GOVERNMENT SERVICE G.R. No.

180291
INSURANCE SYSTEM (GSIS)
and WINSTON F. GARCIA, in Present:
his capacity as PRESIDENT
and GENERAL MANAGER
of the GSIS, CORONA, C.J.,
Petitioners,
CARPIO,

CARPIO MORALES,

VELASCO, JR.,

NACHURA,
- versus - LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,

BRION,

PERALTA,

BERSAMIN,

DEL CASTILLO,
DINNAH VILLAVIZA,
ELIZABETH DUQUE, ABAD,
ADRONICO A. ECHAVEZ,
RODEL RUBIO, ROWENA VILLARAMA, JR.,
THERESE B. GRACIA,
PEREZ, and
PILAR LAYCO, and
ANTONIO JOSE LEGARDA, MENDOZA, JJ.
Respondents.

Promulgated:
 July 27, 2010

x -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

MENDOZA, J.:

This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
seeking to reverse and set aside the August 31, 2007 Decision[1] of the Court of
Appeals (CA), in CA-G.R. SP No. 98952, dismissing the petition for certiorari of
Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) assailing the Civil Service
Commissions Resolution No. 062177.

THE FACTS:

Petitioner Winston Garcia (PGM Garcia), as President and General Manager

of the GSIS, filed separate formal charges against respondents Dinnah Villaviza,
Elizabeth Duque, Adronico A. Echavez, Rodel Rubio, Rowena Therese B. Gracia,
Pilar Layco, and Antonio Jose Legarda for Grave Misconduct and/or Conduct
Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service pursuant to the Rules of Procedure in
Administrative Investigation (RPAI) of GSIS Employees and Officials, III, D, (1, c,
f) in relation to Section 52A (3), (20), Rule IV, of the Uniform Rules on
Administrative Cases in the Civil Service (URACCS), in accordance with Book V
of the Administrative Code of 1987, committed as follows:

That on 27 May 2005, respondent, wearing red shirt together

with some employees, marched to or appeared simultaneously at
or just outside the office of the Investigation Unit in a mass
demonstration/rally of protest and support for Messrs. Mario
Molina and Albert Velasco, the latter having surreptitiously
entered the GSIS premises;
 xxxxxxxxx

That some of these employees badmouthed the security

guards and the GSIS management and defiantly raised clenched
fists led by Atty. Velasco who was barred by Hearing Officer Marvin
R. Gatpayat in an Order dated 24 May 2005 from appearing as
counsel for Atty. Molina pursuant to Section 7 (b) (2) of R.A. 6713
otherwise known as the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for
Public Officials and Employees;

That respondent, together with other employees in utter

contempt of CSC Resolution No. 021316, dated 11 October 2002,
otherwise known as Omnibus Rules on Prohibited Concerted Mass
Actions in the Public Sector caused alarm and heightened some
employees and disrupted the work at the Investigation Unit during
office hours.[2]

This episode was earlier reported to PGM Garcia, through an office

memorandum dated May 31, 2005, by the Manager of the GSIS Security Department
(GSIS-SD), Dennis Nagtalon. On the same day, the Manager of the GSIS
Investigation Unit (GSIS-IU), Atty. Lutgardo Barbo, issued a memorandum to each
of the seven (7) respondents requiring them to explain in writing and under oath
within three (3) days why they should not be administratively dealt with.[3]

Respondents Duque, Echavez, Rubio, Gracia, Layco, and Legarda, together

with two others, submitted a letter-explanation to Atty. Barbo dated June 6, 2005.
Denying that there was a planned mass action, the respondents explained that their
act of going to the office of the GSIS-IU was a spontaneous reaction after learning
that their former union president was there. Aside from some of them wanting to
show their support, they were interested in that hearing as it might also affect
them.For her part, respondent Villaviza submitted a separate letter explaining that
she had a scheduled pre-hearing at the GSIS-IU that day and that she had informed
her immediate supervisor about it, attaching a copy of the order of pre-
hearing. These letters were not under oath.[4]
 PGM Garcia then filed the above-mentioned formal charges for Grave
Misconduct and/or Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service against
each of the respondents, all dated June 4, 2005. Respondents were again directed to
submit their written answers under oath within three (3) days from receipt
thereof.[5]None was filed.

On June 29, 2005, PGM Garcia issued separate but similarly worded decisions
finding all seven (7) respondents guilty of the charges and meting out the penalty of
one (1) year suspension plus the accessory penalties appurtenant thereto.

On appeal, the Civil Service Commission (CSC) found the respondents guilty
of the lesser offense of Violation of Reasonable Office Rules and Regulations and
reduced the penalty to reprimand. The CSC ruled that respondents were not denied
their right to due process but there was no substantial evidence to hold them guilty
of Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service. Instead,

x x x. The actuation of the appellants in going to the IU,

wearing red shirts, to witness a public hearing cannot be considered
as constitutive of such offense. Appellants (respondents herein)
assembly at the said office to express support to Velasco, their Union
President, who pledged to defend them against any oppression by
the GSIS management, can be considered as an exercise of their
freedom of expression, a constitutionally guaranteed right.[6] x x x

PGM Garcia sought reconsideration but was denied. Thus, PGM Garcia went
to the Court of Appeals via a Petition for Review under Rule 43 of the Rules on Civil
Procedure.[7] The CA upheld the CSC in this wise:

The Civil Service Commission is correct when it found that the

act sought to be punished hardly falls within the definition of a
prohibited concerted activity or mass action. The petitioners failed
to prove that the supposed concerted activity of the respondents
resulted in work stoppage and caused prejudice to the public
service. Only about twenty (20) out of more than a hundred
employees at the main office, joined the activity sought to be
punished. These employees, now respondents in this case, were
assigned at different offices of the petitioner GSIS. Hence, despite
the belated claim of the petitioners that the act complained of had
 created substantial disturbance inside the petitioner GSIS premises
during office hours, there is nothing in the record that could support
the claim that the operational capacity of petitioner GSIS was
affected or reduced to substantial percentage when respondents
gathered at the Investigation Unit. Despite the hazy claim of the
petitioners that the gathering was intended to force the
Investigation Unit and petitioner GSIS to be lenient in the handling
of Atty. Molinas case and allow Atty. Velasco to represent Atty.
Molina in his administrative case before petitioner GSIS, there is
likewise no concrete and convincing evidence to prove that the
gathering was made to demand or force concessions, economic or
otherwise from the GSIS management or from the government. In
fact, in the separate formal charges filed against the respondents,
petitioners clearly alleged that respondents marched to or appeared
simultaneously at or just outside the office of the Investigation Unit
in a mass demonstration/rally of protest and support for Mssrs.
Mario Molina and Albert Velasco, the latter surreptitiously entered
the GSIS premises. Thus, petitioners are aware at the outset that the
only apparent intention of the respondents in going to the IU was to
show support to Atty. Mario Molina and Albert Velasco, their union
officers. The belated assertion that the intention of the respondents
in going to the IU was to disrupt the operation and pressure the
GSIS administration to be lenient with Atty. Mario Molina and
Albert Velasco, is only an afterthought.[8]

Not in conformity, PGM Garcia is now before us via this Petition for Review
presenting the following:

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES

WHETHER AN ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL MAY APPLY

SUPPLETORILY THE PROVISIONS OF THE RULES OF COURT
ON THE EFFECT OF FAILURE TO DENY THE ALLEGATIONS
IN THE COMPLAINT AND FAILURE TO FILE ANSWER,
WHERE THE RESPONDENTS IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE
PROCEEDINGS DID NOT FILE ANY RESPONSIVE PLEADING
TO THE FORMAL CHARGES AGAINST THEM.
 II

WHETHER THE RULE THAT ADMINISTRATIVE DUE

PROCESS CANNOT BE EQUATED WITH DUE PROCESS IN
JUDICIAL SENSE AUTHORIZES AN ADMINISTRATIVE
TRIBUNAL TO CONSIDER IN EVIDENCE AND GIVE FULL
PROBATIVE VALUE TO UNNOTARIZED LETTERS THAT DID
NOT FORM PART OF THE CASE RECORD.

III

WHETHER A DECISION THAT MAKES CONCLUSIONS OF

FACTS BASED ON EVIDENCE ON RECORD BUT MAKES A
CONCLUSION OF LAW BASED ON THE ALLEGATIONS OF A
DOCUMENT THAT NEVER FORMED PART OF THE CASE
RECORDS IS VALID.

IV

WHETHER FURTHER PROOF OF SUSBTANTIAL REDUCTION

OF THE OPERATIONAL CAPACITY OF AN AGENCY, DUE TO
UNRULY MASS GATHERING OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES
INSIDE OFFICE PREMISES AND WITHIN OFFICE HOURS, IS
REQUIRED TO HOLD THE SAID EMPLOYEES LIABLE FOR
CONDUCT PREJUDICIAL TO THE BEST INTEREST OF THE
SERVICE PURSUANT TO CSC RESOLUTION NO. 021316.

WHETHER AN UNRULY MASS GATHERING OF TWENTY

EMPLOYEES, LASTING FOR MORE THAN AN HOUR DURING
OFFICE HOURS, INSIDE OFFICE PREMISES AND WITHIN A
UNIT TASKED TO HEAR AN ADMINISTRATIVE CASE, TO
PROTEST THE PROHIBITION AGAINST THE APPEARANCE
OF THEIR LEADER AS COUNSEL IN THE SAID
ADMINISTRATIVE CASE, FALLS WITHIN THE PURVIEW OF
THE CONSTITUTIONAL GUARANTEE TO FREEDOM OF
EXPRESSION AND PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY.
 VI

WHETHER THE CONCERTED ABANDONMENT OF

EMPLOYEES OF THEIR POSTS FOR MORE THAN AN HOUR
TO HOLD AN UNRULY PROTEST INSIDE OFFICE PREMISES
ONLY CONSTITUTES THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFENSE OF
VIOLATION OF REASONABLE OFFICE RULES AND
REGULATIONS.[9]

The Court finds no merit in the petition.

Petitioners primarily question the probative value accorded to respondents

letters of explanation in response to the memorandum of the GSIS-IU Manager. The
respondents never filed their answers to the formal charges. The petitioners argue
that there being no answers, the allegations in the formal charges that they filed
should have been deemed admitted pursuant to Section 11, Rule 8 of the Rules of
Court which provides:

SECTION 11. Allegations not specifically denied deemed

admitted. Material averment in the complaint, other than those as
to the amount of liquidated damages, shall be deemed admitted
when not specifically denied. Allegations of usury in a complaint to
recover usurious interest are deemed admitted if not denied
specifically and under oath.

According to the petitioners, this rule is applicable to the case at bench

pursuant to Rule 1, Section 4 of the Rules of Court which reads:

SECTION 4. In what cases not applicable. These Rules shall

not apply to election cases, land registration, cadastral,
naturalization and insolvency proceedings, and other cases not
herein provided for, except by analogy or in a suppletory character
and whenever practicable and convenient. (underscoring supplied)

The Court does not subscribe to the argument of the petitioners. Petitioners
own rules, Rule XI, Section 4 of the GSIS Amended Policy and Procedural
Guidelines No. 178-04, specifically provides:
 If the respondent fails to file his Answer within five (5)
working days from receipt of the Formal Charge for the supporting
evidence, when requested, he shall be considered to have waived his
right to file an answer and the PGM or the Board of Trustees, in
proper cases, shall render judgment, as may be warranted by the
facts and evidence submitted by the prosecution.

A perusal of said section readily discloses that the failure of a respondent to

file an answer merely translates to a waiver of his right to file an answer. There is
nothing in the rule that says that the charges are deemed admitted. It has not done
away with the burden of the complainant to prove the charges with clear and
convincing evidence.
It is true that Section 4 of the Rules of Court provides that the rules can be
applied in a suppletory character. Suppletory is defined as supplying
deficiencies.[10]It means that the provisions in the Rules of Court will be made to
apply only where there is an insufficiency in the applicable rule. There is, however,
no such deficiency as the rules of the GSIS are explicit in case of failure to file the
required answer. What is clearly stated there is that GSIS may render judgment as
may be warranted by the facts and evidence submitted by the prosecution.

Even granting that Rule 8, Section 11 of the Rules of Court finds application
in this case, petitioners must remember that there remain averments that are not
deemed admitted by the failure to deny the same. Among them are immaterial
allegations and incorrect conclusions drawn from facts set out in the
complaint.[11]Thus, even if respondents failed to file their answer, it does not mean
that all averments found in the complaint will be considered as true and correct in
their entirety, and that the forthcoming decision will be rendered in favor of the
petitioners. We must not forget that even in administrative proceedings, it is still the
complainant, or in this case the petitioners, who have the burden of proving, with
substantial evidence, the allegations in the complaint or in the formal charges.[12]

A perusal of the decisions of the CA and of the CSC will reveal that the case
was resolved against petitioners based, not on the absence of respondents evidence,
but on the weakness of that of the petitioners. Thus, the CA wrote:
 Petitioners correctly submitted the administrative cases for
resolution without the respondents respective answer to the
separate formal charges in accordance with Section 4, Rule XI of
the RPAI. Being in full control of the administrative proceeding and
having effectively prevented respondents from further submitting
their responsive answer and evidence for the defense, petitioners
were in the most advantageous position to prove the merit of their
allegations in the formal charges. When petitioner Winston Garcia
issued those similarly worded decisions in the administrative cases
against the respondents, it is presumed that all evidence in their
favor were duly submitted and justly considered independent of the
weakness of respondents evidence in view of the principle that the
burden of proof belongs to the one who alleges and not the one who
denies.[13]

On the merits, what needs to be resolved in the case at bench is the question
of whether or not there was a violation of Section 5 of CSC Resolution No. 02-
1316. Stated differently, whether or not respondents actions on May 27, 2005
amounted to a prohibited concerted activity or mass action. Pertinently, the said
provision states:

Section 5. As used in this Omnibus Rules, the phrase

prohibited concerted activity or mass action shall be understood to
refer to any collective activity undertaken by government
employees, by themselves or through their employees
organizations, with intent of effecting work stoppage or service
disruption in order to realize their demands of force concession,
economic or otherwise, from their respective agencies or the
government. It shall include mass leaves, walkouts, pickets and
acts of similar nature. (underscoring supplied)

In this case, CSC found that the acts of respondents in going to the GSIS-IU
office wearing red shirts to witness a public hearing do not amount to a concerted
activity or mass action proscribed above. CSC even added that their actuations can
be deemed an exercise of their constitutional right to freedom of expression. The CA
found no cogent reason to deviate therefrom.
 As defined in Section 5 of CSC Resolution No. 02-1316 which serves to
regulate the political rights of those in the government service, the concerted activity
or mass action proscribed must be coupled with the intent of effecting work stoppage
or service disruption in order to realize their demands of force concession. Wearing
similarly colored shirts, attending a public hearing at the GSIS-IU office, bringing
with them recording gadgets, clenching their fists, some even badmouthing the
guards and PGM Garcia, are acts not constitutive of an (i) intent to effect work
stoppage or service disruption and (ii) for the purpose of realizing their demands of
force concession.

Precisely, the limitations or qualifications found in Section 5 of CSC

Resolution No. 02-1316 are there to temper and focus the application of such
prohibition. Not all collective activity or mass undertaking of government
employees is prohibited. Otherwise, we would be totally depriving our brothers and
sisters in the government service of their constitutional right to freedom of
expression.

Government workers, whatever their ranks, have as much right as any person
in the land to voice out their protests against what they believe to be a violation of
their rights and interests. Civil Service does not deprive them of their freedom of
expression. It would be unfair to hold that by joining the government service, the
members thereof have renounced or waived this basic liberty. This freedom can be
reasonably regulated only but can never be taken away.
A review of PGM Garcias formal charges against the respondents reveals that
he himself was not even certain whether the respondents and the rest of the twenty
or so GSIS employees who were at the GSIS-IU office that fateful day marched there
or just simply appeared there simultaneously.[14] Thus, the petitioners were not even
sure if the spontaneous act of each of the twenty or so GSIS employees on May 27,
2005 was a concerted one. The report of Manager Nagtalon of the GSIS-SD which
was the basis for PGM Garcias formal charges reflected such uncertainty. Thus,

Of these red shirt protesters, only Mr. Molina has official

business at the Investigation Unit during this time. The rest
abandoned their post and duties for the duration of this incident
which lasted until 10:55 A.M. It was also observed that the
protesters, some of whom raised their clenched left fists, carefully
planned this illegal action as evident in their behavior of arrogance,
 defiance and provocation, the presence of various recording gadgets
such as VCRs, voice recorders and digital cameras, the bad
mouthing of the security guards and the PGM, the uniformity in
their attire and the collusion regarding the anomalous entry of Mr.
Albert Velasco to the premises as reported earlier.[15]

The said report of Nagtalon contained only bare facts. It did not show
respondents unified intent to effect disruption or stoppage in their work. It also failed
to show that their purpose was to demand a force concession.

In the recent case of GSIS v. Kapisanan ng mga Manggagawa sa GSIS,[16] the

Court upheld the position of petitioner GSIS because its employees, numbering
between 300 and 800 each day, staged a walkout and participated in a mass protest
or demonstration outside the GSIS for four straight days. We cannot say the same
for the 20 or so employees in this case. To equate their wearing of red shirts and
going to the GSIS-IU office for just over an hour with that four-day mass action
inKapisanan ng mga Manggagawa sa GSIS case and to punish them in the same manner
would most certainly be unfair and unjust.

Recent analogous decisions in the United States, while recognizing the

governments right as an employer to lay down certain standards of conduct, tend to
lean towards a broad definition of public concern speech which is protected by their
First Amendment. One such case is that of Scott v. Meters.[17] In said case, the New
York Transit Authority (NYTA), responsible for operation of New York Citys mass
transit service, issued a rule prohibiting employees from wearing badges or buttons
on their uniforms. A number of union members wore union buttons promoting their
opposition to a collective bargaining agreement. Consequently, the NYTA tried to
enforce its rule and threatened to subject these union members to discipline. The
court, though recognizing the governments right to impose reasonable restrictions,
held that the NYTAs rule was unconstitutionally overboard.

In another case, Communication Workers of America v. Ector County Hospital

District,[18] it was held that,

A county hospital employees wearing of a Union Yes lapel pin

during a union organization drive constituted speech on a matter of
public concern, and the countys proffered interest in enforcing the
 anti-adornment provision of its dress code was outweighed by the
employees interest in exercising his First Amendment speech and
associational rights by wearing a pro-union lapel button.[19]

Thus, respondents freedom of speech and of expression remains intact, and

CSCs Resolution No. 02-1316 defining what a prohibited concerted activity or mass
action has only tempered or regulated these rights. Measured against that definition,
respondents actuations did not amount to a prohibited concerted activity or mass
action. The CSC and the CA were both correct in arriving at said conclusion.

WHEREFORE, the assailed August 31, 2007 Decision of the Court of

Appeals as well as its October 16, 2007 Resolution in CA G.R. SP No. 98952 are
hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Case Digest: Imbong vs. Ochoa, Jr.

April 8, 2014

G.R. Nos. 204819, 204934, 204957, 204988, 205003, 205043, 205138, 205478,
205491, 205720, 206355, 207111, 207172 & 207563

JAMES M. IMBONG, ET AL., Petitioners, v. HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., ET

AL., Respondents.

MENDOZA, J.:
FACTS:

Nothing has polarized the nation more in recent years than the issues of population
growth control, abortion and contraception. As in every democratic society,
diametrically opposed views on the subjects and their perceived consequences
freely circulate in various media. From television debates to sticker campaigns, from
rallies by socio-political activists to mass gatherings organized by members of the
clergy -the clash between the seemingly antithetical ideologies of the religious
conservatives and progressive liberals has caused a deep division in every level of
the society. Despite calls to withhold support thereto, however, Republic Act (R.A.)
No. 10354, otherwise known as the Responsible Parenthood and Reproductive
Health Act of 2012 (RH Law), was enacted by Congress on December 21, 2012.

Shortly after the President placed his imprimatur on the said law, challengers from
various sectors of society came knocking on the doors of the Court, beckoning it to
wield the sword that strikes down constitutional disobedience. Aware of the profound
and lasting impact that its decision may produce, the Court now faces the iuris
controversy, as presented in fourteen petitions and 2 petitions-in-intervention.

A perusal of the foregoing petitions shows that the petitioners are assailing the
constitutionality of RH Law on the following grounds: The RH Law violates the right
to life of the unborn, the right to health and the right to protection against hazardous
products, and to religious freedom, equal protection clause, involuntary servitude,
among others.

It is also contended that the RH Law threatens conscientious objectors of criminal

prosecution, imprisonment and other forms of punishment, as it compels medical
practitioners 1] to refer patients who seek advice on reproductive health programs to
other doctors; and 2] to provide full and correct information on reproductive health
programs and service, although it is against their religious beliefs and convictions.

It is also argued that the RH Law providing for the formulation of mandatory sex
education in schools should not be allowed as it is an affront to their religious beliefs.

While the petitioners recognize that the guarantee of religious freedom is not
absolute, they argue that the RH Law fails to satisfy the "clear and present danger
test" and the "compelling state interest test" to justify the regulation of the right to
free exercise of religion and the right to free speech.

In this connection, it is claimed that "Section 7 of the RH Law violates the right to
due process by removing from them (the people) the right to manage their own
affairs and to decide what kind of health facility they shall be and what kind of
services they shall offer." It ignores the management perogative inherent in
corporations for employers to conduct their affairs in accordance with their own
discretion and judgment.

The respondents, aside from traversing the substantive arguments of the petitioners,
pray for the dismissal of the petitions for the principal reasons that 1] there is no
actual case or controversy and, therefore, the issues are not yet ripe for judicial
determination.; 2] some petitioners lack standing to question the RH Law; and 3] the
petitions are essentially petitions for declaratory relief over which the Court has no
original jurisdiction.

Meanwhile, on March 15, 2013, the RH-IRR for the enforcement of the assailed
legislation took effect.

On March 19, 2013, after considering the issues and arguments raised, the Court
issued the Status Quo Ante Order (SQAO), enjoining the effects and implementation
of the assailed legislation for a period of one hundred and twenty (120) days, or until
July 17, 2013.

The petitioners are one in praying that the entire RH Law be declared
unconstitutional. Petitioner ALFI, in particular, argues that the government
sponsored contraception program, the very essence of the RH Law, violates the
right to health of women and the sanctity of life, which the State is mandated to
protect and promote.

ISSUES: 1) Whether the Court may exercise its power of judicial review over
the controversy; 2) Whether the RH law is unconstitutional.

HELD:

1) In this case, the Court is of the view that an actual case or controversy
exists and that the same is ripe for judicial determination.

REMEDIAL LAW: actual case or controversy

Lest it be misunderstood, it bears emphasizing that the Court does not have the
unbridled authority to rule on just any and every claim of constitutional violation.
Jurisprudence is replete with the rule that the power of judicial review is limited by
four exacting requisites, viz : (a) there must be an actual case or controversy; (b) the
petitioners must possess locus standi; (c) the question of constitutionality must be
raised at the earliest opportunity; and ( d) the issue of constitutionality must be the
lis mota of the case.

Proponents of the RH Law submit that the subject petitions do not present any
actual case or controversy because the RH Law has yet to be implemented. They
claim that the questions raised by the petitions are not yet concrete and ripe for
adjudication since no one has been charged with violating any of its provisions and
that there is no showing that any of the petitioners' rights has been adversely
affected by its operation. In short, it is contended that judicial review of the RH Law
is premature.

An actual case or controversy means an existing case or controversy that is

appropriate or ripe for determination, not conjectural or anticipatory, lest the decision
of the court would amount to an advisory opinion. The rule is that courts do not sit to
adjudicate mere academic questions to satisfy scholarly interest, however
intellectually challenging. The controversy must be justiciable-definite and concrete,
touching on the legal relations of parties having adverse legal interests. In other
words, the pleadings must show an active antagonistic assertion of a legal right, on
the one hand, and a denial thereof, on the other; that is, it must concern a real,
tangible and not merely a theoretical question or issue. There ought to be an actual
and substantial controversy admitting of specific relief through a decree conclusive
in nature, as distinguished from an opinion advising what the law would be upon a
hypothetical state of facts.

Corollary to the requirement of an actual case or controversy is the requirement of

ripeness. A question is ripe for adjudication when the act being challenged has had
a direct adverse effect on the individual challenging it. For a case to be considered
ripe for adjudication, it is a prerequisite that something has then been accomplished
or performed by either branch before a court may come into the picture, and the
petitioner must allege the existence of an immediate or threatened injury to himself
as a result of the challenged action. He must show that he has sustained or is
immediately in danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of the act.

In this case, the Court is of the view that an actual case or controversy exists and
that the same is ripe for judicial determination.

Considering that the RH Law and its implementing rules have already taken effect
and that budgetary measures to carry out the law have already been passed, it is
evident that the subject petitions present a justiciable controversy. As stated earlier,
when an action of the legislative branch is seriously alleged to have infringed the
Constitution, it not only becomes a right, but also a duty of the Judiciary to settle the
dispute.

Moreover, the petitioners have shown that the case is so because medical
practitioners or medical providers are in danger of being criminally prosecuted under
the RH Law for vague violations thereof, particularly public health officers who are
threatened to be dismissed from the service with forfeiture of retirement and other
benefits. They must, at least, be heard on the matter NOW.

REMEDIAL LAW: facial challenge

The OSG also assails the propriety of the facial challenge lodged by the subject
petitions, contending that the RH Law cannot be challenged "on its face" as it is not
a speech regulating measure.

The Court is not persuaded.

In United States (US) constitutional law, a facial challenge, also known as a First
Amendment Challenge, is one that is launched to assail the validity of statutes
concerning not only protected speech, but also all other rights in the First
Amendment. These include religious freedom, freedom of the press, and the right of
the people to peaceably assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of
grievances. After all, the fundamental right to religious freedom, freedom of the
press and peaceful assembly are but component rights of the right to one's freedom
of expression, as they are modes which one's thoughts are externalized.

In this jurisdiction, the application of doctrines originating from the U.S. has been
generally maintained, albeit with some modifications. While this Court has withheld
the application of facial challenges to strictly penal statutes, it has expanded its
scope to cover statutes not only regulating free speech, but also those involving
religious freedom, and other fundamental rights. The underlying reason for this
modification is simple. For unlike its counterpart in the U.S., this Court, under its
expanded jurisdiction, is mandated by the Fundamental Law not only to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, but
also to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government. Verily, the framers of Our Constitution envisioned
a proactive Judiciary, ever vigilant with its duty to maintain the supremacy of the
Constitution.

Consequently, considering that the foregoing petitions have seriously alleged that
the constitutional human rights to life, speech and religion and other fundamental
rights mentioned above have been violated by the assailed legislation, the Court has
authority to take cognizance of these kindred petitions and to determine if the RH
Law can indeed pass constitutional scrutiny. To dismiss these petitions on the
simple expedient that there exist no actual case or controversy, would diminish this
Court as a reactive branch of government, acting only when the Fundamental Law
has been transgressed, to the detriment of the Filipino people.

REMEDIAL LAW: locus standi

The OSG also attacks the legal personality of the petitioners to file their respective
petitions. It contends that the "as applied challenge" lodged by the petitioners cannot
prosper as the assailed law has yet to be enforced and applied against them, and
the government has yet to distribute reproductive health devices that are abortive.

The petitioners, for their part, invariably invoke the "transcendental importance"
doctrine and their status as citizens and taxpayers in establishing the requisite locus
standi.

Locus standi or legal standing is defined as a personal and substantial interest in a

case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the
challenged governmental act. It requires a personal stake in the outcome of the
controversy as to assure the concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation
of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult
constitutional questions.

In relation to locus standi, the "as applied challenge" embodies the rule that one can
challenge the constitutionality of a statute only if he asserts a violation of his own
rights. The rule prohibits one from challenging the constitutionality of the statute
grounded on a violation of the rights of third persons not before the court. This rule is
also known as the prohibition against third-party standing.
REMEDIAL LAW: transcendental importance

Notwithstanding, the Court leans on the doctrine that "the rule on standing is a
matter of procedure, hence, can be relaxed for non-traditional plaintiffs like ordinary
citizens, taxpayers, and legislators when the public interest so requires, such as
when the matter is of transcendental importance, of overreaching significance to
society, or of paramount public interest."

In Coconut Oil Refiners Association, Inc. v. Torres, the Court held that in cases of
paramount importance where serious constitutional questions are involved, the
standing requirement may be relaxed and a suit may be allowed to prosper even
where there is no direct injury to the party claiming the right of judicial review. In the
first Emergency Powers Cases, ordinary citizens and taxpayers were allowed to
question the constitutionality of several executive orders although they had only an
indirect and general interest shared in common with the public.

With these said, even if the constitutionality of the RH Law may not be assailed
through an "as-applied challenge, still, the Court has time and again acted liberally
on the locus standi requirement. It has accorded certain individuals standing to sue,
not otherwise directly injured or with material interest affected by a Government act,
provided a constitutional issue of transcendental importance is invoked. The rule on
locus standi is, after all, a procedural technicality which the Court has, on more than
one occasion, waived or relaxed, thus allowing non-traditional plaintiffs, such as
concerned citizens, taxpayers, voters or legislators, to sue in the public interest,
albeit they may not have been directly injured by the operation of a law or any other
government act.

In view of the seriousness, novelty and weight as precedents, not only to the public,
but also to the bench and bar, the issues raised must be resolved for the guidance
of all. After all, the RH Law drastically affects the constitutional provisions on the
right to life and health, the freedom of religion and expression and other
constitutional rights. Mindful of all these and the fact that the issues of contraception
and reproductive health have already caused deep division among a broad
spectrum of society, the Court entertains no doubt that the petitions raise issues of
transcendental importance warranting immediate court adjudication. More
importantly, considering that it is the right to life of the mother and the unborn which
is primarily at issue, the Court need not wait for a life to be taken away before taking
action.

The Court cannot, and should not, exercise judicial restraint at this time when rights
enshrined in the Constitution are being imperilled to be violated. To do so, when the
life of either the mother or her child is at stake, would lead to irreparable
consequences.
REMEDIAL LAW: declaratory relief

The respondents also assail the petitions because they are essentially petitions for
declaratory relief over which the Court has no original jurisdiction. Suffice it to state
that most of the petitions are praying for injunctive reliefs and so the Court would just
consider them as petitions for prohibition under Rule 65, over which it has original
jurisdiction. Where the case has far-reaching implications and prays for injunctive
reliefs, the Court may consider them as petitions for prohibition under Rule 65.

POLITICAL LAW: one subject-one title

The petitioners also question the constitutionality of the RH Law, claiming that it
violates Section 26(1 ), Article VI of the Constitution, prescribing the one subject-one
title rule. According to them, being one for reproductive health with responsible
parenthood, the assailed legislation violates the constitutional standards of due
process by concealing its true intent- to act as a population control measure.

To belittle the challenge, the respondents insist that the RH Law is not a birth or
population control measure, and that the concepts of "responsible parenthood" and
"reproductive health" are both interrelated as they are separate.

Despite efforts to push the RH Law as a reproductive health law, the Court sees it as
principally a population control measure. The corpus of the RH Law is geared
towards the reduction of the country's population. While it claims to save lives and
keep our women and children healthy, it also promotes pregnancy-preventing
products. As stated earlier, the RH Law emphasizes the need to provide Filipinos,
especially the poor and the marginalized, with access to information on the full range
of modem family planning products and methods. These family planning methods,
natural or modern, however, are clearly geared towards the prevention of
pregnancy.

For said reason, the manifest underlying objective of the RH Law is to reduce the
number of births in the country.

It cannot be denied that the measure also seeks to provide pre-natal and post-natal
care as well. A large portion of the law, however, covers the dissemination of
information and provisions on access to medically-safe, non-abortificient, effective,
legal, affordable, and quality reproductive health care services, methods, devices,
and supplies, which are all intended to prevent pregnancy.

The Court, thus, agrees with the petitioners' contention that the whole idea of
contraception pervades the entire RH Law. It is, in fact, the central idea of the RH
Law. Indeed, remove the provisions that refer to contraception or are related to it
and the RH Law loses its very foundation. As earlier explained, "the other positive
provisions such as skilled birth attendance, maternal care including pre-and post-
natal services, prevention and management of reproductive tract infections including
HIV/AIDS are already provided for in the Magna Carta for Women."

Be that as it may, the RH Law does not violate the one subject/one bill rule.

2)

POLITICAL LAW: right to life

It is a universally accepted principle that every human being enjoys the right to life.
Even if not formally established, the right to life, being grounded on natural law, is
inherent and, therefore, not a creation of, or dependent upon a particular law,
custom, or belief. It precedes and transcends any authority or the laws of men.

In this jurisdiction, the right to life is given more than ample protection. Section 1,
Article III of the Constitution provides: Section 1. No person shall be deprived of life,
liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the
equal protection of the laws.

As expounded earlier, the use of contraceptives and family planning methods in the
Philippines is not of recent vintage. From the enactment of R.A. No. 4729, entitled
"An Act To Regulate The Sale, Dispensation, and/or Distribution of Contraceptive
Drugs and Devices "on June 18, 1966, prescribing rules on contraceptive drugs and
devices which prevent fertilization, to the promotion of male vasectomy and tubal
ligation, and the ratification of numerous international agreements, the country has
long recognized the need to promote population control through the use of
contraceptives in order to achieve long-term economic development.

Through the years, however, the use of contraceptives and other family planning
methods evolved from being a component of demographic management, to one
centered on the promotion of public health, particularly, reproductive health.

This has resulted in the enactment of various measures promoting women's rights
and health and the overall promotion of the family's wellbeing.

Thus, aside from R.A. No. 4729, R.A. No. 6365 or "The Population Act of the
Philippines" and R.A. No. 9710, otherwise known as the "The Magna Carta of
Women" were legislated. Notwithstanding this paradigm shift, the Philippine national
population program has always been grounded two cornerstone principles: "principle
of no-abortion" and the "principle of non-coercion." As will be discussed later, these
principles are not merely grounded on administrative policy, but rather, originates
from the constitutional protection expressly provided to afford protection to life and
guarantee religious freedom.

POLITICAL LAW: when life begins

Majority of the Members of the Court are of the position that the question of when
life begins is a scientific and medical issue that should not be decided, at this stage,
without proper hearing and evidence. During the deliberation, however, it was
agreed upon that the individual members of the Court could express their own views
on this matter.

In this regard, the ponente, is of the strong view that life begins at fertilization.

In answering the question of when life begins, focus should be made on the
particular phrase of Section 12 which reads:

Section 12. The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect and
strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social institution. It shall equally protect
the life of the mother and the life of the unborn from conception. The natural and
primary right and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and
the development of moral character shall receive the support of the Government.

Textually, the Constitution affords protection to the unborn from conception. This is
undisputable because before conception, there is no unborn to speak of. For said
reason, it is no surprise that the Constitution is mute as to any proscription prior to
conception or when life begins. The problem has arisen because, amazingly, there
are quarters who have conveniently disregarded the scientific fact that conception is
reckoned from fertilization. They are waving the view that life begins at implantation.
Hence, the issue of when life begins.

In a nutshell, those opposing the RH Law contend that conception is synonymous

with "fertilization" of the female ovum by the male sperm. On the other side of the
spectrum are those who assert that conception refers to the "implantation" of the
fertilized ovum in the uterus.

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION: plain and legal meaning

It is a canon in statutory construction that the words of the Constitution should be

interpreted in their plain and ordinary meaning. As held in the recent case of Chavez
v. Judicial Bar Council:

One of the primary and basic rules in statutory construction is that where the words
of a statute are clear, plain, and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal
meaning and applied without attempted interpretation. It is a well-settled principle of
constitutional construction that the language employed in the Constitution must be
given their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed. As much
as possible, the words of the Constitution should be understood in the sense they
have in common use. What it says according to the text of the provision to be
construed compels acceptance and negates the power of the courts to alter it, based
on the postulate that the framers and the people mean what they say. Verba legis
non est recedendum -from the words of a statute there should be no departure.

The raison d' etre for the rule is essentially two-fold: First, because it is assumed that
the words in which constitutional provisions are couched express the objective
sought to be attained; and second, because the Constitution is not primarily a
lawyer's document but essentially that of the people, in whose consciousness it
should ever be present as an important condition for the rule of law to prevail.

In conformity with the above principle, the traditional meaning of the word
"conception" which, as described and defined by all reliable and reputable sources,
means that life begins at fertilization.

Webster's Third New International Dictionary describes it as the act of becoming

pregnant, formation of a viable zygote; the fertilization that results in a new entity
capable of developing into a being like its parents.

Black's Law Dictionary gives legal meaning to the term "conception" as the
fecundation of the female ovum by the male spermatozoon resulting in human life
capable of survival and maturation under normal conditions.

Even in jurisprudence, an unborn child has already a legal personality.

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION: intent of the framers

Records of the Constitutional Convention also shed light on the intention of the
Framers regarding the term "conception" used in Section 12, Article II of the
Constitution. From their deliberations, it clearly refers to the moment of "fertilization."

From the deliberations, it is apparent that the Framers of the Constitution

emphasized that the State shall provide equal protection to both the mother and the
unborn child from the earliest opportunity of life, that is, upon fertilization or upon the
union of the male sperm and the female ovum. It is also apparent is that the Framers
of the Constitution intended that to prohibit Congress from enacting measures that
would allow it determine when life begins.

Equally apparent, however, is that the Framers of the Constitution did not intend to
ban all contraceptives for being unconstitutional. In fact, Commissioner Bernardo
Villegas, spearheading the need to have a constitutional provision on the right to life,
recognized that the determination of whether a contraceptive device is an
abortifacient is a question of fact which should be left to the courts to decide on
based on established evidence. From the discussions above, contraceptives that kill
or destroy the fertilized ovum should be deemed an abortive and thus prohibited.

Conversely, contraceptives that actually prevent the union of the male sperm and
the female ovum, and those that similarly take action prior to fertilization should be
deemed non-abortive, and thus, constitutionally permissible.

In all, whether it be taken from a plain meaning, or understood under medical

parlance, and more importantly, following the intention of the Framers of the
Constitution, the undeniable conclusion is that a zygote is a human organism and
that the life of a new human being commences at a scientifically well-defined
moment of conception, that is, upon fertilization.

For the above reasons, the Court cannot subscribe to the theory advocated by Hon.
Lagman that life begins at implantation. According to him, "fertilization and
conception are two distinct and successive stages in the reproductive process. They
are not identical and synonymous." Citing a letter of the WHO, he wrote that
"medical authorities confirm that the implantation of the fertilized ovum is the
commencement of conception and it is only after implantation that pregnancy can be
medically detected."

This theory of implantation as the beginning of life is devoid of any legal or scientific
mooring. It does not pertain to the beginning of life but to the viability of the fetus.
The fertilized ovum/zygote is not an inanimate object -it is a living human being
complete with DNA and chromosomes. Implantation has been conceptualized only
for convenience by those who had population control in mind. To adopt it would
constitute textual infidelity not only to the RH Law but also to the Constitution.

POLITICAL LAW: the right to health

A component to the right to life is the constitutional right to health. In this regard, the
Constitution is replete with provisions protecting and promoting the right to health.
Section 15, Article II of the Constitution provides:

Section 15. The State shall protect and promote the right to health of the people and
instill health consciousness among them.

A portion of Article XIII also specifically provides for the States' duty to provide for
the health of the people, viz:

Section 11. The State shall adopt an integrated and comprehensive approach to
health development which shall endeavor to make essential goods, health and other
social services available to all the people at affordable cost. There shall be priority
for the needs of the underprivileged, sick, elderly, disabled, women, and children.
The State shall endeavor to provide free medical care to paupers.

Section 12. The State shall establish and maintain an effective food and drug
regulatory system and undertake appropriate health, manpower development, and
research, responsive to the country's health needs and problems.
Section 13. The State shall establish a special agency for disabled person for their
rehabilitation, self-development, and selfreliance, and their integration into the
mainstream of society.

Finally, Section 9, Article XVI provides:

Section 9. The State shall protect consumers from trade malpractices and from
substandard or hazardous products.

Contrary to the respondent's notion, however, these provisions are self-executing.

Unless the provisions clearly express the contrary, the provisions of the Constitution
should be considered self-executory. There is no need for legislation to implement
these self-executing provisions.

It bears mentioning that the petitioners, particularly ALFI, do not question

contraception and contraceptives per se. In fact, ALFI prays that the status quo -
under R.A. No. 5921 and R.A. No. 4729, the sale and distribution of contraceptives
are not prohibited when they are dispensed by a prescription of a duly licensed by a
physician -be maintained.

The legislative intent in the enactment of the RH Law in this regard is to leave intact
the provisions of R.A. No. 4729. There is no intention at all to do away with it. It is
still a good law and its requirements are still in to be complied with. Thus, the Court
agrees with the observation of respondent Lagman that the effectivity of the RH Law
will not lead to the unmitigated proliferation of contraceptives since the sale,
distribution and dispensation of contraceptive drugs and devices will still require the
prescription of a licensed physician. With R.A. No. 4729 in place, there exists
adequate safeguards to ensure the public that only contraceptives that are safe are
made available to the public.

Thus, in the distribution by the DOH of contraceptive drugs and devices, it must
consider the provisions of R.A. No. 4729, which is still in effect, and ensure that the
contraceptives that it will procure shall be from a duly licensed drug store or
pharmaceutical company and that the actual dispensation of these contraceptive
drugs and devices will done following a prescription of a qualified medical
practitioner. The distribution of contraceptive drugs and devices must not be
indiscriminately done. The public health must be protected by all possible means. As
pointed out by Justice De Castro, a heavy responsibility and burden are assumed by
the government in supplying contraceptive drugs and devices, for it may be held
accountable for any injury, illness or loss of life resulting from or incidental to their
use.

At any rate, it bears pointing out that not a single contraceptive has yet been
submitted to the FDA pursuant to the RH Law. It behooves the Court to await its
determination which drugs or devices are declared by the FDA as safe, it being the
agency tasked to ensure that food and medicines available to the public are safe for
public consumption. Consequently, the Court finds that, at this point, the attack on
the RH Law on this ground is premature. Indeed, the various kinds of contraceptives
must first be measured up to the constitutional yardstick as expounded herein, to be
determined as the case presents itself.

At this point, the Court is of the strong view that Congress cannot legislate that
hormonal contraceptives and intra-uterine devices are safe and non-abortifacient.
The first sentence of Section 9 that ordains their inclusion by the National Drug
Formulary in the EDL by using the mandatory "shall" is to be construed as operative
only after they have been tested, evaluated, and approved by the FDA. The FDA,
not Congress, has the expertise to determine whether a particular hormonal
contraceptive or intrauterine device is safe and non-abortifacient. The provision of
the third sentence concerning the requirements for the inclusion or removal of a
particular family planning supply from the EDL supports this construction.

Stated differently, the provision in Section 9 covering the inclusion of hormonal

contraceptives, intra-uterine devices, injectables, and other safe, legal, non-
abortifacient and effective family planning products and supplies by the National
Drug Formulary in the EDL is not mandatory. There must first be a determination by
the FDA that they are in fact safe, legal, non-abortifacient and effective family
planning products and supplies. There can be no predetermination by Congress that
the gamut of contraceptives are "safe, legal, non-abortifacient and effective" without
the proper scientific examination.

POLITICAL LAW: freedom of religion and the right to free speech

At the outset, it cannot be denied that we all live in a heterogeneous society. It is

made up of people of diverse ethnic, cultural and religious beliefs and backgrounds.
History has shown us that our government, in law and in practice, has allowed these
various religious, cultural, social and racial groups to thrive in a single society
together. It has embraced minority groups and is tolerant towards all -the religious
people of different sects and the non-believers. The undisputed fact is that our
people generally believe in a deity, whatever they conceived Him to be, and to
whom they call for guidance and enlightenment in crafting our fundamental law.
Thus, the preamble of the present Constitution.

The Filipino people in "imploring the aid of Almighty God" manifested their spirituality
innate in our nature and consciousness as a people, shaped by tradition and
historical experience. As this is embodied in the preamble, it means that the State
recognizes with respect the influence of religion in so far as it instills into the mind
the purest principles of morality. Moreover, in recognition of the contributions of
religion to society, the 1935, 1973 and 1987 constitutions contain benevolent and
accommodating provisions towards religions such as tax exemption of church
property, salary of religious officers in government institutions, and optional religious
instructions in public schools.

The Framers, however, felt the need to put up a strong barrier so that the State
would not encroach into the affairs of the church, and vice-versa.

The principle of separation of Church and State was, thus, enshrined in Article II,
Section 6 ofthe 1987 Constitution, viz:

Section 6. The separation of Church and State shall be inviolable.

Verily, the principle of separation of Church and State is based on mutual respect.
Generally, the State cannot meddle in the internal affairs of the church, much less
question its faith and dogmas or dictate upon it. It cannot favor one religion and
discriminate against another. On the other hand, the church cannot impose its
beliefs and convictions on the State and the rest of the citizenry. It cannot demand
that the nation follow its beliefs, even if it sincerely believes that they are good for
the country.

Consistent with the principle that not any one religion should ever be preferred over
another, the Constitution in the above-cited provision utilizes the term "church" in its
generic sense, which refers to a temple, a mosque, an iglesia, or any other house of
God which metaphorically symbolizes a religious organization. Thus, the "Church"
means the religious congregations collectively.

Balancing the benefits that religion affords and the need to provide an ample barrier
to protect the State from the pursuit of its secular objectives, the Constitution lays
down the following mandate in Article III, Section 5 and Article VI, Section 29 (2), of
the 1987 Constitution.

In short, the constitutional assurance of religious freedom provides two guarantees:

the Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause.

The establishment clause "principally prohibits the State from sponsoring any
religion or favoring any religion as against other religions. It mandates a strict
neutrality in affairs among religious groups." Essentially, it prohibits the
establishment of a state religion and the use of public resources for the support or
prohibition ofa religion.

On the other hand, the basis of the free exercise clause is the respect for the
inviolability of the human conscience. Under this part of religious freedom
guarantee, the State is prohibited from unduly interfering with the outside
manifestations of one's belief and faith.

The establishment and free exercise clauses were not designed to serve
contradictory purposes. They have a single goal to promote freedom of individual
religious beliefs and practices. In simplest terms, the free exercise clause prohibits
government from inhibiting religious beliefs with penalties for religious beliefs and
practice, while the establishment clause prohibits government from inhibiting
religious belief with rewards for religious beliefs and practices. In other words, the
two religion clauses were intended to deny government the power to use either the
carrot or the stick to influence individual religious beliefs and practices.

Corollary to the guarantee of free exercise of one's religion is the principle that the
guarantee of religious freedom is comprised of two parts: the freedom to believe,
and the freedom to act on one's belief. The first part is absolute.

The second part however, is limited and subject to the awesome power of the State
and can be enjoyed only with proper regard to the rights of others. It is "subject to
regulation where the belief is translated into external acts that affect the public
welfare.

POLITICAL LAW: legislative acts and the free exercise clause

In the case at bench, it is not within the province of the Court to determine whether
the use of contraceptives or one's participation in the support of modem reproductive
health measures is moral from a religious standpoint or whether the same is right or
wrong according to one's dogma or belief. For the Court has declared that matters
dealing with "faith, practice, doctrine, form of worship, ecclesiastical law, custom and
rule of a church...are unquestionably ecclesiastical matters which are outside the
province of the civil courts." The jurisdiction of the Court extends only to public and
secular morality. Whatever pronouncement the Court makes in the case at bench
should be understood only in this realm where it has authority. Stated otherwise,
while the Court stands without authority to rule on ecclesiastical matters, as
vanguard of the Constitution, it does have authority to determine whether the RH
Law contravenes the guarantee of eligious freedom.

While the Constitution prohibits abortion, laws were enacted allowing the use of
contraceptives. To some medical practitioners, however, the whole idea of using
contraceptives is an anathema. Consistent with the principle of benevolent
neutrality, their beliefs should be respected.

Resultantly, the Court finds no compelling state interest which would limit the free
exercise clause of the conscientious objectors, however few in number. Only the
prevention of an immediate and grave danger to the security and welfare of the
community can justify the infringement of religious freedom. If the government fails
to show the seriousness and immediacy of the threat, State intrusion is
constitutionally unacceptable.

Freedom of religion means more than just the freedom to believe. It also means the
freedom to act or not to act according to what one believes. And this freedom is
violated when one is compelled to act against one's belief or is prevented from
acting according to one's belief.

Apparently, in these cases, there is no immediate danger to the life or health of an

individual in the perceived scenario of the subject provisions. After all, a couple who
plans the timing, number and spacing of the birth of their children refers to a future
event that is contingent on whether or not the mother decides to adopt or use the
information, product, method or supply given to her or whether she even decides to
become pregnant at all. On the other hand, the burden placed upon those who
object to contraceptive use is immediate and occurs the moment a patient seeks
consultation on reproductive health matters.

Moreover, granting that a compelling interest exists to justify the infringement of the
conscientious objector's religious freedom, the respondents have failed to
demonstrate "the gravest abuses, endangering paramount interests" which could
limit or override a person's fundamental right to religious freedom. Also, the
respondents have not presented any government effort exerted to show that the
means it takes to achieve its legitimate state objective is the least intrusive means.
Other than the assertion that the act of referring would only be momentary,
considering that the act of referral by a conscientious objector is the very action
being contested as violative of religious freedom, it behooves the respondents to
demonstrate that no other means can be undertaken by the State to achieve its
objective without violating the rights of the conscientious objector. The health
concerns of women may still be addressed by other practitioners who may perform
reproductive health-related procedures with open willingness and motivation. Suffice
it to say, a person who is forced to perform an act in utter reluctance deserves the
protection of the Court as the last vanguard of constitutional freedoms.

At any rate, there are other secular steps already taken by the Legislature to ensure
that the right to health is protected. Considering other legislations as they stand now,
R.A. No. 4 729 or the Contraceptive Act, R.A. No. 6365 or "The Population Act of the
Philippines" and R.A. No. 9710, otherwise known as "The Magna Carta of Women,"
amply cater to the needs of women in relation to health services and programs.

Granting that there are still deficiencies and flaws in the delivery of social healthcare
programs for Filipino women, they could not be solved by a measure that puts an
unwarrantable stranglehold on religious beliefs m exchange for blind conformity.

POLITICAL LAW: exception; life threatening cases

All this notwithstanding, the Court properly recognizes a valid exception set forth in
the law. While generally healthcare service providers cannot be forced to render
reproductive health care procedures if doing it would contravene their religious
beliefs, an exception must be made in life threatening cases that require the
performance of emergency procedures. In these situations, the right to life of the
mother should be given preference, considering that a referral by a medical
practitioner would amount to a denial of service, resulting to unnecessarily placing
the life of a mother in grave danger.

POLITICAL LAW: academic freedom

The Court declines to rule on its constitutionality or validity.

At any rate, Section 12, Article II of the 1987 Constitution provides that the natural
and primary right and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency
and development of moral character shall receive the support of the Government.
Like the 1973 Constitution and the 1935 Constitution, the 1987 Constitution affirms
the State recognition of the invaluable role of parents in preparing the youth to
become productive members of society. Notably, it places more importance on the
role of parents in the development of their children by recognizing that said role shall
be "primary," that is, that the right of parents in upbringing the youth is superior to
that of the State.

It is also the inherent right of the State to act as parens patriae to aid parents in the
moral development of the youth. Indeed, the Constitution makes mention of the
importance of developing the youth and their important role in nation building.

Furthermore, as Section 14 also mandates that the mandatory reproductive health

education program shall be developed in conjunction with parent-teacher-community
associations, school officials and other interest groups, it could very well be said that
it will be in line with the religious beliefs of the petitioners. By imposing such a
condition, it becomes apparent that the petitioners' contention that Section 14
violates Article XV, Section 3(1) of the Constitution is without merit.

POLITICAL LAW: due process

A statute or act suffers from the defect of vagueness when it lacks comprehensible
standards that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess its meaning and
differ as to its application. It is repugnant to the Constitution in two respects: (1) it
violates due process for failure to accord persons, especially the parties targeted by
it, fair notice of the conduct to avoid; and (2) it leaves law enforcers unbridled
discretion in carrying out its provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing of the
Government muscle.

Moreover, in determining whether the words used in a statute are vague, words
must not only be taken in accordance with their plain meaning alone, but also in
relation to other parts of the statute. It is a rule that every part of the statute must be
interpreted with reference to the context, that is, every part of it must be construed
together with the other parts and kept subservient to the general intent of the whole
enactment.

The Court need not belabor the issue of whether the right to be exempt from being
obligated to render reproductive health service and modem family planning
methods, includes exemption from being obligated to give reproductive health
information and to render reproductive health procedures. Clearly, subject to the
qualifications and exemptions earlier discussed, the right to be exempt from being
obligated to render reproductive health service and modem family planning
methods, necessarily includes exemption from being obligated to give reproductive
health information and to render reproductive health procedures. The terms
"service" and "methods" are broad enough to include the providing of information
and the rendering of medical procedures.

POLITICAL LAW: equal protection

The petitioners also claim that the RH Law violates the equal protection clause
under the Constitution as it discriminates against the poor because it makes them
the primary target of the government program that promotes contraceptive use.
They argue that, rather than promoting reproductive health among the poor, the RH
Law introduces contraceptives that would effectively reduce the number of the poor.
Their bases are the various provisions in the RH Law dealing with the poor,
especially those mentioned in the guiding principles and definition of terms of the
law.

"According to a long line of decisions, equal protection simply requires that all
persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights
conferred and responsibilities imposed." It "requires public bodies and institutions to
treat similarly situated individuals in a similar manner." "The purpose of the equal
protection clause is to secure every person within a state's jurisdiction against
intentional and arbitrary discrimination, whether occasioned by the express terms of
a statue or by its improper execution through the state's duly constituted authorities."
"In other words, the concept of equal justice under the law requires the state to
govern impartially, and it may not draw distinctions between individuals solely on
differences that are irrelevant to a legitimate governmental objective."

The equal protection clause is aimed at all official state actions, not just those of the
legislature. Its inhibitions cover all the departments of the government including the
political and executive departments, and extend to all actions of a state denying
equal protection of the laws, through whatever agency or whatever guise is taken.

It, however, does not require the universal application of the laws to all persons or
things without distinction. What it simply requires is equality among equals as
determined according to a valid classification. Indeed, the equal protection clause
permits classification. Such classification, however, to be valid must pass the test of
reasonableness. The test has four requisites: (1) The classification rests on
substantial distinctions; (2) It is germane to the purpose of the law; (3) It is not
limited to existing conditions only; and (4) It applies equally to all members of the
same class.

"Superficial differences do not make for a valid classification."

For a classification to meet the requirements of constitutionality, it must include or

embrace all persons who naturally belong to the class. "The classification will be
regarded as invalid if all the members of the class are not similarly treated, both as
to rights conferred and obligations imposed. It is not necessary that the classification
be made with absolute symmetry, in the sense that the members of the class should
possess the same characteristics in equal degree. Substantial similarity will suffice;
and as long as this is achieved, all those covered by the classification are to be
treated equally. The mere fact that an individual belonging to a class differs from the
other members, as long as that class is substantially distinguishable from all others,
does not justify the non-application of the law to him."

The classification must not be based on existing circumstances only, or so

constituted as to preclude addition to the number included in the class. It must be of
such a nature as to embrace all those who may thereafter be in similar
circumstances and conditions. It must not leave out or "under include" those that
should otherwise fall into a certain classification.

POLITICAL LAW: involuntary servitude

The OSG counters that the rendition of pro bono services envisioned in Section 17
can hardly be considered as forced labor analogous to slavery, as reproductive
health care service providers have the discretion as to the manner and time of giving
pro bono services. Moreover, the OSG points out that the imposition is within the
powers of the government, the accreditation of medical practitioners with Phil Health
being a privilege and not a right.

The point ofthe OSG is well-taken.

It should first be mentioned that the practice of medicine is undeniably imbued with
public interest that it is both a power and a duty of the State to control and regulate it
in order to protect and promote the public welfare. Like the legal profession, the
practice of medicine is not a right but a privileged burdened with conditions as it
directly involves the very lives of the people. A fortiori, this power includes the power
of Congress to prescribe the qualifications for the practice of professions or trades
which affect the public welfare, the public health, the public morals, and the public
safety; and to regulate or control such professions or trades, even to the point of
revoking such right altogether.

Moreover, as some petitioners put it, the notion of involuntary servitude connotes the
presence of force, threats, intimidation or other similar means of coercion and
compulsion. A reading of the assailed provision, however, reveals that it only
encourages private and non-government reproductive healthcare service providers
to render pro bona service. Other than non-accreditation with Phil Health, no penalty
is imposed should they choose to do otherwise. Private and non-government
reproductive healthcare service providers also enjoy the liberty to choose which kind
of health service they wish to provide, when, where and how to provide it or whether
to provide it all. Clearly, therefore, no compulsion, force or threat is made upon them
to render pro bono service against their will. While the rendering of such service was
made a prerequisite to accreditation with PhilHealth, the Court does not consider the
same to be an unreasonable burden, but rather, a necessary incentive imposed by
Congress in the furtherance of a perceived legitimate state interest.

Consistent with what the Court had earlier discussed, however, it should be
emphasized that conscientious objectors are exempt from this provision as long as
their religious beliefs and convictions do not allow them to render reproductive
health service, pro bona or otherwise.

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION: natural law

With respect to the argument that the RH Law violates natural law, suffice it to say
that the Court does not duly recognize it as a legal basis for upholding or invalidating
a law. Our only guidepost is the Constitution.

While every law enacted by man emanated from what is perceived as natural law,
the Court is not obliged to see if a statute, executive issuance or ordinance is in
conformity to it. To begin with, it is not enacted by an acceptable legitimate body.
Moreover, natural laws are mere thoughts and notions on inherent rights espoused
by theorists, philosophers and theologists. The jurists of the philosophical school are
interested in the law as an abstraction, rather than in the actual law of the past or
present. Unless, a natural right has been transformed into a written law, it cannot
serve as a basis to strike down a law. In Republic v. Sandiganbayan, the very case
cited by the petitioners, it was explained that the Court is not duty bound to examine
every law or action and whether it conforms with both the Constitution and natural
law. Rather, natural law is to be used sparingly only in the most peculiar of
circumstances involving rights inherent to man where no law is applicable.

At any rate, as earlier expounded, the RH Law does not sanction the taking away of
life. It does not allow abortion in any shape or form. It only seeks to enhance the
population control program of the government by providing information and making
non-abortifacient contraceptives more readily available to the public, especially to
the poor.

POLITICAL LAW: constitutionality of the RH law

In general, the Court does not find the RH Law as unconstitutional insofar as it
seeks to provide access to medically-safe, non-abortifacient, effective, legal,
affordable, and quality reproductive healthcare services, methods, devices, and
supplies. As earlier pointed out, however, the religious freedom of some sectors of
society cannot be trampled upon in pursuit of what the law hopes to achieve. After
all, the Constitutional safeguard to religious freedom is a recognition that man
stands accountable to an authority higher than the State.

In conformity with the principle of separation of Church and State, one religious
group cannot be allowed to impose its beliefs on the rest of the society. Philippine
modem society leaves enough room for diversity and pluralism. As such, everyone
should be tolerant and open-minded so that peace and harmony may continue to
reign as we exist alongside each other.

As healthful as the intention of the RH Law may be, the idea does not escape the
Court that what it seeks to address is the problem of rising poverty and
unemployment in the country. Let it be said that the cause of these perennial issues
is not the large population but the unequal distribution of wealth. Even if population
growth is controlled, poverty will remain as long as the country's wealth remains in
the hands of the very few.

At any rate, population control may not be beneficial for the country in the long run.
The European and Asian countries, which embarked on such a program generations
ago, are now burdened with ageing populations. The number of their young workers
is dwindling with adverse effects on their economy. These young workers represent
a significant human capital which could have helped them invigorate, innovate and
fuel their economy. These countries are now trying to reverse their programs, but
they are still struggling. For one, Singapore, even with incentives, is failing.

Indeed, at the present, the country has a population problem, but the State should
not use coercive measures (like the penal provisions of the RH Law against
conscientious objectors) to solve it. Nonetheless, the policy of the Court is non-
interference in the wisdom of a law.

WHEREFORE, the petitions are PARTIALLY GRANTED. Accordingly, the Court

declares R.A. No. 10354 as NOT UNCONSTITUTIONAL except with respect to
the following provisions which are declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL:

1] Section 7 and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR insofar as they: a)

require private health facilities and non-maternity specialty hospitals and hospitals
owned and operated by a religious group to refer patients, not in an emergency or
life-threatening case, as defined under Republic Act No. 8344, to another health
facility which is conveniently accessible; and b) allow minor-parents or minors who
have suffered a miscarriage access to modem methods of family planning without
written consent from their parents or guardian/s;
2) Section 23(a)(l) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR, particularly
Section 5 .24 thereof, insofar as they punish any healthcare service provider who
fails and or refuses to disseminate information regarding programs and services on
reproductive health regardless of his or her religious beliefs.

3) Section 23(a)(2)(i) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR insofar as they
allow a married individual, not in an emergency or lifethreatening case, as defined
under Republic Act No. 8344, to undergo reproductive health procedures without the
consent of the spouse;

4) Section 23(a)(2)(ii) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR insofar as they
limit the requirement of parental consent only to elective surgical procedures.

5] Section 23(a)(3) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR, particularly

Section 5.24 thereof, insofar as they punish any healthcare service provider who
fails and/or refuses to refer a patient not in an emergency or life-threatening case, as
defined under Republic Act No. 8344, to another health care service provider within
the same facility or one which is conveniently accessible regardless ofhis or her
religious beliefs;

6] Section 23(b) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR, particularly Section
5 .24 thereof, insofar as they punish any public officer who refuses to support
reproductive health programs or shall do any act that hinders the full implementation
of a reproductive health program, regardless of his or her religious beliefs;

7] Section 17 and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR regarding the

rendering of pro bona reproductive health service in so far as they affect the
conscientious objector in securing PhilHealth accreditation;

and

8] Section 3.0l(a) and Section 3.01 G) of the RH-IRR, which added the qualifier
"primarily" in defining abortifacients and contraceptives, as they are ultra vires and,
therefore, null and void for contravening Section 4(a) of the RH Law and violating
Section 12, Article II of the Constitution.

The Status Quo Ante Order issued by the Court on March 19, 2013 as extended by
its Order, dated July 16, 2013, is hereby LIFTED, insofar as the provisions of R.A.
No. 10354 which have been herein declared as constitutional.

GOVERNMENT SERVICE G.R. No. 170132

INSURANCE SYSTEM (GSIS) and
 WINSTON F. GARCIA, in his capacity Present:
as GSIS President & General Manager,
Petitioners,
PUNO, J., Chairperson,
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
*
CORONA,
- versus -
AZCUNA, and
GARCIA, JJ.

KAPISANAN NG MGA
MANGGAGAWA SA GSIS,
Respondent. Promulgated:

December 6, 2006
x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

GARCIA, J.:

In this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) and its President and General
Manager Winston F. Garcia (Garcia, for short) assail and seek to nullify the
Decision[1] dated June 16, 2005 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No.
87220,as reiterated in its Resolution[2] of October 18, 2005 denying Garcias motion
for reconsideration.
 The recourse is cast against the following setting:

A four-day October 2004 concerted demonstration, rallies and en

masse walkout waged/held in front of the GSIS main office in Roxas
Boulevard, Pasay City, started it all. Forming a huge part of the October 4 to October
7, 2004 mass action participants were GSIS personnel, among them members of the
herein respondent Kapisanan Ng Mga Manggagawa sa GSIS (KMG or the Union),
a public sector union of GSIS rank-and-file employees. Contingents from other
government agencies joined causes with the GSIS group. The mass actions target
appeared to have been herein petitioner Garcia and his management style. While the
Mayor of Pasay City allegedly issued a rally permit, the absence of the participating
GSIS employees was not covered by a prior approved leave.[3]

On or about October 10, 2004, the manager of the GSIS Investigating Unit
issued a memorandum directing 131 union and non-union members to show cause
why they should not be charged administratively for their participation in said rally.
In reaction, KMGs counsel, Atty. Manuel Molina, sought reconsideration of said
directive on the ground, among others, that the subject employees resumed work
on October 8, 2004 in obedience to the return-to-work order thus issued. The plea
for reconsideration was, however, effectively denied by the filing, on October 25,
2004, of administrative charges against some 110 KMG members for grave
misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service.[4]

What happened next is summarized by the CA in its challenged decision

of June 16, 2005, albeit the herein petitioners would except from some of the details
of the appellate courts narration:

Ignoring said formal charges, KMG, thru its President, Albert

Velasco, commenced the instant suit on November 2, 2004, with the
filing of the Petition for Prohibition at bench. On the ground that its
members should not be made to explain why they supported their unions
cause, petitioner [KMG] faulted respondent [Garcia] with blatant
 disregard of Civil Service Resolution No. 021316, otherwise known as
the Guidelines for Prohibited Mass Action, Section 10 of which exhorts
government agencies to harness all means within their capacity to accord
due regard and attention to employees grievances and facilitate their
speedy and amicable disposition through the use of grievance machinery
or any other modes of settlement sanctioned by law and existing civil
service rules. Two supplements to the foregoing petition were eventually
filed by KMG. The first, apprised [the CA] of the supposed fact that its
Speaker, Atty. Molina, had been placed under preventive suspension for
90 days and that the formal charges thus filed will not only deprive its
members of the privileges and benefits due them but will also disqualify
them from promotion, step increment adjustments and receipt of
monetary benefits, including their 13th month pay and Christmas
bonuses. The second, xxx manifested that, on December 17, 2004,
respondent [Garcia] served a spate of additional formal charges against
230 of KMGs members for their participation in the aforesaid grievance
demonstrations.

In his December 14, 2004 comment to the foregoing petition,

respondent [Garcia] averred that the case at bench was filed by an
unauthorized representative in view of the fact that Albert Velasco had
already been dropped from the GSIS rolls and, by said token, had ceased
to be a member much less the President of KMG. Invoking the rule
against forum shopping, respondent [Garcia] called [the CAs] attention
to the supposed fact that the allegations in the subject petition merely
duplicated those already set forth in two petitions for certiorari and
prohibition earlier filed by Albert Velasco . Because said petitions are, in
point of fact, pending before this court as CA-G.R. SP Nos. 86130 and
86365, respondent [Garcia] prayed for the dismissal of the petition at
bench .[5] (Words in bracket added.)

It appears that pending resolution by the CA of the KMG petition for

prohibition in this case, the GSIS management proceeded with the investigation of
the administrative cases filed. As represented in a pleading before the CA, as of May
18, 2005, two hundred seven (207) out of the two hundred seventy eight (278) cases
filed had been resolved, resulting in the exoneration of twenty (20) respondent-
employees, the reprimand of one hundred eighty two (182) and the suspension for
one month of five (5).[6]
 On June 16, 2005, the CA rendered the herein assailed decision[7] holding
that Garcias filing of administrative charges against 361 of [KMGs] members is
tantamount to grave abuse of discretion which may be the proper subject of the writ
of prohibition. Dispositively, the decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition [of KMG]

is GRANTED and respondent [Winston F. Garcia] is
hereby PERPETUALLY ENJOINED from implementing the issued
formal charges and from issuing other formal charges arising from the
same facts and events.

SO ORDERED. (Emphasis in the original)

Unable to accept the above ruling and the purported speculative factual and
erroneous legal premises holding it together, petitioner Garcia sought
reconsideration. In its equally assailed Resolution[8] of October 18, 2005, however,
the appellate court denied reconsideration of its decision.

Hence, this recourse by the petitioners ascribing serious errors on the

appellate court in granting the petition for prohibition absent an instance of grave
abuse of authority on their part.

We resolve to GRANT the petition.

It should be stressed right off that the civil service encompasses all
branches and agencies of the Government, including government-owned or
controlled corporations (GOCCs) with original charters, like the GSIS,[9] or those
created by special law.[10] As such, employees of covered GOCCs are part of the
 civil service system and are subject to circulars, rules and regulations issued by
the Civil Service Commission (CSC) on discipline, attendance and general
terms/conditions of employment, inclusive of matters involving self-
organization, strikes, demonstrations and like concerted actions. In fact, policies
established on public sector unionism and rules issued on mass action have
been noted and cited by the Court in at least a case.[11] Among these issuances
is Executive Order (EO) No. 180, series of 1987, providing guidelines for the
exercise of the right to organize of government employees. Relevant also is CSC
Resolution No. 021316 which provides rules on prohibited concerted mass
actions in the public sector.

There is hardly any dispute about the formal charges against the 278 affected
GSIS employees a mix of KMG union and non-union members - having arose from
their having gone on unauthorized leave of absence (AWOL) for at least a day or
two in the October 4 to 7, 2004 stretch to join the ranks of the demonstrators /rallyists
at that time. As stated in each of the formal charges, the employees act of attending,
joining, participating and taking part in the strike/rally is a transgression of the rules
on strike in the public sector. The question that immediately comes to the fore,
therefore, is whether or not the mass action staged by or participated in by said GSIS
employees partook of a strike or prohibited concerted mass action. If in the
affirmative, then the denounced filing of the administrative charges would beprima
facie tenable, inasmuch as engaging in mass actions resulting in work stoppage or
service disruption constitutes, in the minimum, the punishable offense of acting
prejudicial to the best interest of the service.[12] If in the negative, then such filing
would indeed smack of arbitrariness and justify the issuance of a corrective or
preventive writ.

Petitioners assert that the filing of the formal charges are but a natural
consequence of the service-disrupting rallies and demonstrations staged during
office hours by the absenting GSIS employees, there being appropriate issuances
outlawing such kinds of mass action. On the other hand, the CA, agreeing with the
respondents argument, assumed the view and held that the organized demonstrating
employees did nothing more than air their grievances in the exercise of their broader
rights of free expression[13] and are, therefore, not amenable to administrative
sanctions. For perspective, following is what the CA said:

Although the filing of administrative charges against [respondent KMGs]

members is well within [petitioner Garcias] official [disciplinary]
prerogatives, [his] exercise of the power vested under Section 45 of
Republic Act No. 8291 was tainted with arbitrariness and vindictiveness
against which prohibition was sought by [respondent]. xxx the fact that
the subject mass demonstrations were directed against [Garcias] supposed
mismanagement of the financial resources of the GSIS, by and of itself,
renders the filing of administrative charges against [KMGs] member
suspect. More significantly, we find the gravity of the offenses and the
sheer number of persons charged administratively to be, at the very least,
antithetical to the best interest of the service.

It matters little that, instead of the 361 alleged by petitioner, only 278
charges were actually filed [and] in the meantime, disposed of and of the
said number, 20 resulted to exoneration, 182 to reprimand and 5 to the
imposition of a penalty of one month suspension. Irrespective of their
outcome, the severe penalties prescribed for the offense with which
petitioners members were charged, to our mind, bespeak of bellicose and
castigatory reaction . The fact that most of the employees [Garcia]
administratively charged were eventually meted with what appears to be
a virtual slap on the wrist even makes us wonder why respondent even
bothered to file said charges at all. xxx.

Alongside the consequences of the right of government employees to

form, join or assist employees organization, we have already mentioned
how the broader rights of free expression cast its long shadow over the
case. xxx we find [petitioner Garcias] assailed acts, on the whole,
anathema to said right which has been aptly characterized as preferred,
one which stands on a higher level than substantive economic and other
liberties, the matrix of other important rights of our people.
xxx.[14] (Underscoring and words in bracket added; citations omitted.)
 While its decision and resolution do not explicitly say so, the CA equated the
right to form associations with the right to engage in strike and similar activities
available to workers in the private sector. In the concrete, the appellate court
concluded that inasmuch as GSIS employees are not barred from forming, joining
or assisting employees organization, petitioner Garcia could not validly initiate
charges against GSIS employees waging or joining rallies and demonstrations
notwithstanding the service-disruptive effect of such mass action. Citing what
Justice Isagani Cruz said in Manila Public School Teachers Association [MPSTA]
v. Laguio, Jr.,[15] the appellate court declared:

It is already evident from the aforesaid provisions of Resolution

No. 021316 that employees of the GSIS are not among those specifically
barred from forming, joining or assisting employees organization such as
[KMG]. If only for this ineluctable fact, the merit of the petition at bench
is readily discernible.[16]

We are unable to lend concurrence to the above CA posture. For, let alone the
fact that it ignores what the Court has uniformly held all along, the appellate courts
position is contrary to what Section 4 in relation to Section 5 of CSC Resolution No.
021316[17] provides. Besides, the appellate courts invocation of Justice Cruzs
opinion in MPSTA is clearly off-tangent, the good Justices opinion thereat being a
dissent. It may be, as the appellate court urged that the freedom of expression and
assembly and the right to petition the government for a redress of grievances stand
on a level higher than economic and other liberties. Any suggestion, however, about
these rights as including the right on the part of government personnel to strike ought
to be, as it has been, trashed. We have made this abundantly clear in our past
determinations. For instance, in Alliance of Government Workers v. Minister of
Labor and Employment,[18] a case decided under the aegis of the 1973 Constitution,
an en banc Court declared that it would be unfair to allow employees of government
corporations to resort to concerted activity with the ever present threat of a strike to
wring benefits from Government. Then came the 1987 Constitution expressly
guaranteeing, for the first time, the right of government personnel to self-
organization[19] to complement the provision according workers the right to engage
in peaceful concerted activities, including the right to strike in accordance with
law.[20]

It was against the backdrop of the aforesaid provisions of the 1987

Constitution that the Court resolved Bangalisan v. Court of Appeals.[21] In it, we
held, citingMPSTA v. Laguio, Jr.,[22] that employees in the public service may not
engage in strikes or in concerted and unauthorized stoppage of work; that the right
of government employees to organize is limited to the formation of unions or
associations, without including the right to strike.

Jacinto v. Court of Appeals[23] came next and there we explained:

Specifically, the right of civil servants to organize themselves was
positively recognized in Association of Court of Appeals Employees vs.
Ferrer-Caleja. But, as in the exercise of the rights of free expression and
of assembly, there are standards for allowable limitations such as the
legitimacy of the purpose of the association, [and] the overriding
considerations of national security . . . .

As regards the right to strike, the Constitution itself qualifies its

exercise with the provision in accordance with law. This is a clear
manifestation that the state may, by law, regulate the use of this right, or
even deny certain sectors such right. Executive Order 180 which provides
guidelines for the exercise of the right of government workers to organize,
for instance, implicitly endorsed an earlier CSC circular which enjoins
under pain of administrative sanctions, all government officers and
employees from staging strikes, demonstrations, mass leaves, walkouts
and other forms of mass action which will result in temporary stoppage or
disruption of public service by stating that the Civil Service law and rules
governing concerted activities and strikes in government service shall be
observed. (Emphasis and words in bracket added; citations omitted)
 And in the fairly recent case of Gesite v. Court of Appeals,[24] the Court
defined the limits of the right of government employees to organize in the
following wise:

It is relevant to state at this point that the settled rule in this jurisdiction is that

employees in the public service may not engage in strikes, mass leaves, walkouts, and

other forms of mass action that will lead in the temporary stoppage or disruption of public

service. The right of government employees to organize is limited to the formation of

unions or associations only, without including the right to strike,

adding that public employees going on disruptive unauthorized absences to join

concerted mass actions may be held liable for conduct prejudicial to the best interest
of the service.

Significantly, 1986 Constitutional Commission member Eulogio Lerum, answering

in the negative the poser of whether or not the right of government employees to
self-organization also includes the right to strike, stated:

When we proposed this amendment providing for self organization of

government employees, it does not mean that because they have the right
to organize, they have also the right to strike. That is a different matter.
xxx[25]

With the view we take of the events that transpired on October 4-7, 2004, what
respondents members launched or participated in during that time partook of a strike
or, what contextually amounts to the same thing, a prohibited concerted activity. The
phrase prohibited concerted activity refers to any collective activity undertaken by
government employees, by themselves or through their employees organization,
with the intent of effecting work stoppage or service disruption in order to realize
their demands or force concessions, economic or otherwise; it includes mass leaves,
walkouts, pickets and acts of similar nature.[26] Indeed, for four straight days,
participating KMG members and other GSIS employees staged a walk out and
waged or participated in a mass protest or demonstration right at the very doorstep
of the GSIS main office building. The record of attendance[27] for the period material
shows that, on the first day of the protest, 851 employees, or forty eight per cent
(48%) of the total number of employees in the main office (1,756) took to the streets
during office hours, from 6 a.m. to 2 p.m.,[28] leaving the other employees to fend for
themselves in an office where a host of transactions take place every business day.
On the second day, 707 employees left their respective work stations, while 538
participated in the mass action on the third day. A smaller number, i.e., 306
employees, but by no means an insignificant few, joined the fourth day activity.

To say that there was no work disruption or that the delivery of services
remained at the usual level of efficiency at the GSIS main office during those four
(4) days of massive walkouts and wholesale absences would be to understate things.
And to place the erring employees beyond the reach of administrative accountability
would be to trivialize the civil service rules, not to mention the compelling spirit of
professionalism exacted of civil servants by the Code of Conduct and Ethical
Standards for Public Officials and Employees. [29]

The appellate court made specific reference to the parliament of the streets,
obviously to lend concurrence to respondents pretension that the gathering of GSIS
employees on October 4-7, 2004 was an assembly of citizens out only to air
grievances, not a striking crowd. According to the respondent, a strike presupposes
a mass action undertaken to press for some economic demands or secure additional
material employment benefits.

We are not convinced.

 In whatever name respondent desires to call the four-day mass action in
October 2004, the stubborn fact remains that the erring employees, instead of
exploring non-crippling activities during their free time, had taken a disruptive
approach to attain whatever it was they were specifically after. As events evolved,
they assembled in front of the GSIS main office building during office hours and
staged rallies and protests, and even tried to convince others to join their cause, thus
provoking work stoppage and service-delivery disruption, the very evil sought to be
forestalled by the prohibition against strikes by government personnel.[30]

The Court can concede hypothetically that the protest rally and gathering in
question did not involve some specific material demand. But then the absence of
such economic-related demand, even if true, did not, under the premises, make such
mass action less of a prohibited concerted activity. For, as articulated earlier, any
collective activity undertaken by government employees with the intent of effecting
work stoppage or service disruption in order to realize their demands or force
concessions, economic or otherwise, is a prohibited concerted mass action[31] and
doubtless actionable administratively. Bangalisan even went further to say the
following: [i]n the absence of statute, public employees do not have the right to
engage in concerted work stoppages for any purpose.
To petitioner Garcia, as President and General Manager of GSIS, rests the
authority and responsibility, under Section 45 of Republic Act No. 8291, the GSIS
Act of 1997, to remove, suspend or otherwise discipline GSIS personnel for
cause.[32] At bottom then, petitioner Garcia, by filing or causing the filing of
administrative charges against the absenting participants of the October 4-7,
2004 mass action, merely performed a duty expected of him and enjoined by law.
Regardless of the mood petitioner Garcia was in when he signed the charge sheet,
his act can easily be sustained as legally correct and doubtless within his
jurisdiction.

It bears to reiterate at this point that the GSIS employees concerned were
proceeded against - and eventually either exonerated, reprimanded or meted a
one-month suspension, as the case may be - not for the exercise of their right to
assemble peacefully and to petition for redress of grievance, but for engaging in
what appeared to be a prohibited concerted activity. Respondent no less admitted
that its members and other GSIS employees might have disrupted public service.[33]

To be sure, arbitrariness and whimsical exercise of power or, in fine, grave

abuse of discretion on the part of petitioner Garcia cannot be simplistically inferred
from the sheer number of those charged as well as the gravity or the dire
consequences of the charge of grave misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the
best interest of the service, as the appellate court made it to appear. The principle
of accountability demands that every erring government employee be made
answerable for any malfeasance or misfeasance committed. And lest it be
overlooked, the mere filing of formal administrative case, regardless of the gravity
of the offense charged, does not overcome the presumptive innocence of the
persons complained of nor does it shift the burden of evidence to prove guilt of an
administrative offense from the complainant.

Moreover, the Court invites attention to its holding in MPSTA v. Laguio, Jr., a
case involving over 800 public school teachers who took part in mass actions for
which the then Secretary of Education filed administrative complaints on assorted
charges, such as gross misconduct. Of those charged, 650 were dismissed and 195
suspended for at least six (6) months The Court, however, did not consider the
element of number of respondents thereat and/or the dire consequences of the
charge/s as fatally vitiating or beclouding the bona fides of the Secretary of
Educations challenged action. Then as now, the Court finds the filing of charges
against a large number of persons and/or the likelihood that they will be suspended
or, worse, dismissed from the service for the offense as indicating a strong and clear
case of grave abuse of authority to justify the issuance of a writ of prohibition.

The appellate court faulted petitioner Garcia for not first taping existing
grievance machinery and other modes of settlement agreed upon in the GSIS-KMG
Collective Negotiations Agreement (CAN) before going full steam ahead with his
formal charges.[34]
 The Court can plausibly accord cogency to the CAs angle on grievance
procedure but for the fact that it conveniently disregarded what appears to be the
more relevant provision of the CNA. We refer to Article VI which reads:

The GSIS Management and the KMG have mutually agreed to

promote the principle of shared responsibility on all matters and
decisions affecting the rights, benefits and interests of all GSIS employees
. Accordingly, the parties also mutually agree that the KMG shall not
declare a strike nor stage any concerted action which will disrupt public
service and the GSIS management shall not lockout employees who are
members of the KMG during the term of this agreement. GSIS
Management shall also respect the rights of the employees to air their
sentiments through peaceful concerted activities during allowable hours,
subject to reasonable office rules .[35] (Underscoring added)

If the finger of blame, therefore, is to be pointed at someone for non-

exhaustion of less confrontational remedies, it should be at the respondent union
for spearheading a concerted mass action without resorting to available settlement
mechanism. As it were, it was KMG, under Atty. Alberto Velasco, which opened fire
first. That none of the parties bothered to avail of the grievance procedures under
the GSIS-KMG CNA should not be taken against the GSIS. At best, both GSIS
management and the Union should be considered as in pari delicto.

With the foregoing disquisitions, the Court finds it unnecessary to discuss at

length the legal standing of Alberto Velasco to represent the herein respondent
union and to initiate the underlying petition for prohibition. Suffice it to state that
Velasco, per Joint Resolution No. 04-10-01 approved on October 5, 2004 by the
KMG Joint Executive-Legislative Assembly, had ceased to be member, let alone
president, of the KMG, having previously been dropped from the rolls of GSIS
employees.[36] While the dropping from the rolls is alleged to have been the subject
of a CA-issued temporary restraining order (TRO), the injunction came after Atty.
Velasco had in fact been separated from the service and it appears that the TRO
had already expired.
 As a final consideration, the Court notes or reiterates the following relevant
incidents surrounding the disposition of the case below:

1. The CA had invoked as part of its ratio decidendi a dissenting opinion

in MPSTA, even going to the extent of describing as instructive and timely a portion,
when the majority opinion thereat, which the appellate court ignored, is the
controlling jurisprudence.

2. The CA gave prominence to dispositions and rattled off holdings[37] of the

Court, which appropriately apply only to strikes in the private industry labor sector,
and utilized the same as springboard to justify an inference of grave abuse of
discretion. On the other hand, it only gave perfunctory treatment if not totally
ignored jurisprudence that squarely dealt with strikes in the public sector, as if the
right to strike given to unions in private corporations/entities is necessarily
applicable to civil service employees.

3. As couched, the assailed CA decision perpetually bars respondent Garcia

and necessarily whoever succeeds him as GSIS President not only from
implementing the formal charges against GSIS employees who participated in the
October 4 - 7, 2004 mass action but also from issuing other formal charges arising
from the same events. The injunction was predicated on a finding that grave abuse
of discretion attended the exercise of petitioner Garcias disciplinary power vested
him under Section 45 of RA 8291.[38] At bottom then, the assailed decision struck
down as a nullity, owing to the alleged attendant arbitrariness, not only acts that
have already been done, but those yet to be done. In net effect, any formal charge
arising from the October 4-7, 2004 incident is, under any and all circumstances,
prejudged as necessarily tainted with arbitrariness to be slain at sight.

The absurdities and ironies easily deducible from the foregoing situations are
not lost on the Court.
 We close with the observation that the assailed decision and resolution, if
allowed to remain undisturbed, would likely pave the way to the legitimization of
mass actions undertaken by civil servants, regardless of their deleterious effects on
the interest of the public they have sworn to serve with loyalty and efficiency.
Worse still, it would permit the emergence of a system where public sector workers
are, as the petitioners aptly put it, immune from the minimum reckoning for acts
that [under settled jurisprudence] are concededly unlawful. This aberration would
be intolerable.

WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of

Appeals are REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the writ of prohibition issued by
that court is NULLIFIED.

No Cost.

SO ORDERED.

Case Digest: Disini v. Secretary of Justice

G.R. No. 203335: February 11, 2014

JOSE JESUS M. DISINI, JR., ROWENA S. DISINI, LIANNE IVY P. MEDINA,

JANETTE TORAL and ERNESTO SONIDO, JR., Petitioners, v. THE
SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, THE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF THE
INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT, THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR OF THE
INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGY OFFICE, THE CHIEF
OF THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE and THE DIRECTOR OF THE
NATIONAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, Respondents.

ABAD, J.:

FACTS:

Petitioners assail the validity of several provision of the Republic Act (R.A.) 10175,
the Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012.
Petitioners claim that the means adopted by the cybercrime law for regulating
undesirable cyberspace activities violate certain of their constitutional rights. The
government of course asserts that the law merely seeks to reasonably put order into
cyberspace activities, punish wrongdoings, and prevent hurtful attacks on the
system.

ISSUES:

Whether or not the following provisions are valid and constitutional.

a. Section 4(a)(1) on Illegal Access;

b. Section 4(a)(3) on Data Interference;

c. Section 4(a)(6) on Cyber-squatting;

d. Section 4(b)(3) on Identity Theft;

e. Section 4(c)(1) on Cybersex;

f. Section 4(c)(2) on Child Pornography;

g.Section 4(c)(3) on Unsolicited Commercial Communications;

h. Section 4(c)(4) on Libel;

i. Section 5 on Aiding or Abetting and Attempt in the Commission of Cybercrimes;

j. Section 6 on the Penalty of One Degree Higher;

k. Section 7 on the Prosecution under both the Revised Penal Code (RPC) and R.A.
10175;

l. Section 8 on Penalties;

m. Section 12 on Real-Time Collection of Traffic Data;

n. Section 13 on Preservation of Computer Data;

o. Section 14 on Disclosure of Computer Data;

p. Section 15 on Search, Seizure and Examination of Computer Data;

q. Section 17 on Destruction of Computer Data;

r. Section 19 on Restricting or Blocking Access to Computer Data;

s. Section 20 on Obstruction of Justice;

t. Section 24 on Cybercrime Investigation and Coordinating Center (CICC); and

u. Section 26(a) on CICCs Powers and Functions.

Some petitioners also raise the constitutionality of related Articles 353, 354, 361,
and 362 of the RPC on the crime of libel.

HELD:

a. Section 4(a)(1) of the Cybercrime Law

Section 4(a)(1) provides:

Section 4. Cybercrime Offenses. The following acts constitute the offense of

cybercrime punishable under this Act:

(a) Offenses against the confidentiality, integrity and availability of computer data
and systems:

(1) Illegal Access. The access to the whole or any part of a computer system without
right.

Petitioners contend that Section 4(a)(1) fails to meet the strict scrutiny standard
required of laws that interfere with the fundamental rights of the people and should
thus be struck down.

The Court finds nothing in Section 4(a)(1) that calls for the application of the strict
scrutiny standard since no fundamental freedom, like speech, is involved in
punishing what is essentially a condemnable act accessing the computer system of
another without right. It is a universally condemned conduct.

Besides, a clients engagement of an ethical hacker requires an agreement between

them as to the extent of the search, the methods to be used, and the systems to be
tested. Since the ethical hacker does his job with prior permission from the client,
such permission would insulate him from the coverage of Section 4(a)(1).

Hence, valid and constitutional.

b. Section 4(a)(3) of the Cybercrime Law

Section 4(a)(3) provides:

(3) Data Interference. The intentional or reckless alteration, damaging, deletion or

deterioration of computer data, electronic document, or electronic data message,
without right, including the introduction or transmission of viruses.

Petitioners claim that Section 4(a)(3) suffers from overbreadth in that, while it seeks
to discourage data interference, it intrudes into the area of protected speech and
expression, creating a chilling and deterrent effect on these guaranteed freedoms.

Under the overbreadth doctrine, a proper governmental purpose, constitutionally

subject to state regulation, may not be achieved by means that unnecessarily sweep
its subject broadly, thereby invading the area of protected freedoms.But Section
4(a)(3) does not encroach on these freedoms at all. It simply punishes what
essentially is a form of vandalism,the act of willfully destroying without right the
things that belong to others, in this case their computer data, electronic document,
or electronic data message. Such act has no connection to guaranteed freedoms.
There is no freedom to destroy other peoples computer systems and private
documents.

Besides, the overbreadth challenge places on petitioners the heavy burden of

proving that under no set of circumstances will Section 4(a)(3) be valid.Petitioner
has failed to discharge this burden.

Hence, valid and constitutional.

Section 4(a)(6) of the Cybercrime Law

Section 4(a)(6) provides:

(6) Cyber-squatting. The acquisition of domain name over the internet in bad faith to
profit, mislead, destroy the reputation, and deprive others from registering the same,
if such a domain name is:

(i) Similar, identical, or confusingly similar to an existing trademark registered with

the appropriate government agency at the time of the domain name registration;

(ii) Identical or in any way similar with the name of a person other than the registrant,
in case of a personal name; and

(iii) Acquired without right or with intellectual property interests in it.

Petitioners claim that Section 4(a)(6) or cyber-squatting violates the equal protection
clausein that, not being narrowly tailored, it will cause a user using his real name to
suffer the same fate as those who use aliases or take the name of another in satire,
parody, or any other literary device.

The law is reasonable in penalizing the offender for acquiring the domain name in
bad faith to profit, mislead, destroy reputation, or deprive others who are not ill-
motivated of the rightful opportunity of registering the same.

Hence, valid and constitutional.

Section 4(b)(3) of the Cybercrime Law

Section 4(b)(3) provides:

b) Computer-related Offenses:

xxxx

(3) Computer-related Identity Theft. The intentional acquisition, use, misuse,

transfer, possession, alteration, or deletion of identifying information belonging to
another, whether natural or juridical, without right: Provided: that if no damage has
yet been caused, the penalty imposable shall be one (1) degree lower.

Petitioners claim that Section 4(b)(3) violates the constitutional rights to due process
and to privacy and correspondence, and transgresses the freedom of the press.

In Morfe v. Mutuc,it ruled that the right to privacy exists independently of its
identification with liberty; it is in itself fully deserving of constitutional protection.

Relevant to any discussion of the right to privacy is the concept known as the
"Zones of Privacy."

Zones of privacy are recognized and protected in our laws. Within these zones, any
form of intrusion is impermissible unless excused by law and in accordance with
customary legal process. The meticulous regard we accord to these zones arises
not only from our conviction that the right to privacy is a "constitutional right" and
"the right most valued by civilized men," but also from our adherence to the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights which mandates that, "no one shall be
subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy" and "everyone has the right to
the protection of the law against such interference or attacks." In the Matter of the
Petition for Issuance of Writ of Habeas Corpus of Sabio v. Senator Gordon, 535 Phil.
687, 714-715 (2006).

Two constitutional guarantees create these zones of privacy: (a) the right against
unreasonable searchesand seizures, which is the basis of the right to be let alone,
and (b) the right to privacy of communication and correspondence.In assessing the
challenge that the State has impermissibly intruded into these zones of privacy, a
court must determine whether a person has exhibited a reasonable expectation of
privacy and, if so, whether that expectation has been violated by unreasonable
government intrusion.

Petitioners simply fail to show how government effort to curb computer-related

identity theft violates the right to privacy and correspondence as well as the right to
due process of law.

Clearly, what this section regulates are specific actions: the acquisition, use, misuse
or deletion of personal identifying data of another. There is no fundamental right to
acquire anothers personal data.

Further, petitioners fear that Section 4(b)(3) violates the freedom of the press in that
journalists would be hindered from accessing the unrestricted user account of a
person in the news to secure information about him that could be published.

The Court held, the press, whether in quest of news reporting or social investigation,
has nothing to fear since a special circumstance is present to negate intent to gain
which is required by this Section.

Hence, valid and constitutional.

Section 4(c)(1) of the Cybercrime Law

Section 4(c)(1) provides:

(c) Content-related Offenses:

(1) Cybersex. The willful engagement, maintenance, control, or operation, directly or

indirectly, of any lascivious exhibition of sexual organs or sexual activity, with the aid
of a computer system, for favor or consideration.

Petitioners claim that the above violates the freedom of expression clause.They
express fear that private communications of sexual character between husband and
wife or consenting adults, which are not regarded as crimes under the penal code,
would now be regarded as crimes when done "for favor" in cyberspace. In common
usage, the term "favor" includes "gracious kindness," "a special privilege or right
granted or conceded," or "a token of love (as a ribbon) usually worn
conspicuously."This meaning given to the term "favor" embraces socially tolerated
trysts. The law as written would invite law enforcement agencies into the bedrooms
of married couples or consenting individuals.

The Act actually seeks to punish cyber prostitution, white slave trade, and
pornography for favor and consideration. This includes interactive prostitution and
pornography, i.e., by webcam.
Likewise, engaging in sexual acts privately through internet connection, perceived
by some as a right, has to be balanced with the mandate of the State to eradicate
white slavery and the exploitation of women.

Hence, valid and constitutional.

Section 4(c)(2) of the Cybercrime Law

Section 4(c)(2) provides:

(2) Child Pornography. The unlawful or prohibited acts defined and punishable by
Republic Act No. 9775 or the Anti-Child Pornography Act of 2009, committed
through a computer system: Provided, That the penalty to be imposed shall be (1)
one degree higher than that provided for in Republic Act No. 9775.

The above merely expands the scope of the Anti-Child Pornography Act of
2009(ACPA) to cover identical activities in cyberspace. In theory, nothing prevents
the government from invoking the ACPA when prosecuting persons who commit
child pornography using a computer system. Actually, ACPAs definition of child
pornography already embraces the use of "electronic, mechanical, digital, optical,
magnetic or any other means."

Of course, the law makes the penalty higher by one degree when the crime is
committed in cyberspace. But no one can complain since the intensity or duration of
penalty is a legislative prerogative and there is rational basis for such higher
penalty.The potential for uncontrolled proliferation of a particular piece of child
pornography when uploaded in the cyberspace is incalculable.

Hence, valid and constitutional.

Section 4(c)(3) of the Cybercrime Law

Section 4(c)(3) provides:

(3) Unsolicited Commercial Communications. The transmission of commercial

electronic communication with the use of computer system which seeks to advertise,
sell, or offer for sale products and services are prohibited unless:

(i) There is prior affirmative consent from the recipient; or

(ii) The primary intent of the communication is for service and/or administrative
announcements from the sender to its existing users, subscribers or customers; or

(iii) The following conditions are present:

(aa) The commercial electronic communication contains a simple, valid, and reliable
way for the recipient to reject receipt of further commercial electronic messages
(opt-out) from the same source;

(bb) The commercial electronic communication does not purposely disguise the
source of the electronic message; and

(cc) The commercial electronic communication does not purposely include

misleading information in any part of the message in order to induce the recipients to
read the message.

The above penalizes the transmission of unsolicited commercial communications,

also known as "spam." The term "spam" surfaced in early internet chat rooms and
interactive fantasy games. One who repeats the same sentence or comment was
said to be making a "spam."

The Government, represented by the Solicitor General, points out that unsolicited
commercial communications or spams are a nuisance that wastes the storage and
network capacities of internet service providers, reduces the efficiency of commerce
and technology, and interferes with the owners peaceful enjoyment of his property.
Transmitting spams amounts to trespass to ones privacy since the person sending
out spams enters the recipients domain without prior permission. The OSG contends
that commercial speech enjoys less protection in law.

These have never been outlawed as nuisance since people might have interest in
such ads. What matters is that the recipient has the option of not opening or reading
these mail ads. That is true with spams. Their recipients always have the option to
delete or not to read them.

To prohibit the transmission of unsolicited ads would deny a person the right to read
his emails, even unsolicited commercial ads addressed to him. Unsolicited
advertisements are legitimate forms of expression.

Hence, void for being unconstitutional.

Articles 353, 354, and 355 of the Penal Code

Section 4(c)(4) of the Cyber Crime Law

Petitioners dispute the constitutionality of both the penal code provisions on libel as
well as Section 4(c)(4) of the Cybercrime Prevention Act on cyberlibel.

The RPC provisions on libel read:

Art. 353. Definition of libel. A libel is public and malicious imputation of a crime, or of
a vice or defect, real or imaginary, or any act, omission, condition, status, or
circumstance tending to cause the dishonor, discredit, or contempt of a natural or
juridical person, or to blacken the memory of one who is dead.

Art. 354. Requirement for publicity. Every defamatory imputation is presumed to be

malicious, even if it be true, if no good intention and justifiable motive for making it is
shown, except in the following cases:

1. A private communication made by any person to another in the performance of

any legal, moral or social duty; and

2. A fair and true report, made in good faith, without any comments or remarks, of
any judicial, legislative or other official proceedings which are not of confidential
nature, or of any statement, report or speech delivered in said proceedings, or of
any other act performed by public officers in the exercise of their functions.

Art. 355. Libel means by writings or similar means. A libel committed by means of
writing, printing, lithography, engraving, radio, phonograph, painting, theatrical
exhibition, cinematographic exhibition, or any similar means, shall be punished by
prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods or a fine ranging from 200
to 6,000 pesos, or both, in addition to the civil action which may be brought by the
offended party.

The libel provision of the cybercrime law, on the other hand, merely incorporates to
form part of it the provisions of the RPC on libel. Thus Section 4(c)(4) reads:

Sec. 4. Cybercrime Offenses. The following acts constitute the offense of cybercrime
punishable under this Act:

xxxx

(c) Content-related Offenses:

xxxx

(4) Libel. The unlawful or prohibited acts of libel as defined in Article 355 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended, committed through a computer system or any
other similar means which may be devised in the future.

Petitioners lament that libel provisions of the penal codeand, in effect, the libel
provisions of the cybercrime law carry with them the requirement of "presumed
malice" even when the latest jurisprudence already replaces it with the higher
standard of "actual malice" as a basis for conviction.Petitioners argue that inferring
"presumed malice" from the accuseds defamatory statement by virtue of Article 354
of the penal code infringes on his constitutionally guaranteed freedom of expression.

Libel is not a constitutionally protected speech and that the government has an
obligation to protect private individuals from defamation. Indeed, cyberlibel is
actually not a new crime since Article 353, in relation to Article 355 of the penal
code, already punishes it. In effect, Section 4(c)(4) above merely affirms that online
defamation constitutes "similar means" for committing libel.

But the Courts acquiescence goes only insofar as the cybercrime law penalizes the
author of the libelous statement or article. Cyberlibel brings with it certain intricacies,
unheard of when the penal code provisions on libel were enacted. The culture
associated with internet media is distinct from that of print.

The internet is characterized as encouraging a freewheeling, anything-goes writing

style. In a sense, they are a world apart in terms of quickness of the readers reaction
to defamatory statements posted in cyberspace, facilitated by one-click reply options
offered by the networking site as well as by the speed with which such reactions are
disseminated down the line to other internet users.

Hence, Section 4(c)(4) penalizing online libel is valid and constitutional with respect
to the original author of the post; but void and unconstitutional with respect to others
who simply receive the post and react to it; and

Section 5 of the Cybercrime Law

Section 5 provides:

Sec. 5. Other Offenses. The following acts shall also constitute an offense:

(a) Aiding or Abetting in the Commission of Cybercrime. Any person who willfully
abets or aids in the commission of any of the offenses enumerated in this Act shall
be held liable.

(b) Attempt in the Commission of Cybercrime. Any person who willfully attempts to
commit any of the offenses enumerated in this Act shall be held liable.

Petitioners assail the constitutionality of Section 5 that renders criminally liable any
person who willfully abets or aids in the commission or attempts to commit any of
the offenses enumerated as cybercrimes. It suffers from overbreadth, creating a
chilling and deterrent effect on protected expression.

The Solicitor General contends, however, that the current body of jurisprudence and
laws on aiding and abetting sufficiently protects the freedom of expression of
"netizens," the multitude that avail themselves of the services of the internet. He
points out that existing laws and jurisprudence sufficiently delineate the meaning of
"aiding or abetting" a crime as to protect the innocent. The Solicitor General argues
that plain, ordinary, and common usage is at times sufficient to guide law
enforcement agencies in enforcing the law.

Libel in the cyberspace can of course stain a persons image with just one click of the
mouse. Scurrilous statements can spread and travel fast across the globe like bad
news. Moreover, cyberlibel often goes hand in hand with cyberbullying that
oppresses the victim, his relatives, and friends, evoking from mild to disastrous
reactions. Still, a governmental purpose, which seeks to regulate the use of this
cyberspace communication technology to protect a persons reputation and peace of
mind, cannot adopt means that will unnecessarily and broadly sweep, invading the
area of protected freedoms. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).

If such means are adopted, self-inhibition borne of fear of what sinister predicaments
await internet users will suppress otherwise robust discussion of public issues.
Democracy will be threatened and with it, all liberties. Penal laws should provide
reasonably clear guidelines for law enforcement officials and triers of facts to
prevent arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. (Adonis) G.R. No. 203378The
terms "aiding or abetting" constitute broad sweep that generates chilling effect on
those who express themselves through cyberspace posts, comments, and other
messages.

Hence, Section 5 of the cybercrime law that punishes "aiding or abetting" libel on the
cyberspace is a nullity.

As already stated, the cyberspace is an incomparable, pervasive medium of

communication. It is inevitable that any government threat of punishment regarding
certain uses of the medium creates a chilling effect on the constitutionally-protected
freedom of expression of the great masses that use it. In this case, the particularly
complex web of interaction on social media websites would give law enforcers such
latitude that they could arbitrarily or selectively enforce the law.

Section 5 with respect to Section 4(c)(4) is unconstitutional. Its vagueness raises

apprehension on the part of internet users because of its obvious chilling effect on
the freedom of expression, especially since the crime of aiding or abetting ensnares
all the actors in the cyberspace front in a fuzzy way.In the absence of legislation
tracing the interaction of netizens and their level of responsibility such as in other
countries, Section 5, in relation to Section 4(c)(4) on Libel, Section 4(c)(3) on
Unsolicited Commercial Communications, and Section 4(c)(2) on Child
Pornography, cannot stand scrutiny.

But the crime of aiding or abetting the commission of cybercrimes under Section 5
should be permitted to apply to Section 4(a)(1) on Illegal Access, Section 4(a)(2) on
Illegal Interception, Section 4(a)(3) on Data Interference, Section 4(a)(4) on System
Interference, Section 4(a)(5) on Misuse of Devices, Section 4(a)(6) on Cyber-
squatting, Section 4(b)(1) on Computer-related Forgery, Section 4(b)(2) on
Computer-related Fraud, Section 4(b)(3) on Computer-related Identity Theft, and
Section 4(c)(1) on Cybersex. None of these offenses borders on the exercise of the
freedom of expression.

Section 6 of the Cybercrime Law

Section 6 provides:

Sec. 6. All crimes defined and penalized by the Revised Penal Code, as amended,
and special laws, if committed by, through and with the use of information and
communications technologies shall be covered by the relevant provisions of this Act:
Provided, That the penalty to be imposed shall be one (1) degree higher than that
provided for by the Revised Penal Code, as amended, and special laws, as the case
may be.

Section 6 merely makes commission of existing crimes through the internet a

qualifying circumstance. As the Solicitor General points out, there exists a
substantial distinction between crimes committed through the use of information and
communications technology and similar crimes committed using other means. In
using the technology in question, the offender often evades identification and is able
to reach far more victims or cause greater harm. The distinction, therefore, creates a
basis for higher penalties for cybercrimes.

Hence, valid and constitutional.

Section 7 of the Cybercrime Law

Section 7 provides:

Sec. 7. Liability under Other Laws. A prosecution under this Act shall be without
prejudice to any liability for violation of any provision of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended, or special laws.

Online libel is different. There should be no question that if the published material on
print, said to be libelous, is again posted online or vice versa, that identical material
cannot be the subject of two separate libels. The two offenses, one a violation of
Article 353 of the Revised Penal Code and the other a violation of Section 4(c)(4) of
R.A. 10175 involve essentially the same elements and are in fact one and the same
offense. Indeed, the OSG itself claims that online libel under Section 4(c)(4) is not a
new crime but is one already punished under Article 353. Section 4(c)(4) merely
establishes the computer system as another means of publication. Charging the
offender under both laws would be a blatant violation of the proscription against
double jeopardy.
The Court RESOLVES to LEAVE THE DETERMINATION of the correct application
of Section 7 that authorizes prosecution of the offender under both the Revised
Penal Code and Republic Act 10175 to actual cases, WITH THE EXCEPTION of the
crimes of:

1. Online libel as to which, charging the offender under both Section 4(c)(4) of
Republic Act 10175 and Article 353 of the Revised Penal Code constitutes a
violation of the proscription against double jeopardy; as well as

2. Child pornography committed online as to which, charging the offender under

both Section 4(c)(2) of Republic Act 10175 and Republic Act 9775 or the Anti-Child
Pornography Act of 2009 also constitutes a violation of the same proscription, and,
in respect to these, is void and unconstitutional.

Section 8 of the Cybercrime Law

Section 8 provides:

Sec. 8. Penalties. Any person found guilty of any of the punishable acts enumerated
in Sections 4(a) and 4(b) of this Act shall be punished with imprisonment of prision
mayor or a fine of at least Two hundred thousand pesos (PhP200,000.00) up to a
maximum amount commensurate to the damage incurred or both.

Any person found guilty of the punishable act under Section 4(a)(5) shall be
punished with imprisonment of prision mayor or a fine of not more than Five hundred
thousand pesos (PhP500,000.00) or both.

If punishable acts in Section 4(a) are committed against critical infrastructure, the
penalty of reclusion temporal or a fine of at least Five hundred thousand pesos
(PhP500,000.00) up to maximum amount commensurate to the damage incurred or
both, shall be imposed.

Any person found guilty of any of the punishable acts enumerated in Section 4(c)(1)
of this Act shall be punished with imprisonment of prision mayor or a fine of at least
Two hundred thousand pesos (PhP200,000.00) but not exceeding One million pesos
(PhP1,000,000.00) or both.

Any person found guilty of any of the punishable acts enumerated in Section 4(c)(2)
of this Act shall be punished with the penalties as enumerated in Republic Act No.
9775 or the "Anti-Child Pornography Act of 2009:" Provided, That the penalty to be
imposed shall be one (1) degree higher than that provided for in Republic Act No.
9775, if committed through a computer system.

Any person found guilty of any of the punishable acts enumerated in Section 4(c)(3)
shall be punished with imprisonment of arresto mayor or a fine of at least Fifty
thousand pesos (PhP50,000.00) but not exceeding Two hundred fifty thousand
pesos (PhP250,000.00) or both.

Any person found guilty of any of the punishable acts enumerated in Section 5 shall
be punished with imprisonment one (1) degree lower than that of the prescribed
penalty for the offense or a fine of at least One hundred thousand pesos
(PhP100,000.00) but not exceeding Five hundred thousand pesos (PhP500,000.00)
or both.

The matter of fixing penalties for the commission of crimes is as a rule a legislative
prerogative. Here the legislature prescribed a measure of severe penalties for what
it regards as deleterious cybercrimes. Judges and magistrates can only interpret and
apply them and have no authority to modify or revise their range as determined by
the legislative department.

The courts should not encroach on this prerogative of the lawmaking body.

Hence, valid and constitutional.

Section 12 of the Cybercrime Law

Section 12 provides:

Sec. 12. Real-Time Collection of Traffic Data. Law enforcement authorities, with due
cause, shall be authorized to collect or record by technical or electronic means traffic
data in real-time associated with specified communications transmitted by means of
a computer system.

Traffic data refer only to the communications origin, destination, route, time, date,
size, duration, or type of underlying service, but not content, nor identities.

All other data to be collected or seized or disclosed will require a court warrant.

Service providers are required to cooperate and assist law enforcement authorities
in the collection or recording of the above-stated information.

The court warrant required under this section shall only be issued or granted upon
written application and the examination under oath or affirmation of the applicant
and the witnesses he may produce and the showing: (1) that there are reasonable
grounds to believe that any of the crimes enumerated hereinabove has been
committed, or is being committed, or is about to be committed; (2) that there are
reasonable grounds to believe that evidence that will be obtained is essential to the
conviction of any person for, or to the solution of, or to the prevention of, any such
crimes; and (3) that there are no other means readily available for obtaining such
evidence.
Petitioners assail the grant to law enforcement agencies of the power to collect or
record traffic data in real time as tending to curtail civil liberties or provide
opportunities for official abuse. They claim that data showing where digital
messages come from, what kind they are, and where they are destined need not be
incriminating to their senders or recipients before they are to be protected.
Petitioners invoke the right of every individual to privacy and to be protected from
government snooping into the messages or information that they send to one
another.

Undoubtedly, the State has a compelling interest in enacting the cybercrime law for
there is a need to put order to the tremendous activities in cyberspace for public
good. To do this, it is within the realm of reason that the government should be able
to monitor traffic data to enhance its ability to combat all sorts of cybercrimes.

Informational privacy has two aspects: the right not to have private information
disclosed, and the right to live freely without surveillance and intrusion.In
determining whether or not a matter is entitled to the right to privacy, this Court has
laid down a two-fold test. The first is a subjective test, where one claiming the right
must have an actual or legitimate expectation of privacy over a certain matter. The
second is an objective test, where his or her expectation of privacy must be one
society is prepared to accept as objectively reasonable. 429 U.S. 589 (1977)

Since the validity of the cybercrime law is being challenged, not in relation to its
application to a particular person or group, petitioners challenge to Section 12
applies to all information and communications technology (ICT) users, meaning the
large segment of the population who use all sorts of electronic devices to
communicate with one another. Consequently, the expectation of privacy is to be
measured from the general publics point of view. Without reasonable expectation of
privacy, the right to it would have no basis in fact.

In Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589 (1977)the United States Supreme Court classified
privacy into two categories: decisional privacy and informational privacy. Decisional
privacy involves the right to independence in making certain important decisions,
while informational privacy refers to the interest in avoiding disclosure of personal
matters. It is the latter rightthe right to informational privacythat those who oppose
government collection or recording of traffic data in real-time seek to protect.

Section 12 does not permit law enforcement authorities to look into the contents of
the messages and uncover the identities of the sender and the recipient.

Section 12, of course, limits the collection of traffic data to those "associated with
specified communications." But this supposed limitation is no limitation at all since,
evidently, it is the law enforcement agencies that would specify the target
communications. The power is virtually limitless, enabling law enforcement
authorities to engage in "fishing expedition," choosing whatever specified
communication they want. This evidently threatens the right of individuals to privacy.

The Court must ensure that laws seeking to take advantage of these technologies
be written with specificity and definiteness as to ensure respect for the rights that the
Constitution guarantees.

Hence, void for being unconstitutional

Section 13 of the Cybercrime Law

Section 13 provides:

Sec. 13. Preservation of Computer Data. The integrity of traffic data and subscriber
information relating to communication services provided by a service provider shall
be preserved for a minimum period of six (6) months from the date of the
transaction. Content data shall be similarly preserved for six (6) months from the
date of receipt of the order from law enforcement authorities requiring its
preservation.

Law enforcement authorities may order a one-time extension for another six (6)
months: Provided, That once computer data preserved, transmitted or stored by a
service provider is used as evidence in a case, the mere furnishing to such service
provider of the transmittal document to the Office of the Prosecutor shall be deemed
a notification to preserve the computer data until the termination of the case.

The service provider ordered to preserve computer data shall keep confidential the
order and its compliance.

Petitioners in G.R. No. 203391 (Palatino v. Ochoa)claim that Section 13 constitutes

an undue deprivation of the right to property. They liken the data preservation order
that law enforcement authorities are to issue as a form of garnishment of personal
property in civil forfeiture proceedings. Such order prevents internet users from
accessing and disposing of traffic data that essentially belong to them.

No doubt, the contents of materials sent or received through the internet belong to
their authors or recipients and are to be considered private communications. But it is
not clear that a service provider has an obligation to indefinitely keep a copy of the
same as they pass its system for the benefit of users. By virtue of Section 13,
however, the law now requires service providers to keep traffic data and subscriber
information relating to communication services for at least six months from the date
of the transaction and those relating to content data for at least six months from
receipt of the order for their preservation.

At any rate, as the Solicitor General correctly points out, the data that service
providers preserve on orders of law enforcement authorities are not made
inaccessible to users by reason of the issuance of such orders. The process of
preserving data will not unduly hamper the normal transmission or use of the same.

Hence, valid and constitutional

Section 14 of the Cybercrime Law

Section 14 provides:

Sec. 14. Disclosure of Computer Data. Law enforcement authorities, upon securing
a court warrant, shall issue an order requiring any person or service provider to
disclose or submit subscribers information, traffic data or relevant data in his/its
possession or control within seventy-two (72) hours from receipt of the order in
relation to a valid complaint officially docketed and assigned for investigation and the
disclosure is necessary and relevant for the purpose of investigation.

The process envisioned in Section 14 is being likened to the issuance of a

subpoena.

Besides, what Section 14 envisions is merely the enforcement of a duly issued court
warrant, a function usually lodged in the hands of law enforcers to enable them to
carry out their executive functions. The prescribed procedure for disclosure would
not constitute an unlawful search or seizure nor would it violate the privacy of
communications and correspondence. Disclosure can be made only after judicial
intervention.

Hence, valid and constitutional.

Section 15 of the Cybercrime Law

Section 15 provides:

Sec. 15. Search, Seizure and Examination of Computer Data. Where a search and
seizure warrant is properly issued, the law enforcement authorities shall likewise
have the following powers and duties.

Within the time period specified in the warrant, to conduct interception, as defined in
this Act, and:

(a) To secure a computer system or a computer data storage medium;

(b) To make and retain a copy of those computer data secured;

(c) To maintain the integrity of the relevant stored computer data;

(d) To conduct forensic analysis or examination of the computer data storage
medium; and

(e) To render inaccessible or remove those computer data in the accessed computer
or computer and communications network.

Pursuant thereof, the law enforcement authorities may order any person who has
knowledge about the functioning of the computer system and the measures to
protect and preserve the computer data therein to provide, as is reasonable, the
necessary information, to enable the undertaking of the search, seizure and
examination.

Law enforcement authorities may request for an extension of time to complete the
examination of the computer data storage medium and to make a return thereon but
in no case for a period longer than thirty (30) days from date of approval by the
court.

Petitioners challenge Section 15 on the assumption that it will supplant established

search and seizure procedures.

The exercise of these duties do not pose any threat on the rights of the person from
whom they were taken. Section 15 does not appear to supersede existing search
and seizure rules but merely supplements them.

Hence, valid and constitutional.

Section 17 of the Cybercrime Law

Section 17 provides:

Sec. 17. Destruction of Computer Data. Upon expiration of the periods as provided
in Sections 13 and 15, service providers and law enforcement authorities, as the
case may be, shall immediately and completely destroy the computer data subject of
a preservation and examination.

Petitioners claim that such destruction of computer data subject of previous

preservation or examination violates the users right against deprivation of property
without due process of law. But, as already stated, it is unclear that the user has a
demandable right to require the service provider to have that copy of the data saved
indefinitely for him in its storage system. If he wanted them preserved, he should
have saved them in his computer when he generated the data or received it. He
could also request the service provider for a copy before it is deleted.

Hence, valid and constitutional.

Section 19 of the Cybercrime Law

Section 19 empowers the Department of Justice to restrict or block access to

computer data:

Sec. 19. Restricting or Blocking Access to Computer Data. When a computer data is
prima facie found to be in violation of the provisions of this Act, the DOJ shall issue
an order to restrict or block access to such computer data.

Petitioners contest Section 19 in that it stifles freedom of expression and violates the
right against unreasonable searches and seizures. The Solicitor General concedes
that this provision may be unconstitutional. But since laws enjoy a presumption of
constitutionality, the Court must satisfy itself that Section 19 indeed violates the
freedom and right mentioned.

Not only does Section 19 preclude any judicial intervention, but it also disregards
jurisprudential guidelines established to determine the validity of restrictions on
speech. Restraints on free speech are generally evaluated on one of or a
combination of three tests: the dangerous tendency doctrine, the balancing of
interest test, and the clear and present danger rule. Section 19, however, merely
requires that the data to be blocked be found prima facie in violation of any provision
of the cybercrime law. Taking Section 6 into consideration, this can actually be made
to apply in relation to any penal provision. It does not take into consideration any of
the three tests mentioned above.

The Court is therefore compelled to strike down Section 19 for being violative of the
constitutional guarantees to freedom of expression and against unreasonable
searches and seizures.

Section 20 of the Cybercrime Law

Section 20 provides:

Sec. 20. Noncompliance. Failure to comply with the provisions of Chapter IV hereof
specifically the orders from law enforcement authorities shall be punished as a
violation of Presidential Decree No. 1829 with imprisonment of prision correctional in
its maximum period or a fine of One hundred thousand pesos (Php100,000.00) or
both, for each and every noncompliance with an order issued by law enforcement
authorities.

Petitioners challenge Section 20, alleging that it is a bill of attainder. The argument is
that the mere failure to comply constitutes a legislative finding of guilt, without regard
to situations where non-compliance would be reasonable or valid.
But since the non-compliance would be punished as a violation of Presidential
Decree (P.D.) 1829,PENALIZING OBSTRUCTION OF APPREHENSION AND
PROSECUTION OF CRIMINAL OFFENDERS. Section 20 necessarily incorporates
elements of the offense which are defined therein.

Thus, the act of non-compliance, for it to be punishable, must still be done

"knowingly or willfully." There must still be a judicial determination of guilt, during
which, as the Solicitor General assumes, defense and justifications for non-
compliance may be raised. Thus, Section 20 is valid insofar as it applies to the
provisions of Chapter IV which are not struck down by the Court.

Hence, valid and constitutional.

Sections 24 and 26(a) of the Cybercrime Law

Sections 24 and 26(a) provide:

Sec. 24. Cybercrime Investigation and Coordinating Center. There is hereby

created, within thirty (30) days from the effectivity of this Act, an inter-agency body to
be known as the Cybercrime Investigation and Coordinating Center (CICC), under
the administrative supervision of the Office of the President, for policy coordination
among concerned agencies and for the formulation and enforcement of the national
cybersecurity plan.

Sec. 26. Powers and Functions. The CICC shall have the following powers and
functions:

(a) To formulate a national cybersecurity plan and extend immediate assistance of

real time commission of cybercrime offenses through a computer emergency
response team (CERT); x x x.

Petitioners mainly contend that Congress invalidly delegated its power when it gave
the Cybercrime Investigation and Coordinating Center (CICC) the power to
formulate a national cybersecurity plan without any sufficient standards or
parameters for it to follow.

In order to determine whether there is undue delegation of legislative power, the

Court has adopted two tests: the completeness test and the sufficient standard test.
Under the first test, the law must be complete in all its terms and conditions when it
leaves the legislature such that when it reaches the delegate, the only thing he will
have to do is to enforce it.1avvphi1The second test mandates adequate guidelines
or limitations in the law to determine the boundaries of the delegates authority and
prevent the delegation from running riot. Gerochi v. Department of Energy, 554 Phil.
563 (2007).
Here, the cybercrime law is complete in itself when it directed the CICC to formulate
and implement a national cybersecurity plan. Also, contrary to the position of the
petitioners, the law gave sufficient standards for the CICC to follow when it provided
a definition of cybersecurity.

Cybersecurity refers to the collection of tools, policies, risk management

approaches, actions, training, best practices, assurance and technologies that can
be used to protect cyber environment and organization and users assets.This
definition serves as the parameters within which CICC should work in formulating
the cybersecurity plan.

Further, the formulation of the cybersecurity plan is consistent with the policy of the
law to "prevent and combat such [cyber] offenses by facilitating their detection,
investigation, and prosecution at both the domestic and international levels, and by
providing arrangements for fast and reliable international cooperation." This policy is
clearly adopted in the interest of law and order, which has been considered as
sufficient standard.

Hence, Sections 24 and 26(a) are likewise valid and constitutional