Year 12 of Akhenaten in the Context of the Near Eastern Political and Military History

Ivan A. Ladynin, Alexander A. Nemirovski

(Russian State University for Humanities and Lomonosov Moscow State University,
Moscow, Russia)

When proposing a theme for the Egyptological conference in Helwan, the Arab Republic
of Egypt, in May 2005, one of the authors of this article chose at first to talk about the general
evolution of Egyptology, with special regard at the gradual decrease of historical studies in it
during the 20th century. The thesis he intended to postulate was that this decrease is a great
danger to our discipline. When the Egyptologists of the heroic age were writing their respective
histories of Ancient Egypt1, they were willing to present in them its comprehensive picture
reflecting facts as they were known, social conditions and culture of the Egyptian civilization.
Now the prevailing trend of Egyptology is the highly specialized studies of language and texts,
or religion, or archaeological and artistic artifacts; but these studies, however useful for
developing the methods of research, cannot be a value of themselves. They badly want a
framework, which would turn each specific achievement of an individual researcher into a piece
of an integrate mosaic. The strongest opinion of these articles authors is that there is no need to
look for a better framework, than the one chosen by the founders of the Egyptological discipline,
i.e. writing a history of Egypt. Hence, whatever specific Egyptological problem is being
treated, its historical background should not be neglected; and all opportunities provided for
interpreting specific sources within their historical context should be used as far, as it is found
possible. The best opportunity to demonstrate the advantages of the historical intention in
Egyptological research not with historiographical speculations, but with a concise example. The
choice of such example for the present paper might be called quite ambitious: this is Year 12 of
Akhenaten, well-known as a turning point in the development of the Amarna religion. Thus, the
aim of this paper is to show some of its historical aspects, which, as it seems, have yet been
underrated or overlooked in its interpretation.
The changes in the Amarna religion in Akhenatens Year 12 have been well-known to
Egyptologists since a long time. In that year the emphasized piety towards Aten, which had been
making a contrast to a reserved attitude towards the traditional gods, yielded the place to the
consequent and fierce elimination of their cults. The texts showing the names of the traditional
gods, Amun-Re in the first place, were destroyed or at least modified; in the new texts the signs
bearing associations to the traditional gods were replaced with neutral phonetic writings; all
allusions to ancient cults were withdrawn from the royal titles of Akhenaten and Aten; the

1
H. BRUGSCH, Geschichte gyptens unter den Pharaonen , Leipzig 1877; A. WIEDEMANN,
gyptische Geschichte, Gotha, 1884-1888; G. MASPERO, Histoire ancienne des peoples de
lOrient classique, 1-3, Paris 1895-1899; J.H. BREASTED, A History of the Ancient Egyptians,
New York 1908; A. H. Gardiner, Egypt of the Pharaohs, Oxford 1961.
 2

images of the traditional gods and even animals connected with their cults happened to be
destroyed. Finally, the very words god and gods (nTr, nTrw) were banished from the new
official texts, which style Akhenaten and Aten only rulers (HqA)2.
No wonder that the start of this new policy at Akhenatens Year 12 attracted the
attentions of many Egyptologists. A cluster of interpretations for these events was connected
with a theory of the twelve years coregency of Akhenaten and Amenophis III3; and this is the
point we would like to start with. A recent standard book on the Ancient Egyptian chronology by
J. von Beckerath reads very definitely: Eine lngere Zusammenregierung, die sogar bis ins 12.
Jahr des jngeren Partners gedauert haben sollte, ist mit Sicherheit auszuschliessen4. This
judgement had been formed much earlier than 1997, when this book appeared, and was founded
on extensive studies of both Egyptian and Near Eastern material. Among the Egyptian artifacts
an important argument against the twelve years coregency is the evidence of the Malqata palace
(Western Thebes), where the indications of Year 38 of Amenophis III and Year 1 of Akhenaten
were contemporary5. Arguments against this long coregency have been presented by E.
Hornung6, E.F. Campbell7, D. Redford8 and W. Murnane9, and probably the most convincing of
them are based on the cuneiform diplomatic archive of Amarna10. It is inexplicable that among
340 letters of the archive none is addressed to both coregents, and their totality shows no evident

2
See for the general studies of the reign of Akhenaten and the religion of Amarna: C. ALDRED,
Akhenaten: Pharaoh of EgyptA New Study, New York 1968; D.B. REDFORD, Akhenaten: The
Heretic King, Princeton 1984; E. HORNUNG, The Rediscovery of Akhenaten and His Place in
Religion, in: JARCE 29 (1992), 43-49; IDEM, Echnaton. Die Religion des Lichtes, Zrich 1995 ;
M. GABOLDE, D'Akhenaton Toutnkhamon, Lyon-Paris 1998 ; R. E. FREED, Y. J. MARKOWITZ
AND S. H. D'AURIA, eds., Pharaohs of the Sun: Akhenaten, Nefertiti, Tutankhamen (Catalogue of
the Exhibition), London 1999; N. REEVES, Akhenaten: Egypts False Prophet, London 2001; Yu.
Ya. Perepyolkin, The Revolution of Amen-Hotp IV, 1, Moscow 1967; 2, Moscow 1984
(= .. - IV. . 1. ., 1967. . 2. ., 1984).
3
The idea of such coregency was first posited by C. ALDRED (The End of the El-'Amrna
Period, in: JEA 43 (1957), 30-41; cf. his later publications and F. J. GILES, Ikhnaton. Legend
and History, London 1970).
4
J. VON BECKERATH, Chronologie des pharaonischen gypten, Mnchner gyptologische
Studien 49, Mainz am Rhein 1997, 110.
5
IDEM, 110, n. 485 (referring to: W.C. HAYES, Inscriptions from the Palace of Amenhotep III,
in: JNES 10 (1951), 28)
6
E. HORNUNG, Untersuchungen zur Chronologie und Geschichte des Neuen Reiches,
gyptologische Abhandlungen 11, Wiesbaden, 1961, 71-78.
7
E.F. CAMPBELL, The Chronology of the Amarna Letters With Special Reference to the
Hypothetical Coregency of Amenophis III and Akhenaten, Baltimore 1964.
8
D.B.REDFORD, History and Chronology of the Eighteenth Dynasty of Egypt, Toronto 1967, 88-
170.
9
W.J. MURNANE, The Hypothetical Coregency between Amenhotep III and Akhenaten: Two
Observations, in: Serapis 2 (1970), 17-21; IDEM, Ancient Egyptian Coregencies, Studies in
Ancient Oriental Civilization 40, Chicago 1977, 123-169.
10
J.A. KNUDTZON, Die El-Amarna-Tafeln: Teil 1-2, Leipzig 1907-1915; A.F. RAINEY, El
Amarna Tablets 359-379. Supplement to J. A. Knudtzon Die El-Amarna-Tafeln, Neukirchen-
Vluyn 1970; W.L. MORAN, Les lettres dEl-Amarna. Correspondance diplomatique du pharaon,
Paris 1987.
 3

bifurcation of the addressees falling in one and the same period; the earliest letter addressed by
the king Tushratta of Mitanni to Akhenaten as a sole ruler implies his incompetence in foreign
affairs, which is impossible in the case of coregency (EA27. 69-76: the previous contacts
between Tushratta and Amenophis III being a secret matter, of which Akhenaten is advised to
ask his mother); another letter by Tushratta to Akhenaten (EA29. 55-62) says explicitly that
Amenophis III was dead and his son took over as a sole ruler from the start of their
correspondence; finally, if the twelve years coregency is accepted, there would remain no
space for all the developments registered by the archive for the time of Akhenatens sole rule in
his remaining Years 12 to 1711. However, after these strong arguments have already been
formulated, W.R. Johnson forwarded a theory of twelve years coregency again, basing it on the
analysis of Egyptian monuments and presuming that in the Amarna religion of those 12 years
Amenophis III had to be equated with Atum/Re-Horakhty and Aten, and Akhenaten with Shu12.
In fact, this theory might be called an instructive example of how Egyptology isolates itself from
the well-established realities of political history, which indeed should be necessary context and
background for any analysis of monuments. It is important for the present that the theory of W.R.
Johnson and some adjoining judgements13 by no means deflate the arguments against the twelve
years coregency of Akhenaten and his father. Hence, the events of his Year 12 are to be treated
as the deed of Akhenaten alone.
Incidentally, the start of the persecution of the traditional gods in Akhenatens Year 12
used to attract much more attention of the scholars than its absence in the previous 11 years,
though the latter point in its importance should want explanation not less than the former. The
Egyptian notions made of the Pharaoh a necessary and the only possible mediator in contacts
between the mundane and the divine14. Private persons played no independent role in rituals; as
for priests, they performed the divine service instead of the Pharaoh with only reason that he
could not multiply himself and perform it personally in all the temples of the country. However,

11
REDFORD, History and Chronology..., 154 ff.
12
W.R. JOHNSON, Images of Amenhotep III in Thebes: Styles and Intentions, in: L.M.
Berman, ed., The Art of Amenhotep III: Art Historical Analysis. Papers Presented at the
International Symposium Held at The Cleveland Museum of Art, Cleveland, Ohio, 20-21
November 1987, Cleveland 1990, 26-46; IDEM, The Deified Amenhotep III as the Living Re-
Horakhty: Stylistic and Iconographic Considerations, in: Atti del VI Congresso Internazionale
di Egittologia, I, Turin 1992, 232-236; IDEM, Amenhotep III and Amarna: Some New
Considerations, in: JEA 82 (1996), 65-82.
13
F.J. MARTIN VALENTIN, Indicaciones y evidencias de una corregencia entre Amenhotep III y
Amenhotep IV en la necrpolis tebana, in: Boleten de la Asociacin Espaola de Egiptologia 6
(1996), 119-146 ; see, most deplorably, the statements of perfect scholars impressed with the
glamour of Johnsons scheme: ST. QUIRKE, The Cult of Ra : Sun-Worship in Ancient Egypt,
London 2001, 153-154; A.O. BOLSHAKOV, The Beautiful Has Come: The Masterpieces of
Portrait from the Egyptian Museum at Berlin (Catalogue of the Exhibition), St.Petersburg 2009
(= .. .
. . ., 2009), 33-37.
14
Ph. Derchain, Le rle du roi dEgypte dans le maintien de lordre cosmique, in: Le Pouvoir
et le Sacr, Annales du Centre d'Etude des Religions 1, Brussels 1962, 61-73.
 4

this was just the case in theory, as one can judge from the temple reliefs showing only the king
as the performer of rites. Taking this into account, we must conclude that till Akhenatens Year
12 the followers of the traditional cults could find a mediator for maintaining them, with all
necessary rituals, only in that king; moreover, since Akhenaten was not persecuting the
traditional cults during this period, he must have performed this mediation with his own accord.
There can be no doubt that Akhenaten hated the traditional gods from the very start of his reign;
thus, he must have carried on the mediation in contacts to them not without internal resistance;
nevertheless he thought it necessary for some reason to carry on this function. His participation
in performing the traditional cults must have stopped only at the start of their persecution; and
retrospectively this became a much stronger point of Akhenatens accusation than his personal
belief in Aten. This can be seen most explicitly from Tutanchamuns Restoration Stela, which
reads (Urk. IV. 2027.11-18):

The country was experiencing the disease; the gods turned away from this country. If the army was sent
towards Djahi to enlarge the borders of Egypt, none of its success happened. If a god was prayed to get an advice
from him, he did not come at all. If a goddess was asked for the same, she did not come at all. Their hearts became
weak in respect of their images; they destroyed the created.
The quoted passage is extremely important, for it describes all the consequences of
Akhenatens Year 12 for the traditional religion, as seen by its adherents. One of its phrases is
 5

somewhat difficult to understand; nevertheless the translation we suggest Their [gods] hearts
were weak in respect of their images15 seems the best fitting. This means that after the divine
service in ancient temples was stopped the gods ceased to embody themselves in their cult
images available for ritual contact; hence, they ceased to come for help to Egypt, when this
help was necessary. Moreover, normally the numinous forces personified in deities were
channeled by the Pharaoh so as to put their balance at the service of humans; since the Pharaohs
mediation stopped, these forces started acting unrestrictedly, without any control, damaging
thereby the world that the gods created themselves (HD.sn iryt). Thus, from the viewpoint of the
traditional religion, Akhenatens activities in his Year 12 caused a real cosmic catastrophe.
The explanation for Akhenatens decisions of his Year 12 has to be looked for in his own
position, however difficult for reconstruction from nowadays. Anyway, we can be sure about one
important point: Akhenaten thought it possible and necessary to pursue a compromise to the
traditional gods till his Year 12, and in this year he thought it just as possible and necessary to
eliminate it. To understand his motives, we have inevitably to turn to the essence of his own
belief in Aten.
The Amarna religion has been described as the first monotheistic concept at the Near East
since quite a long time. Extensive studies of its contemporary sources did not make less topical
one question: which of the later, medieval and modern, monotheistic religions does it resemble
most? Actually, this question is not so meaningless from the scholarly viewpoint: if we postulate
the resemblance of the Amarna beliefs with a religion we know much better, we might
extrapolate some of its knowledge into the time of Akhenaten to expand our understanding of his
motives. The structure of the Amarna religion can be summed up as follows. Its central figure
was the sun-god, the father of the mundane universal king and the king of the universe himself;
and this was no difference to the traditional Egyptian ideology. At the same time, the god of
Amarna was the god of revelation, which brought to the humanity absolutely doubtless truth.
The very idea of revelation and absolute though unverifiable truth was alien to the archaic
religions of the Near East; and at the same time this is a much stronger affinity of the Amarna
religion to later monotheistic confessions, than the position of Aten alone, without any adjoining
pantheon in it. However, the specifics of the Amarna revelation was its being opened to only one
mundane being the son of Aten and the universal ruler, these two capacities depending on one
another. This makes impossible any further comparison of the Amarna religion to later
monotheistic confessions: in their concept the revelation was available to quite a number of
humans, none of them being sons of god and very few rulers, who received revelation without
any relevance of their status. The exclusive position of Akhenaten not only made him the
translator of revelation to the humanity, which was quite important itself, but also justified all his
actions, however unusual and even cruel they could be. For instance, the inscriptions of the tomb
of the chamberlain Tutu speak of the execution of those who oppose the teaching of the only
one of [Re] (i.e. Akhenaten) and the burning of their bodies (he (i.e., contextually, the king)

15
ib.sn fn Hr Dt.sn; check for the meaning of Dt image, bodily form of god FCD 317, with
references to Urk. IV 97.17, 384.7; cf. Wb. V 505. 16-18.
 6

descends to slaughter and fire devours [his] (i.e. opponents) limbs16), which probably alludes
to the real executions of the kings opponents and the destruction of their bodies in order not to
allow them the afterlife; to evaluate the cruelty of this massacre one might recall, for instance,
that after the harim conspiracy against Ramesses III only its leaders were not even executed but
forced to commit suicide and their remains, as it seems, were not destroyed17.
Thus, the changes of Akhenatens Year 12, however dramatic for the traditional religion
of Egypt, could find all necessary and sufficient justification in kings relationship to Aten. One
might ask, however, why this relationship demanded such an abrupt change of the course, which
had been was followed for more than a decade? The earlier motives for Akhenaten to pursue that
course of compromise and maintain, though without zeal, the traditional cults are clear enough.
Akhenaten must have been reluctant to excite the resistance of the society, which conceived its
existence only within the system of ritual contacts to the traditional gods. However, Akhenaten
himself must have thought numinous forces personified in those gods quite real, though hostile
to Aten and the truth of his revelation18. Hence, while he was maintaining the traditional cults he
guaranteed to himself if not benevolence, than at least neutrality of those forces. Since he
stopped maintaining these cults, he ceased to channel these forces into safe and even helpful
directions and allowed them to act totally at their own will, which risked a severe damage to him

16
N. DE G. DAVIES, The Rock-Tombs of el-Amarna, VI: Tombs of Parennefer, Tutu and A,
London 1908, pl. XXI:17; W. J. MURNAME, Texts from the Amarna Period in Egypt, Writings
from the Ancient World 5, Atlanta, 1995, 198.
17
See, recently: S. KTHEN-WELPOT, berlegungen zu den Harimsverschwrungen, in: D.
BROCKELMANN, A. KLUG (eds.), In Pharaos Staat: Festschrift fr Rolf Gundlach zum 75.
Geburtstag, Wiesbaden 2006, 115-124.
18
The tantalizing fact of Akhenatens abandoning the very terminology god/gods (nTr/nTrw)
can find its explanation in the interpretation of these Egyptian words and their basic writing by
E. HORNUNG (Conceptions of God in Ancient Egypt: The One and the Many, Ithaca (N.Y.), 1996,
33-40). According to Hornung interpretation, the hieroglyphic sign R8 represented an object
completely covered by texture resembling the mummy-wrappings; a flag at its top was a strip
of these wrappings; and the Ptolemaic value of this sign w could have been derived only from a
stem connected to wt wrap, bind. At the same time, the worship of flagpoles set up at the
entrances to holy tombs and being the embodiment of divine was spread until very recently
throughout North Africa and the Sudan. Thus, this most ancient Egyptian sign for the word god
associated it with some fetish-object serving the embodiment of the divine, closed because of it
from humans with wrappings (but at the same time available to those having enough knowledge
and power to unwrap it and establish contact with the divine through its mediation), and
belonging to the mundane world. The idea that this object was the embodiment of the divine
presumed that this divine being itself, in its true nature, existed in the transcendence (the sky of
the archaic notions in Egypt and actually elsewhere); thus, in Akhenatens view this term was
inapplicable to Aten, who was perceived by the king strictly as a being immanent to the mundane
in its nature of the sun-disk; see the works by E. Hornung in our n. 2 and A.O. BOLSHAKOV,
Image and Text: Two Languages of the Ancient Egyptian Culture, in: Journal of Ancient
History 4(247) (2003) (= .. :
// . 2003. 4), 19). Hence, Akhenaten must have perceived the traditional
deities as some supernatural beings, probably, also belonging in the mundane (as he seems to
have denied the existence of any transcendence) but hostile to the good cause of Aten and his
teaching.
 7

and to his state. Obviously enough, this risk could have been taken by Akhenaten only if the
other course, i.e. continuing the compromise with the traditional cult, could bring an even greater
risk. It remains to be seen, what risk Akhenaten could expect and which tokens of it he could
observe on the eve of his Year 12.
To begin with, Tutanchamuns Restoration Stela, which we have quoted, describes the
practical consequences of the abolition of the traditional cults quite explicitly: If the army was
sent towards Djahi to enlarge the borders of Egypt, none of its success happened. It seems quite
natural for a royal text of Dynasty XVIII, military in its origin and history, to see a sign of gods
disgrace in a mischief at a battlefield. However the text obviously speaks about the real events of
Akhenatens reign, which had to be pondered on still in his time. If Akhenatens military
misfortune had retrospectively to be connected with his abandon of the traditional cult, the same
misfortune must have been viewed from inside of the Amarna religion as a token of Atens
anger. This anger could be directed only against the king, who had to be a victorious fighter of
Egypts foreign foes in the notions of the traditional ideology. At the same time, the only doing
of Akhenaten, which could be perceived as his sin against Aten, was exactly his compromise
course towards the enemies of Aten - the traditional Egyptian gods.
Another important evidence contemporary to Akhenatens Year 12 are the well-known
scenes of foreigners bringing gifts to Akhenaten and Nefertiti from the tombs of Huy and Merira
II19. The student of these scenes C. Aldred has once suggested that the ceremony they depict
marked some event of outstanding importance, presumably the start of Akhenaten independent
rule20. We have already said that the theory of twelve years coregency of Akhenaten and his
father has to be abandoned with good reasons; however, the extraordinary character of those
ceremonies of gift-bearing is not to be denied. The intention of these ceremonies was obviously
to emphasize Egypts domination in the lands of Asia and Africa that sent their messengers with
gifts to Akhenatens court. In this case it is rather logical to conclude: if such accent in
Akhenatens Year 12 was necessary, the real situation in the Egyptian dominions must have been
troubling. We have to find out now, what sort of trouble it was and how serious it must have
been by the time of our interest.
The present state of the Near Eastern Late Bronze chronology allows dating the events of
this period, including Akhenatens years of reign, with high certainty. A number of reasons, to
lengthy to give them all now, incline to prefer the so-called middle chronology of this period as
a better option then its alternative long and short versions21. However, this choice and its
19
N. DE G. DAVIES, The Rock-Tombs of el-Amarna, II: Tombs of Panehesy and Meryra II,
London 1905, 38-43, pl. XXXVII; idem, III: The Tombs of Huya and Ahmes, London 1905, 9-
12.
20
ALDRED, The End of the El-'Amrna Period (see out n. 3).
21
The short chronology is now generally accepted by Egyptologists: J. VON BECKERATH, op.
cit. (our note 4); E. HORNUNG, R. KRAUSS, D. WARBURTON (eds.), Ancient Egyptian Chronology,
Handbuch der Orientalistik 83, Leiden 2006. This choice was strongly affected by the conclusion
of L.W. CASPERSON (The Lunar Dates of Thutmose III, in: JNES 45 (1986), 139-150) that
1490 has to be ruled out as a possible date of Thutmosis III accession on astronomical grounds.
However, these grounds were not so much the authentic Egyptian evidence, as the personal
 8

motivation are not critical for our argumentation, which will depend on the relative chronology
of the Amarna archive rather than on the absolute dates; whenever we give them we do so just
for convenience. Nevertheless, according to the middle chronology Akhenatens Year 1 is
about 1365 and Year 12 is about 1354. From the data of the Amarna archive we can say that
these 12 years were filled with rapid and dramatic evolution of the Egyptian position at the
Eastern Mediterranean. The cornerstone of stability in this region since the end of the 15th
century B.C. was the accord between Egypt, the Upper Mesopotamian kingdom of Mitanni and
the Kassite Babylonia preserving the balance of their interests. By the way, a firm territorial
division of the Levantine lands between these three powers was established then (Canaan with
part of Trans-Jordan and Southern Syria with Kadesh, Katna and Amurru and as it seems even
with Ugarit belonged to Egypt, Northern Syria with Mukish, Niy and Nuhashshe belonged to
Mitanni, and Tadmor [Palmyrean] region and steppes from Tadmor to the very border of Trans-
Jordan Egyptian possessions belonged to Kassite Babylonia22, so all the three superpowers
shared common borders in Levantine region). Which fact is even more important is that no one
of these powers have tried since this moment to encroach upon another ones possessions23.
These stable, firmly peaceful and essentially friendly relations between Mitanni, Kassite
Babylonia and Egypt formed the core of the whole system of international relations in Near East
for several decades and moreover were the neccesary condition and main base for safe and stable
Egypt rule over its Levantine dominions24.

evaluation by L. Casperson; thus, his arguments do not stand so strong and the system of the
middle chronology is not ruled out categorically. Another point is placing the letter KBo I 10
(from Hattusili III to Kadashman-Ellil II) before or after the Hittite-Egyptian peace treaty of
Year 21 of Ramesses II. The contents of the letter (including the diplomatic encounter with
Egypt on the deserters exchange stipulated by the peace treaty) strongly suggests that the letter
follows the treaty, which accordingly rules out the short and supports the middle chronology.
22
See A NEMIROVSKY, Babylonian presence on the borders of Egyptian possessions in Asia
throughout the Amarna Age, in: Moving Across Borders. Foreign Relations, Religion and
Cultural Interactions in the Ancient Mediterranean, Leuven 2007, 169-184.
23
Bright examples: Kurigalzu I of Babylonia (beginning of XIV c. BC) definetely rejected a
proposal of Canaanites who offered him that they would secede to him from Egypt (EA 9: 19-
30); Amenophis III of Egypt has not taken advantage of defeats which were inflicted to Mitanni
by Suppiluliumasa in Syria in the latters so called first Syrian foray (which took place
somewhen around Amenophis 30th regnal year) and refused to accept under his power several
former Syrian vassals of Mitanni (which vassals, while having faced Hittite intervention in Syria
and collapse of Mitannian power there, made an attempt to secede from Mitanni to Egypt and
asked Egypt to accept them under Egyptian protectorate, see EA 51 and EA 53 which could be
dated just to the times of 1st Syrian foray of Suppilumas, as we want to show elsewhere). It is
true that Kassite Babylonia had not a very friendly attitude to its northern neigbour, Mitanni
(Kadashman-Ellil of Babylonia in his letter to Egypt compares and equals the king of
Hanigalbat, i.e. Mitanni, to the most unsignificant rulers of Near East, EA 1:37-40), but
nevertheless these two powers were close allies of one and the same Egypt and we have no
evidence of any war or conflict between them in the late XV middle XIV cc. BC.
24
The tumultuous course of events of preceding XV c. B.C. (when Egypt was almost all the time
at war r cold war with Mitanny and could not therefore maintain any stable control over its
Asian possessions for more than a decade, but at least three times under Hatshepsut, c. 40th
regnal year of Thutmose III and after 9th year of Amenophis II had lost vast parts of them to
 9

All of this system ceased to exist in the very first decade of Akhenatens reign with
disastrous consequences for Egyptian rul in Asia. It is not our aim here to discuss in details
various possible reconstruction of the corresponding course of events, but it would be necessary
to give here the most redible (from our point of view) such a reconstruction with stress on the
direct information of our primary sources.
The relations between Egypt and Mitanni, which were a very important constituent of
Egyprian security and foreign policy system described above, developed from good to bad and
from bad to worse in Akhenatens first 4 years. The first but already bright traces of a sharp
crise can be seen in EA 26 written very soon after Akhenaten acession: it occurs from the letter
that Tushratta of Mitanni has already established separate correspondence with Teie, Dowage
Queen of Egypt and Akhenatens mother, behind Akhenatens back; Tushratta complains to to
Teie against Akhenaten and asks her to carry active influence on the latter in the way favourable
to Tushrattas policy while Teie asked him to be friendly and careful with Akhenaten (EA 26:
27). As a direct correspondence between Tushratta and Teie would be against political customs
and an encroachment on Akhenatens prerogatives (as the latter as a king was an only person in
Egypt to whom a foreign great king had to address), Tushratta proposes Teie to maintain a
contact with Mitanni separately from Akhenaten through Yuni, Tushrattas wife, and to establish
constant change of letters and messengers between Teie and Yuni (i.e. in fact with Tishratta
himself), EA 26: 58-63. Thus Tushratta was frankly and successfully trying to lean upon Teie
against Akhenaten and this attempt met a rather favourable attitude of Teie; we can conclude that
this striking fact reflects existance of some home opposition to Akhenaten involving even Teie
and attempts of this opposition to maintain separate friendly contacts with Mitanni
Akhenaten and in a way rather crictical in respect to the latter. As EA 26 was found in Amarna
Archive we can guess that Akhenaten got somehow this letter and thus was informed about this
secret diplomacy of Mitanni; needless to say it could only worsen his relations with Tushratta.
These relations have indeed deteriorated next years and soon reached the very border dividing
nominal friendship with open hostilities: Akhenaten detained Mitannian messengers in Egypt for
several years (EA 28: 20-31, EA 29: 110-113, 148-152) in defiance of constant Tushrattas
requests to Akhenaten to free and dispatch them to Mitanni (e.g. EA 28), and Tushratta at last
answered with symmetrical detaining Egyptian messengers in Mitanni (EA 29:149 ff.). Such a
forced retaining of foreign messengers (in fact as hostages) in ones country was the highest
possible degree of hostilities in frames of still peaceful relations; the next step would be just a
state of war. In his last letter to Egypt (EA 29) Tushratta says there that he was very rageous
and feeling in hostile way against Akhenaten and that he is very troubled due to his
unfriendly conduct in respect to Mitanni (Akhenaten refused to send to Tushratta gifts which

Mitanni and tried to reconquer them till a territorial compromise was reached under Thutmose
IV and Artatama of Mitanni may be after a fourth loss of some Egyptian possessions in Asia to
Mitanni) had shown that only peace with neighbouring Asian superpowers and territorial
division of Levant with them could allow Egypt to keep its rich Levantine dominions under its
own control and derive profit from them.
 10

Amenophis III had prepared for him, detained Mitannian messengers, etc.), EA 29:74, 156.
Tushratta insists again in asking Akhenaten to follow Teies advices and influence (EA 29:45 ff.,
124 f.) and states that Mitannian messengers are already retained forcefully by Akhenaten for 4
years (EA 29:113). In EA 29 Tushratta gives also a full retrospection of Egyptian relations with
Mitanni under Akhenaten, describes them as full, unprovoked and unilateral withdrawal of
Akhenaten from the former Entente cordiale between Egypt and Mitanni and proposes to
Akhenaten obviously for a last time to renew this friendship and to fulfill all former demands
of Tushratta. EA 29 is something like an ultimate peaceful proposal of Tushratta to Egypt
marking a deadline; the next possoble step after such a letter could be either reconciliation and
new period of firm friendship or open hostilities and war, and Tushratta himself gives a
transparent hint on these consequences: he says that in times of Egyptian friendship with Mitanni
under Amenophis III it was impossible that boundary-stone (between Egypt and Mitanni)
would be [displaced / broken] as formerly (i.e. as in epoch of great Egypt-Mitannian wars of XV
c. BC) , EA 29: 122-123, and thus warns Akhenaten quite clearly of the fact that if this
friendship would really come at end, then the boundary stone of Egypt would be found under
Mitannian theat again.
This ultimatum was sent to Egypt c. 5th year of Akhenaten as it can be deduced from the
fact that it mentions 4 years of retaining of Mitannian ambassadors in Egypt (EA 29:113).
Complex of other sources gives it clear that Akhenaten did not change his course of policy and
Tushratta answered (as it was presumed in EA 29) by formal breaking out with Egypt and open
hostilities resulting in a war: Tushratta attacked Egyptian possessions in Syria and conquered
vast part of them. It was not merely a raid, but a real conquest25. EA 58, 60, 85, 86, 101 tell us
that Tushratta invaded Egyptian Asia personally with his army (after some long military
preparations which were immediately reported to Egypt by Rib-Addi of Byblos, EA 95:27-3326,
cf. EA 90: 19-2427, but did not cause any Egyptian reaction); as the result he marched as far as
Sumura (capital of Egyptian protectorate Amurru) and desired to march on Byblos but was in
shortage of water and returned to his land (EA 85:51-55), thus coming through almost all
protectorate of Amurru. The same campaign is reported in EA 58:5-9, where it is said that the
king of Mitanni conducted a campaign of war with his chariots and archers and that many
petty rulers submitted to him because of fear of him. As the result Amurru principality of
Abdi-Ashirta was subdued by Mitanni and paid tribute to it (EA 86:6-12, 101:6-10) till the very
Suppiluliumas One Year War against Mitanni (in the middle of Akhematens reign, see below; in
25
Cf. A. ALTMAN, The Mittanian Raid on Amurru (EA 85: 51-55) Reconsidered, in. AoF 30/2
(2003), 345-371; A. J. SPALINGER, Egyptian-Hittite Relations at the Close of the Amarna Age
and Some Notes on Hittite Military Strategy in North Syria, in: Bulletin of the Egyptological
Seminar 1 (1979), 5589.
26
The King of Mitanni looked at the land of Amurru and said: What land is this? Great it this
land! Let the king of Egypt send his deputy to me in order to held this land (=Amurru) for
himself (=King of Egypt).
27
Further: behold, in Mitanni is this [man = Tushratta] and his face is turned to Byblos. Then
what shall I do in my helplessness? You (=King of Egypt) are giving up you subject cities. So
Hapiru are taking them.
 11

course of this war Amurru preferred to secede from Mitanni to Hatti)28. Moreover, new vassals
of Mitanni tried to make further attacks on those who remained loyal to Egypt (Rib-Addi wrote
in EA 60: 13 ff.: All kings subject to the King of Hurri-warriors [one of the titles of the King of
Mitanni] try to snatch the lands from [me/my lord]). From Hittites sourses it can be concluded
quite safely that almost all the protectorate of Upe with Kadesh and Damascusi was also
conquered and subdued by Tushratta during this campaign so that Egyptians retained as their
newly northenmost dominions only Amki and Byblos with Sumura while all theif former
northerner terrories were lost now to Mitanni29. As it is firmly seen from Amarna Corpus
(unopposed in this point by any other materials) no Egyptian reaction has followed.
A little time later Suppiluliumas of Hatti defeated Tushratta in his famous One Year War
and conquered all the Syrian possessions of Mitanni including new ones, gained by Tushratta
recently from Egypt. This fact was a new great political fail for Egypt because any Egyptian
attempt to regain its former Asian dominions would be now an unprovoked aggression against
Hatti and would involve Egypt in a new decades of military confrontation with a new Asian
superpower built by Suppiluliumas. Thus Akhenaten in around a decade lost friendship with
Mitanni, lost a vast part of Egyptian possessions in Asia and became involved in a situation
fraught with confrontation wuth one more Asian great power Hatti. All achievements which by

28
This course of events is clearly presumed in a later Hittite treaty with Shaushkamuwa of
Amurru (CTH 105, 3, cf. translation in G. BECKMAN, Hittite Diplomatic Texts, Atlanta 1996,
99) where it is stated that the first establishment of Hittite power over Amurru took place as
follows: Before Aziru seceded to Suppiluliumas, my ancestor, the lands of Amurru were
hostile to Hittites, (as) they were then subjects of the King of Hurri, and Azira was loyal subject
to him too.
29
Later (after his famous One Year Campaign, see below) Suppilulimas, according to famous
chronicle of his reign (so called Deeds), declared to Egyptian messengers that he had conquered
Kadesh (during One Year War) not from Egypt but from Mitanni and never had made an
aggression against Egypt, so it was Egypt who made for a first time and unprovoked aggression
against him by attaking Kadesh (H.G. GTERBOCK, The Deeds of Suppiluliuma as told by his
son, Mursilli II, in: JCS 10 (1956), 97). Afterwards Mursilis II has yet recognized (in one of his
Plague Prayers, see I. SINGER. Hittite Prayers, Atlanta 2002, 58) that the first aggressive act in
between Egypt and Hittites was made by Suppiluliumas but the act in discussion was only a raid
in Amki (Beqaa) Valley, not any conquest of any Egyptian possession or any action in districts
to the north of Amki. On the whole it means (1) that to the moment of Suppiluliumas One Year
War the northern border of Egypt lay just in Amki, thus leaving main parts of former Egyptian
protectorates of Upe and Amurru to some other (i.e. Mitannian) overlordship; (2) that
territorial gains of Suppiluliumas during this war (i.e. in particular Kadesh and Damascus) were
made not at the expence of Egyptian possesions (so Egypt didnt control said lands before the
war in discussion); (3) that before the war Kadesh was a Mitannian, not Egyptian dependency (as
Suppiluliumas states directly to Egyptian ambassadors themselves, thus having no room or sense
for lying on the point), i.e. that Mitanni had gained it from Egypt after Amenophis III death
(under Amenophis III Kadesh had been undoubtedly an Egyptian possession as Amarna Letters
show). All of this means that to the moment when One Year War broke out all the territories to
the north of Amki which had formerly (under Amenopis III) belonged to Egypt (and during One
Year War were subdued to Suppiluliumas), including Kadesh and Damascus (and Amurru, see
above and note 28) constituted dominions of Mitanni, which fact can be treated only as a result
of Tushrattas anty-Egyptian campaign discussed above.
 12

great cost were provided to Egypt several decades ago and were safely mantained by Thutmose
IV and Amenophis III were ruined under Akhenaten and it could be acsribed only to his own
improvident foreign policy. From Egyptian point of view it was a very heavy defeat and this
defeat was an only result reached by the new pharaoh in foreign affairs. Impression caused by
this defeat in Egypt could be only sharper when one inevitably was taking into account a striking
contrast between successful stability under predecessors of Akhenation and rapid collapse caused
by the latter. Symptomatically, a Hittite raid at the end of this war has first touched the region of
Amki in the Beqaa Valley, which still remained an Egyptian dominion. This raid had no
consequences; but it has first indicated the neighbourghood of Egypt and the Hittites as a novelty
with totally unknown prospect.
Tushrattas Syrian campaign can be dated c. 1360 BC (in frames of Middle Chronology).
The Hittite-Mitannian One Year War must have fallen between Akhenatens Years 9 to 1430, i.e.
around 1356-1351; a better consideration allows placing this war just before Akhenatens Year
1231. At the same time, Egyptian relations to Amurru were highly uncertain. Its new king Aziru,
who succeeded Abdi-Ashirta before the Hittite invasion in Syria, which followed the defeat of

30
This is the dating resulting from the considerations by W. Murnane in connection to the letter
EA155 of the king Abimilki of Tyre (see W.J. MURNANE, The Road to Kadesh: A Historical
Interpretation of the Battle Reliefs of Kings Sety I at. Karnak, Chicago 1991, 120-122), who
portrayed the sack of Sumur as a recent, though not an immediate event. Sumur could have
been sacked only near the time of this war, when Aziru took it and put the end to the reign of
Rib-addi at Byblos.
31
These datings can be derived from the totality of the Amarna correspondence belonging to the
second part of Akhenatens reign, see W.J. MURNANE, loc.cit. The latest letters of Rib-Addi of
Byblos to Akhenaten mention the Hittite-Mitannian war (i.e. One Year War); near its time
Aziru of Amurru seized and sacked Sumur; and later on Abimilki of Tyre pleaded Akhenaten
to check if Sumur was rebuilt after a war, which is spoken of as a recent, though not an
immediate event. This event might be separated from the time of Abimilkis letter by a time
span of not less than 1 and not more then 4 years; if this letter dates to Akhenatens Years 12-
15, the war must really fall between his Years 9 to 14. However, Aziru was told to come to
Egypt during the Hittite-Mitannian war; he first took his time and was providing for his own
position at Syria but then came and, according to the letter of his son, stayed at Egypt long
enough. The length of all developments with Aziru must be evaluated as 4 to 5 years. Even if
one presumes Azirus return to Amurru to have taken place in Akhenatens last Year 17, this
will lead one to date the Hittite-Mitannian war to his Years 12-13. However, such calculation
is certainly wrong, for the Amarna archive must have lacked the correspondence of
Akhenatens last years (it must have been moved under Tutanchamun from Amarna to
Memphis with all other faculties of the capital city). So, the timing of the Hittite-Mitannian
war must anyway be even earlier, which must give a date before Akhenatens Year 12. An
argument in favour of the same dating, which is independent of the Amarna archive, is the
date of Tushrattas death: on the one hand it followed One Year War (as it is directly given in
Suppiluliumass second treaty with Shattiwazza, CTH 51, Obv.46-48), and on the other hand
took place still during the reign of Eriba-Adad I in Ashur (see W.J. MURNANEA.
NEMIRPOVSKY, Who was Man of Ashur which does not pay tribute? The initial passages of
CTH 52 and historical and chronological reconstruction of Amarna Epoch, in: VDI 3 (2009),
122-37), i.e. before 1355/54 BC ( i.e. about Akhenatens Years 9-10 in frames of Middle
Chronology).
 13

Mitanni, was at that time invited to come to Akhenatens court; for some time he abstained from
doing it on the grounds of the imminent Hittite presence in Syria and actually in order to
strengthen his own position there. Finally, he came to Egypt leaving his son as a vicegerent; he
must have done it under Egyptian duress and, perhaps, the mention of the Restoration Stela about
sending troops towards Djahi is its indicator. However, according to the Stela itself, this action
remained useless; and the reasons to say so are clear. Aziru came to Egypt and stayed there for
some time confirming his loyalty to Akhenaten, already attested in their correspondence;
perhaps, his stay correlates to the ceremony of bringing gifts attested for Akhenatens Year 12 in
the Amarna tombs. However, his son insisted on Azirus coming back due to the severe military
situation; and at home he rejected the Egyptian sovereignty and became a vassal of a closer and a
stronger power the Hittite king. About the same time32 the letter of the king Abimilki of Tyre
pleading Akhenaten to pay attention to the pitiful situation of the city of Sumur shows that the
entire North-Central Syria fell out of Egyptian control.
All these facts allow to conclude that the eve of Akhenatens Year 12 saw a downfall of
Egyptian domination in own of the key regions of the Eastern Mediterranean the North-Central
Syria, including Amurru. Moreover, the sequence of these events brought Egypt to the
neighbourghood with the Hittite kingdom, which replaced Mitanni as a second chief power of
the region. Yet unmarked with conflict, this neighbourghood was unpredictable as to its eventual
development; however, the impetuosity of the Hittite king Suppiluliuma and his generals well-
shown in the previous events inclined to consider this neighbourghood a possible danger. As it
has been said, these developments, which can be defined only as a severe military and diplomatic
crisis, have shown their results exactly on the eve of Akhenatens Year 12. Hence, this situation
could be perceived by the worshippers of Aten as a token of his anger and lead the king not only
to the pragmatic manoeuvres but also to the cessation of his compromise with the old cults, in
order to pacify his sun deity.
The conclusions that we tried to present should certainly be treated as preliminary: they
still want a more detailed argumentation from both Egyptian and Near Eastern sources.
However, they have been made within an approach yet overlooked by the students of Amarna
and placing its turning point into a wide historical context. If we managed to show the possible
advantages of this historical intention of studies, we can feel the task of this paper accomplished.

32
The letter of Abimilki was intended, among the other things, to flatter Meritaten exalted to the
rank of Hmt-nsw-wrt. She is attested in this rank instead of Nefertiti in Akhenatens Year 15;
the last attestations of Nefertiti are exactly the scenes of gift-bringing in Year 12. However,
the praise of Meritaten in the letter is so lengthy, that it must have been an immediate reaction
to the change of her rank, probably antedating Year 15.