Case 8:17-cv-00644-CJC-KES Document 40 Filed 07/28/17 Page 1 of 16 Page ID #:1763

7 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

8 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
9 SOUTHERN DIVISION
10
)
11 ) Case No.: SACV 17-00644-CJC(KESx)
)
12
IRAJ KHOSROABADI, )
)
13 )
Plaintiff, )
14 ) ORDER DENYING IN SUBSTANTIAL
v. ) PART DEFENDANTS MOTION TO
15 ) DISMISS
)
16
MAZGANI SOCIAL SERVICES, INC., )
)
17 MAHVASH MAZGANI, NAZANIN )
MAZGANI, NEYAZ MAZGANI, )
18
MAHNAZ MOGHADDAM, and )
)
19 SHOHREH SHARIFZADEH, )
)
20 )
Defendants. )
21 )
22

23
I. INTRODUCTION
24

25
On March 13, 2017, Plaintiff Iraj Khosroabadi filed this case in Orange County
26
Superior Court, which was removed to this court on April 7, 2017. (See Dkt. 1 Ex. 1;
27
Dkt. 1.) The First Amended Complaint (FAC), filed June 14, 2017, alleges seven
28

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1 causes of action against Defendants Mazgani Social Services, Inc., Mahvash Mazgani,
2 Nazanin Mazgani, Neyaz Mazgani,1 Mahnaz Moghaddam, and Shohreh Sharifzadeh
3 arising out of Plaintiffs interactions with Defendants regarding his application for Social
4 Security benefits. (See Dkt. 15 [hereinafter FAC].) Before the Court is Defendants
5 motion to dismiss the FAC. (Dkt. 31.) For the following reasons, the motion to dismiss
6 is DENIED IN SUBSTANTIAL PART.2
7

8 II. BACKGROUND
9

10 According to the FAC, Defendant Mahvash, through her company Mazgani Social
11 Services, Inc., (MSS) aids Iranian-Americans in applying for Social Security Benefits.
12 (FAC 15; see also id. 2021.) 20 C.F.R. 404.1705 authorizes an individual to
13 appoint a representative in dealings with the Social Security Administration (SSA);
14 such representatives are authorized to charge a fee for their services pursuant to 20 C.F.R.
15 404.1720(b). (Id. 6668.) That regulation states that, when charging and receiving
16 a fee related [to representative services], (1) the representative must file a written request
17 with [SSA] before he or she may charge or receive a fee for his or her services. (2)
18 [SSA] decide[s] the amount of the fee, if any, a representative may charge or receive. (3)
19 Subject to paragraph (e) of this section, a representative must not charge or receive any
20 fee unless we have authorized it. (Id. 69 (quoting 20 C.F.R. 404.1270(b)).)
21

22 On February 23, 2017, Plaintiff contacted Defendant Mahvash Mazgani to inquire

23 about representing him in applying for Social Security benefits; he located her, inter alia,
24 through her ad in the Attorney Services Bureau section of The Iranian Pocket
25 Dictionary Yellow Pages. (Id. 3436.) She informed him that since 2005 she had
26
1
27 As these Defendants share a last name, they are referred to by their first names in this Order.
2
Having read and considered the papers presented by the parties, the Court finds this matter appropriate
28 for disposition without a hearing. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 78; Local Rule 7-15. Accordingly, the hearing set
for August 7, 2017, at 1:30 p.m. is hereby vacated and off calendar.
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1 helped thousands of people obtain Social Security benefits, mainly representing

2 Iranian-Americans. (Id. 36.) She instructed him to meet with her at her office on
3 March 1, 2017, and to bring a money order for $500 as a down payment on the $3,000
4 fee for her services. (Id. 36.) Plaintiff obtained the money order from Western Union
5 on February 28, 2017, and noted on it that it was payable to Mazgani and was payment
6 for Social Security Administration work. (Id. 37.)
7

8 At the March 1, 2017, meeting, Mahvash told Plaintiff that the fee was for
9 applying for disability benefits. (Id. 40.) When Plaintiff asked if she could waive the
10 fee, she said Definitely not! (Id. 41.) She had Plaintiff sign a contract with her in
11 various places; he was not given a copy of the contract, which was all in English. (Id.
12 42.) Plaintiff alleges that Mahvash and Defendant Sharifzadeh, MSS support staff, had
13 him quickly sign the documents without explaining their content. (Id. 12, 42.) He
14 gave Mahvash the money order and asked her if she wanted him to fill it out, to which
15 she replied we will complete it. (Id. 43.) Defendant Sharifzadeh later came in to
16 collect the money order and the signed contract. (Id. 43.)
17

18 After discussing Plaintiffs family and reviewing his documents, Mahvash went
19 over the $3,000 fee again, including the requirement that he provide her with five signed,
20 undated checks made out to Mahvash for $500. (Id. 44, 45.) Plaintiff asked what
21 would happen to the initial $500 deposit if he was rejected and Mahvash responded, you
22 say bye bye to it. (Id. 45.) Plaintiff claims that Mahvash seemed irritated by his
23 questions about the fee and in response began to ask him detailed questions about him
24 and all of his relatives. (Id. 47.) Throughout the meeting, Mahvashs office door was
25 open such that Defendant Sharifzadeh could hear their conversation and interject. (Id.
26 46.)
27

28 //

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1 After the meeting, Plaintiff went to his bank and obtained checks. (Id. 50.) He
2 provided to MSS via Defendant Sharifzadeh five signed, blank checks for $500 with the
3 pay to lines blank. (Id. 50, 52.) Each one had Ms Mazgani ssi in the memo. (Id.
4 52.) In the following days, Plaintiff felt increasingly uncomfortable with the blank
5 checks and asked Mahvash if they were necessary. (Id. 51.) She said that it was their
6 standard fee for Social Security applications and warned him that if he failed to pay the
7 rest of the $3,000 he would forfeit his Social Security benefits and lose his $500. (Id.
8 51.)
9

10 Plaintiff sought legal advice and filed the original Complaint on March 13, 2017.
11 (Id. 53.) In the following weeks, Plaintiff alleges that he was harassed and stalked by
12 Mahvash and her agents. (See id. 54 (March 15, 2017, phone call from Mahvash saying
13 she needed to talk to him, followed by a second phone call from Defendant Sharifzadeh
14 insisting he come to the office to talk about the situation and not let it blow up); id.
15 55 (multiple phone calls from restricted numbers that would hang up when he answered
16 commencing March 20, 2017); id. 55 (unidentified man asking Plaintiffs mail carrier if
17 he knew Plaintiff, where Plaintiff lived, and when Plaintiff typically came to collect his
18 mail); id. 56 (Plaintiff approached by large man attempting to enter his secured building
19 who said he was looking for Plaintiff and told Plaintiff that people that you have sued
20 arent happy; when man reached for bulge in jacket Plaintiff panicked and ran to his car;
21 man followed Plaintiff, who drove to police station); id. 57 (Mahvash visited Plaintiffs
22 sister on March 30, 2017, threatening to file false claims against Plaintiffs newphew, a
23 lawyer, with the California Bar Association; when asked if she was threatening Plaintiffs
24 sister, Mahvash replied, I will kill for my children); id. 58 (two phone calls from
25 Mahvash on April 3, 2017, during which she yelled at him, followed by a phone call
26 answered by Plaintiffs wife that resulted in a panic attack); id. 59 (April 5, 2017, phone
27 call from unknown number, man on other end said Ill be watching you, you
28

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1 motherfucker, were watching you); id. 60 (two phone calls from Mahvash on April
2 17, 2017).)
3

4 On April 3, 2017, Mahvash sent Plaintiff a money order for $500, essentially
5 refunding his deposit. (Id. 124.) Plaintiff rejected the offer and gave the check to his
6 attorney. (Id. 124.) On April 22, 2017, Mahvashs sister, Defendant Moghaddam,
7 cashed his $500 money order. (Id. 49, 77.)
8

9 MSS is a closely-held corporation in which Mahvash and her two daughters,

10 Nazanin and Neyaz, are the only Corporate Officers and DirectorsMahvash is the
11 CEO, Nazanin is the Secretary, and Neyaz is the CFO. (Id. 29.) Plaintiff claims that all
12 three work at the same address in offices rented by MSS. (Id. 31 (relying in part on a
13 Complaint and declaration in a separate state court case against MSS and others); id.
14 63; see also id. 33 (referencing declarations from Neyaz and Mahvash claiming that
15 Neyaz does not currently perform any work or engage in any formal or informal
16 functions for MSS; Neyazs declaration attests that she has not worked for MSS since
17 2009).)
18

19 The foundation of Plaintiffs claims is his allegation that the $3,000 fee is invalid
20 under Social Security regulations regarding payment to representatives who help
21 claimants apply for benefits. (See id. 6679.) He alleges that Defendants engage in
22 money laundering and other techniques, such as having customers provide checks with
23 blank pay to lines, to conceal this fraud. (See id. 1819, 80103.)
24

25 Nazanin is a licensed attorney who works out of the same building as MSS. (Id.
26 9.) Her law office lists Social Security Disability and SSI as one of its practice areas.
27 (Id. 16 n.2.) Plaintiff claims that Nazanin provides legal assistance to MSS clients
28 seeking benefits, namely by coordinating their appeals from denial of benefits. (Id.

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1 62, 63 (relying on declarations filed by Mahvash and Nazanin stating that they have
2 never simultaneously represented a client); see also id. 63 (noting that, while Nazanins
3 website advertises initial benefits filings, her declaration states that the vast majority of
4 her Social Security practice involves advising clients who were denied benefits).) He
5 alleges essentially a kickback scheme where Nazanin provides MSS with legal support
6 and in return MSS refers benefits claimants to her law office. (Id. 129.) In her
7 representation of those claimants, Plaintiff claims, Nazanin is aware that MSS has
8 charged them an illegal fee but never reveals that fact to them. (Id. 129.) And
9 transactions including Nazanin are flagged by Plaintiff as indications of money
10 laundering. (See id. 91.)
11

12 As for Neyaz, Plaintiff alleges that she is named on one of the accounts used for
13 money laundering of illegally-obtained fees. (Id. 81.) In addition, her personal bank
14 account contains many deposits of $500 through cash or personal checks that Plaintiff
15 claims come from MSS clients paying illegal fees. (Id. 83.) Several such checks have
16 Neyazs name written in different handwriting than the memo lines, which reference
17 Social Security benefits. (Id. 99; see also 10203.) Her account is also allegedly
18 drawn on to pay for Mahvashs credit card. (Id. 87, 93.)
19

20 On the basis of these allegations, Plaintiff seeks to represent a class of [a]ll

21 persons who were charged by Defendants, and each of them, for a fee related to obtaining
22 Social Security Administration benefits or California State benefits in excess of the
23 established permissible amount pursuant to Code of Federal Regulations 404.1720 from
24 December 23, 2005, to the present. (Id. 107; see also id. 29 (alleging that MSS was
25 incorporated on December 21, 2005).) He also seeks to represent two California sub-
26 classes, defined as (1) [a]ll persons who suffered emotional distress as a result of
27 Defendants threats, aggressiveness, and/or bullish tactics designed to induce them to pay
28

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1 the illegal fees, (id. 109), and (2) class members aged 65 years or older when they
2 were charged illegal fees by Defendants, (id. 181).
3

4 Plaintiff brings seven causes of action: (1) intentional fraud against all Defendants
5 in violation of California Civil Code 1572, (id. 12637); (2) unfair and deceptive
6 business practices against all Defendants in violation of California Business and
7 Professions Code 17200 et seq. (UCL), (id. 13852); (3) false advertising against
8 Mahvash, Defendant Sharifzadeh, and MSS in violation of California Business and
9 Professions Code 17500 et seq., (id. 15358); (4) breach of fiduciary duty against
10 Mahvash, Neyaz, Nazanin, Shohreh, and MSS in violation of 20 C.F.R. 404.1705, (id.
11 15972); (5) intentional infliction of emotional distress against Mahvash, Defendant
12 Sharifzadeh, and MSS, (id. 17380); (6) Financial Elder Abuse against all Defendants
13 in violation of California Welfare and Institutions Code 15610.30 & 15657.5, (id.
14 18192); and (7) violation of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act,
15 (RICO), 18 U.S.C. 1961 et seq., against all Defendants (id. 193210). Plaintiffs
16 prayer for relief seeks, inter alia, actual, compensatory, and punitive damages;
17 disgorgement of all ill-gotten gains; injunctive relief; appointment of a receiver; and an
18 asset freeze. (Id. at Prayer for Relief.)
19

20 III. LEGAL STANDARD

21

22 A motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) tests the legal
23 sufficiency of the claims asserted in the complaint. The issue on a motion to dismiss for
24 failure to state a claim is not whether the claimant will ultimately prevail, but whether the
25 claimant is entitled to offer evidence to support the claims asserted. Gilligan v. Jamco
26 Dev. Corp., 108 F.3d 246, 249 (9th Cir. 1997). Rule 12(b)(6) is read in conjunction with
27 Rule 8(a), which requires only a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the
28 pleader is entitled to relief. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). When evaluating a Rule 12(b)(6)

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1 motion, the district court must accept all material allegations in the complaint as true and
2 construe them in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Moyo v. Gomez, 32
3 F.3d 1382, 1384 (9th Cir. 1994). The district court may also consider additional facts in
4 materials that the district court may take judicial notice, Barron v. Reich, 13 F.3d 1370,
5 1377 (9th Cir. 1994), as well as documents whose contents are alleged in a complaint
6 and whose authenticity no party questions, but which are not physically attached to the
7 pleading, Branch v. Tunnell, 14 F.3d 449, 454 (9th Cir. 1994), overruled in part on
8 other grounds by Galbraith v. Cnty. of Santa Clara, 307 F.3d 1119 (9th Cir. 2002).
9

10 However, the tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained
11 in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678
12 (2009); see also Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (stating that while
13 a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not need detailed factual
14 allegations, courts are not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual
15 allegation (citations and quotes omitted)). Dismissal of a complaint for failure to state a
16 claim is not proper where a plaintiff has alleged enough facts to state a claim to relief
17 that is plausible on its face. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. In keeping with this liberal
18 pleading standard, the district court should grant the plaintiff leave to amend if the
19 complaint can possibly be cured by additional factual allegations. Doe v. United States,
20 58 F.3d 494, 497 (9th Cir. 1995).
21

22 In federal court, a plaintiff alleging fraud must state with particularity the
23 circumstances constituting fraud or mistake. Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b); see Kearns v. Ford
24 Motor Co., 567 F.3d 1120, 1145 (9th Cir. 2009). Under Rule 9(b), the plaintiff must set
25 forth the who, what, when, where, and how of the alleged fraud. Vess v. Ciba-Geigy
26 Corp. USA, 317 F.3d 1097, 1106 (9th Cir. 2003). When an artificial entity is the alleged
27 perpetrator of the fraud, the plaintiff must allege the names of the persons who made the
28 allegedly fraudulent representations, their authority to speak, to whom they spoke, what

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1 they said or wrote, and when it was said or written. UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Glob.
2 Eagle Entmt, Inc., 117 F. Supp. 3d 1092, 1107 (C.D. Cal. 2015).
3

4 IV. DISCUSSION
5

6 Defendants motion to dismiss challenges each of Plaintiffs causes of action.

7 (Dkt. 31.) The Court considers each in turn.
8

9 A. Intentional Fraud
10

11 Defendants argue that Plaintiffs FAC falls woefully short of the pleading
12 standard required. (Id. at 5.) However, they admit that the FAC (1) has additional detail
13 of Mahvashs statements in the March 1, 2017, meeting, (2) discusses and attaches
14 financial documents that, Plaintiff avers, indicate Neyazs participation in the fraud, and
15 (3) and an example of the fraud, namely Mahvash and Defendant Sharifzadehs
16 persuading Plaintiff to give them $500 and five blank checks, each for $500. (Id.) These
17 added facts are more than sufficient to give Defendants Mahvash, MSS, and Defendant
18 Sharifzadeh fair notice of the particularities of the fraud. Contrary to Defendants belief,
19 the example described at length in the FAC is sufficientMSS, Mahvash, and Defendant
20 Sharifzadeh on a particular day, in a particular place aggressively persuading him to pay
21 what he claims to be illegal fees by threatening his Social Security benefits and telling
22 him it was necessary. (See FAC 4652.)
23

24 As for the remaining Defendants, the motion argues that Plaintiff alleges other
25 individuals engaged in conduct that does not actually support his fraud claim. (Dkt. 31
26 at 5.) The FAC clearly alleges, and Defendants do not dispute, that Defendant
27 Moghaddam cashed Plaintiffs $500 money order deposit, which was blank when
28 Plaintiff gave it to Mahvash and Defendant Sharifzadeh. (See id.; FAC 43, 49.) As

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1 Plaintiff recognizes, one who accepts the fruits of a fraud, with knowledge of the
2 misrepresentations or concealments by which the fraud was perpetrated, thereby
3 inferentially ratifies the fraud complained of and will be liable therefore even though he
4 did not personally participate in the fraud. (Dkt. 38 at 19 (quoting McClung v. Watt, 190
5 Cal. 155, 161 (1922)).) The FAC, by pleading that Defendant Moghaddam cashed a
6 blank money order given to MSS by Plaintiff for Social Security representation, and
7 containing writing on it to that effect, has sufficiently pled her knowledge and
8 participation in the fraud. (See FAC 43, 49; see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b) (stating that
9 knowledge and intention may be pled generally in fraud cases)).) The same applies to
10 Neyaz, who the FAC alleges deposited or cashed $500 checks made out to Mahvash,
11 MSS, or otherwise indicating their association with fee payments for Social Security
12 representation. (See, e.g., id. 90, 94.)
13

14 However, the FAC contains no allegation that Nazanin interacted with Plaintiff at
15 any time or that Mahvash or anyone else mentioned Nazanin as a potential lawyer for
16 Plaintiff should he need to appeal denial of Social Security benefits. The FAC therefore
17 fails to adequately plead that Nazanin had anything to do with the fraud perpetrated on
18 Plaintiff. Regardless of whether Nazanin is involved in fraud committed on other
19 members of the proposed class, Plaintiff must plead sufficient facts to state the elements
20 of his claim. Johnson v. Riverside Healthcare System, LP, 534 F.3d 1116, 1122 (9th Cir.
21 2008). In addition to sufficient facts being absent from the FAC, in no filing has Plaintiff
22 indicated any contact with Nazanin or indication that she ratified the fraud perpetrated
23 against Plaintiff alleged in the FAC. (See Dkt. 1 Ex. 1 (original complaint); Dkt. 9 (first
24 application for a temporary restraining order); Dkt. 10 (Plaintiffs opposition to
25 Defendants first motion to dismiss); Dkt. 19 (second application for a temporary
26 restraining order).) Given Plaintiffs repeated failure to allege any relationship between
27 the fraud underlying his claim and Nazanin, the Court must conclude that Plaintiff cannot
28 allege such facts in any amended complaint. See Arizona Students Assn v. Arizona Bd.

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1 of Regents, 824 F.3d 858, 871 (9th Cir. 2016) (Dismissal of a complaint without leave to
2 amend is only proper when, upon de novo review, it is clear that the complaint could not
3 be saved by any amendment.). Accordingly, Plaintiffs intentional fraud claim against
4 Nazanin must be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
5

6 B. False Advertising
7

8 Defendants argue that Plaintiffs false advertising claim against Mahvash,

9 Defendant Sharfizadeh, and MSS should be dismissed because Plaintiff failed to identify
10 the purported falsity of these advertisements. (Dkt. 31 at 9.) Plaintiffs FAC, however,
11 expressly alleges that advertisements for MSS were in the Attorney Services Bureau
12 section of The Iranian Pocket Dictionary Yellow Pages and that Mahvash was listed as an
13 attorney on Connect Iranian American. (FAC 35.) That, along with Plaintiffs
14 attaching said advertisements to the FAC, (see id. at Exs. A-2, A-3, C), given Plaintiffs
15 repeated emphasis on the fact that Mahvash is not actually an attorney, (see id. 25), is
16 sufficient to state a claim for false advertising against MSS, Mahvash, and Defendant
17 Sharfizadeh (MSS secretarial support who likely was involved in placing said
18 advertisements).
19

20 C. Breach of Fiduciary Duty

21

22 Plaintiff brings his breach of fiduciary duty claim against Mahvash, Neyaz,
23 Nazanin, Defendant Moghaddam, and MSS. (Id. 159.) A fiduciary relationship is
24 any relation existing between parties to a transaction wherein one of the parties is in duty
25 bound to act with the utmost good faith for the benefit of the other party. Such a relation
26 ordinarily arises where a confidence is reposed by one person in the integrity of another,
27 and in such a relation the party in whom the confidence is reposed, if he voluntarily
28 accepts or assumes to accept the confidence, can take no advantage from his acts relating

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1 to the interest of the other party without the latters knowledge or consent. Wolf v.
2 Superior Court, 107 Cal. App. 4th 25, 29 (2003) (internal citations omitted).
3

4 Traditional examples of fiduciary relationships in the commercial context include

5 . . . agent/principal. Id. at 30. Here, the FAC pleads at most facts indicating that
6 Mahvash was acting as Plaintiffs agent by agreeing to serve as his Social Security
7 representative. (FAC 166.) There are no facts, however, supporting such a relationship
8 between Plaintiff and Neyaz, Nazanin, Defendant Sharifzadeh, or MSS as an entity.
9 Plaintiffs opposition to Defendants motion argues that Neyaz and Nazanin have a
10 fiduciary relationship with him through their roles as Corporate Officers and their
11 ratification of the fraud, and Defendant Moghaddam has such a relationship because she
12 is an employee of MSS. (Dkt. 38 at 2223.) Plaintiff provides no support for imputing
13 fiduciary relationships through the corporate form and the Court can find none. (See Dkt.
14 38 at 2223.) The fact that Corporate Officers can face some form of liability for a
15 corporate entity does not mean that a fiduciary relationship with one employee and
16 Corporate Officer implicates all such individuals in a fiduciary relationship. The Court
17 refuses to distort the meaning of fiduciary relationship beyond recognition and impose
18 obligations on Neyaz, Nazanin, MSS, and Defendant Sharifzadeh.
19

20 Furthermore, the Court highlighted this issue when it dismissed Plaintiffs original
21 complaint with leave to amend. (See Dkt. 14 at 9 ([T]he following facts are absent from
22 the complaint: . . . (11) any factual support for there being a fiduciary relationship
23 between each Defendant and Plaintiff.).) Plaintiffs failure to plead facts indicating any
24 meaningful relationship with any Defendant other than Mahvash, let alone a fiduciary
25 relationship, in his FAC is consistent with the assertions made in all of his filings thus far
26 that his primary contact with the allegedly fraudulent scheme was with Mahvash, not
27 with MSS as an entity, Neyaz, Nazanin, or Defendant Sharifzadeh. (See Dkt. 1 Ex. 1
28 (original complaint); Dkt. 9 (first application for a temporary restraining order); Dkt. 10

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1 (Plaintiffs opposition to Defendants first motion to dismiss); Dkt. 19 (second

2 application for a temporary restraining order).) Accordingly, Plaintiffs breach of
3 fiduciary duty claims against MSS, Neyaz, Nazanin, and Defendant Sharifzadeh3 must be
4 DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. See Natl Council of La Raza v. Cegavske, 800 F.3d
5 1032, 1045 (9th Cir. 2015) (A district court may exercise its discretion to deny leave to
6 amend due to . . . repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments previously
7 allowed.).
8

9 D. Financial Elder Abuse

10

11 Plaintiff admits that he is not aged 65 or older and, as such, California Welfare &
12 Institutions Code 15610.30 and 15657.5 do not apply to him. (FAC 182.)
13 Nevertheless, he seeks to represent a subclass of class members who are aged 65 or
14 older. (Id.) However, as noted above, Plaintiff must plead sufficient facts to state the
15 elements of his claim. Johnson v. Riverside Healthcare System, LP, 534 F.3d 1116, 1122
16 (9th Cir. 2008). As Plaintiff cannot plead sufficient facts to raise a Financial Elder Abuse
17 claim on his own behalf, that claim is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
18

19 E. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress

20

21 Defendants argue that Plaintiffs Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress

22 (IIED) claim, brought against Mahvash, Defendant Sharifzadeh, and MSS, must be
23 dismissed because the FAC fails to allege severe or extreme emotional distress. (Dkt. 31
24 at 1213.4) The elements of IIED are (1) extreme and outrageous conduct by the
25
3
Plaintiffs opposition seems to argue that a fiduciary relationship should also be extended to Defendant
26
Moghaddam based on her cashing of his $500 deposit money order. (Dkt. 38 at 2223.) However, the
27 FAC does not name her as a Defendant against whom he brings his breach of fiduciary duty claim, (see
FAC 159), so the Court need not consider that argument.
4
28 While Defendants motion states that Plaintiff has failed to allege any of the elements of IIED, (Dkt. 31
at 11), it does not state how the extensive detail of harassment alleged in the FAC, (FAC 5361),
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1 defendant with the intention of causing, or reckless disregard of the probability of

2 causing, emotional distress; (2) the plaintiffs suffering severe or extreme emotional
3 distress; and (3) actual and proximate causation of the emotional distress by the
4 defendants outrageous conduct. Hughes v. Pair, 46 Cal. 4th 1035, 1050 (2009)
5 (internal citations omitted). The pleaded facts must state the nature, extent, and duration
6 of any emotional distress. See Holden v. Target Corp., No. 16-CV-02217-JST, 2016 WL
7 3938950, at *5 (N.D. Cal. July 21, 2016). While Plaintiffs FAC does allege that the
8 harassment caused him to panic, flee to the police, and have trouble sleeping, (FAC
9 56, 177), those vague, fleeting allegations do not constitute emotional distress of such
10 substantial quantity or enduring quality that an individual in civilized society should not
11 be expected to endure it. Angie M. v. Superior Court, 37 Cal. App. 4th 1217, 1227
12 (1995). The Court cannot conclude, however, that, given the extensive allegations of
13 harassment, including inducing a panic attack to be suffered by Plaintiffs wife, Plaintiff
14 would be unable to plead such facts as to his emotional distress. This claim is therefore
15 DISMISSED WITH THIRTY DAYS LEAVE TO AMEND.
16

17 F. RICO Claim
18

19 Defendants also argue that Plaintiff has failed to plead a claim under RICO. (Dkt.
20 31 at 1516.) The RICO statute prohibits four types of activities: (1) investing in, (2)
21 acquiring, or (3) conducting or participating in an enterprise with income derived from a
22 pattern of racketeering activity or collection of an unlawful debt, or (4) conspiring to
23 commit any of the first three types of activity. 18 U.S.C. 1962(a)(d). The statute is to
24 be liberally construed to effectuate its remedial purposes. Odom v. Microsoft Corp.,
25 486 F.3d 541, 546 (9th Cir. 2007). To recover under 1962(c), a plaintiff must prove (1)
26 conduct, (2) of an enterprise, (3) through a pattern, (4) of racketeering activity (known as
27

28 does not constitute extreme and outrageous conduct, (Dkt. 31 at 1113). And, as discussed in this
section, the distress Plaintiff alleges is actually and proximately caused by the harassment.
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1 predicate acts), (5) causing injury to the plaintiffs business or property by the
2 conduct constituting the violation. See Living Designs, Inc. v. E.I. Dupont de Numours &
3 Co., 431 F.3d 353, 361 (9th Cir. 2005).
4

5 Contrary to Defendants contention, the FAC contains detailed allegations of a

6 scheme whereby MSS, holding itself out as an attorney service to Iranian-Americans,
7 entices benefit claimants to pay an illegal, up-front fee for representation services through
8 Mahvashs threats of losing benefits and the combined pressure of her and Defendant
9 Sharifzadeh. This alleged scheme is effectuated and hidden by requiring claimants to
10 provide blank checks that are cashed, deposited into Neyazs or Defendant Moghaddams
11 accounts, or otherwise concealed. And the scheme is further protected by Nazanin
12 providing appellate representation to claimants to prevent them from realizing the
13 illegality of the up-front fees. This scheme contains specific allegations against each
14 Defendant, more than one predicate act, including fraud, mail fraud, and extortion, see 18
15 U.S.C. 1961, within the last ten years, and involves commerce in a variety of ways,
16 including banking. As such, Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged a RICO claim against
17 Defendants.
18

19 G. UCL Claim
20

21 Finally, Defendants argue that Plaintiffs UCL claim must be dismissed. (Dkt. 31
22 at 67.) The UCL prohibits unlawful, unfair, and fraudulent business acts. Cal.
23 Bus. & Prof. Code 17200. As discussed above, Plaintiff has sufficiently pled a RICO
24 claim against Defendants, so the unlawful prong UCL claim is sufficiently pled. The
25 fraud prong UCL claim also is sufficiently pled against Mahvash, Neyaz, Defendant
26 Moghaddam, Defendant Sharifzadeh, and MSS since Plaintiff has sufficiently pled fraud
27 and/or false advertising against those Defendants. And as for the unfair prong, the
28 Court refuses to countenance Defendants argument that, because Plaintiff could choose

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1 other Social Security representatives, any practice could not have been unfair within the
2 meaning of the UCL. (Dkt. 31 at 7.) Rather, the FAC is replete with allegations of
3 conduct by all Defendants that gave them an unfair advantage over representatives who
4 did not demand illegal feesfrom pressuring payment of such fees in the first place to
5 harassing individuals who seek to vindicate claims against them to shielding discovery of
6 their conduct through alleged money laundering and referrals to Nazanin. As such,
7 Plaintiffs UCL claim is sufficiently pled.
8

9 V. CONCLUSION
10

11 For the foregoing reasons, Defendants motion to dismiss is DENIED IN

12 SUBSTANTIAL PART. Plaintiffs Financial Elder Abuse claim is DISMISSED WITH
13 PREJUDICE, as are his intentional fraud claim against Nazanin and his breach of
14 fiduciary duty claim against Neyaz, Nazanin, MSS, and Defendant Sharifzadeh.
15 Plaintiffs intentional infliction of emotional distress claim is DISMISSED WITH
16 THIRTY DAYS LEAVE TO AMEND.
17

18

19 DATED: July 28, 2017

20 __________________________________
21 CORMAC J. CARNEY
22 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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