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Republic of the Philippines SANDIGANBAYAN Quezon City FOURTH DIVISION PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff - versus - CRIM. CASE NO. 28091 For violation of Section 3(g) of RA 3019 HENRY T. GO, Present: Accused. ONG, J: Chairman HERNANDEZ and PONFERRADA, JJ. 18, 2005, i ee 5, 2005, x Promulgated o1 RESOLUTION Hernandez, J.: This resolves the MOTION TO QUASH (“Motion”) filed by accused HENRY 1. GO (“accused-movant”) on April 22, 2005, together with the prosecution's COMMENT/OPPOSITION to the said Motion filed on May 12, 2005. In his Motion, accused-movant prayed for the quashal of the information filed against him in the present case. In support of his prayer, he argued that this Court has no jurisdiction over the present case because he is “neither a public officer nor was capacitated by any special authority as an agent from the government to enter into a Va be contract or transaction on [its] behalf.” He further argued that he cannot be prosecuted under Section 3(g) of Republic Act No. 3019 ("RA 3019”) or The Anti-graft and Corrupt Practices Act independently of the alleged co-conspirator, former Department of Transportation and Communication (’DOTC’) Secretary Arturo Enrile who is already deceased at the time the information was filed. On the other hand, in its Comment/Opposition, the prosecution maintains that this Court has jurisdiction over the present case and over the person of the accused-movant so that the present case should proceed against the latter despite the death of his alleged co-conspirator. To support its position, the prosecution raised the following arguments: First, the prosecution argued that the present case is filed against the accused-movant pursuant to the following paragraph of Section 4 of PD 1606, as amended: In case private individuals are charged as co-principals, accomplices or accessories with the public officers or employees, including those employed in government-owned or controlled corporations, they shalll be tried jointly with said public officers and employees in the proper courts which shall exercise exclusive jurisdiction over them, The prosecution contended that, “as alleged in the Information, then DOTC Secretary Arturo Enrile conspired“ with [the accused- cA Mw movant] in violating Section 3(g), RA 3019. Accordingly, the former and the latter are co-principals of each other. As such, and conformably with the provisions of Section 4, RA 8249, they should be charged and tried jointly before this Honorable Court.” Second, the prosecution argued that “the death of Arturo Enrile before the filing of the information is, therefore, of no moment.” Accused-movant, having acted in conspiracy in committing the offense charged, stands in “equal footing” with the deceased co- conspirator. This being so, according to the prosecution, “the judicial body that should try and decide the case of Arturo Enrile if he was [sic] alive, which is this Honorable Court, should also be the court that should hear and decide the case of [accused-movant].” Third, the prosecution argued that the death of one of the respondents, who is found to be probably guilty of committing an offense but who is not yet charged in court, should not affect the jurisdiction of a court over the other respondents who are still living, To maintain otherwise, according to the prosecution, would make the jurisdiction of a court not “entirely based on statutes defining its jurisdiction but also on extrinsic matters” such as death of one of the Ge ae offenders. Fourth and last, the prosecution cited the following paragraph of Section 4 of PD 1606, as amended: "Sec. 4. Jurisdiction. — The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving: ‘a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, other known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Coce, where one or more of the accused are officials occupying the following positions in the government, whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of the commission of the offense: xxx (underscoring supplied by the prosecution) The prosecution argued that the word “accused” in the above- quoted provision should be interpreted to mean those “persons who, after preliminary investigation, are found to be probably guilty of committing an offense and not necessarily limited to those already formally charged in court.” To interpret the word “accused” as referring to those persons against whom an information has already been filed in court would, according to the prosecution, violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution. This is because there would then be an “unreasonable classification” between, on the one hand, private individuals charged before this Court of having conspired with public officers who are living and, on the other hand, private individuals charged before Regional Trial Courts or Municipal Trial Courts of having conspired with public officers who are already deceased at the time the information is filed. ae The Issue The sole issue to be resolved in this incident is - Whether or not this Court has jurisdiction over the accused-movant, a private individual, charged in conspiracy with a public officer who is already deceased at the time the information is filed? Disposition in life, as in law, it is always best to abide by the fundamental principles that govern things. One of the essential requisites of a valid court proceeding is that the court hearing the case must have jurisdiction over its subject matter. It is a fundamental rule that, if the court is acting without jurisdiction, then any and alll proceedings held are null and void.' Jurisdiction is the right to act on a case or the power and authority to hear and determine a cause? Criminal jurisdiction, in particular, is the authority to hear and try an offense and impose the corresponding punishment for it? 1 Dela Cruz vs. Moya, 160 SCRA 838 (1988) 2 Conchada vs. Director of Prisons, 31 Phil. 94, 102 (1915); Herrera vs. Barretto, 25 Phil. 245, 251 (1913), } People vs. Mariano, 71 SCRA 600 (1976); citing Moran, Rules of Coprl, 1970 Ed., Vol. 1, p. 36 y: Ww Jurisdiction is a question of law.‘ As consistently ruled by the Supreme Court, jurisdiction over the subject matter is vested by law 5 And since it is “a matter of substantive law, the established rule is that the statute in force at the time of the commencement of the action determines the jurisdiction of the court.” Similarly, in People vs. Lagon, et al,’ the Supreme Court held that the subject_matter jurisdiction of a court in criminal law matters is properly measured by the law in effect at the time of the commencement of a criminal action, rather than by the law in effect at the time of the commission of the offense charged. The question then is - When is a criminal action commenced? A criminal action is one by which the State prosecutes a person for an act or omission punishable by law. Clearly then, only when the complaint or information is filed in court can it be said that a criminal prosecution is commenced, and continues when the court “Gala vs. Cui, 25 Phil 522, 527 (1913). 5 Dela Cruz vs. Moya, Supra, Lee vs. Presiding Judge, Municipal Trial Court of Legazpi City, 229 Phil. 405, 413 (1986); Tolentino vs. Social Security Commission, 138 SCRA 428, 434 (1985); Bacalso vs, Ramolete, 128 Phil. 559, 553 (1967); De Jesus vs. Garcia, 125 Phil 955, 959 (1967) &Cang vs. CA, 357 Phil. 129 (1998); See Republic vs. CA, 205 SCRA 356, 362 (1992); Aguizap vs Basilio, 129 Phil. 712, 715 (1967); Rilloraza vs. Arciaga, 128 Phil. 799, 803 (1967); People vs Pegarum, 58 Phil 715, 717 (1933). 7 People vs. Lagon, et al, GR. No, 45815, May 18, 1990; also citing the cases of People vs. Pegarum, 58 Phil 715 (1953); People vs. Romualdo, 90 Phil. 739 (1952); People vs. Pecson, 92 Phil 172 (1952); Lee vs. Presiding Judge, 145 SCRA 408 (1986); Dela Cruz ys. Moya, Supra ® Section 3(b), Rule 1 of the Rules of Court 7 eh 6 acquires jurisdiction over the person of the accused, that is when he surrenders or files bail; he is then arraigned, proceeds to the trial and ends to either his acquittal or conviction.? In the case of People vs. Mariano,!° the Supreme Court made a categorical ruling, thus: In People vs. Fontanilla, [23 SCRA 1227 (1968)] this Court, speaking through then Justice now Chief Justice Fred Ruiz Castro, categorically reiterated the settled rule that the jurisdiction of a court is determined by the statute in force at the time of the commencement of the action. In the case at bar, it is rightly contended by the Solicitor General that at the time Criminal Case No. SM-649 was filed, with the Court of First Instance of Bulacan, that was December 18, 1974, the law in force vesting jurisdiction upon said court was the Judiciary Act of 1948, the particular provision of which was not affected one way or the other by any Presidential issuances under Martial Law. Xxx (emphasis supplied) The above ruling was reiterated in the more recent cases of People vs. Lagon, et alt and Dela Cruz vs. Moya? where the commencement of the criminal action was both reckoned from the time of filing of the informations before the proper courts. Also, in the later case of Uy vs. Sandiganbayan, the Supreme Court again upheld the basic principle that the statute in force at the time of the filing of the informations determines the jurisdiction of this Court. ° Ruben E, Agpalo, Handbook on Criminal Procedure (Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure Effective December 1, 2000), 2001 Edition, p. 23. 0 Supra 4 Supra. 2 Supra 312 SCRA 77 (1999), Pak acti Turning now to the present case, the records show that the information was filed on February 10, 2005. At the time the present case was commenced, the statute that determines the jurisdiction of this Court is Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 1606 (“PD 1606”), as amended by Republic Act No. 8249 (“RA 8249”) which took effect on February 23, 1997. Section 4 of PD 1606, as amended, provides that: "Sec. 4. Jurisdiction. — The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving: ‘a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, other known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code, where one or more of the accused are officials ‘occupying the following positions in the government, whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of the commission of the offense: "(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and higher, otherwise classified as Grade '27' and higher, of the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 989 (Republic Act No. 6758), specifically including XXX XK XK "(2) Members of Congress and officials thereof classified as Grade '27' and up under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989; "@) Members of the judiciary without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution; "(@) Chairmen and members of Constitutional Commission, without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution; and ") All other national and local officials classified as Grade '27' and higher under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989 "b. Other offenses of felonies whether simple or complexed with other crimes committed by the public officials and employees mentioned in subsection a of this section in relation to their office "ec, Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and in connection with Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, issued in 1986. Gh "In cases where none of the accused are occupying positions corresponding to Salary Grade '27' or higher, as prescribed in the said Republic Act No. 6758, or military and PNP officer mentioned above, exclusive original jurisdiction thereof shall be vested in the proper regional [trial] court, metropolitan trial court, municipal trial court, and municipal circuit trial court, as the case may be, pursuant to their respective jurisdictions as provided in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended. "The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive appellate jurisdiction over final judgments, resolutions or order of regional trial courts whether in the exercise of their own original jurisdiction or of their appellate jurisdiction as herein provided. "The Sandiganbayan shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over petitions for the issuance of the writs of mandamus, prohibition, certiorari, habeas corpus, injunctions, and other ancillary writs and processes in aid of its appellate jurisdiction and over petitions of similar nature, including quo warranto, arising or that may arise in cases filed or which may be filed under Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, issued in 1986: Provided, That the jurisdiction over these petitions shall not be exclusive of the Supreme Court. "The procedure prescribed in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as well as the implementing rules that the Supreme Court has promulgated and may thereafter promulgate, relative to appeals/ petitions for review to the Court of Appeals, shall apply to appeals and petitions for review filed with the Sandiganbayan. In all cases elevated to the Sandiganbayan and from the Sandiganbayan to the Supreme Court, the Office of the Ombudsman, through its special prosecutor, shall represent the People of the Philippines, except in cases filed pursuant to Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, issued in 1986. "In case private individuals are charged as co-principals, accomplices or accessories with the public officers or employees, including those employed in government-owned or controlled corporations, they shall be tried jointly with said public officers and employees in the proper courts which shall exercise exclusive jurisdiction over them XXX XX XXX, Interpreting this provision in Uy vs. Sandiganbayan,4 the Supreme Court held that the nature of the offense and the public M Supra y pe position occupied by the accused are conditions sine qua non before this Court can validly take cognizance of a case. The Supreme Court laid out in Lacson vs. Executive Secretary, et al,5 and subsequently in Geduspan, et al. vs. People, et al,,'6 the requisites that must concur in order that the jurisdiction over a particular case may properly be vested with this Court. It ruled that: A perusal of the aforequoted Section 4 of R.A. 8249 reveals that to fall under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, the following requisites must concur: (1) the offense committed is a violation of (a) R.A. 3019, as amended (the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act), (b) R.A. 1379 (the law on ill-gotten wealth), (c) Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book Il of the Revised Penal Code (the law on bribery), (d) Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, issued in 1986 (sequestration cases), or (¢) other offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with other crimes; (2) the offender committing the offenses in items (a), (¥), (¢) and (e) is a public official or employee holding any of the positions enumerated in paragraph a of section 4; and (3) the offense committed is in relation to the office, (emphasis supplied) Alll the above three (3) requisites should then be present and concur at the time the information was filed before this Court, such filing being, the time when the criminal action is commenced. This is consistent with the position that the subject matter jurisdiction of a court in criminal law matters is properly measured by the law in effect at the time of the commencement of a criminal action. 15301 SCRA 298 (1999). WG No. 158187, February 11, 2005. Y oo we p/ There is no dispute that the first requisite is present in this case because the information contains sufficient allegations constituting the proscribed act in Section 3(g) of Republic Act No. 3019. The second requisite, however, is not satisfied as the accused- movant is not a public official or employee holding any of the positions enumerated in Section 4(a) of PD 1606, as amended. The information alleges that accused-movant is the Chairman and President of PIATCO, the private contracting party to the alleged manifestly and grossly disadvantageous contract; he is then a private individual. In Barriga vs. The Honorable Sandiganbayan (4* Division),!? and also citing Inding vs. Sandiganbayan,® the Supreme Court pronounced that this Court “has original jurisdiction over crimes and felonies committed by public officers and employees, at least one of whom belongs to any of the five categories” enumerated in Section 4(a) of PD 1606, as amended. The prosecution, however, tries to convince this Court that the present case is filed against accused-movant pursuant to the following paragraph of Section 4 of PD 1606, as amended: In case private individuals are charged as co-principals, accomplices or accessories with the public officers or employees, GR. No, 161784-86, Apri 18 GR. No, 143047, 14 July 2004, 434 SCRA 388, Vv & pf including those employed in government-owned or controlled corporations, they shall be tried jointly with said public officers and employees in the proper courts which shall exercise exclusive jurisdiction over them. The prosecution further argues that, “as alleged in the Information, then DOTC Secretary Arturo Enrile conspired with [accused-movant] in violating Section 3(g), RA 3019. Accordingly, the former and the latter are co-principals of each other. As such, and conformably with the provisions of Section 4, RA 8249, they should be charged and tried jointly before this Honorable Court.” We are not convinced. At the time the present criminal action was commenced by the filing of the information, this Court had no jurisdiction over the accused-movant, and continues to be so up to the present. The prosecution's interpretation of the above-quoted paragraph is patently erroneous. There is an important condition sine qua non before said paragraph comes into operation, a condition expressly stated in the law itself, that is - “the private individuals are charged as co-principals, accomplices or accessories with the public officers or employees, including those employed in government-owned or controlled corporations.” 12 jw yY In the present case, the prosecution had prior knowledge of the death of the alleged co-conspirator, former DOTC Secretary Enrile, even before it filed the information before this Court on February 10, 2005. The information, in fact, states that he is already deceased. The prosecution is obviously under the wrong impression that such death is inconsequential in the filing of the information in the present case. Itis a big blunder on its part, and it is fatal. Again, two fundamental legal principles come to mind. First, it is settled that the death of a person produces the total extinction of his criminal liability."? From the precise moment a person breathed his last, his criminal liability, which is personal to him only, is totally extinguished. It is buried with him in his grave. Second, the law provides that juridical capacity, which is the fitness to be the subject of legal relations, is inherent in every natural person and is lost through his death.” Applying these fundamental principles, a deceased person cannot then be validly charged in an information. To do so, like in the present case, is not only an exercise in futility, but also an exercise in absurdity because it runs counter to the purpose of a criminal prosecution - that is, to hear and try an alleged crime and impose the ® article 89, paragraph (1) of the Revised Penal Code. / Article 37 of the New Civil Code. Y ra ie corresponding, penalty upon the offender if he is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt. As the alleged co-conspirator, former DOTC Secretary Enrile, no longer had the “fitness to be the subject of legal relations” at the time the information was filed because of his death, in legal contemplation, it is as if the accused-movant is the only accused charged in the present case, which is not allowed. The contention that the quashal of the information against the accused-movant would violate the Equal Protection Clause is misplaced because it prescinds from the prosecution’s flawed assumptions regarding the jurisdiction of this Court and when such jurisdiction attaches This is not to say, however, that the accused is already free from the offense charged against him. His guilt or innocence should be determined in the proper forum. ACCORDINGLY, accused-movant’s MOTION TO QUASH is granted and this case is DISMISSED for lack of jurisdiction. ne a SO ORDERED. Quezon City, Metro Manila, Philippines. jo u herd Associate Justice WE CONCUR: GREGORY 8. ONG ROD@LFO A. PONFERRADA Associate Justice Associate Justice Chairman

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