Echegaray vs.
Secretary of Justice Also, she does not want to pay her penalty for she understands that being granted the absolute pardon
Facts: The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction of petitioner Leo Echegaray y Pilo for the crime of rape
of the 10 year-old daughter of his common-law spouse. The supreme penalty of death was to be imposed
upon him. He then filed motion for recon and a supplemental motion for recon raising constitutionality of
Republic Act No. 7659 and the death penalty for rape. Both were denied. Consequently, Congress changed
the mode of execution of the death penalty from electrocution to lethal injection, and passed Republic Act
No. 8177, designating death by lethal injection. Echegaray filed a Petition for prohibition from carrying out
the lethal injection against him under the grounds that it constituted 1. cruel, degrading, or unusual
punishment, 2. Being violative of due process, 3. a violation of the Philippines obligations under
international covenants, 4. an undue delegation of legislative power by Congress, an unlawful exercise by
respondent Secretary of the power to legislate, and an unlawful delegation of delegated powers by the
Secretary of Justice. In his motion to amend, the petitioner added equal protection as a ground.
The Solicitor General stated that the Supreme Court has already upheld the constitutionality of the Death
Penalty Law, and has declared that the death penalty is not cruel, unjust, excessive or unusual punishment;
execution by lethal injection, as authorized under R.A. No. 8177 and the questioned rules, is constitutional,
lethal injection being the most modern, more humane, more economical, safer and easier to apply (than
electrocution or the gas chamber); in addition to that, the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights does not expressly or impliedly prohibit the imposition of the death penalty.
ISSUE: Whether or not the court abused its discretion in granting a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) on
the execution of Echegaray despite the fact that the finality of judgment has already been rendered that
by granting the TRO, the Honorable Court has in effect granted reprieve which is an executive function.
HELD:
No. Respondents cited sec 19, art VII. The provision is simply the source of power of the President to grant
reprieves, commutations, and pardons and remit fines and forfeitures after conviction by final judgment.
The provision, however, cannot be interpreted as denying the power of courts to control the enforcement
of their decisions after their finality.
The powers of the Executive, the Legislative and the Judiciary to save the life of a death convict do not
exclude each other for the simple reason that there is no higher right than the right to life.
For the public respondents therefore to contend that only the Executive can protect the right to life of an
accused after his final conviction is to violate the principle of co-equal and coordinate powers of the three
branches of our government.
MONSANTO vs FACTORAN
170 SCRA 190
February 9, 1989
FACTS
: Salvacion A. Monsanto is an assistant city treasurer of Calbayog City.
She was convicted by the Sandiganbayan of committing the complex crime of estafa through falsification
of public documents. She appealed the decision to the Supreme Court, such was not reversed.
She then duly filed a motion for reconsideration. While the motion was pending, President Marcos granted
her an absolute pardon
. Acting on the absolute pardon granted her, she wished to be reinstated to her position as assistant city
treasurer. Her request by processed by the Ministry of Finance.
The Ministry granted her request for reinstatement. However, it shall take effect only right after her
pardon. She was also reminded to pay the indemnification required of her by the Sandiganbayan.
(P4, 892.50) This pissed her off. She said that she should be reinstated effectively starting from the date
of her suspension (August 1, 1982) and not from the effectivity of the absolute pardon (April 17, 1985).
also removed her legal obligation to pay her penalties. The Ministry of Finance forwarded her concern to
the Office of the President. The Office of the President replied through Deputy Executive Secretary
Fulgencio S. Factoran. Factoran held that both the Ministry of Finance and Ms. Monsnato are wrong.
Factoran held that:
1. She cannot be automatically reinstated. ONLY acquittal and NOT PARDON can give rise to such effect.
She must secure reappointment.
2. She is still liable for the civil liability and she still must pay. This, of course, super pissed Ms. Monsanto
because what the eff, she was granted absolute pardon, hence, she invoked the power of the Supreme
Court to decide on the matter.
ISSUE: Being a public officer granted the absolute pardon, can she be automatically reinstated to her old
position without need for reappointment?
RULING: NO automatic reinstatement whatsoever is to take effect. Upon conviction of Estafa, absolute
disqualification or ineligibility from public office forms part of the punishment. Upon her absolute pardon,
this particular disability was removed. So, she can apply for reappointment to the same position that she
lost because she was convicted.
The pardon only removed her disqualification from public office. It cannot go beyond that. To
regain her former post as assistant city treasurer, she must re-apply and undergo the usual procedure
required for a new appointment.
The court stressed that upon her application that in considering her qualifications and
suitability for the public post, the facts constituting her offense must be and should be evaluated and taken
into account to determine ultimately whether she can once again be entrusted with public funds.
Garcia v. Chairman G.R. No. 75025 September 14, 1993
VICENTE GARCIA, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE CHAIRMAN, COMMISSION ON AUDIT, THE HONORABLE
MINISTER, LAND TRANSPORTATION AND COMMUNICATIONS, THE REGIONAL DIRECTOR, TELECOM
REGIONAL OFFICE NO. IV, respondents.
Facts:
Herein petitioner Vicente Garcia was employed as a Supervising lineman at the Bureau of
Telecommunications. He was accused of stealing some materials in their company. Thus, public
respondents filed a criminal case against him for qualified theft before a court and on the same ground
respondents also filed an administrative case in which petitioner was found guilty and was later dismissed
from the service. With respect to the criminal offense, petitioner was acquitted by the court due to
insufficiency of evidence. Petitioner was then reinstated from his work and is now claiming before the COA
for his back salaries from the time of his dismissal up to present. But COA on the other hand reluctantly
denied his pleadings. Meanwhile, petitioner was extended an executive clemency (absolute pardon) by
the President. Still, respondent COA strongly refused to give due course to petitioners claim.
Issue:
Whether or not respondent is entitled to the payment of back wages after having been reinstated pursuant
to the grant of executive clemency.
Holding:
The Court ruled initially by explaining the mandate of Sec 19 Article VII of the Constitution and further
articulates that the bestowal of executive clemency on petitioner in effect completely obliterated the
adverse effects of the administrative decision which found him guilty of dishonesty and ordered his
separation from the service. This can be inferred from the executive clemency itself exculpating petitioner
from the administrative charge and thereby directing his reinstatement, which is rendered automatic by
the grant of the pardon. This signifies that petitioner need no longer apply to be reinstated to his former
employment; he is restored to his office ipso facto upon the issuance of the clemency.
G.R. No. 122338 December 29, 1995
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF WILFREDO SUMULONG TORRES,
(LYDIA DELA ROSA TORRES, Wife of Wilfredo Sumulong Torres, and daughters RAMONA ELISA R. TORRES
and MARIA CECILIA R. TORRES), petitioners,
vs. THE DIRECTOR, BUREAU OF CORRECTIONS, NEW BILIBID PRISONS, MUNTINLUPA, MM., respondents.
HERMOSISIMA, JR. J.:
We ruled consistently, viz., in Tesoro v. Director of Prisons, 1 Sales v. Director of Prisons 2 Espuelas v.
Provincial Warden of Bohol 3 and Torres v. Gonzales, 4 that, where a conditional pardonee has allegedly
breached a condition of a pardon, the President who opts to proceed against him under Section 64 (i) of
the Revised Administrative Code need not wait for a judicial pronouncement of guilt of a subsequent crime
or for his conviction therefor by final judgment, in order to effectuate the recommitment of the pardonee
to prison. The grant of pardon, the determination of the terms and conditions of the pardon, the
determination of the occurrence of the breach thereof, and the proper sanctions for such breach, are
purely executive acts and, thus, are not subject to judicial scrutiny. We have so ruled in the past, and we
so rule now.
In this original petition for habeas corpus, the wife and children of convicted felon Wilfredo Sumulong
Torres pray for his immediate release from prison on the ground that the exercise of the President's
prerogative under Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code to determine the occurrence, if any,
of a breach of a condition of a pardon in violation of pardonee's right to due process and the constitutional
presumption of innocence, constitutes a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction.
Of two counts of estafa Torres was convicted by the Court of First Instance of Manila some time before
1979. These convictions were affirmed by the Court of Appeals. The maximum sentence would expire on
November 2, 2000. On April 18, 1979, a conditional pardon was granted to Torres by the President of the
Philippines on condition that petitioner would "not again violate any of the penal laws of the Philippines.
5" Petitioner accepted the conditional pardon and was consequently released from confinement. 6
On May 21, 1986, the Board of Pardons and Parole resolved to recommend to the President the
cancellation of the conditional pardon granted to Torres because Torres had been charged with twenty
counts of estafa before, and convicted of sedition by, the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. On
September 8, 1986, the President cancelled the conditional pardon of Torres. On October 10, 1986, then
Minister of Justice Neptali A. Gonzales issued "by authority of the President" an Order of Arrest and
Recommitment 7 against petitioner. The petitioner was accordingly arrested and confined in Muntinlupa
to serve the unexpired portion of his sentence. Torres impugned the validity of the Order of Arrest and
Recommitment in the aforecited case of Torres v. Gonzales 8. There we ruled that:
Succinctly put, in proceeding against a convict who has been conditional pardoned and who is alleged to
have breached the conditions of his pardon, the Executive Department has two options: (i) to proceed
against him under Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code, or (ii) to proceed against him under
Article 159 of the Revised Penal Code . . . Here, the President has chosen to proceed against the petitioner
under Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code. That choice is an exercise of the President's
executive prerogative and is not subject to judicial scrutiny. 9
Now, Torres, apparently through his wife and children, seeks anew relief from this court. Unfortunately,
there is no adequate basis for us to oblige him.
A conditional pardon is in the nature of a contract between the sovereign power or the Chief Executive
and the convicted criminal to the effect that the former will release the latter subject to the condition that
if he does not comply with the terms of the pardon, he will be recommitted to prison to serve the
unexpired portion of the sentence or an additional one. 10 By the pardonee's consent to the terms
stipulated in this contract, the pardonee has thereby placed himself under the supervision of the Chief
Executive or his delegate who is duty-bound to see to it that the pardonee complies with the terms and
conditions of the pardon. Under Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code, the Chief Executive is
authorized to order "the arrest and re-incarceration of any such person who, in his judgment, shall fail to
comply with the condition, or conditions of his pardon, parole, or suspension of sentence." It is now a well-
entrenched rule in this jurisdiction that this exercise of presidential judgment is beyond judicial scrutiny.
The determination of the violation of the conditional pardon rests exclusively in the sound judgment of
the Chief Executive, and the pardonee, having consented to place his liberty on conditional pardon upon
the judgment of the power that has granted it, cannot invoke the aid of the courts, however erroneous
the findings may be upon which his recommitment was ordered. 11
It matters not that in the case of Torres, he has allegedly been acquitted in two of the three criminal cases
filed against him subsequent to his conditional pardon, and that the third case remains pending for
thirteen (13) years in apparent violation of his right to a speedy trial.
Habeas corpus lies only where the restraint of a person's liberty has been judicially adjudged as illegal or
unlawful. In the instant petition, the incarceration of Torres remains legal considering that, were it not for
the grant of conditional pardon which had been revoked because of a breach thereof, the determination
of which is beyond judicial scrutiny, he would have served his final sentence for his first conviction until
November 2, 2000.
Ultimately, solely vested in the Chief Executive, who in the first place was the exclusive author of the
conditional pardon and of its revocation, is the corrollary prerogative to reinstate the pardon if in his own
judgment, the acquittal of the pardonee from the subsequent charges filed against him, warrants the
same. Courts have no authority to interefer with the grant by the President of a pardon to a convicted
criminal. It has been our fortified ruling that a final judicial pronouncement as to the guilt of a pardonee is
not a requirement for the President to determine whether or not there has been a breach of the terms of
a conditional pardon. There is likewise nil a basis for the courts to effectuate the reinstatement of a
conditional pardon revoked by the President in the exercise of powers undisputedly solely and absolutely
lodged in his office.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for habeas corpus is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. No
pronouncement as to costs.
Risos-Vidal v. COMELEC G.R. No. 206666, January 21, 2015
FACTS:
September 12, 2007, the Sandiganbayan convicted former President Estrada, a former President of the
Republic of the Philippines, for the crime of plunder.
October 25, 2007, however, former President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo (former President Arroyo)
extended executive clemency, by way of pardon, to former President Estrada.
October 2, 2012, former President Estrada once more ventured into the political arena, and filed a
Certificate of Candidacy, this time vying for a local elective post, that of the Mayor of the City of Manila.
January 24, 2013, Risos-Vidal, the petitioner in this case, filed a Petition for Disqualification against former
President Estrada before the COMELEC. Risos Vidal anchored her petition on the theory that Former
President Estrada is Disqualified to Run for Public Office because of his Conviction for Plunder by the
Sandiganbayan Sentencing Him to Suffer the Penalty of Reclusion Perpetua with Perpetual Absolute
Disqualification.
ISSUE: Whether or not former President Estrada is qualified to vote and be voted for in public office as a
result of the pardon granted to him by former President Arroyo.
HELD:
Yes, former President Estrada is qualified to vote and be voted for in public office as a result of the pardon
granted to him by former President Arroyo.
It is well-entrenched that where the words of a statute are clear, plain, and free from ambiguity, it must
be given its literal meaning and applied without attempted interpretation. Verba legis non est
recedendum. From the words of a statute there should be no departure. It is this Courts firm view that
the phrase in the presidential pardon at issue which declares that former President Estrada is hereby
restored to his civil and political rights substantially complies with the requirement of express restoration.
BAYAN VS. ZAMORA
July 11, 2009, 11:20 pm
Filed under: PUBLIC INTL'L LAW, Treaty
The Philippines and the United States entered into a Mutual Defense Treaty on August 30, 1951, To
further strengthen their defense and security relationship. Under the treaty, the parties agreed to respond
to any external armed attack on their territory, armed forces, public vessels, and aircraft.
On September 16, 1991, the Philippine Senate rejected the proposed RP-US Treaty of Friendship,
Cooperation and Security which, in effect, would have extended the presence of US military bases in the
Philippines.
On July 18, 1997 RP and US exchanged notes and discussed, among other things, the possible
elements of the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA).This resulted to a series of conferences and negotiations
which culminated on January 12 and 13, 1998. Thereafter, President Fidel Ramos approved the VFA, which
was respectively signed by Secretary Siazon and United States Ambassador Thomas Hubbard.
On October 5, 1998, President Joseph E. Estrada, through respondent Secretary of Foreign Affairs,
ratified the VFA. On October 6, 1998, the President, acting through respondent Executive Secretary
Ronaldo Zamora, officially transmitted to the Senate of the Philippines,the Instrument of Ratification, the
letter of the President and the VFA, for concurrence pursuant to Section 21, Article VII of the 1987
Constitution.
Petitions for certiorari and prohibition, petitioners as legislators, non-governmental organizations,
citizens and taxpayers assail the constitutionality of the VFA and impute to herein respondents grave
abuse of discretion in ratifying the agreement.
Petitioner contends, under they provision cited, the foreign military bases, troops, or facilities may
be allowed in the Philippines unless the following conditions are sufficiently met: a) it must be a treaty,b)
it must be duly concurred in by the senate, ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a national referendum
held for that purpose if so required by congress, and c) recognized as such by the other contracting state.
Respondents, on the other hand, argue that Section 21 Article VII is applicable so that, what is
requires for such treaty to be valid and effective is the concurrence in by at least two-thirds of all the
members of the senate.
Issue: Is the VFA governed by the provisions of Section 21, Art VII or of Section 25, Article XVIII of the
Constitution?
Ruling: Section 25, Article XVIII, which specifically deals with treaties involving foreign military bases,
troops or facilities should apply in the instant case.
The 1987 Philippine Constitution contains two provisions requiring the concurrence of the Senate on
treaties or international agreements. Sec. 21 Art. VII, which respondent invokes, reads: No treaty or
international agreement shall be valid and effective unless concurred in by at least 2/3 of all the Members
of the Senate. Sec. 25 Art. XVIII provides : After the expiration in 1991 of the Agreement between the RP
and the US concerning Military Bases, foreign military bases, troops or facilities shall not be allowed in the
Philippines except under a treaty duly concurred in and when the Congress so requires, ratified by a
majority of votes cast by the people in a national referendum held for that purpose, and recognized as a
treaty by the Senate by the other contracting state.
The first cited provision applies to any form of treaties and international agreements in general with
a wide variety of subject matter. All treaties and international agreements entered into by the Philippines,
regardless of subject matter, coverage or particular designation requires the concurrence of the Senate to
be valid and effective.
In contrast, the second cited provision applies to treaties which involve presence of foreign military
bases, troops and facilities in the Philippines. Both constitutional provisions share some common ground.
The fact that the President referred the VFA to the Senate under Sec. 21 Art. VII, and that Senate extended
its concurrence under the same provision is immaterial.
Abaya vs Ebdane
Facts:
The government of the japan and the government of the philippines, through their duly authorized
representatives, reached an understanding concerning japanese loans to be extended to the philippines,
by way of exchanging of notes. These loans were said to be aimed at promoting the country's economic
stabilization and development efforts. Particulaly, the loan was set for the rehabilitation of San Andres
(Codon)-Virac-Jct. Bago-Viga road, with the length of 79.818 kilometers, in the island province of
Catanduanes. The project, named CP I, is one of the four packages comprising the project for the
improvement of the catanduanes circumferential road.
The works was put up for bidding to interested contractors. By virtue of resolution no. PJHL-A-04-012
issued by the DPWH, project CP I was subsequently awarded to China Road and Bridge Corporation, them
being the lowest bidder. Thereafter, a contract of agreement was entered into between DPWH and the
aforementioned contractor.
The petitioners herein seek to nullify and set aside the the resolution issued by the DPWH and the
agreement entered into between them and the contractor on the ground that the loan agreement entered
into by the philippines and JBIC, a banking agency of Japan, is neither a treaty nor an executive agreement.
They point out that inorder for an agreement to be considered a treaty or an executive agreement, the
parties must be 2 sovereigns or states. It is also, accordingly, violative of the non-impairment clause set
forth in the consititution. What should therefore apply to the loan, is not what was set forth by the JBIC,
but RA 9184 of the Philippine Procurement Act. However, the respondents characterize foreign loan
agreements, including the one at bar, as executive agreements and should be complided with pursuant to
the fundamental principle in international law of pacta sunt servanda. Section 20, Article 7 of The
philippine constitution also provides that
The President may contract or guarantee foreign loans on behalf of the Republic of the Philippines with
the prior concurrence of the Monetary Board, and subject to such limitations as may be provided by law.
The Monetary Board shall, within thirty days from the end of every quarter of the calendar year, submit
to the Congress a complete report of its decisions on applications for loans to be contracted or guaranteed
by the Government or Government-owned and Controlled Corporations which would have the effect of
increasing the foreign debt, and containing other matters as may be provided by law.
They also maintain that executive agreements are essentially contracts governing the rights and
obligations of parties, such that, being the law among parties, it must be faithfully adhered to by them.
Apropos to that, it is but incumbent upon the philippine government to perform in good faith the
obligations set forth in the loan agreement in question.
Issue:
Whether or not the procurement loan is an executive agreement or treaty
Ruling:
the Court held that in conjunction with the exchange of notes between the two sovereign states, japan
and the philippines, the procurement loan possesses the character of an executive agreement. The
exchange of notes expressed the understanding reached by the governments of japan and philippines
concerning the loan, an integral part thereof, aimed at the promotion of economic stabilization and
development efforts.
Executive agreements are those which become binding without need of a vote by the senate or congress.
They sometimes take the form of exchange of notes.
Exchange of notes is a record of a routine agreement that has many similarities with the private law
contract. The agreement consists of the exchange of two documents, each of the parties in posession of
the one signed by the representative of the other.
Under the principle of Pacta Sunt Servanda, which provides for the performance in good faith of any
international or executive agreement, or treaty, the DPWH, as executing agency of the project has
rightfully and dutifully awarded the bid to china road and bridge corporation.
The petition is thereby dismissed.
PHILCONSA VS. ENRIQUEZ
G.R. No. 113105, August 19 1994, 235 SCRA 506
FACTS:
House Bill No. 10900, the General Appropriation Bill of 1994 (GAB of 1994), was passed and approved by
both houses of Congress on December 17, 1993. As passed, it imposed conditions and limitations on
certain items of appropriations in the proposed budget previously submitted by the President. It also
authorized members of Congress to propose and identify projects in the "pork barrels" allotted to them
and to realign their respective operating budgets.
On December 30, 1993, the President signed the bill into law, making it as Republic Act No. 7663, entitled
"AN ACT APPROPRIATING FUNDS FOR THE OPERATION OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINES FROM
JANUARY ONE TO DECEMBER THIRTY ONE, NINETEEN HUNDRED AND NINETY-FOUR, AND FOR OTHER
PURPOSES" (GAA of 1994). On the same day, the President delivered his Presidential Veto Message,
specifying the provisions of the bill he vetoed and on which he imposed certain conditions.
Petitioners assail the special provision allowing a member of Congress to realign his allocation for
operational expenses to any other expense category claiming that it violates Section 25, Article 7 of the
Constitution. Issues of constitutionality were raised before the Supreme Court.
Petition prayed for a writ of prohibition to declare unconstitutional and void the provision under Article
16 of the Countrywide Development Fund and the veto of the President of the Special provision of Art
XLVIII of the GAA of 1994.
There were 16 members of the Senate who sought for the issuance of writs of certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus against the Executive Secretary, the Secretary of Department of Budget and Management and
the National Treasurer and questions the constitutionality of the conditions imposed by the President in
the items of the GAA of 1994 as well as the constitutionality of the veto of the special provision in the
appropriation for debt services.
Senator Tanada and Senator Romulo sought the issuance of the writs of prohibition and mandamus against
the same respondents. Petitioners contest the constitutionality of (1) the veto on four special provisions
added to items in the GAA of 1994 for the AFP and DPWH; and (2) the conditions imposed by the President
in the implementation of certain appropriations for the CAFGUs, DPWH, and National Highway Authority.
Issue: Whether or not the Presidents veto is valid?
Decision: Petition dismissed. Congress can not include in the general appropriations matters that should
be enacted in a separate legislation and if it does so, the inappropriate provision must be treated as an
item and can be vetoed by the President.
he provision in GAA authorizing the Chief of Staff to use savings to augment the pension and
gratuity fund violates Section 25 (paragraph 5) and Section 29 (paragraph 1) of Article 6 of the 1987
Constitution. Only the President is authorized to augment items from savings in the general appropriation
to the executive branch. Also pursuant to Section 29 no money shall be paid out of the treasury except
in pursuance of an appropriation made by law.
Maria Carolina Araullo vs Benigno Aquino III
Power of the Purse Executive Impoundment
When President Benigno Aquino III took office, his administration noticed the sluggish growth
of the economy. The World Bank advised that the economy needed a stimulus plan. Budget Secretary
Florencio Butch Abad then came up with a program called the Disbursement Acceleration Program
(DAP).
The DAP was seen as a remedy to speed up the funding of government projects. DAP enables
the Executive to realign funds from slow moving projects to priority projects instead of waiting for next
years appropriation. So what happens under the DAP was that if a certain government project is being
undertaken slowly by a certain executive agency, the funds allotted therefor will be withdrawn by the
Executive. Once withdrawn, these funds are declared as savings by the Executive and said funds will then
be reallotted to other priority projects. The DAP program did work to stimulate the economy as economic
growth was in fact reported and portion of such growth was attributed to the DAP (as noted by the
Supreme Court).
Other sources of the DAP include the unprogrammed funds from the General Appropriations
Act (GAA). Unprogrammed funds are standby appropriations made by Congress in the GAA.
Meanwhile, in September 2013, Senator Jinggoy Estrada made an expos claiming that he, and
other Senators, received Php50M from the President as an incentive for voting in favor of the
impeachment of then Chief Justice Renato Corona. Secretary Abad claimed that the money was taken from
the DAP but was disbursed upon the request of the Senators.
This apparently opened a can of worms as it turns out that the DAP does not only realign funds
within the Executive. It turns out that some non-Executive projects were also funded; to name a few:
Php1.5B for the CPLA (Cordillera Peoples Liberation Army), Php1.8B for the MNLF (Moro National
Liberation Front), P700M for the Quezon Province, P50-P100M for certain Senators each, P10B for
Relocation Projects, etc.
This prompted Maria Carolina Araullo, Chairperson of the Bagong Alyansang Makabayan, and
several other concerned citizens to file various petitions with the Supreme Court questioning the validity
of the DAP. Among their contentions was:
DAP is unconstitutional because it violates the constitutional rule which provides that no
money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law.
Secretary Abad argued that the DAP is based on certain laws particularly the GAA (savings and
augmentation provisions thereof), Sec. 25(5), Art. VI of the Constitution (power of the President to
augment), Secs. 38 and 49 of Executive Order 292 (power of the President to suspend expenditures and
authority to use savings, respectively).
ISSUE. Whether or not the DAP realignments can be considered as impoundments by the executive.
RULING: No, there is no executive impoundment in the DAP. Impoundment of funds refers to the
Presidents power to refuse to spend appropriations or to retain or deduct appropriations for whatever
reason. Impoundment is actually prohibited by the GAA unless there will be an unmanageable national
government budget deficit (which did not happen). Nevertheless, theres no impoundment in the case at
bar because whats involved in the DAP was the transfer of funds.
VINUYA VS. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
G.R. No. 162230, 28 April 2010
FACTS
Petitioners narrate that during the Second World War, the Japanese army attacked villages and
systematically raped the women as part of the destruction of the village. As a result of the actions of their
Japanese tormentors, the petitioners have spent their lives in misery, having endured physical injuries,
pain and disability, and mental emotional suffering. Petitioners claim that since 1998, they have
approached the Executive Department through the DOJ, DFA and OSG, requesting assistance in filing a
claim against the Japanese officials and military officers who ordered the establishment of the comfort
women stations in the Philippines. However, said officials declined to assist the petitioners, and took the
position that the individual claims for compensation have already been fully satisfied by Japans
compliance with the Peace Treaty between the Philippines and Japan. Petitioners also argued that the
comfort women system constituted a crime against humanity, sexual slavery, and torture. They alleged
that the prohibition against these international crimes is jus cogens norms from which no derogation is
possible, as such, the Philippine government is in breach of its legal obligation not to afford impunity for
crimes against humanity.
ISSUE
November 13, 2000, Estrada was impeached by the Hor and, on December 7, impeachment proceedings
were begun in the Senate during which more serious allegations of graft and corruption against Estrada
were made and were only stopped on January 16, 2001 when 11 senators, sympathetic to the President,
succeeded in suppressing damaging evidence against Estrada. As a result, the impeachment trial was
thrown into an uproar as the entire prosecution panel walked out and Senate President Pimentel resigned
after casting his vote against Estrada.
On January 19, PNP and the AFP also withdrew their support for Estrada and joined the crowd at EDSA
Shrine. Estrada called for a snap presidential election to be held concurrently with congressional and local
elections on May 14, 2001. He added that he will not run in this election. On January 20, SC declared that
the seat of presidency was vacant, saying that Estrada constructively resigned his post. At noon, Arroyo
took her oath of office in the presence of the crowd at EDSA as the 14th President. Estrada and his family
later left Malacaang Palace. Erap, after his fall, filed petition for prohibition with prayer for WPI. It sought
to enjoin the respondent Ombudsman from conducting any further proceedings in cases filed against him
not until his term as president ends. He also prayed for judgment confirming Estrada to be the lawful and
incumbent President of the Republic of the Philippines temporarily unable to discharge the duties of his
office.
ISSUE(S):
1. WoN the petition presents a justiciable controversy.

Whether the Executive Department committed grave abuse of discretion in not espousing petitioners RULING:
claims for official apology and other forms of reparations against Japan.
1. Political questions- "to those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people
RULING in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the
legislative or executive branch of the government. It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom,
No. The question whether the government should espouse claims of its nationals against a foreign not legality of a particular measure."
government is a foreign relations matter, the authority for which is demonstrably committed by our Legal distinction between EDSA People Power I EDSA People Power II:
Constitution not to the courts but to the political branches. In this case, the Executive Department has
determined that taking up petitioners cause would be inimical to our countrys foreign policy interests,
and could disrupt our relations with Japan, thereby creating serious implications for stability in this region.
For the Court to overturn the Executive Departments determination would mean an assessment of the
foreign policy judgments by a coordinate political branch to which authority to make that judgment has
been constitutionally committed. In the international sphere, traditionally, the only means available for
individuals to bring a claim within the international legal system has been when the individual is able to
persuade a government to bring a claim on the individuals behalf. Even then, it is not the individuals rights
that are being asserted, but rather, the states own rights. The State, therefore, is the sole judge to decide
whether its protection will be granted, to what extent it is granted, and when will it cease.

The Court fully agree that rape, sexual slavery, torture, and sexual violence are morally
reprehensible as well as legally prohibited under contemporary international law. However, it does not
automatically imply that the Philippines is under a non-derogable obligation to prosecute international
crimes. Absent the consent of the states, an applicable treaty regime, or a directive by the Security Council,
there is no non-derogable duty to institute proceedings against Japan. Even the invocation of jus cogens
norms and erga omnes obligations will not alter this analysis. Even if we sidestep the question of whether
jus cogens norms existed in 1951, petitioners have not deigned to show that the crimes committed by the
Japanese army violated jus cogens prohibitions at the time the Treaty of Peace was signed, or that the
duty to prosecute perpetrators of international crimes is an erga omnes obligation or has attained the The cases at bar pose legal and not political questions. The principal issues for resolution require the
status of jus cogens. proper interpretation of certain provisions in the 1987 Constitution: Sec 1 of Art II, and Sec 8 of Art VII,
and the allocation of governmental powers under Sec 11 of Art VII. The issues likewise call for a ruling on
Estrada vs Desierto G.R. No. 146710-15 March 2 2001 the scope of presidential immunity from suit. They also involve the correct calibration of the right of
petitioner against prejudicial publicity.
FACTS:
It began in October 2000 when allegations of wrong doings involving bribe-taking, illegal gambling, and
other forms of corruption were made against Estrada before the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee. On
Cruz vs Secretary of DENR
Natural Resources and Environmental Law; Constitutional Law; IPRA; Regalian Doctrine
GR. No. 135385, Dec. 6, 2000
FACTS:
Petitioners Isagani Cruz and Cesar Europa filed a suit for prohibition and mandamus as citizens and
taxpayers, assailing the constitutionality of certain provisions of Republic Act No. 8371, otherwise known
as the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997 (IPRA) and its implementing rules and regulations (IRR). The
petitioners assail certain provisions of the IPRA and its IRR on the ground that these amount to an unlawful
deprivation of the States ownership over lands of the public domain as well as minerals and other natural
resources therein, in violation of the regalian doctrine embodied in section 2, Article XII of the Constitution.
ISSUE:
Do the provisions of IPRA contravene the Constitution?
HELD:
No, the provisions of IPRA do not contravene the Constitution. Examining the IPRA, there is nothing in the
law that grants to the ICCs/IPs ownership over the natural resources within their ancestral domain.
Ownership over the natural resources in the ancestral domains remains with the State and the rights
granted by the IPRA to the ICCs/IPs over the natural resources in their ancestral domains merely gives
them, as owners and occupants of the land on which the resources are found, the right to the small scale
utilization of these resources, and at the same time, a priority in their large scale development and
exploitation.
Additionally, ancestral lands and ancestral domains are not part of the lands of the public domain. They
are private lands and belong to the ICCs/IPs by native title, which is a concept of private land title that
existed irrespective of any royal grant from the State. However, the right of ownership and possession by
the ICCs/IPs of their ancestral domains is a limited form of ownership and does not include the right to
alienate the same.
Seven (7) voted to dismiss the petition. Justice Kapunan filed an opinion, which the Chief Justice and
Justices Bellosillo, Quisumbing, and Santiago join, sustaining the validity of the challenged provisions of
R.A. 8371. Justice Puno also filed a separate opinion sustaining all challenged provisions of the law with
the exception of Section 1, Part II, Rule III of NCIP Administrative Order No. 1, series of 1998, the Rules and
Regulations Implementing the IPRA, and Section 57 of the IPRA which he contends should be interpreted
as dealing with the large-scale exploitation of natural resources and should be read in conjunction with
Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution. On the other hand, Justice Mendoza voted to dismiss the
petition solely on the ground that it does not raise a justiciable controversy and petitioners do not have
standing to question the constitutionality of R.A. 8371.
Indeed, the judicial power cannot be extended to matters which do not involve actual cases or
controversies without upsetting the balance of power among the three branches of the government and
erecting, as it were, the judiciary, particularly the Supreme Court, as a third branch of Congress, with power
not only to invalidate statutes but even to rewrite them. Yet that is exactly what we would be permitting
in this case were we to assume jurisdiction and decide wholesale the constitutional validity of the IPRA
contrary to the established rule that a party can question the validity of a statute only if, as applied to him,
it is unconstitutional. Here the IPRA is sought to be declared void on its face.
But, in this case, what public right is there for petitioners to enforce when the IPRA does not apply to them
except in general and in common with other citizens.
For the foregoing reasons I vote to dismiss the petition in this case.
UDK-15143: In the matter of: Save the Supreme Court Judicial Independence and Fiscal Autonomy
Movement v. Abolition of Judiciary Development Fund (JDF) and Reduction of Fiscal Autonomy
This case involves the proposed bills abolishing the Judiciary Development Fund1 and replacing
it with the "Judiciary Support Fund." Funds collected from the proposed Judiciary Support Fund shall be
remitted to the national treasury and Congress shall determine how the funds will be used. Petitioner Rolly
Mijares (Mijares) prays for the issuance of a writ of mandamus in order to compel this court to exercise its
judicial independence and fiscal autonomy against the perceived hostility of Congress. The complaint
implied that certain acts of members of Congress and the President after the promulgation of these cases
show a threat to judicial independence.
The issue for resolution is whether petitioner Rolly Mijares has sufficiently shown grounds for
this court to grant the petition and issue a writ of mandamus. Petitioner argues that Congress gravely
abused its discretion with a blatant usurpation of judicial independence and fiscal autonomy of the
Supreme Court. Petitioner points out that Congress is exercising its power in an arbitrary and despotic
manner by reason of passion or personal hostility by abolishing the Judiciary Development Fund (JDF) of
the Supreme Court.
The power of judicial review, like all powers granted by the Constitution, is subject to certain
limitations. Petitioner must comply with all the requisites for judicial review before this court may take
cognizance of the case. Petitioners failure to comply with the first two requisites warrants the outright
dismissal of this petition.
ISSUE: Whether petitioner Rolly Mijares has sufficiently shown grounds for this court to grant the petition
and issue a writ of mandamus.
RULING: One of the requirements for this court to exercise its power of judicial review is the existence
of an actual controversy. This means that there must be an existing case or controversy that is appropriate
or ripe for determination, not conjectural or anticipatory, lest the decision of the court would amount to
an advisory opinion. Petitioners allegations show that he wants this court to strike down the proposed
bills abolishing the Judiciary Development Fund. This court, however, must act only within its powers
granted under the Constitution. This court is not empowered to review proposed bills because a bill is not
a law.
Similar to Montesclaros, petitioner is asking this court to stop Congress from passing laws that
will abolish the Judiciary Development Fund. This court has explained that the filing of bills is within the
legislative power of Congress and is not subject to judicial restraint. A proposed bill produces no legal
effects until it is passed into law. Under the Constitution, the judiciary is mandated to interpret laws. It
cannot speculate on the constitutionality or unconstitutionality of a bill that Congress may or may not
pass. It cannot rule on mere speculations or issues that are not ripe for judicial determination. The petition,
therefore, does not present any actual case or controversy that is ripe for this courts determination.
For this reason, we appreciate petitioner's concern for the judiciary. It is often only through the
vigilance of private citizens that issues relating to the judiciary can be discussed in the political sphere.
Unfortunately, the remedy he seeks cannot be granted by this court. But his crusade is not a lost cause.
Considering that what he seeks to be struck down is a proposed bill, it would be better for him to air his
concerns by lobbying in Congress. There, he may discover the representatives and senators who may have
a similar enthusiastic response to truly making the needed investments in the Rule of Law.
RULE 63 Declaratory Relief and Similar Remedies
Section 1. Who may file petition. Any person interested under a deed, will, contract or other written
instrument, or whose rights are affected by a statute, executive order or regulation, ordinance, or any
other governmental regulation may, before breach or violation thereof bring an action in the appropriate
Regional Trial Court to determine any question of construction or validity arising, and for a declaration of
his rights or duties, thereunder. (Bar Matter No. 803, 17 February 1998)
ABS-CBN BROADCASTING CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
FACTS:
Before us is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court assailing Commission
on Elections (Comelec) en banc Resolution No. 98-1419[1] dated April 21, 1998. In the said Resolution, the
poll body
 IBP v. Zamora, 338 SCRA 81(2000)
"RESOLVED to approve the issuance of a restraining order to stop ABS-CBN or any other groups, its agents
or representatives from conducting such exit survey and to authorize the Honorable Chairman to issue the
same."
The Resolution was issued by the Comelec allegedly upon "information from [a] reliable source
that ABS-CBN (Lopez Group) has prepared a project, with PR groups, to conduct radio-TV coverage of the
elections x x x and to make [an] exit survey of the x x x vote during the elections for national officials
particularly for President and Vice President, results of which shall be [broadcast] immediately."[2] The
electoral body believed that such project might conflict with the official Comelec count, as well as the
unofficial quick count of the National Movement for Free Elections (Namfrel). It also noted that it had not
authorized or deputized Petitioner ABS-CBN to undertake the exit survey.
On May 9, 1998, this Court issued the Temporary Restraining Order prayed for by petitioner.
We directed the Comelec to cease and desist, until further orders, from implementing the assailed
Resolution or the restraining order issued pursuant thereto, if any. In fact, the exit polls were actually
conducted and reported by media without any difficulty or problem.

ISSUE: Petitioner raises this lone issue: "Whether or not the Respondent Commission acted with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to a lack or excess of jurisdiction when it approved the issuance of a
restraining order enjoining the petitioner or any [other group], its agents or representatives from
conducting exit polls during the x x x May 11 elections."[3]
In his Memorandum,[4] the solicitor general, in seeking to dismiss the Petition, brings up
additional issues: (1) mootness and (2) prematurity, because of petitioner's failure to seek a
reconsideration of the assailed Comelec Resolution.

The Court's Ruling

The Petition[5] is meritorious.

Procedural Issues: Mootness and Prematurity

The solicitor general contends that the petition is moot and academic, because the May 11,
1998 election has already been held and done with. Allegedly, there is no longer any actual controversy
before us.
The issue is not totally moot. While the assailed Resolution referred specifically to the May 11,
1998 election, its implications on the people's fundamental freedom of expression transcend the past
election. The holding of periodic elections is a basic feature of our democratic government. By its very
nature, exit polling is tied up with elections. To set aside the resolution of the issue now will only postpone
a task that could well crop up again in future elections.[6]
In any event, in Salonga v. Cruz Pano, the Court had occasion to reiterate that it "also has the
duty to formulate guiding and controlling constitutional principles, precepts, doctrines, or rules. It has the ISSUE: Does it have standing?
symbolic function of educating bench and bar on the extent of protection given by constitutional
guarantees."[7] Since the fundamental freedoms of speech and of the press are being invoked here, we HELD: Locus standi has been defined as personal & substantial interest in the case such that the party has
have resolved to settle, for the guidance of posterity, whether they likewise protect the holding of exit sustained or will sustain direct injury as result of the challenged act. In this case, IBP primarily anchors its
polls and the dissemination of data derived therefrom. standing on its alleged responsibility to uphold the constitution. The mere invocation by the IBP of its duty
The solicitor general further contends that the Petition should be dismissed for petitioner's to preserve the rule of law & nothing more, while undoubtedly true, is not sufficient to clothed it w/
failure to exhaust available remedies before the issuing forum, specifically the filing of a motion for standing. That is too general, an interests that is shared by other groups & the whole citizenry. IBPs
reconsideration. fundamental purpose that is to elevate the standards of the law profession & improve the administration
This Court, however, has ruled in the past that this procedural requirement may be glossed of justice, cannot be affected by the deployment of the Marines.
over to prevent a miscarriage of justice,[8] when the issue involves the principle of social justice or the
protection of labor,[9] when the decision or resolution sought to be set aside is a nullity,[10] or when the HON. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, et al. v. SOUTHWING HEAVY INDUSTRIES, INC., et al. G.R. No. 164171:
need for relief is extremely urgent and certiorari is the only adequate and speedy remedy available.[11]
The instant Petition assails a Resolution issued by the Comelec en banc on April 21, 1998, only On January 16, 2004, respondents Southwing Heavy Industries, Inc., (SOUTHWING) United Auctioneers,
twenty (20) days before the election itself. Besides, the petitioner got hold of a copy thereof only on May Inc. (UNITED AUCTIONEERS), and Microvan, Inc. (MICROVAN), instituted a declaratory relief case docketed
4, 1998. Under the circumstances, there was hardly enough opportunity to move for a reconsideration as Civil Case No. 20-0-04,[1] against the Executive Secretary, Secretary of Transportation and
and to obtain a swift resolution in time for the May 11, 1998 elections. Moreover, not only is time of the Communication, Commissioner of Customs, Assistant Secretary and Head of the Land Transportation
essence; the Petition involves transcendental constitutional issues. Direct resort to this Court through a Office, Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority (SBMA), Collector of Customs for the Port at Subic Bay Freeport
special civil action for certiorari is therefore justified. Zone, and the Chief of the Land Transportation Office at Subic Bay Freeport Zone.
SOUTHWING, UNITED AUCTIONEERS and MICROVAN prayed that judgment be rendered (1) declaring
Article 2, Section 3.1 of EO 156 unconstitutional and illegal; (2) directing the Secretary of Finance,
Commissioner of Customs, Collector of Customs and the Chairman of the SBMA to allow the importation
of used motor vehicles; (2) ordering the Land Transportation Office and its subordinates inside the Subic
Special Economic Zone to process the registration of the imported used motor vehicles; and (3) in general,
to allow the unimpeded entry and importation of used motor vehicles subject only to the payment of the
required customs duties.
Upon filing of petitioners answer/comment, respondents SOUTHWING and MICROVAN filed a motion for
summary judgment which was granted by the trial court. On May 24, 2004, a summary judgment was
rendered declaring that Article 2, Section 3.1 of EO 156 constitutes an unlawful usurpation of legislative
power vested by the Constitution with Congress. The trial court further held that the proviso is contrary
to the mandate of Republic Act No. 7227 (RA 7227) or the Bases Conversion and Development Act of 1992
which allows the free flow of goods and capital within the Freeport. The dispositive portion of the said
decision reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of petitioner declaring Executive Order 156 [Article 2,
Section] 3.1 for being unconstitutional and illegal; directing respondents Collector of Customs based at
SBMA to allow the importation and entry of used motor vehicles pursuant to the mandate of RA 7227;
directing respondent Chief of the Land Transportation Office and its subordinates inside the Subic Special
Economic Zone or SBMA to process the registration of imported used motor vehicle; and in general, to
allow unimpeded entry and importation of used motor vehicles to the Philippines subject only to the
payment of the required customs duties.
SO ORDERED.
ISSUE: Petitioners are now before this Court contending that Article 2, Section 3.1 of EO 156 is valid and
applicable to the entire country, including the Freeeport. In support of their arguments, they raise
procedural and substantive issues bearing on the constitutionality of the assailed proviso. The procedural
issues are: the lack of respondents locus standi to question the validity of EO 156, the propriety of
challenging EO 156 in a declaratory relief proceeding and the applicability of a judgment on the pleadings
in this case.
Petitioners argue that respondents will not be affected by the importation ban considering that their
certificate of registration and tax exemption do not authorize them to engage in the importation and/or
trading of used cars. They also aver that the actions filed by respondents do not qualify as declaratory
relief cases. Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court provides that a petition for declaratory relief may be
filed before there is a breach or violation of rights. Petitioners claim that there was already a breach of
respondents supposed right because the cases were filed more than a year after the issuance of EO 156.
In fact, in Civil Case No. 30-0-2003, numerous warrants of seizure and detention were issued against
imported used motor vehicles belonging to respondent ASSOCIATIONs members.
RULING: Petitioners arguments lack merit.
The established rule that the constitutionality of a law or administrative issuance can be challenged by one
who will sustain a direct injury as a result of its enforcement has been satisfied in the instant case. The
broad subject of the prohibited importation is all types of used motor vehicles. Respondents would
definitely suffer a direct injury from the implementation of EO 156 because their certificate of registration
and tax exemption authorize them to trade and/or import new and used motor vehicles and spare parts,
except used cars. Other types of motor vehicles imported and/or traded by respondents and not falling
within the category of used cars would thus be subjected to the ban to the prejudice of their business.
Undoubtedly, respondents have the legal standing to assail the validity of EO 156.
Oposa vs. Factoran Case Digest (G.R. No. 101083, July 30, 1993)
FACTS:
The plaintiffs in this case are all minors duly represented and joined by their parents. The first
complaint was filed as a taxpayer's class suit at the Branch 66 (Makati, Metro Manila), of the Regional Trial
Court, National capital Judicial Region against defendant (respondent) Secretary of the Department of
Environment and Natural Reasources (DENR). Plaintiffs alleged that they are entitled to the full benefit,
use and enjoyment of the natural resource treasure that is the country's virgin tropical forests. They
further asseverate that they represent their generation as well as generations yet unborn and asserted
that continued deforestation have caused a distortion and disturbance of the ecological balance and have
resulted in a host of environmental tragedies.
Plaintiffs prayed that judgement be rendered ordering the respondent, his agents,
representatives and other persons acting in his behalf to cancel all existing Timber License Agreement
(TLA) in the country and to cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving
new TLAs.
Defendant, on the other hand, filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the complaint had
no cause of action against him and that it raises a political question.
The RTC Judge sustained the motion to dismiss, further ruling that granting of the relief prayed
for would result in the impairment of contracts which is prohibited by the Constitution.
Plaintiffs (petitioners) thus filed the instant special civil action for certiorari and asked the court
to rescind and set aside the dismissal order on the ground that the respondent RTC Judge gravely abused
his discretion in dismissing the action.
Issue: Did the children have the legal standing to file the case?
Ruling: Yes. The Supreme Court in granting the petition ruled that the children had the legal standing to
file the case based on the concept of intergenerational responsibility. Their right to a healthy
environment carried with it an obligation to preserve that environment for the succeeding generations. In
this, the Court recognized legal standing to sue on behalf of future generations. Also, the Court said, the
law on non-impairment of contracts must give way to the exercise of the police power of the state in the
interest of public welfare.
David v. Macapagal-Arroyo
G.R. No. 171396 May 3, 2006
Sandoval-Gutierrez, J.
Facts:
On February 24, 2006, as the nation celebrated the 20th Anniversary of the Edsa People Power I,
President Arroyo issued PP 1017 declaring a state of national emergency, thus:
NOW, THEREFORE, I, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, President of the Republic of the Philippines and
Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested upon me by
Section 18, Article 7 of the Philippine Constitution which states that: The President. . . whenever it
becomes necessary, . . . may call out (the) armed forces to prevent or suppress. . .rebellion. . ., and in my
capacity as their Commander-in-Chief, do hereby command the Armed Forces of the Philippines, to
maintain law and order throughout the Philippines, prevent or suppress all forms of lawless violence as
well as any act of insurrection or rebellion and to enforce obedience to all the laws and to all decrees,
orders and regulations promulgated by me personally or upon my direction; and as provided in Section
17, Article 12 of the Constitution do hereby declare a State of National Emergency.
On the same day, the President issued G. O. No. 5 implementing PP 1017.
Respondents stated that the proximate cause behind the executive issuances was the conspiracy among
some military officers, leftist insurgents of the New Peoples Army (NPA), and some members of the
political opposition in a plot to unseat or assassinate President Arroyo. They considered the aim to oust or
assassinate the President and take-over the reigns of government as a clear and present danger.
Issue: whether petitioners have legal standing
Held:
Locus standi is defined as a right of appearance in a court of justice on a given question. In
private suits, standing is governed by the real-parties-in interest rule as contained in Section 2, Rule 3 of
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended. It provides that every action must be prosecuted or
defended in the name of the real party in interest. Accordingly, the real-party-in interest is the party
who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit or the party entitled to the avails of the
suit. Succinctly put, the plaintiffs standing is based on his own right to the relief sought.
Case law in most jurisdictions now allows both citizen and taxpayer standing in public actions.
However, to prevent just about any person from seeking judicial interference in any official policy or act
with which he disagreed with, and thus hinders the activities of governmental agencies engaged in public
service the Supreme Court laid down the more stringent direct injury test. For a private individual to
invoke the judicial power to determine the validity of an executive or legislative action, he must show that
he has sustained a direct injury as a result of that action, and it is not sufficient that he has a general
interest common to all members of the public. However, being a mere procedural technicality, the
requirement of locus standi may be waived by the Court in the exercise of its discretion in cases of
transcendental importance and far-reaching implications.
By way of summary, the following rules may be culled from the cases decided by the Supreme
Court. Taxpayers, voters, concerned citizens, and legislators may be accorded standing to sue, provided
that the following requirements are met:
(1) the cases involve constitutional issues;
(2) for taxpayers, there must be a claim of illegal disbursement of public funds or that the tax measure is
unconstitutional;
(3) for voters, there must be a showing of obvious interest in the validity of the election law in question;
(4) for concerned citizens, there must be a showing that the issues raised are of transcendental
importance which must be settled early; and
(5) for legislators, there must be a claim that the official action complained of infringes upon their
prerogatives as legislators.
EPIFANIO LALICAN, petitioner, vs. HON. FILOMENO A. VERGARA, Presiding Judge, RTC Branch 52, Puerto
Princesa City and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
FACTS: The issue posed for resolution in this petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for the
issuance of a temporary restraining order is whether or not a charge of illegal possession of "lumber" is
excluded from the crime of illegal possession of "timber" as defined in Sec. 68 of Presidential Decree No.
705 (The Forestry Reform Code of the Philippines), as amended, to warrant the quashal of an information
charging the former offense or a "nonexistent crime."
On July 23, 1991, an information for violation of Section 68 of P.D. No. 705, as amended by Executive Order
No. 277, was filed by the City Prosecutor of Puerto Princesa City against petitioner Epifanio Lalican, 1 Ruben
Benitez, Allan Pulgar and Jose Roblo before the Regional Trial Court of that city. Docketed as Criminal Case
No. 9543, the information reads:
That on or about the 9th day of February, 1991, at Sitio Cadiz, Barangay Bacungan, City of Puerto Princesa,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, without lawful
authority or permit, conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping one another, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in their possession, custody and control 1,800 board
feet of assorted species and dimensions of lumber on board two (2) passenger jeeps, with a value of
Fourteen Thousand Pesos (P14,000.00), Philippine Currency, to the damage and prejudice of the
Government in the amount aforestated.
Lalican claimed that the law is vague and standardless as it does not specify the authority or the legal
documents required by existing forest laws and regulations. Hence, the information should be quashed as
it violated his constitutional rights to due process and equal protection of the law.
ISSUE: Whether or not the filing of the case id proper
RULING: The Court, therefore, finds that the lower court did not gravely abuse its discretion in denying
the quashal of the information. The petition simply has no legal basis. Certiorari may be issued only where
it is clearly shown that there is patent and gross abuse of discretion as to amount to an evasion of positive
duty or to virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law, as
where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or personal
hostility. 11 Grave abuse of discretion implies a capricious and whimsical exercise of power.
Certiorari is not the proper remedy where a motion to quash an information is denied. That the
appropriate recourse is to proceed to trial and in case of conviction, to appeal such conviction, as well as
the denial of the motion to quash, is impelled by the fact that a denial of a motion to quash is an
interlocutory procedural aspect which cannot be appealed nor can it be the subject of a petition for
certiorari.
With respect to the constitutionality of Sec. 68 of P.D. No. 705 which petitioner would have this
Court consider, 24 this Court has always desisted from delving on constitutional issues. Thus, even if all
the requisites for judicial review of a constitutional matter are present in a case, 25 this Court will not pass
upon a constitutional question unless it is the lis mota of the case or if the case can be disposed of on some
other grounds, such as the application of the statute or general law. 26
The Court can well take judicial notice of the deplorable problem of deforestation in this
country, considering that the deleterious effects of this problem are now imperiling our lives and
properties, more specifically, by causing rampaging floods in the lowlands. While it is true that the rights
of an accused must be favored in the interpretation of penal provisions of law, it is equally true that when
the general welfare and interest of the people are interwoven in the prosecution of a crime, the Court
must arrive at a solution only after a fair and just balancing of interests. This the Court did in arriving at
the foregoing interpretation of Sec. 68 of the Revised Forestry Reform Code. This task, however, has not
at all been a difficult one considering that, contrary to petitioner's assertion, his rights to due process and
equal protection of the law have not been clearly shown to have been jeopardized.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for certiorari and prohibition is hereby DISMISSED.
It is also emphasized that every court, including this Court, is charged with the duty of a purposeful
hesitation before declaring a law unconstitutional, on the theory that the measure was first carefully
studied by the executive and the legislative departments and determined by them to be in accordance
with the fundamental law before it was finally approved. To doubt is to sustain. The presumption of
constitutionality can be overcome only by the clearest showing that there was indeed an infraction of the
Constitution, and only when such a conclusion is reached by the required majority may the Court
pronounce, in the discharge of the duty it cannot escape, that the challenged act must be struck down.