST, OBC, disabled and minority candidates.
Applications should be addressed to Director, Giri
Institute of Development Studies, Sector O Aliganj,
Lucknow 226 024. The last date of submitting
application is 20 April, 2017. For further details, visit our
website: http/:gids.org.in or contact Dr. Animesh Roy,
(Mob: 8052465387) by E-mail: animeshroy4@gmail.
com or gids.general@gmail.com.
Director

Money, Banking & Finance

March 25, 2017
Introduction Saibal Ghosh, Partha Ray
MONETARY POLICY
Reflections on Analytical Issues in Monetary Policy: The Indian Economic Realities A Vasudevan
Negative Interest Rates: Symptom of Crisis or Instrument for Recovery C P Chandrasekhar
Vulnerability of Emerging Market Economies to Exogenous Shocks Bhupal Singh, Rajeev Jain
BANKING CHALLENGES
Indian Banking: Perception and Reality Ashima Goyal
Non-performing Assets in Indian Banks: This Time It Is Different Rajeswari Sengupta, Harsh Vardhan
Were Public Sector Banks Victimised through AQR? A Strategic Orientation Perspective Shubhabrata Basu, Moovendhan V
Did MGNREGS Improve Financial Inclusion? Saibal Ghosh
How Efficient Are Indias Cooperative Banks? Evidence from DCCBs Sarthak Gaurav, Jisha Krishnan
Role of Fintech in Financial Inclusion and New Business Models Ajit Ranade
FINANCIAL MARKETS
Determinants of Bid-ask Spread in the Indian Government Securities Market Golaka C Nath, Sahana Rajaram,
Priyanka Shiraly, Manoj Dalvi
Long-run Performance of Seasoned Equity Offerings: New Evidence from India Soumya G Deb

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email: circulation@epw.in

Economic & Political Weekly EPW april 1, 2017 vol liI no 13 73

APPOINTMENTS/PROGRAMMES/ANNOUNCEMENTS ADVERTISEMENTS

CALL FOR PAPERS

International Conference on
Inclusive Quality Education:
Towards Sustainable Development Goal 4
17-18 June 2017
On the occasion of the
Bicentenary of Royal Rescript 1817 Travancore (Kerala)
Venue
India International Centre,
40, Max Mueller Marg, New Delhi,
Papers are invited in the following areas:
1. Governance of Public Policy for Inclusive Education with special focus on diversity,
mainstreaming out-of-school children, education of girls and marginalised communities.
2. Teacher Management for Quality Education with special focus on teacher professional
development policies, teacher recruitment and rationalisation, teacher accountability.
3. Cross-sectoral Linkages for School Quality and Learner Achievement with focus on
early childhood development, protection of children from physical and emotional abuse in
schools, provision of basic health services including water and sanitation.
4. Skills Development, Employability and Lifelong Learning best practices/alternatives
for school and post-secondary adolescents and youth with focus on gender, ethnic minorities,
children with disabilities and out-of-school children.
The Conference will serve as a platform for discussion and debate amongst scholars, government
officials, policy makers, implementers and civil society organisations.
Abstract may be submitted in 500 words to issnd@issin.org before 1 May 2017. Shortlisted
writers will be invited to present papers in the conference. Preference will be given to original
research and best practices from the field.

Institute of Social Sciences

8 Nelson Mandela Road, New Delhi 110 070
Phone: (91) 11-43158800, 43158801
Web site: www.issin.org E-mail: issnd@issin.org

74 april 1, 2017 vol liI no 13 EPW Economic & Political Weekly

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