1. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs.

ERMELINDA SEQUIO, VICENTE TUMANGAN, and

NENITO MELVIDA, Accused-Appellants.(K)

Doctrine: Where a policeman suspected a person to have committed a crime, the act of such suspect voluntarily
going with the policeman upon such officers invitation constituted an arrest.

Facts: SPO Elpidio Luna, who was then at the Medellin police headquarters, received a report from another
policeman about a robbery at sitio Antipolo. Together with other policemen and some "Cafgus," Luna went to the
crime scene he found an abandoned motorcycle. People who by then had milled around the site informed Luna "that
the culprit had already fled." Luna noticed that the "bushes were compressed" and found "a piece of paper utilized as
toilet paper with a stool on it [which] was somewhat newly delivered." The paper was a bio-data sheet with the name
"Melvida, Nenito" and the entry for the fathers name filled in with "Elpidio Melvida." Locating Melvida, Luna took
Melvida to the police station after knowing that the barangay captain was not home. Melvida was kept at the station
the whole evening of 24 April 1991 for investtigation. Upon trial, the sufficiency of Lunas basis to arrest Melvida was
questioned. Luna contended that although he suspected Melvida to have committed the crime, he did not arrest him
but merely invited him.

Issue: Did Lunas invitation of Melvida to the police constitute arrest?

Ruling: Yes. Where a policeman suspected a person to have committed a crime, the act of such suspect voluntarily
going with the policeman upon such officers invitation constituted an arrest. Regardless of Lunas claim to the
contrary, accused Nenito Melvida was arrested. An arrest is the taking of a person into custody in order that he may
be bound to answer for the commission of an offense, and it is made by an actual restraint of the person to be
arrested, or by his submission to the custody of the person making the arrest. Melvidas voluntarily going with Luna
upon the latters invitation was a submission to Lunas custody, and Luna believed that Melvida was a suspect in
the robbery charged herein, hence, Melvida was being held to answer for the commission of the said offense.

2. G.R. Nos. 94054-57. February 19, 1991 VICENTE LIM, SR. and MAYOR SUSANA LIM, Petitioners, v. HON.
NEMESIO S. FELIX and HON. ANTONIO ALFANE, Respondents (K)

Doctrine: In satisfying himself of the existence of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest, the judge is
not required to personally examine the complainant and his witnesses. Following established doctrine and
procedures, he shall: (1) personally evaluate the report and the supporting documents submitted by the fiscal
regarding the existence of probable cause and, on the basis thereof, issue a warrant of arrest; or (2) if on the basis
thereof he finds no probable cause, he may disregard the fiscals report and require the submission of supporting
affidavits of witnesses to aid him iii arriving at a conclusion as to the existence of probable cause. He, however, is not
allowed to rely solely on the prosecutors recommendation or certification that probable cause exists.

Facts: After a killing incident in the Masbate Dosmetic Airport, and for the purpose of preliminary investigation, the
designated investigator, Harry O. Tantiado filed an amended complaint with the Municipal Trial Court of Masbate
accusing, among others, Vicente Lim, Sr., Mayor Susana Lim of Masbate, Jolly T. Fernandez, Florencio T.
Fernandez, Jr., Nonilon A. Bagalihog, Mayor Nestor C. Lim and Mayor Antonio Kho of the crime of multiple murder
and frustrated murder in connection with the airport incident. After conducting the preliminary investigation, the court
issued an order dated July 31, 1989 stating that there exists probable cause for the issuance of warrants of arrest
against the aforementioned individuals. Petitioners questioned the validity of the determination made in finding
probable cause for the issuance of the warrants of arrest against them alleging that no personal determination of the
same was made.

Issue: May a Judge without ascertaining the facts through his own personal determination and relying solely on the
certification or recommendation of a prosecutor that a probable cause exists issue a warrant of arrest?
Ruling: No. We reiterate the ruling in Soliven v. Makasiar that the Judge does not have to personally examine the
complainant and his witnesses. The Prosecutor can perform the same functions as a commissioner for the taking of
the evidence. However, there should be a report and necessary documents supporting the Fiscals bare certification.
All of these should be before the Judge.

The records of the preliminary investigation conducted by the Municipal Court of Masbate and reviewed by the
respondent Fiscal were still in Masbate when the respondent Fiscal issued the warrants of arrest against the
petitioners. There was no basis for the respondent Judge to make his own personal determination regarding the
existence of a probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest as mandated by the Constitution. He could not
possibly have known what transpired in Masbate as he had nothing but a certification. Significantly, the respondent
Judge denied the petitioners motion for the transmittal of the records on the ground that the mere certification and
recommendation of the respondent Fiscal that a probable cause exists is sufficient for him to issue a warrant of arrest.

3. JOSE ANTONIO C. LEVISTE, PETITIONER, VS. HON. ELMO M. ALAMEDA, HON. RAUL M. GONZALEZ, HON.
EMMANUEL Y. VELASCO, HEIRS OF THE LATE RAFAEL DE LAS ALAS, RESPONDENTS. (K)

Doctrine: An accused does not have the right to insist on a hearing for the judicial determination of probable cause.

Facts: Petitioner Leviste was charged with homicide for the death of De Las Alas. The private complainants-heirs of
De las Alas filed, with the conformity of the public prosecutor, an Urgent Omnibus Motion[7] praying, inter alia, for the
deferment of the proceedings to allow the public prosecutor to re-examine the evidence on record or to conduct a
reinvestigation to determine the proper offense.

The RTC thereafter issued the (1) Order of January 24, 2007[8] deferring petitioner's arraignment and allowing the
prosecution to conduct a reinvestigation to determine the proper offense and submit a recommendation within 30 days
from its inception, inter alia; and (2) Order of January 31, 2007[9]denying reconsideration of the first order. Petitioner
assailed these orders via certiorari and prohibition before the Court of Appeals.

Meantime, petitioner filed an Urgent Ex-Parte Manifestation and Motion before the trial court to defer acting on the
public prosecutor's recommendation on the proper offense until after the appellate court resolves his application for
injunctive reliefs, or alternatively, to grant him time to comment on the prosecutor's recommendation and thereafter
set a hearing for the judicial determination of probable cause.

Issue: Can the accused, as a matter of right, insist on a hearing for judicial determination of probable cause for the
issuance of a warrant of arrest?

Ruling: No. The rules do not require cases to be set for hearing to determine probable cause for the issuance of a
warrant of arrest of the accused before any warrant may be issued. Petitioner thus cannot, as a matter of right, insist
on a hearing for judicial determination of probable cause. Certainly, petitioner cannot determine beforehand how
cursory or exhaustive the [judges] examination of the records should be [since t]he extent of the judges examination
depends on the exercise of his sound discretion as the circumstances of the case require. In one case, the Court
emphatically stated: The periods provided in the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure are mandatory, and as such,
the judge must determine the presence or absence of probable cause within such periods. The Sandiganbayans
determination of probable cause is made ex parte and is summary in nature, not adversarial. The Judge should not be
stymied and distracted from his determination of probable cause by needless motions for determination of probable
cause filed by the accused. (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
4. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. NOEL TUDTUD y PAYPA and DINDO BOLONG y
NARET, Accused-Appellants. (K)

Doctrine: The long-standing rule in this jurisdiction, applied with a great degree of consistency, is that reliable
information alone is not sufficient to justify a warrantless arrest under Section 5 (a), Rule 113. The rule requires, in
addition, that the accused perform some overt act that would indicate that he has committed, is actually committing,
or is attempting to commit an offense.

Facts: By information from Solier that his neighbor accused Tudtud was responsible for proliferation of marijuana in
their area, a team of police officers conducted an operation against Tudtud. They posted themselves at the corner of
Saipon and McArthur Highway to await Tudtuds arrival. All wore civilian clothes. About 8:00 later that evening, two
men disembarked from a bus and helped each other carry a carton marked "King Flakes." Standing some five feet
away from the men, PO1 Desierto and PO1 Floreta observed that one of the men fit Tudtuds description. The same
man also toted a plastic bag.

PO1 Floreta and PO1 Desierto then approached the suspects and identified themselves as police officers. PO1
Desierto informed them that the police had received information that stocks of illegal drugs would be arriving that
night. The man who resembled Tudtuds description denied that he was carrying any drugs. PO1 Desierto asked him
if he could see the contents of the box. Tudtud obliged, saying, "it was alright." Tudtud opened the box himself as his
companion looked on.

The box yielded pieces of dried fish, beneath which were two bundles, one wrapped in a striped plastic bag and
another in newspapers. PO1 Desierto asked Tudtud to unwrap the packages. They contained what seemed to the
police officers as marijuana leaves. The police thus arrested Tudtud and his companion, informed them of their rights
and brought them to the police station. 26 The two did not resist

Issue: Was the arrest of Tudtud and his companion valid?

Ruling: No. SEC. 5. states that an arrest without warrant is lawful when a peace officer or a person may, without a
warrant, arrest a person:

(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit
an offense;

Appellants in this case were neither performing any overt act or acting in a suspicious manner that would hint that a
crime has been, was being, or was about to be, committed. If the arresting officers testimonies are to be believed,
appellants were merely helping each other carry a carton box. Although appellant Tudtud did appear "afraid and
perspiring," 104 "pale" 105 and "trembling," 106 this was only after, not before, he was asked to open the said box.

In no sense can the knowledge of the herein arresting officers that appellant Tudtud was in possession of marijuana
be described as "personal," having learned the same only from their informant Solier. Solier, for his part, testified that
he obtained his information only from his neighbors and the friends of appellant Tudtud. In other words, Soliers
information itself is hearsay. He did not even elaborate on how his neighbors or Tudtuds friends acquired their
information that Tudtud was responsible for the proliferation of drugs in their neighborhood.

5. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. ROLANDO S. DELOS REYES, ALIAS "BOTONG,"
AND RAYMUNDO G. REYES, ALIAS "MAC-MAC," ACCUSED-APPELLANTS. (K)
Doctrine: For warrantless arrests to be valid, personal knowledge of the apprehending officer is essential.

Facts: A confidential informant informed the police that a narcotics drug deal to commence at the vicinity of the
parking area of Shangrila Plaza Hotel, Mandaluyong City. The police then strategically positioned themselves at the
vicinity parking area of said hotel and about 10:00 p.m., accused/respondent Reyes a.k.a. Mac-Mac, on board a white
Toyota Corolla, and accused/respondent [Rolando] delos Reyes, a.k.a. "Botong," on board a red Toyota Corolla,
arrived with accused/respondent Reyes subsequently proceeding inside Whistletop Bar and Restaurant, and
accused/respondent [Rolando] delos Reyes calling accused/respondent [Emmanuel] de Claro through his cellular
phone. De claro parked his Mazda and from the parked car, a box in transparent plastic bag was taken, which
accused/respondent de Claro handed-over to accused/respondent delos Reyes; accused/respondent delos Reyes in
turn handed the box in a plastic bag to accused/respondent Reyes. Thereafter, the arresting officers accosted the
accused/respondents who according to the arresting officers admitted having in their possession illegal drugs; that the
recovered items containing ten (10) pcs. of heat sealed transparent plastic bags of white crystalline substance with a
total weight of 980.9 grams turned positive to the test for methylamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu, a regulated
drug.

Issue: Was the arrest of the accused valid?

Ruling: No. Where the arresting officers had no prior knowledge of the suspects identities, and they completely relied
on their confidential informant to actually identify the suspects, the circumstances that said officers arrested the
accused and searched their persons without a warrant after seeing the accused and some other persons momentarily
conversing in a restaurant, and later witnessing a white plastic bag with a box or carton inside being passed to the
accused, hardly constitute overt acts indicative of a felonious enterprise.

Evident from the foregoing excerpts that the police officers arrested accused-appellants and searched the latters
persons without a warrant after seeing Rolando delos Reyes and Emmanuel de Claro momentarily conversing in the
restaurant, and witnessing the white plastic bag with a box or carton inside being passed from Lantion-Tom to
Emmanuel de Claro, to accused-appellant Rolando delos Reyes, and finally, to accused-appellant Reyes. These
circumstances, however, hardly constitute overt acts indicative of a felonious enterprise. SPO1 Lectura, PO3
Santiago, and PO3 Yumul had no prior knowledge of the suspects identities, and they completely relied on their
confidential informant to actually identify the suspects. None of the police officers actually saw what was inside that
box. There is also no evidence that the confidential informant himself knew that the box contained shabu. No effort at
all was taken to confirm that the arrested suspects actually knew that the box or carton inside the white plastic bag,
seized from their possession, contained shabu. The police officers were unable to establish a cogent fact or
circumstance that would have reasonably invited their attention, as officers of the law, to suspect that accused-
appellants, Emmanuel de Claro, and Lantion-Tom has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to
commit a crime, particularly, an illegal drug deal.

6. HADJI IBRAHIM SOLAY PANGANDAMAN, , Petitioners, v. DIMAPORO T. CASAR, AS MUNICIPAL CIRCUIT

TRIAL JUDGE OF POONABAYABAO, Respondents (K)

Doctrine: For warrants of arrest to be valid, it must particularly describe the person to be seized.

Facts: A shooting incident occurred in Pantao, Masiu, Lanao del Sur, which left at least five persons dead and two
others wounded. What in fact transpired is still unclear. According to one version, armed men had attacked a
residence in Pantao, Masiu, with both attackers and defenders suffering casualties. Another version has it that a
group that was on its way to another place, Lalabuan, also in Masiu, had been ambushed. Thereafter, a fiscal filed the
complaint to the Judge whp approved the complaint and issued the corresponding warrant of arrest against the
fourteen (14) petitioners (who were named by the witnesses) and fifty (50) "John Does."
On the following day, Atty. Mangurun Batuampar, claiming to represent the widow of one of the victims, filed a letter-
complaint with the Provincial Fiscal at Marawi City, asking for a "full blast preliminary investigation" of the incident.

Issue: Is the issuance of the warrant of arrest against fifty "John Does" valid?

Ruling: No. Insofar, however, as said warrant is issued against fifty (50) "John Does" not one of whom the witnesses
to the complaint could or would identify, it is of the nature of a general warrant, one of a class of writs long proscribed
as unconstitutional and once anathematized as "totally subversive of the liberty of the subject." Clearly violative of the
constitutional injunction that warrants of arrest should particularly describe the person or persons to be seized, the
warrant must, as regards its unidentified subjects, be voided.

7. People vs. Albior, 163 SCRA 332, No. L-75034 June 30, 1988 (K)

Doctrine: The rights of a person under custodial investigation include the right to be assisted by a counsel.

Facts: Accused are charged with the crime of robbery with homicide with rape. Agent Teofilo Jamela of the CIS
Investigation Section testified that he was ordered to investigate the crime. When he investigated the scene of the
crime, he found the room of the victim disarranged. One of the glass windows of the room was detached from its
frame and must have been used by the assailant as entry to the room. He also found under the victim's bed the
wooden baluster which was used in bludgeoning the victim. He further testified that he took the statements of the
accused Manalangsang, Albior and Vasquez after their arrest, wherein Manalangsang and Albior, after having been
appraised of their constitutional rights, admitted that they served as lookouts while Bernardo Reyes entered the
victim's room Vasquez stated that in a drinking spree at the house of one Rogelio Ferrer on the afternoon of May 30,
1984 Manalangsang and Reyes related to him that earlier that day they robbed the house of the victim and, in the
course of the robbery, Reyes raped and killed the victim.Furthermore, Lt. Gracito Barangan of the CIS testified that he
and his team went to the house of accused Vasquez at Fema Road, Quezon City, on June 7, 1984 where they
"confronted" accused Manalangsang, Albior and Vasquez and "invited" them to the CIS headquarters for questioning.
Bernardo Reyes was able to elude the CIS team. For his defense, accused-appellant Albior testified that at the time of
the commission of the crime, he was at the house of his cousin in Baesa, Quezon City and that he had nothing to do
with the crime. He said that he did not understand Tagalog, the dialect in which the extra-judicial confession was
written, being a Cebuano, and that he only signed it because he was told that if he did he would be released.
Accused-appellant Albior assailed the legality of his arrest and the admissibility of his confession.

Issue: Is Albior's confession upon his arrest admissible as evidence?

Ruling: No. With regard to Albior's sworn statement, the Court finds obvious defects that would render it inadmissible
in evidence. In the case of People v. Galit [G.R. No. L-51770, March 20, 1985, 135 SCRA 465], the Court, quoting
from Morales, Jr. v. Enrile [G.R. No. 61016, April 26, 1983, 121 SCRA 538], said:

At the time a person is arrested, it shall be the duty of the arresting officer to inform him of the reason for the arrest
and he must be shown the warrant of arrest, if any. He shall be informed of his constitutional rights to remain silent
and to counsel, and that any statement he might make could be used against him. The person arrested shall have the
right to communicate with his lawyer, a relative, or anyone he chooses by the most expedient means by telephone
if possible or by letter or messenger. It shall be the responsibility of the arresting officer to see to it that this is
accomplished. No custodial investigation shall be conducted unless it be in the presence of counsel engaged by the
person arrested, by any person on his behalf, or appointed by the court upon petition either of the detainee himself of
by anyone on his behalf. The right to counsel stay be waived but the waiver shall not be valid unless made with the
assistance of counsel. Any statement obtained in violation of the procedure herein laid down, whether exculpatory or
inculpatory, in whole or in part, shall be inadmissible in evidence.
Note that the Court said that since the issue of the legality of his arrest was never raised in the proceedings before the
trial court, it cannot be considered and passed upon on appeal. So only the prior issue, among others, was resolved.

8. JOSE ANTONIO C. LEVISTE, PETITIONER, VS. HON. ELMO M. ALAMEDA, HON. RAUL M. GONZALEZ, HON.
EMMANUEL Y. VELASCO, HEIRS OF THE LATE RAFAEL DE LAS ALAS, RESPONDENTS. (K)

Doctrine: An executive and judicial determination of existence of probable cause are distinct from each other. The
executive determination of probable cause is one made during preliminary investigation while the judicial determination of probable
cause is one made by the judge to ascertain whether a warrant of arrest should be issued against the accused.

Facts: Petitioner Leviste was charged with homicide for the death of De Las Alas. The private complainants-heirs of
De las Alas filed, with the conformity of the public prosecutor, an Urgent Omnibus Motion [7] praying, inter alia, for the
deferment of the proceedings to allow the public prosecutor to re-examine the evidence on record or to conduct a
reinvestigation to determine the proper offense.

The RTC thereafter issued the (1) Order of January 24, 2007[8] deferring petitioner's arraignment and allowing the
prosecution to conduct a reinvestigation to determine the proper offense and submit a recommendation within 30 days
from its inception, inter alia; and (2) Order of January 31, 2007[9]denying reconsideration of the first order. Petitioner
assailed these orders via certiorari and prohibition before the Court of Appeals.

Meantime, petitioner filed an Urgent Ex-Parte Manifestation and Motion before the trial court to defer acting on the
public prosecutor's recommendation on the proper offense until after the appellate court resolves his application for
injunctive reliefs, or alternatively, to grant him time to comment on the prosecutor's recommendation and thereafter
set a hearing for the judicial determination of probable cause.

Issue: What is an executive determination of probable cause as compared to the judicial determination of probable
cause?

Ruling: There are two kinds of determination of probable cause: executive and judicial; The executive determination of probable
cause is one made during preliminary investigation; The judicial determination of probable cause is one made by the judge to
ascertain whether a warrant of arrest should be issued against the accused.There are two kinds of determination of probable
cause: executive and judicial. The executive determination of probable cause is one made during preliminary investigation. It is a
function that properly pertains to the public prosecutor who is given a broad discretion to determine whether probable cause exists
and to charge those whom he believes to have committed the crime as defined by law and thus should be held for trial. Otherwise
stated, such official has the quasi-judicial authority to determine whether or not a criminal case must be filed in court. Whether that
function has been correctly discharged by the public prosecutor, i.e., whether he has made a correct ascertainment of the
existence of probable cause in a case, is a matter that the trial court itself does not and may not be compelled to pass upon. The
judicial determination of probable cause is one made by the judge to ascertain whether a warrant of arrest should be issued
against the accused. The judge must satisfy himself that based on the evidence submitted, there is necessity for placing the
accused under custody in order not to frustrate the ends of justice. If the judge finds no probable cause, the judge cannot be forced
to issue the arrest warrant. Paragraph (a), Section 5, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court outlines the procedure to be followed by the
RTC.

9. Ilagan vs. Enrile, 139 SCRA 349, No. L-70748 October 21, 1985 (K)

Doctrine: The Writ of Habeas Corpus no longer available after information is filed and a warrant of arrest issued by the trial court.

FACTS: On May 10, 1985, Attorney Laurente C. Ilagan was arrested in Davao City by elements of the PC-INP and
detained at Camp Catitipan on the basis of a Mission Order allegedly issued by the Ministry of National Defense. On
that same day, fifteen lawyers from the IBP Davao Chapter visited Atty. Ilagan. Thereafter, two other petitioners were
arrested for the same cause.

This petition for habeas corpus was then filed by and on behalf of the three arrested lawyers hereinafter referred to as
the detained attorneys on the ground that their arrests were illegal and violative of the Constitution, since arrests
cannot be made on the basis of Mission Orders. and that there appears to be a military campaign to harass lawyers
involved in national security cases.

On May 16, 1985, the Court issued the Writ, required a Return, and set the petition for hearing on May 23, 1985.
Respondents contend that the lawyers were arrested due to basis of a PDA issued by the President on January 25,
1985 and that the lawyers played active roles in organizing mass actions of the Communist Party of the Philippines
and the National Democratic Front.

Issue: May the petitioners avail of the remedy of the writ of habeas corpus?

Ruling: No. The Writ of Habeas Corpus no longer available after information is filed and a warrant of arrest issued by the trial
court. As contended by respondents, the petition herein has been rendered moot and academic by virtue of the filing of an
Information against them for Rebellion, a capital offense, before the Regional Trial Court of Davao City and the issuance of a
Warrant of Arrest against them. The function of the special proceeding of habeas corpus is to inquire into the legality of one's
detention. Now that the detained attorneys' incarceration is by virtue of a judicial order in relation to criminal cases subsequently
filed against them before the Regional Trial Court of Davao City, the remedy of habeas corpus no longer lies. The Writ had served
its purpose.

10. Go v. CA (K)

Doctrine: The right to have a preliminary investigation conducted before being bound over to trial for a criminal offense and hence
formally at risk of incarceration or some other penalty is not a mere formal or technical right; it is a substantial right.

Facts: Rolito Go while traveling in the wrong direction on a one-way street, nearly bumped Eldon Maguans car. Go alighted from
his car, shot Maguan and left the scene. A security guard at a nearby restaurant was able to take down petitioners car plate
number. The police arrived shortly thereafter at the scene of the shooting. A manhunt ensued.

Six days after, petitioner presented himself before the San Juan Police Station to verify news reports that he was being hunted by
the police; he was accompanied by two (2) lawyers. The police forthwith detained him. An eyewitness to the shooting, who was at
the police station at that time, positively identified petitioner as the gunman.

Petitioner posted bail, the prosecutor filed the case to the lower court, setting and commencing trial without preliminary
investigation. Prosecutor reasons that the petitioner has waived his right to preliminary investigation as bail has been posted and
that such situation, that petitioner has been arrested without a warrant lawfully, falls under Section 5, Rule 113 and Section 7, Rule
112 of The 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure which provides for the rules and procedure pertaining to situations of lawful
warrantless arrests.

Petitioner argues that he was not lawfully arrested without warrant because he went to the police station six (6) days after the
shooting which he had allegedly perpetrated. Thus, petitioner argues, the crime had not been just committed at the time that he
was arrested. Moreover, none of the police officers who arrested him had been an eyewitness to the shooting of Maguan and
accordingly none had the personal knowledge required for the lawfulness of a warrantless arrest. Since there had been no lawful
warrantless arrest, Section 7, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court which establishes the only exception to the right to preliminary
investigation, could not apply in respect of petitioner.

Issue: Is the petitioner still entitled to a preliminary investigation?

Ruling: We consider that petitioner remains entitled to a preliminary investigation although trial on the merits has
already began. Trial on the merits should be suspended or held in abeyance and a preliminary investigation forthwith
accorded to petitioner. It is true that the Prosecutor might, in view of the evidence that he may at this time have on
hand, conclude that probable cause exists; upon the other hand, the Prosecutor conceivably could reach the
conclusion that the evidence on hand does not warrant a finding of probable cause. In any event, the constitutional
point is that petitioner was not accorded what he was entitled to by way of procedural due process. 27 Petitioner was
forced to undergo arraignment and literally pushed to trial without preliminary investigation, with extraordinary haste,
to the applause from the audience that filled the courtroom. If he submitted to arraignment at trial, petitioner did so
"kicking and screaming," in a manner of speaking . During the proceedings held before the trial court on 23 August
1991, the date set for arraignment of petitioner, and just before arraignment, counsel made very clear petitioner's
vigorous protest and objection to the arraignment precisely because of the denial of preliminary investigation. 28 So
energetic and determined were petitioner's counsel's protests and objections that an obviously angered court and
prosecutor dared him to withdraw or walkout, promising to replace him with counsel de oficio. During the trial, before
the prosecution called its first witness, petitioner through counsel once again reiterated his objection to going to trial
without preliminary investigation: petitioner's counsel made of record his "continuing objection." 29 Petitioner had
promptly gone to the appellate court on certiorari and prohibition to challenge the lawfulness of the procedure he was
being forced to undergo and the lawfulness of his detention.30 If he did not walk out on the trial, and if he cross-
examined the prosecution's witnesses, it was because he was extremely loath to be represented by counsel de
oficio selected by the trial judge, and to run the risk of being held to have waived also his right to use what is
frequently the only test of truth in the judicial process.