As the Court has postulated in A vs. A.

In a string of decisions, the Court has consistently ruled:

Clearly, following stare decisis,

Speaking for the Court, Justice J.B.L. Reyes unequivocally restated the
rule in the following words:
"While the choice of the court where to bring an action, where there are
two or more courts having concurrent jurisdiction thereon, is a matter of
procedure and not jurisdiction, as suggested by the appellant, the moment
such choice has been exercised, the matter becomes jurisdictional. Such
choice is deemed made when the proper complaint or information is filed
with the court having jurisdiction over the crime, and said court acquires
jurisdiction over the person of the defendant; from which time the right and
power of the court to try the accused attaches (see People vs. Blanco, 47
Off. Gaz. No. 7, 3425; Crisologo vs. People, 50 Off. Gaz. No. 3, 1021)."
(italics supplied)

G.R. No. 209330, January 11, 2016

SECRETARY LEILA DE LIMA, ASSISTANT STATE PROSECUTOR STEWART
ALLAN A. MARIANO, ASSISTANT STATE PROSECUTOR VIMAR M.
BARCELLANO AND ASSISTANT STATE PROSECUTOR GERARD E.
GAERLAN, PETITIONERS, VS. MARIO JOEL T. REYES, RESPONDENT.

LEONEN, J.:

The Secretary of Justice has the discretion, upon motion or motu proprio, to act
on any matter that may cause a probable miscarriage of justice in the conduct of
a preliminary investigation. This action may include, but is not limited to, the
conduct of a reinvestigation. Furthermore, a petition for certiorari under Rule 65
questioning the regularity of preliminary investigation becomes moot after the trial
court completes its determination of probable cause and issues a warrant of
arrest.
Determination of Probable Cause

G.R. No. 203057, June 06, 2016

BUREAU OF INTERNAL REVENUE AS REPRESENTED BY THE
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, PETITIONER, VS. MANILA HOME
TEXTILE, INC,*** THELMA LEE AND SAMUEL LE,E, RESPONDENTS.

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

There is grave abuse of discretion when the determination of probable cause is
exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner due to passion or personal hostility,
so patent and so gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual
refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law.

G.R. No. 177780, January 25, 2012

METROPOLITAN BANK & TRUST CO. (METROBANK), REPRESENTED BY
ROSELLA A. SANTIAGO, PETITIONER, VS. ANTONINO O. TOBIAS III,
RESPONDENT.

DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
Under the doctrine of separation of powers, the courts have no right to directly
decide matters over which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the
Executive Branch of the Government, or to substitute their own judgments for
that of the Executive Branch, represented in this case by the Department of
Justice. The settled policy is that the courts will not interfere with the executive
determination of probable cause for the purpose of filing an information, in the
absence of grave abuse of discretion.[29] That abuse of discretion must be so
patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal
to perform a duty enjoined by law or to act at all in contemplation of law, such as
where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of
passion or hostility.[30] For instance, in Balanganan v. Court of Appeals, Special
Nineteenth Division, Cebu City,[31] the Court ruled that the Secretary of Justice
exceeded his jurisdiction when he required hard facts and solid evidence in
order to hold the defendant liable for criminal prosecution when such requirement
should have been left to the court after the conduct of a trial.

In this regard, we stress that a preliminary investigation for the purpose of

determining the existence of probable cause is not part of a trial.[32] At a
preliminary investigation, the investigating prosecutor or the Secretary of Justice
only determines whether the act or omission complained of constitutes the
offense charged.[33] Probable cause refers to facts and circumstances that
engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and that the
respondent is probably guilty thereof.[34] There is no definitive standard by which
probable cause is determined except to consider the attendant conditions; the
existence of probable cause depends upon the finding of the public prosecutor
conducting the examination, who is called upon not to disregard the facts
presented, and to ensure that his finding should not run counter to the clear
dictates of reason.[35]

G.R. No. 171188, June 19, 2009

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PETITIONER, VS. JESSIE B. CASTILLO AND
FELICITO R. MEJIA, RESPONDENTS.

DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
There are two kinds of determination of probable cause: executive and judicial.
The executive determination of probable cause is one made during preliminary
investigation. It is a function that properly pertains to the public prosecutor who is
given a broad discretion to determine whether probable cause exists and to
charge those whom he believes to have committed the crime as defined by law
and thus should be held for trial. Otherwise stated, such official has the quasi-
judicial authority to determine whether or not a criminal case must be filed in
court.[22] Whether or not that function has been correctly discharged by the
public prosecutor, i.e., whether or not he has made a correct ascertainment of the
existence of probable cause in a case, is a matter that the trial court itself does
not and may not be compelled to pass upon.[23]

The judicial determination of probable cause, on the other hand, is one made by
the judge to ascertain whether a warrant of arrest should be issued against the
accused. The judge must satisfy himself that based on the evidence submitted,
there is necessity for placing the accused under custody in order not to frustrate
the ends of justice.[24] If the judge finds no probable cause, the judge cannot be
forced to issue the arrest warrant.[25]

Corollary to the principle that a judge cannot be compelled to issue a warrant of

arrest if he or she deems that there is no probable cause for doing so, the judge
in turn should not override the public prosecutor's determination of probable
cause to hold an accused for trial on the ground that the evidence presented to
substantiate the issuance of an arrest warrant was insufficient. It must be
stressed that in our criminal justice system, the public prosecutor exercises a
wide latitude of discretion in determining whether a criminal case should be filed
in court, and that courts must respect the exercise of such discretion when the
information filed against the person charged is valid on its face, and that no
manifest error or grave abuse of discretion can be imputed to the public
prosecutor.[26]

Thus, absent a finding that an information is invalid on its face or that the
prosecutor committed manifest error or grave abuse of discretion, a judge's
determination of probable cause is limited only to the judicial kind or for the
purpose of deciding whether the arrest warrants should be issued against the
accused.

A public prosecutor alone determines the sufficiency of evidence that establishes

the probable cause justifying the filing of a criminal information against the
respondent because the determination of existence of a probable cause is the
function of the public prosecutor.[

G.R. No. L-28949, June 23, 1969

JIBIN ARULA, PETITIONER, VS. BRIG. GEN. ROMEO C. ESPINO, MEMBERS
OF THE GENERAL COURT-MARTIAL, NAMELY, CANDIDO B. GAVINO,
PRESIDENT, CRISOGONO T. MAKILAN, RUBEN S. MONTOYA, SIXTO R.
ALHAMBRA, SEGUNDINO S. QUINTANS, PEDRO FERNANDEZ, JOSE
APOLINARIO, AVELINO MENEZ, EFRAIN MACLANG, AND MABINI BERNABE,
LAW MEMBER, RESPONDENTS.

DECISION
CASTRO, J.:

Court rendered the three purposes of a preliminary investigation, to wit: (1) to

inquire concerning the commission of a crime and the connection of the accused
with it, in order that he may be informed of the nature and character of the crime
charged against him, and, if there is probable cause for believing him guilty, that
the State may take the necessary steps to bring him to trial; (2) to preserve the
evidence and keep the witnesses within the control of the State; and (3) to
determine the amount of bail, if the offense is bailable. The officer conducting the
examination investigates or inquires into facts concerning the commission of a
crime with the end in view of determining whether an information may be
prepared against the accused.
G.R. No. 160619, September 09, 2015
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PETITIONER, VS. SANDIGANBAYAN
(FOURTH DIVISION), JESSIE CASTILLO, MELENCIO ARCIAGA AND
EMERENCIANO ARCIAGA, RESPONDENTS.

DECISION
JARDELEZA, J.:

The purpose of an Information is to afford an accused his right to be informed of

the nature and cause of the accusation against him. It is in pursuit of this purpose
that the Rules of Court require that the Information allege the ultimate facts
constituting the elements of the crime charged. Details that do not go into the
core of the crime need not be included in the Information, but may be presented
during trial. The rule that evidence must be presented to establish the existence
of the elements of a crime to the point of moral certainty is only for purposes of
conviction. It finds no application in the determination of whether or not an
Information is sufficient to warrant the trial of an accused.

The Issue

The case before us raises the question of what ultimate facts are required to be
stated in an Information charging an accused with violation of Section 3(e) of
R.A. No. 3019. Specifically, we are called to resolve whether an Information
alleging the grant of unwarranted benefits and existence of undue injury must
state the precise amount of the alleged benefit unduly granted as well as identify,
specify, and prove the alleged injury to the point of moral certainty.

Ruling of the Court

The petition is meritorious.

The main purpose of an Information is to ensure that an accused is formally

informed of the facts and the acts constituting the offense charged.[16] Where
insufficient, an accused in a criminal case can file a motion to have the
Information against him quashed and/or dismissed before he enters his plea.[17]
A motion to quash challenges the efficacy of an Information[18] and compels the
court to determine whether the Information suffices to require an accused to
endure the rigors of a trial. Where the Information is insufficient and thus cannot
be the basis of any valid conviction, the court must drop the case immediately
and save an accused from the anxiety and convenience of a useless trial.[19]
A motion to quash an Information on the ground that the facts charged do not
constitute an offense should be resolved on the basis of the allegations in the
Information whose truth and veracity are hypothetically admitted.[20] The
question that must be answered is whether such allegations are sufficient to
establish the elements of the crime charged without considering matters aliunde.
[21] In proceeding to resolve this issue, courts must look into three matters: (1)
what must be alleged in a valid Information; (2) what the elements of the crime
charged are; and (3) whether these elements are sufficiently stated in the
Information.

complaint of information
sufficiency of the complaint

G.R. NO. 168168, September 14, 2005

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, APPELLEE, VS. EDGARDO DIMAANO,
APPELLANT.

DECISION
PER CURIAM:
For complaint or information to be sufficient, it must state the name of the
accused; the designation of the offense given by the statute; the acts or
omissions complained of as constituting the offense; the name of the offended
party; the approximate time of the commission of the offense, and the place
wherein the offense was committed.[35] What is controlling is not the title of the
complaint, nor the designation of the offense charged or the particular law or part
thereof allegedly violated, these being mere conclusions of law made by the
prosecutor, but the description of the crime charged and the particular facts
therein recited.[36] The acts or omissions complained of must be alleged in such
form as is sufficient to enable a person of common understanding to know what
offense is intended to be charged, and enable the court to pronounce proper
judgment. No information for a crime will be sufficient if it does not accurately and
clearly allege the elements of the crime charged. Every element of the offense
must be stated in the information. What facts and circumstances are necessary
to be included therein must be determined by reference to the definitions and
essentials of the specified crimes. The requirement of alleging the elements of a
crime in the information is to inform the accused of the nature of the accusation
against him so as to enable him to suitably prepare his defense. The
presumption is that the accused has no independent knowledge of the facts that
constitute the offense.[37]
amended information
G.R. No. 174461, September 11, 2013
LETICIA I. KUMMER, PETITIONER, VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
RESPONDENT.

DECISION
BRION, J.:
Section 14, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court permits a formal amendment of a
complaint even after the plea but only if it is made with leave of court and
provided that it can be done without causing prejudice to the rights of the
accused. Section 14 provides:
Section 14. Amendment or substitution. A complaint or information may be
amended, in form or in substance, without leave of court, at any time
before the accused enters his plea. After the plea and during the trial, a
formal amendment may only be made with leave of court and when it can
be done without causing prejudice to the rights of the accused.

However, any amendment before plea, which downgrades the nature of

the offense charged in or excludes any accused from the complaint or
information, can be made only upon motion by the prosecutor, with notice
to the offended party and with leave of court. The court shall state its
reasons in resolving the motion and copies of its order shall be furnished
all parties, especially the offended party.

If it appears at any time before judgment that a mistake has been made in
charging the proper offense, the court shall dismiss the original complaint
or information upon the filing of a new one charging the proper offense in
accordance with section 19, Rule 119, provided the accused [would] not
be placed in double jeopardy. The court may require the witnesses to give
bail for their appearance at the trial. [emphasis and underscore ours]
A mere change in the date of the commission of the crime, if the disparity of time
is not great, is more formal than substantial. Such an amendment would not
prejudice the rights of the accused since the proposed amendment would not
alter the nature of the offense.

The test as to when the rights of an accused are prejudiced by the amendment of
a complaint or information is when a defense under the complaint or information,
as it originally stood, would no longer be available after the amendment is made,
when any evidence the accused might have would no longer be available after
the amendment is made, and when any evidence the accused might have would
be inapplicable to the complaint or information, as amended.
G.R. No. 153008, May 20, 2004
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, APPELLEE, VS. LARRY CACHAPERO Y
BASILIO, APPELLANT.

DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Time is not an essential element of rape. An information that states the
approximate rather than the precise time it was committed is sufficient in form.
Any perceived formal defect in the information must be raised before
arraignment, either through a bill of particulars or a motion to quash; otherwise,
objection to such defect shall be considered waived.

viz;
Moreover, objections as to the form of the complaint or information cannot be
made for the first time on appeal.[16] If the present appellant found the
Information insufficient, he should have moved before arraignment either for a bill
of particulars,[17] for him to be properly informed of the exact date of the alleged
rape; or for the quashal of the Information, on the ground that it did not conform
with the prescribed form.[18] Having failed to pursue either remedy, he is
deemed to have waived objection to any formal defect in the Information.

G.R. No. 189343, July 10, 2013

BENILDA N. BACASMAS, PETITIONER, VS. SANDIGANBAYAN AND PEOPLE
OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENTS.

[G.R. NO. 189369]

ALAN C. GAVIOLA, PETITIONER, VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

RESPONDENT.

[G.R. NO. 189553]

EUSTAQUIO B. CESA, PETITIONER, VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

RESPONDENT.

DECISION
SERENO, C.J.:
An information is deemed sufficient if it contains the following: (a) the name of all
the accused; (b) the designation of the offense as given in the statute; (c) the
acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense; (d) the name of the
offended party; (e) the approximate date of the commission of the offense; and (f)
the place where the offense was committed.

viz; First, it is not necessary to state the precise date when the offense was
committed, except when it is a material ingredient thereof.[60] The offense may
be alleged to have been committed on a date as near as possible to the actual
date of its commission

substitution of information

G.R. No. 157472, September 28, 2007

SSGT. JOSE M. PACOY, PETITIONER, VS. HON. AFABLE E. CAJIGAL,
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND OLYMPIO L. ESCUETA, RESPONDENTS.

DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:

In determining, therefore, whether there should be an amendment under the first

paragraph of Section 14, Rule 110, or a substitution of information under the
second paragraph thereof, the rule is that where the second information involves
the same offense, or an offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily
included in the first information, an amendment of the information is sufficient;
otherwise, where the new information charges an offense which is distinct and
different from that initially charged, a substitution is in order.

There is identity between the two offenses when the evidence to support a
conviction for one offense would be sufficient to warrant a conviction for the
other, or when the second offense is exactly the same as the first, or when the
second offense is an attempt to commit or a frustration of, or when it necessarily
includes or is necessarily included in, the offense charged in the first information.
In this connection, an offense may be said to necessarily include another when
some of the essential elements or ingredients of the former, as this is alleged in
the information, constitute the latter. And, vice-versa, an offense may be said to
be necessarily included in another when the essential ingredients of the former
constitute or form a part of those constituting the latter.[
Sections 6 and 9 of Rule 110 of the Rules of Court are relevant. They state -
Sec. 6. Sufficiency of complaint or information. - A complaint or information
is sufficient if it states the name of the accused; the designation of the
offense given by the statute; the acts or omissions complained of as
constituting the offense; the name of the offended party; the approximate
date of the commission of the offense; and the place where the offense
was committed.

When an offense is committed by more than one person, all of them shall
be included in the complaint or information.

xxx

Sec. 9. Cause of the accusation. - The acts or omissions complained of as

constituting the offense and the qualifying and aggravating circumstances
must be stated in ordinary and concise language and not necessarily in
the language used in the statute but in terms sufficient to enable a person
of common understanding to know what offense is being charged as well
as its qualifying and aggravating circumstances and for the court to
pronounce judgment.

viz:

G.R. No. 180122, March 13, 2009

FELICISIMO F. LAZARTE, JR., PETITIONER, VS. SANDIGANBAYAN (FIRST
DIVISION) AND PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENTS.

DECISION
TINGA, J.:
The raison d'etre of the rule is to enable the accused to suitably prepare his
defense.[36] Another purpose is to enable accused, if found guilty, to plead his
conviction in a subsequent prosecution for the same offense. The use of
derivatives or synonyms or allegations of basic facts constituting the offense
charged is sufficient.[37]

viz; Does conspiracy in a crime need to include in an information?

answer- When conspiracy is charged as a crime, the act of conspiring and all the
elements of said crime must be set forth in the complaint or information. But
when conspiracy is not charged as a crime in itself but only as the mode of
committing the crime as in the case at bar, there is less necessity of reciting its
particularities in the Information because conspiracy is not the gravamen of the
offense charged. The conspiracy is significant only because it changes the
criminal liability of all the accused in the conspiracy and makes them answerable
as co-principals regardless of the degree of their participation in the crime. The
liability of the conspirators is collective and each participant will be equally
responsible for the acts of others, for the act of one is the act of all.[
G.R. No. 133925, November 29, 2000
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, vs. AGUSTIN GOPIO,
ACCUSED-APPELLANT.

DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
In any event, it is now too late in the day to question the form or substance of the
information because when he entered his plea at his arraignment, accused-
appellant did not object to the sufficiency of the information against him. The rule
is that, at any time before entering his plea, the accused may move to quash the
information on the ground that it does not conform substantially to the prescribed
form. The failure of accused-appellant to assert any ground for a motion to quash
before he pleads to the information, either because he did not file a motion to
quash or failed to allege the same in said motion, shall be deemed a waiver of
the grounds for a motion to quash, except when the grounds are that no offense
was charged, the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the offense
charged, the offense or penalty has been extinguished, and the accused would
be twice put in jeopardy.[38]

664 Phil. 405

 THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 165412, May 30, 2011
GEORGE MILLER, PETITIONER, VS. SECRETARY HERNANDO
B. PEREZ, IN HIS CAPACITY AS SECRETARY OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE AND GIOVAN BERNARDINO,
RESPONDENTS.

DECISION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:

The term "probable cause" does not mean actual and positive cause nor does it import
absolute certainty. It is merely based on opinion and reasonable belief. Thus, a finding of
probable cause does not require an inquiry into whether there is sufficient evidence to
procure a conviction. It is enough that it is believed that the act or omission complained
of constitutes the offense charged. Precisely, there is a trial for the reception of evidence
of the prosecution in support of the charge.[42]

While it is this Court's general policy not to interfere in the conduct of preliminary
investigations, leaving the investigating officers sufficient discretion to determine
probable cause, courts are nevertheless empowered to substitute their judgment for that of
the Secretary of Justice when the same was rendered without or in excess of authority.
[43] Where the Secretary of Justice dismissed the complaint against the respondent
despite sufficient evidence to support a finding of probable cause, such clearly constitutes
grave error, thus warranting a reversal.[

160 Phil. 750

 FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-31665, August 06, 1975
LEONARDO ALMEDA, PETITIONER, VS. HON. ONOFRE A.
VILLALUZ, IN HIS CAPACITY AS PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE
CIRCUIT CRIMINAL COURT, SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT,
PASIG, RIZAL, AND HON. GREGORIO PINEDA, CITY FISCAL OF
PASAY CITY, RESPONDENTS.

DECISION
CASTRO, J.:

With respect to the amount of the bail bond, the trial court is well advised to consider,
inter alia, the following factors, where applicable: (1) the ability of the accused to give
bail; (2) the nature of the offense; (3) the penalty for the offense charged; (4) the
character and reputation of the accused; (5) the health of the accused; (6) the character
and strength of the evidence; (7) the probability of the accused's appearance or non-
appearance at the trial; (8) forfeiture of previous bonds; (9) whether the accused was a
fugitive from justice when arrested; and (10) whether the accused is under bond for
appearance at trial in other cases.[9]

It is not amiss, at this point, to remind all courts to exercise extreme care and caution in
the screening of bondsmen and sureties in regard to their reputation, solvency and
promptitude. Aside from the other precautions hitherto considered useful, courts should
see to it that all surety bonds are accompanied by corresponding clearances from the
Office of the Insurance Commissioner. Bondsmen who cannot make good their
undertakings render inutile all efforts at making the bail system work in this jurisdiction.

383 Phil. 255

 FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 139599, February 23, 2000
ANICETO SABBUN MAGUDDATU AND LAUREANA SABBUN
MAGUDDATU, PETITIONERS, VS. HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS (FOURTH DIVISION) AND PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENTS.

DECISION
KAPUNAN, J.:
For a human being who has been inside a prison cell, a bail bond represents his only
ticket to liberty, albeit provisional. But the right to bail is not always a demandable right.
In certain instances, it is a matter of discretion. This discretion, however, is not full and
unfettered because the law and the rules set the parameters for its proper exercise.
Discretion is, of course, a delicate thing and its abuse of such grave nature would warrant
intervention of this Court by way of the special civil action for certiorari.

viz;Bail is defined as a security for the release of a person conditioned upon his
appearance before any court.[13] The accused shall also appear before the proper court
whenever so required by the court or these Rules.[14] Petitioners' non-appearance during
the promulgation of the trial court's decision despite due notice and without justifiable
reason, and their continued non-submission to the proper authorities as ordered by the
Court of Appeals, constitute violations of the conditions of their bail. Moreover, it
appears that petitioners failed to renew their expired bail bond,[15] as shown by a
Motion, dated January 06, 1987, filed by AFISCO Insurance Corporation, praying for the
cancellation of petitioners' bail bond because of the latter's failure to renew the same
upon its expiration.[16]

399 Phil. 1
 SECOND DIVISION
A.M. No. MTJ-00-1320, November 22, 2000
ANTONIO M. BANGAYAN, COMPLAINANT, VS. JUDGE JIMMY R.
BUTACAN, RESPONDENT.

DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:

Under the present rules, a hearing is required in granting bail whether it is a matter of
right or discretion.[11] A motion to reduce the amount of bail likewise requires a hearing
before it is granted in order to afford the prosecution the chance to oppose it.

In Domingo vs. Minister of National Defense,[8] the Court en banc, speaking through
Mr. Justice Vasquez, held:
"The petitioner is a person subject to military law facing charges before a general
court-martial, and his release from confinement pending the trial of the charges
against him is a matter that lies largely in the discretion of the military authorities.
They are undeniably in a better position to appreciate the gravity of said charges
and the feasibility and advisability of releasing him or relaxing the terms of his
confinement pending the trial and disposition of the case filed against him."

In Commendador vs. De Villa, et al.,[7] the Court en banc, speaking through Mr. Justice
Cruz, held:
"We find that the right to bail invoked by the private respondents in G.R. Nos.
95020 has traditionally not been recognized and is not available the military, as an
exception to the general rule embodied in the Bill of Rights. This much was
suggested in Arula, where We observed that the right to a speedy trial is given
more emphasis in the military where the right to bail does not exist.
 FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 88555, November 21, 1991
EDUARDO N. ASWAT, PETITIONER, VS. BRIGADIER-GENERAL
ALEJANDRO GALIDO, IN HIS CAPACITY AS COMMANDER OF
THE SOUTHERN LUZON COMMAND, ARMED FORCES OF THE
PHILIPPINES, CAMP GUILLERMO NAKAR, LUCENA CITY,
RESPONDENT.

DECISION
FELICIANO, J.:

'The argument that denial from the military of the right to bail would violate the equal
protection clause is not acceptable. This guarantee requires equal treatment only of
persons or things similarly situated and does not apply where the subject of the
treatement is substantially different from others. The accused officers can complain if
they are denied bail and other members of the military are not. But they cannot say they
have been discriminated against because they are not allowed the same right that is
extended to civilians.'