NATIONAL PRESS CLUB, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.

G.R. No. 102653 March 5, 1992

FACTS:

Petitioners argue that Section 11 (b) of RA No. 6646 invades and violates the

constitutional guarantees comprising freedom of expression and it amounts to censorship as it

selects and singles out for suppression and repression with criminal sanctions, only publications

of a particular content, namely, media-based election or political propaganda. It is asserted that

the prohibition is in derogation of media's role, function and duty to provide adequate channels

of public information and public opinion relevant to election issues. Further, petitioners contend

that it abridges freedom of speech of candidates, as it would bring about a substantial reduction

in the quantity or volume of information concerning candidates and issues in the election thereby

curtailing and limiting the right of voters to information and opinion.

ISSUE:
WON Section 11 (b) of Republic Act No. 6646 is constitutional.

RULING:
COMELEC has been expressly authorized by Article IX(C) (4) of the Constitution to

supervise or regulate enjoyment or utilization of the franchises or permits for the operation of

media of communication and information. The fundamental purpose of such "supervision or

regulation" is spelled out in the Constitution to ensure "equal opportunity, time, and space, and

the right to reply," as well as uniform and reasonable rates of charges for the use of such media

facilities, in connection with "public information campaigns and forums among candidates."

The technical effect of Article IX (C) (4) of the Constitution may be seen to be that no

presumption of invalidity arises in respect of exercises of supervisory or regulatory authority on

the part of the Comelec for the purpose of securing equal opportunity among candidates for

political office, although such supervision or regulation may result in some limitation of the

rights of free speech and free press. For supervision or regulation of the operations of media

enterprises is scarcely conceivable without such accompanying limitation. Thus, the applicable

rule is the general, time-honored one that a statute is presumed to be constitutional and that

the party asserting its unconstitutionality must discharge the burden of clearly and convincingly

proving that assertion.