1 Aglipay v.
Ruiz
Aglipay v. Ruiz
In commemorating the 33rd International Eucharistic Congress, postage stamps
were to be printed, distributed and sold. Petitioner, the Supreme Hea of the
Philippine Independent Church, raised the constitutional question on non-
appropriation for religious purposes.
Facts:
1. In May 1936, the Director of Posts (Juan Ruiz) announced in Manila dailies
that he would order the issues of postage stamps commemorating the
celebration in the City of Manila of the 33rd International Eucharistic
Congress organized by the Roman Catholic Church.
2. The petitioner (Monsignor Gregorio Aglipay) is the Supreme Head of the
Philippine Independent Church. He seeks to prohibit the respondent Juan
Ruiz, the Director of Posts from issuing and selling postage stamps
commemorative of the 33rd International Eucharistic Congress.
3. Aglipay contends regarding the design of the stamp. He said: [I]n the
center is chalice, with grape vine and stalks of wheat as border design. The
stamps are blue, green, brown, cardinal red, violet and orange, 1 inch by
1.094 inches. The denominations are for 2, 6, 16, 20, 36 and 50 centavos.
Aglipay adds that the said stamps were actually issued and sold though the
greater part thereof remained unsold.
4. The important question raised refers to the alleged violation of the
Constitution by the respondent in issuing and selling postage stamps
commemorative of the Eucharistic congress, especially Section 23(3),
Article VI which states that [N]o public money or property shall ever be
appropriated, applied or used, directly or indirectly for the use, benefit or
support of any sect, church, denomination, sectarian institution or system
of religion
Ruling:
1. It should be stated that what is guaranteed by our Constitution is religious
liberty, not mere religious toleration.
2. Religious freedom, however, as a constitutional mandate is not inhibition
of profound reverence for religion and is not denial of its influence in
human affairs. Religion as a profession of faith to an active power that
binds and elevates man to his Creator is recognized. And, in so far as it
Case Digests on Freedom of Religion by Mark Justin Mooc
instils into the minds the purest principles of morality, its influence is
deeply felt and highly appreciated.
Garces v. Estenzo
The Barangay Council of Valencia, Ormoc City raised funds for the purchase of San
Vicente Ferrers image and construction of the waiting shed. The image was
temporarily sheltered inside the Catholic Church of the barangay. When requested
to be turned over to them, the parish priest refused to do so. A replevin case was
filed for the recovery of the image. The parish priest turned over the image but
questioned the constitutionality of the resolutions passed by the Barangay Council.
Facts:
1. The barangay council of Valencia, Ormoc City adopted Resolution No. 5
which called for the revival of the traditional socio-religious celebration
every 5th day of April in honor of San Vicente Ferrer. The said resolution
designated the members of the 9 committees who would take charge of
the 1976 festivity. The tasks of the committee are to acquire the image of
San Vicente Ferrer and to construct a waiting shed as the barangays
project. The funds were to be obtained through the selling of tickets and
cash donations.
2. The barangay council likewise passed Resolution No. 6 which specified that
the councilman (Tomas Cabatingan), the chairman of the fiesta would be
the caretaker of the image of San Vicente Ferrer and that image would
remain in his residence for 1 year and until the election of his successor as
chairman of the next feast day. It was added that the image would be
available to the Catholic priest during the celebration of the saints feast
day.
3. Funds were raised by means of solicitations and cash donations of
barangay residents and those of the neighboring places of Valencia. With
those funds, the waiting shed was constructed and the wooden image of
San Vicente Ferrer was acquired in Cebu City by the barangay council for
Php 400.00.
4. Image was temporarily placed in the Catholic Church of the barangay.
However, the parish priest (Fr. Sergio Osmea) refused to return the image
to the barangay council on the reason that it was the property of the
church because church funds were used for its acquisition. Several days
after the fiesta, the parish priest allegedly uttered defamatory remarks
2 Gonzales v. Archbishop of Manila
against the barangay captain (Manuel Veloso) in connection with the said
image. Veloso, in turn, filed a charge for grave oral defamation.
5. Because the image was never returned in accordance with Resolution No.
6, the council passed resolution no. 10 which authorized the hiring of a
lawyer to file a replevin case against the parish priest for the recovery of
the image. After the barangay council posted a cash bond of Php 800.00,
the parish priest turned over the image to the council. In turn, the priest
questioned the constitutionality of the resolutions.
Ruling:
1. The contention of the petitioners is that the resolutions contravene the
constitutional provisions that no law shall be made respecting or
establishment of religion and that no public money or property shall
ever be appropriated, applied, paid or used, directly or indirectly, for the
use, benefit or support of any sect, church, denomination, sectarian
institution, or system of religion The contention is devoid of merit. The
questioned resolutions do not directly or indirectly nor abridge religious
liberty nor appropriate public money or property for the benefit of any
sect, priest or clergyman. The image was purchased with private funds,
not with tax money. The construction of a waiting shed is entirely a
secular matter.
2. If there is nothing unconstitutional or illegal in holding a fiesta and having a
patron saint for the barrio, then any activity intended to facilitate the
worship of the patron saint (such as the acquisition and display of his
image) cannot be branded as illegal.
Gonzales v. Archbishop of Manila
Petitioner wanted to collect income from certain properties located in Calle Rosario,
District of Binondo. He contended that as having been assigned by the property
owner as chaplain, he had the right to do so.
Facts:
1. Petitioner (Angel Gonzales) wanted to collect the income from certain
properties situated in Calle Rosario, District of Binondo. He was assigned
by the property owner (Petronila de Guzman) for the maintenance of a
collative chaplaincy founded by her. The ownership dates back to June 20,
1901.
Case Digests on Freedom of Religion by Mark Justin Mooc
2. Petitioner contends that as the chaplain, incumbent and beneficiary of the
said chaplaincy, he had the right, by virtue of a title in perpetuity, from
June 20, 1901, to receive and retain all the income and revenues of the
said property. The property mentioned had been producing and yielding
not less than Php 650/month. Thus, from June 20, 1901 to the time the
action was instituted, the property in question is a sum of Php 12,500.00.
3. Respondents are the Archbishop of Manila (Msgr. Harty) and the
administrator of funds of the Sagrada Mitra (Thomas Hartigan).
4. Going back to history, by virtue of the provisions contained in the will
executed by Donya Petronila de Guzman on March 3, 1816, a collative
chaplaincy was founded in this archdiocese. It entailed a certain obligation
of a spiritual character and possessed a capital of Php 1,700. It was also
provided that the first executor of the estate of the testatrix should act as
administrator of the property subject to the chaplaincy during the minority
of Esteban de Guzman, the first chaplain appointed for the foundation.
Angel Gonzales, a descent of Petronila, was appointed chaplain on August
21, 1901.
Ruling:
1. Our attention has been invited to the fact that the property affected by the
chaplaincy should have been administered by the chaplains and not by the
administrators of the Sagrada Mitra inasmuch as clause 11 of the
foundress will so provided. To refute this assertion, it suffices to say that
the provisions of the said will set forth that the first testamentary executor
of the estate of the testatrix should act as the administrator of the
property during the minority of the first chaplain appointed in that
document. This provision must be understood to be mandatory, except as
otherwise provided by the canonical laws and as, pursuant therewith, the
chief ecclesiastical authority may order for, after the latter had accepted
the foundation of the chaplaincy, the administration of its property
appertains to the authorities established by the Church, pursuant to the
latters own laws, and this rule has been observed since 1863.
2. The defendants in this case were absolved.
Fonacier v. CA
The Consejo Supremo de Obispos of the Iglesia Filipina Independiente approved the
designation of bishops to respective bishoprics. However, Monsignor Fonacier
questioned some assignments. Having been removed by the Asemblea Magna of
3 American Bible Society v. City of Manila
the church and upon selection of successor to him, Fonacier refused to turn over the
funds, documents and properties. Moreover, as the Asemblea was electing its
Supreme Bishop, Fonacier was doing the same.
Facts:
1. On September 2, 1945, the Consejo Supremo de Obispos (Supreme Council
of Bishops) of the Iglesia Filipina Independiente (IFI) convened and
approved the designation of bishops to their respective bishoprics. Here
began the conflict which culminated in the division.
2. Monsignor Alejandro Remollino was assigned as bishop of the diocese of
Cavite. Upon learning that the latter notified the priests of his bishopric
regarding his assignment, Monsignor Fonacier wrote him a letter dated
September 18, 1945 enjoining him from assuming the duties of his office
and from taking possession of the diocese of Cavite until he (Fonacier) had
approved the appointment made by the Supreme Council.
3. On December 1, Bishop Manuel Aguilar filed charges against Monsignor
Fonacier as Supreme Bishop which were submitted to a meeting of the
Supreme Council of Bishops held on January 21 of the following year and
same charges were submitted to the Asemblea Magna or Asemblea
General of the church held the following day. This body approved the
forced resignation of petitioner and elected Bishop Bacaya as Supreme
Bishop to succeed Fonacier. Fonacier, when informed of his removal,
refused to turn over all the funds, documents and other properties of the
church to his successor.
4. On September 1, 1946, the Asemblea convened and elected Monsignor
Isabelo de los Reyes Jr., as Supreme Bishop. Meanwhile, on the same date,
Monsignor Fonacier and some of his followers met at the Manila Hotel and
elected Monsignor Juan Jamias as their Supreme Bishop.
Ruling:
1. The claim that the ouster in question was legal and valid because
petitioner, as Supreme Bishop, could act alone pursuant to the constitution
of the church wherein it is provided that the Supreme Bishop is the
supreme head of the Iglesia Filipina Independiente and as such shall have
full powers to impose the penalties of dismissal, confinement in the
seminary, suspension, fine, transfer, etc. which, without contravening the
penal laws of the constituted government, can be imposed upon the
bishops, and that said power can be exercised even without the
Case Digests on Freedom of Religion by Mark Justin Mooc
intervention of the Supreme Council, cannot be entertained in the light of
the very provisions of the constitution of the church, it appearing that the
alleged power of the Supreme Bishop under the constitution is not all-
embracing but limited and, in any event, the final action shall be taken by
the Supreme Council.
2. We have already stated that while the civil courts will ordinarily leave
ecclesiastical matters to church authorities, they may however intervene
when it is shown, as in this case, that they have acted outside the scope of
their authority or in a manner contrary to their organic law and rules.
American Bible Society v. City of Manila
The acting City Treasurer of the City of Manila required the payment of a particular
amount from petitioner. Respondent claims that petitioners Philippine agency had
distributed and sold bibles and/or gospel portions throughout the country; thus,
conducting business of general merchandise.
Facts:
1. Petitioners Philippine agency has been distributing and selling bibles
and/or gospel portions throughout the country and translating the same
into several Philippine dialects.
2. On May 29, 1953, the acting City Treasurer of the City of Manila informed
petitioner that it was conducting the business of general merchandise
since November 1945 without providing itself with necessary Mayors
permit and municipal license in violation of Ordinance No. 3000, as
amended, and further required petitioner to secure the corresponding
permit and license fees, together with compromise covering the period
from 4th quarter of 1945 to 2nd quarter of 1953, within 3 days. Sum of said
fees amounted to Php 5,821.45.
Ruling:
1. Article III, Section 1(7) of the Constitution guarantees the freedom of
religious profession and worship. It has reference to ones views of his
relations to His Creator and to the obligations they impose of reverence to
His being and character, and obedience to His Will. The constitutional
guaranty of the free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and
worship carries with it the right to disseminate religious information. Any
restraint of such right can only be justified like other restraints of freedom
4 Gerona v. Secretary of Education
of expression on the grounds that there is a clear and present danger of
any substantive evil which the State has the right to prevent.
2. It may be true that in the case at bar, the price asked for the bibles and
other religious pamphlets was in some instances a little bit higher than the
actual cost of the same but this cannot mean that petitioner was engaged
in the business or occupation of selling said merchandise for profit. To
have the City Ordinance in question applied would impair its free exercise
and enjoyment of its religious profession and worship as well as its rights
of dissemination of religious beliefs.
Gerona v. Secretary of Education
The Secretary of Education released a department order directing all pupils and
teachers regarding what they should do during the flag ceremony. Petitioners are
members of the Jehovahs Witnesses who sought that they be exempted from
performing the acts contemplated by the said department order.
Facts:
1. Republic Act No. 1265 took effect on June 11, 1955. The Secretary of
Education, acting upon Section 2 of said Act authorizing and directing him
to issue or cause to issue rules and regulations for the proper conduct of
the flag ceremony, issued Department Order No. 8 on July 21 of the same
year.
2. Pertinent portions of the said department order include the directive that
pupils and teachers or students and faculty who are in school and its
premises shall assemble in formation facing the flag. And, said assembly
shall sing the Philippine National Anthem with everyone standing at
attention and execute a salute. Moreover, immediately following the
singing of the Anthem, the assembly shall recite in unison the patriotic
pledge (in English or vernacular version).
3. Petitioners who are members of the Jehovahs Witnesses wrote to the
Secretary of Education allowing their children to remain silent and stand at
attention with their arms and hands down and straight at the sides and
that they be exempted from executing the formal salute, singing of the
National Anthem and the reciting of the patriotic pledge. Said petition was
denied by the Secretary.
4. Petitioners religious beliefs, which served as bases for this action, state
that: [t]hou shalt not make unto thee any graven image or any likeness of
anything that is in heaven above or that is in the earth beneath, or that is
Case Digests on Freedom of Religion by Mark Justin Mooc
in the water under earth; thou shalt not bow down thyself to them, nor
serve them. They consider that the flag is an image within this
command.
Ruling:
1. The realm of belief and creed is infinite and limitless bounded only by
ones imagination and thought. So is the freedom of belief, including
religious belief, limitless and without bounds. One may believe in most
anything, however, strange, bizarre and unreasonable the same may
appear to others, even heretical when weighed in the scales of orthodoxy
or doctrinal standards. But between the freedom of belief and the
exercises of said belief, there is quite a stretch of road to travel. If the
exercise of said religious belief clashes with the established institutions of
society and with the law, then the former must yield and give way to the
latter. The Government steps in and either restrains said exercise or even
prosecutes the one exercising it.
2. The flag is not an image but a symbol of the Republic, of freedom and
liberty which it and the Constitution guarantee and protect. Considering
the complete separation of church and state in our system of government,
the flag is utterly devoid of any religious significance. Saluting the flag
consequently does not involve any religious ceremony. The flag salute,
particularly the recital of the pledge of loyalty is no more a religious
ceremony.
3. The determination of whether a certain ritual is or is not a religious
ceremony must rest with the courts. It cannot be left to a religious group
or sect, much less to its followers; otherwise, there would be confusion
and misunderstanding for there might be as many interpretations and
meanings to be given to a certain ritual or ceremony as there are religious
groups or sects or followers.
4. The Court finds nothing objectionable even from the point of view of
religious belief. The school child or student is simply made to say that he
loves the Philippines because it is the land of his birth and the home of his
people. He is not even made to pledge allegiance to the flag or to the
Republic for which it stands. So even if the Court assumes for a moment
that the flag were in image, connoting religious and veneration instead of a
mere symbol of the State and of national unity, the religious scruples of
petitioners against bowing to and venerating an image are not interfered
with or otherwise jeopardized.
5 Ebralinag v. Division Superintendent of Cebu
5. In requiring school pupils to participate in the flag salute, the State through
the Secretary of Education was not imposing a religion or religious belief or
a religious test on said students. It was merely enforcing a non-
discriminatory school regulation applicable to all alike. The state was
merely carrying out the duty imposed upon it by the Constitution.
6. The children of Jehovah witnesses cannot be exempted from participation
in the flag ceremony for they have no valid right to such exemption.
Moreover, an exemption to the requirement will disrupt school discipline
and demoralize the rest of the school population which by far constitutes
the great majority.
7. The freedom of religious belief guaranteed by the Constitution does not
and cannot mean exemption from or non-compliance with reasonable and
non-discriminatory laws, rules and regulations promulgated by competent
authority.
Ebralinag v. Division Superintendent of Cebu
For refusing to salute the flag, sing the national anthem and recite the patriotic
pledge, petitioners were expelled from their classes by the public school authorities
in Cebu.
Facts:
1. Petitioners were expelled from their classes by the public school
authorities in Cebu for refusing to salute the flag, sing the national anthem
and recite the patriotic pledge as required by RA 1264 and by Department
Order No. 8 dated July 21, 1955 of the DECS making the flag ceremony
compulsory in all educational institutions.
2. There were a total of 68 students who were expelled from various public
schools in Cebu.
3. According to petitioners, while they do not take part in the compulsory
flag ceremony, they do not engage in external acts or behaviour that
would offend their countrymen who believe in expressing their love of
country through the observance of the flag ceremony. They quietly stand
at attention during the flag ceremony to show their respect for the right of
those who choose to participate in the solemn proceeding. Since they do
not engage in disruptive behaviour, there is no warrant for their
expulsion.
Ruling:
Case Digests on Freedom of Religion by Mark Justin Mooc
1. The idea that one may be compelled to salute the flag, sing the national
anthem and recite the patriotic pledge, during a flag ceremony on pain of
being dismissed from one's job or of being expelled from school, is alien to
the conscience of the present generation of Filipinos who cut their teeth
on the Bill of Rights which guarantees their rights to free speech and the
free exercise of religious profession and worship.
2. Religious freedom is a fundamental right which is entitled to the highest
priority and the amplest protection among human rights, for it involves the
relationship of man to his Creator.
3. The Court is not persuaded that by exempting the Jehovahs Witnesses
from saluting the flag, singing the national anthem and reciting the
patriotic pledge, this religious group which admittedly comprises a small
portion of the school population will shake up our part of the globe and
suddenly produce a nation untaught and uninculcated in and unimbued
with reverence for the flag, patriotism, love of country and admiration for
national heroes. After all, what the petitioners seek only is exemption
from the flag ceremony, not exclusion from public schools where they may
learn and be trained. Expelling or banning the petitioners from Philippine
schools will bring about the very situation that this Court had feared in
Gerona case. Forcing a small religious group, through the iron hand of the
law, to participate in a ceremony that violates their religious beliefs, will
hardly be conducive to love of country or respect for duly constituted
authorities.
4. While the highest regard must be afforded their right to the free exercise
of their religion, this should not be taken to mean that school authorities
are powerless to discipline them if they should commit breaches of the
peace by actions that offend the sensibilities, both religious and patriotic,
of other persons. If they quietly stand at attention during the flag
ceremony while their classmates and teachers salute the flag, sing the
national anthem and recite the patriotic pledge, the Court does not see
how such conduct may possibly disturb the peace, or pose a grave and
present danger of a serious evil to public safety, public morals, public
health or any other legitimate public interest that the State has a right and
duty to prevent.
German v. Barangan
Petitioners gathered and marched down J.P. Laurel Street and eventually hear mass
at St. Jude Chapel, which is within the Malacaang security area. Respondents
prevented them from doing so.
6 People v. Zosa
Facts:
1. Petitioners in this case wanted to hear Mass inside St. Jude Chapel located
at J.P. Laurel Street and well within the Malacaang security area.
2. On October 2, 1984, 5:00 pm, 50 individuals composed of businessmen,
students and office employees converged at J.P. Laurel Street and, wearing
the yellow shirts, they marched down said street with raised clenched fists
and shouts of anti-government invectives.
3. They were barred however by respondent (Major Isabelo Lariosa) upon
orders of his superior and co-respondent General Santiago Barangan from
proceeding any further. According to respondents, they were disallowed
to enter the chapel because same was found within the security area.
4. They were unable to convince respondents that their (the petitioners)
intention was to hear mass. Thus, they decided to leave. However, they
were allegedly warned by Lariosa that any similar attempt to enter the
church in the future would likewise be prevented.
Ruling:
1. Even assuming that petitioners claim to the free exercise of religion is
genuine and valid, still respondents reaction to the said incident may not
be characterized as violative of the freedom of religious worship. Since
1972, when mobs of demonstrators crashed through the palace gates and
scaled its perimeter fence, the use by the public of J.P. Laurel Street and
the streets approaching it have been restricted. While travel to and from
the affected thoroughfares has not been absolutely prohibited, passers-by
have been subjected to courteous, unobtrusive security checks. The
reasonableness of this restriction is readily perceived and appreciated if it
is considered that the same is designed to protect the lives of the
President and his family, as well as other government officials, diplomats
and foreign guests transacting business with Malacaang. The need to
secure the safety of heads of state and other government officials cannot
be overemphasized.
2. As announced in Cantwell v. Connecticut, [t]he constitutional inhibition
on legislation on the subject of religion has a double aspect. On the one
hand, it forestalls compulsion by law of the acceptance of any creed or the
practice of any form of worship. Freedom of conscience and freedom to
adhere such religious organization or form of worship as the individual
may choose cannot be restricted by law. On the other hand, it safeguards
the free exercise of the chosen form of religion. Thus, the amendment
Case Digests on Freedom of Religion by Mark Justin Mooc
embraces two concepts freedom to believe and freedom to act. The first
is absolute; but, in the nature of things, the second cannot be.
3. In the case at bar, petitioners are not denied or restrained of their freedom
of belief or choice of their religion, but only in the manner which they had
attempted to translate the same into action.
People v. Zosa
Zosa and Lagman sought that they be exempted from military enlistment, having
reached the age of 20 years.
Facts:
1. Tranquilino Lagman and Primitivo de Zosa reached the age of twenty years
and were thus required to register in the military service between April 1
and 7 of the said year. This compulsory military enlistment is in
consonance with section 60 of CA 1 (National Defense Law).
2. Zosa claimed that he was fatherless and a mother and a brother of 8 years
old to support, while Lagman also had a father to support, had no military
learnings and does not wish to kill or be killed.
Ruling:
1. As declared in Jacobson v. Massachusetts, [w]ithout violating the
Constitution, a person may be compelled by force, if need be, against his
will, against his pecuniary interests and even against his religious or
political convictions, to take his place in the ranks of the army of his
country and risk the chance of being shot down in its defense.
Pamil v. Teleron
Fr. Gonzaga won the mayoralty race in Alburquerque, Bohol. Petitioner however
raised that Gonzaga, being an ecclesiastic, is barred from being elected or
appointed.
Facts:
1. Father Margarito Gonzaga was elected to the position of municipal mayor
of Alburquerque, Bohol in 1971. However, petitioner who happened to be
an aspirant for the office, filed a suit for quo warranto based on a provision
of the Administrative Code, which provides that: [i]n no case shall there
7 Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers Union
be elected or appointed to a municipal office ecclesiastics, soldiers in
active service, persons receiving salaries or compensation from provincial
or national funds, or contractors for public works of the municipality.
2. The suit however did not prosper under the sala of respondent judge
stating that the statutory ineligibility was impliedly repealed by the
Election Code of 1971.
Ruling:
1. The Revised Administrative Code was enacted in 1917. In the 1935
Constitution, as it was the Charter being referred to that time, it was
explicitly declared that [n]o religious test shall be required for the exercise
of civil or political rights. The principle of the paramount character of the
fundamental law thus comes into play.
2. The challenged Administrative Code provision, certainly insofar as it
declares ineligible ecclesiastics to any elective or appointive office, is, on its
face, inconsistent with the religious freedom guaranteed by the
Constitution. To exclude them is to impose a religious test.
3. However, the vote is indecisive. While five members (grant petition for
there is no constitutional infirmity against the prohibition) of the Court
constituted a minority, the vote of the remaining seven (those which
affirmed decision as the challenged provision is no longer operative) does
not suffice to render the challenged provision (Section 2175 of the Revised
Administrative Code) ineffective.
Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers Union
Victoriano tendered his resignation for being a member of Iglesia ni Cristo, after the
enactment of RA 3350 which directed that the agreement between employer and
labor organization is not binding to members of religious sects which prohibit
affiliation of their members to any such organization. In order to remain with the
Company, according to the Collective Bargaining Agreement, the employee should
likewise be a member of the Union.
Facts:
1. Benjamin Victoriano was a member of the Iglesia ni Cristo and was
employed by Elizalde Rope Factory, Inc. since 1958. He was a member of
the Workers Union, whose collective bargaining agreement with the
Case Digests on Freedom of Religion by Mark Justin Mooc
company provided that [m]embership in the Union shall be required as a
condition of employment for all permanent employees.
2. Republic Act 3350 was enacted on June 18, 1961. It introduced
amendment to Section 4[4(a)] of RA 875. Said section of RA 875 did not
preclude the employer from making an agreement with a labor
organization to require as a condition of employment membership therein,
if such labor organization is the representative of the employees.
However, due to the amendment introduced by RA 3350, such agreement
(between employer and labor organization) shall not cover members of
any religious sect which prohibit affiliation of their members in any such
labor organization.
3. Being a member of a religious sect which prohibits affiliation of its
members with any labor organization, Victoriano tendered his resignation
to the Union in 1962. However, no action was taken by the Union; thus,
petitioner reiterated his resignation 12 years later. The Union, on the
other end, wrote a formal letter to the Company asking for the separation
of Victoriano from service as he was resigning from the Union as a
member.
4. The management in turn notified Victoriano and his counsel that unless
they (Victoriano) could achieve a satisfactory arrangement with the Union,
the Company would be constrained to dismiss him from service.
Ruling:
1. The purpose of RA 3350 was to insure freedom of belief and religion, and
to promote the general welfare by preventing discrimination against those
members of religious sects which prohibit their members from joining
labor unions, confirming thereby their natural, statutory and constitutional
right to work, the fruits of which work are usually the only means whereby
they can maintain their own life and the life of their dependents.
2. Religious freedom, although not unlimited, is a fundamental personal right
and liberty and has a preferred position in the hierarchy of values.
Contractual rights, therefore, must yield to freedom of religion. It is only
where unavoidably necessary to prevent an immediate and grave danger
to the security and welfare of the community that infringement of religious
freedom may be justified, and only to the smallest extent necessary to
avoid the danger.
3. The constitutional provision prohibiting the establishment of religion only
prohibits legislation for the support of any religious tenets or the modes of
worship of any sect, this forestalling compulsion by law of the acceptance
8 Iglesia ni Cristo v. Gironella

of any creed or the practice of any form of worship, but also assures the indicate lack of sincerity. It is a ploy or device to persuade others to take a
free exercise of ones chosen form of religion within the limits of utmost course of action, which without it may not be acceptable.
amplitude. It has been said that the religion clause of the Constitution are 2. It is to be expected that a religious sect accused of having to resort to a
all designed to protect the broadest possible liberty of conscience, to allow gimmick to gain coverts would certainly be far from pleased. Freedom of
each man to believe as his conscience directs, to profess his beliefs, and to religion implies respect for every creed. No one, much less a public official,
live as he believes he ought to live, consistent with the liberty of others is privileged to characterize the actuation of its adherents in a derogatory
and with the common good. Any legislation whose effect or purpose is to sense. It should not be lost sight to either that the attendance at a trial of
impede the observance of one or all religions or to discriminate invidiously many members of a religious sect finds support in the Constitution.
between religions is invalid, even though the burden may be characterized
as being only indirect. But, if the state regulates conduct by enacting,
within its power, a general law which has for its purpose and effect to
advance the States secular goals, the statute is valid despite its indirect
burden on religious observance, unless the State can accomplish its
purpose without imposing such burden.
4. A religious test required for the exercise of a right needs a right to be
exercised.

Iglesia ni Cristo v. Gironella

Respondents opinion in a case provoked Ramos to charge him of ignorance of the

law and conduct unbecoming a member of the bench.

Facts:

1. Mr. Teofilo C. Ramos, Sr., on behalf of the INC, charged respondent Judge
due to his opinion in the course of acquitting the defendants-accused of
Triple Rape. In his opinion, Gironella said that, [i]t cannot, therefore, be
discarded that the filing of the charge was resorted to as a gimmick of
showing the community of La Paz, Abra in particular and to the public in
general that the Iglesia ni Cristo unhesitatingly helps its member of his/her
problem.
2. Respondent, in so doing, was charged with ignorance of the law and
conduct unbecoming a member of the bench.

Ruling:

1. The use of the word gimmick could offend the sensibilities of the
members of the Iglesia ni Cristo. It is not inaccurate to state that as
understood in the popular sense, it is not exactly complimentary. It may

Case Digests on Freedom of Religion by Mark Justin Mooc