Vda. De Chua vs.

CA
G.R. No. 116835 March 5, 1998

Facts: From 1970 up to 1981, Roberto Chua lived out of wedlock with private respondent Florita A. Vallejo and they

begot two sons. On 28 May 1992, Roberto Chua died intestate in Davao City.

On 2 July 1992, Vallejo filed with the Regional Trial Court of Cotabato City a petition for the guardianship and administration

over the persons and properties of the two minors.

Petitioner Antonietta Garcia Vda. de Chua, representing to be the surviving spouse of Roberto Chua, filed a Motion to Dismiss on

the ground of improper venue. Petitioner alleged that at the time of the decedents death, Davao City was his residence, hence,

the Regional Trial Court of Davao City is the proper forum. In support of her allegation, petitioner presented the following

documents: (1) photocopy of the marriage contract; (2) Transfer Certificate of Title issued in the name of Roberto L. Chua

married to Antonietta Garcia, and a resident of Davao City; (3) Residence Certificates from 1988 and 1989 issued at Davao City

indicating that he was married and was born in Cotabato City; (4) Income Tax Returns for 1990 and 1991 filed in Davao City

where the status of the decedent was stated as married; and, (5) Passport of the decedent specifying that he was married and

his residence was Davao City.

Vallejo contends that movant/oppositor Antonietta Chua is not the surviving spouse of the late Roberto L. Chua but a pretender

to the estate of the latter since the deceased never contracted marriage with any woman until he died.

The trial court ruled that petitioner has no personality to file the motion not having proven his status as a wife of the decedent.

The Order was appealed to the CA, but it decided in favor of herein respondents.

Issue: Was petitioner able to prove her marriage to Roberto L. Chua?

Held: No. The best proof of marriage between a man and wife is a marriage contract which petitioner failed to

produce. The lower court correctly disregarded the Photostat copy of the marriage certificate which she presented, this being a

violation of the best evidence rule, together with other worthless pieces of evidence. Transfer Certificates of Title, Residence

Certificates, passports and other similar documents cannot prove marriage especially so when the private respondent has

submitted a certification from the Local Civil Registrar concerned that the alleged marriage was not registered and a letter from

the judge alleged to have solemnized the marriage that he has not solemnized said alleged marriage.
Republic vs Orbecido
Republic vs. Orbecido
GR NO. 154380, October 5, 2005

FACTS:

Cipriano Orbecido III was married with Lady Myros Villanueva on May 24, 1981
at the United Church of Christ in the Philippines in Ozamis City. They had a son
and a daughter named Kristoffer and Kimberly, respectively. In 1986, the wife
left for US bringing along their son Kristoffer. A few years later, Orbecido
discovered that his wife had been naturalized as an American citizen and
learned from his son that his wife sometime in 2000 had obtained a divorce
decree and married a certain Stanley. He thereafter filed with the trial court a
petition for authority to remarry invoking Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family
Code.

ISSUE: Whether or not Orbecido can remarry under Article 26 of the Family
Code.

HELD:

The court ruled that taking into consideration the legislative intent and applying
the rule of reason, Article 26 Par.2 should be interpreted to include cases
involving parties who, at the time of the celebration of the marriage were
Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them becomes naturalized as a foreign
citizen and obtains a divorce decree. The Filipino spouse should likewise be
allowed to remarry as if the other party were a foreigner at the time of the
solemnization of the marriage.

Hence, the courts unanimous decision in holding Article 26 Par 2 be interpreted

as allowing a Filipino citizen who has been divorced by a spouse who had
acquired a citizenship and remarried, also to remarry under Philippine law.

Pilapil vs Ibay-Somera
TITLE: Imelda Manalaysay Pilapil v Hon. Corona Ibay-Somera
CITATION: GR No. 80116, June 30, 1989| 174 SCRA 653

FACTS:

Imelda M. Pilapil, a Filipino citizen, was married with private respondent, Erich
Ekkehard Geiling, a German national before the Registrar of Births, Marriages
and Deaths at Friedensweiler, Federal Republic of Germany. They have a child
who was born on April 20, 1980 and named Isabella Pilapil Geiling. Conjugal
disharmony eventuated in private respondent and he initiated a divorce
proceeding against petitioner in Germany before the Schoneberg Local Court in
January 1983. The petitioner then filed an action for legal separation, support
and separation of property before the RTC Manila on January 23, 1983.

The decree of divorce was promulgated on January 15, 1986 on the ground of
failure of marriage of the spouses. The custody of the child was granted to the
petitioner.

On June 27, 1986, private respondent filed 2 complaints for adultery before the
City Fiscal of Manila alleging that while still married to Imelda, latter had an
affair with William Chia as early as 1982 and another man named Jesus Chua
sometime in 1983.

ISSUE: Whether private respondent can prosecute petitioner on the ground of

adultery even though they are no longer husband and wife as decree of divorce
was already issued.

HELD:

The law specifically provided that in prosecution for adultery and concubinage,
the person who can legally file the complaint should be the offended spouse and
nobody else. Though in this case, it appeared that private respondent is the
offended spouse, the latter obtained a valid divorce in his country, the Federal
Republic of Germany, and said divorce and its legal effects may be recognized in
the Philippines in so far as he is concerned. Thus, under the same consideration
and rationale, private respondent is no longer the husband of petitioner and has
no legal standing to commence the adultery case under the imposture that he
was the offended spouse at the time he filed suit.

Van Dorn vs Romillo

Van Dorn vs. Romillo
139 SCRA 139

FACTS:

Alice Reyes Van Dorn, a Filipino Citizen and private respondent, Richard Upton, a
US citizen, was married in Hong Kong in 1979. They established their residence
in the Philippines and had 2 children. They were divorced in Nevada, USA in
1982 and petitioner remarried, this time with Theodore Van Dorn. A suit against
petitioner was filed on June 8, 1983, stating that petitioners business in Ermita
Manila, the Galleon Shop, is a conjugal property with Upton and prayed therein
that Alice be ordered to render an accounting of the business and he be
declared as the administrator of the said property.
ISSUE: Whether or not the foreign divorce between the petitioner and private
respondent in Nevada is binding in the Philippines where petitioner is a Filipino
citizen.

HELD:

Private respondent is no longer the husband of the petitioner. He would have no

standing to sue petitioner to exercise control over conjugal assets. He is
estopped by his own representation before the court from asserting his right
over the alleged conjugal property. Furthermore, aliens may obtain divorces
abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid
according to their national law. Petitioner is not bound to her marital obligations
to respondent by virtue of her nationality laws. She should not be discriminated
against her own country if the end of justice is to be served.

Republic vs CA and Castro

Republic vs. CA and Castro
GR No. 103047, September 12, 1994

FACTS:

Angelina Castro, with her parents unaware, contracted a civil marriage with
Edwin Cardenas. They did not immediately live together and it was only upon
Castro found out that she was pregnant that they decided to live together
wherein the said cohabitation lasted for only 4 months. Thereafter, they parted
ways and Castro gave birth that was adopted by her brother with the consent of
Cardenas.

The baby was brought in the US and in Castros earnest desire to follow her
daughter wanted to put in order her marital status before leaving for US. She
filed a petition seeking a declaration for the nullity of her marriage. Her lawyer
then found out that there was no marriage license issued prior to the celebration
of their marriage proven by the certification issued by the Civil Registrar of
Pasig.

ISSUE: Whether or not the documentary and testimonial evidence resorted to

by Castro is sufficient to establish that no marriage license was issued to the
parties prior to the solemnization of their marriage.

HELD:

The court affirmed the decision of CA that the certification issued by the Civil
Registrar unaccompanied by any circumstances of suspicion sufficiently prove
that the office did not issue a marriage license to the contracting parties. Albeit
the fact that the testimony of Castro is not supported by any other witnesses is
not a ground to deny her petition because of the peculiar circumstances of her
case. Furthermore, Cardenas was duly served with notice of the proceedings,
which he chose to ignore.

Under the circumstances of the case, the documentary and testimonial evidence
presented by private respondent Castro sufficiently established the absence of
the subject marriage license.

Garcia-Recio vs. Recio

TITLE: Grace J. Garcia-Recio v Rederick A. Recio
CITATION: GR NO. 138322, Oct. 2, 2002 | 366 SCRA 437

FACTS:

Rederick A. Recio, a Filipino, was married to Editha Samson, an Australian

Citizen, in Malabon, Rizal on March 1, 1987. They lived as husband and wife in
Australia. However, an Australian family court issued purportedly a decree of
divorce, dissolving the marriage of Rederick and Editha on May 18, 1989.

On January 12, 1994, Rederick married Grace J. Garcia where it was solemnized
at Our lady of Perpetual Help Church, Cabanatuan City. Since October 22, 1995,
the couple lived separately without prior judicial dissolution of their marriage.
As a matter of fact, while they were still in Australia, their conjugal assets were
divided on May 16, 1996, in accordance with their Statutory Declarations
secured in Australia.

Grace filed a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage on the ground of

bigamy on March 3, 1998, claiming that she learned only in November 1997,
Redericks marriage with Editha Samson.

ISSUE: Whether the decree of divorce submitted by Rederick Recio is admissible

as evidence to prove his legal capacity to marry petitioner and absolved him of
bigamy.

HELD:

The nullity of Redericks marriage with Editha as shown by the divorce decree
issued was valid and recognized in the Philippines since the respondent is a
naturalized Australian. However, there is absolutely no evidence that proves
respondents legal capacity to marry petitioner though the former presented a
divorce decree. The said decree, being a foreign document was inadmissible to
court as evidence primarily because it was not authenticated by the consul/
embassy of the country where it will be used.
Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, a writing or document may be proven as
a public or official record of a foreign country by either:

(1) an official publication or

(2) a copy thereof attested by the officer having legal custody of the document.
If the record is not kept in the Philippines, such copy must be:

(a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or

consular officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country
in which the record is kept and

(b) authenticated by the seal of his office.

Thus, the Supreme Court remands the case to the Regional Trial Court of
Cabanatuan City to receive or trial evidence that will conclusively prove
respondents legal capacity to marry petitioner and thus free him on the ground
of bigamy.

Estrada vs Escritor (August 4, 2003)

Estrada vs. Escritor
AM P-02-1651, August 4, 2003

FACTS:

Soledad Escritor is a court interpreter since 1999 in the RTC of Las Pinas City.
Alejandro Estrada, the complainant, wrote to Judge Jose F. Caoibes, presiding
judge of Branch 253, RTC of Las Pinas City, requesting for an investigation of
rumors that Escritor has been living with Luciano Quilapio Jr., a man not her
husband, and had eventually begotten a son. Escritors husband, who had lived
with another woman, died a year before she entered into the judiciary. On the
other hand, Quilapio is still legally married to another woman. Estrada is not
related to either Escritor or Quilapio and is not a resident of Las Pinas but of
Bacoor, Cavite. According to the complainant, respondent should not be
allowed to remain employed in the judiciary for it will appear as if the court
allows such act.

Escritor is a member of the religious sect known as the Jehovahs Witnesses and
the Watch Tower and Bible Tract Society where her conjugal arrangement with
Quilapio is in conformity with their religious beliefs. After ten years of living
together, she executed on July 28, 1991 a Declaration of Pledging Faithfulness
which was approved by the congregation. Such declaration is effective when
legal impediments render it impossible for a couple to legalize their union.
Gregorio, Salazar, a member of the Jehovahs Witnesses since 1985 and has
been a presiding minister since 1991, testified and explained the import of and
procedures for executing the declaration which was completely executed by
Escritor and Quilapios in Atimonan, Quezon and was signed by three witnesses
and recorded in Watch Tower Central Office.

ISSUE:

Whether or not respondent should be found guilty of the administrative charge

of gross and immoral conduct and be penalized by the State for such conjugal
arrangement.

HELD:

A distinction between public and secular morality and religious morality should
be kept in mind. The jurisdiction of the Court extends only to public and secular
morality.

The Court states that our Constitution adheres the benevolent neutrality
approach that gives room for accommodation of religious exercises as required
by the Free Exercise Clause. This benevolent neutrality could allow for
accommodation of morality based on religion, provided it does not offend
compelling state interests.

The states interest is the preservation of the integrity of the judiciary by

maintaining among its ranks a high standard of morality and decency. There is
nothing in the OCAs (Office of the Court Administrator) memorandum to the
Court that demonstrates how this interest is so compelling that it should
override respondents plea of religious freedom. Indeed, it is inappropriate for
the complainant, a private person, to present evidence on the compelling
interest of the state. The burden of evidence should be discharged by the proper
agency of the government which is the Office of the Solicitor General.

In order to properly settle the case at bar, it is essential that the government be
given an opportunity to demonstrate the compelling state interest it seeks to
uphold in opposing the respondents position that her conjugal arrangement is
not immoral and punishable as it is within the scope of free exercise protection.
The Court could not prohibit and punish her conduct where the Free Exercise
Clause protects it, since this would be an unconstitutional encroachment of her
right to religious freedom. Furthermore, the court cannot simply take a passing
look at respondents claim of religious freedom but must also apply the
compelling state interest test.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the case is REMANDED to the Office of the Court

Administrator. The Solicitor General is ordered to intervene in the case where it
will be given the opportunity (a) to examine the sincerity and centrality of
respondent's claimed religious belief and practice; (b) to present evidence on
the state's "compelling interest" to override respondent's religious belief and
practice; and (c) to show that the means the state adopts in pursuing its interest
is the least restrictive to respondent's religious freedom. The rehearing should
be concluded thirty (30) days from the Office of the Court Administrator's receipt
of this Decision.

De Jesus vs Syquia
TITLE: De Jesus v Syquia
CITATION: 58 Phil 866

FACTS:

Antonia Loanco, a likely unmarried girl 20 years of age was a cashier in a barber
shop owned by the defendants brother in law Vicente Mendoza. Cesar Syquia,
the defendant, 23 years of age and an unmarried scion of a prominent family in
Manila was accustomed to have his haircut in the said barber shop. He got
acquainted with Antonio and had an amorous relationship. As a consequence,
Antonia got pregnant and a baby boy was born on June 17, 1931.

In the early months of Antonias pregnancy, defendant was a constant visitor.

On February 1931, he even wrote a letter to a rev father confirming that the
child is his and he wanted his name to be given to the child. Though he was out
of the country, he continuously wrote letters to Antonia reminding her to eat on
time for her and juniors sake. The defendant ask his friend Dr. Talavera to
attend at the birth and hospital arrangements at St. Joseph Hospital in Manila.

After giving birth, Syquia brought Antonia and his child at a House in Camarines
Street Manila where they lived together for about a year. When Antonia showed
signs of second pregnancy, defendant suddenly departed and he was married
with another woman at this time.

It should be noted that during the christening of the child, the defendant who
was in charge of the arrangement of the ceremony caused the name Ismael
Loanco to be given instead of Cesar Syquia Jr. that was first planned.

ISSUES:

1. Whether the note to the padre in connection with the other letters written by
defendant to Antonia during her pregnancy proves acknowledgement of
paternity.

2. Whether trial court erred in holding that Ismael Loanco had been in the
uninterrupted possession of the status of a natural child, justified by the conduct
of the father himself, and that as a consequence, the defendant in this case
should be compelled to acknowledge the said Ismael Loanco.

HELD:
The letter written by Syquia to Rev. Father serves as admission of paternity and
the other letters are sufficient to connect the admission with the child carried by
Antonia. The mere requirement is that the writing shall be indubitable.

The law fixes no period during which a child must be in the continuous
possession of the status of a natural child; and the period in this case was long
enough to reveal the father's resolution to admit the status.

Supreme Court held that they agree with the trial court in refusing to provide
damages to Antonia Loanco for supposed breach of promise to marry since
action on this has no standing in civil law. Furthermore, there is no proof upon
which a judgment could be based requiring the defendant to recognize the
second baby, Pacita Loanco. Finally, SC found no necessity to modify the
judgment as to the amount of maintenance allowed to Ismael Loanco in the
amount of P50 pesos per month. They likewise pointed out that it is only the
trial court who has jurisdiction to modify the order as to the amount of pension.

Goitia vs Campos-Rueda
Goitia vs. Campos-Rueda
35 Phil 252

FACTS:

Luisa Goitia y de la Camara, petitioner, and Jose Campos y Rueda, respondent,

were married on January 7, 1915 and had a residence at 115 Calle San Marcelino
Manila. They stayed together for a month before petitioner returned to her
parents home. Goitia filed a complaint against respondent for support outside
the conjugal home. It was alleged that respondent demanded her to perform
unchaste and lascivious acts on his genital organs. Petitioner refused to perform
such acts and demanded her husband other than the legal and valid
cohabitation. Since Goitia kept on refusing, respondent maltreated her by word
and deed, inflicting injuries upon her lops, face and different body parts. The
trial court ruled in favor of respondent and stated that Goitia could not compel
her husband to support her except in the conjugal home unless it is by virtue of
a judicial decree granting her separation or divorce from respondent. Goitia
filed motion for review.

ISSUE: Whether or not Goitia can compel her husband to support her outside
the conjugal home.

HELD:

The obligation on the part of the husband to support his wife is created merely
in the act of marriage. The law provides that the husband, who is obliged to
support the wife, may fulfill the obligation either by paying her a fixed pension
or by maintaining her in his own home at his option. However, this option given
by law is not absolute. The law will not permit the husband to evade or
terminate his obligation to support his wife if the wife is driven away from the
conjugal home because of his wrongful acts. In the case at bar, the wife was
forced to leave the conjugal abode because of the lewd designs and physical
assault of the husband, she can therefore claim support from the husband for
separate maintenance even outside the conjugal home.

Balogbog vs CA
Balogbog vs. CA
GR No. 83598, March 7, 1997

FACTS:

Ramonito and Generoso Balogbog filed an action for partition and accounting
against their Aunt Leoncia and Uncle Gaudioso for partition and accounting of
their grandparents estate at the Court of First Instance of Cebu City which was
granted by the latter. Leoncia and Gaudioso appealed to the Court of Appeals
but the latter affirmed the lower courts decision.

Basilio Balogbog and Genoveva Arnibal died intestate in 1951 and 1961
respectively. They have three children, Leoncia, Gaudioso and Gavino, their
older brother who died in 1935. Ramoncito and Generoso was claiming that
they were the legitimate children of Gavino by Catalina Ubas and that, as such
they were entitled to the one-third share in the estate of their grandparents.
However, Leoncia and Gaudioso claimed they are not aware that their brother
has 2 sons and that he was married. They started to question the validity of the
marriage between their brother Gavino and Catalina despite how Gaudioso
himself admitted during a police investigation proceeding that indeed Ramonito
is his nephew as the latter is the son of his elder brother Gavino.

In the efforts of Ramoncito and Generoso to prove the validity of their parents
marriage, they presented Priscilo Trazo, 81 years old then mayor of Asturias
from 1928 to 1934 and Matias Pogoy who both testified that he knew Gavino
and Catalina to be husband and wife and that they have three children. Catalina
herself testified that she was handed a receipt presumably the marriage
certificate by Fr. Jomao-as but it was burned during the war.

On the other hand,Leoncia claimed that her brother Gavino died single at the
family residence in Asturias. She obtained a certificate from the local Civil
Registrar of Asturias to the effect that the office did not have a record of the
names of Gavino and Catalina which was prepared by Assistant Municipal
Treasurer Juan Maranga who testified in the hearing as well.

Leoncia and Gaudioso contended that the marriage of Gavino and Catalina
should have been proven in accordance with Arts. 53 and 54 of the Civil Code of
1889 because this was the law in force at the time of the alleged marriage was
celebrated.

Art. 53 provides that marriages celebrated under the Civil Code of 1889 should
be proven only by a certified copy of the memorandum in the Civil Registry,
unless the books thereof have not been kept or have been lost, or unless they
are questioned in the courts, in which case any other proof, such as that of the
continuous possession by parents of the status of husband and wife, may be
considered, provided that the registration of the birth of their children as their
legitimate children is also submitted in evidence.

ISSUE: Whether or not Gavino and Catalinas marriage is valid.

HELD:

Supreme Court affirmed the decisions of the trial court and Court of Appeals in
rendering Gavino and Catalinas marriage as valid and thus entitle Ramonito and
Generoso one third of their grandparents estate.

The court further states that Arts. 42 to 107 of the Civil Code of 889 of Spain did
not take effect, having been suspended by the Governor General of the
Philippines shortly after the extension of that code of this country. Therefore,
Arts. 53 and 54 never came into force. Since this case was brought in the lower
court in 1968, the existence of the marriage must be determined in accordance
with the present Civil Code, which repealed the provisions of the former Civil
Code, except as they related to vested rights, and the rules of evidence. Under
the Rules of Court, the presumption is that a man and a woman conducting
themselves as husband and wife are legally married.

Albeit, a marriage contract is considered primary evidence of marriage, failure

to present it would not mean that marriage did not take place. Other evidence
may be presented where in this case evidence consisting of the testimonies of
witnesses was held competent to prove the marriage of Gavino and Catalina in
1929, that they have three children, one of whom, Petronilo, died at the age of
six and that they are recognized by Gavinos family and by the public as the
legitimate children of Gavino.

Eugenio vs Velez
Eugenio vs Velez
185 SCRA 45

FACTS:

Vitaliana Vargas brothers and sisters unaware of the formers death on August
28, 1988 filed a petition for Habeas Corpus on September 27, 1988 before the
RTC of Misamis Oriental alleging that she was forcible taken from her residence
sometime in 1987 and was confined by the herein petitioner, Tomas Eugenio in
his palacial residence in Jasaan, Misamis Oriental. The court then issued a writ
of habeas corpus but petitioner refused to surrender the Vitalianas body to the
sheriff on the ground that a corpse cannot be subjected to habeas corpus
proceedings. Vitaliana, 25 year old single, died of heart failure due to toxemia of
pregnancy in Eugenios residence. The court ordered that the body should be
delivered to a funeral parlor for autopsy but Eugenio assailed the lack of
jurisdiction of the court.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner can claim custody of the deceased.

HELD:

The court held that the custody of the dead body of Vitaliana was correctly
awarded to the surviving brothers and sisters pursuant to Section 1103 of the
Revised Administrative Code which provides:

Persons charged with duty of burial- if the deceased was an unmarried man or
woman or a child and left any kin; the duty of the burial shall devolve upon the
nearest kin of the deceased.

Albeit, petitioner claims he is the spouse as contemplated under Art. 294 of the
Civil Code, Philippine law does not recognize common law marriages where a
man and a woman not legally married who cohabit for many years as husband
and wife, who represent themselves to the public as husband and wife, and who
are reputed to be husband and wife in the community where they live may be
considered legally mauled in common law jurisdictions. In addition, it requires
that the man and woman living together must not in any way be incapacitated
to contract marriage. Whereas, the petitioner has a subsisting marriage with
another woman, legal impediment that disqualified him from even legally
marrying Vitaliana.

Cosca vs Palaypayon
Cosca vs. Palaypayon
237 SCRA 249

FACTS:

The following are the complainants: Juvy N. Cosca (Stenographer 1), Edmundo B.
Peralta (Interpreter 1), Ramon C. Sambo (Clerk II) and Apollo Villamora (Process
Server). Respondents are Judge Lucio Palaypayon Jr., the presiding judge, and
Nelia B. Esmeralda-Baroy, clerk of court II. All work in MTC-Tinambac, Camarines
Sur.
Complainants alleged that Palaypayon solemnized marriages even without the
requisite of a marriage license. Hence, the following couples were able to get
married just by paying the marriage fees to respondent Baroy: Alano P. Abellano
& Nelly Edralin; Francisco Selpo & Julieta Carrido; Eddie Terrobias & Maria Gacer;
Renato Gamay & Maricris Belga; Arsenio Sabater & Margarita Nacario; Sammy
Bocaya & Gina Bismonte. As a consequence, the marriage contracts of the
following couples did not reflect any marriage license number. In addition,
Palaypayon did not sign the marriage contracts and did not indicate the date of
solemnization reasoning out that he allegedly had to wait for the marriage
license to be submitted by the parties which happens usually several days after
the marriage ceremony.

Palaypayon contends that marriage between Abellano & Edralin falls under
Article 34 of the Civil Code thus exempted from the marriage license
requirement. According to him, he gave strict instructions to complainant
Sambo to furnish the couple copy of the marriage contract and to file the same
with the civil registrar but the latter failed to do so. In order to solve the
problem, the spouses subsequently formalized the marriage by securing a
marriage license and executing their marriage contract, a copy of which was
then filed with the civil registrar. The other five marriages were not illegally
solemnized because Palaypayon did not sign their marriage contracts and the
date and place of marriage are not included. It was alleged that copies of these
marriage contracts are in the custody of complainant Sambo. The alleged
marriage of Selpo & Carrido, Terrobias & Gacer, Gamay & Belga, Sabater &
Nacario were not celebrated by him since he refused to solemnize them in the
absence of a marriage license and that the marriage of Bocaya & Bismonte was
celebrated even without the requisite license due to the insistence of the parties
to avoid embarrassment with the guests which he again did not sign the
marriage contract.

An illegal solemnization of marriage was charged against the respondents.

ISSUE: Whether the marriage solemnized by Judge Palaypayon were valid.

HELD:
Bocaya & Besmontes marriage was solemnized without a marriage license
along with the other couples. The testimonies of Bocay and Pompeo Ariola
including the photographs taken showed that it was really Judge Palaypayon who
solemnized their marriage. Bocaya declared that they were advised by judge to
return after 10 days after the solemnization and bring with them their marriage
license. They already started living together as husband and wife even without
the formal requisite. With respect to the photographs, judge explained that it
was a simulated solemnization of marriage and not a real one. However,
considering that there were pictures from the start of the wedding ceremony up
to the signing of the marriage certificates in front of him. The court held that it
is hard to believe that it was simulated.

On the other hand, Judge Palaypayon admitted that he solemnized marriage

between Abellano & Edralin and claimed it was under Article 34 of the Civil Code
so the marriage license was dispensed with considering that the contracting
parties executed a joint affidavit that they have been living together as husband
and wife for almost 6 years already. However, it was shown in the marriage
contract that Abellano was only 18 yrs 2months and 7 days old. If he and
Edralin had been living together for 6 years already before they got married as
what is stated in the joint affidavit, Abellano must have been less than 13 years
old when they started living together which is hard to believe. Palaypayon
should have been aware, as it is his duty to ascertain the qualification of the
contracting parties who might have executed a false joint affidavit in order to
avoid the marriage license requirement.

Article 4 of the Family Code pertinently provides that in the absence of any of
the essential or formal requisites shall render the marriage void ab initio
whereas an irregularity in the formal requisite shall not affect the validity of the
marriage but the party or parties responsible for the irregularity shall be civilly,
criminally, and administratively liable.

Wassmer vs. Velez

G.R. No. L-20089, December 26, 1964

12 SCRA 648
Facts: Francisco Velez and Beatriz Wassmer applied for a Marriage License on August 23,

1954. The wedding was to take place on September 4, 1954. All the necessary preparations were

undertaken for the said event. However, two days before the wedding, Francisco left a note for Beatriz

informing her that the wedding will not push through because his mother opposed the union. The

following day, he sent her a telegram stating that he will be returning very soon. Francisco never

showed up and has not been heard since then. Beatriz subsequently sued Francisco for damages. The

trial court ordered Francisco to pay Beatriz actual, moral and exemplary damages.

Francisco filed a petition for relief from orders, judgment and proceedings and motion for new trial and

reconsideration which was denied by the trial court. Francisco appealed to the Supreme Court,

asserting that the judgment is contrary to law as there is no provision in the Civil Code authorizing an

action for breach of promise to marry.

Issue: May Francisco be held liable to pay Beatriz damages for breach of promise to

marry?

Held: Yes. Francisco may be held liable under Article 21 of the Civil Code, which provides:

"Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good

customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage."

Mere breach of promise to marry is not an actionable wrong. But to formally set a wedding and go

through all the preparation and publicity, only to walk out of it when the matrimony is about to be

solemnized, is quite different. Surely this is not a case of mere breach of promise to marry. This is

palpably and unjustifiably contrary to good customs for which defendant must be held answerable in

damages in accordance with Article 21.

Navarro vs Domagtoy
Navarro vs. Domagtoy
AM No. MTJ 96-1088, July 19, 1996

FACTS:

Municipal Mayor of Dapa, Surigao del Norte, Rodolfo G. Navarro filed a complaint
on two specific acts committed by respondent Municipal Circuit Trial Court Judge
Hernando Domagtoy on the grounds of gross misconduct, ineffiency in offce and
ignorance of the law.
It was alleged that Domagtoy solemnized marriage of Gaspar Tagadan and Arlyn
Borja on September 27, 1994 despite the knowledge that the groom has a
subsisting marriage with Ida Penaranda and that they are merely separated. It
was told that Ida left their conjugal home in Bukidnon and has not returned and
been heard for almost seven years. The said judge likewise solemnize marriage
of Floriano Dadoy Sumaylo and Gemma G. del Rosario outside his courts
jurisdiction on October 27, 1994. The judge holds his office and has jurisdiction
in the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Sta Monica-Burgos, Surigao del Norte but
he solemnized the said wedding at his residence in the municipality of Dapa
located 40 to 50 km away.

ISSUE: Whether or not the marriages solemnized were void.

HELD:

The court held that the marriage between Tagadan and Borja was void and
bigamous there being a subsisting marriage between Tagadan and Penaranda.
Albeit, the latter was gone for seven years and the spouse had a well-founded
belief that the absent spouse was dead, Tagadan did not institute a summary
proceeding as provided in the Civil Code for the declaration of presumptive
death of the absentee, without prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the
absent spouse.

With regard to the marriage of Sumaylo and Del Rosario, the latter only made
the written request where it should have been both parties as stated in Article 8
of the Family Code. Their non-compliance did not invalidate their marriage
however, Domagtoy may be held administratively liable.

Aranes vs Judge Occiano

Aranes vs. Judge Occiano
AM No. MTJ 02-1309, April 11, 2002

FACTS:

Petitioner Mercedita Mata Aranes charged respondent Judge Occiano with gross
ignorance of the law. Occiano is the presiding judge in Court of Balatan,
Camarines Sur. However, he solemnized the marriage of Aranes and Dominador
Orobia on February 17, 2000 at the couples residence in Nabua, Camarines Sur
which is outside his territorial jurisdiction and without the requisite of marriage
license.

It appeared in the records that petitioner and Orobia filed their application of
marriage license on January 5, 2000 and was stamped that it will be issued on
January 17, 2000 but neither of them claimed it. In addition, no record also
appeared with the Office of the Civil Registrar General for the alleged marriage.
Before Judge Occiano started the ceremony, he carefully examined the
documents and first refused to conduct the marriage and advised them to reset
the date considering the absence of the marriage license. However, due to the
earnest pleas of the parties, the influx of visitors and fear that the
postponement of the wedding might aggravate the physical condition of Orobia
who just suffered from stroke, he solemnized the marriage on the assurance of
the couple that they will provide the license that same afternoon. Occiano
denies that he told the couple that their marriage is valid.

ISSUE: Whether Judge Occiano is guilty of solemnizing a marriage without a

duly issued marriage license and conducting it outside his territorial jurisdiction.

HELD:

The court held that the territorial jurisdiction of respondent judge is limited to
the municipality of Balatan, Camarines Sur. His act of solemnizing the marriage
of petitioner and Orobia in Nabua, Camarines Sur therefore is contrary to law
and subjects him to administrative liability. His act may not amount to gross
ignorance of the law for he allegedly solemnized the marriage out of human
compassion but nonetheless, he cannot avoid liability for violating the law on
marriage.

WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Salvador M. Occiano, Presiding Judge of the

Municipal Trial Court of Balatan, Camarines Sur, is fined P5,000.00 pesos with a
STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar offense in the future
will be dealt with more severely.