3rd Meeting: Consti2 Cases
PEOPLE VS. ARUTA
[288 SCRA 626; G.R. NO. 120515; 13 APR 1998]
Facts:
On Dec. 13, 1988, P/Lt. Abello was tipped off by his informant that a certain
Aling Rosa will be arriving from Baguio City with a large volume of
marijuana and assembled a team. The next day, at the Victory Liner Bus
terminal they waited for the bus coming from Baguio, when the informer
pointed out who Aling Rosa was, the team approached her and introduced
themselves as NARCOM agents. When Abello asked aling Rosa about the
contents of her bag, the latter handed it out to the police. They found dried
marijuana leaves packed in a plastic bag marked cash katutak.
Instead of presenting its evidence, the defense filed a demurrer to evidence
alleging the illegality of the search and seizure of the items. In her testimony,
the accused claimed that she had just come from Choice theatre where she
watched a movie Balweg. While about to cross the road an old woman
asked her for help in carrying a shoulder bag, when she was later on arrested
by the police. She has no knowledge of the identity of the old woman and
the woman was nowhere to be found. Also, no search warrant was
presented.
The trial court convicted the accused in violation of the dangerous drugs of
1972
Issue:
Whether or Not the police correctly searched and seized the drugs from the
accused.
Held:
The following cases are specifically provided or allowed by law:
1. Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest recognized under Section
12, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court 8 and by prevailing jurisprudence
2. Seizure of evidence in "plain view," the elements of which are: (a) a prior
valid intrusion based on the valid warrantless arrest in which the police are
legally present in the pursuit of their official duties; (b) the evidence was
inadvertently discovered by the police who had the right to be where they
are; (c) the evidence must be immediately apparent, and (d) "plain view"
justified mere seizure of evidence without further search;
3. Search of a moving vehicle. Highly regulated by the government, the
vehicle's inherent mobility reduces expectation of privacy especially when its
transit in public thoroughfares furnishes a highly reasonable suspicion
amounting to probable cause that the occupant committed a criminal
activity;
4. Consented warrantless search;
5. Customs search;
6. Stop and Frisk;
7. Exigent and Emergency Circumstances.
The essential requisite of probable cause must still be satisfied before a
warrantless search and seizure can be lawfully conducted.
The accused cannot be said to be committing a crime, she was merely
crossing the street and was not acting suspiciously for the Narcom agents to
conclude that she was committing a crime. There was no legal basis to
effect a warrantless arrest of the accuseds bag, there was no probable cause
and the accused was not lawfully arrested.
The police had more than 24 hours to procure a search warrant and they did
not do so. The seized marijuana was illegal and inadmissible evidence.
RULE 113, RULES OF COURT
Section 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. A peace officer or a
private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is
actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has just been committed, and he has probable cause to
believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the
person to be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a
penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or is
temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being
transferred from one confinement to another.
In cases falling under paragraph (a) and (b) above, the person arrested
without a warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest police station
or jail and shall be proceeded against in accordance with section 7 of Rule
112.
RULE 126, RULES OF COURT
Section 2. Court where application for search warrant shall be filed. An
application for search warrant shall be filed with the following:
a) Any court within whose territorial jurisdiction a crime was committed.
b) For compelling reasons stated in the application, any court within the
judicial region where the crime was committed if the place of the
commission of the crime is known, or any court within the judicial region
where the warrant shall be enforced.
However, if the criminal action has already been filed, the application shall
only be made in the court where the criminal action is pending.
Section 7. Right to break door or window to effect search. The officer, if
refused admittance to the place of directed search after giving notice of his
purpose and authority, may break open any outer or inner door or window of
a house or any part of a house or anything therein to execute the warrant or
liberate himself or any person lawfully aiding him when unlawfully detained
therein.
Section 12. Delivery of property and inventory thereof to court; return and
proceedings thereon.
(a) The officer must forthwith deliver the property seized to the judge who
issued the warrant, together with a true inventory thereof duly verified
under oath.
(b) Ten (10) days after issuance of the search warrant, the issuing judge shall
ascertain if the return has been made, and if none, shall summon the person
to whom the warrant was issued and require him to explain why no return
was made. If the return has been made, the judge shall ascertain whether
section 11 of this Rule has been complained with and shall require that the
property seized be delivered to him. The judge shall see to it that subsection
(a) hereof has been complied with.
(c) The return on the search warrant shall be filed and kept by the
custodian of the log book on search warrants who shall enter therein the
date of the return, the result, and other actions of the judge.
A violation of this section shall constitute contempt of court.
Nolasco vs. Cruz Pano
[GR L-69803, 8 October 1985]
En Banc, Melencio-Herrera (J): 7 concur, 1 concurs in the result, 1 took no
part, 1 reserves his vote
Facts:
Prior to 6 August 1984, Mila Aguilar-Roque was one of the accused of
Rebellion in Criminal Case SMC-1-1 before Special Military Commission 1,
and also one of the accused of Subversion in Criminal Case MC-25-113 of
Military Commission 25, both cases being entitled "People of the Philippines
vs. Jose Ma. Sison, et al." She was then still at large. At around 9:00 a.m. on
August 6, Lt. Col. Virgilio G. Saldajeno of the CSG, applied for a Search
Warrant from the Hon. Ernani Cruz Pao, Executive Judge of the Regional
Trial Court in Quezon City, to be served at No. 239-B Mayon Street, Quezon
City, determined to be the leased residence of Aguilar-Roque, after almost a
month of "round the clock surveillance" of the premises as a "suspected
underground house of the CPP/NPA."
Aguilar-Roque has been long wanted by the military for being a high ranking
officer of the Communist Party of the Philippines, particularly connected with
the MV Karagatan/Doa Andrea cases. At 11:30 a.m., Aguilar-Roque and
Cynthia D. Nolasco were arrested by a Constabulary Security Group (CSG) at
the intersection of Mayon Street and P. Margall Street, Quezon City.
The record does not disclose that a warrant of arrest had previously been
issued against Nolasco. At 12:00 noon on the same day, elements of the CSG
searched the premises at 239- B Mayon Street, Quezon City. Willie C.
Tolentino, a person then in charge of the premises, was arrested by the
searching party presumably without a warrant of arrest. The searching party
seized 428 documents and written materials, and additionally a portable
typewriter, and 2 wooden boxes, making 431 items in all.
3rd Meeting: Consti2 Cases
On August 10, Aguilar-Roque, Nolasco and Tolentino, were charged before
the Quezon City Fiscal's Office upon complaint filed by the CSG against the
former for "Subversion/Rebellion and/or Conspiracy to Commit
Rebellion/Subversion.
On August 13, the City Fiscal filed an Information for Violation of Presidential
Decree (PD) 33 (Illegal Possession of Subversive Documents) against Aguilar-
Roque, et. al. before Branch 42 of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon
City, Judge Antonio P. Santos, presiding.
On August 16, CSG filed a Motion for Reconsideration with the City Fiscal,
praying that Aguilar-Roque and Nolasco be charged with Subversion.
The Motion was denied on November 16. On September 10, the CSG
submitted an Amended Return in the Search Warrant case praying, inter alia,
that the CSG be allowed to retain the seized 431 documents and articles, "in
connection with cases that are presently pending against Mila Aguilar Roque
before the Quezon City Fiscal's Office and the court."
On December 13, Judge Pao admitted the Amended Return and ruled that
the seized documents "shall be subject to disposition of the tribunal trying
the case against respondent."
A day before that, Aguilar-Roque, et. al. filed a Motion to Suppress, praying
that such of the 431 items belonging to them be returned to them. It was
claimed that the proceedings under the Search Warrant were unlawful.
Judge Santos denied the Motion on 7 January 1985 on the ground that the
validity of the Search Warrant has to be litigated in the other case,
apparently unaware of the Order issued by Judge Pao on December 13.
Nolasco, Aguilar-Roque, and Tolentino filed the Petition for Certiorari,
Prohibition and Mandamus to annul and set aside the (1) Search Warrant
issued by RTC Judge Pao; (2) his Order admitting the Amended Return and
granting the Motion to Retain Seized Items; and (3) Order of MTC Judge
Santos denying Aguilar-Roque, et. al.'s Motion to Suppress.
Issue:
Whether the description of the personalities to be seized in the search
warrant is too general to render the warrant void.
Held:
The disputed Search Warrant (80-84) describes the personalities to be seized
as "Documents, papers and other records of the Communist Party of the
Philippines/New Peoples Army and/or the National Democratic Front, such
as Minutes of the Party Meetings, Plans of these groups, Programs, List of
possible supporters, subversive books and instructions, manuals not
otherwise available to the public, and support money from foreign or local
sources."
It is at once evident that the Search Warrant authorizes the seizure of
personal properties vaguely described and not particularized. It is an all-
embracing description which includes everything conceivable regarding the
Communist Party of the Philippines and the National Democratic Front. It
does not specify what the subversive books and instructions are; what the
manuals not otherwise available to the public contain to make them
subversive or to enable them to be used for the crime of rebellion. There is
absent a definite guideline to the searching team as to what items might be
lawfully seized thus giving the officers of the law discretion regarding what
articles they should seize as, in fact, taken also were a portable typewriter
and 2 wooden boxes.
It is thus in the nature of a general warrant and infringes on the
constitutional mandate requiring particular description of the things to be
seized. Search warrants of similar description were considered null and void
for being too general.
Notwithstanding the irregular issuance of the Search Warrant and although,
ordinarily, the articles seized under an invalid search warrant should be
returned, they cannot be ordered returned to Aguilar-Roque. Some searches
may be made without a warrant. Section 12, Rule 126, Rules of Court, is
declaratory in the sense that it is confined to the search, without a search
warrant, of a person who had been arrested. It is also a general rule that, as
an incident of an arrest, the place or premises where the arrest was made
can also be search without a search warrant. In this latter case, "the extent
and reasonableness of the search must be decided on its own facts and
circumstances, and it has been stated that, in the application of general
rules, there is some confusion in the decisions as to what constitutes the
extent of the place or premises which may be searched".
Considering that Aguilar-Roque has been charged with Rebellion, which is a
crime against public order; that the warrant for her arrest has not been
served for a considerable period of time; that she was arrested within the
general vicinity of her dwelling; and that the search of her dwelling was made
within a half hour of her arrest, the Court was of the opinion that, in her
respect, the search at No. 239- B Mayon Street, Quezon City, did not need a
search warrant; this, for possible effective results in the interest of public
order. Such being the case, the personalities seized may be retained by CSG,
for possible introduction as evidence in the Rebellion Case, leaving it to
Aguilar-Roque to object to their relevance and to ask Special Military
Commission 1 to return to her any all irrelevant documents and articles.
Papa vs. Mago [GR L-27360, 28 February 1968]
En Banc, Zaldivar (J): 9 concur
Facts:
Martin Alagao, head of the counter-intelligence unit of the Manila Police
Department, acting upon a reliable information received on 3 November
1966 to the effect that a certain shipment of personal effects, allegedly
misdeclared and undervalued, would be released the following day from the
customs zone of the port of Manila and loaded on two trucks, and upon
orders of Ricardo Papa, Chief of Police of Manila and a duly deputized agent
of the Bureau of Customs, conducted surveillance at gate 1 of the customs
zone. When the trucks left gate 1 at about 4:30 p.m. of 4 November 1966,
elements of the counter-intelligence unit went after the trucks and
intercepted them at the Agrifina Circle, Ermita, Manila. The load of the two
trucks, consisting of nine bales of goods, and the two trucks, were seized on
instructions of the Chief of Police.
Upon investigation, a person claimed ownership of the goods and showed to
the policemen a "Statement and Receipts of Duties Collected on Informal
Entry No. 147- 5501", issued by the Bureau of Customs in the name of a
certain Bienvenido Naguit. Claiming to have been prejudiced by the seizure
and detention of the two trucks and their cargo, Remedios Mago and
Valentin B. Lanopa filed with the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Manila a
petition "for mandamus with restraining order or preliminary injunction (Civil
Case 67496), praying for the issuance of a restraining order, ex parte,
enjoining the police and customs authorities, or their agents, from opening
the bales and examining the goods, and a writ of mandamus for the return of
the goods and the trucks, as well as a judgment for actual, moral and
exemplary damages in their favor.
On 10 November 1966, Judge Hilarion Jarencio issued an order ex parte
restraining Ricardo Papa (as Chief of Police of Manila) and Juan Ponce Enrile
(as Commissioner of Customs) in Civil Case 67496. However, when the
restraining order was received by Papa. et. al., some bales had already been
opened by the examiners of the Bureau of Customs in the presence of
officials of the Manila Police Department, an assistant city fiscal and a
representative of Remedios Mago. Under date of 15 November 1966, Mago
filed an amended petition, including as party defendants Collector of
Customs Pedro Pacis of the Port of Manila and Lt. Martin Alagao of the
Manila Police Department.
At the hearing on 9 December 1966, the lower court, with the conformity of
the parties, ordered that an inventory of the goods be made by its clerk of
court in the presence of the representatives of the claimant of the goods, the
Bureau of Customs, and the Anti- Smuggling Center of the Manila Police
Department.
On 23 December 1966, Mago filed an ex parte motion to release the goods,
alleging that since the inventory of the goods seized did not show any article
of prohibited importation, the same should be released as per agreement of
the parties upon her posting of the appropriate bond that may be
determined by the court.
On 7 March 1967, the Judge issued an order releasing the goods to Mago
upon her filing of a bond in the amount of P40,000.00.
3rd Meeting: Consti2 Cases
On 13 March 1967, Papa, on his own behalf, filed a motion for
reconsideration of the order of the court releasing the goods under bond,
upon the ground that the Manila Police Department had been directed by
the Collector of Customs of the Port of Manila to hold the goods pending
termination of the seizure proceedings.
Without waiting for the court's action on the motion for reconsideration, and
alleging that they had no plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law, Papa, et. al. filed the action for prohibition and certiorari with
preliminary injunction before the Supreme Court.
Held:
The Chief of the Manila Police Department, Ricardo G. Papa, having been
deputized in writing by the Commissioner of Customs, could, for the
purposes of the enforcement of the customs and tariff laws, effect searches,
seizures, and arrests, and it was his duty to make seizure, among others, of
any cargo, articles or other movable property when the same may be subject
to forfeiture or liable for any fine imposed under customs and tariff laws.
He could lawfully open and examine any box, trunk, envelope or other
container wherever found when he had reasonable cause to suspect the
presence therein of dutiable articles introduced into the Philippines contrary
to law; and likewise to stop, search and examine any vehicle, beast or person
reasonably suspected of holding or conveying such article as aforesaid. It
cannot be doubted, therefore, that Papa, Chief of Police of Manila, could
lawfully effect the search and seizure of the goods in question.
The Tariff and Customs Code authorizes him to demand assistance of any
police officer to effect said search and seizure, and the latter has the legal
duty to render said assistance. This was what happened precisely in the case
of Lt. Martin Alagao who, with his unit, made the search and seizure of the
two trucks loaded with the nine bales of goods in question at the Agrifina
Circle. He was given authority by the Chief of Police to make the interception
of the cargo. Martin Alagao and his companion policemen had authority to
effect the seizure without any search warrant issued by a competent court.
The Tariff and Customs Code does not require said warrant herein. The Code
authorizes persons having police authority under Section 2203 of the Tariff
and Customs Code to enter, pass through or search any land, inclosure,
warehouse, store or building, not being a dwelling house; and also to inspect,
search and examine any vessel or aircraft and any trunk, package, box or
envelope or any person on board, or stop and search and examine any
vehicle, beast or person suspected of holding or conveying any dutiable or
prohibited article introduced into the Philippines contrary to law, without
mentioning the need of a search warrant in said cases. But in the search of a
dwelling house, the Code provides that said "dwelling house may be entered
and searched only upon warrant issued by a judge or justice of the peace."
Except in the case of the search of a dwelling house, persons exercising
police authority under the customs law may effect search and seizure
without a search warrant in the enforcement of customs laws. Herein, Martin
Alagao and his companion policemen did not have to make any search
before they seized the two trucks and their cargo.
But even if there was a search, there is still authority to the effect that no
search warrant would be needed under the circumstances obtaining herein.
The guaranty of freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures is
construed as recognizing a necessary difference between a search of a
dwelling house or other structure in respect of which a search warrant may
readily be obtained and a search of a ship, motorboat, wagon, or automobile
for contraband goods, where it is not practicable to secure a warrant,
because the vehicle can be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in
which the warrant must be sought. Having declared that the seizure by the
members of the Manila Police Department of the goods in question was in
accordance with law and by that seizure the Bureau of Customs had acquired
jurisdiction over the goods for the purposes of the enforcement of the
customs and tariff laws, to the exclusion of the Court of First Instance of
Manila.
People vs. CFI Rizal, Branch IX, Quezon City [GR L-41686, 17 November
1980] First Division, Guerrero (J): 4 concur
Facts:
One week before 9 February 1974, the Regional Anti-Smuggling Action
Center (RASAC) was informed by an undisclosed Informer that a shipment of
highly dutiable goods would be transported to Manila from Angeles City on a
blue Dodge car. Spurred by such lead, RASAC Agents Arthur Manuel and
Macario Sabado, on said date and upon order of the Chief of Intelligence and
Operations Branch, RASAC-MBA, Col. Antonio Abad, Jr., stationed themselves
in the vicinity of the toll gate of the North Diversion Road at Balintawak,
Quezon City.
At about 6:45 a.m. of the same day, a light blue Dodge car with Plate 21-87-
73, driven by Sgt. Jessie Hope who was accompanied by Monina Medina
approached the exit gate and after giving the toll receipt sped away towards
Manila. The RASAC agents gave a chase and overtook Sgt. Hope's car. Agent
Sabado blew his whistle and signaled Sgt. Hope to stop but the latter instead
of heeding, made a U-turn back to the North Diversion Road, but he could
not go through because of the buses in front of his car. At this point, the
agents succeeded in blocking Sgt. Hope's car and the latter stopped. Manuel
and Sabado who were in civilian clothes showed their identification cards to
Hope and Medina and introduced themselves as RASAC agents.
The Agents saw 4 boxes on the back seat of the Dodge and upon inquiry as to
what those boxes were, Sgt. Hope answered "I do not know." Further, Hope
and Medina were asked where they were bringing the boxes, to which
Medina replied that they were bringing them (boxes) to the Tropical Hut at
Epifanio de los Santos.
Agent Sabado boarded the Dodge car with Hope and Medina while Agent
Manuel took their own car and both cars drove towards Tropical Hut making
a brief stop at the Bonanza where Agent Manuel called up Col. Abad by
telephone. Arriving at the Tropical Hut, the party, together with Col. Abad
who had joined them waited for the man who according to Monina Medina
was supposed to receive the boxes. As the man did not appear, Col. Abad
"called off the mission" and brought respondents and their car to Camp
Aguinaldo arriving there at about 9:00 a.m.
An inspection of Sgt. Hope's car at Camp Aguinaldo yielded 11 sealed boxes,
4 on the rear seat and 7 more in the baggage compartment which was
opened on orders of Col. Abad. On the same order of the intelligence officer,
the boxes were opened before the presence of Hope and Medina,
representatives of the Bureau of Internal Revenue, Bureau of Customs, P.C.,
COSAC and photographers of the Department of National Defense. The
contents of the bozes revealed some "4,441 more or less wrist watches of
assorted brands; 1,075 more or less watch bracelets of assorted brands,"
supposedly untaxed.
As consequence, thereof, ASAC Chairman General Pelagio Cruz requested the
Bureau of Customs to issue a Warrant of Seizure and Detention against the
articles including the Dodge car. The Collector of Customs did issue the same
on 12 February 1974. It was admitted, however, that when the
apprehending agents arrested respondents and brought them together with
the seized articles to the ASAC Office in Camp Aguinaldo, the former were
not armed with a warrant of arrest and seizure.
In conjunction with the Warrant of Seizure and Detention issued by the
Collector of Customs, seizure proceedings were instituted and docketed as
Seizure Identification 14281 against the wrist watches and watch bracelets
pursuant to Section 2530 (m) 1 of the Tariff and Customs Code, and
Seizure Identification No. 14281-A against the Dodge car pursuant to Section
2530(k) of the same Code. On the other hand, Hope and Medina disclaimed
ownership of the seized articles. Ownership was instead claimed by one
Antonio del Rosario who intervened in the proceedings.
Hope claimed that at the time of apprehension, he had no knowledge of the
contents of the boxes, and granting that he had such knowledge, he never
knew that these are untaxed commodities; that he consented to transport
said boxes from Angeles City to Manila in his car upon request of his
girlfriend Monina as a personal favor; that he was not present when the
boxes were loaded in his car nor was he ever told of their contents on the
way.
3rd Meeting: Consti2 Cases
On the part of Monina Medina, she testified that what she did was only in
compliance with the agreement with Mr. Del Rosario to transport the boxes
and deliver them to a certain Mr. Peter at the Tropical Hut who will in turn
give her the contracted price; that Mr. Del Rosario did not reveal the
contents of the boxes which she came to know of only when the boxes were
opened at Camp Aguinaldo.
As there was not enough evidence to controvert the testimonies of
respondents and the narration of claimant Antonio del Rosario, the Collector
of Customs issued his decision in the seizure cases on 1 April 1975 declaring
that the seized articles including the car are not subject of forfeiture.
Meanwhile, on 14 March 1974, after the requisite preliminary investigation,
the City Fiscal of Quezon City, finding the existence of a prima facie case
against Hope and Medina, filed Criminal Case Q-3781 in the Court of First
Instance of Rizal (Quezon City). Upon arraignment on 23 April 1974,
respondents pleaded not guilty.
Trial commenced on 28 January 1975 and while the prosecution through its
first witness, Agent Macario Sabado, was adducing as evidence the pictures
of the 11 boxes containing the assorted watches and watch bracelets, the
defense counsel objected to the presentation of the pictures and the subject
articles on the ground that they were seized without the benefit of warrant,
and therefore inadmissible in evidence under Section 4(2), Article IV of the
New Constitution.
After the parties have argued their grounds in their respective memoranda,
the trial court issued the order of 20 August 1975 declaring that the alleged
smuggled articles and the pictures taken of said items as inadmissible in
evidence. The prosecution's motion for reconsideration was denied on 30
September 1975. The prosecution filed a petition for certiorari which was
treated as a special civil action in the Supreme Court's Resolution of 5 May
1976.
Issue: Whether the search and seizure made on the boxes in the blue Dodge
car was valid, even after the Collector of Customs declared the seized articles
not subject to forfeiture.
Held: It is not accurate to say that the Collector of Customs made no findings
that the articles were smuggled. In fact, what the Collector stated was that
the prosecution failed to present the quantum of evidence sufficient to
warrant the forfeiture of the subject articles. In a general sense, this does not
necessarily exclude the possibility of smuggling.
The decision of the Collector of Customs, as in other seizure proceedings,
concerns the res rather than the persona. The proceeding is a probe on
contraband or illegally imported goods. The importer or possessor is treated
differently. The fact that the administrative penalty befalls on him is an
inconsequential incidence to criminal liability. By the same token, the
probable guilt cannot be negated simply because he was not held
administratively liable. The Collector's final declaration that the articles are
not subject to forfeiture does not detract his findings that untaxed goods
were transported in Hope and Medina's car and seized from their possession
by agents of the law. Whether criminal liability lurks on the strength of the
provision of the Tariff and Customs Code adduced in the information can
only be determined in a separate criminal action.
Hope and Medina's exoneration in the administrative cases cannot deprive
the State of its right to prosecute. But under our penal laws, criminal
responsibility, if any, must be proven not by preponderance of evidence but
by proof beyond reasonable doubt. As enunciated in the leading case of Papa
vs. Mago, in the exercise of the specific functions, the Code does not
mention the need of a search warrant unlike Section 2209 which explicitly
provides that a "dwelling house may be entered and searched only upon
warrant issued by a judge (or justice of the peace), upon sworn application
showing probable cause and particularly describing the place to be searched
and person or thing to be seized." Aware of this delineation, the Court in that
case expressed the considered view that "except in the case of the search of
a dwelling house, persons exercising police authority under the customs law
may effect search and seizure without a search warrant in the enforcement
of customs laws."
The rationale of the Mago ruling was nurtured by the traditional doctrine in
Carroll v. United States 6 wherein an imprimatur against, constitutional
infirmity was stamped in favor of a warrantless search and seizure of such
nature as herein. On this stable foundation, the warrantless seizure did not
violate Article IV, Section 3 of the 1973 Constitution, which finds origin in the
Fourth Amendment of the American Constitution.
Veroy v. Layague [GR 95630, 18 June 1992]
En Banc, Paras (J): 12 concur
Facts: Leopoldo and Ma. Luisa Veroy are husband and wife residing in Davao
City. When Veroy was promoted to the position of Assistant Administrator of
the Social Security System sometime in June 1988, he and his family
transferred to Quezon City. The care and upkeep of their residence in Davao
City was left to 2 houseboys, Jimmy Favia and Eric Burgos, who had their
assigned quarters at a portion of the premises. The Veroys would
occasionally send money to Edna Soquilon for the salary of the said
houseboys and other expenses for the upkeep of their house. While the
Veroys had the keys to the interior of the house, only the key to the kitchen,
where the circuit breakers were located, was entrusted to Edna Soquilon to
give her access in case of an emergency.
On 12 April 1990, Capt. Reynaldo Obrero of the Talomo Patrol Station,
PC/INP raided Veroys house in Davao City on information that the said
residence was being used as a safehouse of rebel soldiers. They were able to
enter the yard with the help of the caretakers but did not enter the house
since the owner was not present and they did not have a search warrant.
Permission was requested by phone to Ma. Luisa Veroy who consented on
the condition that the search be conducted in the presence of Major
Macasaet. The following day, Capt. Obrero and Maj. Macasaet met at the
Veroys house to conduct the search pursuant to the authority granted by
Ma. Luisa. Capt. Obrero recovered a .45 cal. handgun with a magazine
containing 7 live bullets in a black clutch bag inside an unlocked drawer in
the childrens room. 3 half- full jute sacks containing printed materials of
RAM-SFP were also found in the children's room. A search of the children's
recreation and study area revealed a big travelling bag containing assorted
clothing, a small black bag containing a book entitled "Islamic Revolution
Future Path of the Nation", a road map of the Philippines, a telescope, a
plastic bag containing assorted medicines and religious pamphlets was found
in the master's bedroom. Inventory and receipt of seized articles were made.
The case was referred for preliminary investigation to the Quezon City
Assistant Prosecutor , who was designated Acting Provincial Prosecutor for
Davao City by the DOJ through Department Order 88 (16 May 1990). In a
resolution dated 6 August 1990, the Fiscal recommended the filing of
Information against the Veroys for violation of PD 1866 (Illegal Possession of
Firearms and Ammunitions in Furtherance of Rebellion). Hence, on 8 August
1990, Information for the said offense was filed by the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Davao City before the RTC Davao City). No bail was
recommended by the prosecution. The fiscals resolution was received by the
Veroys on 13 August 1990. The latter filed a motion for bail on the same day
which was denied for being premature, as they have not been arrested yet.
The Veroys voluntarily surrendered to Gen. Pantaleon Dumlao, but who
refused to receive them o the ground that his office has not received copies
of their warrants of arrest. In the meantime, on 15 August 1990, the Veroys
were admitted to the St. Luke's Hospital for various ailments brought about
or aggravated by the stress and anxiety caused by the filing of the criminal
complaint. On 17 August 1990, Gen. Dumlao granted their request that they
be allowed to be confined at the hospital and placed under guard thereat.
Upon arraignment on 1 October 1990, the Veroys pleaded not guilty and filed
a motion for hospital confinement, which was denied. The court ordered
their commitment at the Davao City Rehabilitation Center pending trial on
the merits. At the conclusion thereof, the court issued a second order
denying their motion for reconsideration. The Veroys were returned to the
St. Luke's Hospital where their physical condition remained erratic. Gen.
Dumlao informed the Veroys that he had issued a directive for their transfer
from the St. Luke's Hospital to Camp Crame on the basis of the 2 October
1990 Order. They would proceed with their transfer pursuant to the order of
the trial court, unless otherwise restrained by the court. The Veroys filed the
petition for certiorari, mandamus and prohibition.
3rd Meeting: Consti2 Cases
Issue: Whether the permission granted by ma. Luisa Veroy for ascertaining
there at the presence of alleged rebel soldiers include the authority to
conduct a room to room search once inside the house.
Held: The Constitution guarantees the right of the people to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and
seizures (Article III, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution). However, the rule
that searches and seizures must be supported by a valid warrant is not an
absolute one. Among the recognized exceptions thereto are: (1) a search
incidental to an arrest; (2) a search of a moving vehicle; and seizure of
evidence in plain view (People v. Lo Ho Wing). The necessity of the
permission obtained from Ma. Luisa underlines the recognition of Capt.
Obrero of the need of a search warrant to enter the house. The permission
granted by was for the purpose of ascertaining there at the presence of the
alleged "rebel" soldiers. The permission did not include any authority to
conduct a room to room search once inside the house. The police officers
had ample time to procure a search warrant but did not. Warrantless
searches were declared illegal because the officials conducting the search
had every opportunity to secure a search warrant. The items taken were,
therefore, products of an illegal search, violative of their constitutional rights.
As such, they are inadmissible in evidence in the criminal actions instituted
against them. The offense of illegal possession of firearms is malum
prohibitum but it does not follow that the subject thereof is necessarily
illegal per se. Motive is immaterial in mala prohibita but the subjects of this
kind of offense may not be summarily seized simply because they are
prohibited. A search warrant is still necessary. Hence, the rule having been
violated and no exception being applicable, the articles seized were
confiscated illegally and are therefore protected by the exclusionary
principle. They cannot be used as evidence against the Veroys in the criminal
action against them for illegal possession of firearms. Besides, assuming that
there was indeed a search warrant, still in mala prohibita, while there is no
need of criminal intent, there must be knowledge that the same existed.
Without the knowledge or voluntariness there is no crime.
People v. Lo Ho Wing (alias Peter Lo), Lim Cheng Huat (alias Antonio Lim)
and Reynaldo Tia
In the light of such circumstance, would be to sanction impotence and
ineffectiveness in law enforcement, to the detriment of society.
taxicab while Lim followed in another taxi cab. Meanwhile, the operatives of
the NARCOM (Narcotics Command), having been notified by Palmera,
stationed themselves in strategic places around the arrival area. Upon seeing
Lo and Tia leave the airport, the operatives followed them. Along Imelda
Avenue, the car of the operatives overtook the taxicab ridden by Lo and Tia
and cut into its path which forced the taxi driver to stop. The other tax cab
carrying Lim, however, sped away but was later caught on Retiro Street,
Quezon City.
Going back to Lo and Tia, the operatives approached the taxicab and asked
the driver to open the baggage compartment. Three pieces of luggage were
retrieved from the back compartment of the vehicle. The operatives
requested from Lo and Tia permission to search their luggage. A tin can of
tea was taken out of the red travel bag owned by Lo. A certain Sgt. Cayabyab,
one of the operatives, pried the lid open, pulled out a paper tea bag from the
can and pressed it in the middle to feel its contents. Some crystalline white
powder resembling crushed aluminum came out of the bag. The sergeant
then opened the tea bag and examined its content more closely. He had the
three travel bags opened for inspection. From the red travel bag, 6 tin cans
were found; including the one previously opened and nothing else was
recovered from the other bags. The tea bag contained methamphetamine
after examination by the PC-INP Crime Laboratory. One of
methamphetamines derivatives is methamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu/
poor mans cocaine). The three were charged with violation of Dangerous
Drugs Act of 1972. Lo contends that the search and seizure was illegal. He
contends that the officers concerned could very well have procured a search
warrant since they had been informed of the date and time of arrival of the
accused at the NAIA well ahead of time. Moreover, as claimed by Lo, the fact
that the search and seizure in question were made on a moving vehicle does
not automatically make the warrantless search fall within the coverage of
exceptions of the necessity of a valid warrant to effect search.
Ruling:
The search and seizure supported by a valid warrant is not an absolute
rule. As set forth in Manipon, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan, there are at least 3 well-
recognized exceptions, namely: (a) a search incidental to an arrest, (b)
a search of a moving vehicle, and (c) seizure of evidence in plain view. In the
case at bar, there is a clear showing that the search in question, having been
made in a moving vehicle, does not need a valid warrant to effect search.2.

Reynaldo Tia, a deep penetration agent of the SOG, reported of his A warrantless search of a moving vehicle is justified on the ground that it is
undercover activities on the suspected criminal syndicate led by Lo and not practicable to secure a warrant because the vehicle can be quickly moved
Lim. Moreover, Tia informed his superior regarding their return to the out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought.
country. Upon arrival in the Philippines, Lo and Tia rode in one taxi cab while
Lim rode in another. They were pursued by the members of the NARCOM
and were stopped. With permission of Lo and Tia, a tin can of tea was taken
out of the red travel bag and, upon examination by the PC-INP Crime
Laboratory, contained metamphetamine. Petitioner contend that a warrant
was needed.

Facts:
The Special Operations Group received a tip from one of its informers about
an organized group engaged in the importation of illegal drugs, smuggling of
contraband goods and gunrunning. As part of the operations, the
recruitment of confidential men and deep penetration agents was carried
out to infiltrate the crime syndicate. One of those recruited was Reynaldo
Tia.

Tia was introduced to Lim Cheng Huat (Antonio Lim) where the latter
expressed a desire to hire a male travel companion for his business trips
abroad. Tia offered his services and was hire. Together with Lim, Tia, in one
of the meetings in China, was introduced to Lo Ho Wing (Peter Lo) whom tia
found out to be the person he was to accompany to China in lieu of Lim.

As deep penetration agent, Tia regularly submitted reports of his

undercover activities on the suspected criminal syndicate to Capt.
Luisito Palmera, head of Oplan Sharon 887 the group created in order to
bus the suspected syndicate. Tia informed Palmera of their return to the
Philippines after they (Lo and Tia) left forHong Kong.

Upon arrival in the Philippines, they were met by Lim. After Lim and Lo
finished their conversation, Lo hailed a taxicab. Lo and Tia boarded the
3rd Meeting: Consti2 Cases
Caballes vs. Court of Appeals [GR 136292, 15 January 2002]
First Division, Puno (J): 4 concur
Facts: About 9:15 p.m. of 28 June 1989, Sgt. Victorino Noceja and Pat. Alex
de Castro, while on a routine patrol in Barangay Sampalucan, Pagsanjan,
Laguna, spotted a passenger jeep unusually covered with "kakawati" leaves.
Suspecting that the jeep was loaded with smuggled goods, the two police
officers flagged down the vehicle. The jeep was driven by Rudy Caballes y
Taio. When asked what was loaded on the jeep, he did not answer, but he
appeared pale and nervous. With Caballes' consent, the police officers
checked the cargo and they discovered bundles of 3.08 mm
aluminum/galvanized conductor wires exclusively owned by National Power
Corporation (NAOCOR). The conductor wires weighed 700 kilos and valued at
P55,244.45. Noceja asked Caballes where the wires came from and Caballes
answered that they came from Cavinti, a town approximately 8 kilometers
away from Sampalucan. Thereafter, Caballes and the vehicle with the high-
voltage wires were brought to the Pagsanjan Police Station. Danilo Cabale
took pictures of Caballes and the jeep loaded with the wires which were
turned over to the Police Station Commander of Pagsanjan, Laguna. Caballes
was incarcerated for 7 days in the Municipal jail. Caballes was charged with
the crime of theft in an information dated 16 October 1989.
During the arraignment, Caballes pleaded not guilty and hence, trial on the
merits ensued. On 27 April 1993, Regional Trial Court of Santa Cruz, Laguna
rendered judgment, finding Caballes, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of theft. In a resolution dated 9 November 1998, the trial court denied
Caballes' motion for reconsideration. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial
court decision on 15 September 1998. Caballes appealed the decision by
certiorari.
Issue: Whether Caballes passive submission to the statement of Sgt. Noceja
that the latter "will look at the contents of his vehicle and he answered in the
positive" be considered as waiver on Caballes part on warrantless search
and seizure.
Held: Enshrined in our Constitution is the inviolable right of the people to be
secure in their persons and properties against unreasonable searches and
seizures, as defined under Section 2, Article III thereof. The exclusionary rule
under Section 3(2), Article III of the Constitution bars the admission of
evidence obtained in violation of such right. The constitutional proscription
against warrantless searches and seizures is not absolute but admits of
certain exceptions, namely: (1) warrantless search incidental to a lawful
arrest recognized under Section 12, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court and by
prevailing jurisprudence; (2) seizure of evidence in plain view; (3) search of
moving vehicles; (4) consented warrantless search; (5) customs search;
stop and frisk situations (Terry search); and (7) exigent and emergency
circumstances. In cases where warrant is necessary, the steps prescribed by
the Constitution and reiterated in the Rules of Court must be complied with.
In the exceptional events where warrant is not necessary to effect a valid
search or seizure, or when the latter cannot be performed except without a
warrant, what constitutes a reasonable or unreasonable search or seizure is
purely a judicial question, determinable from the uniqueness of the
circumstances involved, including the purpose of the search or seizure, the
presence or absence of probable cause, the manner in which the search and
seizure was made, the place or thing searched and the character of the
articles procured. It is not controverted that the search and seizure
conducted by the police officers was not authorized by a search warrant. The
mere mobility of these vehicles, however, does not give the police officers
unlimited discretion to conduct indiscriminate searches without warrants if
made within the interior of the territory and in the absence of probable
cause. Herein, the police officers did not merely conduct a visual search or
visual inspection of Caballes' vehicle. They had to reach inside the vehicle, lift
the kakawati leaves and look inside the sacks before they were able to see
the cable wires. It thus cannot be considered a simple routine check. Also,
Caballes' vehicle was flagged down because the police officers who were on
routine patrol became suspicious when they saw that the back of the vehicle
was covered with kakawati leaves which, according to them, was unusual
and uncommon. The fact that the vehicle looked suspicious simply because it
is not common for such to be covered with kakawati leaves does not
constitute "probable cause" as would justify the conduct of a search without
a warrant. In addition, the police authorities do not claim to have received
any confidential report or tipped information that petitioner was carrying
stolen cable wires in his vehicle which could otherwise have sustained their
suspicion. Philippine jurisprudence is replete with cases where tipped
information has become a sufficient probable cause to effect a warrantless
search and seizure. Unfortunately, none exists in the present case. Further,
the evidence is lacking that Caballes intentionally surrendered his right
against unreasonable searches. The manner by which the two police officers
allegedly obtained the consent of Caballes for them to conduct the search
leaves much to be desired. When Caballes' vehicle was flagged down, Sgt.
Noceja approached Caballes and "told him I will look at the contents of his
vehicle and he answered in the positive." By uttering those words, it cannot
be said the police officers were asking or requesting for permission that they
be allowed to search the vehicle of Caballes. For all intents and purposes,
they were informing, nay, imposing upon Caballes that they will search his
vehicle. The "consent" given under intimidating or coercive circumstances is
no consent within the purview of the constitutional guaranty. In addition, in
cases where the Court upheld the validity of consented search, it will be
noted that the police authorities expressly asked, in no uncertain terms, for
the consent of the accused to be searched. And the consent of the accused
was established by clear and positive proof. Neither can Caballes' passive
submission be construed as an implied acquiescence to the warrantless
search. Casting aside the cable wires as evidence, the remaining evidence on
record are insufficient to sustain Caballes' conviction. His guilt can only be
established without violating the constitutional right of the accused against
unreasonable search and seizure.
OBRA v. CA
FACTS
Petitioner Benjamin Obra was Regional Director of the Bureau of Mines and
Geo-Sciences (BMGS) in Baguio. On jun 26, 1985, Jeannette Grybos wrote
him a letter on behalf of the Gillies heirs complaining that private
respondents (Sps. James and June Brett) had been conducting illegal
mining activities in Bgy. Palasa-an, Mankayan, Benguet, belonging to Gillies
family. On the same day, Obra wrote Brig. Gen Tomas Dumpit1 requesting
assistance in apprehending a truck2 allegedly used by Sps. Brett in illegal
mining. The next day, Obra wrote Sps Brett and Grybos informing them that
BMGS was going to conduct an ocular inspeciton and field investigation and
requesting them to be present so that all matters shall be gathered and
collated in order for this Office to take appropriate action. Elements of RUC
under Maj. Densen seized the truck3 as it was entering Mamakar mining
area. It was impounded by the military and prevented from leaving the area
except on mercy missions4. Private respondents filed a complaint for
injunction and damages with the RTC as the truck was seized without due
provess in violation of their constitutional rights under Art. 32 of the Civil
Code.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners (Obra and Dumpit) were authorized to
seize the vehicle in the absence of any finding of probably cause (PC).
HELD: NO. Although peittioners have authority to order seizure and
confiscation via PD. 1281, Art IV, S3 of the 1973 Constitution merely
validated the grant by law to non-judicial officers of the power to issue
warrants but did not in any way exempt them from the duty of determining
the existence of probable cause. Petitioner Obras letters to private
respondents and Grybos clearly stated that an investigation was to be held
on July 2-5, 1985 to determine the veracity of the allegations of Grybos
complaint. His only basis was an alleged certification from the BMGS that no
mining permit had been issued to the Sps. However, such certification was
not presented in evidence. The seizure cannot be justified under the moving
vehicle doctrine as there is no existence of probable cause. The doctrine does
not give police officers unlimited discretion to conduct warrantless searches
of automobiles in the absence of PC. Therefore, the CA is correct in affirming
the RTCs decision that petitioners are liable for damages (P100,000) and
attorneys fees (P10,000) in violation of the Sps. Rights under Art. 32 of the
Civil Code.
People v. Malmstedt [GR 91107, 19 June 1991]
En Banc, Padilla (J): 8 concur, 1 on leave
Facts: Mikael Malmstedt, a Swedish national, entered the Philippines for the
3rd time in December 1988 as a tourist. He had visited the country sometime
in 1982 and 1985. In the evening of 7 May 1989, Malmstedt left for Baguio
3rd Meeting: Consti2 Cases
City. Upon his arrival thereat in the morning of the following day, he took a
bus to Sagada and stayed in that place for 2 days.
On 11 May 1989, Capt. Alen Vasco of NARCOM, stationed at Camp Dangwa,
ordered his men to set up a temporary checkpoint at Kilometer 14, Acop,
Tublay, Mountain Province, for the purpose of checking all vehicles coming
from the Cordillera Region. The order to establish a checkpoint in the said
area was prompted by persistent reports that vehicles coming from Sagada
were transporting marijuana and other prohibited drugs. Moreover,
information was received by the Commanding Officer of NARCOM, that same
morning that a Caucasian coming from Sagada had in his possession
prohibited drugs.
At about 1:30 pm, the bus where Malmstedt was riding was stopped. Sgt.
Fider and CIC Galutan boarded the bus and announced that they were
members of the NARCOM and that they would conduct an inspection.
During the inspection, CIC Galutan noticed a bulge on Malmstedt's waist.
Suspecting the bulge on Malmstedt's waist to be a gun, the officer asked for
Malmstedt's passport and other identification papers. When Malmstedt
failed to comply, the officer required him to bring out whatever it was that
was bulging on his waist, which was a pouch bag. When Malmstedt opened
the same bag, as ordered, the officer noticed 4 suspicious-looking objects
wrapped in brown packing tape, which turned out to contain hashish, a
derivative of marijuana, when opened. Malmstedt stopped to get 2 travelling
bags from the luggage carrier, each containing a teddy bear, when he was
invited outside the bus for questioning. It was observed that there were also
bulges inside the teddy bears which did not feel like foam stuffing.
Malmstedt was then brought to the headquarters of the NARCOM at Camp
Dangwa for further investigation.
At the investigation room, the officers opened the teddy bears and they were
found to also contain hashish. Representative samples were taken from the
hashish found among the personal effects of Malmstedt and the same were
brought to the PC Crime Laboratory for chemical analysis, which established
the objects examined as hashish. Malmstedt claimed that the hashish was
planted by the NARCOM officers in his pouch bag and that the 2 travelling
bags were not owned by him, but were merely entrusted to him by an
Australian couple whom he met in Sagada. He further claimed that the
Australian couple intended to take the same bus with him but because there
were no more seats available in said bus, they decided to take the next ride
and asked Malmstedt to take charge of the bags, and that they would meet
each other at the Dangwa Station.
An information was filed against Malmstedt for violation of the Dangerous
Drugs Act. During the arraignment, Malmstedt entered a plea of "not guilty."
After trial and on 12 October 1989, the trial court found Malmstedt guilty
beyond reasonable doubt for violation of Section 4, Article II of RA 6425 and
sentenced him to life imprisonment and to pay a fine of P20,000. Malmstedt
sought reversal of the decision of the trial court.
Issue: Whether the personal effects of Malmstedt may be searched without
an issued warrant.
Held: The Constitution guarantees the right of the people to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and
seizures. However, where the search is made pursuant to a lawful arrest,
there is no need to obtain a search warrant. A lawful arrest without a
warrant may be made by a peace officer or a private person under the
following circumstances. Section 5 provides that a peace officer or a private
person may, without a warrant, arrest a person (a) When, in his presence,
the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense; (b) When an offense has in fact just been
committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the
person to be arrested has committed it; and (c) When the person to be
arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place
where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is
pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to
another. In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) hereof, the person
arrested without a warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest police
station or jail, and he shall be proceeded against in accordance with Rule
112, Section 7." Herein, Malmstedt was caught in flagrante delicto, when he
was transporting prohibited drugs. Thus, the search made upon his personal
effects falls squarely under paragraph (1) of the foregoing provisions of law,
which allow a warrantless search incident to a lawful arrest.
Roan v. Gonzales, 145 SCRA 687
Beltran's column of Oct. 12, 1987 title "The Nervous Officials of the Aquino
Administration": "If you recall, during the August 29 coup attempt, the
President hid under her bed while the firing was going on - perhaps the first
Commander-in-Chief to do so."
Facts: In this case, upon the issue raised by petitioner Beltran, the
constitutional provision on the issuance of warrants of arrest was called for
an interpretation. Beltran wrote in the Philippine Star that during
the August 29 coup attempt, the President hid under her bed while the firing
was going on. Due to this, the President filed a libel complaint against
petitioners.
Beltran argues that the addition of the word personally after the word
determined and the deletion of the grant of authority by the 1973
Constitution to issue warrants to other responsible officers as may be
authorized by law. This interpretation convinced him that the Constitution
now requires the judge to personally examine the complainant and his
witnesses in his determination of probable cause for the issuance of warrants
of arrest.
Issue: Whether or not Beltrans constitution rights were violated when the
respondent RTC judge issued a warrant of arrest without personally
examining the complainant and the witnesses to determine probable cause
Ruling:
1. The judge is not required to personally examine the complainant and his
witnesses. What the Constitution underscores is the exclusive and personal
responsibility of the issuing judge to satisfy himself of the existence of
probable cause. Instead, he shall (a) personally evaluate the report and the
supporting documents submitted by the fiscal regarding the existence of
probable cause and, on the basis thereof, issue a warrant of arrest; or (b)
if on the basis thereof he finds no probable cause, he may disregard the
fiscals report and require the submission of supporting affidavits of
witnesses to aid him in arriving at a conclusion as to the existence of
probable cause. This procedure should be followed, otherwise judges would
be unduly laden with the preliminary examinations and investigation of
criminal complaints instead of concentrating on hearing and deciding cases
filed before their courts.
2. In making the required personal determination, a Judge is not precluded
from relying on the evidence earlier gathered by responsible officers. The
extent of the reliance depends on the circumstances of each case and is
subject to the Judges sound discretion.
Roan v. Gonzales, 145 SCRA 687
Roans house was searched by virtue of a search warrant and the said search
was performed by military authorities. During their search, the authorities
found a Colt Magnum revolver and 18 live bullets which they confiscated and
served as bases for the charge of illegal possession of firearms. However, the
application of said search warrant was based on the accounts of two
witnesses. The applicant did not have personal knowledge of said firearm.
Facts:
1. A search warrant was issued by respondent judge (Gonzales) on May 10,
1984.Application for the said search warrant was personally filed by PC Capt.
Mauro Quillosa. Together with Quillosa were two witnesses (Esmael Morada
and Jesus Tohilida), who presented to respondent judge their respective
affidavits. The application was not yet subscribed and sworn to, as such
respondent Judge proceeded to examine Quillosa on the contents of the
application to ascertain if he knew and understood the same. Afterwards,
Quillosa subscribed and swore the said application before respondent.
2. Petitioners (Josefino Roan) house was searched two days after the
issuance of the search warrant. The said search was performed by military
authorities. Despite none of the articles listed in the warrant was discovered,
the officers who conducted the search found one Colt Magnum revolver and
3rd Meeting: Consti2 Cases
18 live bullets which they confiscated. The said items served as bases for the
charge of illegal possession of firearms against the petitioner.
Issue: Whether or not a search warrant be annulled on the ground that it
violates the privacy of one persons house
Ruling/Decision:
1. To be valid, a search warrant must be supported by probable cause to be
determined by the judge or some authorized officer after examining the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce. There must be a specific
description of the place to be searched and the things to be seized, to
prevent arbitrary and indiscriminate use of the warrant. Probable cause, as
described by Judge Escolin in Burgos v. Chief of Staff, refers to such facts
and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man
to believe that an offense has been committed and that the objects sought in
connection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched. The
probable cause must refer to only one specific offense.
2. The applicant (Capt. Quillosa) was asking for the issuance of the search
warrant on the basis of mere hearsay and not of information personally
known to him as required by settled jurisprudence.
3. It is axiomatic that the magistrate must be probing and exhaustive,
not merely routinary or pro-forma, if the claimed probable cause is to be
established. The examining magistrate must not simply rehash the contents
of the affidavit but must make his own inquiry on the intent and justification
of the application.4.
Prohibited articles may be seized but only as long as the search is valid. In
this case, it was not because: (a) there was no valid search warrant; and (b)
absent such a warrant, the right thereto was not validly waived by the
petitioner. In short, the
PEOPLE VS. TABAR
FACTS:
Respondent-accused was charged, together with her nephew, for violation of
the Dangerous Drugs Act in an information which provided that: That on or
about the 8th day of February 1989, at about 3:00 PM. in the City of Cebu,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said
accused, conniving and confederating together and mutually helping each
other, with deliberate intent, did then and there sell and deliver, without
authority of law, Three (3) sticks of marijuana cigarettes, a (sic) prohibited
drugs, to a person who posted himself as a buyer, in Viol. of Sec. 4, Art. 11, of
RA 6425, as amended, otherwise known as the Dangerous Act of 1972. The
accused were then convicted of the offense charged against them in the trial
court.
On appeal, respondent presented her argument that the lower court erred in
admitting the evidence against her when there wasnt any search warrant.
Therefore, violating the constitutional guarantee against unreasonable
searches and seizures.
ISSUE: WON there was a violation against the constitutional guarantee of
individuals against unreasonable searches and seizures.
RULING: The second assigned error is without merit. The evidence for the
prosecution discloses that the appellant placed the packs of marijuana sticks
under the rolled pair of pants which she was then carrying at the time she
hurriedly left her shanty after noticing the arrest of Rommel. When she was
asked to spread it out, which she voluntary did, the package containing the
packs of marijuana sticks were thus exposed in plain view to the member of
the team. A crime was thus committed in the presence of the policemen.
Pursuant to Section 5, Rule 113 and Section 12 Rule 126 of the Revised Rules
of Court, she could lawfully be arrested and searched for anything which may
be used as proof of the commission of an offense without the corresponding
arrest and search warrants
Even assuming ex gratia argumenti that the seach and seizure were without
a warrant, the appellant had effectively waived her constitutional right
relative thereto by voluntarily submitting to the seach and seizure. In People
vs. Malasugui, 20 this Court ruled:
When one voluntarily submits to a search and consent to have it made of his
person or premises, he is precluded from later complaining thereof. The right
to be secure from unreasonable seach may, like every right, be waived and
such waiver may be made either expressly or impliedly.
Aniag vs. Commission on Elections [GR 104961, 7 October 1994]
En Banc, Bellosillo (J): 6 concur, 3 on leave
Facts: In preparation for the synchronized national and local elections
scheduled on 11 May 1992, the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) issued
on 11 December 1991 Resolution 2323 ("Gun Ban"), promulgating rules and
regulations on bearing, carrying and transporting of firearms or other deadly
weapons, on security personnel or bodyguards, on bearing arms by members
of security agencies or police organizations, and organization or maintenance
of reaction forces during the election period.
Subsequently, on 26 December 1991 COMELEC issued Resolution 2327
providing for the summary disqualification of candidates engaged in
gunrunning, using and transporting of firearms, organizing special strike
forces, and establishing spot checkpoints.
On 10 January 1992, pursuant to the "Gun Ban," Mr. Serapio P. Taccad,
Sergeant-at-Arms, House of Representatives, wrote Congressman Francisc B.
Aniag Jr., who was then Congressman of the 1st District of Bulacan
requesting the return of the 2 firearms issued to him by the House of
Representatives. Upon being advised of the request on 13 January 1992 by
his staff, Aniag immediately instructed his driver, Ernesto Arellano, to pick up
the firearms from his house at Valle Verde and return them to Congress.
Meanwhile, at about 5:00 p,.m. of the same day, the Philippine National
Police (PNP) headed by Senior Superintendent Danilo Cordero set up a
checkpoint outside the Batasan Complex some 20 meters away from its
entrance. About 30 minutes later, the policemen manning the outpost
flagged down the car driven by Arellano as it approached the checkpoint.
They searched the car and found the firearms neatly packed in their gun
cases and placed in a bag in the trunk of the car. Arellano was then
apprehended and detained. He explained that he was ordered by Aniag to
get the firearms from the house and return them to Sergeant-at Arms Taccad
of the House of Representatives. Thereafter, the police referred Arellano's
case to the Office of the City Prosecutor for inquest. The referral did not
include Aniag as among those charged with an election offense. On 15
January 1992, the City Prosecutor ordered the release of Arellano after
finding the latter's sworn explanation meritorious. On 28 January 1992, the
City Prosecutor invited Aniag to shed light on the circumstances mentioned
in Arellano's sworn explanation. Aniag not only appeared at the preliminary
investigation to confirm Arellano's statement but also wrote the City
Prosecutor urging him to exonerate Arellano. He explained that Arellano did
not violate the firearms ban as he in fact was complying with it when
apprehended by returning the firearms to Congress; and, that he was Aniag's
driver, not a security officer nor a bodyguard.
On 6 March 1992, the Office of the City Prosecutor issued a resolution which,
among other matters, recommended that the case against Arellano be
dismissed and that the "unofficial" charge against Aniag be also dismissed.
Nevertheless, on 6 April 1992, upon recommendation of its Law Department,
COMELEC issued Resolution 92-0829 directing the filing of information
against Aniag and Arellano for violation of Sec. 261, par. (q), of BP 881
otherwise known as the Omnibus Election Code, in relation to Sec. 32 of RA
7166; and Aniag to show cause why he should not be disqualified from
running for an elective position, pursuant to COMELEC Resolution 2327, in
relation to Secs. 32, 33 and 35 of RA 7166, and Sec. 52, par. (c), of BP 881.
On 13 April 1992, Aniag moved for reconsideration and to hold in abeyance
the administrative proceedings as well as the filing of the information in
court.
On 23 April 1992, the COMELEC denied Aniag's motion for reconsideration.
Aniag filed a petition for declaratory relief, certiorari and prohibition against
the COMELEC.
3rd Meeting: Consti2 Cases
Issue: Whether the search of Aniags car that yielded the firearms which
were to be returned to the House of Representatives within the purview of
the exception as to the search of moving vehicles.
Held: As a rule, a valid search must be authorized by a search warrant duly
issued by an appropriate authority. However, this is not absolute. Aside from
a search incident to a lawful arrest, a warrantless search had been upheld in
cases of moving vehicles and the seizure of evidence in plain view, as well as
the search conducted at police or military checkpoints which we declared are
not illegal per se, and stressed that the warrantless search is not violative of
the Constitution for as long as the vehicle is neither searched nor its
occupants subjected to a body search, and the inspection of the vehicle is
merely limited to a visual search. As there was no evidence to show that the
policemen were impelled to do so because of a confidential report leading
them to reasonably believe that certain motorists matching the description
furnished by their informant were engaged in gunrunning, transporting
firearms or in organizing special strike forces. Nor was there any indication
from the package or behavior of Arellano that could have triggered the
suspicion of the policemen. Absent such justifying circumstances specifically
pointing to the culpability of Aniag and Arellano, the search could not be
valid. The action then of the policemen unreasonably intruded into Aniag's
privacy and the security of his property, in violation of Sec. 2, Art. III, of the
Constitution. Consequently, the firearms obtained in violation of Aniag's right
against warrantless search cannot be admitted for any purpose in any
proceeding.
People vs. Tudtud [GR 144037, 26 September 2003]
Second Division, Tinga (J): 3 concur, 1 filed a separate dissenting opinion
Facts:
Sometime during the months of July and August 1999, the Toril Police
Station, Davao City received a report from a civilian asset named Bobong
Solier about a certain Noel Tudtud. Solier related that his neighbors have
been complaining about Tudtud, who was allegedly responsible for the
proliferation of marijuana in their area. Reacting to the report, PO1 Ronald
Desierto, PO1 Ramil Floreta and their superior, SPO1 Villalonghan, all
members of the Intelligence Section of the Toril Police Station, conducted
surveillance in Soliers neighborhood in Sapa, Toril, Davao City. For 5 days,
they gathered information and learned that Tudtud was involved in illegal
drugs. According to his neighbors, Tudtud was engaged in selling marijuana.
On 1 August 1999, Solier informed the police that Tudtud had headed to
Cotabato and would be back later that day with new stocks of marijuana.
Solier described Tudtud as big-bodied and short, and usually wore a hat. At
around 4:00 p.m. that same day, a team composed of PO1 Desierto, PO1
Floreta and SPO1 Villalonghan posted themselves at the corner of Saipon and
McArthur Highway to await Tudtuds arrival. All wore civilian clothes. About
8:00 p.m., 2 men disembarked from a bus and helped each other carry a
carton marked King Flakes. Standing some 5 feet away from the men, PO1
Desierto and PO1 Floreta observed that one of the men fit Tudtuds
description. The same man also toted a plastic bag. PO1 Floreta and PO1
Desierto then approached the suspects and identified themselves as police
officers. PO1 Desierto informed them that the police had received
information that stocks of illegal drugs would be arriving that night. The man
who resembled Tudtuds description denied that he was carrying any drugs.
PO1 Desierto asked him if he could see the contents of the box. Tudtud
obliged, saying, it was alright.
Tudtud opened the box himself as his companion looked on. The box yielded
pieces of dried fish, beneath which were two bundles, one wrapped in a
striped plastic bag and another in newspapers. PO1 Desierto asked Tudtud
to unwrap the packages. They contained what seemed to the police officers
as marijuana leaves. The police thus arrested Tudtud and his companion,
informed them of their rights and brought them to the police station. The
two did not resist. The confiscated items were turned over to the Philippine
National Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory for examination. Forensic tests on
specimens taken from the confiscated items confirmed the police officers
suspicion. The plastic bag contained 3,200 grams of marijuana leaves while
the newspapers contained another 890 grams. Noel Tudtud and his
companion, Dindo Bulong, were subsequently charged before the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Davao City with illegal possession of prohibited drugs.
Upon arraignment, both accused pleaded not guilty. The defense, however,
reserved their right to question the validity of their arrest and the seizure of
the evidence against them. Trial ensued thereafter. Tudtud, denying the
charges against them, cried frame-up. Swayed by the prosecutions evidence
beyond reasonable doubt, the RTC rendered judgment convicting both
accused as charged and sentencing them to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua and to pay a fine of P500,000.00.
On appeal, Noel Tudtud and Dindo Bolong assign, among other errors, the
admission in evidence of the marijuana leaves, which they claim were seized
in violation of their right against unreasonable searches and seizures.
Issue: Whether the Tudtuds implied acquiescence (Tudtuds statement of
its all right when the police officers requested that the box be opened) be
considered a waiver.
Held: The right against unreasonable searches and seizures is secured by
Section 2, Article III of the Constitution. The RTC justified the warrantless
search of appellants belongings under the first exception, as a search
incident to a lawful arrest. A search incidental to a lawful arrest is sanctioned
by the Rules of Court. It is significant to note that the search in question
preceded the arrest. Recent jurisprudence holds that the arrest must
precede the search; the process cannot be reversed. Nevertheless, a search
substantially contemporaneous with an arrest can precede the arrest if the
police have probable cause to make the arrest at the outset of the search.
The question, therefore, is whether the police herein had probable cause to
arrest Tudtud, et. al. The long-standing rule in this jurisdiction, applied with a
great degree of consistency, is that reliable information alone is not
sufficient to justify a warrantless arrest under Section 5 (a), Rule 113. The
rule requires, in addition, that the accused perform some overt act that
would indicate that he has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense. For the exception in Section 5 (a), Rule
113 to apply, this Court ruled, two elements must concur: (1) the person to
be arrested must execute an overt act indicating he has just committed, is
actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such overt
act is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer.
Reliable information alone is insufficient. Thus, herein, in no sense can the
knowledge of the arresting officers that Tudtud was in possession of
marijuana be described as personal, having learned the same only from
their informant Solier. Solier, for his part, testified that he obtained his
information only from his neighbors and the friends of Tudtud. Soliers
information is hearsay. Confronted with such a dubious informant, the police
perhaps felt it necessary to conduct their own surveillance. This
surveillance, it turns out, did not actually consist of staking out Tudtud to
catch him in the act of plying his illegal trade, but of a mere gathering of
information from the assets there. The police officers who conducted such
surveillance did not identify who these assets were or the basis of the
latters information. Clearly, such information is also hearsay, not of personal
knowledge. Finally, there is an effective waiver of rights against unreasonable
searches and seizures only if the following requisites are present: (1) It must
appear that the rights exist; (2) The person involved had knowledge, actual or
constructive, of the existence of such right; (3) Said person had an actual
intention to relinquish the right. Here, the prosecution failed to establish the
second and third requisites. Records disclose that when the police officers
introduced themselves as such and requested Tudtud that they see the
contents of the carton box supposedly containing the marijuana, Tudtud said
it was alright. He did not resist and opened the box himself. Tudtud's
implied acquiescence, if at all, could not have been more than mere passive
conformity given under coercive or intimidating circumstances and is, thus,
considered no consent at all within the purview of the constitutional
guarantee. Consequently, Tudtud's lack of objection to the search and
seizure is not tantamount to a waiver of his constitutional right or a voluntary
submission to the warrantless search and seizure. As the search of Tudtud's
box does not come under the recognized exceptions to a valid warrantless
search, the marijuana leaves obtained thereby are inadmissible in evidence.
And as there is no evidence other than the hearsay testimony of the
arresting officers and their informant, the conviction of Tudtud, et. al. cannot
be sustained.
----
People vs. Compacion [GR 124442, 20 July 2001]
First Division, Kapunan (J): 4 concur
Facts:
3rd Meeting: Consti2 Cases
Acting on a confidential tip supplied by a police informant that Armando
Compacio y Surposa was growing and cultivating marijuana plants, SPO1
Gilbert L. Linda and SPO2 Basilio Sarong of the 6th Narcotic Regional Field
Unit of the Narcotics Command (NARCOM) of the Bacolod City Detachment
conducted a surveillance of the residence of Compacion who was then the
barangay captain of barangay Bagonbon, San Carlos City, Negros Occidental
on 9 July 1995. During the said surveillance, they saw 2 tall plants in the
backyard of Compacion which they suspected to be marijuana plants. SPO1
Linda and SPO2 Sarong reported the result of their surveillance to SPO4
Ranulfo T. Villamor, Jr., Chief of NARCOM, Bacolod City, who immediately
formed a team composed of the members of the Intelligence Division
Provincial Command, the Criminal Investigation Command and the Special
Action Force.
Two members of the media, one from DYWF Radio and another from DYRL
Radio, were also included in the composite team. On 12 July 1995, the team
applied for a search warrant with the office of Executive Judge Bernardo
Ponferrada in Bacolod City. However, Judge Ponferrada informed them that
he did not have territorial jurisdiction over the matter. The team then left
Bacolod City for San Carlos City. They arrived there around 6:30 p.m., then
went to the house of Executive Judge Roberto S. Javellana to secure a search
warrant. They were not able to do so because it was nighttime and office
hours were obviously over.
They were told by the judge to go back in the morning. Nonetheless, the
team proceeded to barangay Bagonbon and arrived at the residence of
Compacion in the early morning of 13 July 1995. SPO4 Villamor knocked at
the gate and called out for Compacion. What happened thereafter is subject
to conflicting accounts. The prosecution contends that Compacion opened
the gate and permitted them to come in. He was immediately asked by SPO4
Villamor about the suspected marijuana plants and he admitted that he
planted and cultivated the same for the use of his wife who was suffering
from migraine. SPO4 Villamor then told him that he would be charged for
violation of Section 9 of RA 6425 and informed him of his constitutional
rights. The operatives then uprooted the suspected marijuana plants. SPO1
Linda conducted an initial field test of the plants by using the Narcotics Drug
Identification Kit. The test yielded a positive result. On 15 July 1995, the
plants were turned over to the Philippine National Police (PNP) Crime
Laboratory, Bacolod City Police Command, particularly to Senior Inspector
Reah Abastillas Villavicencio.
Senior Inspector Villavicencio weighed and measured the plants, one was
125 inches and weighed 700 grams while the other was 130 inches and
weighed 900 grams. Three (3) qualitative examinations were conducted,
namely: the microscopic test, the chemical test, and the thin layer
chromatographic test. All yielded positive results. On his part, Compacion
maintains that around 1:30 a.m. on 13 July 1995 while he and his family were
sleeping, he heard somebody knocking outside his house. He went down
bringing with him a flashlight. After he opened the gate, 4 persons who he
thought were members of the military, entered the premises then went
inside the house. It was dark so he could not count the others who entered
the house as the same was lit only by a kerosene lamp. One of the four men
told him to sit in the living room. Some of the men went upstairs while the
others went around the house. None of them asked for his permission to
search his house and the premises. After about 20 minutes of searching, the
men called him outside and brought him to the backyard. One of the military
men said: "Captain, you have a (sic) marijuana here at your backyard" to
which Compacion replied: "I do not know that they were (sic) marijuana
plants but what I know is that they are medicinal plants for my wife" who
was suffering from migraine. After he was informed that the plants in his
backyard were marijuana, the men took pictures of him and themselves.
Thereafter, he was brought inside the house where he and the military men
spent the night. At around 10:00 a.m., they brought him with them to the
city hall. Compacion saw that one of the 2 service vehicles they brought was
fully loaded with plants. He was later told by the military men that said
plants were marijuana. Upon arrival at the city hall, the men met with the
mayor and then unloaded the alleged marijuana plants. A picture of him
together with the arresting team was taken with the alleged marijuana as
back drop. Soon thereafter, he was taken to Hda. Socorro at the SAF
Headquarters. A criminal complaint for violation of Section 9 of RA 6425, as
amended by RA 7659 was filed against Compacion. On 2 January 1996, the
trial court convicted Compacion of the crime charged, and sentenced him to
reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of P500,000.00.
Issue: Whether Compacion's right against unreasonable search and seizure
was violated.
Held: Sections 2 and 3 [2], Article III of the 1987 Constitution are safeguards
against reckless, malicious and unreasonable invasion of privacy and liberty.
A search and seizure, therefore, must be carried out through or with a
judicial warrant; otherwise, such search and seizure becomes "unreasonable"
within the meaning of the constitutional provision. Evidence secured
thereby, i.e., the "fruits" of the search and seizure, will be inadmissible in
evidence for any purpose in any proceeding." The requirement that a
warrant must be obtained from the proper judicial authority prior to the
conduct of a search and seizure is, however, not absolute. There are several
instances when the law recognizes exceptions, such as when the owner of
the premises consents or voluntarily submits to a search; when the owner of
the premises waives his right against such incursion; when the search is
incidental to a lawful arrest; when it is made on vessels and aircraft for
violation of customs laws; when it is made on automobiles for the purpose of
preventing violations of smuggling or immigration laws; when it involves
prohibited articles in plain view; when it involves a "stop and frisk" situation;
when the search is under exigent and emergency circumstances; or in cases
of inspection of buildings and other premises for the enforcement of fire,
sanitary and building regulations. In these instances, a search may be validly
made even without a warrant. Herein, the search and seizure conducted by
the composite team in the house of accused-appellant was not authorized by
a search warrant, It does not appear either that the situation falls under any
of the above mentioned cases. Consequently, Compacion's right against
unreasonable search and seizure was clearly violated. As a general rule,
objects in the "plain view" of an officer who has the right to be in the
position to have that view are subject to seizure without a warrant. It is
usually applied where a police officer is not searching for evidence against
the accused, but nonetheless inadvertently comes across an incriminating
object. Thus, the following elements must be present before the doctrine
may be applied: (a) a prior valid intention based on the valid warrantless
arrest in which the police are legally present in the pursuit of their official
duties; (b) the evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police who have
the right to be where they are; (c) the evidence must be immediately
apparent; and (d) "plain view" justified were seizure of evidence without
further search. Here, there was no valid warrantless arrest. They forced their
way into Compacion's premises without the latter's consent. It is undisputed
that the NARCOM agents conducted a surveillance of the residence of
Compacion on 9 July 1995 on the suspicion that he was growing and
cultivating marijuana when they allegedly came in "plain view" of the
marijuana plants. When the agents entered his premises on 13 July 1995,
their intention was to seize the evidence against him. In fact, they initially
wanted to secure a search warrant but could not simply wait for one to be
issued. The NARCOM agents, therefore, did not come across the marijuana
plants inadvertently when they conducted a surveillance and barged into
Compacion's residence. As held in People v. Musa, the "plain view" doctrine
may not be used to launch unbridled searches and indiscriminate seizures
nor to extend a general exploratory search made solely to find evidence of
defendant's guilt. The "plain view" doctrine is usually applied where a police
officer is not searching for evidence against the accused, but nonetheless
inadvertently comes across an incriminating object. Hence, Compacion is
acquitted of the crime to which he was charged.
People vs. Valdez [GR 129296, 25 September 2000]
En Banc, Quisumbing (J): 13 concur, 1 on leave
Facts: At around 10:15 a.m. of 24 September 1996, SPO3 Marcelo Tipay, a
member of the police force of Villaverde, Nueva Vizcaya, received a tip from
an unnamed informer about the presence of a marijuana plantation,
allegedly owned by Abe Valdez y Dela Cruz at Sitio Bulan, Ibung, Villaverde,
Nueva Vizcaya. The prohibited plants were allegedly planted close to Valdez's
hut. Police Inspector Alejandro R. Parungao, Chief of Police of Villaverde,
Nueva Vizcaya then formed a reaction team from his operatives to verify the
report. The team was composed of SPO3 Marcelo M. Tipay, SPO2 Noel V.
Libunao, SPO2 Pedro S. Morales, SPO1 Romulo G. Tobias and PO2 Alfelmer I.
Balut. Inspector Parungao gave them specific instructions to "uproot said
marijuana plants and arrest the cultivator of same." At approximately 5:00
3rd Meeting: Consti2 Cases
a.m. the following day, said police team, accompanied by their informer, left
for the site where the marijuana plants were allegedly being grown. After a
three-hour, uphill trek from the nearest barangay road, the police operatives
arrived at the place pinpointed by their informant. The police found Valdez
alone in his nipa hut. They, then, proceeded to look around the area where
Valdez had his kaingin and saw 7 five-foot high, flowering marijuana plants in
two rows, approximately 25 meters from Valdez's hut. PO2 Balut asked
Valdez who owned the prohibited plants and, according to Balut, the latter
admitted that they were his. The police uprooted the 7 marijuana plants,
which weighed 2.194 kilograms. The police took photos of Valdez standing
beside the cannabis plants. Valdez was then arrested. One of the plants,
weighing 1.090 kilograms, was sent to the Philippine National Police Crime
Laboratory in Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya for analysis. Inspector Prevy Fabros
Luwis, the Crime Laboratory forensic analyst, testified that upon microscopic
examination of said plant, she found cystolitic hairs containing calcium
carbonate, a positive indication for marijuana. She next conducted a
chemical examination, the results of which confirmed her initial impressions.
Valdez alleged otherwise. He claims that at around 10:00 a.m., 25 September
1996, he was weeding his vegetable farm in Sitio Bulan when he was called
by a person whose identity he does not know. He was asked to go with the
latter to "see something." This unknown person then brought Valdez to the
place where the marijuana plants were found, approximately 100 meters
away from his nipa hut. 5 armed policemen were present and they made him
stand in front of the hemp plants. He was then asked if he knew anything
about the marijuana growing there. When he denied any knowledge thereof,
SPO2 Libunao poked a fist at him and told him to admit ownership of the
plants. Valdez was so nervous and afraid that he admitted owning the
marijuana. The police then took a photo of him standing in front of one of
the marijuana plants. He was then made to uproot 5 of the cannabis plants,
and bring them to his hut, where another photo was taken of him standing
next to a bundle of uprooted marijuana plants. The police team then brought
him to the police station at Villaverde. On the way, a certain Kiko Pascua, a
barangay peace officer of Barangay Sawmill, accompanied the police officers.
Pascua, who bore a grudge against him, because of his refusal to participate
in the former's illegal logging activities, threatened him to admit owning the
marijuana, otherwise be would "be put in a bad situation." At the police
headquarters, Valdez reiterated that he knew nothing about the marijuana
plants seized by the police. Still, on 26 September 1996, Valdez was charged
for the cultivation and culture of the 7 fully grown marijuana plants. On 15
November 1996, Valdez was arraigned and, with assistance of counsel,
pleaded not guilty to the charge. Trial on the merits then ensued. On 18
February 1997, the Regional Trial Court of Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya,
Branch 27, in Criminal Case 3105, found Valdez guilty beyond reasonable
doubt for violating Section 9 of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 (RA 6425, as
amended by RA 7659), and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of death by
lethal injection. Hence, the automatic review by the Supreme Court.
Issue: Whether the seizure of the marijuana plants was made pursuant to
warrantless search and seizure, based on the plain view doctrine.
Held: The Constitution lays down the general rule that a search and seizure
must be carried on the strength of a judicial warrant. Otherwise, the search
and seizure is deemed "unreasonable." Evidence procured on the occasion of
an unreasonable search and seizure is deemed tainted for being the
proverbial fruit of a poisonous tree and should be excluded. Such evidence
shall be inadmissible in evidence for any purpose in any proceeding. Herein,
there was no search warrant issued by a judge after personal determination
of the existence of probable cause. From the declarations of the police
officers themselves, it is clear that they had at least 1 day to obtain a warrant
to search Valdez's farm. Their informant had revealed his name to them. The
place where the cannabis plants were planted was pinpointed. From the
information in their possession, they could have convinced a judge that there
was probable cause to justify the issuance of a warrant. But they did not.
Instead, they uprooted the plants and apprehended the accused on the
excuse that the trip was a good six hours and inconvenient to them. We need
not underscore that the protection against illegal search and seizure is
constitutionally mandated and only under specific instances are searches
allowed without warrants. The mantle of protection extended by the Bill of
Rights covers both innocent and guilty alike against any form of high-
handedness of law enforcers, regardless of the praiseworthiness of their
intentions. The Court finds no reason to subscribe to Solicitor General's
contention that it should apply the "plain view" doctrine. For the doctrine to
apply, the following elements must be present: (a) a prior valid intrusion
based on the valid warrantless arrest in which the police are legally present
in the pursuit of their official duties; (b) the evidence was inadvertently
discovered by the police who have the right to be where they are; and (c) the
evidence must be immediately apparent; and (d) plain view justified mere
seizure of evidence without further search. Herein, the police officers first
located the marijuana plants before Valdez was arrested without a warrant.
Hence, there was no valid warrantless arrest which preceded the search of
Valdez's premises. The police team was dispatched to Valdez's kaingin
precisely to search for and uproot the prohibited flora. The seizure of
evidence in "plain view" applies only where the police officer is not searching
for evidence against the accused, but inadvertently comes across an
incriminating object. Clearly, their discovery of the cannabis plants was not
inadvertent. Also, upon arriving at the area, they first had to "look around
the area" before they could spot the illegal plants. Patently, the seized
marijuana plants were not "immediately apparent" and a "further search"
was needed. In sum, the marijuana plants in question were not in "plain
view" or "open to eye and hand." The "plain view" doctrine, thus, cannot be
made to apply.
People vs. de Gracia [GR 102009-10, 6 July 1994] Second Division, Regalado
(J): 5 concur
Facts: The incidents took place at the height of the coup d'etat staged in
December, 1989 by ultra-rightist elements headed by the Reform the Armed
Forces Movement-Soldiers of the Filipino People (RAM-SFP) against the
Government. At that time, various government establishments and military
camps in Metro Manila were being bombarded by the rightist group with
their "tora-tora" planes. At around midnight of 30 November 1989, the 4th
Marine Battalion of the Philippine Marines occupied Villamor Air Base, while
the Scout Rangers took over the Headquarters of the Philippine Army, the
Army Operations Center, and Channel 4, the government television station.
Also, some elements of the Philippine Army coming from Fort Magsaysay
occupied the Greenhills Shopping Center in San Juan, Metro Manila. On 1
December 1989, Maj. Efren Soria of the Intelligence Division, National Capital
Region Defense Command, was on board a brown Toyota car conducting a
surveillance of the Eurocar Sales Office located at Epifanio de los Santos
Avenue (EDSA) in Quezon City, together with his team composed of Sgt.
Crispin Sagario, M/Sgt. Ramon Briones, S/Sgt. Henry Aquino, one S/Sgt.
Simon and a Sgt. Ramos. The surveillance, which actually started on the night
of 30 November 1989 at around 10:00 p.m., was conducted pursuant to an
intelligence report received by the division that said establishment was being
occupied by elements of the RAM-SFP as a communication command post.
Sgt. Crispin Sagario, the driver of the car, parked the vehicle around 10 to 15
meters away from the Eurocar building near P. Tuazon Street, S/Sgt. Henry
Aquino had earlier alighted from the car to conduct his surveillance on foot.
A crowd was then gathered near the Eurocar office watching the on-going
bombardment near Camp Aguinaldo. After a while a group of 5 men
disengaged themselves from the crowd and walked towards the car of the
surveillance team. At that moment, Maj. Soria, who was then seated in front,
saw the approaching group and immediately ordered Sgt. Sagario to start the
car and leave the area. As they passed by the group, then only 6 meters
away, the latter pointed to them, drew their guns and fired at the team,
which attack resulted in the wounding of Sgt. Sagario on the right thigh.
Nobody in the surveillance team was able to retaliate because they sought
cover inside the car and they were afraid that civilians or bystanders might
be caught in the cross-fire. As a consequence, at around 6:30 a.m. of 5
December 1989, searching them composed of F/Lt. Virgilio Babao as team
leader, M/Sgt. Lacdao, Sgt. Magallion, Sgt. Patricio Pacatang, and elements of
the 16th Infantry Battalion under one Col. delos Santos raided the Eurocar
Sales Office. They were able to find and confiscate 6 cartons of M-16
ammunition, five bundles of C-4 dynamites, M-shells of different calibers,
and "molotov" bombs inside one of the rooms belonging to a certain Col.
Matillano which is located at the right portion of the building. St. Oscar
Obenia, the first one to enter the Eurocar building, saw Rolando De Gracia
inside the office of Col. Matillano, holding a C-4 and suspiciously peeping
through a door. De Gracia was the only person then present inside the room.
A uniform with the nametag of Col. Matillano was also found. As a result of
the raid, the team arrested de Gracia, as well as Soprieso Verbo and Roberto
Jimena who were janitors at the Eurocar building. They were then made to
sign an inventory, written in Tagalog, of the explosives and ammunition
confiscated by the raiding team. No search warrant was secured by the
3rd Meeting: Consti2 Cases
raiding team because, according to them, at that time there was so much
disorder considering that the nearby Camp Aguinaldo was being mopped up
by the rebel forces and there was simultaneous firing within the vicinity of
the Eurocar office, aside from the fact that the courts were consequently
closed. The group was able to confirm later that the owner of Eurocar office
is a certain Mr. Gutierrez and that de Gracia is supposedly a "boy" therein. de
Gracia was charged in two separate information for illegal possession of
ammunition and explosives in furtherance of rebellion, and for attempted
homicide (Criminal Cases Q-90-11755 and Q-90-11756, respectively), which
were tried jointly by the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 103.
During the arraignment, de Gracia pleaded not guilty to both charges.
However, he admitted that he is not authorized to posses any firearms,
ammunition and/or explosive. The parties likewise stipulated that there was
a rebellion during the period from November 30 up to 9 December 1989. On
22 February 1991, the trial court rendered judgment acquitting de Gracia of
attempted homicide, but found him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
offense of illegal possession of firearms in furtherance of rebellion and
sentenced him to serve the penalty of reclusion perpetua. De Gracia
appealed.
Canton to bring out the packages but Canton refused, saying: Money,
money only. Cabunoc reported the matter to her supervisor on duty, SPO4
Victorio de los Reyes.
SPO4 de los Reyes instructed Cabunoc to call Customs Examiner Lorna Jalac
and to bring Canton to a comfort room for a thorough physical examination.
Upon further frisking in the ladies room, Cabunoc touched something in
front of Cantons sex organ and she directed Canton to remove her skirt,
girdles and panty. Canton obliged and Cabunoc and Jalac discovered three
packages (abdominal area, in front of her genital area, and right thigh)
individually wrapped and sealed in gray colored packing tape, which Canton
voluntarily handed to them.
Cabunoc turned over the packages to SPO4 de los Reyes who then informed
Police Superintendent Daniel Santos about the incident. Together with
Canton, they brought the gray plastic packs to the customs examination
table, opened them, and found white crystalline substances inside, which
after laboratory examination yielded positive results for methamphetamine
hydrochloride or shabu, a regulated drug.

Issue: Whether the military operatives made a valid search and seizure For the defense, SPO2 Jerome Cause testified that no investigation was ever
during the height of the December 1989 coup detat. conducted on Canton. However, Canton signed a receipt of the following
articles seized from her: (1) 3 bags of methamphetamine hydrochloride or
Held: It is admitted that the military operatives who raided the Eurocar Sales shabu approximately 1,100 grams; (2) 1 American passport; (3) 1 Continental
Office were not armed with a search warrant at that time. The raid was Micronesia plane ticket; and (4) two panty girdles. SPO2 Cause said that he
actually precipitated by intelligence reports that said office was being used as informed Canton of her rights but admitted that she did not have a counsel
headquarters by the RAM. Prior to the raid, there was a surveillance when she signed the receipt.
conducted on the premises wherein the surveillance team was fired at by a RTC: found Canton guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 16
group of men coming from the Eurocar building. When the military Article III of RA 6425, and sentencing her to suffer the penalty of reclusion
operatives raided the place, the occupants thereof refused to open the door perpetua and to pay a fine of Php1million.
despite the requests for them to do so, thereby compelling the former to
break into the office. The Eurocar Sales Office is obviously not a gun store Issue: Whether or not the warrantless search made on Canton was valid. YES,
and it is definitely not an armory or arsenals which are the usual depositories it was valid.
for explosives and ammunition. It is primarily and solely engaged in the sale
of automobiles. The presence of an unusual quantity of high-powered Held/Ratio:
firearms and explosives could not be justifiably or even colorably explained. Cantons contentions Supreme Court
In addition, there was general chaos and disorder at that time because of TC erred in justifying the The search conducted on Canton was
simultaneous and intense firing within the vicinity of the office and in the warrantless search against her not incidental to a lawful arrest
nearby Camp Aguinaldo which was under attack by rebel forces. The courts based on the alleged existence of Cantons arrest did not precede the
in the surrounding areas were obviously closed and, for that matter, the probable cause search. When the metal detector
building and houses therein were deserted. Under the foregoing alarmed while Canton was passing
circumstances, the case falls under one of the exceptions to the prohibition through it, the lady frisker on duty
against a warrantless search. In the first place, the military operatives, taking made a pat down search on her. In the
into account the facts obtaining in this case, had reasonable ground to process, Cabunoc felt a bulge on
believe that a crime was being committed. There was consequently more Cantons abdomen. The strip search
than sufficient probable cause to warrant their action. Furthermore, under that followed was for the purpose of
the situation then prevailing, the raiding team had no opportunity to apply ascertaining what were the packages
for and secure a search warrant from the courts. The trial judge himself concealed on Cantons body.
manifested that on 5 December 1989 when the raid was conducted, his court TC erred in holding that she was Canton, having been flagrante delicto,
was closed. Under such urgency and exigency of the moment, a search caught in flagrante delicto and that was lawfully arrested without a warrant
warrant could lawfully be dispensed with. the warrantless search was Section 5, Rule 113 ROC provides that a
incidental to a lawful arrest peace officer or a private person may,
PEOPLE V. CANTON The arrest could not be said to without a warrant, arrest a person: (a)
People of the Philippines, appellee, vs. Susan Canton, appellant. have been made before the search When, in his presence, the person to be
Nature: Appeal from a decision of the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City, because at the time of the strip arrested has committed, is actually
Date: December 27, 2002 search, the arresting officers could committing, or is attempting to commit
Ponente: Davide, Jr., C. J. not have known what was inside an offense...
Doctrine: RA 6235 Sec. 9 is another exception to the proscription against the plastic containers hidden in her The present case falls under paragraph
warrantless searches and seizures. The provision clearly states that the body, which were wrapped and (a) of Section 5, Rule 113. The search
search, unlike in the Terry search, is not limited to weapons. Passengers are sealed. conducted on Canton resulted in the
also subject to search for prohibited materials or substances. They could not have determined discovery of shabu. Armed with the
whether Canton was actually knowledge that Canton was committing
Facts: committing a crime; the strip a crime, the airport security personnel
February 12, 1998 Susan Canton was at the NAIA, being a departing search was therefore nothing but a and police authorities were duty-bound
passenger bound for Saigon, Vietnam. When she passed through the metal fishing expedition to arrest her. Her subsequent arrest
detector booth, a beeping sound was emitted. Mylene Cabunoc, a civilian without a warrant was justified, since it
employee of the National Action Committee on Hijacking and Terrorism was effected upon the discovery and
(NACHT) and the frisker on duty at that time, called her attention and asked recovery of shabu in her person
her if she (Cabunoc) could search her (Canton). Upon frisking Canton, flagrante delicto.
Cabunoc felt something bulging at her abdominal area, and similar packages TC erred in not ruling that the The scope of a search pursuant to
in front of her genital area and thighs. According to Cabunoc, she noticed frisker went beyond the limits of airport security procedure is not
that the package contained what felt like rice granules. Cabunoc asked the Terry search doctrine confined only to search for weapons
3rd Meeting: Consti2 Cases
The stop and frisk search should
have been limited to the patting of
her outer garments in order to
determine whether she was armed
or dangerous.
TC erred in not ruling that Canton
was under custodial investigation
without counsel
Canton alleges that from the
moment frisker Cabunoc felt a
package at her abdominal area,
started inquiring about its
contents, detained her, and
stripped search her in the ladies
room, she was under custodial
investigation without counsel.
TC erred in admitting to the
records of the case the report of
Dr. Ma. Bernadette Arcena, which
was not testified on or offered in
evidence, and using the same in
determining her guilt
TC erred in applying the ruling in
People v. Johnson
Canton questions the applicability
of the doctrine in the Johnson case
because of its sweeping statement
allowing searches and seizures of
departing passengers in airports in
view of the gravity of the safety
interests involved.
She argues that the applicable case
under the Terry search doctrine
The Terry search or stop and frisk
situation refers to a case where a police
officer approaches a person who is
acting suspiciously for purposes of
investigating possibly criminal behavior
in line with the general interest of
effective crime prevention and
detection. He could validly conduct a
carefully limited search of the outer
clothing of such person to discover
weapons which might be used to
assault him.
In the present case, the search was
made pursuant to routine airport
security procedure. RA 6235 Section 9
provides: Every ticket issued to a
passenger by the airline or air carrier
concerned shall contain among others
the following condition printed thereon:
Holder hereof and his hand-carried
luggage(s) are subject to search for, and
seizure of, prohibited materials or
substances. Holder refusing to be
searched shall not be allowed to board
the aircraft, which shall constitute a
part of the contract between the
passenger and the air carrier.
RA 6235 Sec. 9 is another exception to
the proscription against warrantless
searches and seizures. The provision
clearly states that the search, unlike in
the Terry search, is not limited to
weapons. Passengers are also subject to
search for prohibited materials or
substances.
The strip search in the ladies room was
justified under the circumstances.
The constitutional right to counsel
afforded an accused under custodial
investigation was not violated
In this case, no custodial investigation
was conducted after Cantons arrest.
She affixed her signature to the receipt
of the articles seized from her, but
before she did so, she was told that she
had the option to sign or not to sign it.
Aside from this, no statement was
taken from her during her detention
and used in evidence against her.
The admission of the medical report
was erroneous.
Canton assails the validity of the
medical report as evidence on the
ground that it violates the hearsay rule.
The medical report contained the
following: This is the first time I carried
shabu. I need the money.
SC held that this contention is
meritorious. The admission of the
questioned document was erroneous
because it was not properly identified.
The ruling in People v. Johnson is
applicable to the instant case
The Johnson case, which involves
similar facts and issues, finds
application to the present case. The
court ruled that the packs of
methamphetamine hydrochloride
seized during the routine frisk at the
airport was acquired legitimately
pursuant to airport security procedures
should have been Katz v. United and are therefore admissible in
States which upholds the 4th evidence against Johnson.
Amendment that protects people Cantons reliance on Katz v. United
and not places. States is misplaced. The facts and
circumstances of that case are entirely
different from the case at bar.
Dispositive: Canton guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the violation of
Section 16 Article III of RA 6425, sentencing her to suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua and to pay the fine of Php 1 million. The appellants
passport, plane ticket, and girdles are ordered to be returned to her.
People v. Musa [GR 96177, 27 January 1993]
Third Division, Romero (J): 4 concur
Facts:
On 13 December 1989, the Narcotics Command (NARCOM) in Zamboanga
City conducted surveillance and test buy on a certain Mari Musa of Suterville,
Zamboanga City. Information received from civilian informer was that this
Mari Musa was engaged in selling marijuana in said place. The Narcom agent
(Sgt. Ani) was able to buy one newspaper-wrapped dried marijuana for
P10.00, which was turned over to the Narcom office. The next day, a buy-
bust was planned with Sgt. Ani being the poseur-buyer. NARCOM teams
proceeded to the target site in 2 civilian vehicles. Ani gave Musa the P20.00
marked money.
Musa returned to his house and gave Ani 2 newspaper wrappers containing
dried marijuana. The signal to apprehend Musa was given. The NARCOM
team rushed to the location of Ani, and a NARCOM officer (Sgt. Belarga)
frisked Musa but did not find the marked money. The money was given to
Musas wife who was able to slip away. Later, Belarga found a plastic bag
containing dried marijuana inside it somewhere in the kitchen.
Musa was placed under arrest and was brought to the NARCOM office.
One newspaper- wrapper marijuana and the plastic bag containing more
marijuana was sent to the PC Crime Laboratory, the test of which gave
positive results for the presence of marijuana. On the other hand, Mari
Musa alleged that the NARCOM agents, dressed in civilian clothes, got inside
his house without any search warrant, neither his permission to enter the
house.
The NARCOM agents searched the house and allegedly found a red plastic
bag whose contents, Mari Musa said, he did not know. He also did not know
if the plastic bag belonged to his brother, Faisal, who was living with him, or
his father, who was living in another house about ten arms-length away.
Mari Musa was handcuffed and was taken to the NARCOM office where he
was joined by his wife. Musa claimed that he was subjected to torture when
he refused to sign the document containing details of the investigation. The
next day, he was taken to the fiscals office to which he was allegedly made
to answer to a single question: that if he owned the marijuana. He allegedly
was not able to tell the fiscal that he had been maltreated by the NARCOM
agents because he was afraid he might be maltreated in the fiscal's office.
Mari Musa was brought to the City Jail. Still, an information against Musa
was filed on 15 December 1989. Upon his arraignment on 11 January 1990,
Musa pleaded not guilty. After trial and on 31 August 1990, the RTC
Zamboanga City (Branch XII) found him guilty of selling marijuana in violation
of Article II, Section 4 of RA 6425. Musa appealed to the Supreme Court.
Issue: Whether the contents of the red plastic bag found in the kitchen may
be admitted as evidence as evidence acquired incidental to a lawful arrest.
Held: Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest authorizes the arresting
officer to make a search upon the person of the person arrested. An officer
making an arrest may take from the person arrested and money or property
found upon his person which was used in the commission of the crime or was
the fruit of the crime or which might furnish the prisoner with the means of
committing violence or of escaping, or which may be used as evidence in the
trial of the cause. Hence, in a buy-bust operation conducted to entrap a drug-
pusher, the law enforcement agents may seize the marked money found on
the person of the pusher immediately after the arrest even without arrest
and search warrants. The warrantless search and seizure, as an incident to a
suspect's lawful arrest, may extend beyond the person of the one arrested to
3rd Meeting: Consti2 Cases
include the premises or surroundings under his immediate control. Objects in
the "plain view" of an officer who has the right to be in the position to have
that view are subject to seizure and may be presented as evidence. When
the discovery of the evidence did not constitute a search, but where the
officer merely saw what was placed before him in full view, the warrantless
seizure of the object was legal on the basis of the "plain view" doctrine and
upheld the admissibility of said evidence. The "plain view" doctrine,
however, may not be used to launch unbridled searches and indiscriminate
seizures nor to extend a general exploratory search made solely to find
evidence of defendant's guilt. The "plain view" doctrine is usually applied
where a police officer is not searching for evidence against the accused, but
nonetheless inadvertently comes across an incriminating object. What the
'plain view' cases have in common is that the police officer in each of them
had a prior justification for an intrusion in the course of which he came
inadvertently across a piece of evidence incriminating the accused. The
doctrine serves to supplement the prior justification whether it be a
warrant for another object, hot pursuit, search incident to lawful arrest, or
some other legitimate reason for being present unconnected with a search
directed against the accused and permits the warrantless seizure. Of
course, the extension of the original justification is legitimate only where it is
immediately apparent to the police that they have evidence before them; the
'plain view' doctrine may not be used to extend a general exploratory search
from one object to another until something incriminating at last emerges.
The "plain view" doctrine neither justify the seizure of the object where the
incriminating nature of the object is not apparent from the "plain view" of
the object. Thus, the exclusion of the plastic bag containing marijuana does
not, however, diminish, in any way, the damaging effect of the other pieces
of evidence presented by the prosecution to prove that the appellant sold
marijuana, in violation of Article II, Section 4 of the Dangerous Drugs Act of
1972. By virtue of the testimonies of Sgt. Ani and T/Sgt. Belarga and the two
wrappings of marijuana sold by Musa to Sgt. Ani, among other pieces of
evidence, the guilt of Musa of the crime charged has been proved beyond
reasonable doubt.
----
Camara vs. Municipal Court of the City and Country of San Francisco [387
US 523, 5 June 1967]White (J)
Facts:
On 6 November 1963, an inspector of the Division of Housing Inspection of
the San Francisco Department of Public Health entered an apartment
building to make a routine annual inspection for possible violations of the
city's Housing Code. The building's manager informed the inspector that
Camara, lessee of the ground floor, was using the rear of his leasehold as a
personal residence. Claiming that the building's occupancy permit did not
allow residential use of the ground floor, the inspector confronted Camara
and demanded that he permit an inspection of the premises. Camara
refused to allow the inspection because the inspector lacked a search
warrant. The inspector returned on November 8, again without a warrant,
and Camara again refused to allow an inspection. A citation was then mailed
ordering Camara to appear at the district attorney's office. When Camara
failed to appear, two inspectors returned to his apartment on November 22.
They informed Camara that he was required by law to permit an inspection
under 503 of the Housing Code. Camara nevertheless refused the inspectors
access to his apartment without a search warrant. Thereafter, a complaint
was filed charging him with refusing to permit a lawful inspection in violation
of 507 of the Code. Camara was arrested on December 2nd released on bail.
When his demurrer to the criminal complaint was denied, Camara filed the
petition for a writ of prohibition in a California Superior Court alleging that he
was awaiting trial on a criminal charge of violating the San Francisco Housing
Code by refusing to permit a warrantless inspection of his residence, and that
a writ of prohibition should issue to the criminal court because the ordinance
authorizing such inspections is unconstitutional on its face. The Superior
Court denied the writ, the District Court of Appeal affirmed, and the Supreme
Court of California denied a petition for hearing.
Issue: Whether Camara can validly refuse the inspection of his dwelling by
the Division of Housing Inspection.
Held: The Fourth Amendment bars prosecution of a person who has refused
to permit a warrantless code-enforcement inspection of his personal
residence. The basic purpose of the Fourth Amendment, which is enforceable
against the States through the Fourteenth, through its prohibition of
"unreasonable" searches and seizures is to safeguard the privacy and security
of individuals against arbitrary invasions by governmental officials. With
certain carefully defined exceptions, an unconsented warrantless search of
private property is "unreasonable." Administrative searches of the kind at
issue here are significant intrusions upon the interests protected by the
Fourth Amendment, that such searches when authorized and conducted
without a warrant procedure lack the traditional safeguards which the Fourth
Amendment guarantees to the individual, and that the reasons put forth in
Frank v. Maryland and in other cases for upholding these warrantless
searches are insufficient to justify so substantial a weakening of the Fourth
Amendment's protections. Contrary to the assumption of Frank v. Maryland,
Fourth Amendment interests are not merely "peripheral" where municipal
fire, health, and housing inspection programs are involved whose purpose is
to determine the existence of physical conditions not complying with local
ordinances. Those programs, moreover, are enforceable by criminal process,
as is refusal to allow an inspection. Warrantless administrative searches
cannot be justified on the grounds that they make minimal demands on
occupants; that warrants in such cases are unfeasible; or that area inspection
programs could not function under reasonable search-warrant requirements.
Probable cause upon the basis of which warrants are to be issued for area
code- enforcement inspections is not dependent on the inspector's belief
that a particular dwelling violates the code but on the reasonableness of the
enforcement agency's appraisal of conditions in the area as a whole. The
standards to guide the magistrate in the issuance of such search warrants
will necessarily vary with the municipal program being enforced. Nothing
here is intended to foreclose prompt inspections, even without a warrant,
that the law has traditionally upheld in emergency situations. On the other
hand, in the case of most routine area inspections, there is no compelling
urgency to inspect at a particular time or on a particular day. Moreover, most
citizens allow inspections of their property without a warrant. Thus, as a
practical matter and in light of the Fourth Amendment's requirement that a
warrant specify the property to be searched, it seems likely that warrants
should normally be sought only after entry is refused unless there has been a
citizen complaint or there is other satisfactory reason for securing immediate
entry. Similarly, the requirement of a warrant procedure does not suggest
any change in what seems to be the prevailing local policy, in most situations,
of authorizing entry, but not entry by force, to inspect. Herein, Camara has
been charged with a crime for his refusal to permit housing inspectors to
enter his leasehold without a warrant. There was no emergency demanding
immediate access; in fact, the inspectors made three trips to the building in
an attempt to obtain Camara's consent to search. Yet no warrant was
obtained and thus appellant was unable to verify either the need for or the
appropriate limits of the inspection. No doubt, the inspectors entered the
public portion of the building with the consent of the landlord, through the
building's manager, but the City/County does not contend that such consent
was sufficient to authorize inspection of Camara's premises. Assuming the
facts to be as the parties have alleged, camara had a constitutional right to
insist that the inspectors obtain a warrant to search and that appellant may
not constitutionally be convicted for refusing to consent to the inspection. It
appears from the opinion of the District Court of Appeal that under these
circumstances a writ of prohibition will issue to the criminal court under
California law.
In RE: Umil, Umil vs. Ramos [GR 81567, 9 July 1990]; also Roque vs. de Villa
[GR 84581-82],
In RE: Anonuevo. Anonuevo vs. Ramos [GR 84583-84], In RE: Ocaya. Ocaya
vs. Aguirre [GR
83162], In RE: Espiritu. Espiritu vs. Lim [GR 85727], and In RE: Nazareno.
Nazareno vs. Station Commander of Muntinlupa Police Station [GR 86332]
En Banc, Per Curiam: 11 concur
Facts: [GR 81567] On 1 February 1988, the Regional Intelligence Operations
Unit of the Capital Command (RIOU-CAPCOM) received confidential
information about a member of the NPA Sparrow Unit (liquidation squad)
being treated for a gunshot wound at the St. Agnes Hospital in Roosevelt
Avenue, Quezon City.
3rd Meeting: Consti2 Cases
Upon verification, it was found that the wounded person, who was listed in
the hospital records as Ronnie Javelon, is actually Rolando Dural, a member
of the NPA liquidation squad, responsible for the killing of 2 CAPCOM soldiers
the day before, or on 31 January 1988, in Macanining Street, Bagong Barrio,
Caloocan City. In view of this verification, Dural was transferred to the
Regional Medical Services of the CAPCOM, for security reasons. While
confined thereat, or on 4 February 1988, Dural was positively identified by
eyewitnesses as the gunman who went on top of the hood of the CAPCOM
mobile patrol car, and fired at the 2 CAPCOM soldiers seated inside the car
identified as T/Sgt. Carlos Pabon and CIC Renato Manligot. As a consequence
of this positive identification, Dural was referred to the Caloocan City Fiscal
who conducted an inquest and thereafter filed with the Regional Trial Court
of Caloocan City an information charging Rolando Dural alias Ronnie Javelon
with the crime of "Double Murder with Assault Upon Agents of Persons in
Authority." (Criminal Case C-30112; no bail recommended).
On 15 February 1988, the information was amended to include, as
defendant, Bernardo Itucal, Jr. who, at the filing of the original information,
was still unidentified. Meanwhile, on 6 February 1988, a petition for habeas
corpus was filed with the Supreme Court on behalf of Roberto Umil, Rolando
Dural, and Renato Villanueva. The Court issued the writ of habeas corpus on
9 February 1988 and Fidel V. Ramos, Maj. Gen. Renato de Villa, Brig. Gen.
Ramon Montano, and Brig. Gen. Alexander Aguirre filed a Return of the Writ
on 12 February 1988. Thereafter, the parties were heard on 15 February
1988.
On 26 February 1988, however, Umil and Villanueva posted bail before the
Regional Trial Court of Pasay City where charges for violation of the Anti-
Subversion Act had been filed against them, and they were accordingly
released.
Issue: Whether Dural can be validly arrested without any warrant of arrest
for the crime of rebellion.
Held: Dural, it clearly appears that he was not arrested while in the act of
shooting the 2 CAPCOM soldiers nor was he arrested just after the
commission of the said offense for his arrest came a day after the said
shooting incident. Seemingly, his arrest without warrant is unjustified.
However, Dural was arrested for being a member of the New Peoples Army
(NPA), an outlawed subversive organization. Subversion being a continuing
offense, the arrest of Rolando Dural without warrant is justified as it can be
said that he was committing an offense when arrested. The crimes of
rebellion, subversion, conspiracy or proposal to commit such crimes, and
crimes or offenses committed in furtherance thereof or in connection
therewith constitute direct assaults against the State and are in the nature of
continuing crimes. The arrest of persons involved in the rebellion whether as
its fighting armed elements, or for committing non-violent acts but in
furtherance of the rebellion, is more an act of capturing them in the course
of an armed conflict, to quell the rebellion, than for the purpose of
immediately prosecuting them in court for a statutory offense. The arrest,
therefore, need not follow the usual procedure in the prosecution of
offenses which requires the determination by a judge of the existence of
probable cause before the issuance of a judicial warrant of arrest and the
granting of bail if the offense is bailable. Obviously, the absence of a judicial
warrant is no legal impediment to arresting or capturing persons committing
overt acts of violence against government forces, or any other milder acts
but equally in pursuance of the rebellious movement. The arrest or capture is
thus impelled by the exigencies of the situation that involves the very
survival of society and its government and duly constituted authorities.
People vs. dela Cruz [GR 83260, 18 April 1990]
Second Division, Regalado (J): 4 concur
Facts:
After receiving a confidential report from Arnel, their informant, a "buy-bust"
operation was conducted by the 13th Narcotics Regional Unit through a team
composed of T/Sgt. Jaime Raposas as Team Leader, S/Sgt. Rodelito Oblice,
Sgt. Dante Yang, Sgt. Vicente Jimenez, P/Pfc. Adolfo Arcoy as poseur-buyer
and Pat. Deogracias Gorgonia at Maliclic St., Tondo, Manila at around 2:30
p.m. of 4 May 1987 to catch the pusher/s. P/Pfc. Adolfo Arcoy acted as the
poseur-buyer with Arnel as his companion to buy marijuana worth P10.00
from the two accused, Juan de la Cruz and Reynaldo Beltran.
At the scene, it was Juan de la Cruz whom Arcoy first negotiated with on the
purchase and when Arcoy told De la Cruz that he was buying P10.00 worth of
marijuana, De la Cruz instructed Reynaldo Beltran to give one aluminum foil
of marijuana which Beltran got from his pants' pocket and delivered it to
Arcoy.
After ascertaining that the foil of suspected marijuana was really marijuana,
Arcoy gave the prearranged signal to his teammates by scratching his head
and his teammates who were strategically positioned in the vicinity,
converged at the place, identified themselves as NARCOM agents and
effected the arrest of De la Cruz and Beltran.
The P10.00 marked bill used by Arcoy was found in the possession of Juan de
la Cruz together with two aluminum foils and containing marijuana. Juan de
la Cruz y Gonzales and Reynaldo Beltran y Aniban were charged in Criminal
Case 87-54417 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila with violation of
Section 4, Art. II, in relation to Section 21, Article IV of Republic Act 6425, as
amended.
The court, on 15 March 1988, found Dela Cruz and Beltran guilty beyond
reasonable doubt and sentenced each of them to suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua, with the accessory penalties provided by law; to pay a
fine of P20,000.00, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency,
and each to pay one-half of the costs.
From this decision, de la Cruz and Beltran appealed.
In a letter of the Warden, Manila City Jail, dated 3 March 1989, the Court was
informed of the death of de la Cruz on 21 February 1989.
Thus, the criminal case against de la Cruz was dismissed in the Supreme
Court resolution of 25 September 1989.
The present appellate proceeding is limited only to Beltran.
Issue: Whether the warrantless seizure incidental to the buy-bust operation
violates Beltrans constitutional rights against unreasonable search and
seizure.
Held: A buy-bust operation is the method employed by peace officers to trap
and catch a malefactor inflagrante delicto. It is essentially a form of
entrapment since the peace officer neither instigates nor induces the
accused to commit a crime. Entrapment is the employment of such ways and
means for the purpose of trapping or capturing a lawbreaker from whose
mind the criminal intent originated. Oftentimes, it is the only effective way of
apprehending a criminal in the act of the commission of the offense. While it
is conceded that in a buy-bust operation, there is seizure of evidence from
one's person without a search warrant, needless to state a search warrant is
not necessary, the search being incident to a lawful arrest. A peace officer
may, without a warrant, arrest a person when, in his presence, the person to
be arrested has committed, is actually committing or is attempting to commit
an offense. It is a matter of judicial experience that in the arrest of violators
of the Dangerous Drugs Act in a buy-bust operation, the malefactors were
invariably caught red-handed. There being no violation of the constitutional
right against unreasonable search and seizure, the confiscated articles are
admissible in evidence.
In RE Harvey v. Defensor-Santiago,GR 82544 (Case Digest)
Focus Topics: Acts of the State; Sovereignty; Elements; State
FACTS
American nationals Andrew Harvey and John Sherman, 52 and 72 years,
respectively, and Adriaan Van Elshout, 58, a Dutch citizen, are all residing at
Pagsanjan, Laguna. Commissioner Miriam Defensor Santiago issued Mission
Orders to the Commission of Immigration and Deportation (CID) to
apprehended petitioners at their residences.
The Operation Report read that Andrew Harvey was found together with
two young boys. Richard Sherman was found with two naked boys inside his
room. While Van Den Elshout in the after Mission Report read that two
children of ages 14 and 16 has been under his care and subjects confirmed
being live-in for some time now. Seized during the petitioners apprehension
were rolls of photo negatives and photos of suspected child prostitutes
shown in scandalous poses as well as boys and girls engaged in sex. Posters
and other literature advertising the child prostitutes were also found.
Petitioners were among the twenty-two (22) suspected alien pedophiles who
were apprehended after three months of close surveillance by CID agents in
Pagsanjan, Laguna. Only the three petitioners have chosen to face
3rd Meeting: Consti2 Cases
deportation. Warrants of Arrest were issued by respondent against
petitioners for violation of Sections 37, 45 and 46 of the Immigration Act and
Section 69 of the Revised Administrative Code.Tthe Board of Special Inquiry
III commenced trial against petitioners. Petitioners filed a Petition for Bail
which the CID denied. Andrew Harvey filed a Manifestation/Motion stating
that he had finally agreed to a self-deportation and praying that he be
provisionally released for at least 15 days and placed under the custody of
Atty. Asinas before he voluntarily departs the country. However, it appears
that on the same date that the aforesaid Manifestation/ Motion was filed,
Harvey and his co-petitioners had already filed the present petition.
Petitioners availed of this Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus. A Return of
the Writ was filed by the Solicitor General and the Court heard the case on
oral argument on 20 April 1988. A Traverse to the Writ was presented by
petitioners to which a Reply was filed by the Solicitor General.
ISSUES
Whether or not the Philippine Immigration Act clothed the Commissioner
with any authority to arrest and detain petitioners pending determination of
the existence of a probable cause leading to an administrative investigation.
HELD : AFFIRMATIVE. [The Court] reject petitioners contentions and uphold
respondents official acts ably defended by the Solicitor General. The Petition
is dismissed and the Writ of Habeas Corpus is hereby denied.
There can be no question that the right against unreasonable searches and
seizures guaranteed by the Constitution is available to all persons, including
aliens, whether accused of crime or not. One of the constitutional
requirements of a valid search warrant or warrant of arrest is that it must be
based upon probable cause.
In this case, the arrest of petitioners was based on probable cause
determined after close surveillance for three (3) months during which period
their activities were monitored. The existence of probable cause justified the
arrest and the seizure of the photo negatives, photographs and posters
without warrant. [The fact that] petitioners were not caught in the act
does not make their arrest illegal.
The deportation charges instituted by respondent Commissioner are in
accordance with Section 37(a) of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940, in
relation to Section 69 of the Revised Administrative Code. The requirement
of probable cause, to be determined by a Judge, does not extend to
deportation proceedings.
What is essential is that there should be a specific charge against the alien
intended to be arrested and deported, that a fair hearing be conducted with
the assistance of counsel, if desired, and that the charge be substantiated by
competent evidence.
The denial by respondent Commissioner of petitioners release on bail, also
challenged by them, was in order because in deportation proceedings, the
right to bail is not a matter of right but a matter of discretion on the part of
the Commissioner of Immigration and Deportation. As deportation
proceedings do not partake of the nature of a criminal action, the
constitutional guarantee to bail may not be invoked by aliens in said
proceedings.
Every sovereign power has the inherent power to exclude aliens from its
territory upon such grounds as it may deem proper for its self-preservation
or public interest. The power to deport aliens is an act of State, an act done
by or under the authority of the sovereign power. It is a police measure
against undesirable aliens whose continued presence in the country is found
to be injurious to the public good and the domestic tranquility of the people.
Particularly so in this case where the State has expressly committed itself to
defend the tight of children to assistance and special protection from all
forms of neglect, abuse, cruelty, exploitation, and other conditions
prejudicial to their development (Article XV, Section 3[2]). Respondent
Commissioner of Immigration and Deportation, in instituting deportation
proceedings against petitioners, acted in the interests of the State
People vs. Sucro [GR 93239, 18 March 1991]
Third Division, Gutierrez Jr. (J): 4 concur
Facts: On 21 March 1989, Pat. Roy Fulgencio, a member of the INP, Kalibo,
Aklan, was instructed by P/Lt. Vicente Seraspi, Jr. (Station Commander of the
INP Kalibo, Aklan) to monitor the activities of Edison Sucro, because of
information gathered by Seraspi that Sucro was selling marijuana.
As planned, at about 5:00 P.M. on said date, Pat. Fulgencio positioned
himself under the house of a certain Arlie Regalado at C. Quimpo Street.
Adjacent to the house of Regalado, about 2 meters away, was a chapel.
Thereafter, Pat. Fulgencio saw Sucro enter the chapel, taking something
which turned out later to be marijuana from the compartment of a cart
found inside the chapel, and then return to the street where he handed the
same to a buyer, Aldie Borromeo. After a while Sucro went back to the
chapel and again came out with marijuana which he gave to a group of
persons. It was at this instance that Pat. Fulgencio radioed P/Lt. Seraspi and
reported the activity going on P/Lt. Seraspi instructed Pat. Fulgencio to
continue monitoring developments. At about 6:30 P.M., Pat. Fulgencio again
called up Seraspi to report that a third buyer later identified as Ronnie
Macabante, was transacting with Sucro. At that point, the team of P/Lt
Seraspi proceeded to the area and while the police officers were at the Youth
Hostel at Maagma St., Pat. Fulgencio told P/Lt. Seraspi to intercept
Macabante and Sucro. P/ Lt. Seraspi and his team caught up with Macabante
at the crossing of Mabini and Maagma Sts. in front of the Aklan Medical
Center. Upon seeing the police, Macabante threw something to the ground
which turned out to be a tea bag of marijuana. When confronted, Macabante
readily admitted that he bought the same from Sucro in front of the chapel.
The police team was able to overtake and arrest Sucro at the corner of C.
Quimpo and Veterans Sts. The police recovered 19 sticks and 4 teabags of
marijuana from the cart inside the chapel and another teabag from
Macabante. The teabags of marijuana were sent to the PC-INP Crime
Laboratory Service, at Camp Delgado, Iloilo City for analysis. The specimens
were all found positive of marijuana. Sucro was charged with violation of
Section 4, Article II of the Dangerous Drugs Act. Upon arraignment, Sucro,
assisted by counsel, entered a plea of "not guilty" to the offense charged.
Trial ensued and a judgment of conviction was rendered, finding Sucro guilty
of the sale of prohibited drug and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of life
imprisonment, and pay a fine of P20,000, and costs. Sucro appealed.
Issue: Whether the arrest without warrant of the accused is lawful and
consequently, whether the evidence resulting from such arrest is admissible.
Held: Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure provides for the
instances where arrest without warrant is considered lawful. The rule states
that "A peace officer or private person may, without warrant, arrest a
person: (a) When in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed,
is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense; (b) When an
offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of
facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it;" An offense
is committed in the presence or within the view of an officer, within the
meaning of the rule authorizing an arrest without a warrant, when the officer
sees the offense, although at a distance, or hears the disturbances created
thereby and proceeds at once to the scene thereof. The failure of the police
officers to secure a warrant stems from the fact that their knowledge
acquired from the surveillance was insufficient to fulfill the requirements for
the issuance of a search warrant. What is paramount is that probable cause
existed. Still, that searches and seizures must be supported by a valid
warrant is not an absolute rule. Among the exceptions granted by law is a
search incidental to a lawful arrest under Sec. 12, Rule 126 of the Rules on
Criminal Procedure, which provides that a person lawfully arrested may be
searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as proof of
the commission of an offense, without a search warrant. Herein, police
officers have personal knowledge of the actual commission of the crime
when it had earlier conducted surveillance activities of the accused. Under
the circumstances (monitoring of transactions) there existed probable cause
for the arresting officers, to arrest Sucro who was in fact selling marijuana
and to seize the contraband. Thus, as there is nothing unlawful about the
arrest considering its compliance with the requirements of a warrantless
arrest; ergo, the fruits obtained from such lawful arrest are admissible in
evidence.
People vs. Rodrigueza [GR 95902, 4 February 1992]
Second Division, Regalado (J): 4 concur
Facts: [Prosecution] At around 5:00 p.m. of 1 July 1987, CIC Ciriaco Taduran
was in their headquarters at the Office of the Narcotics Regional Unit at
Camp Bagong Ibalon, Legaspi City, together with S/Sgt. Elpidio Molinawe, CIC
3rd Meeting: Consti2 Cases
Leonardo B. Galutan and their commanding officer, Major Crisostomo M.
Zeidem, when a confidential informer arrived and told them that there was
an ongoing illegal traffic of prohibited drugs in Tagas, Daraga, Albay. Major
Zeidem formed a team to conduct a buybust operation, which team was
given P200.00 in different denominations to buy marijuana. These bills were
treated with ultraviolet powder at the Philippine Constabulary Crime
Laboratory (PCCL). Sgt. Molinawe gave the money to Taduran who acted as
the poseur buyer. He was told to look for a certain Don, the alleged seller of
prohibited drugs. Taduran went to Tagas alone and, while along the road, he
met Samuel Segovia. He asked Segovia where he could find Don and where
he could buy marijuana. Segovia left for a while and when he returned, he
was accompanied by a man who was later on introduced to him as Don
Rodrigueza.
After agreeing on the price of P200.00 for 100 grams of marijuana, Don
halted a passing tricycle driven by Antonio Lonceras. He boarded it and left
Taduran and Segovia. When he came back, Don gave Taduran "a certain
object wrapped in a plastic" which was later identified as marijuana, and
received payment therefor. Thereafter, Taduran returned to the
headquarters and made a report regarding his said purchase of marijuana.
Based on that information, Major Zeidem ordered a team to conduct an
operation to apprehend the suspects. In the evening of the same date, CIC
Galutan and S/Sgt. Molinawe proceeded to Regidor Street, Daraga, Albay and
arrested Rodrigueza, Antonio Lonceras and Samuel Segovia. The constables
were not, however, armed with a warrant of arrest when they apprehended
the three accused. The arrests were brought to the headquarters for
investigation. Thereafter, agents of the Narcotics Command (NARCOM)
conducted a raid in the house of Jovencio Rodrigueza, Don's father. Taduran
did not go with them. During the raid, they were able to confiscate dried
marijuana leaves and a plastic syringe, among others. The search, however,
was not authorized by any search warrant. The next day, Jovencio
Rodrigueza was released from detention but Don Rodrigueza was detained.
[Defense] Don Rodrigueza, on the other hand, claimed that on said date he
was in the house of his aunt in San Roque, Legaspi City. He stayed there
overnight and did not leave the place until the next day when his brother
arrived and told him that their father was taken by some military men the
preceding night. Rodrigueza went to Camp Bagong Ibalon and arrived there
at around 8:00 a.m. of 2 July 1987. When he arrived, he was asked if he
knew anything about the marijuana incident, to which question he answered
in the negative. Like Segovia, he was made to hold a P10.00 bill and was
brought to the crime laboratory for examination. From that time on, he was
not allowed to go home and was detained inside the camp. He was also
tortured in order to make him admit his complicity in the alleged sale of
marijuana.
On 10 July 1987, Don Rodrigueza, Samuel Segovia and Antonio Lonceras, for
possession of 100 grams of marijuana leaves and for selling, in a buy-bust
operation, said 100 grams of dried marijuana leaves for a consideration of
P200.00. During the arraignment, all the accused pleaded not guilty to the
charge against them. The Regional Trial Court of Legaspi City, Branch 10,
found Don Rodrigueza guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 4,
Article II of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 (Republic Act 6425, as
amended) and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and
to pay a fine of P20,000.00 and costs. The court, however, acquitted Segovia
and Lonceres. Rodrigueza appealed.
Issue: Whether the time of Don Rodriguezas arrest is material in
determining his culpability in the crime charged.
Held: As provided in the present Constitution, a search, to be valid, must
generally be authorized by a search warrant duly issued by the proper
government authority. True, in some instances, the Court has allowed
government authorities to conduct searches and seizures even without a
search warrant. Thus, when the owner of the premises waives his right
against such incursion; when the search is incidental to a lawful arrest; when
it is made on vessels and aircraft for violation of customs laws; when it is
made on automobiles for the purpose of preventing violations of smuggling
or immigration laws; when it involves prohibited articles in plain view; or in
cases of inspection of buildings and other premises for the enforcement of
fire, sanitary and building regulations, a search may be validly made even
without a search warrant. Herein, however, the raid conducted by the
NARCOM agents in the house of Jovencio Rodrigueza was not authorized by
any search warrant. It does not appear, either, that the situation falls under
any of the aforementioned cases. Hence, Rodrigueza's right against
unreasonable search and seizure was clearly violated. The NARCOM agents
could not have justified their act by invoking the urgency and necessity of the
situation because the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses reveal that
the place had already been put under surveillance for quite some time. Had it
been their intention to conduct the raid, then they should, because they
easily could, have first secured a search warrant during that time. Further,
the inconsistencies made by prosecution witnesses give more credibility to
the testimony of Don Rodrigueza. While it is true that Rodrigueza's defense
amounts to an alibi, and as such is the weakest defense in a criminal
prosecution, there are, nonetheless, some evidentiary aspects pointing to
the truth in his testimony. Firstly, the Joint Affidavit of Arrest corroborates
his testimony that he was not among those who were arrested on the night
of 1 July 1987. His co-accused Segovia also testified that Rodrigueza was not
with them when they were apprehended by the NARCOM agents. Hence,
Rodrigueza is acquitted of the crime charged, due to the failure of the
prosecution to establish its cause.
PEOPLE V. MENGOTE
Facts: The Western Police District received a telephone call from an informer
that there were three suspicious looking persons at the corner of Juan Luna
and North Bay Boulevard in Tondo, Manila. A surveillance team of
plainclothesmen was forthwith dispatched to the place. The patrolmen saw
two men looking from side to side, one of whom holding his abdomen. They
approached the persons and identified themselves as policemen, whereupon
the two tried to run but unable to escape because the other lawmen
surrounded them. The suspects were then searched. One of them the
accused-appellant was found with a .38 caliber with live ammunitions in it,
while his companion had a fan knife. The weapons were taken from them
and they were turned over to the police headquarters for investigation.
Information was filed before the RTC convicting the accused of illegal
possession of firearm arm. A witness testified that the weapon was among
the articles stolen at his shop, which he reported to the police including the
revolver. For his part, Mengote made no effort to prove that he owned the
fire arm or that he was licensed to possess it but instead, he claimed that the
weapon was planted on him at the time of his arrest. He was convicted for
violation of P.D.1866 and was sentenced to reclusion perpetua. In his appeal
he pleads that the weapon was not admissible as evidence against him
because it had been illegally seized and therefore the fruit of a poisonous
tree.
Issue: Whether or not the warrantless search and arrest was illegal.
Held: Evidence obtained as a result of an illegal search and seizure
inadmissible in any proceeding for any purpose as provided by Art. III sec 32
of the Constitution. Rule 113 sec.5 of the Rules of Court, provides arrest
without warrant lawful when: (a) the person to be arrested has committed, is
actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense, (b) when the
offense in fact has just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of
the facts indicating the person arrested has committed it and (c) the person
to be arrested has escaped from a penal establishment or a place where he is
serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or
has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.
These requirements have not been established in the case at bar. At the time
of the arrest in question, the accused appellant was merely looking from side
to side and holding his abdomen, according to the arresting officers
themselves. There was apparently no offense that has just been committed
or was being actually committed or at least being attempt by Mengote in
their presence. Moreover a person may not be stopped and frisked in a
broad daylight or on a busy street on unexplained suspicion. Judgment is
reversed and set aside. Accused-appellant is acquitted
Go vs. Court of Appeals [GR 101837, 11 February 1992]
En Banc, Feliciano (J): 5 concur
Facts: On 2 July 1991, Eldon Maguan was driving his car along Wilson St., San
Juan, Metro Manila, heading towards P. Guevarra St. Rolito Go y Tambunting
entered Wilson St., where it is a one- way street and started traveling in the
opposite or "wrong" direction. At the corner of Wilson and J. Abad Santos
Sts., Go's and Maguan's cars nearly bumped each other. Go alighted from his
3rd Meeting: Consti2 Cases
car, walked over and shot Maguan inside his car. Go then boarded his car and
left the scene. A security guard at a nearby restaurant was able to take down
Go's car plate number. The police arrived shortly thereafter at the scene of
the shooting and there retrieved an empty shell and one round of live
ammunition for a 9mm caliber pistol. Verification at the Land Transportation
Office showed that the car was registered to one Elsa Ang Go. The following
day, the police returned to the scene of the shooting to find out where the
suspect had come from; they were informed that Go had dined at Cravings
Bake Shop shortly before the shooting. The police obtained a facsimile or
impression of the credit card used by Go from the cashier of the bake shop.
The security guard of the bake shop was shown a picture of Go and he
positively identified him as the same person who had shot Maguan. Having
established that the assailant was probably Go, the police launched a
manhunt for Go. On 8 July 1991, Go presented himself before the San Juan
Police Station to verify news reports that he was being hunted by the police;
he was accompanied by two (2) lawyers. The police forthwith detained him.
An eyewitness to the shooting, who was at the police station at that time,
positively identified Go as the gunman.
That same day, the police promptly filed a complaint for frustrated homicide
against Go with the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Rizal. First Assistant
Provincial Prosecutor Dennis Villa Ignacio ("Prosecutor") informed Go, in the
Presence of his lawyers. that he could avail himself of his right to preliminary
investigation but that he must first sign a waiver of the provisions of Article
125 of the Revised Penal Code. Go refused to execute any such waiver. On 9
July 1991, while the complaint was still with the Prosecutor, and before an
information could be filed in court, the victim, Eldon Maguan, died of his
gunshot wound(s). Accordingly, on 11 July 1991, the Prosecutor, instead of
filing information for frustrated homicide, filed information for murder
before the Regional Trial Court. No bail was recommended. At the bottom of
the information, the Prosecutor certified that no preliminary investigation
had been conducted because the accused did not execute and sign a waiver
of the provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code.
In the afternoon of 11 July 1991, Go's counsel filed with the prosecutor an
omnibus motion for immediate release and proper preliminary investigation,
alleging that the warrantless arrest of Go was unlawful and that no
preliminary investigation had been conducted before the information was
filed. On 12 July 1991, Go filed an urgent ex-parte motion for special raffle in
order to expedite action on the Prosecutor's bail recommendation. The case
was raffled to the sala of Judge Benjamin V. Pelayo (Branch 168, RTC of Pasig
City), who, on the same date, approved the cash bond posted by Go and
ordered his release. Go was in fact released that same day. On 16 July 1991,
the Prosecutor filed with the Regional Trial Court a motion for leave to
conduct preliminary investigation and prayed that in the meantime all
proceedings in the court be suspended. On the said date, the trial court
issued an Order 9 granting leave to conduct preliminary investigation and
cancelling the arraignment set for 15 August 1991 until after the prosecution
shall have concluded its preliminary investigation.
On 17 July 1991, however, the Judge motu proprio issued an Order, (1)
recalling the 12 July 1991 Order which granted bail: petitioner was given 48
hours from receipt of the Order to surrender himself: (2) recalling and
cancelling the 16 July 1991 Order which granted leave to the Prosecutor to
conduct preliminary investigation: (3) treating Go's omnibus motion for
immediate release and preliminary investigation dated 11 July 1991 as a
petition for bail and set for hearing on 23 July 1991.
On 19 July 1991, Go filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus
before the Supreme Court assailing the 17 July 1991 Order. Go also moved
for suspension of all proceedings in the case pending resolution by the
Supreme Court of his petition: this motion was, however, denied by Judge
Pelayo. On 23 July 1991, Go surrendered to the police. By a Resolution dated
24 July 1991, the Supreme Court remanded the petition for certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus to the Court of Appeals. On 16 August 1991,
Judge Pelayo issued an order in open court setting Go's arraignment on 23
August 1991. On 19 August 1991, Go filed with the Court of Appeals a
motion to restrain his arraignment. On 23 August 1991, Judge Pelayo issued
a Commitment Order directing the Provincial Warden of Rizal to admit Go
into his custody at the Rizal Provincial Jail. On the same date, Go was
arraigned. In view, however, of his refusal to enter a plea, the trial court
entered for him a plea of not guilty.
The trial court then set the criminal case for continuous hearings on 19, 24
and 26 September; on 2, 3, 11 and 17 October; and on 7, 8, 14, 15, 21 and 22
November 1991. On 27 August 1991. Go filed a petition for habeas corpus in
the Court of Appeals. On 30 August 1991, the Court of Appeals issued the
writ of habeas corpus. The petition for certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus, on the one hand, and the petition for habeas corpus, upon the
other, were subsequently consolidated in the Court of Appeals. The Court of
Appeals, on 2 September 1991, issued a resolution denying Go's motion to
restrain his arraignment on the ground that motion had become moot and
academic. On 19 September 1991, trial of the criminal case commenced. On
23 September 1991, the Court of Appeals rendered a consolidated decision
dismissing the 2 petitions on the grounds that Go's warrantless arrest was
valid and Go's act of posting bail constituted waiver of any irregularity
attending his arrest, among others. On 3 October 1991, the prosecution
presented three (3) more witnesses at the trial. Go's Counsel also filed a
"Withdrawal of Appearance" with the trial court, with Go's conformity. On 4
October 1991, Go filed the present petition for Review on Certiorari. On 14
October 1991, the Court issued a Resolution directing Judge Pelayo to held in
abeyance the hearing of the criminal case below until further orders from the
Supreme Court.
Issue: Whether Go was arrested legally without warrant for the killing of
Maguan, and is thus not entitled to be released pending the conduct of a
preliminary investigation.
Held: Go's warrantless "arrest" or detention does not fall within the terms of
Section 5 of Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure which
provides that "A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant,
arrest a person: (a) When, in his presence, the person to be created has
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense; (b)
When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal
knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed
it; and (c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped
from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or
temporarily confined while his case is pending or has escaped while being
transferred from one confinement to another. In cases falling under
paragraphs (a) and (b) hereof, the person arrested without a warrant shall be
forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or jail, and he shall be
proceeded against in accordance with Rule 112, Section 7." Go's "arrest"
took place 6 days after the shooting of Maguan. The "arresting" officers
obviously were not present, within the meaning of Section 5(a), at the time
Go had allegedly shot Maguan. Neither could the "arrest" effected 6 days
after the shooting be reasonably regarded as effected "when [the shooting
had] in fact just been committed" within the meaning of Section 5 (b).
Moreover, none of the "arresting" officers had any "personal knowledge" of
facts indicating that Go was the gunman who had shot Maguan. The
information upon which the police acted had been derived from statements
made by alleged eyewitnesses to the shooting -- one stated that Go was the
gunman another was able to take down the alleged gunman's car's plate
number which turned out to be registered in Go's wife's name. That
information did not, however, constitute "personal knowledge." It is thus
clear to the Court that there was no lawful warrantless arrest of Go within
the meaning of Section 5 of Rule 113. It is clear too that Section 7 of Rule 112
is also not applicable. Indeed, Go was not arrested at all. When he walked
into the San Juan Police Station, accompanied by two (2) lawyers, he in fact
placed himself at the disposal of the police authorities. He did not state that
he was "surrendering" himself, in all probability to avoid the implication he
was admitting that he had slain Eldon Maguan or that he was otherwise
guilty of a crime.
When the police filed a complaint for frustrated homicide with the
Prosecutor, the latter should have immediately scheduled a preliminary
investigation to determine whether there was probable cause for charging
Go in court for the killing of Eldon Maguan. Instead, as noted earlier, the
Prosecutor proceeded under the erroneous supposition that Section 7 of
Rule 112 was applicable and required Go to waive the provisions of Article
125 of the Revised Penal Code as a condition for carrying out a preliminary
investigation. This was substantive error, for Go was entitled to a preliminary
investigation and that right should have been accorded him without any
conditions. Moreover, since Go had not been arrested; with or without a
warrant, he was also entitled to be released forthwith subject only to his
appearing at the preliminary investigation.
3rd Meeting: Consti2 Cases
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs. IDEL AMINNUDIN y AHNI
FACTS: Aminnudin claimed his business was selling watches but he was
nonetheless arrested, tried and found guilty of illegally transporting
marijuana. He was arrested on June 25, 1984, shortly after disembarking
from the M/V Wilcon 9 in Iloilo City. The PC officers who were in fact waiting
for him simply accosted him, in sp ected h is bag an d find ing w hat
looked liked marijua na leaves took h im to th eir headqu arters
for investigation. The two bundles of suspect articles were confiscated from
him and later taken to the NBI laboratory for examination. When they were
verified as marijuana leaves, an information for violation of the Dangerous
Drugs Act was filed against him.
Later, the information was amended to include Farida Aliy Hassen, who had
also been arrested with him that same evening and likewise investigated.
According to the prosecution, the PC officers had earlier received a tip from
one of their informers that the accused-appellant was on board a vessel
bound for Iloilo City and was carrying marijuana.
He was identified by name. Acting on this tip, they waited for him in the
evening of June 25, 1984, and approached him as he descended from the
gangplank after the informer had pointed to him. They detained him and
inspected the bag h e was carrying. It wa s found to con tain th ree
kilos of wh at were la ter ana lyzed a s marijuan a leaves by an NBI forensic
examiner.
ISSUE: WON the marijuana allegedly found in his possession is inadmissible
in evidence arrested because he was searchedwithoutwarrant
HELD: Yes [Sec. 2, Art. III of the Constitution]. In the case at bar, there was no
warrant of arrest or search warran t is sued b y a judge after personal
determination by him of th e ex is ten ce of probab le cau se.
Contrary to the averments of the government, the accused-appellant was not
caught
in flagrante
nor wasa crime ab ou t to b e committed or had jus t b een
committed to ju stify the warrantles s a rrest a llow ed. F rom the
con flicting decla ra tions of th e PC witnes ses, it is clea r that
they h ad a t lea st 2 d ays within which they could have obtained a
warrant to arrest and search Aminnudin who was coming to Iloilo on the M/V
Wilcon 9. His name was known. The vehicle was identified. The date of its
arrival was certain. And from the information they had received, they could
have persuaded a judge that there was probable cause, indeed, to justify the
issuance of a warrant. Yet they did nothing. No effort was made to comply
with the law. The Bill of Rights was ignored altogether because the PC
lieutenant who was the head of the arresting team, had determined on his
own authority that a "search warrant was not necessary." In the case at bar,
the accused-appellant was not, at the moment of his arrest, committing a
crime nor was it shown that he was about to do so or that he had just done
so.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ROGELIO MENGOTE y TEJASCRUZ, J.
Facts:
Shortly before noon of August 8, 1987, the Western Police District received a
telephone call from an informer that there were 3 suspicious-looking persons
at the corner of Juan Luna & North Bay Boulevard. A surveillance team
of plainclothesmen was forthwith dispatched to the place. As later narrated
there were 2men "looking from side to side," 1 of whom was holding his
abdomen. They approached these persons and id en tified th emselves as
policemen, wh ereupon the two tried to run away bu t w ere
unab le to escape becaus e th e other lawmen ha d su rroun ded
them. The su spects w ere then s earched. On e of them, w ho
turned ou t to be th e accus ed- appella nt, w as fou nd w ith a . 38
caliber. Smith & Wess on revolver w/ 6 live bullets in the chamber.
The weapons were taken from them. Mengote & others were turned over to
police headquarters for investigation by the Intelligence Division.-Said
accused did then and there unlawfully and knowingly have in his possession
and under his custody and control 1 caliber 38 without first having secured
the necessary license or permit. Mengote was then con victed of illegal
poss ess ion of firea rms. App ellan t con tend s tha t the revolver
shou ld not have b een admitted in evidence because of its illegal seizure.
No warrant therefor having been previously obtained.
Issue: Whether or not the warrantless arrest of Mengote was constitutional?
Ruling: the appealed decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The accused-
appellant is ACQUITTED and ordered released immediately unless he is
validly detained for other offenses. No costs.
RD: As provided in Sec. 5 of the bill of rights, A peace officer or private
person may, without a warrant, arrest a person; (a) When, in his presence,
the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense; (b) When an offense has just been
committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the
person to be arrested has committed it. At the time of the arrest, the
accused-appellant was merely "looking from side to side" and "holding his
abdomen." There was no offense that had just been committed or actually
committed or being attempted in their presence. The arresting officers had
no personal knowledge of facts indicating that Mengote had committed
neither mengotes identity. All they had was hearsay information from the
telephone caller&about a crime that had yet to be committed. A crime must
in fact or actually have been committed first. That a crime has actually been
committed is an essential precondition. It is not enough to suspect that a
crime may have been committed. The fact of the commission of the offense
must be undisputed. The test of reasonable ground applies only to the
identity of the perpetrator.
People v. Manlulu
FACTS:
Alfaro, a NARCOM agent, was stabbed and shot in a drinking spree. His
drinking companions, Manlulu and Samson were arrested nineteen hours
after the incident. Patrolman Perez arrested Manluluon the information
given by Manlapaz, who was also drinking with the accused and the
victim. Patrolman Perez seized from Manlulu the .45 cal. Pistol and Casio
wristwatch said to belong to Alfaro, without a warrant and without informing
Manlulu of his right to counsel.
ISSUE: Whether or not the arrest and seizure of the gun and the watch was
valid.
HELD: The warrantless arrest was invalid. The killing took place at one oclock
in the morning. The arrest and the consequent search and seizure came at
around seven oclock that evening, some nineteen hours later. This instance
cannot come within the purview of a valid warrantless arrest. Paragraph (b)
Sec. 5,Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure provides that the
arresting officer must have personal knowledge nor was the offense in
fact just been committed. While Pat. Perez may have personally gathered
the information which led to the arrest of Manlulu that is not enough. The
law requires personal knowledge. Obviously, personal gathering of
information is different from personal knowledge. The rule requires that the
arrest immediately follows the commission of the offense, not some
nineteen hours later. However, the flaw, fatal as it may be, becomes moot
in view of the eyewitness account of Manlapaz which the Court found
credible. In spite of the nullification of the arrest of accused Manlulu, and the
exclusion of
PEOPLE vs. ANTHONY ESCORDIAL
Petition: Review from the decision of RTC finding him guilty of robbery with
rape.
Facts:
Michelle, Erma and Teresa were living in a boarding house. While they were
asleep in the evening of December 27, 1996, Erma was awakened by the
presence of a man who had covered his head with a t-sh irt to p revent
identifica tion a nd ca rried a knife. He threatened her so
Michelle a nd Teresa were also awakened. After getting their money, the
man gave a t-shirt to Erma to blindfold Teresa and another to Michelle to
blindfold Erma. He blindfolded Michelle himself and then raped her. He told
Michelle that he used to call her a beautiful girl whenever she passed by his
place but she had ignored him.
Michelle said that although she was blindfolded and could not see, she could
feel that the man had no cover on his fa ce wh en h e was rap ing
her. She felt th at h is ch est w a s rough and had s ome scars. When
he placed her hands on his nape, she felt that it was also rough. On the
3rd Meeting: Consti2 Cases
other hand, Erma claimed she was able to see through her blindfold and that
she saw the mans face because of th e light coming from the la mp
pos t ou ts ide th e board ing house. Th eir b edroom win dow h ad
panes through which the light filtered in.
Mark tes tified tha t h e was in his bed room on the secon d floor,
when he saw from his bed room wind ow a man w earing den im
shorts coming out of the boarding h ous e and id entified
Anthony Escordial as the man he saw that night.
When the policemen arrived, Michelle told them that she could only identify
his voice and his eyes. The women w/ the police looked for the man but did
not find him. Tancinco, one of the police who responded to the report
shortly after the commission of the crime, also testified to the
prosecution. Tancinco learned from Fidel Hinolan, the owner of Coffee Break
Corner and employer of the accused, that the latter had gone home to
Negros Occidental. Michelle, Allan and Pacita Aguillonwent to Negros
Occidental and found him w/ the help of the police.
Michelle executed an affidavit, identifying Anthony as the person who had
robbed and raped her. She testified that she had gone to the Coffee Break
Corner and usually passed by there when going home and Anthony would
often whistle at her and call her a beautiful girl.
Anthony testified that on the way to Bacolod City, Tancinco began beating
him and hitting him with the butt of a shotgun to force him to admit liability
for the crime. Because he refused to do so, he was taken to a lodging house
where he was tortured. Tancinco put a knife to his neck, telling him that he
would be killed if he refused to admit that he was the culprit. Tancinco took
Anthony to a house so that he could be identified by another complainant
but she likewise said that he was not the assailant, as the latter had a heavier
build and longer hair.
On January 6, 1997, Gemarino, Dojillo, and Villaspen, together with
Anthonys grandfather, a certain Inspector Tamayo, and reporters from
Bombo Radyo, went to the Bacolod police station to visit Anthony and found
him tied to a chair. He had a limp because his feet were injured so they
brought him to the hospital for treatment.
Issue: WoN the warrantless arrest was lawful. (Unlawful)
Decision: REVERSED and the accused is ACQUITTED on the ground of
reasonable doubt.
RD: The arrest of Anthony does not fall under Rule 113; Section 5 w/c
enumerates the circumstances wherein a person may arrest another w/o a
warrant. At the time of his arrest, accused was watching a game in a
basketball court and was not committing or attempting to commit a crime
when he was arrested by the police on that day. The police officers neither
had personal knowledge of facts and circumstances that would lead them to
believe that he had just committed a crime. The crime took place on
December27, 1996 but Anthony was arrested only on January 3, 1997. As the
arresting officers were not present when the crime was committed, they
could not have personal knowledge of the facts and circumstances of the
commission of the crime so as to be justified in the belief that he was guilty
of the crime. The arresting officers had no reason for not securing a warrant.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. DAVID SALVATIERRA y EGUIA
Facts:
For the fatal stabbing of a vendor named Charlie Fernandez, the RTC of
Manila, meted David Salvatierra the penalty of reclusion perpetua and the
payment of the amounts of P30,183.25 as actual damages and P50,000.00 as
indemnity to the heirs of the victim, plus the cost of suit.
On August 1990, Charlie was walking towards Quiapo when suddenly, three
persons met him. Oneof them was David Salvatierra, who thrust a pointed
instrument at Charlie. He was able to parrythe thrust but David swung the
instrument anew hitting Charlie at the left breast. Thereafter, allthree
persons scampered away. Charlie still managed to walk home to tell his
father about the incident but suddenly collapsed. He was taken immediately
to the hospital where he was operated on.
The assault was witnessed by Milagros Martinez, another vendor who
stopped by to rest at the right side of the street. She told the incident only to
her daughter and did not immediately report the incident to the police
authorities because she was afraid.
Charlies father, Marciano, reported the crime to the police and since the
victim could not be interviewed as he was then undergoing operation, they
proceeded to the crime scene to get information about the incident but their
effort was fruitless as no one in the area would volunteer to identify the
culprits. A relative of the victim informed the police that David was one
of the suspects in the crime.
Charlie died the following day because of hemorrhage secondary to the stab
wound on the anterior chest wall. The medical report showed that Charlie
sustained, aside from the stab wound on the chest, another stab wound on
the left forearm and an incised wound on the left wrist.
Marciano went back to Police Station to inform the authorities that his son
had died. He was advised to report the matter to the Homicide Section of the
Western Police District where advance information was prepared indicating
that 4 unidentified persons perpetrated the crime.
On November 15, 1990 at about 4:35 in the afternoon, Police Station No.4
received a complaint that David was creating a commotion along Miguel in
Street. He was thereby taken in custody by Pat. Celso Tan and two other
policemen who later found out that he was a suspect in the killing of Charlie.
Later that day, he was turned over to the WPD.
Milagros, upon being informed that David was transferred to the WPD,
went to the station where she executed a sworn statement implicating David
to the crime. In a police line-up, she pinpointed David as the person who
stabbed Charlie. Thereafter, Pat. Amores prepared a booking sheet and
arrest order which David signed.
Issue: WoN the warrantless arrest is valid. (It was an illegal arrest but it is not
a sufficient cause for setting aside a valid judgment.)
Decision: AFFIRMED.
RD:
His arrest on suspicion that he was involved in the killing of Charlie was made
almost three monthsafter the commission of the crime and only after he had
been taken in police custody for a minor offense.
As such, because no warrant had been obtained during the 3-month
intervening period between
thecommission of the crime and his apprehension, his arrest would have ordi
narily been renderedunconstitutional and illegal. The element of immediacy
between the time of the commission of the offenseand the time of the arrest
had not been complied with. While these arguments may be valid, his
claimthat the case against him should be dismissed for violation of his
constitutional rights, must fail becausehe is estopped from questioning the
legality of his arrest considering that he never raised this beforeentering his
plea, thus, the objection is deemed waived.From her testimony, it is clear
that although Milagros did not know appellants name, sheremembered his
features and recognize him as the perpetrator of the crime. Indeed, she
could not have failed to identify him because she was only eight meters away
when the assault occurred. Visibility was not a problem because while there
were some pedestrians in the area, traffic light was light and could not have
obstructed Milagros view. Furthermore, it was 4:30 in the afternoon when
the day was still bright
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ZENAIDA BOLASA Y NAKOBOAN and
ROBERTO DELOS REYESG.R. No. 125754 December 22, 1999
FACTS:
An anonymous caller tipped off PO3 Dante Salonga and PO3 Albert Carizon in
the early evening of 11 September 1995that a man and a woman were
repacking prohibited drugs at a certain house in Sta. Brigida St., Karuhatan,
Valenzuela, Metro Manila. PO3 Salonga and PO3 Carizon together with SPO1
Fernando Arenas immediately proceeded to the house of the suspects and
parked their car some three hundred (300) meters away. They walked
towards their quarry's lair accompanied this time by their unnamed informer.
When they reached the house they "peeped (inside) through a small window
and x x x saw one man and a woman repacking suspected marijuana."
They entered the house and introduced themselves as police officersto the
occupants and thereupon confiscated the tea bags and some drug
paraphernalia. They arrested the two (2) who turnedout to be the accused
Zenaida Bolasa y Nakoboan and Roberto delos Reyes. Subsequent
3rd Meeting: Consti2 Cases
examination of the tea bags by NBI Forensic Chemist Rubie Calalo confirmed
the suspicion that the tea bags contained marijuana. Both the accused
however denied on the witness stand ownership over the confiscated tea
bags and drug implements.
ISSUE: W/N the seizure and subsequent arrest were valid?
HELD: Yes. The Court held that the tea bags containing marijuana were not
seized in plain view or inadvertently discovered. There was no valid
intrusion and the accused were illegally arrested. The police officers
intentionally peeped first through the window before they saw and
ascertained the activities of accused inside the room. Further, the Court
contended that the apprehending officers should have conducted first a
surveillance considering that the identities and address of the suspected
culprits were already ascertained. After conducting the surveillance and
determining the existence of probable cause for arresting accused, they
should have secured a search warrant prior to affecting a valid arrest and
seizure. The Court stated that the arrest being illegal ab initio, the
accompanying search was likewise illegal. Every evidence thus obtained
during the illegal search cannot be used against accused. The Court held that
the State cannot in a cavalier fashion intrude into the persons of its citizens
as well as into their houses, papers and effects. The constitutional provision
protects the privacy and sanctity of the person himself against unlawful
arrests and other forms of restraint.
Obiter Dictum
The Court enumerated the exceptions as follows:
1. Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest;
2. Search of evidence in plain view. The elements of the plain view doctrine
are: (a) a prior valid intrusion based on the valid warrantless arrest in which
the policeare legally present in the pursuit of their official duties; (b) the
evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police who havethe right to be
where they are; (c) the evidence must be immediately apparent; and, (d)
"plain view" justified mere seizure of evidence without further search.
3. Search of a moving vehicle. Highly regulated by the government, the
vehicle s inherent mobility reduces expectation of privacy especially when
its transit in public thoroughfares furnishes a highly reasonable suspicion
amounting to probable cause that the occupant committed a criminal
activity;
4. Consented warrantless search;
5. Customs search;6. Stop and Frisk; and
7. Exigent and emergency circumstances. Citing the Rules of Criminal
Procedure on lawful warrantless arrest, the Court stated that an arrest is
lawful even in the absence of a warrant :
(a) when the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is about to commit an offense in his presence;
(b) when an offense has in fact been committed and he has reasonable
ground to believe that the person to be arrested hascommitted it; and,
(c) when the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from
a penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or
temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being
transferred from one confinement to another. (A person charged with an
offense may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may be
used as proof of the commission of the offense)
People vs. Doria [GR 125299, 22 January 1999]
En Banc, Puno (J): 13 concur
Facts:
In November 1995, members of the North Metropolitan District, Philippine
National Police (PNP) Narcotics Command (Narcom), received information
from 2 civilian informants (CI) that one "Jun" was engaged in illegal drug
activities in Mandaluyong City. The Narcom agents decided to entrap and
arrest "Jun" in a buy-bust operation. As arranged by one of the CI's, a
meeting between the Narcom agents and "Jun" was scheduled on 5
December 1995 at E. Jacinto Street in Mandaluyong City.
On 5 December 1995, at 6:00 a.m., the CI went to the PNP Headquarters at
EDSA, Kamuning, Quezon City to prepare for the buy-bust operation. The
Narcom agents formed Team Alpha composed of P/Insp. Nolasco Cortes as
team leader and PO3 Celso Manlangit, SPO1 Edmund Badua and four (4)
other policemen as members. P/Insp. Cortes designated PO3 Manlangit as
the poseur-buyer and SPO1 Badua as his back-up, and the rest of the team as
perimeter security. Superintendent Pedro Alcantara, Chief of the North
Metropolitan District PNP Narcom, gave the team P2,000.00 to cover
operational expenses. From this sum, PO3 Manlangit set aside P1,600.00 a
one thousand peso bill and six (6) one hundred peso bills as money for the
buy-bust operation. The market price of one kilo of marijuana was then
P1,600.00. PO3 Manlangit marked the bills with his initials and listed their
serial numbers in the police blotter. The team rode in two cars and headed
for the target area.
At 7:20 a.m., "Jun" appeared and the CI introduced PO3 Manlangit as
interested in buying one (1) kilo of marijuana. PO3 Manlangit handed "Jun"
the marked bills worth P1,600.00. "Jun" instructed PO3 Manlangit to wait for
him at the corner of Shaw Boulevard and Jacinto Street while he got the
marijuana from his associate.
An hour later, "Jun" appeared at the agreed place where PO3 Manlangit, the
CI and the rest of the team were waiting. "Jun" took out from his bag an
object wrapped in plastic and gave it to PO3 Manlangit. PO3 Manlangit
forthwith arrested "Jun" as SPO1 Badua rushed to help in the arrest. They
frisked "Jun" but did not find the marked bills on him. Upon inquiry, "Jun"
revealed that he left the money at the house of his associate named
"Neneth." "Jun" led the police team to "Neneth's" house nearby at Daang
Bakal. The team found the door of "Neneth's" house open and at woman
inside. "Jun" identified the woman as his associate. SPO1 Badua asked
"Neneth" about the P1,600.00 as PO3 Manlangit looked over "Neneth's"
house. Standing by the door, PO3 Manlangit noticed a carton box under the
dining table. He saw that one of the box's flaps was open and inside the box
was something wrapped in plastic. The plastic wrapper and its contents
appeared similar to the marijuana earlier "sold" to him by "Jun." His
suspicion aroused, PO3 Manlangit entered "Neneth's" house and took hold
of the box.
He peeked inside the box and found that it contained 10 bricks of what
appeared to be dried marijuana leaves. Simultaneous with the box's
discovery, SPO1 Badua recovered the marked bills from "Neneth." The
policemen arrested "Neneth." They took "Neneth" and "Jun," together with
the box, its contents and the marked bills and turned them over to the
investigator at headquarters. It was only then that the police learned that
"Jun" is Florencio Doria y Bolado while "Neneth" is Violeta Gaddao y Catama.
The 1 brick of dried marijuana leaves recovered from "Jun" plus the 10 bricks
recovered from "Neneth's" house were examined at the PNP Crime
Laboratory. The bricks were found to be dried marijuana fruiting tops of
various weights totalling 7,641.08 grams.
On 7 December 1995, Doria and Gadda were charged with violation of
Section 4, in relation to Section 21 of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972. After
trial, the Regional Trial Court, Branch 156, Pasig City convicted Dorria and
Gaddao. The trial court found the existence of an "organized/syndicated
crime group" and sentenced both to death and pay a fine of P500,000.00
each. Hence, the automatic review.
Issue: Whether the warrantless arrests of Doria and Gaddao are legally
permissible.
Held: It is recognized that in every arrest, there is a certain amount of
entrapment used to outwit the persons violating or about to violate the law.
Not every deception is forbidden. The type of entrapment the law forbids is
the inducing of another to violate the law, the "seduction" of an otherwise
innocent person into a criminal career. Where the criminal intent originates
in the mind of the entrapping person and the accused is lured into the
commission of the offense charged in order to prosecute him, there is
entrapment and no conviction may be had. Where, however, the criminal
intent originates in the mind of the accused and the criminal offense is
completed, the fact that a person acting as a decoy for the state, or public
officials furnished the accused an opportunity for commission of the offense,
or that the accused is aided in the commission of the crime in order to secure
the evidence necessary to prosecute him, there is no entrapment and the
accused must be convicted. The law tolerates the use of decoys and other
artifices to catch a criminal. The warrantless arrest of Doria is not unlawful.
Warrantless arrests are allowed in three instances as provided by Section 5
of Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, to wit: "A peace officer
or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person: (a) When, in his
3rd Meeting: Consti2 Cases
presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing,
or is attempting to commit an offense; (b) When an offense has in fact just
been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the
person to be arrested has committed it; and (c) When the person to be
arrested is a prisoner who escaped from a penal establishment or place
where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is
pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to
another. xxx"
Under Section 5 (a), as above-quoted, a person may be arrested without a
warrant if he "has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to
commit an offense." Herein, Doria was caught in the act of committing an
offense. When an accused is apprehended in flagrante delicto as a result of a
buy- bust operation, the police are not only authorized but duty-bound to
arrest him even without a warrant. The warrantless arrest of Gaddao, the
search of her person and residence, and the seizure of the box of marijuana
and marked bills, however, are different matters. Our Constitution proscribes
search and seizure without a judicial warrant and any evidence obtained
without such warrant is inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. The
rule is, however, not absolute. Search and seizure may be made without a
warrant and the evidence obtained there from may be admissible in the
following instances: (1) search incident to a lawful arrest; (2) search of a
moving motor vehicle; (3) search in violation of customs laws; (4) seizure of
evidence in plain view; (5) when the accused himself waives his right against
unreasonable searches and seizures. To be lawful, the warrantless arrest of
appellant Gaddao must fall under any of the three (3) instances enumerated
in Section 5 of Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure. Gaddao
was not caught red-handed during the buy-bust operation to give ground for
her arrest under Section 5 (a) of Rule 113. She was not committing any crime.
Contrary to the finding of the trial court, there was no occasion at all for
Gaddao to flee from the policemen to justify her arrest in "hot pursuit." In
fact, she was going about her daily chores when the policemen pounced on
her. Neither could the arrest of Gaddao be justified under the second
instance of Rule
"Personal knowledge" of facts in arrests without warrant under Section 5 (b)
of Rule 113 must be based upon "probable cause" which means an "actual
belief or reasonable grounds of suspicion." Gaddao was arrested solely on
the basis of the alleged identification made by her co-accused, Doria. Save
for Doria's word, the Narcom agents had no reasonable grounds to believe
that she was engaged in drug pushing. If there is no showing that the person
who effected the warrantless arrest had, in his own right, knowledge of facts
implicating the person arrested to the perpetration of a criminal offense, the
arrest is legally objectionable. Since the warrantless arrest of Gaddao was
illegal, it follows that the search of her person and home and the subsequent
seizure of the marked bills and marijuana cannot be deemed legal as an
incident to her arrest.
People vs. Go [GR 116001, 14 March 2001]; also Go vs. Court of Appeals [GR
123943] First Division, Ynares-Santiago (J): 4 concur
Facts: On 22 October 1992, at around 10:00 p.m., SPO1 Mauro Piamonte and
SPO3 Candido Liquido, members of the Intelligence and Follow-up Unit of the
Calamba Police, went to the police outpost at Crossing, Calamba, Laguna, to
follow up an intelligence report that methamphetamine hydrochloride, or
shabu, a regulated drug, was being supplied there. Police civilian agent
Ronnie Panuringan arrived and reported to them that he saw Luisito Go, also
known as "King Louie", enter the Flamingo Disco House with two women.
Panuringan said that he spotted a gun tucked in Go's waist. Together, the
three policemen proceeded to the Flamingo, which was located about a
hundred meters away from the outpost. When they arrived at the Flamingo,
the police officers informed the owner that they were conducting an
"Operation Bakal," whereby they search for illegally possessed firearms. The
owner allowed them in and told a waiter to accompany them. They went up
to the second floor of the disco. The waiter turned on the lights, and the
police officers saw Go and his lady companions seated at a table. They
identified themselves and asked Go to stand up. When the later did so, the
policemen saw the gun tucked in his waist. SPO1 Piamonte asked for the
license of the gun, but Go was unable to produce any. Instead, Go brought
out the driver's license of a certain Tan Antonio Lerios. SPO1 Piamonte
confiscated the gun, which was later identified as a 9mm Walther P88,
Serial Number 006784, with a magazine containing 10 rounds of live
ammunition. Go was invited to the police precinct for questioning. On the
way out of the disco, Go asked permission to bring his car, which was parked
outside. The police officers accompanied Go to his car, a Honda Civic with
license plate number TCM-789. Through the windshield, SPO3 Liquido
noticed a Philippine National Police identification card hanging from the
rearview mirror. He asked Go if he was a member of the PNP, and he said no.
The police officers asked Go for his driver's license and the registration
papers of the vehicle, but he was unable to produce them. When Go opened
the door, SPO3 Liquido took the ID card and found that the same belonged to
SPO4 Zenaida Bagadiong. The police officers saw pieces of glass tooters and
tin foils on the backseat and floor of the car. They asked Go why he had
these items, but he did not say anything. Instead, Go suggested that they talk
the matter over, and intimated that he had money. SPO3 Liquido replied that
they should talk at the police headquarters. Go took out an attach case
from the car and opened it. There were two black clutch bags inside. Go
opened the first bag, which contained shiny white substance wrapped in
cellophane. The second bag contained P120,000.00 in cash. The police
officers brought Go to the police station. When they arrived at the precinct,
they turned over the attach case together with the two black clutch bags to
the investigator. The investigator found eight cellophane bags containing
granules suspected to be shabu in one of the clutch bags. When the attach
case was opened, the police officers found that it also contained three glass
tooters, tin foils, an improvised burner, magazines and newspapers.
Consequently, two Informations were filed against Go before the Regional
Trial Court of Calamba, Laguna, Branch 34 (Criminal Case 3308-92-C, for
violation of Article III of RA 6452 or the Dangerous Drugs Act; and Criminal
Case 3309-92-C, for violation of PD 1866) After a joint trial, the lower court
rendered judgment convicting Go in the two criminal cases, and sentencing
him in Criminal Case 3308-92-C to a penalty of imprisonment of 6 years and 1
day to 12 years and a fine of P12,000.00; and in Criminal Case 3309-92-C to
suffer an imprisonment of reclusion perpetua. Go appealed his conviction in
Criminal Case 3309-92- C directly to the Supreme Court (GR 116001). On the
other hand, Go brought his appeal of the judgment in Criminal Case 3308-92-
C before the Court of Appeals. In an Amended Decision dated 21 February
1996, the Court of Appeals affirmed Go's conviction but modified the penalty
imposed by the trial court by sentencing him, in addition to imprisonment of
6 years and 1 day to 12 years, to pay a fine of P6,000.00, citing Section 8 of
RA 6425, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. Go filed the
petition for review (GR 123943). The two cases were subsequently
consolidated.
Issue: Whether Go was legally arrested without warrant for illegal possession
of firearms and illegal drugs.
Held: The constitutional proscription, that no person shall be arrested
without any warrant of arrest having been issued prior thereto, is not a hard-
and-fast rule. The Rules of Court and jurisprudence recognize exceptional
cases where an arrest may be effected without a warrant. Among these are
when, in the presence of a peace officer, the person to be arrested has
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense; or
when an offense has in fact just been committed, and the arresting officer
has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has
committed it. Herein, the police saw the gun tucked in Go's waist when he
stood up. The gun was plainly visible. No search was conducted as none was
necessary. Go could not show any license for the firearm, whether at the
time of his arrest or thereafter. Thus, he was in effect committing a crime in
the presence of the police officers. No warrant of arrest was necessary in
such a situation, it being one of the recognized exceptions under the Rules.
As a consequence of Go's valid warrantless arrest, he may be lawfully
searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as proof of
the commission of an offense, without a search warrant, as provided in Rule
126, Section 12. This is a valid search incidental to the lawful arrest. The
subsequent discovery in his car of drug paraphernalia and the crystalline
substance, which was later identified as shabu, though in a distant place
from where the illegal possession of firearm was committed, cannot be said
to have been made during an illegal search. As such, the seized items do not
fall within the exclusionary clause, which states that any evidence obtained
in violation of the right against warrantless arrest cannot be used for any
purposes in any proceeding. Hence, not being fruits of the poisonous tree, so
to speak, the objects found at the scene of the crime, such as the firearm,
the shabu and the drug paraphernalia, can be used as evidence against
appellant. Besides, it has been held that drugs discovered as a result of a
consented search is admissible in evidence.
3rd Meeting: Consti2 Cases
Terry vs. Ohio [392 US 1, 10 June 1968]
Warren (J)
Facts: Martin McFadden, a Cleveland police detective, on a downtown beat
which he had been patrolling for many years, observed two strangers (Terry
and Richard Chilton) on a street corner. He saw them proceed alternately
back and forth along an identical route, strolling down Huron Road, pausing
to stare in the same store window, which they did for a total of about 24
times. Each completion of the route was followed by a conference between
the two on a corner, at one of which they were joined by a third man (Katz)
who left swiftly. Suspecting the two men of "casing a job, a stick- up," the
officer followed them and saw them rejoin the third man a couple of blocks
away in front of a store. The officer approached the three, identified himself
as a policeman, and asked their names. The men "mumbled something,"
whereupon McFadden spun Terry around, patted down his outside clothing,
and found in his overcoat pocket, but was unable to remove, a pistol. The
officer ordered the three into the store. He removed Terry's overcoat, took
out a revolver, and ordered the three to face the wall with their hands raised.
He patted down the outer clothing of Chilton and Katz and seized a revolver
from Chilton's outside overcoat pocket. He did not put his hands under the
outer garments of Katz (since he discovered nothing in his pat-down which
might have been a weapon), or under Terry's or Chilton's outer garments
until he felt the guns. The three were taken to the police station. Terry and
Chilton were charged with carrying concealed weapons. The defense moved
to suppress the weapons. Though the trial court rejected the prosecution
theory that the guns had been seized during a search incident to a lawful
arrest, the court denied the motion to suppress and admitted the weapons
into evidence on the ground that the officer had cause to believe that Terry
and Chilton were acting suspiciously, that their interrogation was warranted,
and that the officer for his own protection had the right to pat down their
outer clothing having reasonable cause to believe that they might be armed.
The court distinguished between an investigatory "stop" and an arrest, and
between a "frisk" of the outer clothing for weapons and a full-blown search
for evidence of crime. Terry and Chilton were found guilty, an intermediate
appellate court affirmed, and the State Supreme Court dismissed the appeal
on the ground that "no substantial constitutional question" was involved.
Issue: Whether it is always unreasonable for a policeman to seize a person
and subject him to a limited search for weapons unless there is probable
cause for an arrest.
Held: The Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable searches and
seizures, made applicable to the States by the Fourteenth Amendment,
"protects people, not places," and therefore applies as much to the citizen on
the streets as well as at home or elsewhere. The issue in this case is not the
abstract propriety of the police conduct but the admissibility against
petitioner of the evidence uncovered by the search and seizure. The
exclusionary rule cannot properly be invoked to exclude the products of
legitimate and restrained police investigative techniques; and this Court's
approval of such techniques should not discourage remedies other than the
exclusionary rule to curtail police abuses for which that is not an effective
sanction. The Fourth Amendment applies to "stop and frisk" procedures such
as those followed here. Whenever a police officer accosts an individual and
restrains his freedom to walk away, he has "seized" that person within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment. A careful exploration of the outer
surfaces of a person's clothing in an attempt to find weapons is a "search"
under that Amendment. Where a reasonably prudent officer is warranted in
the circumstances of a given case in believing that his safety or that of others
is endangered, he may make a reasonable search for weapons of the person
believed by him to be armed and dangerous regardless of whether he has
probable cause to arrest that individual for crime or the absolute certainty
that the individual is armed. Though the police must whenever practicable
secure a warrant to make a search and seizure, that procedure cannot be
followed where swift action based upon on-the-spot observations of the
officer on the beat is required. The reasonableness of any particular search
and seizure must be assessed in light of the particular circumstances against
the standard of whether a man of reasonable caution is warranted in
believing that the action taken was appropriate. The officer here was
performing a legitimate function of investigating suspicious conduct when he
decided to approach Terry and his companions. An officer justified in
believing that an individual whose suspicious behavior he is investigating at
close range is armed may, to neutralize the threat of physical harm, take
necessary measures to determine whether that person is carrying a weapon.
A search for weapons in the absence of probable cause to arrest must be
strictly circumscribed by the exigencies of the situation. An officer may make
an intrusion short of arrest where he has reasonable apprehension of danger
before being possessed of information justifying arrest. The officer's
protective seizure of Terry and his companions and the limited search which
he made were reasonable, both at their inception and as conducted. The
actions of Terry and his companions were consistent with the officer's
hypothesis that they were contemplating a daylight robbery and were
armed. The officer's search was confined to what was minimally necessary to
determine whether the men were armed, and the intrusion, which was made
for the sole purpose of protecting himself and others nearby, was confined
to ascertaining the presence of weapons. Herein, Officer McFadden patted
down the outer clothing of Terry and his two companions. He did not place
his hands in their pockets or under the outer surface of their garments until
he had felt weapons, and then he merely reached for and removed the guns.
He did not conduct a general exploratory search for whatever evidence of
criminal activity he might find. Thus, the revolver seized from Terry was
properly admitted in evidence against him. At the time McFadden seized
Terry and searched him for weapons, Officer McFadden had reasonable
grounds to believe that Terry was armed and dangerous, and it was
necessary for the protection of himself and others to take swift measures to
discover the true facts and neutralize the threat of harm if it materialized.
The policeman carefully restricted his search to what was appropriate to the
discovery of the particular items which he sought. Each case of this sort will,
of course, have to be decided on its own facts. Where a police officer
observes unusual conduct which leads him reasonably to conclude in light of
his experience that criminal activity may be afoot and that the persons with
whom he is dealing may be armed and presently dangerous, where in the
course of investigating this behavior he identifies himself as a policeman and
makes reasonable inquiries, and where nothing in the initial stages of the
encounter serves to dispel his reasonable fear for his own or others' safety,
he is entitled for the protection of himself and others in the area to conduct
a carefully limited search of the outer clothing of such persons in an attempt
to discover weapons which might be used to assault him. Such a search is a
reasonable search under the Fourth Amendment, and any weapons seized
may properly be introduced in evidence against the person from whom they
were taken.
Malacat vs. Court of Appeals [GR 123595, 12 December 1997]
En Banc, Davide Jr. (J): 11 concur
Facts: On 27 August 1990, at about 6:30 p.m., allegedly in response to bomb
threats reported seven days earlier, Rodolfo Yu of the Western Police
District, Metropolitan Police Force of the Integrated National Police, Police
Station No. 3, Quiapo, Manila, was on foot patrol with three other police
officers (all of them in uniform) along Quezon Boulevard, Quiapo, Manila,
near the Mercury Drug store at Plaza Miranda. They chanced upon two
groups of Muslim-looking men, with each group, comprised of three to four
men, posted at opposite sides of the corner of Quezon Boulevard near the
Mercury Drug Store. These men were acting suspiciously with "their eyes
moving very fast." Yu and his companions positioned themselves at strategic
points and observed both groups for about 30 minutes. The police officers
then approached one group of men, who then fled in different directions. As
the policemen gave chase, Yu caught up with and apprehended Sammy
Malacat y Mandar (who Yu recognized, inasmuch as allegedly the previous
Saturday, 25 August 1990, likewise at Plaza Miranda, Yu saw Malacat and 2
others attempt to detonate a grenade). Upon searching Malacat, Yu found a
fragmentation grenade tucked inside the latter's "front waist line." Yu's
companion, police officer Rogelio Malibiran, apprehended Abdul Casan from
whom a .38 caliber revolver was recovered. Malacat and Casan were then
brought to Police Station 3 where Yu placed an "X" mark at the bottom of the
grenade and thereafter gave it to his commander. Yu did not issue any
receipt for the grenade he allegedly recovered from Malacat. On 30 August
1990, Malacat was charged with violating Section 3 of Presidential Decree
1866. At arraignment on 9 October 1990, petitioner, assisted by counsel de
3rd Meeting: Consti2 Cases
officio, entered a plea of not guilty. Malacat denied the charges and with a deadly weapon. None was visible to Yu, for as he admitted, the alleged
explained that he only recently arrived in Manila. However, several grenade was "discovered" "inside the front waistline" of Malacat, and from
other police officers mauled him, hitting him with benches and guns. all indications as to the distance between Yu and Malacat, any telltale bulge,
Petitioner was once again searched, but nothing was found on him. He saw assuming that Malacat was indeed hiding a grenade, could not have been
the grenade only in court when it was presented. In its decision dated 10 visible to Yu. What is unequivocal then are blatant violations of Malacat's
February 1994 but promulgated on 15 February 1994, the trial court ruled rights solemnly guaranteed in Sections 2 and 12(1) of Article III of the
that the warrantless search and seizure of Malacat was akin to a "stop and Constitution.
frisk," where a "warrant and seizure can be effected without necessarily
being preceded by an arrest" and "whose object is either to maintain the
status quo momentarily while the police officer seeks to obtain more
information"; and that the seizure of the grenade from Malacat was
incidental to a lawful arrest. The trial court thus found Malacat guilty of the
crime of illegal possession of explosives under Section 3 of PD 1866, and
sentenced him to suffer the penalty of not less than 17 years, 4 months and 1
day of Reclusion Temporal, as minimum, and not more than 30 years of
Reclusion Perpetua, as maximum. On 18 February 1994, Malacat filed a
notice of appeal indicating that he was appealing to the Supreme Court.
However, the record of the case was forwarded to the Court of Appeals (CA-
GR CR 15988). In its decision of 24 January 1996, the Court of Appeals
affirmed the trial court. Manalili filed a petition for review with the Supreme
Court.

Issue: Whether the search made on Malacat is valid, pursuant to the

exception of stop and frisk.

Held: The general rule as regards arrests, searches and seizures is that a
warrant is needed in order to validly affect the same. The Constitutional
prohibition against unreasonable arrests, searches and seizures refers to
those affected without a validly issued warrant, subject to certain exceptions.
As regards valid warrantless arrests, these are found in Section 5, Rule 113 of
the Rules of Court. A warrantless arrest under the circumstances
contemplated under Section 5(a) has been denominated as one "in flagrante
delicto," while that under Section 5(b) has been described as a "hot pursuit"
arrest. Turning to valid warrantless searches, they are limited to the
following: (1) customs searches; (2) search of moving vehicles; (3) seizure of
evidence in plain view; (4) consent searches; (5) a search incidental to a
lawful arrest; and (6) a "stop and frisk." The concepts of a "stop-and-frisk"
and of a search incidental to a lawful arrest must not be confused. These two
types of warrantless searches differ in terms of the requisite quantum of
proof before they may be validly affected and in their allowable scope. In a
search incidental to a lawful arrest, as the precedent arrest determines the
validity of the incidental search. Here, there could have been no valid in
flagrante delicto or hot pursuit arrest preceding the search in light of the lack
of personal knowledge on the part of Yu, the arresting officer, or an overt
physical act, on the part of Malacat, indicating that a crime had just been
committed, was being committed or was going to be committed. Plainly, the
search conducted on Malacat could not have been one incidental to a lawful
arrest. On the other hand, while probable cause is not required to conduct a
"stop and frisk," it nevertheless holds that mere suspicion or a hunch will not
validate a "stop and frisk." A genuine reason must exist, in light of the police
officer's experience and surrounding conditions, to warrant the belief that
the person detained has weapons concealed about him. Finally, a "stop-and-
frisk" serves a two-fold interest: (1) the general interest of effective crime
prevention and detection, which underlies the recognition that a police
officer may, under appropriate circumstances and in an appropriate manner,
approach a person for purposes of investigating possible criminal behavior
even without probable cause; and (2) the more pressing interest of safety
and self-preservation which permit the police officer to take steps to assure
himself that the person with whom he deals is not armed with a deadly
weapon that could unexpectedly and fatally be used against the police
officer. Here, there are at least three (3) reasons why the "stop-and-frisk"
was invalid: First, there is grave doubts as to Yu's claim that Malacat was a
member of the group which attempted to bomb Plaza Miranda 2 days
earlier. This claim is neither supported by any police report or record nor
corroborated by any other police officer who allegedly chased that group.
Second, there was nothing in Malacat's behavior or conduct which could
have reasonably elicited even mere suspicion other than that his eyes were
"moving very fast" an observation which leaves us incredulous since Yu
and his teammates were nowhere near Malacat and it was already 6:30 p.m.,
thus presumably dusk. Malacat and his companions were merely standing at
the corner and were not creating any commotion or trouble. Third, there was
at all no ground, probable or otherwise, to believe that Malacat was armed