Republic of the Philippines
SANDIGANBAYAN
Quezon City
FOURTH DIVISION
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Plaintiff
- versus - CRIM. CASE NO. 28091
For violation of Section
3(g) of RA 3019
HENRY T. GO, Present:
Accused. ONG, J: Chairman
HERNANDEZ and
PONFERRADA, JJ.
18, 2005,
i ee 5, 2005,
x
Promulgated o1
RESOLUTION
Hernandez, J.:
This resolves the MOTION TO QUASH (“Motion”) filed by
accused HENRY 1. GO (“accused-movant”) on April 22, 2005,
together with the prosecution's COMMENT/OPPOSITION to the
said Motion filed on May 12, 2005.
In his Motion, accused-movant prayed for the quashal of the
information filed against him in the present case. In support of his
prayer, he argued that this Court has no jurisdiction over the present
case because he is “neither a public officer nor was capacitated by
any special authority as an agent from the government to enter into a
Va becontract or transaction on [its] behalf.” He further argued that he
cannot be prosecuted under Section 3(g) of Republic Act No. 3019
("RA 3019”) or The Anti-graft and Corrupt Practices Act independently
of the alleged co-conspirator, former Department of Transportation
and Communication (’DOTC’) Secretary Arturo Enrile who is
already deceased at the time the information was filed.
On the other hand, in its Comment/Opposition, the
prosecution maintains that this Court has jurisdiction over the
present case and over the person of the accused-movant so that the
present case should proceed against the latter despite the death of his
alleged co-conspirator. To support its position, the prosecution raised
the following arguments:
First, the prosecution argued that the present case is filed
against the accused-movant pursuant to the following paragraph of
Section 4 of PD 1606, as amended:
In case private individuals are charged as co-principals,
accomplices or accessories with the public officers or employees,
including those employed in government-owned or controlled
corporations, they shalll be tried jointly with said public officers and
employees in the proper courts which shall exercise exclusive
jurisdiction over them,
The prosecution contended that, “as alleged in the Information,
then DOTC Secretary Arturo Enrile conspired“ with [the accused-
cA Mwmovant] in violating Section 3(g), RA 3019. Accordingly, the former
and the latter are co-principals of each other. As such, and
conformably with the provisions of Section 4, RA 8249, they should
be charged and tried jointly before this Honorable Court.”
Second, the prosecution argued that “the death of Arturo Enrile
before the filing of the information is, therefore, of no moment.”
Accused-movant, having acted in conspiracy in committing the
offense charged, stands in “equal footing” with the deceased co-
conspirator. This being so, according to the prosecution, “the judicial
body that should try and decide the case of Arturo Enrile if he was
[sic] alive, which is this Honorable Court, should also be the court
that should hear and decide the case of [accused-movant].”
Third, the prosecution argued that the death of one of the
respondents, who is found to be probably guilty of committing an
offense but who is not yet charged in court, should not affect the
jurisdiction of a court over the other respondents who are still living,
To maintain otherwise, according to the prosecution, would make the
jurisdiction of a court not “entirely based on statutes defining its
jurisdiction but also on extrinsic matters” such as death of one of the
Ge ae
offenders.Fourth and last, the prosecution cited the following paragraph of
Section 4 of PD 1606, as amended:
"Sec. 4. Jurisdiction. — The Sandiganbayan shall exercise
exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving:
‘a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended,
other known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic
Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the
Revised Penal Coce, where one or more of the accused are officials
occupying the following positions in the government, whether in a
permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of the
commission of the offense: xxx (underscoring supplied by
the prosecution)
The prosecution argued that the word “accused” in the above-
quoted provision should be interpreted to mean those “persons who,
after preliminary investigation, are found to be probably guilty of
committing an offense and not necessarily limited to those already
formally charged in court.” To interpret the word “accused” as
referring to those persons against whom an information has already
been filed in court would, according to the prosecution, violate the
Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution. This is because there
would then be an “unreasonable classification” between, on the one
hand, private individuals charged before this Court of having
conspired with public officers who are living and, on the other hand,
private individuals charged before Regional Trial Courts or
Municipal Trial Courts of having conspired with public officers who
are already deceased at the time the information is filed.
aeThe Issue
The sole issue to be resolved in this incident is - Whether or not
this Court has jurisdiction over the accused-movant, a private
individual, charged in conspiracy with a public officer who is already
deceased at the time the information is filed?
Disposition
in life, as in law, it is always best to abide by the fundamental
principles that govern things.
One of the essential requisites of a valid court proceeding is
that the court hearing the case must have jurisdiction over its subject
matter. It is a fundamental rule that, if the court is acting without
jurisdiction, then any and alll proceedings held are null and void.'
Jurisdiction is the right to act on a case or the power and
authority to hear and determine a cause? Criminal jurisdiction, in
particular, is the authority to hear and try an offense and impose the
corresponding punishment for it?
1 Dela Cruz vs. Moya, 160 SCRA 838 (1988)
2 Conchada vs. Director of Prisons, 31 Phil. 94, 102 (1915); Herrera vs. Barretto, 25 Phil. 245, 251
(1913),
} People vs. Mariano, 71 SCRA 600 (1976); citing Moran, Rules of Coprl, 1970 Ed., Vol. 1, p. 36
y: WwJurisdiction is a question of law.‘ As consistently ruled by the
Supreme Court, jurisdiction over the subject matter is vested by law 5
And since it is “a matter of substantive law, the established rule is
that the statute in force at the time of the commencement of the action
determines the jurisdiction of the court.” Similarly, in People vs.
Lagon, et al,’ the Supreme Court held that the subject_matter
jurisdiction of a court in criminal law matters is properly measured
by the law in effect at the time of the commencement of a criminal
action, rather than by the law in effect at the time of the commission of
the offense charged.
The question then is - When is a criminal action commenced?
A criminal action is one by which the State prosecutes a person
for an act or omission punishable by law. Clearly then, only when
the complaint or information is filed in court can it be said that a
criminal prosecution is commenced, and continues when the court
“Gala vs. Cui, 25 Phil 522, 527 (1913).
5 Dela Cruz vs. Moya, Supra, Lee vs. Presiding Judge, Municipal Trial Court of Legazpi City, 229
Phil. 405, 413 (1986); Tolentino vs. Social Security Commission, 138 SCRA 428, 434 (1985); Bacalso
vs, Ramolete, 128 Phil. 559, 553 (1967); De Jesus vs. Garcia, 125 Phil 955, 959 (1967)
&Cang vs. CA, 357 Phil. 129 (1998); See Republic vs. CA, 205 SCRA 356, 362 (1992); Aguizap vs
Basilio, 129 Phil. 712, 715 (1967); Rilloraza vs. Arciaga, 128 Phil. 799, 803 (1967); People vs
Pegarum, 58 Phil 715, 717 (1933).
7 People vs. Lagon, et al, GR. No, 45815, May 18, 1990; also citing the cases of People vs.
Pegarum, 58 Phil 715 (1953); People vs. Romualdo, 90 Phil. 739 (1952); People vs. Pecson, 92 Phil
172 (1952); Lee vs. Presiding Judge, 145 SCRA 408 (1986); Dela Cruz ys. Moya, Supra
® Section 3(b), Rule 1 of the Rules of Court 7
eh 6acquires jurisdiction over the person of the accused, that is when he
surrenders or files bail; he is then arraigned, proceeds to the trial and
ends to either his acquittal or conviction.?
In the case of People vs. Mariano,!° the Supreme Court made a
categorical ruling, thus:
In People vs. Fontanilla, [23 SCRA 1227 (1968)] this Court,
speaking through then Justice now Chief Justice Fred Ruiz Castro,
categorically reiterated the settled rule that the jurisdiction of a
court is determined by the statute in force at the time of the
commencement of the action. In the case at bar, it is rightly
contended by the Solicitor General that at the time Criminal Case
No. SM-649 was filed, with the Court of First Instance of Bulacan,
that was December 18, 1974, the law in force vesting jurisdiction
upon said court was the Judiciary Act of 1948, the particular
provision of which was not affected one way or the other by any
Presidential issuances under Martial Law. Xxx (emphasis supplied)
The above ruling was reiterated in the more recent cases of
People vs. Lagon, et alt and Dela Cruz vs. Moya? where the
commencement of the criminal action was both reckoned from the
time of filing of the informations before the proper courts. Also, in
the later case of Uy vs. Sandiganbayan, the Supreme Court again
upheld the basic principle that the statute in force at the time of the
filing of the informations determines the jurisdiction of this Court.
° Ruben E, Agpalo, Handbook on Criminal Procedure (Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure
Effective December 1, 2000), 2001 Edition, p. 23.
0 Supra
4 Supra.
2 Supra
312 SCRA 77 (1999),
Pak actiTurning now to the present case, the records show that the
information was filed on February 10, 2005. At the time the present
case was commenced, the statute that determines the jurisdiction of
this Court is Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 1606 (“PD 1606”), as
amended by Republic Act No. 8249 (“RA 8249”) which took effect on
February 23, 1997. Section 4 of PD 1606, as amended, provides that:
"Sec. 4. Jurisdiction. — The Sandiganbayan shall exercise
exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving:
‘a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended,
other known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic
Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the
Revised Penal Code, where one or more of the accused are officials
‘occupying the following positions in the government, whether in a
permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of the
commission of the offense:
"(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the
positions of regional director and higher, otherwise classified as
Grade '27' and higher, of the Compensation and Position
Classification Act of 989 (Republic Act No. 6758), specifically
including
XXX XK XK
"(2) Members of Congress and officials thereof classified
as Grade '27' and up under the Compensation and Position
Classification Act of 1989;
"@) Members of the judiciary without prejudice to the
provisions of the Constitution;
"(@) Chairmen and members of Constitutional
Commission, without prejudice to the provisions of the
Constitution; and
") All other national and local officials classified as
Grade '27' and higher under the Compensation and Position
Classification Act of 1989
"b. Other offenses of felonies whether simple or
complexed with other crimes committed by the public officials and
employees mentioned in subsection a of this section in relation to
their office
"ec, Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and in
connection with Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, issued in
1986.
Gh"In cases where none of the accused are occupying positions
corresponding to Salary Grade '27' or higher, as prescribed in the
said Republic Act No. 6758, or military and PNP officer mentioned
above, exclusive original jurisdiction thereof shall be vested in the
proper regional [trial] court, metropolitan trial court, municipal
trial court, and municipal circuit trial court, as the case may be,
pursuant to their respective jurisdictions as provided in Batas
Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended.
"The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive appellate
jurisdiction over final judgments, resolutions or order of regional
trial courts whether in the exercise of their own original jurisdiction
or of their appellate jurisdiction as herein provided.
"The Sandiganbayan shall have exclusive original
jurisdiction over petitions for the issuance of the writs of
mandamus, prohibition, certiorari, habeas corpus, injunctions, and
other ancillary writs and processes in aid of its appellate
jurisdiction and over petitions of similar nature, including quo
warranto, arising or that may arise in cases filed or which may be
filed under Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, issued in 1986:
Provided, That the jurisdiction over these petitions shall not be
exclusive of the Supreme Court.
"The procedure prescribed in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as
well as the implementing rules that the Supreme Court has
promulgated and may thereafter promulgate, relative to
appeals/ petitions for review to the Court of Appeals, shall apply to
appeals and petitions for review filed with the Sandiganbayan. In
all cases elevated to the Sandiganbayan and from the
Sandiganbayan to the Supreme Court, the Office of the
Ombudsman, through its special prosecutor, shall represent the
People of the Philippines, except in cases filed pursuant to
Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, issued in 1986.
"In case private individuals are charged as co-principals,
accomplices or accessories with the public officers or employees,
including those employed in government-owned or controlled
corporations, they shall be tried jointly with said public officers and
employees in the proper courts which shall exercise exclusive
jurisdiction over them
XXX XX XXX,
Interpreting this provision in Uy vs. Sandiganbayan,4 the
Supreme Court held that the nature of the offense and the public
M Supra
y peposition occupied by the accused are conditions sine qua non before
this Court can validly take cognizance of a case.
The Supreme Court laid out in Lacson vs. Executive Secretary, et
al,5 and subsequently in Geduspan, et al. vs. People, et al,,'6 the
requisites that must concur in order that the jurisdiction over a
particular case may properly be vested with this Court. It ruled that:
A perusal of the aforequoted Section 4 of R.A. 8249 reveals
that to fall under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan,
the following requisites must concur: (1) the offense committed is a
violation of (a) R.A. 3019, as amended (the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act), (b) R.A. 1379 (the law on ill-gotten wealth), (c)
Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book Il of the Revised Penal Code
(the law on bribery), (d) Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A,
issued in 1986 (sequestration cases), or (¢) other offenses or felonies
whether simple or complexed with other crimes; (2) the offender
committing the offenses in items (a), (¥), (¢) and (e) is a public
official or employee holding any of the positions enumerated in
paragraph a of section 4; and (3) the offense committed is in
relation to the office, (emphasis supplied)
Alll the above three (3) requisites should then be present and
concur at the time the information was filed before this Court, such
filing being, the time when the criminal action is commenced. This is
consistent with the position that the subject matter jurisdiction of a
court in criminal law matters is properly measured by the law in
effect at the time of the commencement of a criminal action.
15301 SCRA 298 (1999).
WG No. 158187, February 11, 2005.
Y oo we p/There is no dispute that the first requisite is present in this case
because the information contains sufficient allegations constituting
the proscribed act in Section 3(g) of Republic Act No. 3019.
The second requisite, however, is not satisfied as the accused-
movant is not a public official or employee holding any of the
positions enumerated in Section 4(a) of PD 1606, as amended. The
information alleges that accused-movant is the Chairman and
President of PIATCO, the private contracting party to the alleged
manifestly and grossly disadvantageous contract; he is then a private
individual. In Barriga vs. The Honorable Sandiganbayan (4* Division),!?
and also citing Inding vs. Sandiganbayan,® the Supreme Court
pronounced that this Court “has original jurisdiction over crimes and
felonies committed by public officers and employees, at least one of
whom belongs to any of the five categories” enumerated in Section
4(a) of PD 1606, as amended.
The prosecution, however, tries to convince this Court that the
present case is filed against accused-movant pursuant to the
following paragraph of Section 4 of PD 1606, as amended:
In case private individuals are charged as co-principals,
accomplices or accessories with the public officers or employees,
GR. No, 161784-86, Apri
18 GR. No, 143047, 14 July 2004, 434 SCRA 388,
Vv & pfincluding those employed in government-owned or controlled
corporations, they shall be tried jointly with said public officers and
employees in the proper courts which shall exercise exclusive
jurisdiction over them.
The prosecution further argues that, “as alleged in the
Information, then DOTC Secretary Arturo Enrile conspired with
[accused-movant] in violating Section 3(g), RA 3019. Accordingly, the
former and the latter are co-principals of each other. As such, and
conformably with the provisions of Section 4, RA 8249, they should
be charged and tried jointly before this Honorable Court.”
We are not convinced. At the time the present criminal action was
commenced by the filing of the information, this Court had no jurisdiction
over the accused-movant, and continues to be so up to the present.
The prosecution's interpretation of the above-quoted paragraph
is patently erroneous. There is an important condition sine qua non
before said paragraph comes into operation, a condition expressly
stated in the law itself, that is - “the private individuals are charged
as co-principals, accomplices or accessories with the public officers or
employees, including those employed in government-owned or
controlled corporations.”
12 jw
yYIn the present case, the prosecution had prior knowledge of the
death of the alleged co-conspirator, former DOTC Secretary Enrile,
even before it filed the information before this Court on February 10,
2005. The information, in fact, states that he is already deceased. The
prosecution is obviously under the wrong impression that such death
is inconsequential in the filing of the information in the present case.
Itis a big blunder on its part, and it is fatal.
Again, two fundamental legal principles come to mind. First, it
is settled that the death of a person produces the total extinction of
his criminal liability."? From the precise moment a person breathed
his last, his criminal liability, which is personal to him only, is totally
extinguished. It is buried with him in his grave. Second, the law
provides that juridical capacity, which is the fitness to be the subject
of legal relations, is inherent in every natural person and is lost
through his death.”
Applying these fundamental principles, a deceased person
cannot then be validly charged in an information. To do so, like in the
present case, is not only an exercise in futility, but also an exercise in
absurdity because it runs counter to the purpose of a criminal
prosecution - that is, to hear and try an alleged crime and impose the
® article 89, paragraph (1) of the Revised Penal Code. /
Article 37 of the New Civil Code.
Y ra iecorresponding, penalty upon the offender if he is found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt.
As the alleged co-conspirator, former DOTC Secretary Enrile,
no longer had the “fitness to be the subject of legal relations” at the
time the information was filed because of his death, in legal
contemplation, it is as if the accused-movant is the only accused
charged in the present case, which is not allowed.
The contention that the quashal of the information against the
accused-movant would violate the Equal Protection Clause is
misplaced because it prescinds from the prosecution’s flawed
assumptions regarding the jurisdiction of this Court and when such
jurisdiction attaches
This is not to say, however, that the accused is already free
from the offense charged against him. His guilt or innocence should
be determined in the proper forum.
ACCORDINGLY, accused-movant’s MOTION TO QUASH is
granted and this case is DISMISSED for lack of jurisdiction.
ne aSO ORDERED.
Quezon City, Metro Manila, Philippines.
jo u herd
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
GREGORY 8. ONG ROD@LFO A. PONFERRADA
Associate Justice Associate Justice
Chairman