Polytechnic University of the Philippines

College of Law

Sta. Mesa, City of Manila

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS ON

CHAPTER III: AIDS TO CONSTRUCTION
AND
CHAPTER IV: ADHERENCE TO, OR DEPARTURE FROM, LANGUAGE OF
STATUTE

A Written Report

Submitted by:

Ferrer, Michael
Guarte, Isabel
Louron, Rodel
Torres, Melbert
Pineda, Ma. Clarida D.
Nicolas, Ariel Joseph B.
Cortez, Alyssa
JD 1-2

Submitted to:

Atty. Gary C. Aure

October 17, 2016

 TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER III: AIDS TO CONSTRUCTION ......................................................... 1

A. In General ................................................................................................ 1

B. Legislative History .................................................................................... 4

C. Contemporary Construction ..................................................................... 7

CHAPTER IV: ADHERENCE TO, OR DEPARTURE FROM, LANGUAGE OF

STATUTE ...................................................................................................... 10

A. Literal Interpretation .............................................................................. 10

B. Departure from Literal Interpretation ..................................................... 11

C. Implications ........................................................................................... 15

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 CHAPTER III
AIDS TO CONSTRUCTION

A. In General

Q: What are the aids the court can avail when the meaning of the statute
is ambiguous?

A: The following are the aids that the court can avail when the meaning of
the statute is ambiguous:

(a) Intrinsic aids, which are found in the printed page of the statute itself;
and
(b) Extrinsic aids, which are the extraneous facts and circumstances
outside the printed page.

Q: Can the court avail of the aids to interpretation and construction when
the statute is clear and unambiguous?

A: No. When the text of the statute is clear and free from doubt, it is
improper to resort to the aids to make it obscure. The aids may be resorted to
in order to remove, but not to create, doubt or uncertainty. Hence, these aids
cannot expand nor restrict the operation of a statute that is clear and
unambiguous.

Q: Can the title of a statute serve as an aid in interpretation and

construction in case of ambiguity?

A: Yes. It carries more weight in the jurisdiction because of the

constitutional requirement that every bill shall embrace only one subject
which shall be expressed in the title thereof Article VI, Sec. 26(1). This
constitutional injunction makes the title an indispensable part of a statute and
what may inadequately be omitted in the text may be supplied or remedied by
its title.

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Q: Can the preamble be used as an aid in interpretation and construction
in case of ambiguity?

A: Yes, because it states the purpose, reason or justification for the

enactment of the law which is written immediately after its title and expressed
in the form of Whereas clauses.

Q: In ascertaining the legislative intent, can the court consider only a

specific part of the statute?

A: No. To ascertain legislative intent, the statute must be taken as a whole

and in relation to one another considering the whole context of the statute and
not from an isolated part of the provision. The meaning dictated by the context
of whole text prevails and every section, provision, or clause of the statute must
be expounded by reference to each other in order to arrive at the effect
contemplated by the legislature.

Q: Can the punctuation marks be considered to clear the ambiguity in a

statute?

A: Yes, an ambiguity of a statute which may be partially or wholly solved by

a punctuation mark may be considered in the interpretation or construction of
a statute.

Q: In case of ambiguity, what is the general rule in consulting the

language of a statute officially promulgated in English and Spanish?

A: The general rule is that where a statute is officially promulgated in

English and Spanish, the English text shall govern, but in case of ambiguity,
omission, or mistake, the Spanish may be consulted to explain the English
text, unless otherwise provided.

Q: What is the meaning of what is within the spirit is within the statute
although it is not within the letter thereof, and what is within the letter
but not within the spirit is not within the statute?

A: The spirit, rather than the letter, of a statute determines its construction;
hence a statute must be read according to its spirit or intent. Legislative intent
or spirit is the controlling factor or the leading star and guiding light in the
application and interpretation of a statute. If a statute needs construction, the
influence most dominant in that process is the intent or spirit of the act. A

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thing which is within the intent of the lawmaker is as much within the statute
as if within the letter; and a thing which is within the letter of the statute is not
within the statute unless within the intent of the lawmakers.

Q: If the legislative intent of spirit is not expressed in the statute, is it

within the bounds of judicial power of the court to supply the meaning it
by interpretation?

A: No. The courts cannot by interpretation speculate as to an intent and

supply a meaning not found in the phraseology of the law. They cannot assume
intent in no way expressed and then construe the statute to accomplish the
supposed intention; otherwise they would pass beyond the bounds of judicial
power to usurp legislative power.

Q: Why is it said that the purpose or object of the law or the mischief
intended to be removed or suppressed and the causes which induced the
enactment of the law are important factors to be considered in construing
a statute?

A: In constuing a statute, its prupose is said to be more important than the

rules of grammar and logic in ascertaining its meaning, in which a statute
must be read in such a way as to give effect to the pupose projected in the
statute. For a staute derives its vitality from the purpose for which it is enacted
and to construe it in a manner that disregards or defeats such purpose is to
nullify or destroy the law.

Q: When definitions given by lexicographers are not binding where can the
court consult?

A: Dictionaries, courts may be used as an aid in determining the meaning

to be asssigned to such words.

Q: What consequences of constructions wherein a statute should be

rejected?

A: A statute should be rejected if its consequences are any of the following:

(a) if it will cause injustice or hardhip;

(b) if it results in absurdity;

(c) if it will defeat the legislative intent or spirit of the statute;

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 (d) if it will preclude accomplishment of legislative purpose or object;

(e) if it will render certain words of phrases a surplusage; or

(f) if it will nullify the statute or make any of its provision nugatory.

Q: In construing a statute, where can the court may rely in order to

resolve doubts as to the correct interpretation of a statue?

A: The court may rely, in order to resolve doubts as to the correct

interpretation of a statute.

Q: What are the common presumptions in construing a statue?

A: The following presumptions are:

(a) presumption in favor of constitutionality;

(b) presumption of completeness;

(c) presumption of the statutes prospective operation;

(d) presumption of right and justice;

(e) presumption of the statute being effective, sensib;e, beneficial and

reasonable operation as a whole; and

(f) presumptions against inconsistence and implied repeal, unnecessary

changes in law, impossibility, absurdity, injustice and hardship, inconvenience
and ineffectiveness.

B. Legislative History

Q: What is legislative history of a statute?

A: Legislative history of a statute refers to all the statutes antecedents from

its inception until its enactment into law. It covers the period and the steps
done from the time the bill is introduced until it is finally passed by the
legislature.

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Q: What constitutes Legislative history of a statute?

A: The following constitutes legislative history:

(a) Presidents message;

(b) explanatory note;

(c) committee reports of legislative investigations and public gearings;

(d) sponsorhip speech; and

(e) debates and deliberations.

Q: What is explanatory note?

A: Explanatory note is a short exposition accompanying a proposed
legislation by its author or proponent. It contains statements of the reason or
purpose of the bill as well as arguments by its author in arguing the passage of
the statute.

Q: What is the rule in the construction of a statute in terms of its

amendments in the

legislative history?

A: The general rule in the amendment of the legislative history of the statute
in terms of its changes in phraseology or changes by deletion is to give effect to
the changes in statutory language for it is presumed that the legislative body in
changing the words and phrases does not merely do a semantic exercise. The
said amendments indicate a legislative intent to change the meaning of the
provision from that that it originally had (Commissioner of Customs vs Court of
Tax Appeals; Gloria vs CA).

However, this rule applies only when the deleted words or phrases are
not surplusage and when the intention is clear to change the previous meaning
of the old law. The rule does not apply in the following cases:

(a) when the intent, as shown in the history of the enactment, is clear
that the amendment is precisely to express the construction of the act because
the language is insufficient and
(b) when it is done in the revision and codification of statute wherein
neither alteration in phraseology nor the omission or addition of words of the
latter statute will be held necessarily to alter the construction of the former act.

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Q: What is the rule on the construction of adopted statutes?

A: The general rule is that, where local statutes are patterned after or
copied from those of another country; the decisions in the courts of such
country construing those laws are entitled to great weight in the interpretation
of such local statutes. For instance, if the law is patterned from the USA
statute, then the decision of the Supreme Court of the US has the persuasive
effect in the construction of such adopted statute.

Nevertheless, the exception to the rule is when:

(a) the statute from where the former was patterned differs in some
material aspects;

(b) the foreign construction is clearly erroneous or has not become

settled; and

(c) the adopting state has given the statute its own interpretation.

Q: What is the principle of the common law?

A: The common law is not in force in this country, however, the courts may
properly resort to common law principles in construing doubtful provisions of a
statute, particularly where such statute is modelled upon Anglo-American
precedents. It should be noted that when there is conflict between common law
principles and statutory provisions, latter prevails.

Q: What are the other things to consider in the construction of the

statute in terms of the time of enactment?
A: In the interpretation of statute, the physical conditions of the country
should be considered. The courts should then place itself in the situation of the
legislature and to construe the statute as to give effect to such intent or
meaning.

The court shall examine the state of things existing when the statue was
enacted and interpret in the light of the conditions obtaining. The subjects to
inquiry are the evils intended to be remedied and the good to be accomplished.

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C. Contemporary Construction

Q: What is contemporary construction?

A: Contemporary or PRACTICAL constructions are the constructions placed

upon statutes at the time of, or after their enactment by the executive,
legislature, or judicial authorities as well as by those who, because of their
involvement in the process of legislation, are knowledgeable of the intent and
purpose of the law, such as draftsman and bill sponsor. The principles
embedded in this construction are contemporanea expositio est optima et
fortissima in lege which means that the contemporary construction is
strongest in the law, and Optimus interpres rerum usus which means usage is
the best interpreter of the law.

Contemporary construction includes executive construction which is

commonly understood and usually referred to, as contemporaneous
construction per se. It is the construction by an executive or administrative
office which is the very first to interpret the law, preparatory for its enforcement
(in the form of rules and regulations, circulars, directives, opinions, and
rulings). There are 3 types of Executive interpretation of the law. They are the
following:

(a) construction by Executive or Administrative Officer as expressed

(embodied in circular, directive or regulation) or implied (by usage or practice);
(b) construction by Secretary of Justice (chief legal adviser of the
government) in the form of opinion issued upon request of administrative or
executive officials who enforce the law; and
(c) interpretation handed down in an adversary proceeding in the
forms of a ruling by an executive officer exercising quasi-judicial power.

Generally, where there is doubt as to the proper interpretation of the

statute, the uniform construction placed upon it by the executive or
administrative officer charged with its enforcement will be adopted, if necessary
to resolve a doubt (Nestle Phil Inc v. CA).

Q: Does the executive have the power to interpret its own rules and
regulations?

A: Yes, an administrative agency has the power to interpret its own rules
and such interpretation becomes part of the rules. The principle is that the
interpretation by those charged with the enforcement of laws is entitled to great
weight, especially by the court in its construction of such rules and
regulations.

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Q: Why is contemporaneous construction given much weight?

A: Contemporaneous construction is given much weight because it comes

from the particular branch of government called upon to implement the law
thus construed. The government agency or officials charged with the
implementation of the law are presumed to have familiarized themselves with
all the considerations pertinent to the meaning and purpose of the law, and to
have formed an independent, conscientious and competent expert opinion.

Q: When may the court disregard contemporaneous construction?

A: The court may disregard contemporaneous construction when there is no

ambiguity in the law, when the construction is clearly erroneous, where strong
reason to the contrary exists, or where the court has previously given the
statute a different interpretation. Construction is to be declared null if it is
erroneous.

Q: Can an erroneous contemporaneous construction create rights?

A: An erroneous contemporaneous construction creates no vested right on

the part of those who relied upon, followed, such construction. A vested right
may not arise from wrong interpretation of a law by an administrative or
executive officer whose primary duty is to is to enforce, and not to construe,
the law.

Q: Does the legislative have the power to interpret its enactments?

A: Although it is the province and duty of the judiciary to interpret laws, the
legislature is not limited or restricted from indicating its construction of a
statute it enacts into law. The legislature may indicate how its provisions
should be construed through a declaratory clause.

Q: How is a contemporaneous construction approved?

A: The legislative may approve or ratify a contemporaneous construction by

action or inaction. The legislature may expressly confirm a contemporaneous
construction in a provision. The legislatures silence, however, is an implied
consent to continue with the ratification.

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Q: What is the principle of legislative approval of administrative
interpretation by reenactment?

A: The reenactment of a statute, previously given a contemporaneous

construction, is persuasive indication of the adoption by the legislature of the
prior construction. It means that the reenactment of a statute substantially
unchanged is persuasive indication of the adoption of a prior executive
construction by the Congress.

Q: What is the Stare Decisis Doctrine?

A: The Stare Decisis Doctrine is based on the principle of the adherence to

judicial precedents. Once a question of law has been examined and decided, it
should be deemed settled and closed to further argument in order to have
stability in the law.

Q: Is the application of the Stare Decisis Doctrine absolute?

A: No, it does not apply when there is a conflict between the precedent and
the law. The Supreme Court can change or abandon a precedent enunciated by
it; however, it cannot be done by lower courts. Hence, inferior courts can state
opinions only but must decide in a case in accordance with the doctrine.

Q: What are the two ways of applying the stare decisis doctrine?

A: The stare decisis Doctrine is applied in two ways: horizontally and

vertically. The doctrine is applied vertically whenever inferior courts are to
decide on cases based on Supreme Court decisions on the condition that there
are similar circumstances on both cases. On the other hand, the doctrine is
applied horizontally whenever a court decides on a case based on a decision
made by a court of the same degree on the condition that there are similar
circumstances on both cases.

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 CHAPTER IV
ADHERENCE TO, OR DEPARTURE FROM, LANGUAGE OF STATUTE

A. Literal Interpretation

Q: What is the meaning of verba legis?

A: If a statute is clear, plain and free from ambiguity, it must be given its
literal meaning and applied without attempted interpretation.

Q: What is the meaning of verba legis non est recedendum?

A: It means that from the words of a statute, there should be no departure.

Therefore, what is not clearly provided in the law cannot be extended to those
matters outside its scope. To depart from the meaning expressed by the words
is to alter the statute, to legislate and not interpret

Q: What is the meaning of dura lex sed lex?

A: It means that the law may be harsh but it is still the law.

Q: What is the meaning of absoluta sentential expositore non indigent?

A: It means that when the language of the law is clear, no explanation of it

is required. It must be applied regardless of who may be affected, even if
it may be harsh.

Q: What is the meaning of hoc quidem perquam durum est, sed ital ex
scripta est?

A: It means that the law is exceedingly hard but so the law is written.

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B. Departure from Literal Interpretation

Q: What does the maxim "ratio legis" mean?

A: The maxim ratio legis means interpretation according to the spirit or

reason of law. This maxim is expressive in the principle that the spirit of the
law controls its letter. Likewise, the principle states that, "the spirit or intention
of a statute prevails over the letter thereof, and what is within the spirit of at
statute is within the statute although it is not within the letter thereof, while
that is which within the letter but not within the spirit of the statute is not
within the statute." If that is the case, then the spirit, rather than the letter, of
a statute determines the construction thereof, and the court looks less to its
words and more to its context, subject matter, consequence and effect.

Q: How should a law be construed?

A: A law should be construed as to be in accordance with, and not

repugnant to, the spirit of the law. Likewise, the court may consider the spirit
or reason of a statute if and only if its literal meaning would lead to absurdity,
contradiction, injustice or would defeat the clear purpose or the lawmakers.

Q: What does the maxim "verba intentioni, non e contra, debent inservire"
mean?

A: The maxim "verba intentioni, non e contra, debent inservire" means that,
words ought to be subservient to the intent and not the intent to the words.
This implies that the literal import or meaning of a statute must yield to its
apparent intent, purpose or spirit. The intention of the legislature and its
purpose, being the fundamental inquiry in judicial construction, control the
literal interpretation of particular language of a statute. In addition, a language
capable of more than one meaning is to be taken in such sense as to
harmonize with the intention and object and effectuate the purpose of the
enactment.

Q: What is the limitation of the rule "what is within the spirit of a statute
is within the statute itself although it is not within its letter"?

A: The rule "what is within the spirit of a statute is within the statute itself
although it is not within its letter" applies only if and only if there is ambiguity
in the language employed in the law. If the law is clear and free from

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ambiguity, the letter of the law is not to be disregarded on the pretext of
pursuing its spirit.

Q: What will happen if the reason of a law ceases to exist?

A: When the reason of law ceases, the law itself ceases. This principle is
expressed in the maxim "cessante ratione legis, cessat et ipsa lex" and "ration
legis et anima." The reason which induced the legislature enact a law is the
heart of the law. Thus its nullification renders the law inoperative. It is a
fundamental principle in statutory construction that when the reason of the
law ceases, the law itself ceases.

Q: List some objectives of construction according to the spirit or reason

of the law.

A: The objectives of construction according to the spirit or reason of the law

are the following:

(a) It is to accomplish the purpose. Legislation is a working instrument of

government and not merely a collection of English words. Laws have an end or
purpose to be achieved. Thus, if there is ambiguity in the language of a statute
and its literal interpretation will defeat its purpose, construction according to
the spirit or reason of law is needed.

(b) It is to avoid absurdity.

(c) It is to avoid injustice.

(d) It is to avoid danger to public interest.

(e) Finally, it is to favor what is right and justiciable.

Q: Why is the statutory rule of supplying legislative omission necessary?

A: The statutory rule of supplying legislative omission is necessary because

it is a well-settled rule that what is within the spirit of the law is as much a
part of it as what is written pursuant to which an apparent omission in an
interpretation purely literal of the language used may be remedied by adhering
to its avowed objective and intent. Hence, where a literal import of the language
of a statute shows words have been omitted that should have been in the
statute in order to carry out its intent and spirit, clearly ascertainable from the
context, the court may supply the omission to make the statute conform to the
obvious intent of the legislature or to prevent the act from being absurd.

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Q: What is the statutory rule of correcting clerical errors?

A: The statutory rule of correcting clerical errors states that the court, in
order to carry out the obvious intent of the legislature, may correct clerical
errors, mistakes, or misprints which, if uncorrected, would render the statute
meaningless, empty or nonsensical, or would defeat or impair its intended
operation, so long as the meaning intended is apparent on the face of the whole
enactment and no specific provision is abrogated.

Q: What is the purpose of the statutory rule of correcting clerical errors?

A: The purpose of the statutory rule of correcting clerical errors is to

prevent the nullification of the statute and give it a meaning and purpose. The
reason is that it is the duty of the court to give statute a sensible construction,
one that will effectuate legislative intent and avoid injustice or absurdity.
Furthermore, it is also its duty to arrive at the legislative intent and, in doing
so, it should not adopt an arbitrary rule under which it must be held without
variance or shadow of turning that the legislature intended to make a
typographical error, the result of which would be to make nonsense of the act,
and not to carry out the legislative scheme, but to destroy it.

Q: How do the statutory rules of supplying legislative omission and

correcting clerical errors differ from judicial legislation?

A: The statutory rules of supplying legislative omission and correcting

clerical errors differ from judicial legislation because, in the statutory rules of
supplying legislative omission and correcting clerical errors, the courts may
only correct to reflect the real and apparent intention of the legislature are only
those which are clearly clerical errors or obvious mistakes, omissions and
misprints. They do not, in the guise of construction, correct what they think is
due to oversight as shown by an examination of extraneous circumstances,
where the statute is clear and to correct it would be to change the meaning of
the law, or specific provision will be abrogated. To do so is to rewrite the law
and invade the domain of the legislature; it is judicial legislation in the guise of
interpretation.

Q: What is the rationale behind the statutory rule of disregarding

surplusage and superfluity?
A: The rationale behind the statutory rule of disregarding surplusage and
superfluity can be expressed in the maxims surplusagium non noceat and utile

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per inutile non vitiatur. Surplusagium non noceat means that surplusage does
not vitiate a statute. Utile per inutile non vitiatur means that the useful is not
vitiated by the non-useful. These mean that where a word, phrase or clause in
a statute is devoid of meaning in relation to the context or intent of the statute,
or where it suggests a meaning that nullifies the statute or renders it without
sense, the word, phrase or clause may be disregarded as surplusage and
entirely ignored provided that the statute should be construed in accordance
with the evident intent of the legislature without regard to the rejected word,
phrase or clause.

Q: What is the rule on rejecting redundant words?

A: The rule on rejecting redundant words is that words or phrases may be

rejected if they are mere reiteration or repetition of other language in the
statute, in itself sufficient to carry out the intention of the legislature.

Q: Why is it that obscure or missing word, or false description may not

preclude construction?

A: Obscure or missing word, or false description may not preclude

construction because the courts are not always bounded by the phraseology or
literal meaning of a statute. They may at times disregard loose or obscure
words in order to arrive at the real meaning and spirit of the statute.

Q: What is the rule on treating the number of words?

A: The rule on treating the number of words is that when the context of a
statute so indicates, words in plural include the singular, and vice versa.

Q: What is the rule on treating the gender of words?

A: The rule on treating the gender of words is that, in construing a statute,

the masculine, but not the feminine, includes all genders, unless the context in
which the word is used in the statute indicates otherwise.

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C. Implications

Q: What is the doctrine of necessary implication?

A: The doctrine of necessary implication states that what is implied in a

statute is as much a part thereof as that which is expressed to fill in the gaps
that developed when a statute is enforced. After all, no statute can be enacted
that can provide all the details involved in a particular situation. What is
thought, at the time of enactment, to be an all-embracing legislation may be
inadequate to provide for future events.

Necessary implication defines what may properly and logically be inferred

from and read into the statute. In other words, it includes inferences as may
logically be drawn from the following, provided that it is consistent with the
Constitution or existing laws:

(a) purpose or object of the statute;

(b) what the legislature must be presumed to have intended; and
(c) necessity of making the statute effective and operative.

Q: What is Ubi jus, ibi remedium?

A: Ubi jus, ibi remedium means that where there is a right, there is a remedy
for violation thereof.

Note: It is in the individuals will to avail or not avail the remedy implied
from right.

Q: Who can confer jurisdiction to hear and decide cases?

A: It is only the Constitution that can confer jurisdiction to hear and decide
cases.

Q: What is incidental power?

A: Where a general power is conferred or duty enjoined, every particular

power necessary for the exercise of one or the performance of the other is also
conferred. The incidental powers are those which are necessarily included in,
and are therefore of lesser degree than the power granted.

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Q: Give examples of Incidental Powers.

A: The following are examples of Incidental Powers:

(a) the power to establish an office includes authority to abolish;

(b) the warrant issued shall be made upon probable cause determined
by the judgeimplies the grant of power to the judge to conduct preliminary
investigations;
(c) the power to deport includes the power to arrest undesirable aliens
after investigation; and
(d) the power to appropriate money includes the power to withdraw
unexpended money already appropriated.

Q: What is the principle of xclusion of power from the granted power?

A: The principle that the grant of power includes all incidental powers
necessary to make the exercise thereof effective implies the exclusion of those
which are greater than that conferred.

Q: Give examples of exclusion of power from the granted power.

A: The following are examples of exclusion of power from the granted power:

(a) the power of supervision excludes power to suspend or removal;

and
(b) the power to regulate business excludes power to prohibit.

Q: What do you mean by the latin maxim, Quando aliquid prohibetur ex

directo, prohibetur et per obliquum?

A: The latin maxim Quando aliquid prohibetur ex directo, prohibetur et per

obliquum means that what cannot, by law, be done directly cannot be done
indirectly.

Q: What is the helding on the statutory issue on the Peo v. Concepcion

case?

A: A corporation is forbidden from doing an act; the prohibition extends to

the board of directors and to each director separately and individually. The
board of directors is prohibited from granting loans to its director, a loan to a

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partnership of which the wife of a director is a partner falls within the
prohibition.

Q: What does Article 3 of the Civil Code of the Philippines state?

A: Article 3 of the Civil Code of the Philippines states, Ignorance of the law
excuses no one from compliance therewith.

Q: What are the laws covered by Article 3 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines?

A: The laws covered by Article 3 of the Civil Code of the Philippines are the
following:

(a) all kinds of domestic laws;

(b) limited to mandatory and prohibitory laws; and
(c) not applicable to foreign laws. Ignorance of the foreign law will not
be a mistake of law but a mistake of fact.

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