Académique Documents
Professionnel Documents
Culture Documents
ANDREA M. JACKMAN,
MARIO G. BERUVIDES, AND
GARY S. NESTLER
10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
KEYWORDS
List of Figures xi
List of Tables xiii
1Introduction: Why We Need to Analyze Policy
in Emergency Management 1
1.1Why Emergency Management? An Introduction
by Andrea Jackman 1
1.2 About This Book 4
2 Emergency Management in the United States: 18001969 7
2.1 Nineteenth-Century Beginnings 7
2.2U.S. Disasters in the Early 20th Century 8
2.3Duck and Cover! Military Influence and the Cold War 12
Websites of Interest 14
3 The 1970s: Four Phases and FEMA 15
3.1Shifting Government Priorities and Agencies 15
3.2Our Four-Phase Cycle: The Industry Standard 17
3.3The New Federal Emergency Management Agency 23
Websites of Interest 24
4 The Stafford Act of 1988Then and Now 27
4.1 The Stafford Act 27
4.2Updates to Federal Disaster Management 28
4.3 The Stafford Act in the 21st Century 31
Websites of Interest 34
viii Contents
Appendixes 87
Appendix A: Glossary of Terms 87
Appendix B: Additional Reading Materials 95
Bibliography 99
Index 105
List of Figures
Introduction: Why We
Need to Analyze Policy in
Emergency Management
A hundred years ago, the field of emergency management did not exist.
The same can be said for many other disciplines that arose in the 20th
century, as well as technological advances and products of the rapid mod-
ernization and eventual digitization of our society. Yet, our field becomes
more critical with each of the advancements in both society and technol-
ogy. The more advanced systems we have to support our daily lives, the
more tightly these systems become interwoven, and the more our depen-
dence on them grows. What might have been an unreported non-incident a
hundred years agoa minor flood or loss of telephone linescould today
cause significant disruption and be broadcast globally through online
media. Studying our management of such disruptions is essential, and a
policy provides a measuring stick by which to do just that. As this book
will show, the implementation of an existing policy provides a chance to
measure our progress, and the development of a new policy provides an
opportunity to shape our reactions.
When I was eight years old, my family lived in Hiroshima, Japan. My
parents and I lived in a fifth floor apartment in a residential neighborhood
of one of the safest and most orderly countries in the world. One weekend
in the fall, my mother and her friend planned to take a trip to another city
to do some shopping. The weather forecast called for a miserable, windy,
and rainy fall daya mild typhoon was near the coastso she planned to
be on the train and indoors while my father and I stayed home.
2 DISASTER POLICY AND ITS PRACTICE IN THE UNITED STATES
As the end of the weekend got closer, the forecast changed. The
typhoon had strengthened, and was likely to come ashore. Dad and I
kept an eye on the sky from our apartment as clouds darkened, the wind
picked up, and a steady rain started to fall. Nobody seemed particularly
alarmed, although this was years before the Internet and 24-hour news
cycle that surrounds hurricanes and typhoons today. My father had some
fluency in Japanese and tried to pick up bits and pieces of information
from television and radio, as well as the police officer with a megaphone
driving down the street giving instructions for staying safe. My mom,
who had already boarded her return train, found that it was not moving
as quickly as usual and she thought they might be late getting back to
Hiroshima stationsomething very unusual on the high-precision bullet
trains.
The sun went down as the storm picked up, and Dad and I watched
sheets of rain, and occasional pieces of corrugated roofing, blow sideways
down the street. The wind rattled our windows and blew the screens back
and forth, making loud banging noises. Never a fan of startling noises
or severe weather to begin with, I was getting more and more uneasy as
the evening went on. The husband of my moms friend phoned us to say
he was going to try to get to the train station, just down the hill from
their house, to try to get some information about the trains and see about
picking up his wife and my mom on what was clearly going to be a late
arrival. My mom and her friend, meanwhile, were experiencing intermit-
tent power outages on the train, which had stopped moving. They were
able to piece together bits of announcements from the train conductor to
figure out that they were parking in a tunnel for the night until the train
could proceed safely. Years later, the two women enjoy telling the story of
how they found the last bit of food available on board and shared it: a stale
tray of noodle salad and a warm beer.
Back in Hiroshima, it was getting close to midnight, and there was
nothing left for us to do but try and get some sleep. Dad brought me into
his room and tucked me in bed while he sat up watching the weather out-
side. I woke up a few hours later in pitch darkness, with no memory of
having fallen asleep. My dad was gone. Not just gone to sit in the living
room, but gone from the apartment. I looked for him and realized the
power was out. Trying to calm myself down, I thought perhaps he had
gone to get my mom. My mom! Where was she? Was she safe? Had my
dad tried to get her and something happened? I picked up the phone and
started to dial our friends house to see if they were there, but the phones
were out along with the power. Feeling helpless and terrified, I thought the
best thing I could do was stay locked in the apartment and wait, under the
INTRODUCTION 3
safety of a few blankets, and hope none of the larger bits of flying debris
smashed through the window.
I woke up early in the morning to find both my parents returned. My
moms bullet train had limped into Hiroshima station around 4 a.m. as the
storm was dying down. My dad had gone to get her, but failed to wake me
up or leave a note explaining his absence, much to my moms and my own
horror. We were safe and unharmed, but were soon evacuated to a hotel
when it was discovered our neighborhood would be without water, power,
or phone service for the next few days.
I maintained an interest in weather and the natural sciences through
school, and in college, decided to major in meteorology. It seemed if
Iunderstood what was happening in the atmosphere around me, I would
be less likely to find myself alone and completely in the darkliterally
and figurativelyin the middle of a raging storm. One afternoon during
a junior-year internship with the National Weather Service in Indiana,
Ifelt a familiar uneasiness. Conditions were ripe for severe weather and
my bosses were issuing tornado watches. I tried to stay out of the way
as storms began popping up and I expected mayhem. Surely, forecast-
ers would be running around, making urgent and animated phone calls,
shouting over each other and the howling wind. But, instead of a chaotic,
panicked forecast room, I watched seasoned professionals talk to each
other as though it was a pleasant sunny day. They quietly issued warnings
after measured discussion on whether or not radar signals were strong
enough to indicate possible tornadoes, took calls from trained spotters and
answered questions from sheriffs, and calmly made recommendations for
ensuring citizen safety. No alarm bells went off, no lightning struck our
building, and not a single person raised their voice. I did the only thing I
could think of to make myself useful and brought everyone lunch, all the
while thinking that if this was how professionals conducted themselves in
life-threatening situations, maybe there was a place for me in emergency
management.
People across many disciplines come to emergency management in
their own ways, including my co-authors from industrial engineering and
holistic medicine. What I learned from my typhoon experience and my
day at the National Weather Service, then later a career in studying natural
disasters and their management, was that, often in our society, disasters
are what we make of them. Many times, they are just afterthoughts; blips
on an otherwise smooth road of business-as-usual. They do not happen a
lot. We do not like to think about them happening. We have little natural
inclination to prepare for them, or try to mitigate what we cannot see (and
might go a lifetime without ever seeing). Humans much prefer to react, to
4 DISASTER POLICY AND ITS PRACTICE IN THE UNITED STATES
in system design and the interactions of humans and systems. Dr. Gary
Nestler has 30 years experience in the emergency management field. He
currently maintains a license to practice medicine, serves as a Captain in
his local fire department working with emergency medical services, and
remains as an active member of a local law enforcement SWAT team.
Index