SJS vs. Lim

CASES REPORTED
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
____________________
G.R. No. 187836. November 25, 2014.*

SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY (SJS) OFFICERS, namely,
SAMSON S. ALCANTARA, and VLADIMIR ALARIQUE T.
CABIGAO, petitioners, vs. ALFREDO S. LIM, in his
capacity as mayor of the City of Manila, respondent.
G.R. No. 187916. November 25, 2014.*

JOSE L. ATIENZA, JR., BIENVINIDO M. ABANTE,
MA. LOURDES M. ISIPGARCIA, RAFAEL P.
BORROMEO,
_______________
* EN BANC.
2 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Social Justice Society (SJS) Officers vs. Lim
JOCELYN DAWISASUNCION, minors MARIAN

REGINA B. TARAN, MACAILA RICCI B. TARAN,
RICHARD KENNETH B. TARAN, represented and joined
by their parents RICHARD and MARITES TARAN, minors
CZARINA ALYSANDRA C. RAMOS, CEZARAH
ADRIANNA C. RAMOS, and CRISTEN AIDAN C.
RAMOS, represented and joined by their mother DONNA
C. RAMOS, minors JAZMIN SYLLITA T. VILA and
ANTONIO T. CRUZ IV, represented and joined by their
mother MAUREEN C. TOLENTINO, petitioners, vs.
MAYOR ALFREDO S. LIM, VICE MAYOR FRANCISCO
DOMAGOSO, COUNCILORS ARLENE W. KOA, MOISES
T. LIM, JESUS FAJARDO LOUISITO N. CHUA,
VICTORIANO A. MELENDEZ, JOHN MARVIN C.
NIETO, ROLANDO M. VALERIANO, RAYMUNDO R.
YUPANGCO, EDWARD VP MACEDA, RODERICK D.
VALBUENA, JOSEFINA M. SISCAR, SALVADOR
PHILLIP H. LACUNA, LUCIANO M. VELOSO, CARLO V.
LOPEZ, ERNESTO F. RIVERA,1 DANILO VICTOR H.
LACUNA, JR., ERNESTO G. ISIP, HONEY H. LACUNA
PANGAN, ERNESTO M. DIONISIO, JR. and ERICK IAN
O. NIEVA, respondents.
CHEVRON PHILIPPINES, INC., PETRON
CORPORATION and PILIPINAS SHELL PETROLEUM
CORPORATION, intervenors.
Remedial Law; Special Civil Actions; Prohibition; Assuming

that a petition for declaratory relief is the proper remedy, and that
the petitions should have been filed with the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), the Supreme Court (SC) has, time and again, resolved to
treat such a petition as one for prohibition, provided that the case
has farreaching implications and transcendental issues that need
to be resolved, as in these present petitions.Assuming that a
petition for
_______________
1 In a Resolution dated 21 July 2009, the Court granted the motion to

drop respondent Ernesto Rivera as a partyrespondent on the ground that
he actually voted against the enactment of the assailed ordinance. Rollo in
G.R. No. 187916, Vol. I, (no proper pagination, should be pp. 148149).
VOL. 742, NOVEMBER 25, 2014 3

declaratory relief is the proper remedy, and that the petitions

should have been filed with the Regional Trial Court, we have,
time and again, resolved to treat such a petition as one for
prohibition, provided that the case has farreaching implications
and transcendental issues that need to be resolved, as in these
present petitions. On a related issue, we initially found convincing
the argument that the petitions should have been filed with the
Regional Trial Court, it having concurrent jurisdiction with this
Court over a special civil action for prohibition, and original
jurisdiction over petitions for declaratory relief. However, as we
have repeatedly said, the petitions at bar are of transcendental
importance warranting a relaxation of the doctrine of hierarchy of
courts.
Locus Standi; Parties; Social Justice Society (SJS), now
represented by SJS Officer Alcantara, has been recognized by the
Court in G.R. No. 156052 to have legal standing to sue in
connection with the same subject matter herein considered. The
rest of the petitioners are residents of Manila. Hence, all of them
have a direct interest in the prohibition proceedings against the
enforcement of the assailed ordinance.No different are herein
petitioners who seek to prohibit the enforcement of the assailed
ordinance, and who deal with the same subject matter that
concerns a public right. Necessarily, the people who are interested
in the nullification of such an ordinance are themselves the real
partiesininterest, for which reason, they are no longer required
to show any specific interest therein. Moreover, it is worth
mentioning that SJS, now represented by SJS Officer Alcantara,
has been recognized by the Court in G.R. No. 156052 to have legal
standing to sue in connection with the same subject matter herein
considered. The rest of the petitioners are residents of Manila.
Hence, all of them have a direct interest in the prohibition
proceedings against the enforcement of the assailed ordinance.
Remedial Law; Special Civil Actions; Certiorari; Prohibition;
Statutes; The writs of certiorari and prohibition are proper
remedies to test the constitutionality of statutes.It is pointless to
discuss the matter at length in these instant cases of
transcendental importance in view of the Courts pronouncement,
in Magallona v. Ermita, 655 SCRA 476 (2011). There it held that
the writs of certiorari and prohibition are proper remedies to test
the constitutionality of statutes, notwithstanding the following
defects: In praying for the dismissal of the petition on preliminary
grounds, respondents seek a strict obser

vance of the offices of the writs of certiorari and prohibition,

noting that the writs cannot issue absent any showing of
grave abuse of discretion in the exercise of judicial, quasi
judicial or ministerial powers on the part of respondents
and resulting prejudice on the part of petitioners. Respondents
submission holds true in ordinary civil proceedings. When this
Court exercises its constitutional power of judicial review,
however, we have, by tradition, viewed the writs of certiorari and
prohibition as proper remedial vehicles to test the
constitutionality of statutes, and indeed, of acts of other
branches of government. Issues of constitutional import
xxx carry such relevance in the life of this nation that the
Court inevitably finds itself constrained to take
cognizance of the case and pass upon the issues raised,
noncompliance with the letter of procedural rules
notwithstanding. The statute sought to be reviewed here is one
such law.
Same; Judicial Review; Requisites for a Valid Exercise of the
Power of Judicial Review.For a valid exercise of the power of
judicial review, the following requisites shall concur: (1) the
existence of a legal controversy; (2) legal standing to sue of the
party raising the constitutional question; (3) a plea that judicial
review be exercised at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the
constitutional question is the lis mota of the case.
Same; Verification; Certification Against Forum Shopping;
The verification and certification against forum shopping are
governed specifically by Sections 4 and 5, Rule 7 of the Rules of
Court.The verification and certification against forum shopping
are governed specifically by Sections 4 and 5, Rule 7 of the Rules
of Court. Section 4 provides that a pleading, when required to be
verified, shall be treated as an unsigned pleading if it lacks a
proper verification while Section 5 requires that the certification
to be executed by the plaintiff or principal party be under oath.
These sections, in turn, should be read together with Sections 6
and 12, Rule 2 of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice. Section 6 of
the latter Rules, specifically, likewise provides that any
competent evidence of identity specified under Section 12 thereof
may now be presented before the notary public, to wit: SEC. 12.
Competent Evidence of Identity.The phrase competent evidence
of identity refers to the identification of an individual based on:
(a) at least one current identification document issued by an
official agency bearing the photograph and signature of the indi
VOL. 742, NOVEMBER 25, 2014 5

vidual, such as but not limited to passport, drivers license,

Professional Regulations Commission ID, National Bureau of
Investigation clearance, police clearance, postal ID, voters ID,
Barangay certification, Government Service and Insurance
System (GSIS) ecard, Social Security System (SSS) card,
Philhealth card, senior citizen card, Overseas Workers Welfare
Administration (OWWA) ID, OFW ID, seamans book, alien
certificate of registration/immigrant certificate of registration,
government office ID, certification from the National Council for
the Welfare of Disable Persons (NCWDP), Department of Social
Welfare and Development (DSWD) certification.
Same; Civil Procedure; Forum Shopping; Words and Phrases;
Forum shopping is an act of a party, against whom an adverse
judgment or order has been rendered in one forum, of seeking and
possibly getting a favorable opinion in another forum, other than
by appeal or special civil action for certiorari.In Spouses Cruz v.
Spouses Caraos, 521 SCRA 510 (2007), the Court expounded on
the nature of forum shopping. Thus: Forum shopping is an act of a
party, against whom an adverse judgment or order has been
rendered in one forum, of seeking and possibly getting a favorable
opinion in another forum, other than by appeal or special civil
action for certiorari. It may also be the institution of two or more
actions or proceedings grounded on the same cause on the
supposition that one or the other court would make a favorable
disposition. The established rule is that for forum shopping to
exist, both actions must involve the same transactions, same
essential facts and circumstances and must raise identical causes
of actions, subject matter, and issues.
Same; Same; Same; It bears reiterating that a judgment on
the merits is one rendered after a determination of which party is
right, as distinguished from a judgment rendered upon some
preliminary or formal or merely technical point.Here, it should
be noted that this Court denied the said Manifestation and Urgent
Motion, and refused to act on the succeeding pleadings, for being
moot. Clearly, the merits of the motion were not considered by the
Court. The following disquisition of the Court in Spouses Cruz v.
Spouses Caraos is further enlightening: The judgment of
dismissal in Civil Case No. 951387 does not constitute res
judicata to sufficiently bar the refiling thereof in Civil Case No.
960225. As earlier underscored, the dismissal was one without
prejudice. Verily, it was not a judgment on

the merits. It bears reiterating that a judgment on the

merits is one rendered after a determination of which
party is right, as distinguished from a judgment rendered
upon some preliminary or formal or merely technical
point. The dismissal of the case without prejudice indicates the
absence of a decision on the merits and leaves the parties free to
litigate the matter in a subsequent action as though the dismissed
action had not been commenced. (Emphasis supplied; citations
omitted) Considering that there is definitely no forum shopping in
the instant cases, we need not discuss in detail the elements of
forum shopping.
Local Government Code of 1991; Zoning; The Local
Government Code (LGC) of 1991 expressly provides that the
Sangguniang Panlungsod is vested with the power to reclassify
land within the jurisdiction of the city subject to the pertinent
provisions of the Code.The Local Government Code of 1991
expressly provides that the Sangguniang Panlungsod is vested
with the power to reclassify land within the jurisdiction of the
city subject to the pertinent provisions of the Code. It is also
settled that an ordinance may be modified or repealed by another
ordinance. These have been properly applied in G.R. No. 156052,
where the Court upheld the position of the Sangguniang
Panlungsod to reclassify the land subject of the Ordinance, and
declared that the mayor has the duty to enforce Ordinance No.
8027, provided that it has not been repealed by the Sangguniang
Panlungsod or otherwise annulled by the courts. In the same
case, the Court also used the principle that the Sangguniang
Panlungsod is in the best position to determine the needs of its
constituents that the removal of the oil depots from the
Pandacan area is necessary to protect the residents of Manila
from catastrophic devastation in case of a terrorist attack on the
Pandacan Terminals.
Supreme Court; Judicial Power; When the judiciary mediates
it does not in reality nullify or invalidate an act of the Manila
Sangguniang Panlungsod, but only asserts the solemn and sacred
obligation assigned to the Court by the Constitution to determine
conflicting claims of authority under the Constitution and to
establish for the parties in an actual controversy the rights which
that instrument secures and guarantees to them.In its
Comment, the 7th Council (20072010) alleged that the assailed
Ordinance was enacted to alleviate the economic condition of its
constituents. Expressing the
VOL. 742, NOVEMBER 25, 2014 7

same position, former Mayor Lim even went to the extent of

detailing the steps he took prior to the signing of the Ordinance, if
only to show his honest intention to make the right decision. The
fact remains, however, that notwithstanding that the conditions
with respect to the operations of the oil depots existing prior to
the enactment of Ordinance No. 8027 do not substantially differ to
this day, as would later be discussed, the position of the
Sangguniang Panlungsod on the matter has thrice changed,
largely depending on the new composition of the council and/or
political affiliations. The foregoing, thus, shows that its
determination of the general welfare of the city does not after all
gear towards the protection of the people in its true sense and
meaning, but is, one way or another, dependent on the personal
preference of the members who sit in the council as to which
particular sector among its constituents it wishes to favor. Now
that the City of Manila, through the mayor and the city
councilors, has changed its view on the matter, favoring the citys
economicrelated benefits, through the continued stay of the oil
terminals, over the protection of the very lives and safety of its
constituents, it is imperative for this Court to make a final
determination on the basis of the facts on the table as to which
specific right of the inhabitants of Manila should prevail. For, in
this present controversy, history reveals that there is truly no
such thing as the will of Manila insofar as the general welfare of
the people is concerned. If in sacrilege, in free translation of
Angara v. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil. 139 (1936), by Justice
Laurel, we say when the judiciary mediates we do not in reality
nullify or invalidate an act of the Manila Sangguniang
Panlungsod, but only asserts the solemn and sacred obligation
assigned to the Court by the Constitution to determine conflicting
claims of authority under the Constitution and to establish for the
parties in an actual controversy the rights which that instrument
secures and guarantees to them.
Oil Depots; Pandacan Terminal; The issue of whether or not
the Pandacan Terminal is not a likely target of terrorist attacks
has already been passed upon in G.R. No. 156052. Based on the
assessment of the Committee on Housing, Resettlement and Urban
Development of the City of Manila and the then position of the
Sangguniang Panlungsod, the Supreme Court (SC) was convinced
that the threat of terrorism is imminent.The issue of whether or
not the Pandacan Terminal is not a likely target of terrorist
attacks has already been passed upon in G.R. No. 156052. Based
on the assess

ment of the Committee on Housing, Resettlement and Urban

Development of the City of Manila and the then position of the
Sangguniang Panlungsod, the Court was convinced that the
threat of terrorism is imminent. It remains so convinced. Even
assuming that the respondents and intervenors were correct, the
very nature of the depots where millions of liters of highly
flammable and highly volatile products, regardless of whether or
not the composition may cause explosions, has no place in a
densely populated area. Surely, any untoward incident in the oil
depots, be it related to terrorism of whatever origin or otherwise,
would definitely cause not only destruction to properties within
and among the neighboring communities but certainly mass
deaths and injuries.
Same; Same; It is the removal of the danger to life not the
mere subdual of risk of catastrophe, that we saw in and made us
favor Ordinance No. 8027.It is the removal of the danger to life
not the mere subdual of risk of catastrophe, that we saw in and
made us favor Ordinance No. 8027. That reason, unaffected by
Ordinance No. 8187, compels the affirmance of our Decision in
G.R. No. 156052.
Same; Same; The Pandacan oil depot remains a terrorist
target even if the contents have been lessened.The same best
interest of the public guides the present decision. The Pandacan
oil depot remains a terrorist target even if the contents have been
lessened. In the absence of any convincing reason to persuade this
Court that the life, security and safety of the inhabitants of
Manila are no longer put at risk by the presence of the oil depots,
we hold that Ordinance No. 8187 in relation to the Pandacan
Terminals is invalid and unconstitutional.
Same; Same; The oil companies shall be given a fresh non
extendible period of fortyfive (45) days from notice within which to
submit to the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 39, Manila an
updated comprehensive plan and relocation schedule. The
relocation, in turn, shall be completed not later than six (6) months
from the date of their submission.The periods were given in the
Decision in G.R. No. 156052 which became final on 23 April 2009.
Five years have passed, since then. The years of noncompliance
may be excused by the swing of local legislative leads. We now
stay the sway and begin a final count. A comprehensive and well
coordinated plan within a specific timeframe shall, therefore, be
observed in the relocation of
VOL. 742, NOVEMBER 25, 2014 9

the Pandacan Terminals. The oil companies shall be given a

fresh nonextendible period of fortyfive (45) days from notice
within which to submit to the Regional Trial Court, Branch 39,
Manila an updated comprehensive plan and relocation schedule.
The relocation, in turn, shall be completed not later than six
months from the date of their submission.
Leonen, J., Concurring and Dissenting Opinion:
Statutes; View that all laws, including ordinances, enjoy the

presumption of constitutionality.All laws, including ordinances,
enjoy the presumption of constitutionality. The reason behind this
presumption has been discussed by this court as follows: This
strong predilection for constitutionality takes its bearings on the
idea that it is forbidden for one branch of the government to
encroach upon the duties and powers of another. Thus it has been
said that the presumption is based on the deference the judicial
branch accords to its coordinate branch the legislature.
Oil Depots; Pandacan Terminal; View that no convincing
evidence was presented to show why oil depots are inherently risky
or why oil depots are targets of terrorist attacks.The arguments
raised by petitioners are hypothetical. No convincing evidence
was presented to show why oil depots are inherently risky or why
oil depots are targets of terrorist attacks. The examples of fire
incidents in other fuel facilities located in Puerto Rico and India
are insufficient to give us a scientific basis for concluding that the
risks of simply having an oil depot are unmanageably high. The
examples do not relate to the number of oil depots that have
operated continuously without any safety problems. To decide a
controversy on the basis of hypothetical facts would have the
effect of barring litigation between real parties with real causes of
action.
Same; Same; Police Power; View that Social Justice Society
(SJS), et al. v. Hon. Atienza, Jr., 545 SCRA 92 (2008), has the
authority to hold that Ordinance No. 8027 was enacted in the
exercise of police power.Social Justice Society (SJS), et al. v.
Hon. Atienza, Jr., 545 SCRA 92 (2008), has the authority to hold
that Ordinance No. 8027 was enacted in the exercise of police
power. It did not discriminate against the Pandacan terminal and
the oil depots found therein. Neither did the ordinance contravene
Republic Act No. 7638
10

and Republic Act No. 8479. Further, Ordinance No. 8027 does
not prohibit the oil businesses from conducting their business in
Manila, but they are no longer allowed to have an oil depot in the
Pandacan terminal.
Same; Same; View that risks are inherent in all human
activity.Risks are inherent in all human activity. The questions
properly addressed to policy makers are whether the risks are
properly proven and understood, the measures that are proposed
are sufficient to mitigate the risks in relation to the beneficial
effects or objective of the activity, and whether the measures can
be implemented given the institutions in place and the resources
available. Governance cannot proceed from imagined fears.
Therefore, insofar as judicial review is concerned, it is not our
duty to secondguess political branches or local government units.
They are in a better position to understand risks, decide on
measures, and pursue these measures implementation.
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Courts; Hierarchy of Courts;
Jurisdiction; View that the concurrence of jurisdiction does not
mean that parties are free to choose which court to seek redress
from. The Supreme Court (SC) is the court of last resort, and
observance of the doctrine of hierarchy of courts is necessary to
prevent (1) inordinate demands upon the time and attention of the
court, which is better devoted to those matters within its exclusive
jurisdiction; and (2) further overcrowding of the courts docket.
In accordance with Article VIII, Section 5 of the 1987
Constitution, this court has jurisdiction over petitions for
certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas
corpus. The same jurisdiction is granted to the Court of Appeals
and Regional Trial Courts under Batas Pambansa Blg. 129. Thus,
there is concurrence of jurisdiction among this court, the Court of
Appeals, and the Regional Trial Court with regard to petitions for
certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas
corpus. However, the concurrence of jurisdiction does not mean
that parties are free to choose which court to seek redress from.
This court is the court of last resort, and observance of the
doctrine of hierarchy of courts is necessary to prevent (1)
inordinate demands upon the time and attention of the court,
which is better devoted to those matters within its exclusive
jurisdiction; and (2) further overcrowding of the courts docket.
11
VOL. 742, NOVEMBER 25, 2014 11

Same; Same; Same; Same; View that the Supreme Court (SC)
has, from time to time, relaxed its rules and allowed the direct
filing of petitions before it.Nevertheless, this court has, from
time to time, relaxed its rules and allowed the direct filing of
petitions before it. The exceptions to the doctrine of hierarchy of
courts include: (1) when dictated by the public welfare and the
advancement of public policy; (2) when demanded by the broader
interest of justice; (3) when the challenged orders were patent
nullities; or (4) when analogous exceptional and compelling
circumstances called for and justified the immediate and direct
handling of the case. None of these exceptions were sufficiently
shown to be present in this case so as to convince this court that it
should relax its rules of procedure.
Same; Same; Locus Standi; Parties; View that the basic
question in determining if one has locus standing is whether a
party alleges such personal stake in the outcome of the controversy
as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the
presentation of issues upon which the court depends for
illumination of difficult constitutional questions.In cases
involving issues of constitutionality, the party raising the issue of
constitutionality must have locus standi. Locus standi has been
defined as a right of appearance in a court of justice on a given
question. The basic question in determining if one has locus
standing is whether a party alleges such personal stake in the
outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness
which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court
depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable means that the party who seeks
relief from this court must suffer, or is in imminent danger of
suffering, an injury.Rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable means that the party who seeks relief from this court
must suffer, or is in imminent danger of suffering, an injury. In
Tolentino v. COMELEC, 420 SCRA 438 (2004), this court held
that direct injury may be determined using the following
guidelines: Thus, generally, a party will be allowed to litigate only
when (1) he can show that he has personally suffered some actual
or threatened injury because of the allegedly illegal conduct of the
government; (2) the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged
action; and (3) the injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable
action.
12

Issues of Transcendental Importance; View that whether an

issue is of transcendental importance is a matter determined by
this court on a casetocase basis.Whether an issue is of
transcendental importance is a matter determined by this court
on a casetocase basis. An allegation of transcendental
importance must be supported by the proper allegations.
Writs of Kalikasan; View that petitioners could have availed
themselves of the remedy of a writ of kalikasan if they could
properly and clearly show grave danger to the environment.
Petitioners could have availed themselves of the remedy of a writ
of kalikasan if they could properly and clearly show grave danger
to the environment. Petitioners may argue that their petitions
were filed ahead of the promulgation of the rules of procedure for
environmental cases. However, procedural rules are generally
given retroactive effect since there are no vested rights in rules of
procedure.
Same; Temporary Environmental Protection Order; View that
a petition for the issuance of a writ of kalikasan may include a
prayer for the issuance of a temporary environmental protection
order (TEPO).The application for the issuance of a writ of
kalikasan is commenced by filing a verified petition, stating the
personal circumstances of petitioner and respondent, the
environmental laws violated, the acts or omissions complained of,
and the environmental damage as to prejudice the life, health or
property of inhabitants in two or more cities or provinces. The
petition must be supported by relevant evidence such as affidavits
or documents. A petition for the issuance of a writ of kalikasan
may include a prayer for the issuance of a temporary
environmental protection order (TEPO).
Republic Act No. 6969; View that if petitioners had evidence to
support their allegation that Ordinance No. 8187 by its simple
existence actually causes pollution and hazard to communities in
Manila, they could avail themselves of remedies under Republic
Act (RA) No. 6969.If petitioners had evidence to support their
allegation that Ordinance No. 8187 by its simple existence
actually causes pollution and hazard to communities in Manila,
they could avail themselves of remedies under Republic Act No.
6969.
Judicial Review; View that judicial pronouncements on the
validity and constitutionality of laws must be narrowly tailored to
13
VOL. 742, NOVEMBER 25, 2014 13

actual facts and issues in order to prevent judicial overreach

and ensure that the remedy sought is appropriate to the cause of
action.This court is mindful that the power of judicial review
should be exercised with caution. Judicial pronouncements on the
validity and constitutionality of laws must be narrowly tailored to
actual facts and issues in order to prevent judicial overreach and
ensure that the remedy sought is appropriate to the cause of
action. Actual facts that have been duly proven provide the limits
to the scope of judicial review that this court may exercise in a
particular case. In view of these principles, this court must refrain
from ruling upon the validity of Ordinance No. 8187.
Precautionary Principle in International Environmental Law;
View that the precautionary principle applies when it can be
shown that there is plausible risk, and its causes cannot be
determined with scientific certainty.The precautionary principle
applies when it can be shown that there is plausible risk, and its
causes cannot be determined with scientific certainty. It is not
available simply on the basis of imagined fears or imagined
causes. Otherwise, it will be absurd. Rather than a reactive
approach to fear, the precautionary principle is evolving as a
proactive approach in protecting the environment. Furthermore,
being only a principle, it does not trump the requirements for
proper invocation of remedies or act to repeal existing laws.
SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS in the Supreme Court.

Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Monsod, Enriquez, BarriosTaran, Lucido, Tolentino,
Ramos, Meritt Law Office for petitioners in G.R. No.
187916.
Samson S. Alcantara for petitioner in G.R. No. 187836.
Estelito P. Mendoza for Petron Corporation.
Angara, Abello, Concepcion, Regala and Cruz for
Chevron Philippines.
14

Luch R. Gempis, Jr. for then Vice Mayor Francisco

Domagoso and respondent Councilors.
Cruz, Marcelo & Tenefrancia for Pilipinas Shell
Petroleum Corporation.

PEREZ, J.:

Challenged in these consolidated petitions2 is the
validity of Ordinance No. 81873 entitled AN ORDINANCE
AMENDING ORDINANCE NO. 8119, OTHERWISE
KNOWN AS THE MANILA COMPREHENSIVE LAND
USE PLAN AND ZONING ORDINANCE OF 2006, BY
CREATING A MEDIUM INDUSTRIAL ZONE (12) AND
HEAVY INDUSTRIAL ZONE (13), AND PROVIDING
FOR ITS ENFORCEMENT enacted by the Sangguniang
Panlungsod of Manila (Sangguniang Panlungsod) on 14
May 2009.
The creation of a medium industrial zone (12) and
heavy industrial zone (13) effectively lifted the prohibition
against owners and operators of businesses, including
herein intervenors Chevron Philippines, Inc. (Chevron),
Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation (Shell), and Petron
Corporation (Petron), collectively referred to as the oil
companies, from operating in the designated commercial
zone an industrial zone prior to the enactment of
Ordinance No. 80274 entitled
_______________
2 Rollo in G.R. No. 187836, Vol. I, pp. 320. Petition (for Prohibition)
filed on 1 June 2009; Rollo in G.R. No. 187916, Vol. I, pp. 11115. Urgent
Petition for Prohibition, Mandamus and Certiorari (with Application for
an Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order) filed on 5 June 2009. Id.,
at p. 116. Resolution dated 9 June 2009 consolidating G.R. No. 187916
with G.R. No. 187836.
3 Approved by former Mayor Alfredo S. Lim on 28 May 2009. Rollo in
G.R. No. 187916, Vol. I, pp. 7075. Annex A of the Urgent Petition for
Prohibition, Mandamus and Certiorari.
4 Approved by former Mayor Jose L. Atienza, Jr. on 28 November
2001. Id., at pp. 7677. Annex B of the Urgent Petition for Prohibition,
Mandamus and Certiorari.
15
VOL. 742, NOVEMBER 25, 2014 15

AN ORDINANCE RECLASSIFYING THE LAND USE OF

THAT PORTION OF LAND BOUNDED BY THE PASIG
RIVER IN THE NORTH, PNR RAILROAD TRACK IN
THE EAST, BEATA ST. IN THE SOUTH, PALUMPONG
ST. IN THE SOUTHWEST AND ESTERO DE
PANDACAN IN THE WEST, PNR RAILROAD IN THE
NORTHWEST AREA, ESTERO DE PANDACAN IN THE
NORTHEAST, PASIG RIVER IN THE SOUTHEAST AND
DR. M. L. CARREON IN THE SOUTHWEST, THE AREA
OF PUNTA, STA. ANA BOUNDED BY THE PASIG
RIVER, MARCELINO OBRERO ST., MAYO 28 ST. AND
THE F. MANALO STREET FROM INDUSTRIAL II TO
COMMERCIAL I, and Ordinance No. 81195 entitled AN
ORDINANCE ADOPTING THE MANILA
COMPREHENSIVE LAND USE PLAN AND ZONING
REGULATIONS OF 2006 AND PROVIDING FOR THE
ADMINISTRATION, ENFORCEMENT AND
AMENDMENT THERETO.

The Parties

Petitioners allege the parties respective capacity to sue
and be sued, viz.:

alt
_______________
5 Approved by former Mayor Jose L. Atienza, Jr. on 16 June 2006. Id.,

at pp. 78115. Annex C of the Urgent Petition for Prohibition,
Mandamus and Certiorari.
16

alt
VOL. 742, NOVEMBER 25, 2014


* The allegation is inaccurate. SJS Officer Alcantara is
actually one of the counsels for petitioner SJS in G.R. No.
156052. The petitioners in that case are the SJS itself,
Cabigao and Bonifacio S. Tumbokon (Tumbokon).

G.R. No. 187916

alt
17
VOL. 742, NOVEMBER 25, 2014 17

alt
VOL. 742, NOVEMBER 25, 2014

18

alt

The following intervenors, all of which are corporations
organized under Philippine laws, intervened:7

alt
_______________
6 In a Resolution dated 21 July 2009, the Court granted the motion to

drop respondent Ernesto Rivera as a partyrespondent on the ground that
he actually voted against the enactment of the assailed ordinance. Rollo in
G.R. No. 187916, Vol. I, (no proper pagination, should be pp. 148149).
7 Rollo in G.R. No. 187836, Vol. III, pp. 9171065, Motion for Leave to
Intervene filed by Petron on 1 December 2009; pp. 12341409, Urgent
Motion for Leave to Intervene and to Admit Attached Commentin
Intervention filed by Shell on 15 December 2009; Rollo in G.R. No.
187916, Vol. II, pp. 367373, Motion for Leave to Intervene and Admit
Attached Consolidated CommentinIntervention filed by Chevron on 25
November 2009.
19
VOL. 742, NOVEMBER 25, 2014 19

alt
They claim that their rights with respect to the oil
depots in Pandacan would be directly affected by the
outcome of these cases.

The Antecedents

These petitions are a sequel to the case of Social Justice
Society v. Mayor Atienza, Jr.8 (hereinafter referred to as
G.R. No. 156052), where the Court found: (1) that the
ordinance subject thereof Ordinance No. 8027 was
enacted to safeguard the rights to life, security and safety
of the inhabitants of Manila;9 (2) that it had passed the
tests of a valid ordinance; and (3) that it is not superseded
by Ordinance No. 8119.10 Declaring that it is constitutional
and valid,11 the Court accordingly ordered its immediate
enforcement with a specific directive on the relocation and
transfer of the Pandacan oil terminals.12
Highlighting that the Court has so ruled that the
Pandacan oil depots should leave, herein petitioners now
seek the nullification of Ordinance No. 8187, which
contains provisions contrary to those embodied in
Ordinance No. 8027. Allegations of violation of the right to
health and the right to a healthful and balanced
environment are also included.
_______________
8 546 Phil. 485; 517 SCRA 657 (2007). Decision and Resolution, 568
Phil. 658; 545 SCRA 92 (2008).
9 Social Justice Society v. Atienza, Jr., id., at p. 703; p. 139.
10 Id., at p. 684; p. 135.
11 Id., at p. 699; p. 135.
12 Id., at p. 723; p. 161.
20

For a better perspective of the facts of these cases, we

again trace the history of the Pandacan oil terminals, as
well as the intervening events prior to the reclassification
of the land use from Industrial II to Commercial I under
Ordinance No. 8027 until the creation of Medium
Industrial Zone and Heavy Industrial Zone pursuant to
Ordinance No. 8187.

History of the Pandacan Oil Terminals

We quote the following from the Resolution of the Court
in G.R. No. 156052:
Pandacan (one of the districts of the City of Manila) is situated

along the banks of the Pasig [R]iver. At the turn of the twentieth
century, Pandacan was unofficially designated as the industrial
center of Manila. The area, then largely uninhabited, was ideal
for various emerging industries as the nearby river facilitated the
transportation of goods and products. In the 1920s, it was
classified as an industrial zone. Among its early industrial
settlers were the oil companies. xxx
On December 8, 1941, the Second World War reached the
shores of the Philippine Islands. xxx [I]n their zealous attempt to
fend off the Japanese Imperial Army, the United States Army
took control of the Pandacan Terminals and hastily made plans to
destroy the storage facilities to deprive the advancing Japanese
Army of a valuable logistics weapon. The U.S. Army burned
unused petroleum, causing a frightening conflagration. Historian
Nick Joaquin recounted the events as follows:
After the USAFFE evacuated the City late in December 1941,
all army fuel storage dumps were set on fire. The flames spread,
enveloping the City in smoke, setting even the rivers ablaze,
endangering bridges and all riverside buildings. For one week
longer, the
21
VOL. 742, NOVEMBER 25, 2014 21

open city blazed a cloud of smoke by day, a pillar of fire by

night.
The fire consequently destroyed the Pandacan Terminals and
rendered its network of depots and service stations inoperative.
After the war, the oil depots were reconstructed. Pandacan
changed as Manila rebuilt itself. The three major oil companies
resumed the operation of their depots. But the district was no
longer a sparsely populated industrial zone; it had evolved into a
bustling, hodgepodge community. Today, Pandacan has become a
densely populated area inhabited by about 84,000 people,
majority of whom are urban poor who call it home. Aside from
numerous industrial installations, there are also small
businesses, churches, restaurants, schools, daycare centers and
residences situated there. Malacaan Palace, the official
residence of the President of the Philippines and the seat of
governmental power, is just two kilometers away. There is a
private school near the Petron depot. Along the walls of the Shell
facility are shanties of informal settlers. More than 15,000
students are enrolled in elementary and high schools situated
near these facilities. A university with a student population of
about 25,000 is located directly across the depot on the banks of
the Pasig [R]iver.
The 36hectare Pandacan Terminals house the oil companies
distribution terminals and depot facilities. The refineries of
Chevron and Shell in Tabangao and Bauan, both in Batangas,
respectively, are connected to the Pandacan Terminals through a
114kilometer underground pipeline system. Petrons refinery in
Limay, Bataan, on the other hand, also services the depot. The
terminals store fuel and other petroleum products and supply
95% of the fuel requirements of Metro Manila, 50% of Luzons
consumption and 35% nationwide. Fuel can also be transported
through barges along the Pasig
22

[R]iver or tank trucks via the South Luzon Expressway.13

(Citations omitted)

Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) dated 12 October
2001 between the oil companies and the Department
of Energy (DOE)

On 12 October 2001, the oil companies and the DOE
entered into a MOA14 in light of recent international
develop
_______________
13 Id., at pp. 673676; pp. 106109.

14 Rollo in G.R. No. 187916, Vol. II, pp. 428432. Annex I of the
Urgent Petition for Prohibition, Mandamus and Certiorari.
The MOA reads:
xxxx
1. Immediately upon the execution of this Agreement, CALTEX,
PETRON and SHELL shall jointly undertake a comprehensive and
comparative study of the various alternatives to minimize the potential
risks and hazards posed by the proximity of communities, businesses and
offices to the Pandacan oil terminals and to respond to such risks and
hazards to the satisfaction of the relevant stakeholders. The study shall
include the preparation of a Master Plan, whose aim is to determine the
scope and timing of the feasible relocation of the Pandacan oil terminals
and all associated facilities and infrastructure including government
support essential for the relocation such as the necessary transportation
infrastructure, land and right of way acquisition, resettlement of displaced
residents and environmental and social acceptability which shall be based
on mutual benefit of the Parties and the public.
The study and Master Plan shall also take into full consideration (i) the
integrity, reliability and security of supply and distribution of petroleum
products to Metro Manila and the rest of Luzon as well as the interest of
consumers and users of such petroleum products; (ii) the impact of
relocation on the other depots/terminals similarly situated in other parts
of the country; (iii) the security, safety and welfare of the inhabitants
around the current site and those of the proposed sites;
23
VOL. 742, NOVEMBER 25, 2014 23

ments involving acts of terrorism on civilian and

government landmarks,15 potential new security risks
relating to the Pandacan oil terminals and the impact on
the surrounding community which may be affected,16 and
to address the perceived risks posed by the proximity of
communities, businesses and offices to the Pandacan oil
terminals, consistent with the principle of sustainable
development.17 The stakeholders acknowledged that
there is a need for a comprehensive study to address the
economic, social, environmental and security concerns with
the end in view of formulating a Master Plan to address
and minimize the potential risks and
_______________
and (iv) the incremental investment, operating and other related costs for
the proposed relocation.
The study and Masterplan shall be completed within twelve (12)
months from the date of execution of this Agreement.
2. The DOE shall participate in the presentation of the study and
Master Plan by, among others, providing the policy framework and
recommending the necessary infrastructure, fiscal and nonfiscal,
investment incentives and other support measures as enumerated in
paragraph 1 above including the promotion of appropriate legislative
proposals, coordination with other government agencies, identification of
the necessary governmental resources and the provision of other measures
that would facilitate the attainment of objectives of this Agreement.
3. Subject to paragraphs 1 & 2 hereof, the Master Plan shall be
implemented in phases to be completed within a period of no more than
five (5) years from the date of execution of this Agreement; provided, that
the commencement of the first phase shall occur within 2003.
4. The relocation of the Pandacan liquefied petroleum gas (LPG),
facilities of CALTEX, PETRON and SHELL shall form part of the first
phase of relocation.
xxxx
15 Id., at p. 429.
16 Id.
17 Id.
24

hazards posed by the proximity of communities, businesses

and offices to the Pandacan oil terminals without adversely
affecting the security and reliability of supply and
distribution of petroleum products to Metro Manila and the
rest of Luzon, and the interests of consumers and users of
such petroleum products in those areas.18
The enactment of Ordinance No. 8027 against the

continued stay of the oil depots

The MOA, however, was shortlived.
On 20 November 2001, during the incumbency of former
Mayor Jose L. Atienza, Jr. (Mayor Atienza) now one of
the petitioners in G.R. No. 187916 the Sangguniang
Panlungsod enacted Ordinance No. 802719 reclassifying the
use of the
_______________
18 Id.
19 Rollo in G.R. No. 187916, Vol. I, p. 76.
The Ordinance reads:
ORDINANCE NO. 8027
AN ORDINANCE RECLASSIFYING THE LAND USE OF THAT
PORTION OF LAND BOUNDED BY THE PASIG RIVER IN THE
NORTH, xxx FROM INDUSTRIAL II TO COMMERCIAL I
Be it ordained by the City Council of Manila, THAT:
SECTION 1. For the purpose of promoting sound urban planning
and ensuring health, public safety, and general welfare of the residents of
Pandacan and Sta. Ana as well as its adjoining areas, the land use of
[those] portions of land bounded by the Pasig River in the north, PNR
Railroad Track in the east, Beata St. in the south, Palumpong St. in the
southwest, and Estero de Pandacan in the west[,] PNR Railroad in the
northwest area, Estero de Pandacan in the northeast, Pasig River in the
southeast and Dr. M.L. Carreon in the southwest. The area of Punta, Sta.
Ana bounded by the Pasig
25
VOL. 742, NOVEMBER 25, 2014 25

land in Pandacan, Sta. Ana, and its adjoining areas from

Industrial II to Commercial I.
The owners and operators of the businesses thus
affected by the reclassification were given six months from
the date of effectivity of the Ordinance within which to stop
the operation of their businesses.
Nevertheless, the oil companies were granted an
extension of until 30 April 2003 within which to comply
with the Ordinance pursuant to the following:
(1) Memorandum of Understanding (MOU)20 dated 26
June 2002 between the City of Manila and the Department
of Energy (DOE), on the one hand, and the oil companies,
on the other, where the parties agreed that the scaling
down of the Pandacan Terminals [was] the most viable and
practicable option21 and committed to adopt specific
measures22 consistent with
_______________
River, Marcelino Obrero St., Mayo 28 St., and F. Manalo Street, are
hereby reclassified from Industrial II to Commercial I.
xxxx
SEC. 3. Owners or operators of industries and other businesses, the
operation of which are no longer permitted under Section 1 hereof, are
hereby given a period of six (6) months from the date of effectivity of this
Ordinance within which to cease and desist from the operation of
businesses which are hereby in consequence, disallowed.
20 Rollo in G.R. No. 187916, Vol. II, pp. 434440. Annex 2 of the
Consolidated CommentinIntervention.
21 Id., at p. 435.
22 Id., at pp. 435436.
The oil companies undertook to do the following:
Section 1.Consistent with the objectives stated above, the OIL
COMPANIES shall, upon signing of this MOU, undertake a program to
scale down the Pandacan Terminals which shall include, among others,
the immediate removal/decommissioning process of TWENTYEIGHT (28)
tanks starting with the LPG spheres and the commencing of works for the
creation
26

the said objective;
_______________
of safety buffer and green zones surrounding the Pandacan Terminals.

xxx
Section 2.Consistent with the scale down program mentioned
above, the OIL COMPANIES shall establish joint operations and
management, including the operation of common, integrated and/or
shared facilities, consistent with international and domestic technical,
safety, environmental and economic considerations and standards.
Consequently, the joint operations of the OIL COMPANIES in the
Pandacan Terminals shall be limited to the common and integrated
areas/facilities. A separate agreement covering the commercial and
operational terms and conditions of the joint operations, shall be entered
into by the OIL COMPANIES.
Section 3.The development and maintenance of the safety and
green buffer zones mentioned therein, which shall be taken from the
properties of the OIL COMPANIES and not from the surrounding
communities, shall be the sole responsibility of the OIL COMPANIES.
The City of Manila and DOE, on the other hand, tasked themselves to:
Section 1.The City Mayor shall endorse to the City Council this
MOU for its appropriate action with the view of implementing the spirit
and intent thereof.
Section 2.The City Mayor and the DOE shall, consistent with the
spirit and intent of this MOU, enable the OIL COMPANIES to
continuously operate in compliance with legal requirements, within the
limited area resulting from the joint operations and the scale down
program.
Section 3.The DOE and the City Mayor shall monitor the OIL
COMPANIES compliance with the provisions of this MOU.
Section 4.The CITY OF MANILA and the national government
shall protect the safety buffer and green zones and shall exert all efforts at
preventing future occupation or encroachment into these areas by illegal
settlers and other unauthorized parties.
27
VOL. 742, NOVEMBER 25, 2014 27

(2) Resolution No. 97 dated 25 July 200223 of the

(2) Resolution No. 97 dated 25 July 200223 of the
Sangguniang Panlungsod, which ratified the 26 June 2002
MOU but limited the extension of the period within which
to comply to six months from 25 July 2002; and
(3) Resolution No. 13 dated 30 January 200324 of the
Sangguniang Panlungsod, which extended the validity of
Resolution No. 97 to 30 April 2003, authorized then Mayor
Atienza to issue special business permits to the oil
companies, and called for a reassessment of the ordinance.

Social Justice Society v. Atienza (G.R. No. 156052):
The filing of an action for mandamus before the
Supreme Court to enforce Ordinance No. 8027

In the interim, an original action for mandamus entitled
Social Justice Society v. Atienza, Jr. docketed as G.R. No.
15605225 was filed on 4 December 2002 by Tumbokon and
herein petitioners SJS and Cabigao against then Mayor
Atienza. The petitioners sought to compel former Mayor
Atienza to enforce Ordinance No. 8027 and cause the
immediate removal of the terminals of the oil companies.26
Issuance by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of writs

of preliminary prohibitory injunction and
preliminary mandatory injunction, and status quo
order in favor of the oil companies
_______________
23 Id., at pp. 580581. Annex 6 of the Consolidated Commentin

Intervention.
24 Id., at p. 582.
25 Supra note 8.
26 Id., at p. 490; p. 663.
28

Unknown to the Court, during the pendency of G.R. No.

156052, and before the expiration of the validity of
Resolution No. 13, the oil companies filed the following
actions before the Regional Trial Court of Manila: (1) an
action for the annulment of Ordinance No. 8027 with
application for writs of preliminary prohibitory injunction
and preliminary mandatory injunction by Chevron; (2) a
petition for prohibition and mandamus also for the
annulment of the Ordinance with application for writs of
preliminary prohibitory injunction and preliminary
mandatory injunction by Shell; and (3) a petition
assailing the validity of the Ordinance with prayer for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and/or
temporary restraining order (TRO) by Petron.27
Writs of preliminary prohibitory injunction and
preliminary mandatory injunction were issued in favor of
Chevron and Shell on 19 May 2003. Petron, on the other
hand, obtained a status quo order on 4 August 2004.28

The Enactment of Ordinance No. 8119 defining the
Manila land use plan and zoning regulations

On 16 June 2006, then Mayor Atienza approved
Ordinance No. 8119 entitled An Ordinance Adopting the
Manila Comprehensive Land Use Plan and Zoning
Regulations of 2006 and Providing for the Administration,
Enforcement and Amendment thereto.29
Pertinent provisions relative to these cases are the
following:
(a) Article IV, Sec. 730 enumerating the existing zones
or districts in the City of Manila;
_______________
27 Supra note 8 at p. 671; p. 103.

28 Id.
29 Rollo in G.R. No. 187916, Vol. I, pp. 78115. Annex C of the
Urgent Petition for Prohibition, Mandamus and Certiorari.
30 Id., at pp. 7980.
29
VOL. 742, NOVEMBER 25, 2014 29

(b) Article V, Sec. 2331 designating the Pandacan oil

depot area as a Planned Unit Development/Overlay Zone
(OPUD); and
_______________
SEC. 7. Division into Zones or Districts.To effectively carry out the

provisions of this Ordinance, the City of Manila is hereby divided into the
following zones or districts as shown in the Official Zoning Maps.
A. General Residential Zone:
1. High Density Residential/Mixed Use Zone (R3/MXD)
B. Commercial Zones:
2. Medium Intensity Commercial/Mixed Use Zone
(C2/MXD)
3. High Intensity Commercial/Mixed Use Zone
(C3/MXD)
C. Industrial Zone:
4. Light Industrial Zone (I1)
D. Institutional Zones:
5. General Institutional Zone (INSG)
6. University Cluster Zone (INSU)
E. Public Open Space Zones:
7. General Public Open Space Zone (POSGEN)
7.a Parks and Plazas (POSPP)
7.b Playground and Sports Field/Recreation Zone (POSPSR)
8. Cemetery Zone (POSCEM)
F. Others
9. Utility Zone (UTL)
10. Water Zone (WTR)
11. Overlay Zones:
11.1 HistoCultural Heritage Overlay Zone (OHCH)
11.2 Planned Unit Development Overlay Zone (OPUD)
11.3 Buffer Overlay Zone (OBUF) (Emphasis supplied)
31 Id., at p. 92.
30

(c) the repealing clause, which reads:
SEC. 84. Repealing Clause.All ordinances, rules,

regulations in conflict with the provisions of this Ordinance are
hereby repealed; PROVIDED, That the rights that are vested
upon the effectivity of this Ordinance shall not be impaired.32

7 March 2007 Decision in G.R. No. 156052; The mayor
has the mandatory legal duty to enforce Ordinance
No. 8027 and order the removal of the Pandacan
terminals
_______________
SEC. 23. Use Regulations in Planned Unit Development/Overlay Zone

(OPUD).OPUD Zones are identified specific sites in the City of Manila
wherein the project site is comprehensively planned as an entity via
unitary site plan which permits flexibility in planning/design, building
siting, complementarily of building types and land uses, usable open
spaces and the preservation of significant natural land features, pursuant
to regulations specified for each particular PUD. Enumerated below are
identified PUD:
xxxx
6. Pandacan Oil Depot Area
xxxx
Enumerated below are the allowable uses:
1. all uses allowed in all zones where it is located;
2. the [Land Use Intensity Control (LUIC)] under which zones are
located shall, in all instances be complied with;
3. the validity of the prescribed LUIC shall only be [superseded] by the
development controls and regulations specified for each PUD as provided
for each PUD as provided for by the masterplan of respective PUDs.
(Emphasis supplied)
32 Id., at p. 114.
31
VOL. 742, NOVEMBER 25, 2014 31

On 7 March 2007, the Court granted the petition for

mandamus, and directed then respondent Mayor Atienza
to immediately enforce Ordinance No. 8027.33
Confined to the resolution of the following issues raised
by the petitioners, to wit:
1. whether respondent [Mayor Atienza] has the mandatory

legal duty to enforce Ordinance No. 8027 and order the removal of
the Pandacan Terminals, and
2. whether the June 26, 2002 MOU and the resolutions
ratifying it can amend or repeal Ordinance No. 8027.34
the Court declared:
x x x [T]he Local Government Code imposes upon respondent

the duty, as city mayor, to enforce all laws and ordinances
relative to the governance of the city. One of these is Ordinance
No. 8027. As the chief executive of the city, he has the duty to
enforce Ordinance No. 8027 as long as it has not been repealed by
the Sanggunian or annulled by the courts. He has no other choice.
It is his ministerial duty to do so. xxx
xxxx
The question now is whether the MOU entered into by
respondent with the oil companies and the subsequent resolutions
passed by the Sanggunian have made the respondents duty to
enforce Ordinance No. 8027 doubtful, unclear or uncertain. xxx
We need not resolve this issue. Assuming that the terms of the
MOU were inconsistent with Ordinance No. 8027, the resolutions
which ratified it and made it binding on the City of Manila
expressly gave it full force and effect only until April 30, 2003.
Thus, at present, there
_______________
33 Supra note 8 at p. 494; p. 667.

34 Id., at pp. 490491; p. 663.
32

is nothing that legally hinders respondent from enforcing

Ordinance No. 8027.
Ordinance No. 8027 was enacted right after the Philippines,
along with the rest of the world, witnessed the horror of the
September 11, 2001 attack on the Twin Towers of the World
Trade Center in New York City. The objective of the
ordinance is to protect the residents of Manila from the
catastrophic devastation that will surely occur in case of a
terrorist attack on the Pandacan Terminals. No reason
exists why such a protective measure should be delayed.35
(Emphasis supplied; citations omitted)

13 February 2008 Resolution in G.R. No. 156052;
Ordinance No. 8027 is constitutional

The oil companies and the Republic of the Philippines,
represented by the DOE, filed their motions for leave to
intervene and for reconsideration of the 7 March 2007
Decision. During the oral arguments, the parties submitted
to the power of the Court to rule on the constitutionality
and validity of the assailed Ordinance despite the pendency
of the cases in the RTC.36
On 13 February 2008, the Court granted the motions for
leave to intervene of the oil companies and the Republic of
the Philippines but denied their respective motions for
reconsideration. The dispositive portion of the Resolution
reads:
WHEREFORE, xxx
We reiterate our order to respondent Mayor of the City of
Manila to enforce Ordinance No. 8027. In coordination with the
appropriate agencies and other parties involved, respondent
Mayor is hereby ordered to oversee
_______________
35 Id., at pp. 493494; pp. 665667.

36 Supra note 8 at p. 673; p. 105.
33
VOL. 742, NOVEMBER 25, 2014 33

the relocation and transfer of the Pandacan Terminals out of

its present site.37

13 February 2008 Resolution in G.R. No. 156052;
Ordinance No. 8027 was not impliedly repealed by
Ordinance No. 8119

The Court also ruled that Ordinance No. 8027 was not
impliedly repealed by Ordinance No. 8119. On this score,
the Court ratiocinated:
For the first kind of implied repeal, there must be an

irreconcilable conflict between the two ordinances. There is no
conflict between the two ordinances. Ordinance No. 8027
reclassified the Pandacan area from Industrial II to Commercial I.
Ordinance No. 8119, Section 23, designated it as a Planned Unit
Development/Overlay Zone (OPUD). In its Annex C which
defined the zone boundaries, the Pandacan area was shown to be
within the High Density Residential/Mixed Use Zone (R
3/MXD). x x x [B]oth ordinances actually have a common
objective, i.e., to shift the zoning classification from industrial to
commercial (Ordinance No. 8027) or mixed residential commercial
(Ordinance No. 8119)
xxxx
Ordinance No. 8027 is a special law since it deals specifically
with a certain area described therein (the Pandacan oil depot
area) whereas Ordinance No. 8119 can be considered a general
law as it covers the entire city of Manila.
xxxx
x x x The repealing clause of Ordinance No. 8119 cannot be
taken to indicate the legislative intent to repeal all prior
inconsistent laws on the subject matter, including Ordinance No.
8027, a special enactment, since
_______________
37 Id., at p. 723; pp. 160161.
34

the aforequoted minutes (an official record of the discussions in

the Sanggunian) actually indicated the clear intent to preserve
the provisions of Ordinance No. 8027.38

Filing of a draft Resolution amending Ordinance No.
8027 effectively allowing the oil depots to stay in the
Pandacan area; Manifestation and Motion to
forestall the passing of the new Ordinance filed in
G.R. No. 156052

On 5 March 2009, respondent then Councilor Arlene W.
Koa, filed with the Sangguniang Panlungsod a draft
resolution entitled An Ordinance Amending Ordinance
No. 8119 Otherwise Known as The Manila Comprehensive
Land Use Plan and Zoning Ordinance of 2006 by Creating
a Medium Industrial Zone (12) and Heavy Industrial Zone
(13) and Providing for its Enforcement.39 Initially
numbered as Draft Ordinance No. 7177, this was later
renumbered as Ordinance No. 8187, the assailed Ordinance
in these instant petitions.
Considering that the provisions thereof run contrary to
Ordinance No. 8027, the petitioners in G.R. No. 156052
filed a Manifestation and Motion to: a) Stop the City
Council of Manila from further hearing the amending
ordinance to Ordinance No. 8027; [and] b) Transfer the
monitoring of the enforcement of the Resolution of the
Honorable Court on this case dated 13 February 2008 from
Branch 39, Manila Regional Trial Court to the Supreme
Court.40

28 April 2009 Resolution in G.R. No. 156052; Second
Motion
_______________
38 Id., at pp. 17921793; pp. 131134.

39 Rollo in G.R. No. 156052, p. 1793. Manifestation and Motion filed
on 18 March 2009.
40 Id., at pp. 17921803.
35
VOL. 742, NOVEMBER 25, 2014 35

for Reconsideration denied with finality; succeeding

motions likewise denied or otherwise noted without
action

On 28 April 2009, pending the resolution of the
Manifestation and Motion, the Court denied with finality
the second motion for reconsideration dated 27 February
2008 of the oil companies.41 It further ruled that no further
pleadings shall be entertained in the case.42
Succeeding motions were thus denied and/or noted
without action. And, after the Very Urgent Motion to Stop
the Mayor of the City of Manila from Signing Draft
Ordinance No. 7177 and to Cite Him for Contempt if He
Would Do So filed on 19 May 2009 was denied on 2 June
2009 for being moot,43 all pleadings pertaining to the
earlier motion against the drafting of an ordinance to
amend Ordinance No. 8027 were noted without action.44
The Enactment of Ordinance No. 8187 allowing the

continued stay of the oil depots
_______________
41 Id., at pp. 18131816. Resolution dated 28 April 2009.

42 Id., at p. 1816.
43 Id. (no proper pagination, should be pp. 18441845). Resolution
dated 2 June 2009.
44 Id. (no proper pagination, should be p. 1846). Resolution dated 9
June 2009 with respect to the City Legal Offices Motion to Excuse from
Filing Comment (on Petitioners Manifestation and Motion and on
Petitioners Very Urgent Motion to Cite the Members of the City Council
in Direct Contempt of Court), and the Comment. Id. (no proper
pagination, should be pp. 18801881). Resolution dated 23 June 2009 with
respect to the Reply to the Comment filed by the counsel for the
petitioners.
36
On 14 May 2009, during the incumbency of former

Mayor Alfredo S. Lim (Mayor Lim), who succeeded Mayor
Atienza, the Sangguniang Panlungsod enacted Ordinance
No. 8187.45
_______________
45 Rollo, in G.R. No. 187916, Vol. I, pp. 7074.

The Ordinance reads:
ORDINANCE NO. 8187
AN ORDINANCE AMENDING ORDINANCE NO. 8119, OTHERWISE
KNOWN AS THE MANILA COMPREHENSIVE LAND USE PLAN AND
ZONING ORDINANCE OF 2006, BY CREATING A MEDIUM
INDUSTRIAL ZONE (12) AND HEAVY INDUSTRIAL ZONE (13), AND
PROVIDING FOR ITS ENFORCEMENT.
Be it ordained by the City Council of Manila, in session, assembled,
THAT:
SECTION 1. Ordinance No. 8119, otherwise known as the Manila
Comprehensive Land Use Plan and Zoning Ordinance of 2006 is hereby
amended by creating a Medium Industrial Zone (12) and Heavy
Industrial Zone (13) to read as follows:
1. Use Regulations in Medium Industrial Zone (12)
The Medium Industrial Zone (12) shall be for Pollutive/NonHazardous
and Pollutive/Hazardous manufacturing and processing establishments.
Enumerated below are the allowable uses:
a. Pollutive/Hazardous Industries
1. Manufacture and canning of ham
2. Poultry processing and canning
3. Largescale manufacture of ice cream
4. Corn Mill/Rice Mill
5. Chocolate and Cocoa Factory
6. Candy Factory
7. Chewing Gum Factory
8. Peanuts and other nuts factory
9. Other chocolate and confectionary products
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VOL. 742, NOVEMBER 25, 2014 37

_______________
10. Manufacture of flavoring extracts

11. Manufacture of food products n.e.c. (vinegar, vetsin)
12. Manufacture of fish meal
13. Oyster shell grading
14. Manufacture of medicinal and pharmaceutical preparations
15. Manufacture of stationary, art goods, cut stone and marble products
16. Manufacture of abrasive products
17. Manufacture of miscellaneous nonmetallic mineral products n.e.c.
18. Manufacture of cutlery, except table flatware
19. Manufacture of hand tools
20. Manufacture of general hardware
21. Manufacture of miscellaneous cutlery hand tools and general
hardware n.e.c.
22. Manufacture of household metal furniture
23. Manufacture of office, store and restaurant metal furniture
24. Manufacture of metal blinds, screens and shades
25. Manufacture of miscellaneous furniture and fixture primarily of
metal n.e.c.
26. Manufacture of fabricated structural iron and steel
27. Manufacture of architectural and ornamental metal works
28. Manufacture of boiler, tanks and other structural sheet metal
works
29. Manufacture of other structural products n.e.c.
30. Manufacture of metal cans, boxes and containers
31. Manufacture of stamped coated and engraved metal products
32. Manufacture of fabricated wire and cable
33. Manufacture of heating, cooking and lighting equipment except
electrical
38

_______________
34. Metal sheet works generally of manual operation

35. Manufacture of other fabricated metal products except machinery
and equipment n.e.c.
36. Manufacture or assembly of agricultural machinery and equipment
37. Native plow and harrow factory
38. Repair of agricultural machinery
39. Manufacture or assembly of service industry machines
40. Manufacture or assembly of elevators or escalators
41. Manufacture or assembly of sewing machines
42. Manufacture or assembly of cooking ranges
43. Manufacture or assembly of water pumps
44. Refrigeration industry
45. Manufacture or assembly of other machinery and equipment except
electrical n.e.c.
46. Manufacture and repair of electrical apparatus
47. Manufacture and repair of electrical cables and wires
48. Manufacture of cables and wires
49. Manufacture of other electrical industrial machinery and apparatus
n.e.c.
50. Manufacture or assembly of electric equipment such as radio,
television, tape, tape recorders and stereo
51. Manufacture or assembly of radio and television transmitting,
signaling and detection equipment
52. Manufacture or assembly of telephone and telegraphic equipment
53. Manufacture of other electronic equipment and apparatus n.e.c.
54. Manufacture of industrial and commercial electrical appliances
55. Manufacture of household cooking, heating and laundry appliances
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VOL. 742, NOVEMBER 25, 2014 39

_______________
56. Manufacture of other electrical appliances n.e.c.

57. Manufacture of electrical lamp fixtures
b. Pollutive/Hazardous (sic) Industries
1. Flour Mill
2. Cassava Flour Mill
3. Manufacturing of coffee
4. Manufacturing of unprepared animal feeds, other grain milling n.e.c.
5. Production prepared feed for animals
6. Cigar and cigarette Factory
7. Curing and redrying tobacco leaves
8. Miscellaneous processing tobacco leaves n.e.c.
9. Weaving hemp textile
10. Jute spinning and weaving
11. Miscellaneous spinning and weaving mills n.e.c.
12. Hosiery mill
13. Underwear and outwear knitting mills
14. Fabric knitting mills
15. Miscellaneous knitting mills n.e.c.
16. Manufacture of mats and mattings
17. Manufacture of carpets and rugs
18. Manufacture of cordage, rope and twine
19. Manufacture of related products from abaca, sisal, henequen, hemp,
cotton, paper, etc.
20. Manufacture of linoleum and other surface coverings
21. Manufacture of machines for leather and leather products
22. Manufacture of construction machinery
23. Manufacture of machines for clay, stove and glass industries
24. Manufacture, assembly, repair, rebuilding of miscellaneous special
industrial machinery and equipment n.e.c.
25. Manufacture of dry cells, storage battery and other batteries
26. Boat building and repairing
27. Ship repairing industry, dock yards, dry dock, shipways
40

_______________
28. Miscellaneous shipbuilding and repairing n.e.c.

29. Manufacture of locomotive and parts
30. Manufacture of railroads and street cars
31. Manufacture of assembly of automobiles, cars, buses, trucks and
trailers
32. Manufacture of wood furniture including upholstered
33. Manufacture of rattan furniture including upholstered
34. Manufacture of box beds and mattresses
2. Use Regulations in Heavy Industrial Zone (13)
The Heavy Industrial Zone (13) shall be for highly Pollutive/Non
Hazardous; Pollutive/Hazardous; Highly Pollutive/Extremely Hazardous;
NonPollutive/Extremely Hazardous; and Pollutive/Extremely Hazardous
manufacturing and processing establishments. Enumerated below are the
allowable uses:
a. Highly Pollutive/NonHazardous Industries
1. Meat processing, curing, preserving except processing of ham, bacon,
sausage and chicharon
2. Milk processing plants (manufacturing filled, reconstituted or
recombined milk, condensed or evaporated)
3. Butter and cheese processing plants
4. Natural fluid milk processing (pasteurizing, homogenizing,
vitaminizing bottling of natural animal milk and cream related products)
5. Other dairy products n.e.c.
6. Canning and preserving of fruits and fruit juices
7. Canning and preserving of vegetables and vegetable juices
8. Canning and preserving of vegetable sauces
9. Miscellaneous canning and preserving of fruits and vegetables, n.e.c.
10. Fish canning
11. Patis factory
12. Bagoong factory
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VOL. 742, NOVEMBER 25, 2014 41
_______________
13. Processing, preserving and canning of fish and other seafoods, n.e.c.
14. Manufacture of desiccated coconut
15. Manufacture of starch and its byproducts
16. Manufacture of wines from juices of local fruits
17. Manufacture of malt and malt liquors
18. Manufacture of soft drinks carbonated water
19. Manufacture of instant beverages and syrups
20. Other nonalcoholic beverages, n.e.c.
21. Other slaughtering, preparing and preserving meat products, n.e.c.
b. Highly Pollutive/Hazardous Industries
1. Vegetable oil mills, including coconut oil
2. Manufacturing of refined cooking oil and margarine
3. Manufacture of fish, marine and other animal oils
4. Manufacture of vegetable and animal oils and fats, n.e.c.
5. Sugar cane milling (centrifugal refined)
6. Sugar refining
7. Muscovado Sugar Mill
8. Distilled, rectified and blended liquors, n.e.c.
9. Cotton textile mill
10. Ramie textile mill
11. Rayon and other manmade fiber textile mill
12. Bleaching and drying mills
13. Manufacture of narrow fabrics
14. Tanneries and leather finishing plants
15. Pulp mills
16. Paper and paperboard mills
17. Manufacture of fiberboard
18. Manufacture of inorganic salts and compounds
19. Manufacture of soap and cleaning preparations
20. Manufacture of hydraulic cement
21. Manufacture of lime and lime kilns
22. Manufacture of plaster
23. Products of blast furnace, steel works and rolling mills
42

_______________
24. Product of iron and steel foundries

25. Manufacture of smelted and refined nonferrous metals
26. Manufacture of rolled, drawn or astruded nonferrous metals
27. Manufacture of nonferrous foundry products
c. Highly Pollutive/Extremely Hazardous Industries
1. Manufacture of industrial alcohols
2. Other basic industrial chemicals
3. Manufacture of fertilizers
4. Manufacture of pesticides
5. Manufacture of synthetic resins, plastic materials and manmade
fibers except glass
6. Petroleum refineries and oil depots
7. Manufacture of reclaimed, blended and compound petroleum
products
8. Manufacture of miscellaneous products of petroleum and coal
d. Pollutive/Extremely Hazardous Industries
1. Manufacture of paints
2. Manufacture of varnishes, shellac and stains
3. Manufacture of paint removers
4. Manufacture of other paint products
5. Manufacture of matches
6. Manufacture of tires and inner tubes
7. Manufacture of processed natural rubber not in rubber plantations
8. Manufacture of miscellaneous rubber products, n.e.c.
e. NonPollutive/Extremely Hazardous Industries
1. Manufacture of compressed and liquefied gases
SEC. 2. The land use where the existing industries are located, the
operation of which are permitted under Section 1 hereof, are hereby
classified as Industrial Zone.
43
VOL. 742, NOVEMBER 25, 2014 43

The new Ordinance repealed, amended, rescinded or

otherwise modified Ordinance No. 8027, Section 23 of
Ordinance No. 8119, and all other Ordinances or provisions
inconsistent therewith46 thereby allowing, once again, the
operation of Pollutive/NonHazardous and
Pollutive/Hazardous manufacturing and processing
establishments and Highly Pollutive/NonHazardous[,]
Pollutive/Hazardous[,] Highly Pollutive/Extremely
Hazardous[,] NonPollutive/Extremely Hazardous; and
Pollutive/Extremely Hazardous; and Pollutive/Extremely
Hazardous manufacturing and processing establishments
within the newly created Medium Industrial Zone (12) and
Heavy Industrial Zone (13) in the Pandacan area.
_______________
The City Planning and Development Office (CPDO) shall prepare an

amended Zoning Map and Zoning Boundaries which shall be submitted to
the City Council for review.
SEC. 3. The Zoning Fees shall be P10/sq. m. of total floor area for
MEDIUM INDUSTRIAL ZONE (12) and P10/sq. m. of total floor area for
HEAVY INDUSTRIAL ZONE (13).
SEC. 4. Repealing Clause.Ordinance No. 8027, Section 23 of
Ordinance No. 8119 and all other Ordinances or provisions therein
inconsistent with the provisions of this Ordinance are hereby repealed,
amended, rescinded or modified accordingly.
SEC. 5. Effectivity Clause.This Ordinance shall take effect fifteen
(15) days after its publication in accordance with law.
xxxx.
46 Id., at p. 74.
Sec. 4 of Ordinance No. 8187 reads:
SEC. 4. Repealing Clause.Ordinance No. 8027, Section 23 of
Ordinance No. 8119 and all other Ordinances or provisions therein
inconsistent with the provisions of this Ordinance are hereby repealed,
amended, rescinded or otherwise modified accordingly.
44


Thus, where the Industrial Zone under Ordinance No.
8119 was limited to Light Industrial Zone (I1), Ordinance
No. 8187 appended to the list a Medium Industrial Zone (I
2) and a Heavy Industrial Zone (I3), where petroleum
refineries and oil depots are now among those expressly
allowed.
Hence these petitions.

The Petitions

G.R. No. 187836

To support their petition for prohibition against the
enforcement of Ordinance No. 8187, the petitioner Social
Justice Society (SJS) officers allege that:
1. The enactment of the assailed Ordinance is not a
valid exercise of police power because the measures
provided therein do not promote the general welfare of the
people within the contemplation of the following provisions
of law:
a) Article III, Section 18(kk)47 of Republic Act No. 409

a) Article III, Section 18(kk)47 of Republic Act No. 409
otherwise known as the Revised Charter of the City of
Manila, which provides that the Municipal Board
_______________
47 Section 18. Legislative powers.The Municipal Board shall have

the following legislative powers:
xxxx
(kk) To enact all ordinances it may deem necessary and proper for
the sanitation and safety, the furtherance of the prosperity, and the
promotion of the morality, peace good order, comfort, convenience, and
general welfare of the city and its inhabitants, and such others as may be
necessary to carry into effect and discharge the powers and duties
conferred by this chapter; and to fix penalties for the violation of
ordinances which shall not exceed to two hundred pesos fine or six
months imprisonment, or both such fine and imprisonment, for a single
offense.
45
VOL. 742, NOVEMBER 25, 2014 45

shall have the legislative power to enact all ordinances it

may deem necessary and proper;
b) Section 1648 of Republic Act No. 7160 known as the
Local Government Code, which defines the scope of the
general welfare clause;
2. The conditions at the time the Court declared
Ordinance No. 8027 constitutional in G.R. No. 156052 exist
to this date;
3. Despite the finality of the Decision in G.R. No.
156052, and notwithstanding that the conditions and
circumstances warranting the validity of the Ordinance
remain the same, the Manila City Council passed a
contrary Ordinance, thereby refusing to recognize that
judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the
Constitution form part of the legal system of the
Philippines;49 and
4. Ordinance No. 8187 is violative of Sections 15 and
16, Article II of the Constitution of the Philippines on the
duty of the State to protect and promote the right to
health of the
_______________
48 SECTION 16. General Welfare.Every local government unit
shall exercise the powers expressly granted, those necessarily implied
therefrom, as well as powers necessary, appropriate, or incidental for its
efficient and effective governance, and those which are essential to the
promotion of the general welfare. Within their respective territorial
jurisdictions, local government units shall ensure and support, among
other things, the preservation and enrichment of culture, promote health
and safety, enhance the right of the people to a balanced ecology,
encourage and support the development of appropriate and selfreliant
scientific and technological capabilities, improve public morals, enhance
economic prosperity and social justice, promote full employment among
their residents, maintain peace and order, and preserve the comfort and
convenience of their inhabitants.
49 Article 8, Civil Code.
46

people50 and protect and advance the right of the people

to a balanced and healthful ecology.51
Petitioners pray that Ordinance No. 8187 of the City of
Manila be declared null and void, and that respondent, and
all persons acting under him, be prohibited from enforcing
the same.

G.R. No. 187916

The petition for Prohibition, Mandamus and Certiorari
with Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order and/or
Injunction against the enforcement of Ordinance No. 8187
of former Secretary of Department of Environment and
Natural Resources and then Mayor Atienza, together with
other residents and taxpayers of the City of Manila, also
alleges violation of the right to health of the people and the
right to a healthful and balanced environment under
Sections 15 and 16 of the Constitution.
Petitioners likewise claim that the Ordinance is in
violation of the following health and environmentrelated
municipal laws, and international conventions and treaties
to which the Philippines is a state party:
1. Municipal Laws
_______________
50 Section 15. The State shall protect and promote the right to
health of the people and instill health consciousness among them.
51 Section 16. The State shall protect and advance the right of the
people to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and
harmony of nature.
47
VOL. 742, NOVEMBER 25, 2014 47

(a) Sections 4,52 12,53 1954 and 3055 of Republic Act No.
8749 otherwise known as the Philippine Clean Air Act;
_______________
52 SEC. 4. Recognition of Rights.Pursuant to the above declared

principles, the following rights of citizens are hereby sought to be
recognized and the State shall seek to guarantee their enjoyment:
[a] The right to breathe clean air;
[b] The right to utilize and enjoy all natural resources according to the
principles of sustainable development;
[c] The right to participate in the formulation, planning,
implementation and monitoring of environmental policies and programs
and in the decisionmaking process;
[d] The right to participate in the decisionmaking process concerning
development policies, plans and programs projects or activities that may
have adverse impact on the environment and public health;
[e] The right to be informed of the nature and extent of the potential
hazard of any activity, undertaking or project and to be served timely
notice of any significant rise in the level of pollution and the accidental or
deliberate release into the atmosphere of harmful or hazardous
substances;
[f] The right of access to public records which a citizen may need to
exercise his or her rights effectively under this Act;
[g] The right to bring action in court or quasijudicial bodies to enjoin
all activities in violation of environmental laws and regulations, to compel
the rehabilitation and cleanup of affected area, and to seek the imposition
of penal sanctions against violators of environmental laws; and
[h] The right to bring action in court for compensation of personal
damages resulting from the adverse environmental and public health
impact of a project or activity.
53 SEC. 12. Ambient Air Quality Guideline Values and Standards.
The Department, in coordination with other concerned agencies, shall
review and or revise and publish annually a list of hazardous air
pollutants with corresponding ambient guideline values and/or standard
necessary to protect health and safety, and general welfare. The initial list
and values of the hazardous air pollutants shall be as follows:
48
a) For National Ambient Air Quality Guideline for

Criteria Pollutants:
alt

alt
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VOL. 742, NOVEMBER 25, 2014 49

b) For National Ambient Air Quality Standards for

Source Specific Air Pollutants from Industrial
Sources/Operations:
alt
alt
The basis in setting up the ambient air quality guideline values

and standards shall reflect, among others, the latest scientific
knowledge including information on:
50

_______________
a) Variable, including atmospheric conditions, which of themselves or

in combination with other factors may alter the effects on public health or
welfare of such air pollutant;
b) The other types of air pollutants which may interact with such
pollutant to produce an adverse effect on public health or welfare; and
c) The kind and extent of all identifiable effects on public health or
welfare which may be expected from presence of such pollutant in the
ambient air, in varying quantities.
The Department shall base such ambient air quality standards on
World Health Organization (WHO) standards, but shall not be limited to
nor be less stringent than such standards.
54 SEC. 19. Pollution From Stationary Sources.The Department
shall, within two (2) years from the effectivity of this Act, and every two
(2) years thereafter, review, or as the need therefore arises, revise and
publish emission standards, to further improve the emission standards for
stationary sources of air pollution. Such emission standards shall be based
on mass rate of emission for all stationary source of air pollution based on
internationally accepted standards, but not be limited to, nor be less
stringent than such standards and with the standards set forth in this
section. The standards, whichever is applicable, shall be the limit on the
acceptable level of pollutants emitted from a stationary source for the
protection of the publics health and welfare.
With respect to any trade, industry, process and fuelburning
equipment or industrial plant emitting air pollutants, the concentration at
the point of emission shall not exceed the following limits:
alt
51
VOL. 742, NOVEMBER 25, 2014 51

_______________
alt
52
_______________
alt

53
VOL. 742, NOVEMBER 25, 2014 53

_______________
alt
54

_______________
alt
These average values cover also gaseous and the vapor forms of the
relevant heavy metal emission as well as their compounds: Provided, That
the emission of dioxins and furans into the air shall be reduced by the
most progressive techniques: Provided, further, That all average of dioxin
and furans measured over the sample period of a minimum of 5 hours and
maximum of 8 hours must not exceed the limit value of 0.1 nanogram/m3.
Pursuant to Sec. 8 of this Act, the Department shall prepare a detailed
action plan setting the emission standards or standards of
55
VOL. 742, NOVEMBER 25, 2014 55


(b) Environment Code (Presidential Decree No. 1152);
(c) Toxic and Hazardous Wastes Law (Republic Act No.
6969); and
(d) Civil Code provisions on nuisance and human
relations;
2. International Conventions and Treaties to which the
Philippines is a state party
a. Section 1 of the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, which states that [e]veryone has the right to life,
liberty and security of person;
b. Articles 6,56 2457 and 2758 of the Convention on the
Rights of the Child, summarized by the petitioners in the
following manner:
_______________
performance for any stationary source the procedure for testing

emissions for each type of pollutant, and the procedure for enforcement of
said standards.
Existing industries, which are proven to exceed emission rates
established by the Department in consultation with stakeholders, after a
thorough, credible and transparent measurement process shall be allowed
a grace period of eighteen (18) months for the establishment of an
environmental management system and the installation of an appropriate
air pollution control device: Provided, That an extension of not more than
twelve (12) months may be allowed by the Department on meritorious
grounds.
55 SEC. 30. OzoneDepleting Substances.Consistent with the terms
and conditions of the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the
Ozone Layer and other international agreements and protocols to which
the Philippines is a signatory, the Department shall phase out ozone
depleting substances.
Within sixty (60) days after the enactment of this Act, the Department
shall publish a list of substances which are known to cause harmful effects
on the stratospheric ozone layer.
56 Article 6
1. States Parties recognize that every child has the inherent right to
life.
56

_______________
2. States Parties shall ensure to the maximum extent possible the

survival and development of the child.
57 Article 24
1. States Parties recognize the right of the child to the enjoyment of
the highest attainable standard of health and to facilities for the
treatment of illness and rehabilitation of health. States Parties shall
strive to ensure that no child is deprived of his or her right of access to
such health care services.
2. States Parties shall pursue full implementation of this right and, in
particular, shall take appropriate measures:
(a) To diminish infant and child mortality;
(b) To ensure the provision of necessary medical assistance and health
care to all children with emphasis on the development of primary health
care;
(c) To combat disease and malnutrition, including within the
framework of primary health care, through, inter alia, the application of
readily available technology and through the provision of adequate
nutritious foods and clean drinkingwater, taking into consideration the
dangers and risks of environmental pollution;
(d) To ensure appropriate prenatal and postnatal health care for
mothers;
(e) To ensure that all segments of society, in particular parents and
children, are informed, have access to education and are supported in the
use of basic knowledge of child health and nutrition, the advantages of
breastfeeding, hygiene and environmental sanitation and the prevention
of accidents;
(f) To develop preventive health care, guidance for parents and family
planning education and services.
3. States Parties shall take all effective and appropriate measures
with a view to abolishing traditional practices prejudicial to the health of
children.
4. States Parties undertake to promote and encourage international
cooperation with a view to achieving progressively the full realization of
the right recognized in the present article. In this regard, particular
account shall be taken of the needs of developing countries.
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VOL. 742, NOVEMBER 25, 2014 57

1. the human right to safe and healthy environment[;]

2. human right to the highest attainable standard of health[;]
3. the human right to ecologically sustainable development[;]
4. the human right to an adequate standard of living,
including access to safe food and water[;]
5. the human right of the child to live in an environment
appropriate for physical and mental development[; and]
6. the human right to full and equal participation for all
persons in environmental decisionmaking and development
planning, and in shaping decisions and policies af
_______________
58 Article 27
1. States Parties recognize the right of every child to a standard of
living adequate for the childs physical, mental, spiritual, moral and social
development.
2. The parent(s) or others responsible for the child have the primary
responsibility to secure, within their abilities and financial capacities, the
conditions of living necessary for the childs development.
3. States Parties, in accordance with national conditions and within
their means, shall take appropriate measures to assist parents and others
responsible for the child to implement this right and shall in case of need
provide material assistance and support programmes, particularly with
regard to nutrition, clothing and housing.
4. States Parties shall take all appropriate measures to secure the
recovery of maintenance for the child from the parents or other persons
having financial responsibility for the child, both within the State Party
and from abroad. In particular, where the person having financial
responsibility for the child lives in a State different from that of the child,
States Parties shall promote the accession to international agreements or
the conclusion of such agreements, as well as the making of other
appropriate arrangements.
58

fecting ones community, at the local, national and

international levels.59

Petitioners likewise posit that the title of Ordinance No.
8187 purports to amend or repeal Ordinance No. 8119
when it actually intends to repeal Ordinance No. 8027.
According to them, Ordinance No. 8027 was never
mentioned in the title and the body of the new ordinance in
violation of Section 26, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution,
which provides that every bill passed by Congress shall
embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the
title thereof.
Also pointed out by the petitioners is a specific
procedure outlined in Ordinance No. 8119 that should be
observed when amending the zoning ordinance. This is
provided for under Section 81 thereof, which reads:
SEC. 81. Amendments to the Zoning Ordinance.The

proposed amendments to the Zoning Ordinance as reviewed and
evaluated by the City Planning and Development Office (CPDO)
shall be submitted to the City Council for approval of the majority
of the Sangguniang Panlungsod members. The amendments shall
be acceptable and eventually approved: PROVIDED, That there is
sufficient evidence and justification for such proposal;
PROVIDED, FURTHER, That such proposal is consistent with
the development goals, planning objectives, and strategies of the
Manila Comprehensive Land Use Plan. Said amendments shall
take effect immediately upon approval or after thirty (30) days
from application.
Petitioners thus pray that:

1. upon filing of [the] petition, [the] case be referred to the
Court [E]n Banc, and setting (sic) the case for oral argument;
_______________
59 Rollo in G.R. No. 187916, Vol. I, p. 44. Urgent Petition for

59
VOL. 742, NOVEMBER 25, 2014 59

2. upon the filing of [the] petition, a temporary restraining

order be issued enjoining the respondents from publishing and
posting Manila City Ordinance No. 8187 and/or posting of Manila
City Ordinance No. 8187; and/or taking any steps to
implementing (sic) and/or enforce the same and after due hearing,
the temporary restraining order be converted to a permanent
injunction;
3. xxx Manila City Ordinance 8187 [be declared] as null and
void for being repugnant to the Constitution and existing
municipal laws and international covenants;
4. xxx the respondents [be ordered] to refrain from enforcing
and/or implementing Manila City Ordinance No. 8187;
5. x x x respondent City Mayor Alfredo S. Lim [be enjoined]
from issuing any permits (business or otherwise) to all industries
whose allowable uses are anchored under the provisions of Manila
Ordinance No. 8187; and
6. x x x respondent Mayor of Manila Alfredo S. Lim [be
ordered] to comply with the Order of the Honorable Court in G.R.
156052 dated February 13, 2008.60

The Respondents Position
on the Consolidated Petitions

Respondent former Mayor Lim

In his Memorandum,61 former Mayor Lim, through the
City Legal Officer, attacks the petitioners lack of legal
standing to sue. He likewise points out that the petitioners
failed to observe the principle of hierarchy of courts.
Maintaining that Ordinance No. 8187 is valid and
constitutional, he expounds on the following arguments:
On the procedural issues, he contends that: (1) it is the
function of the Sangguniang Panlungsod to enact zoning
_______________
60 Id., at pp. 5859.

61 Rollo in G.R. No. 187916, Vol. IV, pp. 18461926.
60

ordinances, for which reason, it may proceed to amend or

repeal Ordinance No. 8119 without prior referral to the
Manila Zoning Board of Adjustment and Appeals (MZBAA)
as prescribed under Section 80 (Procedure for ReZoning)
and the City Planning and Development Office (CPDO)
pursuant to Section 81 (Amendments to the Zoning
Ordinance) of Ordinance No. 8119, especially when the
action actually originated from the Sangguniang
Panlungsod itself; (2) the Sangguniang Panlungsod may,
in the later ordinance, expressly repeal all or part of the
zoning ordinance sought to be modified; and (3) the
provision repealing Section 23 of Ordinance No. 8119 is not
violative of Section 26, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution,
which requires that every bill must embrace only one
subject and that such shall be expressed in the title.
On the substantive issues, he posits that the petitions
are based on unfounded fears; that the assailed ordinance
is a valid exercise of police power; that it is consistent with
the general welfare clause and public policy, and is not
unreasonable; that it does not run contrary to the
Constitution, municipal laws, and international
conventions; and that the petitioners failed to overcome the
presumption of validity of the assailed ordinance.

Respondents Vice Mayor Domagoso and the City
Councilors who voted in favor of the assailed
ordinance

On 14 September 2012, after the Court gave the
respondents several chances to submit their
62
Memorandum, they,
_______________
62 Resolutions dated 20 October 2009, Rollo in G.R. No. 187916, Vol. I

(no proper pagination, should be pp. 319320); 15 June 2010, Rollo in G.R.
No. 187916, Vol. IV, pp. 19791980; 31 August 2010, Rollo in G.R. No. No.
187916, Vol. IV, pp. 20022003; 31 May 2011, Rollo in G.R. No. 187916,
Vol. V, pp. 23472348; and 17 July 2012, Rollo in G.R. No. 187836, Vol. VI,
pp. 27462747.
61
VOL. 742, NOVEMBER 25, 2014 61

through the Secretary of the Sangguniang Panlungsod,

prayed that the Court dispense with the filing thereof.
In their Comment,63 however, respondents offered a
position essentially similar to those proffered by former
Mayor Lim.

The Intervenors Position
on the Consolidated Petitions

On the other hand, the oil companies sought the
outright dismissal of the petitions based on alleged
procedural infirmities, among others, incomplete requisites
of judicial review, violation of the principle of hierarchy of
courts, improper remedy, submission of a defective
verification and certification against forum shopping, and
forum shopping.
As to the substantive issues, they maintain, among
others, that the assailed ordinance is constitutional and
valid; that the Sangguniang Panlalawigan is in the best
position to determine the needs of its constituents; that it is
a valid exercise of legislative power; that it does not violate
health and environmentrelated provisions of the
Constitution, laws, and international conventions and
treaties to which the Philippines is a party; that the oil
depots are not likely targets of terrorists; that the scaling
down of the operations in Pandacan pursuant to the MOU
has been followed; and that the people are safe in view of
the safety measures installed in the Pandacan terminals.
Incidentally, in its Manifestation dated 30 November
2010,64 Petron informed the Court that it will cease [the]
operation of its petroleum product storage facilities65 in
the Pandacan oil terminal not later than January 2016 on
account of the following:
_______________
63 Rollo in G.R. No. 187916, Vol. I, pp. 282300.

64 Id., Vol. IV, pp. 21282132.
65 Id., at p. 2129.
62

2.01. Environmental issues, many of which are unfounded,

continually crop up and tarnish the Companys image.
2.02. The location of its Pandacan terminal is continually
threatened, and made uncertain preventing longterm planning,
by the changing local government composition. Indeed, the
relevant zoning ordinances have been amended three (3) times,
and their validity subjected to litigation.66
Intervening Events

On 28 August 2012, while the Court was awaiting the
submission of the Memorandum of respondents Vice Mayor
Domagoso and the councilors who voted in favor of the
assailed Ordinance, the Sangguniang Panlungsod, which
composition had already substantially changed, enacted
Ordinance No. 828367 entitled AN ORDINANCE
AMENDING SECTION 2
_______________
66 Id.
67 Id., Vol. V, pp. 26612662.
The new Ordinance reads:
ORDINANCE NO. 8283
AN ORDINANCE AMENDING SECTION 2 OF ORDINANCE NO.
8187 BY RECLASSIFYING THE AREA WHERE PETROLEUM
REFINERIES AND OIL DEPOTS ARE LOCATED FROM HEAVY
INDUSTRIAL
(13) TO HIGH INTENSITY COMMERCIAL/MIXED USE ZONE
(C3/MXD)
Be it ordained by the City Council of Manila, in session, assembled,
THAT:
SEC. 1. Section 2 of Ordinance No. 8187 shall be amended to read as
follows:
SEC. 2. The land use where the existing industries are located, the
operation of which are permitted under Section 1 hereof, are hereby
classified as

63
VOL. 742, NOVEMBER 25, 2014 63

OF ORDINANCE NO. 8187 BY RECLASSIFYING THE

AREA WHERE PETROLEUM REFINERIES AND OIL
DEPOTS ARE LOCATED FROM HEAVY INDUSTRIAL
(13) TO HIGH INTENSITY COMMERCIAL/MIXED USE
ZONE (C3/MXD).
The new ordinance essentially amended the assailed
ordinance to exclude the area where petroleum refineries
and oil depots are located from the Industrial Zone.
_______________
Industrial Zone except the area where petroleum refineries and

oil depots are located, which shall be classified as High Intensity
Commercial/Mixed Use Zone (C3/MXD).
SEC. 2. Owners or operators of petroleum refineries and oil depots,
the operation of which are no longer permitted under Section 1 hereof, are
hereby given a period until the end of January 2016 within which to
relocate the operation of their businesses.
SEC. 3. The City Planning and Development Office shall prepare an
amended zoning map and zoning boundaries which shall be submitted to
the City Council for review.
SEC. 4. All ordinances or provisions which are inconsistent with the
provisions of this Ordinance are hereby repealed, amended, rescinded or
modified accordingly.
SEC. 5. This Ordinance shall take effect fifteen (15) days after its
publication in accordance with law.
This Ordinance was finally enacted by the City Council of Manila on
August 28, 2012.
PRESIDED BY:
FRANCISCO Isko Moreno DOMAGOSO
Vice Mayor and Presiding Officer
City Council, Manila
64

Ordinance No. 8283 thus permits the operation of the

industries operating within the Industrial Zone. However,
the oil companies, whose oil depots are located in the High
Intensity Commercial/Mixed Use Zone (C3/MXD), are given
until the end of January 2016 within which to relocate
their terminals.
Former Mayor Lim, who was then the incumbent mayor,
did not support the amendment. Maintaining that the
removal of the oil depots was prejudicial to public welfare,
and, on account of the pending cases in the Supreme Court,
he vetoed Ordinance No. 8283 on 11 September 2012.68
On 28 November 2012, former Mayor Lim filed a
Manifestation informing this Court that the Sangguniang
Panlungsod voted to override the veto, and that he, in turn,
returned it again with his veto. He likewise directed the
Sangguniang Panlungsod to append his written reasons for
his veto of the Ordinance, so that the same will be
forwarded to the President for his consideration in the
event that his veto is overridden again.69
On 11 December 2012, Shell also filed a similar
Manifestation.70
Meanwhile, three days after former Mayor Lim vetoed
the new ordinance, Atty. Luch R. Gempis, Jr. (Atty.
Gempis), Secretary of the Sangguniang Panlungsod,
writing on behalf of respondents Vice Mayor Domagoso and
the City Councilors of Manila who voted in favor of the
assailed Ordinance, finally complied with this Courts
Resolution dated 17 July 2012
_______________
68 Id., at p. 2662.
The bottom portion of Ordinance No. 8283 reads:
BY HIS HONOR, THE MAYOR ON 11 Sept. 2012,
I veto this Ordinance for being prejudicial to public welfare and in view
of the pending cases in the Supreme Court (G.R. No. 187836 and G.R. No.
187916)
69 Id., at pp. 25162518.
70 Id., at pp. 25262534.
65
VOL. 742, NOVEMBER 25, 2014 65

reiterating its earlier directives71 to submit the said

respondents Memorandum.
In his Compliance/Explanation with Urgent
72
Manifestation dated 13 September 2012, Atty. Gempis
explained that it was not his intention to show disrespect
to this Court or to delay or prejudice the disposition of the
cases.
According to him, he signed the Comment prepared by
respondents Vice Mayor and the City Councilors only to
attest that the pleading was personally signed by the
respondents. He clarified that he was not designated as the
legal counsel of the respondents as, in fact, he was of the
impression that, pursuant to Section 481(b)(3) of the Local
Government Code,73
_______________
71 Resolutions dated 20 October 2009, Rollo in G.R. No. 187916, Vol. I

(no proper pagination, should be pp. 319320); 15 June 2010, Rollo in G.R.
No. 187916, Vol. IV, pp. 19791980; 31 August 2010, Rollo in G.R. No.
187916, Vol. IV, pp. 20022003; 31 May 2011, Rollo in G.R. No. 187916,
Vol. V, pp. 23472348; and 17 July 2012, Rollo in G.R. No. 187836, Vol. VI,
pp. 27462747.
72 Rollo in G.R. No. 187916, Vol. IV, pp. 24952503.
73 SECTION 481. Qualifications, Term Powers and Duties.
xxx
xxxx
(b) The legal officer, the chief legal counsel of the local government
unit, shall take charge of the office for legal services and shall:
xxxx
(3) In addition to the foregoing duties and functions, the legal officer
shall:
(i) Represent the local government unit in all civil actions and special
proceedings wherein the local government unit or any official thereof, in
his official capacity, is a party: Provided, That, in actions or proceedings
where a component city or municipality is a party adverse to the
provincial government or to another component city or municipality, a
special legal officer may be employed to represent the adverse party.
66

it is the City Legal Officer who is authorized to

represent the local government unit or any official thereof
in a litigation. It was for the same reason that he thought
that the filing of a Memorandum may already be dispensed
with when the City Legal Officer filed its own on 8
February 2010. He further explained that the Ordinance
subject of these cases was passed during the 7th Council
(20072010); that the composition of the 8th Council (2010
2013) had already changed after the 2010 elections; and
that steps were already taken to amend the ordinance
again. Hence, he was in a dilemma as to the position of the
Sangguniang Panlungsod at the time he received the
Courts Resolution of 31 May 2011.
Atty. Gempis, thus, prayed that the Court dispense with
the filing of the required memorandum in view of the
passing of Ordinance No. 8283.

Issue

The petitioners arguments are primarily anchored on
the ruling of the Court in G.R. No. 156052 declaring
Ordinance No. 8027 constitutional and valid after finding
that the presence of the oil terminals in Pandacan is a
threat to the life and security of the people of Manila. From
thence, the petitioners enumerated constitutional
provisions, municipal laws and international treaties and
conventions on health and environment protection
allegedly violated by the enactment of the assailed
Ordinance to support their position.
The resolution of the present controversy is, thus,
confined to the determination of whether or not the
enactment of the assailed Ordinance allowing the
continued stay of the oil companies in the depots is, indeed,
invalid and unconstitutional.
67
VOL. 742, NOVEMBER 25, 2014 67

Our Ruling

We see no reason why Ordinance No. 8187 should not be
stricken down insofar as the presence of the oil depots in
Pandacan is concerned.

I

We first rule on the procedural issues raised by the
respondents and the oil companies.
At the outset, let it be emphasized that the Court, in
G.R. No. 156052, has already pronounced that the matter
of whether or not the oil depots should remain in the
Pandacan area is of transcendental importance to the
residents of Manila.74
We may, thus, brush aside procedural infirmities, if any,
as we had in the past, and take cognizance of the cases75 if
only to determine if the acts complained of are no longer
within the bounds of the Constitution and the laws in
place.76
_______________
74 Supra note 8 at p. 679; p. 112.
In that case, the Court held:
xxx [The DOE] seeks to intervene in order to represent the interests of
the members of the public who stand to suffer if the Pandacan Terminals
operations are discontinued. x x x Suffice it to say at this point that, for
the purpose of hearing all sides and considering the transcendental
importance of this case, we will also allow DOEs intervention.
(Emphasis supplied)
75 Santiago v. COMELEC, 336 Phil. 848, 880; 270 SCRA 106, 135
(1997), citing Kilosbayan, Inc. v. Guingona, G.R. No. 113375, 5 May 1994,
232 SCRA 110, 134, further citing the landmark Emergency Powers Cases
(Araneta v. Dinglasan, 84 Phil. 368 [1949]).
76 Basco v. Phil. Amusements and Gaming Corporation, 274 Phil. 323,
335; 197 SCRA 52, 60 (1991), citing Kapatiran ng mga
68

Put otherwise, there can be no valid objection to this

Courts discretion to waive one or some procedural
requirements if only to remove any impediment to address
and resolve the serious constitutional question77 raised in
these petitions of transcendental importance, the same
having farreaching implications insofar as the safety and
general welfare of the residents of Manila, and even its
neighboring communities, are concerned.

Proper Remedy

Respondents and intervenors argue that the petitions
should be outrightly dismissed for failure on the part of the
petitioners to properly apply related provisions of the
Constitution, the Rules of Court, and/or the Rules of
Procedure for Environmental Cases relative to the
appropriate remedy available to them.
To begin with, questioned is the applicability of Rule
78
65 of the Rules of Court to assail the validity and
constitutionality of the Ordinance.
_______________
Naglilingkod sa Pamahalaan ng Pilipinas, Inc. v. Tan, 246 Phil. 380,

385; 163 SCRA 371, 378 (1988).
77 Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. v.
Secretary of Agrarian Reform, 256 Phil. 777, 798; 175 SCRA 343, 365
(1989).
78 Sections 1 to 3, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, provides:
Section 1. Petition for certiorari.When any tribunal, board or
officer exercising judicial or quasijudicial functions has acted without or
in excess its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, or any
plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a
person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court,
alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered
annulling or modifying the proceedings of such tribunal, board or officer,
and granting such incidental reliefs as law and justice may require.
69
VOL. 742, NOVEMBER 25, 2014 69

there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate

remedy in the ordinary course of law

Rule 65 specifically requires that the remedy may be
availed of only when there is no appeal, or any plain,
speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
law.79
_______________
xxxx
Section 2. Petition for prohibition.When the proceedings of any
tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person, whether exercising judicial,
quasijudicial or ministerial functions, are without or in excess of its or his
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy, and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved
thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts
with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered commanding the
respondent to desist from further proceedings in the action or matter
specified therein, or otherwise granting such incidental reliefs as law and
justice may require.
xxxx
Section 3. Petition for mandamus.When any tribunal, corporation,
board, officer or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act
which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust,
or station, or unlawfully excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a
right or office to which such other is entitled, and there is no other plain,
speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, the person
aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging
the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered
commanding the respondent, immediately or at some other time to be
specified by the court, to do the act required to be done to protect the
rights of the petitioner, and to pay the damages sustained by the
petitioner by reason of the wrongful acts of the respondent.
79 Id.
70

Shell argues that the petitioners should have sought

recourse before the first and second level courts under the
Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases,80 which
govern the enforcement or violations of environmental and
other related laws, rules and regulations.81 Petron
additionally submits that the most adequate remedy
available to petitioners is to have the assailed ordinance
repealed by the Sangguniang Panlungsod. In the
alternative, a local referendum may be had. And, assuming
that there were laws violated, the petitioners may file an
action for each alleged violation of law against the
particular individuals that transgressed the law.
It would appear, however, that the remedies identified
by the intervenors prove to be inadequate to resolve the
present controversies in their entirety owing to the
intricacies of the circumstances herein prevailing.
The scope of the Rules of Procedure for Environmental
Cases is embodied in Sec. 2, Part I, Rule I thereof. It states
that the Rules shall govern the procedure in civil, criminal
and special civil actions before the Metropolitan Trial
Courts, Municipal Trial Courts in Cities, Municipal Trial
Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts, and the
Regional Trial Courts involving enforcement or violations
of environmental and other related laws, rules and
regulations such as but not limited to the following:
(k) R.A. No. 6969, Toxic Substances and Hazardous

Waste Act;
xxxx
(r) R.A. No. 8749, Clean Air Act;
xxxx
(y) Provisions in C.A. No. 141, x x x; and other existing
laws that relate to the conservation, develop
_______________
80 Resolution dated 13 April 2010 in A.M. No. 0968SC.

81 Sec. 2, Part I, Rule I, Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases.
71
VOL. 742, NOVEMBER 25, 2014 71

ment, preservation, protection and utilization of the

environment and natural resources.82 (Emphasis supplied)
Notably, the aforesaid Rules are limited in scope. While,

indeed, there are allegations of violations of environmental
laws in the petitions, these only serve as collateral attacks
that would support the other position of the petitioners
the protection of the right to life, security and safety.
Moreover, it bears emphasis that the promulgation of
the said Rules was specifically intended to meet the
following objectives:
SEC. 3. Objectives.The objectives of these Rules are:

(a) To protect and advance the constitutional right of the
people to a balanced and healthful ecology;
(b) To provide a simplified, speedy and inexpensive procedure
for the enforcement of environmental rights and duties recognized
under the Constitution, existing laws, rules and regulations, and
international agreements;
(c) To introduce and adopt innovations and best practices
ensuring the effective enforcement of remedies and redress for
violation of environmental laws; and
(d) To enable the courts to monitor and exact compliance with
orders and judgments in environmental cases.83

Surely, the instant petitions are not within the
contemplation of these Rules.
_______________
82 Id.
83 Sec. 3, Part I, Rule I, Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases.
72

Relative to the position of Petron, it failed to consider

that these petitions are already a sequel to G.R. No.
156052, and that there are some issues herein raised that
the remedies available at the level of the Sangguniang
Panlungsod could not address. Neither could the filing of
an individual action for each law violated be harmonized
with the essence of a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy.
From another perspective, Shell finds fault with the
petitioners direct recourse to this Court when, pursuant to
Section 5, Article VIII of the Constitution, the Supreme
Court exercises only appellate jurisdiction over cases
involving the constitutionality or validity of an ordinance.84
Thus:
Section 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following

powers:
xxxx
2. Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or
certiorari, as the law or the Rules of Court may provide, final
judgments and orders of lower courts in:
a. All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of
any treaty, international or executive agreement, law,
presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance,
or regulation is in question. (Emphasis supplied)

To further support its position, it cites the case of Liga
ng mga Barangay National v. City Mayor of Manila,85
where the petitioners sought the nullification of the
mayors executive order and the councils ordinance
concerning certain functions of the petitioners that are
vested in them by law. There, the Court held:
_______________
84 Rollo in G.R. No. 187916, Vol. IV, pp. 22022203. Memorandum of

Shell, citing Ortega v. Quezon City Government, 506 Phil. 373; 469 SCRA
388 (2005).
85 465 Phil. 529; 420 SCRA 562 (2004).
73
VOL. 742, NOVEMBER 25, 2014 73

Second, although the instant petition is styled as a petition for

certiorari, in essence, it seeks the declaration by this Court of the
unconstitutionality or illegality of the questioned ordinance and
executive order. It, thus, partakes of the nature of a petition for
declaratory relief over which this Court has only appellate, not
original, jurisdiction.86 Section 5, Article VIII of the Constitution
provides: xxx
As such, this petition must necessary fail, as this Court does
not have original jurisdiction over a petition for declaratory relief
even if only questions of law are involved.87

Assuming that a petition for declaratory relief is the
proper remedy, and that the petitions should have been
filed with the Regional Trial Court, we have, time and
again, resolved to treat such a petition as one for
prohibition, provided that the case has farreaching
implications and transcendental issues that need to be
resolved,88 as in these present petitions.
On a related issue, we initially found convincing the
argument that the petitions should have been filed with the
Regional Trial Court, it having concurrent jurisdiction with
this Court over a special civil action for prohibition, and
original jurisdiction over petitions for declaratory relief.
However, as we have repeatedly said, the petitions at
bar are of transcendental importance warranting a
relaxation of
_______________
86 Id., at p. 541; p. 571, citing Philnabank Employees Association v.

Estanislao, G.R. No. 104209, 16 November 1993, 227 SCRA 804, 811.
87 Id., at p. 542; p. 572, citing Tano v. Socrates, 343 Phil. 670, 698; 278
SCRA 154, 172 (1997); Macasiano v. National Housing Authority, G.R. No.
107921, 1 July 1993, 224 SCRA 236, 243.
88 Aquino v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 189793, 7 April 2010, 617 SCRA
623, 638, citing Del Mar v. Phil. Amusement and Gaming Corp., 400 Phil.
307; 346 SCRA 485 (2000) and Fortich v. Corona, 352 Phil. 461; 298 SCRA
679 (1998).
74

the doctrine of hierarchy of courts.89 In the case of

Jaworski v. PAGCOR,90 the Court ratiocinated:
Granting arguendo that the present action cannot be properly

treated as a petition for prohibition, the transcendental
importance of the issues involved in this case warrants
that we set aside the technical defects and take primary
jurisdiction over the petition at bar. x x x This is in
accordance with the wellentrenched principle that rules
of procedure are not inflexible tools designed to hinder or
delay, but to facilitate and promote the administration of
justice. Their strict and rigid application, which would
result in technicalities that tend to frustrate, rather than
promote substantial justice, must always be eschewed.
(Emphasis supplied)
persons aggrieved thereby

As to who may file a petition for certiorari, prohibition or
mandamus, Petron posits that petitioners are not among
the persons aggrieved contemplated under Sections 1 to 3
of Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
Chevron argues that petitioners, whether as citizens,
taxpayers, or legislators, lack the legal standing to assail
the validity and constitutionality of Ordinance No. 8187. It
further claims that petitioners failed to show that they
have suffered any injury and/or threatened injury as a
result of the act complained of.91
_______________
89 Del Mar v. Phil. Amusement and Gaming Corp., id.; Jaworski v.

Phil. Amusement and Gaming Corp., 464 Phil. 375, 384; 419 SCRA 317,
323 (2004).
90 Jaworski v. Phil. Amusement and Gaming Corp., id., at p. 385; pp.
323324.
91 Rollo in G.R. No. 187916, Vol. IV, p. 2100. Memorandum of
Chevron.
75
VOL. 742, NOVEMBER 25, 2014 75

Shell also points out that the petitions cannot be

considered taxpayers suit, for then, there should be a claim
that public funds were illegally disbursed and that
petitioners have sufficient interest concerning the
prevention of illegal expenditure of public money.92 In G.R.
No. 187916, Shell maintains that the petitioners failed to
show their personal interest in the case and/or to establish
that they may represent the general sentiments of the
constituents of the City of Manila so as to be treated as a
class suit. Even the minors, it argues, are not numerous
and representative enough for the petition to be treated as
a class suit. As to the city councilors who joined the
petitioners in assailing the validity of Ordinance No. 8187,
Shell posits that they cannot invoke the ruling in Prof.
David v. Pres. MacapagalArroyo,93 where the Court held
that legislators may question the constitutionality of a
statute, if and when it infringes upon their prerogatives as
legislators, because of the absence of the allegation that the
assailed ordinance indeed infringes upon their
prerogatives.
Former Mayor Lim submitted a similar position
supported by a number of cases on the concept of locus
standi,94 the di
_______________
Chevron relied on the ruling in Automotive Industry Workers Alliance v.

Romulo, 489 Phil. 710, 718; 449 SCRA 1, 10 (2005), where the Court held:
For a citizen to have standing, he must establish that he has suffered
some actual or threatened injury as a result of the allegedly illegal
conduct of the government; the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged
action; and the injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable action.
92 Id., at p. 2222. Memorandum of Shell, citing Velarde v. Social
Justice Society, G.R. No. 159357, 28 April 2004, 428 SCRA 283 and
Kilosbayan, Inc. v. Morato, 320 Phil. 171; 246 SCRA 540 (1995).
93 522 Phil. 705; 489 SCRA 160 (2006).
94 Rollo in G.R. No. 187916, Vol. IV, p. 1859; citing Francisco, Jr. v.
House of Representatives, 460 Phil. 830; 415 SCRA 44 (2003).
76

rect injury test,95 an outline of the stringent

requirements of legal standing when suing as a citizen,96 as
a taxpayer,97 as a legislator and in cases where class suits
are filed in behalf of all citizens.98
Their arguments are misplaced.
In G.R. No. 156052, we ruled that the petitioners in that
case have a legal right to seek the enforcement of
Ordinance No. 8027 because the subject of the petition
concerns a public right, and they, as residents of Manila,
have a direct interest in the implementation of the
ordinances of the city. Thus:
To support the assertion that petitioners have a clear legal

right to the enforcement of the ordinance, petitioner SJS states
that it is a political party registered with the Commission on
Elections and has its offices in Manila. It claims to have many
members who are residents of Manila. The other petitioners,
Cabigao and Tumbokon, are allegedly residents of Manila.
We need not belabor this point. We have ruled in previous
cases that when a mandamus proceeding concerns a public right
and its object is to compel a public duty, the people who are
interested in the execution of the laws are regarded as the real
partiesininterest and they need not show any specific interest.
Besides, as residents of Manila, petitioners have a direct interest
in the enforcement of the citys ordinances.99 x x x (Citations
omitted)
_______________
95 Id., citing Tolentino v. COMELEC, 465 Phil. 385; 420 SCRA 438
(2004).
96 Rollo in G.R. No. 187916, Vol. IV, pp. 18581859, citing Francisco,
Jr. v. House of Representatives, supra note 94.
97 Id.; Velarde v. Social Justice Society, supra note 92.
98 Id., at p. 1863, citing Oposa v. Factoran, Jr., G.R. No. 101083, 30
July 1993, 224 SCRA 792.
99 Supra note 8 at pp. 492493; p. 665.
77
VOL. 742, NOVEMBER 25, 2014 77

No different are herein petitioners who seek to prohibit

the enforcement of the assailed ordinance, and who deal
with the same subject matter that concerns a public right.
Necessarily, the people who are interested in the
nullification of such an ordinance are themselves the real
partiesininterest, for which reason, they are no longer
required to show any specific interest therein. Moreover, it
is worth mentioning that SJS, now represented by SJS
Officer Alcantara, has been recognized by the Court in G.R.
No. 156052 to have legal standing to sue in connection with
the same subject matter herein considered. The rest of the
petitioners are residents of Manila. Hence, all of them have
a direct interest in the prohibition proceedings against the
enforcement of the assailed ordinance.
In the case of Initiatives for Dialogue and Empowerment
through Alternative Legal Services, Inc. (IDEALS, Inc.) v.
Power Sector Assets and Liabilities Management
Corporation (PSALM),100 involving a petition for certiorari
and prohibition to permanently enjoin PSALM from selling
the Angat HydroElectric Power Plant (AHEPP) to Korea
Water Resources Corporation (KWater), the Court ruled:
Legal standing or locus standi has been defined as a personal
and substantial interest in the case such that the party has
sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the
governmental act that is being challenged, alleging more than a
generalized grievance. x x x This Court, however, has adopted a
liberal attitude on the locus standi of a petitioner where the
petitioner is able to craft an issue of transcendental significance
to the people, as when the issues raised are of paramount
importance to the public. Thus, when the proceeding involves
the assertion of a public right, the mere fact that the
petitioner is a citizen satisfies the requirement of personal
interest.
_______________
100 G.R. No. 192088, 9 October 2012, 682 SCRA 602.
78

There can be no doubt that the matter of ensuring adequate

water supply for domestic use is one of paramount importance to
the public. That the continued availability of potable water in
Metro Manila might be compromised if PSALM proceeds with the
privatization of the hydroelectric power plant in the Angat Dam
Complex confers upon petitioners such personal stake in the
resolution of legal issues in a petition to stop its
implementation.101 (Emphasis supplied; citations omitted)

In like manner, the preservation of the life, security and
safety of the people is indisputably a right of utmost
importance to the public. Certainly, the petitioners, as
residents of Manila, have the required personal interest to
seek relief from this Court to protect such right.
in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
Petron takes issue with the alleged failure of the
petitioners to establish the facts with certainty that would
show that the acts of the respondents fall within the
parameters of the grave abuse of discretion clause settled
by jurisprudence, to wit:
xxx [G]rave abuse of discretion means such capricious and

whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of
jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be grave as where the
power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of
passion or personal hostility and must be so patent and gross as
to amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to
per
_______________
101 Id., at pp. 633634.
79
VOL. 742, NOVEMBER 25, 2014 79

form the duty enjoined by or to act all in contemplation of

law.102

It is pointless to discuss the matter at length in these
instant cases of transcendental importance in view of the
Courts pronouncement, in Magallona v. Ermita.103 There
it held that the writs of certiorari and prohibition are
proper remedies to test the constitutionality of statutes,
notwithstanding the following defects:
In praying for the dismissal of the petition on preliminary

grounds, respondents seek a strict observance of the offices of the
writs of certiorari and prohibition, noting that the writs
cannot issue absent any showing of grave abuse of
discretion in the exercise of judicial, quasijudicial or
ministerial powers on the part of respondents and resulting
prejudice on the part of petitioners.
Respondents submission holds true in ordinary civil
proceedings. When this Court exercises its constitutional power of
judicial review, however, we have, by tradition, viewed the writs
of certiorari and prohibition as proper remedial vehicles to test
the constitutionality of statutes, and indeed, of acts of other
branches of government. Issues of constitutional import
xxx carry such relevance in the life of this nation that the
Court inevitably finds itself constrained to take
cognizance of the case and pass upon the issues raised,
noncompliance with the letter of pro
_______________
102 Rollo in G.R. No. 187836, Vol. V, pp. 21442145. Memorandum of

Petron, citing Aduan v. Chong, G.R. No. 172796, 13 July 2009, 592 SCRA
508; see also Taada v. Angara, 338 Phil. 546; 272 SCRA 18 (1997); Duero
v. Court of Appeals, 424 Phil. 12; 373 SCRA 11 (2002); D.M. Consunji v.
Esguerra, 328 Phil. 1168; 260 SCRA 74 (1996); and Planters Products, Inc.
v. Court of Appeals, 271 Phil. 592; 193 SCRA 563 (1991), citing Carson v.
Pantanosas, Jr., 259 Phil. 628; 180 SCRA 151 (1989).
103 G.R. No. 187167, 16 August 2011, 655 SCRA 476.
80

cedural rules notwithstanding. The statute sought to be

reviewed here is one such law.104 (Emphasis supplied; citations
omitted)

Requisites of judicial review

For a valid exercise of the power of judicial review, the
following requisites shall concur: (1) the existence of a legal
controversy; (2) legal standing to sue of the party raising
the constitutional question; (3) a plea that judicial review
be exercised at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the
constitutional question is the lis mota of the case.105
Only the first two requisites are put in issue in these
cases.
On the matter of the existence of a legal controversy, we
reject the contention that the petitions consist of bare
allegations based on speculations, surmises, conjectures
and hypothetical grounds.
The Court declared Ordinance No. 8027 valid and
constitutional and ordered its implementation. With the
passing of the new ordinance containing the contrary
provisions, it cannot be any clearer that here lies an actual
case or controversy for judicial review. The allegation on
this, alone, is sufficient for the purpose.
The second requisite has already been exhaustively
discussed.
_______________
104 Id., at pp. 487488.

105 IBP v. Zamora, 392 Phil. 618, 632; 338 SCRA 81, 99 (2000), citing
Philippine Constitution Association v. Enriquez, G.R. Nos. 113105,
113174, 113766 and 113888, 19 August 1994, 235 SCRA 506, citing Luz
Farms v. Secretary of the Department of Agrarian Reform, G.R. No. 86889,
4 December 1990, 192 SCRA 51; Dumlao v. Commission on Elections, 184
Phil. 369; 95 SCRA 392 (1980); and People v. Vera, 65 Phil. 56 (1937).
81
VOL. 742, NOVEMBER 25, 2014 81
Proof of identification required in the notarization of

the verification and certification against forum
shopping in G.R. No. 187916

At the bottom of the Verification and Certification
against Forum Shopping of the petition in G.R. No. 187916
is the statement of the notary public to the effect that the
affiant, in his presence and after presenting an integrally
competent proof of identification with signature and
photograph,106 signed the document under oath.
Citing Sec. 163 of the Local Government Code,107 which
provides that an individual acknowledging any document
before a notary public shall present his Community Tax
Certificate (CTC), Chevron posits that the petitioners
failure to present his CTC rendered the petition fatally
defective warranting the outright dismissal of the petition.
We disagree.
_______________
106 Rollo in G.R. No. 187916, Vol. I, p. 62. Urgent Petition for
107 Rollo in G.R. No. 187916, Vol. IV, p. 2097.
Sec. 163. Presentation of Community Tax Certificate on Certain
Occasions.(a) When an individual subject to the community tax
acknowledges any document before a notary public, takes the oath
of office upon election or appointment to any position in the government
service; receives any license, certificate, or permit from any public
authority; pays any tax or fee; receives any money from any public fund;
transacts other official business; or receives any salary or wage from any
person or corporation, it shall be the duty of any person, officer or
corporation with whom such transaction is made or business done or from
whom any salary or wage is received to require such individual to exhibit
the community tax certificate. x x x. (Emphasis and underscoring in
the Memorandum of Chevron)
82

The verification and certification against forum

shopping are governed specifically by Sections 4 and 5,
Rule 7 of the Rules of Court.
Section 4 provides that a pleading, when required to be
verified, shall be treated as an unsigned pleading if it lacks
a proper verification while Section 5 requires that the
certification to be executed by the plaintiff or principal
party be under oath.
These sections, in turn, should be read together with
Sections 6 and 12, Rule 2 of the 2004 Rules on Notarial
Practice.
Section 6108 of the latter Rules, specifically, likewise
provides that any competent evidence of identity specified
under Section 12 thereof may now be presented before the
notary public, to wit:
SEC. 12. Competent Evidence of Identity.The phrase

competent evidence of identity refers to the identification of an
individual based on:
(a) at least one current identification document issued by an
official agency bearing the photograph and signature of the
individual, such as but not limited to passport, drivers license,
Professional Regulations Commission ID, National Bureau of
Investigation clearance, police clearance, postal ID, voters ID,
_______________
108 Sec. 6. Jurat.Jurat refers to an act in which an individual on

a single occasion:
(a) appears in person before the notary public and presents an
instrument or document;
(b) is personally known to the notary public or identified by the
notary public through competent evidence of identity as defined by these
Rules;
(c) signs the instrument or document in the presence of the notary;
and
(d) takes an oath or affirmation before the notary public as to such
instrument or document.
83
VOL. 742, NOVEMBER 25, 2014 83

Barangay certification, Government Service and Insurance

System (GSIS) ecard, Social Security System (SSS) card,
Philhealth card, senior citizen card, Overseas Workers Welfare
Administration (OWWA) ID, OFW ID, seamans book, alien
certificate of registration/immigrant certificate of registration,
government office ID, certification from the National Council for
the Welfare of Disable Persons (NCWDP), Department of Social
Welfare and Development (DSWD) certification; or
(b) xxx.109

Forum shopping

Shell contends that the petitioners in G.R. No. 187836
violated the rule against forum shopping allegedly because
all the elements thereof are present in relation to G.R. No.
156052, to wit:
1. identity of parties, or at least such parties who
represent the same interests in both actions
According to Shell, the interest of petitioner SJS in G.R.
No. 156052 and the officers of SJS in G.R. No. 187836 are
clearly the same. Moreover, both actions implead the
incumbent mayor of the City of Manila as respondent. Both
then respondent Mayor Atienza in G.R. No. 156052 and
respondent former Mayor Lim in G.R. No. 187836 are sued
in their capacity as Manila mayor.
2. identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the
relief being founded on the same fact(s)
Shell contends that, in both actions, petitioners assert
the same rights to health and to a balanced and healthful
ecology
_______________
109 As amended by Resolution dated 19 February 2008 in A.M. No. 02

813SC.
84

relative to the fate of the Pandacan terminal, and seek

essentially the same reliefs, that is, the removal of the oil
depots from the present site.
3. the identity of the two preceding particulars is such
that any judgment rendered in the pending case, regardless
of which party is successful, would amount to res judicata
in the other
Relative to the filing of the Manifestation and Motion to:
a) Stop the City Council of Manila from further hearing the
amending ordinance to Ordinance No. 8027 x x x
(Manifestation and Motion) and Very Urgent Motion to Stop
the Mayor of the City of Manila from Signing Draft
Ordinance No. 7177 [now Ordinance No. 8187] and to Cite
Him for Contempt if He Would Do So (Urgent Motion) both
in G.R. No. 156052, Shell points out the possibility that the
Court would have rendered conflicting rulings on cases
involving the same facts, parties, issues and reliefs prayed
for.110
We are not persuaded.
In Spouses Cruz v. Spouses Caraos,111 the Court
expounded on the nature of forum shopping. Thus:
Forum shopping is an act of a party, against whom an adverse

judgment or order has been rendered in one forum, of seeking and
possibly getting a favorable opinion in another forum, other than
by appeal or special civil action for certiorari. It may also be the
institution of two or more actions or proceedings grounded on the
same cause on the supposition that one or the other court would
make a favorable disposition. The established rule is that for
forum shopping to exist, both actions must involve the same
transactions, same essential facts and circumstances and must
raise identical causes of actions, subject matter, and issues. xxx
112 (Citations omitted)
_______________
110 Rollo in G.R. No. 187916, Vol. IV, p. 2216.

111 550 Phil. 98; 521 SCRA 510 (2007).
112 Id., at p. 107; pp. 520521.
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VOL. 742, NOVEMBER 25, 2014 85

It bears to stress that the present petitions were initially

filed, not to secure a judgment adverse to the first decision,
but, precisely, to enforce the earlier ruling to relocate the
oil depots from the Pandacan area.
As to the matter of the denial of the petitioners
Manifestation and Urgent Motion in G.R. No. 156052,
which were both incidental to the enforcement of the
decision favorable to them brought about by the
intervening events after the judgment had become final
and executory, and which involve the same Ordinance
assailed in these petitions, we so hold that the filing of the
instant petitions is not barred by res judicata.
In the same case of Spouses Cruz v. Spouses Caraos
involving the refiling of a complaint, which had been
earlier dismissed without qualification that the dismissal
was with prejudice, and which had not been decided on the
merits, the Court declared that such refiling did not
amount to forum shopping. It ratiocinated:
It is not controverted that the allegations of the respective

complaints in both Civil Case No. 951387 and Civil Case No. 96
0225 are similarly worded, and are identical in all relevant
details, including typographical errors, except for the additional
allegations in support of respondents prayer for the issuance of
preliminary injunction in Civil Case No. 951387. It is similarly
not disputed that both actions involve the same transactions;
same essential facts and circumstances; and raise identical causes
of actions, subject matter, and issues.
xxxx
x x x The dismissal of Civil Case No. 951387 was without
prejudice. Indeed, the Order dated 20 November 1995, dismissing
Civil Case No. 951387 was an unqualified dismissal. More
significantly, its dismissal was not based on grounds under
paragraphs (f), (h), and (i) of Section 1 of Rule 16 of the Rules of
Court, which dismissal shall bar the refiling of the same action or
claim as crystallized in Section 5 of Rule 16 thereof, thus:
86

SEC. 5. Effect of dismissal.Subject to the right of appeal,

an order granting a motion to dismiss based on paragraphs (f),
(h), and (i) of section 1 hereof shall bar the refiling of the same
action or claim.
From the foregoing, it is clear that dismissals under
paragraphs (f), (h), and (i) of Section 1 of Rule 16 of the Rules of
Court constitute res judicata, to wit:
(f) That the cause of action is barred by a prior judgment or
by the statute of limitations;
xxxx
(h) That the claim or demand set forth in the plaintiffs
pleading has been paid, waived, abandoned, or otherwise
extinguished;
(i) That the claim on which the action is founded is
unenforceable under the provisions of the statute of frauds.
Res judicata or bar by prior judgment is a doctrine which holds
that a matter that has been adjudicated by a court of competent
jurisdiction must be deemed to have been finally and conclusively
settled if it arises in any subsequent litigation between the same
parties and for the same cause. Res judicata exists when the
following elements are present: (a) the former judgment must be
final; (b) the court which rendered judgment had jurisdiction over
the parties and the subject matter; (3) it must be a judgment
on the merits; and (d) and there must be, between the first and
second actions, identity of parties, subject matter, and cause of
action.113 (Emphasis supplied; citations omitted)

Here, it should be noted that this Court denied the said
Manifestation and Urgent Motion, and refused to act on the
_______________
113 Id., at pp. 108110; pp. 524525.
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VOL. 742, NOVEMBER 25, 2014 87

succeeding pleadings, for being moot.114 Clearly, the

merits of the motion were not considered by the Court. The
following disquisition of the Court in Spouses Cruz v.
Spouses Caraos is further enlightening:
The judgment of dismissal in Civil Case No. 951387 does not

constitute res judicata to sufficiently bar the refiling thereof in
Civil Case No. 960225. As earlier underscored, the dismissal was
one without prejudice. Verily, it was not a judgment on the
merits. It bears reiterating that a judgment on the merits is
one rendered after a determination of which party is right,
as distinguished from a judgment rendered upon some
preliminary or formal or merely technical point. The
dismissal of the case without prejudice indicates the absence of a
decision on the merits and leaves the parties free to litigate the
matter in a subsequent action as though the dismissed action had
not been commenced.115 (Emphasis supplied; citations omitted)

Considering that there is definitely no forum shopping
in the instant cases, we need not discuss in detail the
elements of forum shopping.
II
The Local Government Code of 1991 expressly provides
that the Sangguniang Panlungsod is vested with the power
to reclassify land within the jurisdiction of the city116
subject to the pertinent provisions of the Code. It is also
settled that an ordinance may be modified or repealed by
another ordinance.117 These have been properly applied in
G.R. No.
_______________
114 Rollo in G.R. No. 156052 (no proper pagination, should be p. 1844).
Resolution dated 2 June 2009.
115 Supra note 111 at pp. 110111; p. 525.
116 Section 458(a)(2)(viii), Local Government Code.
117 Tuzon v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 90107, 21 August 1992, 212
SCRA 739, 747.
88

156052, where the Court upheld the position of the

Sangguniang Panlungsod to reclassify the land subject of
the Ordinance,118 and declared that the mayor has the duty
to enforce Ordinance No. 8027, provided that it has not
been repealed by the Sangguniang Panlungsod or
otherwise annulled by the courts.119 In the same case, the
Court also used the principle that the Sangguniang
Panlungsod is in the best position to determine the needs
of its constituents120 that the removal of the oil depots
from the Pandacan area is necessary to protect the
residents of Manila from catastrophic devastation in case of
a terrorist attack on the Pandacan Terminals.121
Do all these principles equally apply to the cases at bar
involving the same subject matter to justify the contrary
provisions of the assailed Ordinance?
We answer in the negative.
We summarize the position of the Sangguniang
Panlungsod on the matter subject of these petitions. In
2001, the Sanggunian found the relocation of the Pandacan
oil depots necessary. Hence, the enactment of Ordinance
No. 8027.
In 2009, when the composition of the Sanggunian had
already changed, Ordinance No. 8187 was passed in favor
of the retention of the oil depots. In 2012, again when some
of the previous members were no longer reelected, but with
the Vice Mayor still holding the same seat, and pending the
resolution of these petitions, Ordinance No. 8283 was
enacted to give the oil depots until the end of January 2016
within which to transfer to another site. Former Mayor
Lim stood his ground and vetoed the last ordinance.
_______________
118 Social Justice Society v. Atienza, Jr., applying Section 458(a)(2)
(viii) of the Local Government Code.
119 Supra note 8 at p. 493; pp. 665666, citing supra note 116.
120 Id., at p. 703; p. 139.
121 Id., at p. 702; p. 138.
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VOL. 742, NOVEMBER 25, 2014 89

In its Comment, the 7th Council (20072010) alleged that

the assailed Ordinance was enacted to alleviate the
economic condition of its constituents.122
Expressing the same position, former Mayor Lim even
went to the extent of detailing the steps123 he took prior to
the signing of the Ordinance, if only to show his honest
intention to make the right decision.
The fact remains, however, that notwithstanding that
the conditions with respect to the operations of the oil
depots
_______________
122 Rollo in G.R. No. 187916, Vol. I, p. 296. Comment of respondents

Vice Mayor Domagoso and the City Councilors who voted in favor of the
assailed Ordinance.
123 Id., Vol. IV, pp. 18521857. Memorandum of former Mayor Lim.
Former Mayor Lim narrated that when he received the draft Ordinance
for his approval, he did not readily act upon it but took the time to
seriously study the pros and cons of enacting the Ordinance; that he
issued Executive Order No. 18 creating an ad hoc panel to conduct a study
thereon; that the Assistant City Treasurer of Manila submitted to him a
list of properties that would be affected by the proposed ordinance and the
real property taxes they paid from 2007 to 2009; that he conducted a
stakeholders consultative meeting composed of some Cabinet Secretaries
and other officials, including the Joint Foreign Chamber of Commerce of
the Philippines; that Engr. Rodolfo H. Catu (Engr. Catu), Officer in
Charge of the City Planning and Development Office, together with the ad
hoc panel earlier created, conducted an ocular inspection of the Pandacan
Terminal, and submitted a favorable recommendation; that he also sought
guidance from His Eminence, Gaudencio Cardinal Rosales; that he
received a profile of the safety and security features installed at the
Pandacan oil depots from Shell; that he likewise personally conducted an
ocular inspection where he was assured by then President Arroyo and her
cabinet secretaries, who happened to visit the site on the same day, that
they interpose no objection to the proposed ordinance; and that the
European Chamber of Commerce expressed support to the ordinance. It
was only then that he made a decision to approve the Ordinance.
90

existing prior to the enactment of Ordinance No. 8027 do

not substantially differ to this day, as would later be
discussed, the position of the Sangguniang Panlungsod on
the matter has thrice changed, largely depending on the
new composition of the council and/or political affiliations.
The foregoing, thus, shows that its determination of the
general welfare of the city does not after all gear towards
the protection of the people in its true sense and meaning,
but is, one way or another, dependent on the personal
preference of the members who sit in the council as to
which particular sector among its constituents it wishes to
favor.
Now that the City of Manila, through the mayor and the
city councilors, has changed its view on the matter,
favoring the citys economicrelated benefits, through the
continued stay of the oil terminals, over the protection of
the very lives and safety of its constituents, it is imperative
for this Court to make a final determination on the basis of
the facts on the table as to which specific right of the
inhabitants of Manila should prevail. For, in this present
controversy, history reveals that there is truly no such
thing as the will of Manila insofar as the general welfare
of the people is concerned.
If in sacrilege, in free translation of Angara124 by Justice
Laurel, we say when the judiciary mediates we do not in
reality nullify or invalidate an act of the Manila
Sangguniang Panlungsod, but only asserts the solemn and
sacred obligation assigned to the Court by the Constitution
to determine conflicting claims of authority under the
Constitution and to establish for the parties in an actual
controversy the rights which that instrument secures and
guarantees to them.

III

The measures taken by the intervenors to lend support
to their position that Manila is now safe despite the
presence of
_______________
124 Angara v. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil. 139, 158 (1936).
91
VOL. 742, NOVEMBER 25, 2014 91

the oil terminals remain ineffective. These have not

completely removed the threat to the lives of the
inhabitants of Manila.
In G.R. No. 156052, the validity and constitutionality of
Ordinance No. 8027 was declared as a guarantee for the
protection of the constitutional right to life of the residents
of Manila. There, the Court said that the enactment of the
said ordinance was a valid exercise of police power with the
concurrence of the two requisites: a lawful subject to
safeguard the rights to life, security and safety of all the
inhabitants of Manila;125 and a lawful method the
enactment of Ordinance No. 8027 reclassifying the land use
from industrial to commercial, which effectively ends the
continued stay of the oil depots in Pandacan.126
In the present petitions, the respondents and the oil
companies plead that the Pandacan Terminal has never
been one of the targets of terrorist attacks;127 that the
petitions were based on unfounded fears and mere
conjectures;128 and that the possibility that it would be
picked by the terrorists is nil given the security measures
installed thereat.129
The intervenors went on to identify the measures taken
to ensure the safety of the people even with the presence of
the Pandacan Terminals. Thus:
1. Chevron claims that it, together with Shell and
Petron, continues to enhance the safety and security
features of the terminals. They likewise adopt fire and
product spill prevention measures in accordance with the
local standards set by the Bureau of Fire Protection, among
others, and with the
_______________
125 Supra note 8.

126 Id., at pp. 704707; p. 140.
127 Rollo in G.R. No. 187916, Vol. IV, pp. 21032104. Memorandum of
Chevron; Rollo in G.R. No. 187836, Vol. V, pp. 22202225. Memorandum of
Petron.
128 Id., at p. 1883. Memorandum of former Mayor Lim.
129 Id., at pp. 22852310. Memorandum of Shell.
92

international standards of the American Petroleum

Industry (API) and the National Fire Prevention and
Safety Association (NFPSA); that since 1914, the oil
depots had not experienced any incident beyond the
ordinary risks and expectations130 of the residents of
Manila; and that it received a passing grade on the safety
measures they installed in the facilities from the
representatives of the City of Manila who conducted an
ocular inspection on 22 May 2009; and
2. Referring to the old MOU entered into between the
City of Manila and the DOE, on the one hand, and the oil
companies, on the other, where the parties thereto
conceded and acknowledged that the scale down option for
the Pandacan Terminal operations is the best alternative
to the relocation of the terminals, Shell enumerates the
steps taken to scale down its operations.
As to the number of main fuel tanks, the entire
Pandacan Terminal has already decommissioned twenty
eight out of sixtyfour tanks. Speaking for Shell alone, its
LPG Spheres, which it claims is the only product that may
cause explosion, was part of those decommissioned, thereby
allegedly removing the danger of explosion. Safety buffer
zones and linear/green parks were likewise created to
separate the terminal from the nearest residential area.
Shells portion of the oil depot is likewise allegedly
equipped with the latest technology to ensure air quality
control and water quality control, and to prevent and cope
with possible oil spills with a crisis management plan in
place in the event that an oil spill occurs. Finally, Shell
claims that the recommendations of EQE International in
its Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA) study, which it
says is one of the leading independent risk assessment
providers in the world and largest risk management
consultancy, were sufficiently complied with; and that, on
its own initiative, it adopted additional measures for the
_______________
130 Id., at p. 2112. Memorandum of Chevron. Emphasis supplied.
93
VOL. 742, NOVEMBER 25, 2014 93
purpose, for which reason, the individual risk level

resulting from any incident occurring from the Pandacan
Terminal, per the QRA study, is twenty (20) times lower
compared to the individual risk level of an average working
or domestic environment.131
We are not persuaded.
The issue of whether or not the Pandacan Terminal is
not a likely target of terrorist attacks has already been
passed upon in G.R. No. 156052. Based on the assessment
of the Committee on Housing, Resettlement and Urban
Development of the City of Manila and the then position of
the Sangguniang Panlungsod,132 the Court was convinced
that the threat of terrorism is imminent. It remains so
convinced.
Even assuming that the respondents and intervenors
were correct, the very nature of the depots where millions
of liters of highly flammable and highly volatile products,
regardless of whether or not the composition may cause
explosions, has no place in a densely populated area.
Surely, any untoward incident in the oil depots, be it
related to terrorism of whatever origin or otherwise, would
definitely cause not only destruction to properties within
and among the neighboring communities but certainly
mass deaths and injuries.
With regard to the scaling down of the operations in the
Pandacan Terminals, which the oil companies continue to
insist to have been validated and recognized by the MOU,
the Court, in G.R. No. 156052, has already put this issue to
rest. It specifically declared that even assuming that the
terms of the MOU and Ordinance No. 8027 were
inconsistent, the resolutions ratifying the MOU gave it full
force and effect only until 30 April 2003.133
_______________
131 Id., at p. 2280. Memorandum of Shell.

132 Supra note 8 at pp. 702703; p. 138.
133 Id., at p. 494; p. 666.
94

The steps taken by the oil companies, therefore, remain
insufficient to convince the Court that the dangers posed by
the presence of the terminals in a thickly populated area
have already been completely removed.
For, given that the threat sought to be prevented may
strike at one point or another, no matter how remote it is
as perceived by one or some, we cannot allow the right to
life to be dependent on the unlikelihood of an event.
Statistics and theories of probability have no place in
situations where the very life of not just an individual but
of residents of big neighborhoods is at stake.
IV
It is the removal of the danger to life not the mere
subdual of risk of catastrophe, that we saw in and made us
favor Ordinance No. 8027. That reason, unaffected by
Ordinance No. 8187, compels the affirmance of our
Decision in G.R. No. 156052.
In striking down the contrary provisions of the assailed
Ordinance relative to the continued stay of the oil depots,
we follow the same line of reasoning used in G.R. No.
156052, to wit:
Ordinance No. 8027 was enacted for the purpose of promoting

sound urban planning, ensuring health, public safety and general
welfare of the residents of Manila. The Sanggunian was impelled
to take measures to protect the residents of Manila from
catastrophic devastation in case of a terrorist attack on the
Pandacan Terminals. Towards this objective, the Sanggunian
reclassified the area defined in the ordinance from industrial to
commercial.
The following facts were found by the Committee on Housing,
Resettlement and Urban Development of the City of Manila which
recommended the approval of the ordinance:
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VOL. 742, NOVEMBER 25, 2014 95

(1) the depot facilities contained 313.5 million liters of highly

flammable and highly volatile products which include petroleum
gas, liquefied petroleum gas, aviation fuel, diesel, gasoline,
kerosene and fuel oil among others;
(2) the depot is open to attack through land, water or air;
(3) it is situated in a densely populated place and near
Malacaan Palace; and
(4) in case of an explosion or conflagration in the depot, the fire
could spread to the neighboring communities.
The ordinance was intended to safeguard the rights to life,
security and safety of all the inhabitants of Manila and not just of
a particular class. The depot is perceived, rightly or wrongly, as a
representation of western interests which means that it is a
terrorist target. As long as it (sic) there is such a target in their
midst, the residents of Manila are not safe. It therefore became
necessary to remove these terminals to dissipate the threat.
According to respondent:
Such a public need became apparent after the 9/11 incident
which showed that what was perceived to be impossible to
happen, to the most powerful country in the world at that, is
actually possible. The destruction of property and the loss of
thousands of lives on that fateful day became the impetus for a
public need. In the aftermath of the 9/11 tragedy, the threats of
terrorism continued [such] that it became imperative for
governments to take measures to combat their effects.
xxxx
Both law and jurisprudence support the constitutionality and
validity of Ordinance No. 8027. Without a doubt, there are no
impediments to its enforcement and implementation. Any delay is
unfair to the inhabitants of
96

the City of Manila and its leaders who have categorically

expressed their desire for the relocation of the terminals. Their
power to chart and control their own destiny and preserve their
lives and safety should not be curtailed by the intervenors
warnings of doomsday scenarios and threats of economic disorder
if the ordinance is enforced.134

The same best interest of the public guides the present
decision. The Pandacan oil depot remains a terrorist target
even if the contents have been lessened. In the absence of
any convincing reason to persuade this Court that the life,
security and safety of the inhabitants of Manila are no
longer put at risk by the presence of the oil depots, we hold
that Ordinance No. 8187 in relation to the Pandacan
Terminals is invalid and unconstitutional.
There is, therefore, no need to resolve the rest of the
issues.
Neither is it necessary to discuss at length the test of
police power against the assailed ordinance. Suffice it to
state that the objective adopted by the Sangguniang
Panlungsod to promote the constituents general welfare in
terms of economic benefits cannot override the very basic
rights to life, security and safety of the people.
In. G.R. No. 156052, the Court explained:
Essentially, the oil companies are fighting for their right to

property. They allege that they stand to lose billions of pesos if
forced to relocate. However, based on the hierarchy of
constitutionally protected rights, the right to life enjoys
precedence over the right to property. The reason is obvious: life is
irreplaceable, property is not. When the state or LGUs exercise of
police power clashes with a few individuals right to property, the
former should prevail.135
_______________
134 Supra note 8 at pp. 702720; pp. 138157.

135 Id., at p. 720; p. 157.
97
VOL. 742, NOVEMBER 25, 2014 97

We thus conclude with the very final words in G.R. No.

156052:
On Wednesday, January 23, 2008, a defective tanker

containing 2,000 liters of gasoline and 14,000 liters of diesel
exploded in the middle of the street a short distance from the exit
gate of the Pandacan Terminals, causing death, extensive damage
and a frightening conflagration in the vicinity of the incident.
Need we say anything about what will happen if it is the
estimated 162 to 211 million liters [or whatever is left of the 26
tanks] of petroleum products in the terminal complex will blow
up?136

V

As in the prequel case, we note that as early as October
2001, the oil companies signed a MOA with the DOE
obliging themselves to:
... undertake a comprehensive and comparative study ...

[which] shall include the preparation of a Master Plan, whose aim
is to determine the scope and timing of the feasible location of the
Pandacan oil terminals and all associated facilities and
infrastructure including government support essential for the
relocation such as the necessary transportation infrastructure,
land and right of way acquisition, resettlement of displaced
residents and environmental and social acceptability which shall
be based on mutual benefit of the Parties and the public.
such that:
Now that they are being compelled to discontinue their

operations in the Pandacan Terminals, they cannot feign
unreadiness considering that they had years to prepare for this
eventuality.137
_______________
136 Id., at pp. 722723; p. 160.

137 Id., at p. 721; p. 159.
98

On the matter of the details of the relocation, the Court

gave the oil companies the following time frames for
compliance:
To ensure the orderly transfer, movement and relocation of

assets and personnel, the intervenors Chevron Philippines, Inc.,
Petron Corporation and Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation
shall, within a nonextendible period of ninety (90) days, submit
to the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 39, the
comprehensive plan and relocation schedule which have allegedly
been prepared. The presiding judge of Manila RTC, Branch 39
will monitor the strict enforcement of this resolution.138

The periods were given in the Decision in G.R. No.
156052 which became final on 23 April 2009. Five years
have passed, since then. The years of noncompliance may
be excused by the swing of local legislative leads. We now
stay the sway and begin a final count.
A comprehensive and wellcoordinated plan within a
specific timeframe shall, therefore, be observed in the
relocation of the Pandacan Terminals. The oil companies
shall be given a fresh nonextendible period of fortyfive
(45) days from notice within which to submit to the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 39, Manila an updated
comprehensive plan and relocation schedule. The
relocation, in turn, shall be completed not later than six
months from the date of their submission.
Finally, let it be underscored that after the last
Manifestation filed by Shell informing this Court that
respondent former Mayor Lim vetoed Ordinance No. 8283
for the second time, and was anticipating its referral to the
President for the latters consideration, nothing was heard
from any of the parties until the present petitions as to the
status of the approval or disapproval of the said ordinance.
As it is, the fate of
_______________
138 Id., at p. 723; p. 161.
99
VOL. 742, NOVEMBER 25, 2014 99

the Pandacan Terminals remains dependent on this

final disposition of these cases.
VI
On the matter of the failure of Atty. Gempis to
immediately comply with the directives of this Court to file
the Memorandum for the Vice Mayor and the city
councilors who voted in favor of the assailed Ordinance, the
records do not bear proof that he received a copy of any of
the resolutions pertaining to the filing of the
Memorandum.
A narration of the events from his end would show,
however, that he was aware of the directive issued in 2009
when he stated that when the City Legal Officer filed its
Memorandum dated 8 February 2010, [he] thought the
filing of a Memorandum for the other respondent city
officials could be dispensed with.139 There was also a
categorical admission that he received the later Resolution
of 31 May 2011 but that he could not prepare a
Memorandum defending the position of respondents vice
mayor and the city councilors who voted in favor of
Ordinance No. 8187 in view of the ongoing drafting of
Ordinance No. 8283, which would change the position of
the Sanggunian, if subsequently approved.
The reasons he submitted are not impressed with merit.
That he was not officially designated as the counsel for
the vice mayor and the city councilors is beside the point.
As an officer of the court, he cannot feign ignorance of the
fact that a resolution of this Court is not a mere request
but an order which should be complied with promptly and
completely.140 As early as 2009, he should have
immediately responded and filed a Manifestation and
therein set forth his reasons why he cannot represent the
vice mayor and the city councilors. And,
_______________
139 Rollo in G.R. No. 187916, Vol. V, p. 2496. Compliance/Explanation

with Urgent Manifestation of Atty. Gempis, Jr.
140 Gone v. Ga, A.C. No. 7771, 6 April 2011, 647 SCRA 243, 250.
100

even assuming that the 31 May 2011 Resolution was the

first directive he personally received, he had no valid
excuse for disregarding the same. Worse, the Court had to
issue a show cause order before he finally heeded.
Atty. Gempis should strive harder to live up to his
duties of observing and maintaining the respect due to the
courts, respect for law and for legal processes and of
upholding the integrity and dignity of the legal profession
in order to perform his responsibilities as a lawyer
effectively.141
In Sibulo v. Ilagan,142 which involves a lawyers
repeated failure to comply with the directives of the Court,
the penalty recommended by the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines was reduced from suspension to reprimand and
a warning. The Court ratiocinated:
Considering, however, that respondent was absolved of the

administrative charge against him and is being taken to task for
his intransigence and lack of respect, the Court finds that the
penalty of suspension would not be warranted under the
circumstances.
xxxx
To the Courts mind, a reprimand and a warning are sufficient
sanctions for respondents disrespectful actuations directed
against the Court and the IBP. The imposition of these sanctions
in the present case would be more consistent with the avowed
purpose of disciplinary case, which is not so much to punish the
individual attorney as to protect the dispensation of justice by
sheltering the judiciary and the public from the misconduct or
inefficiency of officers of the court.143
_______________
141 Sibulo v. Ilagan, 486 Phil. 197, 204; 444 SCRA 1, 8 (2004), citing
Canons 1, 7, and 11, Code of Professional Responsibility.
142 Id.
143 Id., at pp. 204205; pp. 89, citing Gamilla v. Mario, Jr., 447 Phil.
419; 399 SCRA 308 (2003).
101
VOL. 742, NOVEMBER 25, 2014 101

We consider the participation of Atty. Gempis in this

case and opt to be lenient even as we reiterate the objective
of protecting the dispensation of justice. We deem it
sufficient to remind Atty. Gempis to be more mindful of his
duty as a lawyer towards the Court.
WHEREFORE, in light of all the foregoing, Ordinance
No. 8187 is hereby declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL and
INVALID with respect to the continued stay of the
Pandacan Oil Terminals.
The incumbent mayor of the City of Manila is hereby
ordered to CEASE and DESIST from enforcing Ordinance
No. 8187. In coordination with the appropriate government
agencies and the parties herein involved, he is further
ordered to oversee the relocation and transfer of the oil
terminals out of the Pandacan area.
As likewise required in G.R. No. 156052, the intervenors
Chevron Philippines, Inc., Pilipinas Shell Petroleum
Corporation, and Petron Corporation shall, within a non
extendible period of fortyfive (45) days, submit to the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 39, Manila an updated
comprehensive plan and relocation schedule, which
relocation shall be completed not later than six (6) months
from the date the required documents are submitted. The
presiding judge of Branch 39 shall monitor the strict
enforcement of this Decision.
For failure to observe the respect due to the Court, Atty.
Luch R. Gempis, Jr., Secretary of the Sangguniang
Panlungsod, is REMINDED of his duties towards the
Court and WARNED that a repetition of an act similar to
that here committed shall be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.
Velasco, Jr., LeonardoDe Castro, Peralta, Bersamin,

Del Castillo, Villarama, Jr., Mendoza, Reyes and Perlas
Bernabe, JJ., concur.
102

Sereno, CJ., I join J. Leonen in his Concurring &

Dissenting Opinion.
Carpio, J., No part, one of the counsels is in my former
law firm.
Brion, J., On Leave.
Leonen, J., See Separate Concurring and Dissenting
Opinion.
Jardeleza, J., No part. Intervenor part of former
employer group.

CONCURRING AND DISSENTING OPINION

LEONEN, J.:

The Pandacan oil depots must go, not because
Ordinance No. 8187 is unconstitutional, but because of
Ordinance No. 8283. Due to its proposed doctrine, I regret
that I am unable to bring myself to agree with the well
written ponencia of an esteemed colleague.
The petitions should be dismissed for being moot and
academic in view of the manifestations1 filed by
respondents when the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Manila
enacted City Ordinance No. 8283 entitled An Ordinance
Amending Section 2 of Ordinance No. 8187 by Reclassifying
the Area where
_______________
1 Rollo (G.R. No. 187836), pp. 27572765 (respondents manifestation)

and pp. 28132820 (respondentintervenor Pilipinas Shell Petroleum
Corporations manifestation). The compliance/explanation with urgent
manifestation dated September 13, 2012 of respondent was filed by Luch
R. Gempis, Jr., Secretary of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Manila. The
manifestation with motion to dismiss dated September 2, 2013 of
respondentintervenor Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation likewise
informed this court of the enactment of Ordinance No. 8283.
103
VOL. 742, NOVEMBER 25, 2014 103

Petroleum Refineries and Oil Depots are Located from
Heavy Industrial (I3) to High Intensity Commercial/Mixed
Use Zone (C3/MXD).2
Considering that the petitions are now moot and
academic, this court should have exercised judicial
restraint and refrained from making any determination
with regard to the validity of Ordinance No. 8187.
Even assuming that the petition is not yet moot, the
petitions in G.R. Nos. 187836 and 187916 should be
dismissed on procedural and substantive grounds.

Prefatory

The Sangguniang Panlungsod of Manila has the power
to amend or repeal its zoning ordinances. A determination
by this court in an earlier petition for mandamus denying
challenges to the validity of an earlier ordinance on
constitutional grounds does not necessarily render such
ordinance as irrepealable. That earlier ordinance may still
be repealed should the local government decide to change
its policy. In fact, the local government has changed its
policy by enacting Ordinance No. 8283, which amends
Section 2 of Ordinance No. 8187.
Ordinance No. 8187 is entitled to a presumption of
constitutionality. This presumption cannot be discharged
with petitioners broad factual allegations properly
challenged by respondents. This special civil action is not
the proper forum to determine questions of fact.
The spectre of terrorism and the dangers of ecological
destruction are easy to foist. But our fears should not be
given such privilege so as to numb us to the possibility that
the facts may not be as petitioners present them. The
reality is that the ordinance now in question is the product
of the po
_______________
2 Id., at p. 2760.
104

litical will of the citizens of Manila exercised through

their duly elected representatives.
The Constitution entrusts us with the power of judicial
review. We do not have the power to veto an ordinance.
There are other remedies available to petitioners more
adequate for their purposes. The fields of environment and
health law have progressed to allow the proper causes of
action to be laid in the proper forum. Proper evidence needs
to be received before we conclude with finality at the level
of this court that businesses of private respondents actually
destroy the environment and that they do so with
impunity. The precautionary principle certainly does not
sanction a suspension of judicial rules with respect to
evidence, reason, and legal interpretation.

The Case

The Pandacan terminal is located by the banks of the
Pasig River.3 It was constructed in 1914 and serves as the
main artery for the storage and distribution of fuel to
Metro Manila and the rest of Luzon.4 It is linked to a
permanent underground pipeline5 that connects it to
Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporations (Shell) refinery in
Tabangao and Chevrons finished products import terminal
in San Pascual, both in the province of Batangas.6
Apart from the use of a pipeline, the location of the
Pandacan terminal enables the delivery of fuel through
barges. This is the mode of transportation utilized by
Petron since its refinery is located in Limay, Bataan. When
the terminal is
_______________
3 Id., at p. 2031.
4 Id., at pp. 20292030.
5 Id., at p. 2032. The pipeline was inaugurated in 1969.
6 Id., at p. 2031.
105
VOL. 742, NOVEMBER 25, 2014 105

located elsewhere, delivery of fuel may have to contend

with traffic and other challenges.7
The Pandacan terminal is the focal point of this
countrys fuel supply system. It provides 95% of the fuel
supply in Metro Manila, 70% of the countrys shipping
needs, 90% of the countrys demand for lubricants, and 75%
of the countrys need for aviation fuel.8
The importance of the Pandacan terminal is also felt in
the business sector because it provides livelihood to more
than 3,000 retail stations in Regions I to IV and the
National Capital Region.9
During the 1970s, the Philippines experienced fuel
shortages. The shortage peaked in 1974, reaching a point
where the country was almost paralyzed. Long queues at
fuel stations were seen and, most of the time, the fuel
stations ran out of fuel.10
Fortunately, the national government anticipated the
fuel shortage. Republic Act No. 617311 was passed in 1971,
creating the Oil Industry Commission. The Oil Industry
Commission was mandated to perform the following:
_______________
7 Id.
8 Id., at pp. 2030 and 2526. The data supplied by Chevron and Shell
in their memoranda does not indicate the specific years when the data
was collected.
9 Id., at p. 2030.
10 Id., at p. 2032.
11 An Act Declaring a National Policy on the Petroleum Industry,
Regulating the Activities and Relations of Persons and Entities Engaged
therein, Establishing an Oil Industry Commission to Effectuate the Same,
and Defining its Functions, Powers and Objectives, and for Other
Purposes (1971). Rep. Act No. 6173 was subsequently amended by Pres.
Decrees numbered 56, 102, 389A, 429A, 456 and 1128.
106

SEC. 3. Declaration of Policy and Purposes.. . . .

(a) To assure that the country shall have a proper adequate
and continuous supply of crude oil and refined petroleum products
under the most economic and competitive terms possible
considering all available sources of supply;
(b) To assure that the petroleum industry, as a business vital
to the national interest, operates under conditions of orderly and
economic competition;
(c) To assure the public of reasonable prices for petroleum
products considering the international price levels of crude oil and
petroleum products and after allowing for proper and reasonable
cost of importing, shipping, transporting, processing, refining,
storing, distributing, marketing, and selling crude oil and
petroleum products in the Philippines, and for a fair and
reasonable return; and to prevent collusive practices in the
industry, particularly as to prices[.]

In 1977, the Oil Industry Commission was replaced by
the Department of Energy.12 This department was created
to make certain that there is an adequate supply of energy
for the country.13 Additional functions were granted to the
Department of Energy upon the passage of Republic Act
No. 8479.14
On October 12, 2001, the Department of Energy entered
into a memorandum of agreement with Chevron, Shell, and
Petron to address the safety concerns brought about by the
September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks in the United States.
_______________
12 Pres. Decree No. 1206 (1977), otherwise known as Creating the

Department of Energy.
13 Pres. Decree No. 1206 (1977), Sec. 1.
14 An Act Deregulating the Downstream Oil Industry, and for Other
Purposes (1998).
107
VOL. 742, NOVEMBER 25, 2014 107

The parties agreed to conduct a study regarding the

feasibility of relocating the Pandacan terminal.15
On November 20, 2001, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of
Manila enacted Ordinance No. 8027.16 Ordinance No. 8027,
which took effect on December 28, 2001,17 reclassified the
area where the Pandacan terminal is located from
Industrial II to Commercial I.18
Foreseeing that the effect of Ordinance No. 8027 could
lead to a fuel shortage, then Manila Mayor Jose L. Atienza,
Jr. (petitioner in G.R. No. 187916), Chevron, Shell, Petron,
and then Department of Energy Secretary Vincent S.
Perez, Jr., conducted dialogues.19 On June 26, 2002, the
City of Manila, the Department of Energy, Chevron, Shell,
and Petron executed a memorandum of understanding
(MOU) where the parties agreed to scale down the
operations in the Pandacan terminal by decommissioning
storage tanks and constructing buffer zones around the
Pandacan terminal.20
The Sangguniang Panlungsod of Manila ratified the
MOU in Resolution No. 97, Series of 2002. The MOU would
be valid from July 25, 2002 until December 31, 2002.
Business permits valid until December 31, 2002 were
issued to Shell, Chevron,
_______________
15 Rollo (G.R. No. 187836), p. 2035.

16 Ordinance Reclassifying the Land Use of that Portions of Land
Bounded by the Pasig River in the North, PNR railroad track in the East,
Beata St. in the South, Palumpong St. in the Southwest, and Estero de
Pandacan in the West, PNR railroad in the Northwest Area, Estero de
Pandacan in the Northeast, Pasig River in the Southeast and Dr. M.L.
Carreon in the Southwest; The area of Punta, Sta. Ana bounded by the
Pasig River, Marcelino Obrero St., Mayo 28 St. and the F. Manalo Street
from Industrial II to Commercial I (2001).
17 Social Justice Society (SJS) v. Atienza, Jr., 568 Phil. 658, 668; 545
SCRA 92, 100101 (2008) [Per J. Corona, First Division].
18 Rollo (G.R. No. 187836), pp. 20342035.
19 Id., at p. 2036.
20 Id., at p. 2037.
108

and Petron. Resolution No. 13, Series of 2003, extended

the MOUs validity until April 30, 2003. Again, business
permits were issued with the same validity period as the
MOU.21
Meanwhile, Social Justice Society (SJS) filed a petition
for mandamus before this court on December 4, 2002. They
prayed for the issuance of the writ of mandamus to compel
Mayor Jose L. Atienza, Jr. (Mayor Atienza) to enforce
Ordinance No. 8027. This was docketed as G.R. No.
156052.22
Toward the end of the MOUs validity in April 2003,
Mayor Atienza refused to issue new business permits to
Shell, Chevron, and Petron. This prompted Chevron to file
a complaint before the Regional Trial Court of Manila for
injunction, annulment of Manila City Ordinance No. 8027,
specific performance and damages, with application for a
temporary restraining order and writ of preliminary
prohibitory and mandatory injunction. This case was filed
on April 25, 2003 and docketed as Civil Case No. 03
106377.23
On the same day, Shell filed a petition for prohibition
and mandamus with application for a temporary
restraining order and writs of preliminary injunction and
preliminary mandatory injunction. It assailed the validity
of Ordinance No. 8027 and prayed for the enforcement of
the MOU. This case was docketed as Civil Case No. 03
106380.24
The cases filed by Chevron and Shell were consolidated
and raffled to Branch 39 of the Regional Trial Court of
Manila. The trial court granted applications for the writs of
preliminary mandatory injunction and preliminary
prohibitory injunction.25
_______________
21 Id., at p. 2038.
22 Id., at p. 2040.
23 Id., at pp. 20402041.
24 Id., at p. 2041.
25 Id.
109
VOL. 742, NOVEMBER 25, 2014 109

Petron later filed a petition assailing the validity of

Ordinance No. 8027 and alleging violations of the
Department of Energy law, deregulation law, the
memorandum of agreement dated October 12, 2001, and
the MOU dated June 28, 2002.26
On June 16, 2006, then Manila Mayor Atienza approved
Ordinance No. 8119, also known as the Manila
Comprehensive Land Use Plan and Zoning Regulations of
2006.27 Ordinance No. 8119 reclassified the Pandacan
terminal area from Industrial II to High Density
Residential/Mixed Use Zone.28
The enactment of Ordinance No. 8119 triggered the
filing of another complaint by Shell and Chevron before the
Regional Trial Court of Manila. They filed a complaint for
injunction and nullification of Ordinance No. 8119 with
application for a writ of preliminary injunction, praying
that Ordinance No. 8119 be declared unconstitutional. This
was docketed as Civil Case No. 06115334.29
Petron filed a motion to intervene in Civil Case No. 06
115334 but was denied. Hence, Petron filed its own
complaint docketed as Civil Case No. 07116700. A
temporary restraining order was issued in favor of Petron,
enjoining the enforcement of Ordinance No. 8119.30
On March 7, 2007, this court, through the First Division,
granted the petition filed by SJS and directed that the
mayor of the City of Manila immediately enforce Ordinance
No. 8027.31 Shell, Chevron, and Petron filed motions for
leave to intervene and motions for reconsideration in
intervention. They argued that there were legal
impediments to the enforcement of Ordinance No. 8027
because of the cases they
_______________
26 Id., at p. 2042.
27 Supra note 17 at p. 671; p. 119.
28 Rollo (G.R. No. 187836), p. 2043.
29 Id.
30 Id., at pp. 20432044.
31 Social Justice Society (SJS) v. Atienza, Jr., 546 Phil. 485, 494; 517
SCRA 657, 667 (2007) [Per J. Corona, First Division].
110

filed before the lower courts. On February 13, 2008, the

First Division, through Chief Justice Corona, granted the
motions to intervene, but denied the motions for
reconsideration. The First Division also ordered the
dismissal of Civil Case Nos. 03106377 and 03106380.32
Shell, Chevron, and Petron filed another motion for
reconsideration on February 28, 2008.33 This was denied
with finality on April 28, 2009 in an En Banc resolution34
on the ground that it was a second motion for
reconsideration, a prohibited pleading under Rule 52,
Section 2 of the Rules of Court.35
On May 28, 2009, then Manila Mayor Alfredo S. Lim
(Mayor Lim) signed Ordinance No. 8187, An Ordinance
Amending City Ordinance No. 8119 Otherwise Known as
The Manila Comprehensive Land Use Plan and Zoning
Ordinance of 2006 By Creating a Medium Industrial Zone
(12) and Heavy Industrial Zone (13) and Providing for its
Enforcement.36
In essence, Ordinance No. 8187, a zoning ordinance,
allows the continued stay of the oil depots in the Pandacan
area. Ordinance No. 8187 also repeals the relevant portions
of Ordinance No. 8027.
Petitioner SJS went directly to this court and filed a
petition37 for prohibition on June 1, 2009. This was
docketed as G.R. No. 187836. Petitioners Mayor Atienza
and the other parties followed suit on June 5, 2009 and
filed a petition for prohibition, mandamus, and certiorari
with application for an
_______________
32 Supra note 17 at p. 723; p. 160.

33 Rollo (G.R. No. 187836), p. 2046.
34 Id.
35 Rule 52, Sec. 2 of the Rules of Court states:
SEC. 2. Second motion for reconsideration.No second motion for
reconsideration of a judgment or final resolution by the same party shall
be entertained.
36 Rollo (G.R. No. 187836), p. 2047.
37 Id., at pp. 310.
111
VOL. 742, NOVEMBER 25, 2014 111

injunction and temporary restraining order.38 This was

docketed as G.R. No. 187916. These petitions were
consolidated by this court.
The issues in this case are the following:
(a) Procedural issue: Whether petitioners in G.R.
No. 187836 and G.R. No. 187916 have standing to file this
case.
(b) Substantive issue: Whether Ordinance No. 8187,
otherwise known as An Ordinance Amending Ordinance
No. 8119, Otherwise Known as The Manila Comprehensive
Land Use Plan and Zoning Ordinance of 2006 By Creating
a Medium Industrial Zone (I2) and Heavy Industrial Zone
(I3), and Providing for Its Enforcement, is valid and
constitutional.
This dissent will focus on the substantive issue first.
I
The presumption of constitutionality

All laws, including ordinances, enjoy the presumption of
constitutionality.39 The reason behind this presumption
has been discussed by this court as follows:
This strong predilection for constitutionality takes its bearings

on the idea that it is forbidden for one branch of the government
to encroach upon the duties and powers of another. Thus it has
been said that the presumption is based on the deference the
judicial
_______________
38 Rollo (G.R. No. 187916), pp. 1167.

39 Tano v. Socrates, 343 Phil. 670, 700; 278 SCRA 154, 174 (1997) [Per
J. Davide, Jr., En Banc], citing La Union Electric Cooperative v. Yaranon,
259 Phil. 457, 466; 179 SCRA 828, 836 (1989) [Per J. Gancayco, First
Division] and Francisco v. Permskul, 255 Phil. 311, 322; 173 SCRA 324,
333 (1989) [Per J. Cruz, En Banc].
112

branch accords to its coordinate branch the legislature.40

ErmitaMalate Hotel and Motel Operators Association v.
City of Manila41 explains the reasons behind the
presumption of validity of ordinances:
As was expressed categorically by Justice Malcolm: The

presumption is all in favor of validity. . . . The action of the elected
representatives of the people cannot be lightly set aside. The
councilors must, in the very nature of things, be familiar with the
necessities of their particular municipality and with all the facts
and circumstances which surround the subject and necessitate
action. The local legislative body, by enacting the ordinance, has
in effect given notice that the regulations are essential to the well
being of the people. . . . The Judiciary should not lightly set aside
legislative action when there is not a clear invasion of personal or
property rights under the guise of police regulation.42

In order to overcome this presumption of
constitutionality, petitioners must be able to prove beyond
any doubt how the challenged statute violates the
Constitution.43 Hypothetical arguments will not suffice.
The Sangguniang Panlungsod of Manila and other local
government units have the statutory power to enact zoning
ordinances. Thus, Republic Act No. 7160 or the Local
Government Code of 1991 grants the following powers to
the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Manila:
_______________
40 Estrada v. Sandiganbayan, 421 Phil. 290, 342; 369 SCRA 394, 430
(2001) [Per J. Bellosillo, En Banc].
41 ErmitaMalate Hotel and Motel Operators Association v. City of
Manila, 127 Phil. 306; 20 SCRA 849 (1967) [Per J. Fernando, En Banc].
42 Id., at pp. 314315; pp. 856857, citing U.S. v. Salaveria, 39 Phil.
102, 111 (1918) [Per J. Malcolm, En Banc].
43 Estrada v. Sandiganbayan, supra at p. 343; p. 446.
113
VOL. 742, NOVEMBER 25, 2014 113

SECTION 458. Powers, Duties, Functions and Compensation.

The sangguniang panlungsod, as the legislative body of the city,
shall enact ordinances, approve resolutions and appropriate funds
for the general welfare of the city and its inhabitants pursuant to
Section 16 of this Code and in the proper exercise of the corporate
powers of the city as provided for under Section 22 of this Code,
and shall:
....
(2) Generate and maximize the use of resources and revenues
for the development plans, program objectives and priorities of
the city as provided for under Section 18 of this Code, with
particular attention to agroindustrial development and citywide
growth and progress, and relative thereto, shall:
....
(vii) Adopt a comprehensive land use plan for the city: Provided,
That in the case of component cities, the formulation, adoption or
modification of said plan shall be in coordination with the
approved provincial comprehensive land use plan;
(viii) Reclassify land within the jurisdiction of the city, subject
to the pertinent provisions of this Code;
(ix) Enact integrated zoning ordinances in consonance with the
approved comprehensive land use plan, subject to existing laws,
rules and regulations; establish fire limits or zones, particularly
in populous centers; and regulate the construction, repair or
modification of buildings within said fire limits or zones in
accordance with the provisions of the Fire Code[.] (Emphasis
supplied)
114

The Revised Charter of the City of Manila or Republic

Act No. 409 also provides:44

ARTICLE III. The Municipal Board

....
SEC. 18. Legislative powers.The Municipal Board shall
have the following legislative powers:
....
(kk) To enact all ordinances it may deem necessary and
proper for the sanitation and safety, the furtherance of the
prosperity, and the promotion of the morality, peace, good order,
comfort, convenience, and general welfare of the city and its
inhabitants, and such others as may be necessary to carry into
effect and discharge the powers and duties conferred by this
chapter; and to fix penalties for the violation of ordinances which
shall not exceed to two hundred pesos fine or six months
imprisonment, or both such fine and imprisonment, for a single
offense.

With regard to the seeming overlap between Republic
Act No. 7160 and Republic Act No. 409, this court, in City
of Manila v. Hon. Laguio, Jr.,45 held that:
The rule is that the City Council has only such powers
as are expressly granted to it and those which are
necessarily implied or incidental to the exercise thereof. By
reason of its limited powers and the nature thereof, said
powers are to be construed strictissimi juris and any doubt
or ambiguity arising out of the terms used in
_______________
44 Rep. Act No. 409 (1949), otherwise known as An Act to Revise the
Charter of the City of Manila, and for Other Purposes.
45 495 Phil. 289; 455 SCRA 308 (2005) [Per J. Tinga, En Banc]. This
case involved an ordinance, classified by the city council as a zoning
ordinance, which prohibited the establishment or operation of certain
businesses in the ErmitaMalate area.
115
VOL. 742, NOVEMBER 25, 2014 115

granting said powers must be construed against the City

Council.
....
On the second point, it suffices to say that the Code being a
later expression of the legislative will must necessarily prevail
and override the earlier law, the Revised Charter of Manila. Legis
posteriores priores contrarias abrogant, or later statute repeals
prior ones which are repugnant thereto. As between two laws on
the same subject matter, which are irreconcilably inconsistent,
that which is passed later prevails, since it is the latest expression
of legislative will. If there is an inconsistency or repugnance
between two statutes, both relating to the same subject matter,
which cannot be removed by any fair and reasonable method of
interpretation, it is the latest expression of the legislative will
which must prevail and override the earlier.
....
In addition, Section 534(f) of the Code states that All general
and special laws, acts, city charters, decrees, executive orders,
proclamations and administrative regulations, or part or parts
thereof which are inconsistent with any of the provisions of this
Code are hereby repealed or modified accordingly. Thus,
submitting to petitioners interpretation that the Revised Charter
of Manila empowers the City Council to prohibit motels, that
portion of the Charter stating such must be considered repealed
by the Code as it is at variance with the latters provisions
granting the City Council mere regulatory powers.46

For purposes of this case, there appears to be no
repugnance between Republic Act No. 7160 and Republic
Act No. 409. Both provide for the statutory basis for the
conclusion that the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Manila
was well within its powers when it enacted Ordinance No.
8187. This ordi
_______________
46 Id., at pp. 332334; pp. 353355.
116

nance was also enacted in accordance with the process

for enacting zoning guidelines.
The Local Government Code does not provide for a
special procedure with regard to the passage of a zoning
ordinance. However, Republic Act No. 792447 provides that:
SEC. 3. Scope of MMDA Services.Metrowide services

under the jurisdiction of the MMDA are those services which have
metrowide impact and transcend local political boundaries or
entail huge expenditures such that it would not be viable for said
services to be provided by the individual local government units
(LGUs) comprising Metropolitan Manila. These services shall
include:
....
e. Urban renewal, zoning and land use planning, and shelter
services which include the formulation, adoption and
implementation of policies, standards, rules and regulations,
programs and projects to rationalize and optimize urban land use
and provide direction to urban growth and expansion, the
rehabilitation and development of slum and blighted areas, the
development of shelter and housing facilities and the provision of
necessary social services thereof.

Rule V, Section 15 of the implementing rules and
regulations of Republic Act No. 792448 provides:
Sec. 15. Linkage with HUDCC, HLURB, NHA, LGUs and

Other National Government Agencies Concerned on Urban
Renewal, Zoning and Land
_______________
47 An Act Creating the Metropolitan Manila Development Authority,

Defining its Powers and Functions, Providing Funds therefor and for
Other Purposes (1995).
48 The Rules and Regulations Implementing R.A. No. 7924 became
effective on June 8, 1996.
117
VOL. 742, NOVEMBER 25, 2014 117

Use Planning and Shelter Services.Within the context of

the National Housing and Urban Development Framework, and
pursuant to the national standards, guidelines and regulations
formulated by the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board
[HLURB] on land use planning and zoning, the Authority shall
prepare a metropolitan physical framework plan and regulations
which shall complement and translate the socioeconomic
development plan for Metro Manila into physical or spatial terms,
and provide the basis for the preparation, review, integration and
implementation of local land use plans and zoning ordinances of
cities and municipalities in the area.
Said framework plan and regulations shall contain, among
others, planning and zoning policies and procedures that shall be
observed by local government units in the preparation of their
plans and ordinances pursuant to Sections 447 and 458 of RA
7160, as well as the identification of sites and projects that are
considered to be of national or metropolitan significance.
Cities and municipalities shall prepare their respective land use
plans and zoning ordinances and submit the same for review and
integration by the Authority and indorsement to HLURB in
accordance with Executive Order No. 72 and other pertinent laws.
In the preparation of a Metropolitan Manila physical
framework plan and regulations, the Authority shall coordinate
with the Housing and Urban Development Coordinating Council,
HLURB, the National Housing Authority, Intramuros
Administration, and all other agencies of the national government
which are concerned with land use and zoning, urban renewal and
shelter services. (Emphasis supplied)
OP Executive Order No. 7249 then provides:
_______________
49 Providing for the Preparation and Implementation of the

Comprehensive Land Use Plans of Local Government Units Pursuant to
the Local Government Code of 1991 and Other Pertinent Laws (1993).
118

SECTION 1. Plan formulation or Updating.(a) Cities and

municipalities shall continue to formulate or update their
respective comprehensive land use plans, in conformity with the
land use planning and zoning standards and guidelines
prescribed by the HLRB pursuant to national policies.
....
The comprehensive land use plan prepared by the CDC/MDC
shall be submitted to the sangguniang panlungsod or
sangguniang bayan, as the case may be, for enactment into a
zoning ordinance. Such ordinance shall be enacted and approved
in accordance with Articles 107 and 108 of the Implementing
Rules and Regulations (IRR) of the LGC.
....
c. Cities and municipalities of Metropolitan Manila shall
continue to formulate or update their respective comprehensive
land use plans, in accordance with the land use planning and
zoning standards and guidelines prescribed by the HLRB
pursuant to EO 392, S. of 1990, and other pertinent national
policies.

None of the petitioners question whether Ordinance No.
8187 followed these requirements.
Instead, petitioner Mayor Atienza argues that the
passage of Ordinance No. 8187 was in violation of the
procedure stated in Ordinance No. 8119, specifically:
Sec. 81. Amendments to the Zoning Ordinance.The

proposed amendments to the Zoning Ordinance as reviewed and
evaluated by the City Planning and Development Office (CPDO)
shall be submitted to the City Council for approval of the majority
of the Sangguniang Panlungsod members. The amendments shall
be acceptable and eventually approved; PROVIDED, That there is
sufficient evidence and justification for such proposal;
PROVIDED, FURTHER, That such proposal is consistent with
the development goals, planning objectives and
119
VOL. 742, NOVEMBER 25, 2014 119

strategies of the Manila Comprehensive Land Use Plan. Said

amendments shall take effect immediately upon approval or after
thirty (30) days from application.50

Respondent Mayor Lim points out that Section 81 of
Ordinance No. 8119 is better understood if taken together
with Section 80, which states:
Sec. 80. Procedure for ReZoning.Any association or group

of persons who wishes to prepare a rezoning of a certain area,
may file a petition with the Manila Zoning Board of Adjustments
and Appeals (MZBAA) for initial evaluation.
The MZBAA shall then endorse the proposal together with its
preliminary findings to the City Planning & Development Office
(CPDO) for further evaluation. Whenever necessary, site
inspection of the vicinity subject to rezoning shall be made, the
CPDO shall then recommend for approval the rezoning of the
subject area to the City Council.51

Respondent Mayor Lim points out that the procedure
provided under Sections 80 and 81 of Ordinance No. 8119 is
not a condition precedent for the enactment of Ordinance
No. 8187. He reasons that it would be absurd for the
Sangguniang Panlungsod of Manila to submit its rezoning
plans to the Manila Zoning Board of Adjustments and
Appeals or MZBAA for review, after which the review
would be subject to the approval by the Sangguniang
Panlungsod of Manila.52
We agree with respondent Mayor Lim. Furthermore,
none of the petitioners presented clear basis to conclude
that Ordinance No. 8187 violated any of the provisos in
Section 81.
_______________
50 Rollo (G.R. No. 187836), p. 1810.

51 Id.
52 Id., at pp. 18101812.
120

No clear basis and compelling reasons

This court must be presented with clear basis and
compelling reasons so as to overcome the presumption of
statutory validity and constitutionality. We explained in
Smart Communications, Inc. v. Municipality of Malvar,
Batangas53 that:
To justify the nullification of the law or its implementation,

there must be a clear and unequivocal, not a doubtful, breach of
the Constitution. In case of doubt in the sufficiency of proof
establishing unconstitutionality, the Court must sustain
legislation because to invalidate [a law] based on . . . baseless
supposition is an affront to the wisdom not only of the legislature
that passed it but also of the executive which approved it. This
presumption of constitutionality can be overcome only by the
clearest showing that there was indeed an infraction of the
Constitution, and only when such a conclusion is reached by the
required majority may the Court pronounce, in the discharge of
the duty it cannot escape, that the challenged act must be struck
down.54

In Hon. Fernando v. St. Scholasticas College,55 we
reiterated the test to determine the validity of an
ordinance:
The test of a valid ordinance is wellestablished. A long line of

decisions including City of Manila has held that for an ordinance
to be valid, it must not only be within the corporate powers of the
local government unit to enact and pass according to the
procedure prescribed
_______________
53 G.R. No. 204429, February 18, 2014, 716 SCRA 677 [Per J. Carpio,
En Banc], citing LAMP v. Secretary of Budget and Management, G.R. No.
164987, April 24, 2012, 670 SCRA 373 [Per J. Mendoza, En Banc].
54 Id., at p. 696.
55 G.R. No. 161107, March 12, 2013, 693 SCRA 141 [Per J. Mendoza,
En Banc].
121
VOL. 742, NOVEMBER 25, 2014 121

by law, it must also conform to the following substantive

requirements: (1) must not contravene the Constitution or any
statute; (2) must not be unfair or oppressive; (3) must not be
partial or discriminatory; (4) must not prohibit but may regulate
trade; (5) must be general and consistent with public policy; and
(6) must not be unreasonable.56 (Citation omitted)

The reason for the first requirement that an
ordinance should not contravene the Constitution or any
statute was explained in City of Manila v. Hon. Laguio57
as follows:
Anent the first criterion, ordinances shall only be valid when

they are not contrary to the Constitution and to the laws. The
Ordinance must satisfy two requirements: it must pass muster
under the test of constitutionality and the test of consistency with
the prevailing laws. That ordinances should be constitutional
uphold the principle of the supremacy of the Constitution. The
requirement that the enactment must not violate existing law
gives stress to the precept that local government units are able to
legislate only by virtue of their derivative legislative power, a
delegation of legislative power from the national legislature. The
delegate cannot be superior to the principal or exercise powers
higher than those of the latter.58 (Citations omitted)

In relation to the constitutional requirement of due
process, we further clarified that:
To successfully invoke the exercise of police power as the

rationale for the enactment of an ordinance and to free it from the
imputation of constitutional infirmity, two tests have been used
by the Court the rational relationship test and the strict
scrutiny test:
_______________
56 Id., at p. 157, citing White Light Corporation v. City of Manila, 596

Phil. 444; 576 SCRA 416 (2009) [Per J. Tinga, En Banc].
57 Supra note 45.
58 Id., at p. 308; p. 327.
122

We ourselves have often applied the rational basis test mainly

in analysis of equal protection challenges. Using the rational basis
examination, laws or ordinances are upheld if they rationally
further a legitimate governmental interest. Under intermediate
review, governmental interest is extensively examined and the
availability of less restrictive measures is considered. Applying
strict scrutiny, the focus is on the presence of compelling, rather
than substantial, governmental interest and on the absence of
less restrictive means for achieving that interest.59 (Citation
omitted)

We then recalled the rational relationship test in this
manner:
As with the State, local governments may be considered as

having properly exercised their police power only if the following
requisites are met: (1) the interests of the public generally, as
distinguished from those of a particular class, require its exercise;
and (2) the means employed are reasonably necessary for the
accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive upon
individuals. In short, there must be a concurrence of a lawful
subject and lawful method.60 (Citation omitted)

In White Light Corporation v. City of Manila,61 this
court clarified that heightened or immediate scrutiny is
used for evaluating classifications based on gender and
legitimacy.62
_______________
59 Fernando v. St. Scholasticas College, G.R. No. 161107, March 12,
2013, 693 SCRA 141, 157 [Per J. Mendoza, En Banc].
60 Id., at p. 158, citing Social Justice Society (SJS) v. Atienza, Jr.,
supra note 17 at p. 493; p. 138.
61 Supra note 56.
62 Id., at p. 462; p. 436.
123
VOL. 742, NOVEMBER 25, 2014 123

This standard is still sparingly used in substantive due

process cases.
Unfortunately, the ponencia does not use these
standards but instead anchors its conclusion on the
existence of the prior case of Social Justice Society (SJS), et
al. v. Hon. Atienza, Jr. or G.R. No. 156052. Thus:
It bears to stress that the present petitions were initially filed,

not to secure a judgment adverse to the first decision, but,
precisely, to enforce the earlier ruling to relocate the oil depots
from the Pandacan area.
....
The fact remains, however, that notwithstanding that the
conditions with respect to the operations of the oil depots existing
prior to the enactment of Ordinance No 8027 do not substantially
differ to this day, as would later be discussed, the position of the
particular sector among its constituents it wishes to favor.
Now that the City of Manila, through the mayor and the city
councilors, has changed its view on the matter, favoring the citys
economicrelated benefits, through the continued stay of the oil
terminals, over the protection of the very lives and safety of its
constituents, it is imperative for this Court to make a final
determination on the basis of the facts on the table as to which
specific right of the inhabitants of Manila should prevail. For, in
this present controversy, history reveals that there is
124

truly no such thing as the will of Manila insofar as the

general welfare of the people is concerned.63

On the contrary, the pleadings show that the factual
milieu may have changed. Furthermore, Ordinance No.
8027 cannot be an irrepealable ordinance. Its repeal cannot
be a basis for illegality or unconstitutionality.

II
Unresolved questions of fact
defeat a challenge to the legal or constitutional
validity of an ordinance

Petitioners make the following factual assertions:
First: Oil depots are inherently risky and pose a threat
to the security of its surrounding community.64
Second: There is the confirmed presence of Jemaah
Islamiyah in the country.65 If the Philippines is not a target
of terrorist attacks, then why did Congress pass Republic
Act No. 9372, also known as the Human Security Act of
2007?66
Third: Ordinance No. 8187 allows the entry of pollutive
and hazardous industries in Manila. This violates Article
II, Sections 15 and 16 of the 1987 Constitution. It also
violates Presidential Decree No. 1151, also known as the
Philippine Environmental Policy.67
Fourth: The enactment of Ordinance No. 8187 was in
bad faith because it was passed and signed into law a
month after the denial with finality of the motion for
reconsideration in G.R. No. 156052.68
_______________
63 Ponencia, pp. 85 and 8990.

64 Rollo (G.R. No. 187836), p. 1761.
65 Id., at p. 1768.
66 Id., at p. 1770.
67 Id., at pp. 17731774.
68 Id., at p. 1772.
125
VOL. 742, NOVEMBER 25, 2014 125

SJS attached a committee report69 to its memorandum,

SJS attached a committee report69 to its memorandum,
to convince this court why its petition for prohibition
should be granted. However, that committee report
pertains to Ordinance No. 8027. It is irrelevant. The
circumstances that led to the enactment of Ordinance No.
8027 are different from more contemporary considerations
that led respondents to the promulgation of Ordinance No.
8187. Contrary to the stance of petitioners, we cannot
presume that the world always remains at status quo, that
it is static, and it does not change.
In the ponencia:
The fact remains, however, that notwithstanding that the

conditions with respect to the operations of the oil depots existing
prior to the enactment of Ordinance No. 8027 do not substantially
differ to this day, as would later be discussed, the position of the
particular sector among its constituents it wishes to favor.70
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Intervenor Chevron points out that out of the 52 storage
tanks in the Pandacan terminal, 26 tanks have been
decommissioned.71 Buffer zones and green parks now exist
in order to protect both the terminal and the nearby
residential area.72
Intervenor Shell manifests that its area in the Pandacan
terminal will eventually become a mere distribution point.
At
_______________
69 Id., at p. 1767.
70 Ponencia, pp. 8990.
71 Rollo (G.R. No. 187836), p. 2039.
72 Id.
126

present, it is in the process of transferring its fuel to the
Shell terminals in Batangas, Bataan, La Union, and
Muntinlupa.73 As for its supply of aviation fuel, it will be
delivered directly to the Ninoy Aquino International
Airport.74 Petrons transfer and Shells reduction of their
operations in Pandacan will reduce the terminals
environmental footprint by more than 50%.75
Even the ponencia recognizes that the conditions have
changed when it stated that:
1. Chevron claims that it, together with Shell and Petron,

continue to enhance the safety and security features of the
terminals. They likewise adopt fire and product spill prevention
measures in accordance with the local standards set by the
Bureau of Fire Protection, among others, and with the
international standards of the American Petroleum Industry
(API) and the National Fire Prevention and Safety Association
(NFPSA); that since 1914, the oil depots have not experienced
any incident beyond the ordinary risks and expectations
of the residents of Manila; and that it received a passing grade on
the safety measures they installed in the facilities from the
representatives of the City of Manila who conducted an ocular
inspection on 22 May 2009; and
....
. . . . Shells portion of the oil depot is likewise allegedly
equipped with the latest technology to ensure air quality control
and water quality control, and to prevent and cope with possible
oil spills with a crisis management plan in place in the event that
an oil spill occurs. Finally, Shell claims that the recommendations
of EQE International in its Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA)
study, which it says is one of the leading independent
_______________
73 Id., at p. 2368.
74 Id., at p. 2369.
75 Id.
127
VOL. 742, NOVEMBER 25, 2014 127

risk assessment providers in the world and largest risk

management consultancy, were sufficiently complied with; and
that, on its own initiative, adopted additional measures for the
purpose, for which reason, the individual risk level resulting
from any incident occurring from the Pandacan Terminal, per the
QRA study, is twenty (20) times lower compared to the
individual risk level of an average working or domestic
environment.
....
The steps taken by the oil companies, therefore, remain
insufficient to convince the Court that the dangers posed by the
presence of the terminals in a thickly populated area have already
been completely removed.76 (Emphasis in the original)

With regard to highly flammable substances, Shell
manifested that liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) is no longer
stored in the Pandacan terminal. Among the fuel products,
only LPG can cause an explosion. Diesel, fuel oil, and
lubricating engine oil will not explode even if a lit match or
anything with fire is thrown at any of these fuel products
because these products do not easily vaporize and require
more energy to burn. For gasoline, kerosene, and jet fuel,
Shell also utilizes special containers to prevent explosions.
All of these products are stored below their flashpoint
temperature.77
With respect to terrorist organizations such as Jemaah
Islamiyah being in this country, intervenor Petron rebuts
by stating that it is extremely difficult to ascertain the
objectives of terrorists.78 Further, a survey of terrorist
attacks from 2003 to 2009 reveals that the following areas
have been the targets:
48 buses and trains
_______________
76 Ponencia, pp. 9192, 9293, 94.

77 Rollo (G.R. No. 187836), pp. 24872488.
78 Id., at p. 2222.
128

31 marketplaces
28 churches and mosques
13 police stations
20 restaurants and cafes
18 hotels79

An oil terminal in Yemen was the target of a terrorist
attack, but it was foiled and the small fire in a gas tank,
caused by shrapnel from an explosion, was easily
extinguished.80 Based on this data, Petron makes the
assumption that oil refineries and oil depots may have the
same degree of risk as any other business establishment
when it comes to terrorist attacks.81
Shell alleged that safety measures are in place in the
Pandacan terminal. The terminal employs around 300
security personnel, working round the clock in three shifts.
Checkpoints and security outposts are located at the
entrance and exits of the terminal. The area is equipped
with closed circuit television cameras, capable of zooming
and panning to get a birds eye view of all activities inside
the terminal and its surrounding areas.82
In addition, the Pandacan terminal is in close proximity
to Malacaan Palace. It is included in the nofly zone.
Any aircraft flying near the area can be neutralized by
Malacaan Palaces antiaircraft gun batteries.83
With regard to the argument that Ordinance No. 8187
allows the entry of pollutive and hazardous industries in
the City of Manila, Shell points out that Ordinance No.
8187 simply followed the classifications provided in the
Housing
_______________
79 Id., at p. 2223.
80 Id., at pp. 22242225.
81 Id., at p. 2222.
82 Id., at p. 2370.
83 Id., at p. 2371.
129
VOL. 742, NOVEMBER 25, 2014 129

and Land Use Regulatory Board Model Zoning

Ordinance.84 It does not necessarily mean that they are
actually pollutive or hazardous. Thus, intervenor Shell
states:
It bears noting that while petroleum refineries and oil depots

are classified as highly pollutive/extremely hazardous
industries, they are nonetheless allowable classifications even
under the Model Zoning Ordinance. To reiterate, contrary to
petitioners simplistic and misleading argument, such
classification does not mean that highly essential industries
which are classified as highly pollutive/extremely hazardous
have a license to cause pollution. It only recognizes that these
industries have the possibility to cause pollution if no
environmental safeguards and/or standards are in place.85

Under Ordinance 8187, medium industrial zones would
allow the operation of pollutive/hazardous industries
while heavy industrial zones would allow the operation of
highly pollutive/nonhazardous industries; highly
pollutive/hazardous industries; highly pollutive/extremely
hazardous industries; pollutive/extremely hazardous
industries; and nonpollutive/extremely hazardous
industries.86 However, these are mere classifications that
should not, in any way, lead to the conclusion that the
industries classified under any of these categories are
automatically polluters.
The arguments raised by petitioners are hypothetical.
No convincing evidence was presented to show why oil
depots are inherently risky or why oil depots are targets of
terrorist attacks. The examples of fire incidents in other
fuel facilities located in Puerto Rico and India87 are
insufficient to give us a scientific basis for concluding that
the risks of simply having an oil depot are unmanageably
high. The examples do not
_______________
84 Id., at p. 2462.
85 Id., at pp. 24622463.
86 Id., at pp. 21152122.
87 Id., at pp. 17601761.
130

relate to the number of oil depots that have operated

continuously without any safety problems.
To decide a controversy on the basis of hypothetical facts
would have the effect of barring litigation between real
parties with real causes of action.88

III
The earlier case of
Social Justice Society (SJS), et al. v. Hon. Atienza,
Jr.,
G.R. No. 156052

Although dealing with a different ordinance with a
different treatment of the Pandacan oil depots, the earlier
doctrinal pronouncements in Social Justice Society
(SJS), et al. v. Hon. Atienza, Jr.89 or G.R. No. 156052
support this dissent.
This earlier case was a petition for mandamus filed
directly before this court. It sought to compel the mayor of
the City of Manila to enforce Ordinance No. 8027.
With the petition being an original one, it is wrong to
conclude that this court made definitive factual findings
that are binding in this case when it granted the writ of
mandamus against respondent Mayor Lim. The petition
was granted on the ground that since the validity of the
memorandum of understanding executed between Chevron,
Shell, Petron, and the City of Manila had expired, there
was no more hindrance to the enforcement of Ordinance
No. 8027.90
_______________
88 J. Leonen, Dissenting Opinion in Imbong v. Ochoa, G.R. No.

204819, April 8, 2014, 721 SCRA 146 [Per J. Mendoza, En Banc].
89 Supra note 31. The 2008 Social Justice Society (SJS) v. Atienza, Jr.
case is a resolution on the interventions of Chevron Philippines, Inc.,
Petron Corporation, and Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation.
90 Supra note 31 at p. 494; pp. 662663.
131
VOL. 742, NOVEMBER 25, 2014 131

After the decision had been promulgated, motions for

leave to intervene and motions for reconsideration were
filed. In a resolution, this court granted the motions for
leave to intervene but denied the motions for
reconsideration.91
In denying the motion for reconsideration, this court
ruled that Ordinance No. 8027 was not unconstitutional
based on the challenge raised by Chevron, Shell, and
Petron.92 This court did not make the pronouncement that
the ordinance cannot be repealed. This court certainly did
not even make definitive findings of fact that would have
prevented the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Manila to
change its policy. In this case, it appears that the
Sangguniang Panlungsod of Manila reconsidered its
interpretation of the factual basis of the earlier
ordinance, examined the viability of its policy in
relation to the interests of its constituents, and
passed Ordinance No. 8187. It is also clear that there
were changes in the elected representatives of the City
of Manila.
Social Justice Society (SJS), et al. v. Hon. Atienza, Jr.
has the authority to hold that Ordinance No. 8027 was
enacted in the exercise of police power.93 It did not
discriminate against the Pandacan terminal and the oil
depots found therein.94 Neither did the ordinance
contravene Republic Act No. 763895 and Republic Act No.
8479.96 Further, Ordinance No. 8027 does not prohibit the
oil businesses from conducting their business in Manila,
but they are no longer allowed to have an oil depot in the
Pandacan terminal.97
_______________
91 Supra note 17 at p. 723; p. 160.

92 Id., at p. 720; p. 157.
93 Id., at pp. 702705; p. 136.
94 Id., at pp. 708709; p. 144.
95 An Act Creating the Department of Energy Rationalizing the
Organization and Functions of Government Agencies Related to Energy,
and for Other Purposes (1992).
96 Supra note 17 at pp. 709715; p. 100.
97 Id., at p. 706; p. 142.
132

This court denied the second motion for reconsideration

for being a prohibited pleading.

No res judicata

Certainly, Social Justice Society (SJS), et al. v. Hon.
Atienza, Jr. is not res judicata insofar as the present
original petition is concerned.
The procedural vehicle is no longer mandamus in this
case. Petitioner SJS filed a petition for prohibition.
Petitioner Mayor Atienza now files a petition for
prohibition, mandamus and certiorari. The earlier case
sought to enforce an ordinance. SJS, in this case, seeks to
enjoin the enforcement of an ordinance because:
[T]he same is illegal and unconstitutional, thus, without force
and effect. Further, it is a circumvention of this Honorable Courts
decision on [sic] GR 156052 which mandates the enforcement of
Ordinance No. 8027 by the mayor of the City of Manila which
effectively removes the Pandacan oil depot.98

Clearly, the decision in Social Justice Society (SJS), et
al. v. Hon. Atienza, Jr. dealt with Ordinance No. 8027. This
petition now deals with Ordinance No. 8187. The subject
matter and the issues are totally different.

No allegation and clear basis for a finding that a law
was violated in enacting the ordinance

The petition filed by petitioner SJS in this case and its
memorandum are extraordinary in that these are bereft of
any substantial argument that clearly shows that
Ordinance No. 8187 violates any law. The closest mention
of any law is
_______________
98 Rollo (G.R. No. 187836), p. 1758.
133
VOL. 742, NOVEMBER 25, 2014 133

Section 458 of the Local Government Code of 1991 that

grants the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Manila the power
to enact ordinances for the general welfare.
Petitioner SJS recommends that we rule that:
General welfare means the enjoyment of health and the

common blessings of life, and this could only be achieved if there
would be [a] guarantee against risk in health and the common
blessings of life of the people.99 (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)

Explaining its argument that general welfare can only
be present if there is absolutely no risk to health, petitioner
SJS continues to cite Villanueva v. Castaeda,100 where
this court held that a talipapa (small public market) can
endanger public health and public safety.101 Thus, in the
sole view of petitioner SJS:
If this Honorable Court could consider a talipapa to be
hazardous to public health and safety, there is more reason for
this Honorable Court to consider the Pandacan oil depot to be
hazardous to the community surrounding it. The comparison may
not be apple to apple and orange to orange but the logic and
common sense behind this comparison is to point out the far
greater danger that an oil depot may bring compared to that of a
talipapa. The detrimental impact of the mere presence of the oil
depot in the Pandacan community outweighs the beneficial
impact that it gives, if it has any.102

Such arguments are superficially seducing but
dangerous because these ask that legal decisions be the
outcome of homespun fear rather than based on more
critical analysis.
_______________
99 Id., at p. 1765.
100 238 Phil. 136; 154 SCRA 142 (1987) [Per J. Cruz, First Division].
101 Id., at p. 146; p. 151.
102 Rollo (G.R. No. 187836), p. 1767.
134


The fallacy of the argument of petitioner SJS is obvious.
To begin with, not all talipapa are hazardous to public
health and safety. In the case cited by petitioner SJS, the
talipapa was in the vicinity of the public market of San
Fernando, Pampanga, along Mercado Street, a strip of land
measuring 12 by 77 meters on which stands a
conglomeration of vendors stalls.103 The vendors wanted to
assert their right to remain in the area due to a previous
authorization by the municipal government. The municipal
government denied this right, insisting on the demolition of
their structures because they were illegal constructions on
public property. In deciding to uphold the municipal
government, this court noted that the occupants
proliferated under filthy conditions that added to the basis
of the municipal government to assert its powers over the
public space.104 That case certainly did not denigrate all
talipapa. Its reiteration of the findings of the municipal
government certainly only applied to that specific set of
vendor stalls.
Not all talipapa are the same. Not all are hazardous to
public health and safety. It depends on the condition of the
talipapa. These conditions can be found only upon the
presentation of evidence in the proper judicial forum. Only
after the presentation of evidence can the degree of risk
and hazard be assessed in relation to the standards
contained in law and corresponding regulations. Only after
all these can courts rule whether to remove or demolish a
talipapa.
The same considerations apply to oil depots. In this case,
upon reassessing the facts and weighing the risks in
relation to the necessity of the Pandacan oil depot, the
Sangguniang Panlungsod of Manila found it proper to
reverse its policy through a validly issued ordinance.
Except for superficial arguments based on fallacies
masquerading as common sense, petitioners here do not
present us with facts that can be taken
_______________
103 Villanueva v. Castaeda, supra note 100 at p. 139; p. 145.

104 Id., at p. 146; p. 151.
135
VOL. 742, NOVEMBER 25, 2014 135

judicial notice of. Rather, petitioners present to us the

same city council report that was submitted for the passage
of Ordinance No. 8027, and not the report that served as
basis for Ordinance No. 8187, which is the subject of this
case.
The failure to discharge the burden of clearly showing
the illegality of the ordinance is enough to dismiss the
petition. However, the static view of the world presented by
petitioners merits further attention.
The challenges and controversies surrounding the
passage of the various ordinances relating to the Pandacan
oil depot certainly also impel the corporations and the local
government officials to install measures to further assure
its public. We cannot accept the implied assumption of the
petitioners that nothing in relation to the Pandacan oil
depot has changed since this courts decision and resolution
in the earlier case of Social Justice Society (SJS), et al. v.
Hon. Atienza, Jr.105
For instance, the ponencia in Social Justice Society
(SJS), et al. v. Hon. Atienza, Jr. (2008 resolution) pointed
out that:
The ordinance [Ordinance No. 8027] was intended to safeguard

the rights to life, security and safety of all the inhabitants of
Manila and not just of a particular class. The depot is perceived,
rightly or wrongly, as a representation of western interests which
means that it is a terrorist target. As long as there is such a
target in their midst, the residents of Manila are not safe. It
therefore became necessary to remove these terminals to dissipate
the threat. According to respondent:
Such a public need became apparent after the 9/11 incident
which showed that what was perceived to be impossible to
happen, to the most powerful country in the world at that, is
actually possible. The destruction of property and the loss of
thousand of lives on
_______________
105 Supra notes 31 and 17.

136

that fateful day became the impetus for a public need. In the
aftermath of the 9/11 tragedy, the threats of terrorism continued
[such] that it became imperative for governments to take
measures to combat their effects.106

In this petition, SJS repeats the same argument with
the same certainty that the Pandacan terminal is a target
of terrorist attacks because it represents Western interest
in the Philippines. In its memorandum, SJS randomly
listed acts of terrorism in the Philippines and in Asia. In its
own enumeration, bombs attributed to terrorists exploded:
in cars near the official residence of ambassadors, on a
packed parking deck beneath a stock exchange building,
inside a luggage, outside a bar, in a bus terminal, in an
embassy, in hotels, and inside a light rail transit coach.107
In the Philippines, terrorists have targeted government
buildings, public utility buses, fastfood outlet, beach resort,
markets, and churches.108 At the international level,
terrorists have chosen trains, churches, mosques and other
places where the faithful gather, police stations, hotels,
embassies, and markets.109 Not once has an oil depot been
attacked.
Western interests, if such concept can be accepted
despite its obvious ambiguity and potential to encompass
much of modern life, are simply too omnipresent. To accept
SJS theory would mean that it would be illegal and
unconstitutional not to close down or isolate cars,
residences of ambassadors, parking buildings, lounges,
bars, restaurants, bus terminals, embassy buildings,
hotels, and light rail transit coaches.
The panic does not end there. SJS expands even further
to almost everything. Thus:
_______________
106 Id., at p. 703; p. 139.

107 Rollo (G.R. No. 187836), pp. 17681770.
108 Id., at p. 2224.
109 Id., at p. 2223.
137
VOL. 742, NOVEMBER 25, 2014 137

All of us should not forget the socalled Rizal Day bombings

where innocent ordinary people were targeted by J[emaah]
I[slamiyah] on Light Rail Transit coaches which had claimed
many lives. The Light Rail Transit did not represent Western
interest and had no symbolic value as far as Western target is
concerned and yet it was struck by those heartless terrorists.110

Risks are inherent in all human activity. The questions
properly addressed to policy makers are whether the risks
are properly proven and understood, the measures that are
proposed are sufficient to mitigate the risks in relation to
the beneficial effects or objective of the activity, and
whether the measures can be implemented given the
institutions in place and the resources available.
Governance cannot proceed from imagined fears. Therefore,
insofar as judicial review is concerned, it is not our duty to
secondguess political branches or local government units.
They are in a better position to understand risks, decide on
measures, and pursue these measures implementation.

Doctrine in Social Justice Society (SJS), et al. v.
Hon. Atienza, Jr.

This much was recognized in Social Justice Society
(SJS), et al. v. Hon. Atienza, Jr.111
Statutes and ordinances are presumed valid unless and until

the courts declare the contrary in clear and unequivocal terms.
The mere fact that the ordinance is alleged to be unconstitutional
or invalid will not entitle a party to have its enforcement enjoined.
The presumption is all in favor of validity. The reason for this is
obvious:
_______________
110 Id., at p. 1770.

111 Supra note 17.
138

The action of the elected representatives of the people cannot

be lightly set aside. The councilors must, in the very nature of
things, be familiar with the necessities of their particular
municipality and with all the facts and circumstances which
surround the subject and necessitate action. The local legislative
body, by enacting the ordinance, has in effect given notice that the
regulations are essential to the well being of the people . . . The
Judiciary should not lightly set aside legislative action when
there is not a clear invasion of personal or property rights under
the guise of police regulation.
xxx xxx xxx
[Courts] accord the presumption of constitutionality to
legislative enactments, not only because the legislature is
presumed to abide by the Constitution but also because the
judiciary[,] in the determination of actual cases and
controversies[,] must reflect the wisdom and justice of the people
as expressed through their representatives in the executive and
legislative departments of the government.
The oil companies argue that this presumption must be set
aside when the invalidity or unreasonableness appears on the face
of the ordinance itself. We see no reason to set aside the
presumption. The ordinance, on its face, does not at all appear to
be unconstitutional. It reclassified the subject area from
industrial to commercial. Prima facie, this power is within the
power of municipal corporations:
The power of municipal corporations to divide their territory
into industrial, commercial and residential zones is recognized in
almost all jurisdictions inasmuch as it is derived from the police
power itself and is exercised for the protection and benefit of their
inhabitants.
xxx xxx xxx
There can be no doubt that the City of Manila has the power to
divide its territory into residential and industrial zones, and to
prescribe that offensive and un
139
VOL. 742, NOVEMBER 25, 2014 139

wholesome trades and occupations are to be established

exclusively in the latter zone.
xxx xxx xxx
Likewise, it cannot be denied that the City of Manila has the
authority, derived from the police power, of forbidding the
appellant to continue the manufacture of toyo in the zone where it
is now situated, which has been declared residential....
Courts will not invalidate an ordinance unless it clearly
appears that it is unconstitutional. There is no such showing here.
Therefore, the injunctive writs issued in the Manila RTCs May
19, 2003 order had no leg to stand on.112 (Citations omitted)

IV
No ordinance is irrepealable

Petitioners assail Ordinance No. 8187 because the
ordinance effectively allows the oil depots to remain in the
Pandacan terminal, allegedly contrary to this courts
decision in G.R. No. 156052. It, thus, concludes that the
ordinance is illegal or unconstitutional.
Petitioners are mistaken.
Ordinance No. 8187 repealed Ordinance No. 8027. G.R.
No. 156052 had Ordinance No. 8027 as its subject matter.
There is no circumvention of the decision in G.R. No.
156052 simply because Ordinance No. 8027 no longer exists
upon its valid repeal by the Sangguniang Panlungsod of
Manila. Both ordinances were the result of the
determination of policy by the City of Manila. Certainly,
there is nothing in our decision in
_______________
112 Id., at pp. 683684; pp. 117118. Supra note 41 at p. 325; p. 857;
US v. Salaveria, 39 Phil. 102, 110 (1918) [Per J. Malcolm, En Banc];
Angara v. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil. 139, 157 (1936) [Per J. Laurel,
En Banc].
140

G.R. No. 156052 that categorically prevents the repeal of

Ordinance No. 8027.
As this court has categorically stated, there is no such
thing as an irrepealable law.113 As explained in Duarte v.
Dade:114
It is fundamental that what legislators have the power to enact

they have the power to repeal. In speaking of the powers of
legislative bodies, it is said in Lewis Southerland on Statutory
Construction, Section 244: A state legislature has a plenary law
making power over all subjects, whether pertaining to persons or
things, within its territorial jurisdiction, either to introduce new
laws or repeal the old, unless prohibited expressly or by
implication by the federal constitution or limited or restrained by
its own. It cannot bind itself or its successors by enacting
irrepealable laws except when so restrained. Every legislative body
may modify or abolish the acts passed by itself or its predecessors.
This power of repeal may be exercised at the same session at
which the original act was passed; and even while a bill is in its
progress and before it becomes a law. This legislature cannot bind
a future legislature to a particular mode of repeal. It cannot
declare in advance the intent of subsequent legislatures or the
effect of subsequent legislation upon existing statutes.115
(Emphasis supplied)

In The City of Davao, et al. v. Regional Trial Court,
Branch XII, Davao City, et al.,116 this court stated that:
_______________
113 Atitiw v. Zamora, 508 Phil. 321, 341; 471 SCRA 329, 345 (2005)
[Per J. Tinga, En Banc].
114 32 Phil. 36 (1915) [Per J. Trent, En Banc].
115 Id., at p. 49.
116 504 Phil. 543; 467 SCRA 280 (2005) [Per J. Tinga, Second
Division].
141
VOL. 742, NOVEMBER 25, 2014 141
It is a basic precept that among the implied substantive

limitations on the legislative powers is the prohibition against the
passage of irrepealable laws. Irrepealable laws deprive succeeding
legislatures of the fundamental best senses carte blanche in
crafting laws appropriate to the operative milieu. Their allowance
promotes an unhealthy stasis in the legislative front and
dissuades dynamic democratic impetus that may be responsive to
the times. As Senior Associate Justice Reynato S. Puno once
observed, [t]o be sure, there are no irrepealable laws just as there
are no irrepealable Constitutions. Change is the predicate of
progress and we should not fear change.
Moreover, it would be noxious anathema to democratic
principles for a legislative body to have the ability to bind the
actions of future legislative body, considering that both assemblies
are regarded with equal footing, exercising as they do the same
plenary powers. Perpetual infallibility is not one of the attributes
desired in a legislative body, and a legislature which attempts to
forestall future amendments or repeals of its enactments labors
under delusions of omniscience.117 (Emphasis supplied, citations
omitted)

Even the issuance of a writ of mandamus to implement
Ordinance No. 8027 cannot mean that it becomes
irrepealable. This was a live and existing ordinance when
this court dealt with it in Social Justice Society (SJS), et al.
v. Hon. Atienza, Jr. Today, it has been validly repealed.
This court made it clear in G.R. No. 156052 (2007) that the
city mayor has the duty to enforce Ordinance No. 8027 as
long as it has not been repealed by the Sanggunian or
annulled by the courts.118
_______________
117 Id., at p. 558; p. 295.

118 Supra note 31 at p. 493; pp. 665666.
142

V
Violation of the doctrine of respect
for the hierarchy of courts

Respondents argue that the petitions should be
dismissed because direct recourse to this court is improper.
The allegations in the petitions involve factual issues that
require the presentation of evidence. Also, Rule 65, Section
4 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides:
SEC. 4. When and where petition filed.. . . .

The petition shall be filed in the Supreme Court or, if it relates
to the acts or omissions of a lower court or of a corporation, board,
officer or person, in the Regional Trial Court exercising
jurisdiction over the territorial area as defined by the Supreme
Court. It may also be filed in the Court of Appeals whether or not
the same is in aid of its appellate jurisdiction, or in the
Sandiganbayan if it is in aid of its appellate jurisdiction. If it
involves the acts or omissions of a quasijudicial agency, unless
otherwise provided by law or these rules, the petition shall be
filed in and cognizable only by the Court of Appeals.

Chevron argues that since the act complained of was
done in the City of Manila, then the petition should have
been filed before the Regional Trial Courts of Manila.119 As
a consequence, the petitions in G.R. No. 187836 and G.R.
No. 187916 should be dismissed.
In accordance with Article VIII, Section 5 of the 1987
Constitution, this court has jurisdiction over petitions for
certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and
habeas corpus. The same jurisdiction is granted to the
Court of Appeals120 and Regional Trial Courts121 under
Batas Pambansa
_______________
119 Rollo (G.R. No. 187836), p. 2053.

120 Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 (1981), Sec. 9.
121 Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 (1981), Sec. 21.
143
VOL. 742, NOVEMBER 25, 2014 143

Blg. 129.122 Thus, there is concurrence of jurisdiction

among this court, the Court of Appeals, and the Regional
Trial Court with regard to petitions for certiorari,
prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas corpus.
However, the concurrence of jurisdiction does not mean
that parties are free to choose which court to seek redress
from. This court is the court of last resort, and observance
of the doctrine of hierarchy of courts is necessary to prevent
(1) inordinate demands upon the time and attention of the
court, which is better devoted to those matters within its
exclusive jurisdiction; and (2) further overcrowding of the
courts docket.123
In Anillo v. COSLAP,124 this court explained that:
At the outset, it is necessary to stress that a direct recourse to

this Court is highly improper for it violates the established policy
of strict observance of the judicial hierarchy of courts. While we
have concurrent jurisdiction with the RTCs and the Court of
Appeals to issue writs of certiorari, this concurrence is not to be
taken as an unrestrained freedom of choice as to which court the
application for the writ will be directed. There is after all a
hierarchy of courts. That hierarchy is determinative of the venue
of appeals and should also serve as a general determinant of the
appropriate forum for petitions for the extraordinary writs. This
Court is a court of last resort and must so remain if it is to
satisfactorily perform the functions assigned to it by the
Constitution and immemorial tradition. A direct invocation of the
Supreme Courts original jurisdiction to issue these extraordinary
writs is allowed only when there are special and impor
_______________
122 An Act Reorganizing the Judiciary, Appropriating Funds Therefor,

and for Other Purposes.
123 De Castro v. Carlos, G.R. No. 194994, April 16, 2013, 696 SCRA
400, 407 [Per CJ. Sereno, En Banc].
124 560 Phil. 499; 534 SCRA 228 (2007) [Per J. Tiga, Second
Division].
144

tant reasons therefor, clearly and specifically set out in the

petition.
....
The doctrines of judicial hierarchy and res judicata are not
meaningless procedural rules because they are grounded on
fundamental considerations of public policy and sound practice.
Procedural rules are not to be belittled or dismissed simply
because their nonobservance may have resulted in prejudice to a
partys substantive rights. Like all rules, they are required to be
followed except only for the most persuasive of reasons when they
may be relaxed to relieve a litigant of an injustice not
commensurate with the degree of his thoughtlessness in not
complying with the procedure prescribed. Procedural law has its
own rationale in the orderly administration of justice, namely, to
ensure the effective enforcement of substantive rights by
providing for a system that obviates arbitrariness, caprice,
despotism or whimsicality in the settlement of disputes.125

Exceptions to the doctrine of hierarchy of courts

Nevertheless, this court has, from time to time, relaxed
its rules and allowed the direct filing of petitions before it.
The exceptions to the doctrine of hierarchy of courts
include:
(1) when dictated by the public welfare and the advancement of

public policy; (2) when demanded by the broader interest of
justice; (3) when the challenged orders were patent nullities; or
(4) when analogous exceptional and compelling circumstances
called for and justified the immediate and direct handling of the
case.126
_______________
125 Id., at pp. 505506 and 509; pp. 239240.

126 Dy v. BibatPalamos, G.R. No. 196200, September 11, 2013, 705
SCRA 613, 622 [Per J. Mendoza, Third Division], citing Republic v.
Caguioa, G.R. No. 174385, February 20, 2013, 691 SCRA 306 [Per J.
Brion, Second Division].
145
VOL. 742, NOVEMBER 25, 2014 145

None of these exceptions were sufficiently shown to be

present in this case so as to convince this court that it
should relax its rules of procedure.

VI
Petitioners have no legal standing

In its memorandum, SJS alleges that it is suing not as
taxpayers, but in pursuance of a public right. Since its
members are Filipino citizens, it has the standing to
pursue the public right without need to allege any specific
interest in the public right. SJS also claims that Vladimir
Alarique T. Cabigao resides in Pandacan and lives 300
meters away from the Petron oil depot and, as such, has a
substantial interest.127
In G.R. No. 187916, some of the petitioners are minors
claiming to represent their own generation and future
generations. However, unlike Oposa v. Factoran,128 the
minors in this case do not appear to be representative
enough of the interests of their generation as to consider
their petition to be a class suit.
On the contrary, Shell, Chevron, and Petron point out
that petitioners neither alleged any particular injury
suffered nor did they allege any imminent injury brought
about by Ordinance No. 8187.
In cases involving issues of constitutionality, the party
raising the issue of constitutionality must have locus
standi. Locus standi has been defined as a right of
appearance in a court of justice on a given question.129 The
basic question in
_______________
127 Rollo (G.R. No. 187836), pp. 17611762.

128 G.R. No. 101083, July 30, 1993, 224 SCRA 792 [Per J. Davide, Jr.,
En Banc].
129 J. Leonen, Concurring Opinion in Garcia v. Drilon, G.R. No.
179267, June 25, 2013, 699 SCRA 352, 491 [Per J. PerlasBernabe, En
Banc], citing David v. MacapagalArroyo, 522 Phil. 705, 755; 489 SCRA
160, 216 (2006) [Per J. SandovalGutierrez, En Banc].
146

determining if one has locus standing is whether a

party alleges such personal stake in the outcome of the
controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which
sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court
depends for illumination of difficult constitutional
questions.130
The requirement that one must have locus standi comes
from Article VIII, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution, which
states that:
Article VIII. Judicial Department

Section 1. . . . .
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to
settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not
there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality
of the Government.

The requirement that a party must have standing in
court is not a mere procedural rule that this court can
brush aside on the mere invocation of transcendental
importance, taxpayers suit, and filing as Filipino
citizens. Then Associate Justice Reynato Puno, in his
dissenting opinion in Kilosbayan v. Guingona,131 explained
the importance of locus standi:
The requirement of standing to sue inheres from the definition

of judicial power. It is not merely a technical rule of procedure
which we are at liberty to disregard. Section 1, Article VIII of the
Constitution provides:
....
_______________
130 Id., citing Galicto v. Aquino III, G.R. No. 193978, February 28,
2012, 667 SCRA 150, 170 [Per J. Brion, En Banc].
131 J. Puno, Dissenting Opinion in Kilosbayan v. Guingona, G.R. No.
113375, May 5, 1994, 232 SCRA 110 [Per J. Davide, Jr., En Banc].
147
VOL. 742, NOVEMBER 25, 2014 147

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to

settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not
there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality
of the Government. (Italics in the original)
....
Stated otherwise, courts are neither free to decide all kinds of
cases dumped into their laps nor are they free to open their doors
to all parties or entities claiming a grievance. The rationale for
this constitutional requirement of locus standi is by no means
trifle. It is intended to assure a vigorous adversary presentation
of the case, and, perhaps more importantly to warrant the
judiciarys overruling the determination of a coordinate,
democratically elected organ of government.
....
A lesser but not insignificant reason for screening the standing
of persons who desire to litigate constitutional issues is economic
in character. Given the sparseness of our resources, the capacity
of courts to render efficient judicial service to our people is
severely limited. For courts to indiscriminately open their doors to
all types of suits and suitors is for them to unduly overburden
their dockets, and ultimately render themselves ineffective
dispensers of justice. To be sure, this is an evil that clearly
confronts our judiciary today.132

Rights which are legally demandable and enforceable
means that the party who seeks relief from this court must
suffer, or is in imminent danger of suffering, an injury. In
_______________
132 Id., at pp. 166, 169 and 170171.
148

Tolentino v. COMELEC,133 this court held that direct

injury may be determined using the following guidelines:
Thus, generally, a party will be allowed to litigate only when

(1) he can show that he has personally suffered some actual or
threatened injury because of the allegedly illegal conduct of the
government; (2) the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged
action; and (3) the injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable
action.134

In a previous case,135 this court held that SJS had no
standing to file a petition for declaratory relief before the
Regional Trial Court of Manila on the following grounds:
First, parties suing as taxpayers must specifically prove that

they have sufficient interest in preventing the illegal expenditure
of money raised by taxation. A taxpayers action may be properly
brought only when there is an exercise by Congress of its taxing
or spending power. In the present case, there is no allegation,
whether express or implied, that taxpayers money is being
illegally disbursed.
Second, there was no showing in the Petition for Declaratory
Relief that SJS as a political party or its members as registered
voters would be adversely affected by the alleged acts of the
respondents below, if the question at issue was not resolved.
There was no allegation that SJS had suffered or would be
deprived of votes due to the acts imputed to the said respondents.
Neither did it allege that any of its members would be denied the
right of suffrage or the privilege to be voted for a public office they
are seeking.
_______________
133 465 Phil. 385; 420 SCRA 438 (2004) [Per J. Carpio, En Banc].
134 Id., at p. 402; p. 452.
135 Velarde v. Social Justice Society, G.R. No. 159357, April 28, 2004,
428 SCRA 283 [Per J. Panganiban, En Banc].
149
VOL. 742, NOVEMBER 25, 2014 149

Finally, the allegedly keen interest of its thousands of

members who are citizenstaxpayersregistered voters is too
general and beyond the contemplation of the standards set by our
jurisprudence. Not only is the presumed interest impersonal in
character; it is likewise too vague, highly speculative and
uncertain to satisfy the requirement of standing.136 (Citations
omitted)

This should have guided SJS in determining whether it
had the standing to file the petition for prohibition before
this court. Unfortunately, SJS did not heed this courts
advice.

Transcendental importance

Petitioners try to justify its direct recourse to this court
by arguing that the issues raised in their petitions are of
transcendental importance.137
To determine if an issue is of transcendental
importance, this court is guided by the parameters set forth
in Francisco v. House of Representatives:138
There being no doctrinal definition of transcendental

importance, the following instructive determinants formulated by
former Supreme Court Justice Florentino P. Feliciano are
instructive: (1) the character of the funds or other assets involved
in the case; (2) the presence of a clear case of disregard of a
constitutional or statutory prohibition by the public respondent
agency or instrumentality of the government; and (3) the lack of
any other party with a more direct and specific interest in raising
the questions being raised.139
_______________
136 Id., at pp. 296297.

137 Rollo (G.R. No. 187836), p. 1764.
138 460 Phil. 830; 415 SCRA 44 (2003) [Per J. CarpioMorales, En
Banc].
139 Id., at p. 899; p. 139.
150

A mere allegation of transcendental importance will not

suffice to convince this court to take cognizance of a case.
Petitioner SJS, in its memorandum, point out that since
this court had taken cognizance of G.R. No. 156052, there
is no more need to present other arguments to convince
this court that the matter at hand is of transcendental
importance.140
Petitioners are mistaken. Whether an issue is of
transcendental importance is a matter determined by this
court on a casetocase basis. An allegation of
transcendental importance must be supported by the
proper allegations.
Petitioners, however, merely stated:
This Honorable Court, again in the prequel case of Social

Justice Society, et al. v. Atienza, Jr., G.R. No. 156052, 13 February
2008, made the following statements
The importance of settling this controversy as fully and as
expeditiously as possible was emphasized, considering its impact
on public interest. Thus, we will also dispose of this issue here.
The parties were after all given ample opportunity to present and
argue their respective positions. By so doing, we will do away with
the delays concomitant with litigation and completely adjudicate
an issue which will most likely reach us anyway as the final
arbiter of all legal disputes.
The foregoing was an undeniable recognition by this Honorable
Court of the importance of this case as it mentioned its impact on
public interest that justified its taking cognizance of the original
petition because the issue would most likely reach it anyway as
the final arbiter of all legal disputes. Thus, petitioners need not
stretch its argumentation to convince this Honorable Court about
the transcendental importance of this case.141
_______________
140 Rollo (G.R. No. 187836), p. 1764.

141 Id.
151
VOL. 742, NOVEMBER 25, 2014 151

For this court to brush aside the rules of procedure in

view of the transcendental importance of a case,
petitioners must be able to show that the imminence and
clarity of the threat to fundamental constitutional rights
outweigh the necessity for prudence.142 This they failed to
do.

VII
There are other remedies available

Respondents and intervenors point out that more
appropriate remedies are available to petitioners. As
petitioners allegations relate to the environment, they
could have filed civil, criminal, or special civil actions
before the lower courts, and prayed for the issuance of the
writ of kalikasan, or environment protection orders, as
provided by the rules of procedure for environmental cases.
Chevron raised the argument that since petitioners allege
that the Pandacan terminal is hazardous and pollutive,
then the proper remedy is not to enjoin the enforcement of
Ordinance No. 8187 but to enjoin the hazardous and
pollutive activities inside the terminal.143
I agree with respondents.
Petitioners could have availed themselves of the remedy
of a writ of kalikasan if they could properly and clearly
show grave danger to the environment.
Petitioners may argue that their petitions were filed
ahead of the promulgation of the rules of procedure for
environmental cases. However, procedural rules are
generally given retroactive effect since there are no vested
rights in rules of procedure.144
_______________
142 J. Leonen, Concurring Opinion in Garcia v. Drilon, supra note 129
at p. 493.
143 Rollo (G.R. No. 187836), pp. 20652066.
144 De los Santos v. Vda. de Mangubat, 561 Phil. 512; 535 SCRA 411
(2007) [Per J. AustriaMartinez, Third Division].
152

Rule 7, Section 1 of A.M. No. 0968SC145 provides:
SEC. 1. Nature of the writ.The writ is a remedy available

to a natural or juridical person, entity authorized by law, peoples
organization, nongovernmental organization, or any public
interest group accredited by or registered with any government
agency, on behalf of persons whose constitutional right to a
balanced and healthful ecology is violated, or threatened with
violation by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or
employee, or private individual or entity, involving environmental
damage of such magnitude as to prejudice the life, health or
property of inhabitants in two or more cities or provinces.

The application for the issuance of a writ of kalikasan is
commenced by filing a verified petition, stating the
personal circumstances of petitioner and respondent, the
environmental laws violated, the acts or omissions
complained of, and the environmental damage as to
prejudice the life, health or property of inhabitants in two
or more cities or provinces.146 The petition must be
supported by relevant evidence such as affidavits or
documents. A petition for the issuance of a writ of
kalikasan may include a prayer for the issuance of a
temporary environmental protection order (TEPO).147
If petitioners had evidence, they could also file an action
for abatement of nuisance, considering that in their
memorandum, they characterized the oil depot as a
nuisance per accidens. Their memorandum states:
No selfrespecting government would allow its people to be

exposed to health and safety risk by allowing a nuisance per
accidens, just like the Pandacan oil depot, to
_______________
145 Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases (2010).

146 A.M. No. 0968SC, Rule 7, Sec. 2.
147 A.M. No. 0968SC, Rule 7, Sec. 2(f).
153
VOL. 742, NOVEMBER 25, 2014 153

sit side by side with a densely populated community.148

(Emphasis from the original removed)

Article 694 of the Civil Code defines nuisance as:
ART. 694. A nuisance is any act, omission, establishment,

condition of property, or anything else which:
(1) Injures or endangers the health or safety of others; or
(2) Annoys or offends the senses; or
(3) Shocks, defies or disregards decency or morality; or
(4) Obstructs or interferes with the free passage of any public
highway or street, or any body of water; or
(5) Hinders or impairs the use of property.

Another option available to petitioners was to file a
complaint under the provisions of the Clean Air Act.149
Thus, the law provides:
SEC. 40. Administrative Action.Without prejudice to the

right of any affected person to file an administrative action, the
Department shall, on its own instance or upon verified complaint
by any person, institute administrative proceedings against any
person who violates:
a. Standards or limitation provided under this Act; or
b. Any order, rule or regulation issued by the Department with
respect to such standard or limitation.
_______________
148 Rollo (G.R. No. 187836), p. 1775.

149 Rep. Act No. 8749 (1999), otherwise known as An Act Providing for
a Comprehensive Air Pollution Control Policy and for Other Purposes.
154

SEC. 41. Citizen Suits.For purposes of enforcing the
provisions of this Act or its implementing rules and regulations,
any citizen may file an appropriate civil, criminal or
administrative action in the proper courts against:
a. Any person who violates or fails to comply with the
provisions of this Act or its implementing rules and regulations;
or
b. The Department or other implementing agencies with
respect to orders, rules and regulations issued inconsistent with
this Act; and/or
c. Any public officer who willfully or grossly neglects the
performance of an act specifically enjoined as a duty by this Act or
its implementing rules and regulations; or abuses his authority in
the performance of his duty; or, in any manner, improperly
performs his duties under this Act or its implementing rules and
regulations: Provided, however, That no suit can be filed until
after thirtyday (30) notice has been given to the public officer and
the alleged violator concerned and no appropriate action has been
taken thereon.
The court shall exempt such action from the payment of filing
fees, except fees for actions not capable of pecuniary estimations,
and shall, likewise, upon prima facie showing of the
nonenforcement or violation complained of, exempt the plaintiff
from the filing of an injunction bond for the issuance of a
preliminary injunction.
Within thirty (30) days, the court shall make a determination if
the compliant herein is malicious and/or baseless and shall
accordingly dismiss the action and award attorneys fees and
damages.
SEC. 42. Independence of Action.The filing of an
administrative suit against such person/entity does not preclude
the right of any other person to file any criminal or civil action.
Such civil action shall proceed independently.
155
VOL. 742, NOVEMBER 25, 2014 155

If petitioners had evidence to support their allegation

that Ordinance No. 8187 by its simple existence actually
causes pollution and hazard to communities in Manila,
they could avail themselves of remedies under Republic Act
No. 6969,150 whose pertinent portions state:
SEC. 13. Prohibited Acts.The following acts and omissions

shall be considered unlawful:
a. Knowingly use a chemical substance or mixture which is
imported, manufactured, processed or distributed in violation of
this Act or implementing rules and regulations or orders;
b. Failure or refusal to submit reports, notices or other
information, access to records as required by this Act, or permit
inspection of establishment where chemicals are manufactured,
processed, stored or otherwise held;
c. Failure or refusal to comply with the premanufacture and
preimportation requirements; and
d. Cause, aid or facilitate, directly or indirectly, in the storage,
importation, or bringing into Philippine territory, including its
maritime economic zones, even in transit, either by means of land,
air or sea transportation or otherwise keeping in storage any
amount of hazardous and nuclear wastes in any part of the
Philippines.
SEC. 14. Criminal Offenses and Penalties.
a. (i) The penalty of imprisonment of six (6) months and one
day to six (6) years and one day and a fine ranging from Six
hundred pesos (P600.00) to Four thousand pesos (P4,000.00) shall
be imposed upon any person who shall violate Section 13(a) to (c)
of this Act and shall not be covered by the Probation
_______________
150 An Act to Control Toxic Substances and Hazardous and Nuclear

Wastes, Providing Penalties for Violations Thereof, and for Other
Purposes (1990).
156

Law. If the offender is a foreigner, he or she shall be deported

and barred from any subsequent entry into the Philippines after
serving his or her sentence;
(ii) In case any violation of this Act is committed by a
partnership, corporation, association or any juridical person, the
partner, president, director or manager who shall consent to or
shall knowingly tolerate such violation shall be directly liable and
responsible for the act of the employees and shall be criminally
liable as a coprincipal;
(iii) In case the offender is a government official or employee,
he or she shall, in addition to the above penalties, be deemed
automatically dismissed from office and permanently disqualified
from holding any elective or appointive position.
b. (i) The penalty of imprisonment of twelve (12) years and
one day to twenty (20) years, shall be imposed upon any person
who shall violate Section 13(d) of this Act. If the offender is a
foreigner, he or she shall be deported and barred from any
subsequent entry into the Philippines after serving his or her
sentence;
(ii) In the case of corporations or other associations, the above
penalty shall be imposed upon the managing partner, president or
chief executive in addition to an exemplary damage of at least
Five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00). If it is a foreign firm,
the director and all officers of such foreign firm shall be barred
from entry into the Philippines, in addition to the cancellation of
its license to do business in the Philippines;
(iii) In case the offender is a government official or employee,
he or she shall in addition to the above penalties be deemed
automatically dismissed from office and permanently disqualified
from holding any elective or appointive position.
157
VOL. 742, NOVEMBER 25, 2014 157

c. Every penalty imposed for the unlawful importation, entry,

transport, manufacture, processing, sale or distribution of
chemical substances or mixtures into or within the Philippines
shall carry with it the confiscation and forfeiture in favor of the
Government of the proceeds of the unlawful act and instruments,
tools or other improvements including vehicles, sea vessels, and
aircrafts used in or with which the offense was committed.
Chemical substances so confiscated and forfeited by the
Government at its option shall be turned over to the Department
of Environment and Natural Resources for safekeeping and
proper disposal;
d. The person or firm responsible or connected with the
bringing or importation into the country of hazardous or nuclear
wastes shall be under obligation to transport or send back said
prohibited wastes.
Any and all means of transportation, including all facilities and
appurtenances that may have been used in transporting to or in
the storage in the Philippines of any significant amount of
hazardous or nuclear wastes shall at the option of the government
be forfeited in its favor.

There is also a nonjudicial remedy available to
petitioners: that of local initiative and local referendum.
Section 120 and Section 126 of Republic Act No. 7160
define local initiative and local referendum as:
SECTION 120. Local Initiative Defined.Local initiative is
the legal process whereby the registered voters of a local
government unit may directly propose, enact, or amend any
ordinance.
....
SECTION 126. Local Referendum Defined.Local
referendum is the legal process whereby the registered voters of
the local government units may approve, amend or reject any
ordinance enacted by the sanggunian.
158

The local referendum shall be held under the control and

direction of the COMELEC within sixty (60) days in case of
provinces and cities, fortyfive (45) days in case of municipalities
and thirty (30) days in case of barangays.
The COMELEC shall certify and proclaim the results of the
said referendum.

Petron alleges that a petition for referendum regarding
Ordinance No. 8187 was initiated on June 23, 2009.151 The
petition was entitled Petisyon ng mga mamamayan ng
Maynila sa Sangguniang Panglungsod ng Maynila na
kaagad pawalang bisa ang City Ordinance No[.] 8187 na
may pamagat na An Ordinance Amending Ordinance No.
8119, otherwise known as The Manila Comprehensive
Land Use Plan and Zoning Ordinance of 2006, by creating
a Medium Industrial Zone (12) and Heavy Industrial Zone
(13) and Providing for its Enforcement.152
Two of the signatories in the petition for referendum,
Vladimir Cabigao and Rafael Borromeo, are petitioners in
this case.153
Petitioners definitely had other plain, speedy, and
adequate remedies. On this ground alone, the petition
should have been dismissed.

VIII
Enactment of Ordinance No. 8283
renders this case moot and academic

Intervenor Shell filed a manifestation with motion to
dismiss dated September 2, 2013, informing this court that
Ordinance No. 8283 was published in The Manila Times154
and
_______________
151 Rollo (G.R. No. 187836), p. 2142.

152 Id., at p. 2143.
153 Id.
154 Id., at p. 2815.
159
VOL. 742, NOVEMBER 25, 2014 159

took effect on September 30, 2012.155 Shell prays that

the petitions be dismissed for being moot and academic.156
In the same manifestation, Shell stated that it filed a
petition for declaratory relief docketed as Case No. 131034
questioning Ordinance No. 8283 before the Regional Trial
Court of Makati City.157
Respondent Luch R. Gempis, Jr., Secretary of the
Sangguniang Panlungsod of Manila, filed a
compliance/explanation with urgent manifestation dated
September 13, 2012, informing this court that the
Sangguniang Panlungsod of Manila enacted Ordinance No.
8283 on August 28, 2012.158 The relevant portions of
Ordinance No. 8283 provides:
ORDINANCE NO. 8283

AN ORDINANCE AMENDING SECTION 2 OF ORDINANCE
NO. 8187 BY RECLASSIFYING THE AREA WHERE
PETROLEUM REFINERIES AND OIL DEPOTS ARE LOCATED
FROM HEAVY INDUSTRIAL (I3) TO HIGH INTENSITY
COMMERCIAL/MIXED USE ZONE (C3/MXD)
Be it ordained by the City Council of Manila, in session
assembled, THAT:
SECTION 1. Section 2 of Ordinance No. 8187 shall be
amended to read as follows:
SEC. 2. The land use where the existing industries are
located, the operation of which are permitted under Section 1
hereof, are hereby classified as Industrial Zone except the area
where petroleum refineries and oil depots are located, which shall
be classified
_______________
155 Id., at p. 2814.

156 Id., at p. 2816.
157 Id.
158 Id., at p. 2760.
160

as High Intensity Commercial/Mixed Use Zone (C3/MXD).

(Emphasis from the original removed)
SEC. 2. Owners or operators of petroleum refineries and oil
depots, the operation of which are no longer permitted under
Section 1 hereof, are hereby given a period until the end of
January 2016 within which to relocate the operation of their
businesses.159

Mayor Lim vetoed Ordinance No. 8283.160 However, the
members of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Manila
overrode Mayor Lims veto by more than twothirds (2/3)
vote during a regular session on September 13, 2012.161
Mayor Lim filed a manifestation162 dated November 26,
2012, informing this court that he vetoed Ordinance No.
8283 for a second time, pursuant to Section 17 of Republic
Act No. 409.163
Whether Mayor Lims second veto was overridden does
not appear on record. However, considering this courts
pronouncement in City of Manila v. Hon. Laguio, Jr.,164 the
appli
_______________
159 Id., at pp. 27662767.

160 Id., at p. 2760.
161 Id., at p. 2761.
162 Id., at pp. 27812783.
163 Id., at p. 2782.
164 Supra note 45. This court held that:
On the second point, it suffices to say that the Code being a later
expression of the legislative will must necessarily prevail and override the
earlier law, the Revised Charter of Manila. Legis posteriores priores
contrarias abrogant, or later statute repeals prior ones which are
repugnant thereto. As between two laws on the same subject matter,
which are irreconcilably inconsistent, that which is passed later prevails,
since it is the latest expression of legislative will.
....
In addition, Section 534(f) of the Code states that All general and
special laws, acts, city charters, decrees, ex
161
VOL. 742, NOVEMBER 25, 2014 161
cable law in this case is Republic Act No. 7160 and not
Republic Act No. 409. Section 55(c) of Republic Act No.
7160 provides:

SECTION 55. Veto Power of the Local Chief Executive.. . . .

....
(c) The local chief executive may veto an ordinance or
resolution only once. The sanggunian may override the veto of the
local chief executive by twothirds (2/3) vote of all its members,
thereby making the ordinance effective even without the approval
of the local chief executive concerned. (Emphasis supplied)

Following Section 55(c) of Republic Act No. 7160, Mayor
Lims second veto can be presumed to be of no effect. For
this reason, the enactment, publication, and enforcement of
Ordinance No. 8283 render the petitions moot and
academic. In David v. MacapagalArroyo,165 this court
defined moot and academic in the following manner:
A moot and academic case is one that ceases to present a

justiciable controversy by virtue of supervening events, so that a
declaration thereon would be of no practical use or value.166

In the same case, this court discussed the moot and
academic principle as:
_______________
ecutive orders, proclamations and administrative regulations, or part

or parts thereof which are inconsistent with any of the provisions of this
Code are hereby repealed or modified accordingly. (pp. 333334; pp. 354
355)
165 David v. MacapagalArroyo, supra note 129.
166 Id., at p. 753; pp. 213214.
162

The moot and academic principle is not a magical formula that

can automatically dissuade the courts in resolving a case. Courts
will decide cases, otherwise moot and academic, if: first, there is a
grave violation of the Constitution; second, the exceptional
character of the situation and the paramount public interest is
involved; third, when constitutional issue raised requires
formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar
and the public; and fourth, the case is capable of repetition yet
evading review.167

Province of North Cotabato v. GRP168 discussed another
exception to the moot and academic principle: the
voluntary cessation of the activity complained of by the
defendant or doer.169 This exception was illustrated as
follows:
Thus, once a suit is filed and the doer voluntarily ceases the
challenged conduct, it does not automatically deprive the tribunal
of power to hear and determine the case and does not render the
case moot especially when the plaintiff seeks damages or prays for
injunctive relief against the possible recurrence of the violation.170

None of the parties have been able to show that the
exceptions to the moot and academic principle are present.
A review of the records reveals that after Shell and the
Sangguniang Panlungsod of Manila filed their
manifestations, petitioners SJS and Mayor Atienza did not
file any opposition to the motions to dismiss.
In any case, to rule upon the validity of Ordinance No.
8187 would be of no use since the ordinance has been
amended and, thus, conditions may have changed.
_______________
167 Id., at p. 754; pp. 214215.

168 589 Phil. 387; 568 SCRA 402 (2008) [Per J. CarpioMorales, En
Banc].
169 Id., at p. 490; p. 461.
170 Id.
163
VOL. 742, NOVEMBER 25, 2014 163

This court is mindful that the power of judicial review

should be exercised with caution. Judicial pronouncements
on the validity and constitutionality of laws must be
narrowly tailored to actual facts and issues in order to
prevent judicial overreach171 and ensure that the remedy
prevent judicial overreach171 and ensure that the remedy
sought is appropriate to the cause of action.172 Actual facts
that have been duly proven provide the limits to the scope
of judicial review that this court may exercise in a
particular case.173 In view of these principles, this court
must refrain from ruling upon the validity of Ordinance
No. 8187.
Final note

Mayor Atienza argues that Ordinance No. 8187 violates
the precautionary principle in international environmental
law.174 Intervenor Shell refutes this by arguing that the
precautionary principle only applies when scientific
investigation has found a plausible risk.175
The precautionary principle applies when it can be
shown that there is plausible risk, and its causes cannot be
determined with scientific certainty. It is not available
simply on the basis of imagined fears or imagined causes.
Otherwise, it will be absurd. Rather than a reactive
approach to fear, the precautionary principle is evolving as
a proactive approach in
_______________
171 J. Leonen, Concurring Opinion in Araullo v. Aquino III, G.R. No.

209287, July 1, 2014, 728 SCRA 1, 402403 [Per J. Bersamin, En Banc].
172 J. Leonen, Dissenting and Concurring Opinion in Disini, Jr. v.
Secretary of Justice, G.R. No. 203335, February 18, 2014, 716 SCRA 237
[Per J. Abad, En Banc].
173 J. Leonen, Dissenting Opinion in Imbong v. Ochoa, Jr., G.R. No.
204819, April 8, 2014, 721 SCRA 146, 731 [Per J. Mendoza, En Banc].
174 Rollo (G.R. No. 187836), p. 2466.
175 Id., at p. 2467.
164

protecting the environment.176 Furthermore, being only

a principle, it does not trump the requirements for proper
invocation of remedies or act to repeal existing laws.
Petitioners fears with regard to the prolonged stay of
the oil companies in the Pandacan terminal should be
assuaged by the execution of the MOU in 2002 among the
Department of Energy, City of Manila, Caltex
(Philippines), Inc., Petron Corporation, and Pilipinas Shell
Petroleum Corporation.177 Although it appears that the
Petroleum Corporation.177 Although it appears that the
validity of the MOU expired on April 30, 2003,178 the oil
companies continued to fulfill their responsibilities under
the MOU. Several tanks have been decommissioned and
dismantled,179 including Shells LPG spheres.180 Petron
filed a manifestation,181 informing this court that within
five years, or not later than January 2016, it will cease the
operations of its petroleum storage facilities in Pandacan
due to environmental concerns and the frequent changes in
the zoning ordinances.182 Buffer zones were constructed to
protect both the terminal and the nearby residential
area.183 The oil companies intend to continuously scale
down its operations in the Pandacan terminal, lessening
operations by around 80% in five years.184
Further, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Manila
enacted Ordinance No. 8283 on August 28, 2012,185 which
reclassifies the Pandacan terminal from a heavy industrial
zone to a high
_______________
176 R. B. Deloso, The Precautionary Principle: Relevance in

International Law and Climate Change, 80 PHIL. L. J. 644 (2006).
177 Rollo (G.R. No. 187836), pp. 331334.
178 As per the decision in Social Justice Society (SJS), et al. v. Atienza,
Jr., supra note 31 at pp. 490 and 494; p. 662.
179 Rollo (G.R. No. 187836), p. 2474.
180 Id., at p. 2475.
181 Id., at pp. 23152317.
182 Id., at p. 2316.
183 Id., at p. 2039.
184 Id., at p. 2517.
185 Id., at p. 2760.
165
VOL. 742, NOVEMBER 25, 2014 165

intensity commercial/mixed use zone.186 According to

news reports,187 Mayor Joseph Estrada is enforcing
Ordinance No. 8283 and has informed the oil companies
that they should relocate by January 2016.
Petitioners aggressive vigilance to protect the
communitys security and its environment is laudable.
However, the resources that they deployed would have
been best used in the political forum. This courts
jurisdiction is limited by the rule of law. The policy decision
to remove or gradually phase out the Pandacan oil depot is
left to the representatives of the people of the City of
Manila. We cannot replace their political decision with our
own no matter how convinced we are of our own policy
positions.
ACCORDINGLY, I vote to dismiss the petitions in G.R.
No. 187836 and G.R. No. 187916 for being moot and
academic.
Ordinance No. 8187 declared unconstitutional and

invalid with respect to continued stay of Pandacan Oil
Terminals.
_______________
186 Id., at pp. 27662767.

187 Philippine Information Agency, April 3, 2014
<http://news.pia.gov.ph/article/view/231396509958/estradaordersbig3
toremoveoildepotsinpandacan> (visited November 11, 2014); A. R.
Remo and E. Sauler, Mayor Estrada to Big 3 oil firms: Submit relocation
plans, Philippine Daily Inquirer, April 3, 2014,
<http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/591385/mayorestradatobig3oilfirms
submitrelocationplans> (visited November 11, 2014); B. Cupin, Erap to
oil firms: Shut down Pandacan depot by 2016, Rappler, April 3, 2014 (last
updated April 4, 2014) <http://www.
rappler.com/nation/54618erapestradaclosepandacanoildepot> (visited
November 11, 2014).
166

Notes.Since the issuance of an Executive Order (EO)

is not judicial, quasijudicial or a mandatory act, a petition
for certiorari and prohibition is an incorrect remedy;
instead a petition for declaratory relief under Rule 63 of the
Rules of Court, filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
is the proper recourse. (Galicto vs. Aquino III, 667 SCRA
150 [2012])
Settled is the rule that for the courts to exercise the
power of judicial review, the following must be extant: (1)
there must be an actual case calling for the exercise of
judicial power; (2) the question must be ripe for
adjudication; and (3) the person challenging must have the
standing. (Corales vs. Republic, 703 SCRA 623 [2013])
o0o

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CASES REPORTED

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

G.R. No. 187836. November 25, 2014.*

G.R. No. 187916. November 25, 2014.*

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JOCELYN DAWISASUNCION, minors MARIAN

Remedial Law; Special Civil Actions; Prohibition; Assuming

1 In a Resolution dated 21 July 2009, the Court granted the motion to

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declaratory relief is the proper remedy, and that the petitions

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vance of the offices of the writs of certiorari and prohibition,

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vidual, such as but not limited to passport, drivers license,

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the merits. It bears reiterating that a judgment on the

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same position, former Mayor Lim even went to the extent of

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ment of the Committee on Housing, Resettlement and Urban

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the Pandacan Terminals. The oil companies shall be given a

Leonen, J., Concurring and Dissenting Opinion:

Statutes; View that all laws, including ordinances, enjoy the

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Issues of Transcendental Importance; View that whether an

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actual facts and issues in order to prevent judicial overreach

SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS in the Supreme Court.

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Luch R. Gempis, Jr. for then Vice Mayor Francisco

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AN ORDINANCE RECLASSIFYING THE LAND USE OF

5 Approved by former Mayor Jose L. Atienza, Jr. on 16 June 2006. Id.,

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6 In a Resolution dated 21 July 2009, the Court granted the motion to

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For a better perspective of the facts of these cases, we

Pandacan (one of the districts of the City of Manila) is situated

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open city blazed a cloud of smoke by day, a pillar of fire by

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[R]iver or tank trucks via the South Luzon Expressway.13

13 Id., at pp. 673676; pp. 106109.

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ments involving acts of terrorism on civilian and

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hazards posed by the proximity of communities, businesses

The enactment of Ordinance No. 8027 against the

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land in Pandacan, Sta. Ana, and its adjoining areas from

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the said objective;

of safety buffer and green zones surrounding the Pandacan Terminals.

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(2) Resolution No. 97 dated 25 July 200223 of the

Issuance by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of writs