1

EN BANC
[G.R. No. 24066. December 9, 1925.]
VALENTIN SUSI, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ANGELA RAZON and THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, defendants. THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, appellant.
Acting Attorney-General Reyes for appellant.
Monico R. Mercado for appellee.

SYLLABUS

1. PUBLIC LANDS; ACQUISITION BY OCCUPANCY. An open, continuous, adverse and public possession of a land of the public
domain from time immemorial by a private individual personally and through his predecessors confers an effective title on said possessor,
whereby the land ceases to be public, to become private, property.
2. ID.; ID.; REQUISITES. To acquire a right to a certificate of title over a land of the public domain, under the provisions of Chapter
VI of Act No. 926, as amended by Chapter VIII of Act No. 2874, an open, adverse, public and continuous possession from July 26,1894, is
sufficient, provided the possessor makes application therefor under the provisions of section 47 of Act No. 2874. The possessor under such
circumstances acquires by operation of law, not only a right to a grant, but a grant of the government, and the actual issuance of a title is not
necessary in order that said grant may be sanctioned by the courts.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; RECOVERY OF PROPERTY. As the possessor of a public land under the circumstances mentioned in the preceding
paragraphs acquires the land by operation of law as a grant from the State, the land ceasing to be of public domain, to become private
property, at least by presumption, it follows that it can no longer be sold by the Director of Lands to another person, and if he does, the sale is
void, and the said possessor may recover the land from any person holding it against his will.

VILLA-REAL, J p:

This action was commenced in the Court of First Instance of Pampanga by a complaint filed by Valentin Susi against Angela Razon
and the Director of Lands, praying for judgment: (a) Declaring plaintiff the sole and absolute owner of the parcel of land described in the
second paragraph of the complaint; (b) annulling the sale made by the Director of Lands in favor of Angela Razon, on the ground that the land
is a private property; (c) ordering the cancellation of the certificate of title issued to said Angela Razon; and (d) sentencing the latter to pay
plaintiff the sum of P500 as damages, with the costs.
For his answer to the complaint, the Director of Lands denied each and every allegation contained therein and, as special defense,
alleged that the land in question was a property of the Government of the United States under the administration and control of that of the
Philippine Islands before its sale to Angela Razon, which was made in accordance with law.
After trial, whereat evidence was introduced by both parties, the Court of First Instance of Pampanga rendered judgment declaring
the plaintiff entitled to the possession of the land, annulling the sale made by the Director of Lands in favor of Angela Razon, and ordering the
cancellation of the certificate of title issued to her, with the costs against Angela Razon. From this judgment the Director of Lands took this
appeal, assigning thereto the following errors, to wit: (1) The holding that the judgment rendered in a prior case between the plaintiff and
defendant Angela Razon on the parcel of land in question is controlling in this action; (2) the holding that plaintiff is entitled to recover the
possession of said parcel of land; the annulment of the sale made by the Director of Lands to Angela Razon; and the ordering that the
certificate of title issued by the register of deeds of the Province of Pampanga to Angela Razon by virtue of said sale be cancelled; and (3) the
denial of the motion for new trial filed by the Director of Lands.
The evidence shows that on December 18, 1880, Nemesio Pinlac sold the land in question, then a fish pond, to Apolonio Garcia and
Basilio Mendoza for the sum of P12, reserving the right to repurchase the same (Exhibit B). After having been in possession thereof for about
eight years, and the fish pond having been destroyed, Apolonio Garcia and Basilio Mendoza, on September 5, 1899, sold it to Valentin Susi for
the sum of P12, reserving the right to repurchase it (Exhibit A). Before the execution of the deed of sale, Valentin Susi had already paid its
price and sown "bacawan" on said land, availing himself of the firewood gathered thereon, with the proceeds of the sale of which he had paid
the price of the property. The possession and occupation of the land in question, first, by Apolonio Garcia and Basilio Mendoza, and then by
Valentin Susi has been open, continuous, adverse and public, without any interruption, except during the revolution, or disturbance, except
when Angela Razon, on September 13, 1913, commenced an action in the Court of First Instance of Pampanga to recover the possession of
said land (Exhibit C), wherein after considering the evidence introduced at the trial, the court rendered judgment in favor of Valentin Susi and
against Angela Razon, dismissing the complaint (Exhibit E). Having failed in her attempt to obtain possession of the land in question through
the court, Angela Razon applied to the Director of Lands for the purchase thereof on August 15, 1914 (Exhibit C). Having learned of said
application, Valentin Susi filed an opposition thereto on December 6, 1915, asserting his possession of the land for twenty-five years (Exhibit
P). After making the proper administrative investigation, the Director of Lands overruled the opposition of Valentin Susi and sold the land to
Angela Razon (Exhibit S). By virtue of said grant the register of deeds of Pampanga, on August 31, 1921, issued the proper certificate of title to
Angela Razon. Armed with said document, Angela Razon required Valentin Susi to vacate the land in question, and as he refused to do so, she
brought an action for forcible entry and detainer in the justice of the peace court of Guagua, Pampanga, which was dismissed for lack of
jurisdiction, the case being one of title to real property (Exhibits F and M). Valentin Susi then brought this action.
With these facts in view, we shall proceed to consider the questions raised by the appellant in his assignments of error.
It clearly appears from the evidence that Valentin Susi has been in possession of the land in question openly, continuously,
adversely and publicly, personally and through his predecessors, since the year 1880, that is, for about forty-five years. While the judgment of
the Court of First Instance of Pampanga against Angela Razon in the forcible entry case does not affect the Director of Lands, yet it is
controlling as to Angela Razon and rebuts her claim that she had been in possession thereof. When on August 15, 1914, Angela Razon applied
for the purchase of said land, Valentin Susi had already been in possession thereof personally and through his predecessors for thirty-four
years. And if it is taken into account that Nemesio Pinlac had already made said land a fish pond when he sold it on December 18, 1880, it can
hardly be estimated when he began to possess and occupy it, the period of time being so long that it is beyond the reach of memory. These
being the facts, the doctrine laid down by the Supreme Court of the United States in the case of Cariilo vs. Government of the Philippine
Islands (212 U. S., 449 1 ), is applicable here. In favor of Valentin Susi, there is, more over, the presumption juris et de jure established in
paragraph (b) of section 45 of Act No. 2874, amending Act No. 926, that all the necessary requirements for a grant by the Government were
 2

complied with, for he has been in actual and physical possession, personally and through his predecessors, of an agricultural land of the public
domain openly, continuously, exclusively and publicly since July 26, 1894, with a right to a certificate of title to said land under the provisions
of Chapter VIII of said Act. So that when Angela Razon applied for the grant in her favor, Valentin Susi had already acquired, by operation of
law, not only a right to a grant, but a grant of the Government, for it is not necessary that certificate of title should be issued in order that said
grant may be sanctioned by the courts, an application therefor is sufficient, under the provisions of section 47 of Act No. 2874. If by a legal
fiction, Valentin Susi had acquired the land in question by a grant of the State, it had already ceased to be of the public domain and had
become private property, at least by presumption, of Valentin Susi, beyond the control of the Director of Lands. Consequently, in selling the
land in question to Angela Razon, the Director of Lands disposed of a land over which he had no longer any title or control, and the sale thus
made was void and of no effect, and Angela Razon did not thereby acquire any right.
The Director of Lands contends that the land in question being of the public domain, the plaintiff-appellee cannot maintain an
action to recover possession thereof.
If, as above stated, the land, the possession of which is in dispute, had already become, by operation of law, private property of the
plaintiff, there lacking only the judicial sanction of his title, Valentin Susi has the right to bring an action to recover the possession thereof and
hold it.
For the foregoing, and no error having been found in the judgment appealed from the same is hereby affirmed in all its parts,
without special pronouncement as to costs. So ordered.
Avancea, C.J., Malcolm, Street, Villamor, Ostrand, Johns and Romualdez, JJ., concur.
Johnson, J., did not take part.
||| (Susi v. Razon, G.R. No. 24066, [December 9, 1925], 48 PHIL 424-429)
 3

EN BANC
[G.R. No. 73002. December 29, 1986.]
THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, petitioner, vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and ACME PLYWOOD & VENEER CO. INC.,
ETC., respondents.

NARVASA, J p:

The Director of Lands has brought this appeal by certiorari from a judgment of the Intermediate Appellate Court affirming a decision of the Court
of First Instance of Isabela, which ordered registration in favor of Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc. of five parcels of land measuring 481, 390
square meters, more or less, acquired by it from Mariano and Acer Infiel, members of the Dumagat tribe.

The registration proceedings were for confirmation of title under Section 48 of Commonwealth Act No. 141 (The Public Land Act). as amended; and
the appealed judgment sums up the findings of the trial court in said proceedings in this wise:

"1. That Acme Plywood & Veneer Co. Inc., represented by Mr. Rodolfo Nazario is a corporation duly organized in accordance
with the laws of the Republic of the Philippines and registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission on December
23, 1959;

2. That Acme Plywood & Veneer Co. Inc., represented by Mr. Rodolfo Nazario can acquire real properties pursuant to the
provisions of the Articles of Incorporation particularly on the provision of its secondary purposes (paragraph (9), Exhibit 'M-
1');

3. That the land subject of the Land Registration proceeding was ancestrally acquired by Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc.,
on October 29, 1962, from Mariano Infiel and Acer Infiel, both members of the Dumagat tribe and as such are cultural
minorities;

4. That the constitution of the Republic of the Philippines of 1935 is applicable as the sale took place on October 29, 1962;

5. That the possession of the Infiels over the land relinquished or sold to Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc., dates back before
the Philippines was discovered by Magellan as the ancestors of the Infiels have possessed and occupied the land from
generation to generation until the same came into the possession of Mariano Infiel and Acer Infiel;

6. That the possession of the applicant Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc., is continuous, adverse and public from 1962 to the
present and tacking the possession of the Infiels who were granted from whom the applicant bought said land on October
29, 1962, hence the possession is already considered from time immemorial;

7. That the land sought to be registered is a private land pursuant to the provisions of Republic Act No. 3872 granting
absolute ownership to members of the non-Christian Tribes on land occupied by them or their ancestral lands, whether with
the alienable or disposable public land or within the public domain;

8. That applicant Acme Plywood & Veneer Co. Inc., has introduced more than Forty-Five Million (P45,000,000.00) Pesos
worth of improvements, said improvements were seen by the Court during its ocular investigation of the land sought to be
registered on September 18, 1982;

9. That the ownership and possession of the land sought to be registered by the applicant was duly recognized by the
government when the Municipal Officials of Maconacon, Isabela, have negotiated for the donation of the townsite from
Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc., and the negotiation came to reality when the Board of Directors of the Acme Plywood &
Veneer Co., Inc., had donated a part of the land bought by the Company from the Infiels for the townsite of Maconacon,
Isabela (Exh. 'N') on November 15, 1979, and which donation was accepted by the Municipal Government of Maconacon,
Isabela (Exh. 'N-1'), during their special session on November 22, 1979."

The Director of Lands takes no issue with any of these findings except as to the applicability of the 1935 Constitution to the matter at hand.
Concerning this, he asserts that, the registration proceedings have been commenced only on July 17, 1981, or long after the 1973 Constitution had
gone into effect, the latter is the correctly applicable law; and since section 11 of its Article XIV prohibits private corporations or associations from
holding alienable lands of the public domain, except by lease not to exceed 1,000 hectares (a prohibition not found in the 1935 Constitution which
was in force in 1962 when Acme purchased the lands in question from the Infiels), it was reversible error to decree registration in favor of Acme.

Section 48, paragraphs (b) and (c), of Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended, reads:

"SEC. 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public domain or claiming to own any
such lands or an interest therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First
Instance of the province where the land is located for confirmation of their claims, and the issuance of a certificate of title
therefor, under the Land Registration Act, to wit:

xxx xxx xxx

(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition or
ownership, for at least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title except when
prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a
Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of the chapter.

(c) Members of the National Cultural minorities who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in
open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of lands of the public domain suitable to agriculture,
whether disposable or not, under a bona fide claim of ownership for at least 30 years shall be entitled to the rights granted
in subsection (b) hereof."
 4

The Petition for Review does not dispute indeed, in view of the quoted findings of the trial court which were cited and affirmed by the
Intermediate Appellate Court, it can no longer controvert before this Court the fact that Mariano and Acer Infiel, from whom Acme purchased
the lands in question on October 29, 1962, are members of the national cultural minorities who had, by themselves and through their progenitors,
possessed and occupied those lands since time immemorial, or for more than the required 30-year period and were, by reason thereof, entitled to
exercise the right granted in Section 48 of the Public Land Act to have their title judicially confirmed. Nor is there any pretension that Acme, as the
successor-in-interest of the Infiels, is disqualified to acquire and register ownership of said lands under any provisions of the 1973
Constitutionother than Section 11 of its Article XIV already referred to.

Given the foregoing, the question before this Court is whether or not the title that the Infiels had transferred to Acme in 1962 could be confirmed
in favor of the latter in proceedings instituted by it in 1981 when the 1973 Constitution was already in effect, having in mind the prohibition
therein against private corporations holding lands of the public domain except in lease not exceeding 1,000 hectares.

The question turns upon a determination of the character of the lands at the time of institution of the registration proceedings in 1981. If they
were then still part of the public domain, it must be answered in the negative. If, on the other hand, they were then already private lands, the
constitutional prohibition against their acquisition by private corporations or associations obviously does not apply.

In this regard, attention has been invited to Manila Electric Company vs. Castro-Bartolome, et al, 1 where a similar set of facts prevailed. In that
case, Manila Electric Company, a domestic corporation more than 60% of the capital stock of which is Filipino-owned, had purchased in 1947 two
lots in Tanay, Rizal from the Piguing spouses. The lots had been possessed by the vendors and, before them, by their predecessor-in-interest,
Olimpia Ramos, since prior to the outbreak of the Pacific War in 1941. On December 1, 1976, Meralco applied to the Court of First Instance of Rizal,
Makati Branch, for confirmation of title to said lots. The court, assuming that the lots were public land, dismissed the application on the ground
that Meralco, a juridical person, was not qualified to apply for registration under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act which allows only Filipino
citizens or natural persons to apply for judicial confirmation of imperfect titles to public land. Meralco appealed, and a majority of this Court
upheld the dismissal. It was held that:

". . ., the said land is still public land. It would cease to be public land only upon the issuance of the certificate of title to any
Filipino citizen claiming it under section 48(b). Because it is still public land and the Meralco, as a juridical person, is
disqualified to apply for its registration under section 48(b), Meralco's application cannot be given due course or has to be
dismissed.

xxx xxx xxx

"Finally, it may be observed that the constitutional prohibition makes no distinction between (on the one hand) alienable
agricultural public lands as to which no occupant has an imperfect title and (on the other hand) alienable lands of the public
domain as to which an occupant has an imperfect title subject to judicial confirmation.

Since section 11 of Article XIV does not distinguish, we should not make any distinction or qualification. The prohibition
applies to alienable public lands as to which a Torrens title may be secured under section 48(b). The proceeding under
section 48(b) `presupposes that the land is public' (Mindanao vs. Director of Lands, L-19535, July 30, 1967, 20 SCRA 641,
644)."

The present Chief Justice entered a vigorous dissent, tracing the line of cases beginning with Cario in 1909 2 thru Susi in 1925 3 down to Herico in
1980, 4 which developed, affirmed and reaffirmed the doctrine that open, exclusive and undisputed possession of alienable public land for the
period prescribed by law creates the legal fiction whereby the land, upon completion of the requisite period ipso jure and without the need of
judicial or other sanction, ceases to be public land and becomes private property. That said dissent expressed what is the better and, indeed,
the correct, view becomes evident from a consideration of some of the principal rulings cited therein.

The main theme was given birth, so to speak, in Cario, involving the Decree/Regulations of June 25, 1880 for adjustment of royal lands wrongfully
occupied by private individuals in the Philippine Islands. It was ruled that:

"It is true that the language of articles 4 and 5 5 attributes title to those `who may prove' possession for the necessary time and we do not
overlook the argument that this means may prove in registration proceedings. It may be that an English conveyancer would have recommended an
application under the foregoing decree, but certainly it was not calculated to convey to the mind of an Igorot chief the notion that ancient family
possessions were in danger, if he had read every word of it. The words 'may prove' (acrediten), as well or better, in view of the other provisions,
might be taken to mean when called upon to do so in any litigation. There are indications that registration was expected from all, but none
sufficient to show that, for want of it, ownership actually gained would be lost. The effect of the proof, wherever made, was not to confer title, but
simply to establish it, as already conferred by the decree, if not by earlier law. . . ."

That ruling assumed a more doctrinal character because expressed in more categorical language, in Susi:

". . . In favor of Valentin Susi, there is, moreover, the presumption juris et de jure established in paragraph (b) of section 45
of Act No. 2874, amending Act No. 926, that all the necessary requirements for a grant by the Government were complied
with, for he has been in actual and physical possession, personally and through his predecessors, of an agricultural land of
the public domain openly, continuously, exclusively and publicly since July 26, 1984, with a right to a certificate of title to
said land under the provisions of Chapter VIII of said Act. So that when Angela Razon applied for the grant in her favor,
Valentin Susi had already acquired by operation of law not only a right to a grant, but a grant of the Government, for it is not
necessary that a certificate of title should be issued in order that said grant may be sanctioned by the courts, an application
therefor is sufficient, under the provisions of section 47 of Act No. 2874. If by a legal fiction, Valentin Susi had acquired the
land in question by a grant of the State, it had already ceased to be of the public domain and had become private property, at
least by presumption, of Valentin Susi, beyond the control of the Director of Lands. Consequently, in selling the land in
question of Angela Razon, the Director of Lands disposed of a land over which he had no longer any title or control, and the
sale thus made was void and of no effect, and Angela Razon did not thereby acquire any right. 6

Succeeding cases, of which only some need be mentioned, like Lacaste vs. Director of Lands, 7 Mesina vs. Vda. de Sonza, 8 Manarpac vs.
Cabanatuan, 9 Miguel vs. Court of Appeals 10 and Herico vs. Dar, supra, by invoking and affirming the Susi doctrine have firmly rooted it in
jurisprudence.
 5

Herico, in particular, appears to be squarely affirmative: 11

". . . Secondly, under the provisions of Republic Act No. 1942, which the respondent Court held to be inapplicable to the
petitioner's case, with the latter's proven occupation and cultivation for more than 30 years since 1914, by himself and by his
predecessors-in-interest, title over the land has vested on petitioner so as to segregate the land from the mass of public
land. Thereafter, it is no longer disposable under the Public Land Act as by free patent. . . .

xxx xxx xxx

As interpreted in several cases, when the conditions as specified in the foregoing provision are complied with, the possessor
is deemed to have acquired, by operation of law, a right to a grant, a government grant, without the necessity of a certificate
of title being issued. The land, therefore, ceases to be of the public domain and beyond the authority of the Director of Lands
to dispose of. The application for confirmation is mere formality, the lack of which does not affect the legal sufficiency of the
title as would be evidenced by the patent and the Torrens title to be issued upon the strength of said patent." 12

Nothing can more clearly demonstrate the logical inevitability of considering possession of public land which is of the character and duration
prescribed by statute as the equivalent of an express grant from the State than the dictum of the statute itself 13 that the possessor(s) ". . . shall be
conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title . . ." No
proof being admissible to overcome a conclusive presumption, confirmation proceedings would, in truth be little more than a formality, at the
most limited to ascertaining whether the possession claimed is of the required character and length of time; and registration thereunder would
not confer title, but simply recognize a title already vested. The proceedings would not originally convert the land from public to private land, but
only confirm such a conversion already affected by operation of law from the moment the required period of possession became complete. As was
so well put inCario, ". . . (T)here are indications that registration was expected from all, but none sufficient to show that, for want of it, ownership
actually gained would be lost. The effect of the proof, wherever made, was not to confer title, but simply to establish it, as already conferred by
the decree, if not by earlier law."

If it is accepted as it must be that the land was already private land to which the Infiels had a legally sufficient and transferable title on
October 29, 1962 when Acme acquired it from said owners, it must also be conceded that Acme had a perfect right to make such acquisition, there
being nothing in the 1935 Constitution then in force (or, for that matter, in the 1973 Constitution which came into effect later) prohibiting
corporations from acquiring and owning private lands.

Even on the proposition that the land remained technically "public" land, despite immemorial possession of the Infiels and their ancestors, until
title in their favor was actually confirmed in appropriate proceedings under the Public Land Act, there can be no serious question of Acme's right to
acquire the land at the time it did, there also being nothing in the 1935 Constitution that might be construed to prohibit corporations from
purchasing or acquiring interests in public land to which the vendor had already acquired that type of so-called "incomplete" or "imperfect" title.
The only limitation then extant was that corporations could not acquire, hold or lease public agricultural lands in excess of 1,024 hectares. The
purely accidental circumstance that confirmation proceedings were brought under the aegis of the 1973 Constitution which forbids corporations
from owning lands of the public domain cannot defeat a right already vested before that law came into effect, or invalidate transactions then
perfectly valid and proper, This Court has already held, in analogous circumstances, that the Constitution cannot impair vested rights.

"We hold that the said constitutional prohibition 14 has no retroactive application to the sales application of Bian
Development Co., Inc. because it had already acquired a vested right to the land applied for at the time the 1973
Constitution took effect.

That vested right has to be respected. It could not be abrogated by the new Constitution. Section 2, Article XIII of the 1935
Constitution allows private corporations to purchase public agricultural lands not exceeding one thousand and twenty-four
hectares. Petitioner' prohibition action is barred by the doctrine of vested rights in constitutional law.

xxx xxx xxx

The due process clause prohibits the annihilation of vested rights. `A state may not impair vested rights by legislative
enactment, by the enactment or by the subsequent repeal of a municipal ordinance, or by a change in the constitution of the
State, except in a legitimate exercise of the police power' (16 C.J.S. 1177-78).

xxx xxx xxx

In the instant case, it is incontestable that prior to the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution the right of the corporation to
purchase the land in question had become fixed and established and was no longer open to doubt or controversy.

Its compliance with the requirements of the Public Land Law for the issuance of a patent had the effect of segregating the
said land from the public domain. The corporation's right to obtain a patent for the land is protected by law. It cannot be
deprived of that right without due process (Director of Lands vs. CA, 123 Phil. 919)."15

The fact, therefore, that the confirmation proceedings were instituted by Acme in its own name must be regarded as simply another accidental
circumstance, productive of a defect hardly more than procedural and in nowise affecting the substance and merits of the right of ownership
sought to be confirmed in said proceedings, there being no doubt of Acme's entitlement to the land. As it is unquestionable that in the light of the
undisputed facts, the Infiels, under either the 1935 or the 1973 Constitution, could have had title in themselves confirmed and registered, only a
rigid subservience to the letter of the law would deny the same benefit to their lawful successor-in-interest by valid conveyance which violates no
constitutional mandate.

The Court, in the light of the foregoing, is of the view, and so holds, that the majority ruling in Meralco must be reconsidered and no longer
deemed to be binding precedent. The correct rule, as enunciated in the line of cases already referred to, is that alienable public land held by a
possessor, personally or through his predecessors-in-interest, openly, continuously and exclusively for the prescribed statutory period (30 years
under The Public Land Act, as amended) is converted to private property by the mere lapse or completion of said period, ipso jure. Following that
rule and on the basis of the undisputed facts, the land subject of this appeal was already private property at the time it was acquired from the
Infiels by Acme. Acme thereby acquired a registrable title, there being at the time no prohibition against said corporation's holding or owning
private land. The objection that, as a juridical person, Acme is not qualified to apply for judicial confirmation of title under section 48(b) of the
Public Land Act is technical, rather than substantial and, again, finds its answer in the dissent in Meralco:
 6

"6. To uphold respondent judge's denial of Meralco's application on the technicality that the Public Land Act allows only
citizens of the Philippines who are natural persons to apply for confirmation of their title would be impractical and would
just give rise to multiplicity of court actions. Assuming that there was a technical error in not having filed the application for
registration in the name of the Piguing spouses as the original owners and vendors, still it is conceded that there is no
prohibition against their sale of the land to the applicant Meralco and neither is there any prohibition against the application
being refiled with retroactive effect in the name of the original owners and vendors (as such natural persons) with the end
result of their application being granted, because of their indisputable acquisition of ownership by operation of law and the
conclusive presumption therein provided in their favor. It should not be necessary to go through all the rituals at the great
cost of refiling of all such applications in their names and adding to the overcrowded court dockets when the Court can after
all these years dispose of it here and now. (See Francisco vs. City of Davao)

The ends of justice would best be served, therefore, by considering the applications for confirmation as amended to conform
to the evidence, i.e. as filed in the names of the original persons who as natural persons are duly qualified to apply for formal
confirmation of the title that they had acquired by conclusive presumption and mandate of the Public Land Act and who
thereafter duly sold to the herein corporations (both admittedly Filipino corporations duly qualified to hold and own private
lands) and granting the applications for confirmation of title to the private lands so acquired and sold or exchanged."

There is also nothing to prevent Acme from reconveying the lands to the Infiels and the latter from themselves applying for confirmation of
title and, after issuance of the certificate/s of title in their names, deeding the lands back to Acme. But this would be merely indulging in
empty charades, whereas the same result is more efficaciously and speedily obtained, with no prejudice to anyone, by a liberal application of
the rule on amendment to conform to the evidence suggested in the dissent in Meralco.
While this opinion seemingly reverses an earlier ruling of comparatively recent vintage, in a real sense, it breaks no precedent, but only reaffirms
and re-established, as it were, doctrines the soundness of which has passed the test of searching examination and inquiry in many past cases.
Indeed, it is worth noting that the majority opinion, as well as the concurring opinions of Chief Justice Fernando and Justice Abad Santos,
in Meralco rested chiefly on the proposition that the petitioner therein, a juridical person, was disqualified from applying for confirmation of an
imperfect title to public land under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act. Reference to the 1973 Constitution and its Article XIV, Section 11, was only
tangential, limited to a brief paragraph in the main opinion, and may, in that context, be considered as essentially obiter. Meralco, in short, decided
no constitutional question.

WHEREFORE, there being no reversible error in the appealed judgment of the Intermediate Appellate Court, the same is hereby affirmed, without
costs in this instance.

SO ORDERED.

Feria, Yap, Fernan, Alampay, Cruz, Paras and Feliciano, JJ ., concur.

Gutierrez, Jr., J ., I reiterate my concurrence in Meralco v. Castro-Bartolome, and, therefore, dissent here.

||| (Director of Lands v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 73002, [December 29, 1986], 230 PHIL 590-615)
 7

SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 144057. January 17, 2005.]
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and CORAZON NAGUIT, respondents.

TINGA, J p:

This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, seeking to review the Decision 1 of the Sixth Division
of the Court of Appeals dated July 12, 2000 in CA-G.R. SP No. 51921. The appellate court affirmed the decisions of both the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), 2 Branch 8, of Kalibo, Aklan dated February 26, 1999, and the 7th Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) 3 of Ibajay-Nabas, Aklan dated
February 18, 1998, which granted the application for registration of a parcel of land of Corazon Naguit (Naguit), the respondent herein.

The facts are as follows:

On January 5, 1993, Naguit, a Filipino citizen, of legal age and married to Manolito S. Naguit, filed with the MCTC of Ibajay-Nabas, Aklan, a petition
for registration of title of a parcel of land situated in Brgy. Union, Nabas, Aklan. The parcel of land is designated as Lot No. 10049, Cad. 758-D,
Nabas Cadastre, AP-060414-014779, and contains an area of 31,374 square meters. The application seeks judicial confirmation of respondent's
imperfect title over the aforesaid land. aTEACS

On February 20, 1995, the court held initial hearing on the application. The public prosecutor, appearing for the government, and Jose Angeles,
representing the heirs of Rustico Angeles, opposed the petition. On a later date, however, the heirs of Rustico Angeles filed a formal opposition to
the petition. Also on February 20, 1995, the court issued an order of general default against the whole world except as to the heirs of Rustico
Angeles and the government.

The evidence on record reveals that the subject parcel of land was originally declared for taxation purposes in the name of Ramon Urbano
(Urbano) in 1945 under Tax Declaration No. 3888 until 1991. 4 On July 9, 1992, Urbano executed a Deed of Quitclaim in favor of the heirs of
Honorato Maming (Maming), wherein he renounced all his rights to the subject property and confirmed the sale made by his father to Maming
sometime in 1955 or 1956. 5 Subsequently, the heirs of Maming executed a deed of absolute sale in favor of respondent Naguit who thereupon
started occupying the same. She constituted Manuel Blanco, Jr. as her attorney-in-fact and administrator. The administrator introduced
improvements, planted trees, such as mahogany, coconut and gemelina trees in addition to existing coconut trees which were then 50 to 60 years
old, and paid the corresponding taxes due on the subject land. At present, there are parcels of land surrounding the subject land which have been
issued titles by virtue of judicial decrees. Naguit and her predecessors-in-interest have occupied the land openly and in the concept of owner
without any objection from any private person or even the government until she filed her application for registration.

After the presentation of evidence for Naguit, the public prosecutor manifested that the government did not intend to present any evidence while
oppositor Jose Angeles, as representative of the heirs of Rustico Angeles, failed to appear during the trial despite notice. On September 27, 1997,
the MCTC rendered a decision ordering that the subject parcel be brought under the operation of the Property Registration Decree or Presidential
Decree (P.D.) No. 1529 and that the title thereto registered and confirmed in the name of Naguit. 6

The Republic of the Philippines (Republic), thru the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed a motion for reconsideration. The OSG stressed that
the land applied for was declared alienable and disposable only on October 15, 1980, per the certification from Regional Executive Director Raoul
T. Geollegue of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources, Region VI. 7 However, the court denied the motion for reconsideration in
an order dated February 18, 1998. 8

Thereafter, the Republic appealed the decision and the order of the MCTC to the RTC, Kalibo, Aklan, Branch 8. On February 26, 1999, the RTC
rendered its decision, dismissing the appeal. 9

Undaunted, the Republic elevated the case to the Court of Appeals via Rule 42 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. On July 12, 2000, the appellate
court rendered a decision dismissing the petition filed by the Republic and affirmed in toto the assailed decision of the RTC.

Hence, the present petition for review raising a pure question of law was filed by the Republic on September 4, 2000. 10

The OSG assails the decision of the Court of Appeals contending that the appellate court gravely erred in holding that there is no need for the
government's prior release of the subject lot from the public domain before it can be considered alienable or disposable within the meaning of P.D.
No. 1529, and that Naguit had been in possession of Lot No. 10049 in the concept of owner for the required period. 11

Hence, the central question for resolution is whether it is necessary under Section 14(1) of the Property. Registration Decree that the subject land
be first classified as alienable and disposable before the applicant's possession under a bona fide claim of ownership could even start.

The OSG invokes our holding in Director of Lands v. Intermediate Appellate Court 12 in arguing that the property which is in open, continuous and
exclusive possession must first be alienable. Since the subject land was declared alienable only on October 15, 1980, Naguit could not have
maintained a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, as required by Section 14 of the Property Registration Decree, since prior to 1980,
the land was not alienable or disposable, the OSG argues.

Section 14 of the Property Registration Decree, governing original registration proceedings, bears close examination. It expressly provides:

SECTION 14. Who may apply. The following persons may file in the proper Court of First Instance an application for
registration of title to land, whether personally or through their duly authorized representatives:

(1) those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive
and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under
a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.

(2) Those who have acquired ownership over private lands by prescription under the provisions of existing
laws. ASEcHI

xxx xxx xxx

 8

There are three obvious requisites for the filing of an application for registration of title under Section 14(1) that the property in question is
alienable and disposable land of the public domain; that the applicants by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation, and; that such possession is under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12,
1945 or earlier.

Petitioner suggests an interpretation that the alienable and disposable character of the land should have already been established since June 12,
1945 or earlier. This is not borne out by the plain meaning of Section 14(1). "Since June 12, 1945," as used in the provision, qualifies its antecedent
phrase "under a bonafide claim of ownership." Generally speaking, qualifying words restrict or modify only the words or phrases to which they are
immediately associated, and not those distantly or remotely located. 13 Ad proximum antecedents fiat relation nisi impediatur sentencia.

Besides, we are mindful of the absurdity that would result if we adopt petitioner's position. Absent a legislative amendment, the rule would be,
adopting the OSG's view, that all lands of the public domain which were not declared alienable or disposable before June 12, 1945 would not be
susceptible to original registration, no matter the length of unchallenged possession by the occupant. Such interpretation renders paragraph (1) of
Section 14 virtually inoperative and even precludes the government from giving it effect even as it decides to reclassify public agricultural lands as
alienable and disposable. The unreasonableness of the situation would even be aggravated considering that before June 12, 1945, the Philippines
was not yet even considered an independent state.

Instead, the more reasonable interpretation of Section 14(1) is that it merely requires the property sought to be registered as already alienable and
disposable at the time the application for registration of title is filed. If the State, at the time the application is made, has not yet deemed it proper
to release the property for alienation or disposition, the presumption is that the government is still reserving the right to utilize the property;
hence, the need to preserve its ownership in the State irrespective of the length of adverse possession even if in good faith. However, if the
property has already been classified as alienable and disposable, as it is in this case, then there is already an intention on the part of the State to
abdicate its exclusive prerogative over the property.

This reading aligns conformably with our holding in Republic v. Court of Appeals. 14 Therein, the Court noted that "to prove that the land subject of
an application for registration is alienable, an applicant must establish the existence of a positive act of the government such as a presidential
proclamation or an executive order; an administrative action; investigation reports of Bureau of Lands investigators; and a legislative act or a
statute." 15 In that case, the subject land had been certified by the DENR as alienable and disposable in 1980, thus the Court concluded that the
alienable status of the land, compounded by the established fact that therein respondents had occupied the land even before 1927, sufficed to
allow the application for registration of the said property. In the case at bar, even the petitioner admits that the subject property was released and
certified as within alienable and disposable zone in 1980 by the DENR. 16

This case is distinguishable from Bracewell v. Court of Appeals, 17 wherein the Court noted that while the claimant had been in possession since
1908, it was only in 1972 that the lands in question were classified as alienable and disposable. Thus, the bid at registration therein did not
succeed. In Bracewell, the claimant had filed his application in 1963, or nine (9) years before the property was declared alienable and disposable.
Thus, in this case, where the application was made years after the property had been certified as alienable and disposable, the Bracewell ruling
does not apply.

A different rule obtains for forest lands, 18 such as those which form part of a reservation for provincial park purposes 19 the possession of which
cannot ripen into ownership.20 It is elementary in the law governing natural resources that forest land cannot be owned by private persons. As
held in Palomo v. Court of Appeals, 21 forestland is not registrable and possession thereof, no matter how lengthy, cannot convert it into private
property, unless such lands are reclassified and considered disposable and alienable.22 In the case at bar, the property in question was
undisputedly classified as disposable and alienable; hence, the ruling in Palomo is inapplicable, as correctly held by the Court of Appeals. 23

It must be noted that the present case was decided by the lower courts on the basis of Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree, which
pertains to original registration through ordinary registration proceedings. The right to file the application for registration derives from a bona
fide claim of ownership going back to June 12, 1945 or earlier, by reason of the claimant's open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of
alienable and disposable lands of the public domain.

A similar right is given under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, which reads:

Sec. 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public domain or claiming to own any such
land or an interest therein, but those titles have not been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of
the province where the land is located for confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor,
under the Land Registration Act, to wit:

xxx xxx xxx

(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and
notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of
ownership, for at least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title except when
prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a
Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter.

When the Public Land Act was first promulgated in 1936, the period of possession deemed necessary to vest the right to register their title to
agricultural lands of the public domain commenced from July 26, 1894. However, this period was amended by R.A. No. 1942, which provided that
the bona fide claim of ownership must have been for at least thirty (30) years. Then in 1977, Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act was again
amended, this time by P.D. No. 1073, which pegged the reckoning date at June 12, 1945. This new starting point is concordant with Section 14(1)
of the Property Registration Decree.

Indeed, there are no material differences between Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree and Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as
amended. True, the Public Land Act does refer to "agricultural lands of the public domain," while the Property Registration Decree uses the term
"alienable and disposable lands of the public domain." It must be noted though that the Constitution declares that "alienable lands of the public
domain shall be limited to agricultural lands." 24 Clearly, the subject lands under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act and Section 14(1) of
the Property Registration Decree are of the same type.
 9

Did the enactment of the Property Registration Decree and the amendatory P.D. No. 1073 preclude the application for registration of alienable
lands of the public domain, possession over which commenced only after June 12, 1945? It did not, considering Section 14(2) of the Property
Registration Decree, which governs and authorizes the application of "those who have acquired ownership of private lands by prescription under
the provisions of existing laws."

Prescription is one of the modes of acquiring ownership under the Civil Code. 25 There is a consistent jurisprudential rule that properties classified
as alienable public land may be converted into private property by reason of open, continuous and exclusive possession of at least thirty (30)
years. 26 With such conversion, such property may now fall within the contemplation of "private lands" under Section 14(2), and thus susceptible
to registration by those who have acquired ownership through prescription. Thus, even if possession of the alienable public land commenced on a
date later than June 12, 1945, and such possession being been open, continuous and exclusive, then the possessor may have the right to register
the land by virtue of Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree.

The land in question was found to be local in nature, it having been planted with coconut trees now over fifty years old. 27 The inherent nature of
the land but confirms its certification in 1980 as alienable, hence agricultural. There is no impediment to the application of Section 14(1) of
the Property Registration Decree, as correctly accomplished by the lower courts.

The OSG posits that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that Naguit had been in possession in the concept of owner for the required period. The
argument begs the question. It is again hinged on the assertion shown earlier to be unfounded-that there could have been no bona fide claim of
ownership prior to 1980, when the subject land was declared alienable or disposable.

We find no reason to disturb the conclusion of both the RTC and the Court of Appeals that Naguit had the right to apply for registration owing to
the continuous possession by her and her predecessors-in-interest of the land since 1945. The basis of such conclusion is primarily factual, and the
Court generally respects the factual findings made by lower courts. Notably, possession since 1945 was established through proof of the existence
of 50 to 60-year old trees at the time Naguit purchased the property as well as tax declarations executed by Urbano in 1945. Although tax
declarations and realty tax payment of property are not conclusive evidence of ownership, nevertheless, they are good indicia of the possession in
the concept of owner for no one in his right mind would be paying taxes for a property that is not in his actual or at least constructive possession.
They constitute at least proof that the holder has a claim of title over the property. The voluntary declaration of a piece of property for taxation
purposes manifests not only one's sincere and honest desire to obtain title to the property and announces his adverse claim against the State and
all other interested parties, but also the intention to contribute needed revenues to the Government. Such an act strengthens one's bona
fide claim of acquisition of ownership. 28

Considering that the possession of the subject parcel of land by the respondent can be traced back to that of her predecessors-in-interest which
commenced since 1945 or for almost fifty (50) years, it is indeed beyond any cloud of doubt that she has acquired title thereto which may be
properly brought under the operation of the Torrens system. That she has been in possession of the land in the concept of an owner, open,
continuous, peaceful and without any opposition from any private person and the government itself makes her right thereto undoubtedly settled
and deserving of protection under the law.

WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals dated July 12, 2000 is hereby AFFIRMED. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Puno, Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr. and Chico-Nazario, JJ., concur.

||| (Republic v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 144057, [January 17, 2005], 489 PHIL 405-420)
 10

SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 156117. May 26, 2005.]
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. JEREMIAS AND DAVID HERBIETO, respondents.

CHICO-NAZARIO, J p:

Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari, under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, seeking the reversal of the Decision of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 67625, dated 22 November 2002, 1 which affirmed the Judgment of the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of
Consolacion, Cebu, dated 21 December 1999, 2 granting the application for land registration of the respondents.

Respondents in the present Petition are the Herbieto brothers, Jeremias and David, who filed with the MTC, on 23 September 1998, a single
application for registration of two parcels of land, Lots No. 8422 and 8423, located in Cabangahan, Consolacion, Cebu (Subject Lots). They claimed
to be owners in fee simple of the Subject Lots, which they purchased from their parents, spouses Gregorio Herbieto and Isabel Owatan, on 25 June
1976. 3 Together with their application for registration, respondents submitted the following set of documents:

(a) Advance Survey Plan of Lot No. 8422, in the name of respondent Jeremias; and Advance Survey Plan of Lot No. 8423, in
the name of respondent David; 4

(b) The technical descriptions of the Subject Lots; 5

(c) Certifications by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) dispensing with the need for Surveyor's
Certificates for the Subject Lots; 6

(d) Certifications by the Register of Deeds of Cebu City on the absence of certificates of title covering the Subject Lots; 7

(e) Certifications by the Community Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO) of the DENR on its finding that the
Subject Lots are alienable and disposable, by virtue of Forestry Administrative Order No. 4-1063, dated 25 June
1963; 8

(f) Certified True Copies of Assessment of Real Property (ARP) No. 941800301831, in the name of Jeremias, covering Lot No.
8422, issued in 1994; and ARP No. 941800301833, in the name of David, covering Lot No. 8423, also issued in
1994; 9 and TEHDIA

(g) Deed of Definite Sale executed on 25 June 1976 by spouses Gregorio Herbieto and Isabel Owatan selling the Subject Lots
and the improvements thereon to their sons and respondents herein, Jeremias and David, for P1,000. Lot No. 8422
was sold to Jeremias, while Lot No. 8423 was sold to David. 10

On 11 December 1998, the petitioner Republic of the Philippines (Republic) filed an Opposition to the respondents' application for registration of
the Subject Lots arguing that: (1) Respondents failed to comply with the period of adverse possession of the Subject Lots required by law; (2)
Respondents' muniments of title were not genuine and did not constitute competent and sufficient evidence of bona fide acquisition of the Subject
Lots; and (3) The Subject Lots were part of the public domain belonging to the Republic and were not subject to private appropriation. 11

The MTC set the initial hearing on 03 September 1999 at 8:30 a.m. 12 All owners of the land adjoining the Subject Lots were sent copies of the
Notice of Initial Hearing. 13 A copy of the Notice was also posted on 27 July 1999 in a conspicuous place on the Subject Lots, as well as on the
bulletin board of the municipal building of Consolacion, Cebu, where the Subject Lots were located. 14 Finally, the Notice was also published in the
Official Gazette on 02 August 1999 15 and The Freeman Banat News on 19 December 1999. 16

During the initial hearing on 03 September 1999, the MTC issued an Order of Special Default, 17 with only petitioner Republic opposing the
application for registration of the Subject Lots. The respondents, through their counsel, proceeded to offer and mark documentary evidence to
prove jurisdictional facts. The MTC commissioned the Clerk of Court to receive further evidence from the respondents and to submit a Report to
the MTC after 30 days.

On 21 December 1999, the MTC promulgated its Judgment ordering the registration and confirmation of the title of respondent Jeremias over Lot
No. 8422 and of respondent David over Lot No. 8423. It subsequently issued an Order on 02 February 2000 declaring its Judgment, dated 21
December 1999, final and executory, and directing the Administrator of the Land Registration Authority (LRA) to issue a decree of registration for
the Subject Lots. 18

Petitioner Republic appealed the MTC Judgment, dated 21 December 1999, to the Court of Appeals. 19 The Court of Appeals, in its Decision, dated
22 November 2002, affirmed the appealed MTC Judgment reasoning thus:

In the case at bar, there can be no question that the land sought to be registered has been classified as within the alienable
and disposable zone since June 25, 1963. Article 1113 in relation to Article 1137 of the Civil Code, respectively provides that
"All things which are within the commerce of men are susceptible of prescription, unless otherwise provided. Property of the
State or any of its subdivisions of patrimonial character shall not be the object of prescription" and that "Ownership and
other real rights over immovables also prescribe through uninterrupted adverse possession thereof for thirty years, without
need of title or of good faith."2005cdtai

As testified to by the appellees in the case at bench, their parents already acquired the subject parcels of lands, subject
matter of this application, since 1950 and that they cultivated the same and planted it with jackfruits, bamboos, coconuts,
and other trees (Judgment dated December 21, 1999, p. 6). In short, it is undisputed that herein appellees or their
predecessors-in-interest had occupied and possessed the subject land openly, continuously, exclusively, and adversely since
1950. Consequently, even assuming arguendo that appellees' possession can be reckoned only from June 25, 1963 or from
the time the subject lots had been classified as within the alienable and disposable zone, still the argument of the appellant
does not hold water. CTacSE

As earlier stressed, the subject property, being alienable since 1963 as shown by CENRO Report dated June 23, 1963, may
now be the object of prescription, thus susceptible of private ownership. By express provision of Article 1137, appellees are,
with much greater right, entitled to apply for its registration, as provided by Section 14(4) of P.D. 1529 which allows
 11

individuals to own land in any manner provided by law. Again, even considering that possession of appellees should only be
reckoned from 1963, the year when CENRO declared the subject lands alienable, herein appellees have been possessing the
subject parcels of land in open, continuous, and in the concept of an owner, for 35 years already when they filed the instant
application for registration of title to the land in 1998. As such, this court finds no reason to disturb the finding of the court a
quo. 20

The Republic filed the present Petition for the review and reversal of the Decision of the Court of Appeals, dated 22 November 2002, on the basis
of the following arguments:

First, respondents failed to establish that they and their predecessors-in-interest had been in open, continuous, and adverse possession of the
Subject Lots in the concept of owners since 12 June 1945 or earlier. According to the petitioner Republic, possession of the Subject Lots prior to 25
June 1963 cannot be considered in determining compliance with the periods of possession required by law. The Subject Lots were classified as
alienable and disposable only on 25 June 1963, per CENRO's certification. It also alleges that the Court of Appeals, in applying the 30-year
acquisitive prescription period, had overlooked the ruling in Republic v. Doldol, 21 where this Court declared thatCommonwealth Act No. 141,
otherwise known as the Public Land Act, as amended and as it is presently phrased, requires that possession of land of the public domain must be
from 12 June 1945 or earlier, for the same to be acquired through judicial confirmation of imperfect title.

Second, the application for registration suffers from fatal infirmity as the subject of the application consisted of two parcels of land individually and
separately owned by two applicants. Petitioner Republic contends that it is implicit in the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1529, otherwise
known as the Property Registration Decree, as amended, that the application for registration of title to land shall be filed by a single applicant;
multiple applicants may file a single application only in case they are co-owners. While an application may cover two parcels of land, it is allowed
only when the subject parcels of land belong to the same applicant or applicants (in case the subject parcels of land are co-owned) and are situated
within the same province. Where the authority of the courts to proceed is conferred by a statute and when the manner of obtaining jurisdiction is
mandatory, it must be strictly complied with or the proceedings will be utterly void. Since the respondents failed to comply with the procedure for
land registration under theProperty Registration Decree, the proceedings held before the MTC is void, as the latter did not acquire jurisdiction over
it.

I
Jurisdiction
Addressing first the issue of jurisdiction, this Court finds that the MTC had no jurisdiction to proceed with and hear the application for registration
filed by the respondents but for reasons different from those presented by petitioner Republic.

A. The misjoinder of causes of action and parties does not affect the jurisdiction of the MTC to hear and proceed with respondents' application
for registration.
Respondents filed a single application for registration of the Subject Lots even though they were not co-owners. Respondents Jeremias and David
were actually seeking the individual and separate registration of Lots No. 8422 and 8423, respectively. CSEHcT

Petitioner Republic believes that the procedural irregularity committed by the respondents was fatal to their case, depriving the MTC of
jurisdiction to proceed with and hear their application for registration of the Subject Lots, based on this Court's pronouncement in Director of
Lands v. Court of Appeals, 22 to wit:

. . . In view of these multiple omissions which constitute non-compliance with the above-cited sections of the Act, We rule
that said defects have not invested the Court with the authority or jurisdiction to proceed with the case because the manner
or mode of obtaining jurisdiction as prescribed by the statute which is mandatory has not been strictly followed, thereby
rendering all proceedings utterly null and void.

This Court, however, disagrees with petitioner Republic in this regard. This procedural lapse committed by the respondents should not affect the
jurisdiction of the MTC to proceed with and hear their application for registration of the Subject Lots.

The Property Registration Decree 23 recognizes and expressly allows the following situations: (1) the filing of a single application by several
applicants for as long as they are co-owners of the parcel of land sought to be registered; 24 and (2) the filing of a single application for registration
of several parcels of land provided that the same are located within the same province. 25 The Property Registration Decree is silent, however, as
to the present situation wherein two applicants filed a single application for two parcels of land, but are seeking the separate and individual
registration of the parcels of land in their respective names.

Since the Property Registration Decree failed to provide for such a situation, then this Court refers to the Rules of Court to determine the proper
course of action. Section 34 of the Property Registration Decree itself provides that, "[t]he Rules of Court shall, insofar as not inconsistent with the
provisions of this Decree, be applicable to land registration and cadastral cases by analogy or in a suppletory character and whenever practicable
and convenient."

Considering every application for land registration filed in strict accordance with the Property Registration Decree as a single cause of action, then
the defect in the joint application for registration filed by the respondents with the MTC constitutes a misjoinder of causes of action and parties.
Instead of a single or joint application for registration, respondents Jeremias and David, more appropriately, should have filed separate
applications for registration of Lots No. 8422 and 8423, respectively.

Misjoinder of causes of action and parties do not involve a question of jurisdiction of the court to hear and proceed with the case. 26 They are not
even accepted grounds for dismissal thereof. 27 Instead, under the Rules of Court, the misjoinder of causes of action and parties involve an implied
admission of the court's jurisdiction. It acknowledges the power of the court, acting upon the motion of a party to the case or on its own initiative,
to order the severance of the misjoined cause of action, to be proceeded with separately (in case of misjoinder of causes of action); and/or the
dropping of a party and the severance of any claim against said misjoined party, also to be proceeded with separately (in case of misjoinder of
parties).

The misjoinder of causes of action and parties in the present Petition may have been corrected by the MTC motu propio or on motion of the
petitioner Republic. It is regrettable, however, that the MTC failed to detect the misjoinder when the application for registration was still pending
 12

before it; and more regrettable that the petitioner Republic did not call the attention of the MTC to the fact by filing a motion for severance of the
causes of action and parties, raising the issue of misjoinder only before this Court.

B. Respondents, however, failed to comply with the publication requirements mandated by the Property Registration Decree, thus, the MTC
was not invested with jurisdiction as a land registration court.
Although the misjoinder of causes of action and parties in the present Petition did not affect the jurisdiction of the MTC over the land registration
proceeding, this Court, nonetheless, has discovered a defect in the publication of the Notice of Initial Hearing, which bars the MTC from assuming
jurisdiction to hear and proceed with respondents' application for registration. ASDTEa

A land registration case is a proceeding in rem, 28 and jurisdiction in rem cannot be acquired unless there be constructive seizure of the land
through publication and service of notice. 29

Section 23 of the Property Registration Decree requires that the public be given Notice of the Initial Hearing of the application for land registration
by means of (1) publication; (2) mailing; and (3) posting. Publication of the Notice of Initial Hearing shall be made in the following manner:

1. By publication.

Upon receipt of the order of the court setting the time for initial hearing, the Commissioner of Land Registration shall cause
a notice of initial hearing to be published once in the Official Gazette and once in a newspaper of general circulation in the
Philippines: Provided, however, that the publication in the Official Gazette shall be sufficient to confer jurisdiction upon the
court. Said notice shall be addressed to all persons appearing to have an interest in the land involved including the adjoining
owners so far as known, and "to all whom it may concern." Said notice shall also require all persons concerned to appear in
court at a certain date and time to show cause why the prayer of said application shall not be granted. CEDHTa

Even as this Court concedes that the aforequoted Section 23(1) of the Property Registration Decree expressly provides that publication in the
Official Gazette shall be sufficient to confer jurisdiction upon the land registration court, it still affirms its declaration in Director of Lands v. Court of
Appeals 30 that publication in a newspaper of general circulation is mandatory for the land registration court to validly confirm and register the
title of the applicant or applicants. That Section 23 of the Property Registration Decreeenumerated and described in detail the requirements of
publication, mailing, and posting of the Notice of Initial Hearing, then all such requirements, including publication of the Notice in a newspaper of
general circulation, is essential and imperative, and must be strictly complied with. In the same case, this Court expounded on the reason behind
the compulsory publication of the Notice of Initial Hearing in a newspaper of general circulation, thus

It may be asked why publication in a newspaper of general circulation should be deemed mandatory when the law already
requires notice by publication in the Official Gazette as well as by mailing and posting, all of which have already been
complied with in the case at hand. The reason is due process and the reality that the Official Gazette is not as widely read
and circulated as newspaper and is oftentimes delayed in its circulation, such that the notices published therein may not
reach the interested parties on time, if at all. Additionally, such parties may not be owners of neighboring properties, and
may in fact not own any other real estate. In sum, the all encompassing in rem nature of land registration cases, the
consequences of default orders issued against the whole world and the objective of disseminating the notice in as wide a
manner as possible demand a mandatory construction of the requirements for publication, mailing and posting. 31

In the instant Petition, the initial hearing was set by the MTC, and was in fact held, on 03 September 1999 at 8:30 a.m. While the Notice thereof
was printed in the issue of the Official Gazette, dated 02 August 1999, and officially released on 10 August 1999, it was published in The Freeman
Banat News, a daily newspaper printed in Cebu City and circulated in the province and cities of Cebu and in the rest of Visayas and Mindanao, only
on 19 December 1999, more than three months after the initial hearing.

Indubitably, such publication of the Notice, way after the date of the initial hearing, would already be worthless and ineffective. Whoever read the
Notice as it was published inThe Freeman Banat News and had a claim to the Subject Lots was deprived of due process for it was already too late
for him to appear before the MTC on the day of the initial hearing to oppose respondents' application for registration, and to present his claim and
evidence in support of such claim. Worse, as the Notice itself states, should the claimant-oppositor fail to appear before the MTC on the date of
initial hearing, he would be in default and would forever be barred from contesting respondents' application for registration and even the
registration decree that may be issued pursuant thereto. In fact, the MTC did issue an Order of Special Default on 03 September 1999.

The late publication of the Notice of Initial Hearing in the newspaper of general circulation is tantamount to no publication at all, having the same
ultimate result. Owing to such defect in the publication of the Notice, the MTC failed to constructively seize the Subject Lots and to acquire
jurisdiction over respondents' application for registration thereof. Therefore, the MTC Judgment, dated 21 December 1999, ordering the
registration and confirmation of the title of respondents Jeremias and David over Lots No. 8422 and 8423, respectively; as well as the MTC Order,
dated 02 February 2000, declaring its Judgment of 21 December 1999 final and executory, and directing the LRA Administrator to issue a decree of
registration for the Subject Lots, are both null and void for having been issued by the MTC without jurisdiction.

II
Period of Possession

Respondents failed to comply with the required period of possession of the Subject Lots for the judicial confirmation or legalization of imperfect
or incomplete title.
While this Court has already found that the MTC did not have jurisdiction to hear and proceed with respondents' application for registration, this
Court nevertheless deems it necessary to resolve the legal issue on the required period of possession for acquiring title to public land. TAEDcS

Respondents' application filed with the MTC did not state the statutory basis for their title to the Subject Lots. They only alleged therein that they
obtained title to the Subject Lots by purchase from their parents, spouses Gregorio Herbieto and Isabel Owatan, on 25 June 1976. Respondent
Jeremias, in his testimony, claimed that his parents had been in possession of the Subject Lots in the concept of an owner since 1950. 32

Yet, according to the DENR-CENRO Certification, submitted by respondents themselves, the Subject Lots are "within Alienable and Disposable,
Block I, Project No. 28 per LC Map No. 2545 of Consolacion, Cebu certified under Forestry Administrative Order No. 4-1063, dated June 25, 1963.
Likewise, it is outside Kotkot-Lusaran Mananga Watershed Forest Reservation per Presidential Proclamation No. 932 dated June 29, 1992." 33 The
Subject Lots are thus clearly part of the public domain, classified as alienable and disposable as of 25 June 1963.
 13

As already well-settled in jurisprudence, no public land can be acquired by private persons without any grant, express or implied, from the
government; 34 and it is indispensable that the person claiming title to public land should show that his title was acquired from the State or any
other mode of acquisition recognized by law. 35

The Public Land Act, as amended, governs lands of the public domain, except timber and mineral lands, friar lands, and privately-owned lands
which reverted to the State. 36 It explicitly enumerates the means by which public lands may be disposed, as follows:

(1) For homestead settlement;

(2) By sale;

(3) By lease;

(4) By confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles;

(a) By judicial legalization; or

(b) By administrative legalization (free patent). 37

Each mode of disposition is appropriately covered by separate chapters of the Public Land Act because there are specific requirements and
application procedure for every mode. 38 Since respondents herein filed their application before the MTC, 39 then it can be reasonably
inferred that they are seeking the judicial confirmation or legalization of their imperfect or incomplete title over the Subject Lots.
Judicial confirmation or legalization of imperfect or incomplete title to land, not exceeding 144 hectares, 40 may be availed of by persons identified
under Section 48 of the Public Land Act, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1073, which reads

Section 48. The following-described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public domain or claiming to own any
such lands or an interest therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First
Instance of the province where the land is located for confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate of title
thereafter, under the Land Registration Act, to wit:

(a) [Repealed by Presidential Decree No. 1073].

(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive,
and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona
fide claim of acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945, or earlier, immediately preceding the filing of
the applications for confirmation of title, except when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be
conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be
entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter. TIAEac

(c) Members of the national cultural minorities who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have
been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of lands of the public
domain suitable to agriculture whether disposable or not, under a bona fide claim of ownership since
June 12, 1945 shall be entitled to the rights granted in subsection (b) hereof.

Not being members of any national cultural minorities, respondents may only be entitled to judicial confirmation or legalization of their imperfect
or incomplete title under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as amended. Section 48(b), as amended, now requires adverse possession of the
land since 12 June 1945 or earlier. In the present Petition, the Subject Lots became alienable and disposable only on 25 June 1963. Any period of
possession prior to the date when the Subject Lots were classified as alienable and disposable is inconsequential and should be excluded from the
computation of the period of possession; such possession can never ripen into ownership and unless the land had been classified as alienable and
disposable, the rules on confirmation of imperfect title shall not apply thereto. 41 It is very apparent then that respondents could not have
complied with the period of possession required by Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as amended, to acquire imperfect or incomplete title to
the Subject Lots that may be judicially confirmed or legalized.

The confirmation of respondents' title by the Court of Appeals was based on the erroneous supposition that respondents were claiming title to the
Subject Lots under theProperty Registration Decree. According to the Decision of the Court of Appeals, dated 22 November 2002, Section 14(4) of
the Property Registration Decree allows individuals to own land in any other manner provided by law. It then ruled that the respondents, having
possessed the Subject Lots, by themselves and through their predecessors-in-interest, since 25 June 1963 to 23 September 1998, when they filed
their application, have acquired title to the Subject Lots by extraordinary prescription under Article 1113, in relation to Article 1137, both of the
Civil Code. 42

The Court of Appeals overlooked the difference between the Property Registration Decree and the Public Land Act. Under the Property
Registration Decree, there already exists a title which is confirmed by the court; while under the Public Land Act, the presumption always is that
the land applied for pertains to the State, and that the occupants and possessors only claim an interest in the same by virtue of their imperfect title
or continuous, open, and notorious possession. 43 As established by this Court in the preceding paragraphs, the Subject Lots respondents wish to
register are undoubtedly alienable and disposable lands of the public domain and respondents may have acquired title thereto only under the
provisions of the Public Land Act.

However, it must be clarified herein that even though respondents may acquire imperfect or incomplete title to the Subject Lots under the Public
Land Act, their application for judicial confirmation or legalization thereof must be in accordance with the Property Registration Decree, for Section
50 of the Public Land Act reads

SEC. 50. Any person or persons, or their legal representatives or successors in right, claiming any lands or interest in lands
under the provisions of this chapter, must in every case present an application to the proper Court of First Instance, praying
that the validity of the alleged title or claim be inquired into and that a certificate of title be issued to them under the
provisions of the Land Registration Act. 44

Hence, respondents' application for registration of the Subject Lots must have complied with the substantial requirements under Section 48(b)
of the Public Land Act and the procedural requirements under the Property Registration Decree.
 14

Moreover, provisions of the Civil Code on prescription of ownership and other real rights apply in general to all types of land, while the Public Land
Act specifically governs lands of the public domain. Relative to one another, the Public Land Act may be considered a special law 45 that must take
precedence over the Civil Code, a general law. It is an established rule of statutory construction that between a general law and a special law, the
special law prevails Generalia specialibus non derogant. 46

WHEREFORE, based on the foregoing, the instant Petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 67625, dated 22
November 2002, is REVERSED. The Judgment of the MTC of Consolacion, Cebu in LRC Case No. N-75, dated 21 December 1999, and its Order, dated
02 February 2000 are declared NULL AND VOID. Respondents' application for registration is DISMISSED. EAIcCS

SO ORDERED.

Puno, Austria-Martinez and Callejo, Sr., JJ., concur.

 15

THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 181502. February 2, 2010.]
FLORENCIA G. DIAZ, petitioner, vs. REPUBLIC of the PHILIPPINES, respondent.

CORONA, J p:

This is a letter-motion praying for reconsideration (for the third time) of the June 16, 2008 resolution of this Court denying the
petition for review filed by petitioner Florencia G. Diaz.
Petitioner's late mother, Flora Garcia (Garcia), filed an application for registration of a vast tract of land 1 located in Laur, Nueva
Ecija and Palayan City in the then Court of First Instance (CFI), Branch 1, Nueva Ecija on August 12, 1976. 2 She alleged that she possessed the
land as owner and worked, developed and harvested the agricultural products and benefits of the same continuously, publicly and adversely
for more or less 26 years.
The Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), opposed the application because the land
in question was within the Fort Magsaysay Military Reservation (FMMR), established by virtue of Proclamation No. 237 (Proclamation
237) 3 in 1955. Thus, it was inalienable as it formed part of the public domain.
Significantly, on November 28, 1975, this Court already ruled in Director of Lands v. Reyes 4 that the property subject of Garcia's
application was inalienable as it formed part of a military reservation. Moreover, the existence of Possessory Information Title No. 216
(allegedly registered in the name of a certain Melecio Padilla on March 5, 1895), on which therein respondent Paraaque Investment and
Development Corporation anchored its claim on the land, was not proven. Accordingly, the decree of registration issued in its favor was
declared null and void.
Reyes notwithstanding, the CFI ruled in Garcia's favor in a decision 5 dated July 1, 1981.
The Republic eventually appealed the decision of the CFI to the Court of Appeals (CA). In its decision 6 dated February 26, 1992,
penned by Justice Vicente V. Mendoza (Mendoza decision), 7 the appellate court reversed and set aside the decision of the CFI. The CA found
that Reyes was applicable to petitioner's case as it involved the same property.
The CA observed that Garcia also traced her ownership of the land in question to Possessory Information Title No. 216. As Garcia's
right to the property was largely dependent on the existence and validity of the possessory information title the probative value of which had
already been passed upon by this Court in Reyes, and inasmuch as the land was situated inside a military reservation, the CA concluded that
she did not validly acquire title thereto. IDASHa
During the pendency of the case in the CA, Garcia passed away and was substituted by her heirs, one of whom was petitioner
Florencia G. Diaz. 8
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the Mendoza decision. While the motion was pending in the CA, petitioner also filed
a motion for recall of the records from the former CFI. Without acting on the motion for reconsideration, the appellate court, with Justice
Mendoza as ponente, issued a resolution 9 upholding petitioner's right to recall the records of the case.
Subsequently, however, the CA encouraged the parties to reach an amicable settlement on the matter and even gave the parties
sufficient time to draft and finalize the same.
The parties ultimately entered into a compromise agreement with the Republic withdrawing its claim on the more or less 4,689
hectares supposedly outside the FMMR. For her part, petitioner withdrew her application for the portion of the property inside the military
reservation. They filed a motion for approval of the amicable settlement in the CA. 10
On June 30, 1999, the appellate court approved the compromise agreement. 11 On January 12, 2000, it directed the Land
Registration Administration to issue the corresponding decree of registration in petitioner's favor. 12 cSATDC
However, acting on a letter written by a certain Atty. Restituto S. Lazaro, the OSG filed a motion for reconsideration of the CA
resolution ordering the issuance of the decree of registration. The OSG informed the appellate court that the tract of land subject of the
amicable settlement was still within the military reservation.
On April 16, 2007, the CA issued an amended resolution (amended resolution) 13 annulling the compromise agreement entered into
between the parties. The relevant part of the dispositive portion of the resolution read:
ACCORDINGLY, the Court resolves to:

(1) . . .

(2) . . .

(3) . . .

(4) . . .

(5) . . .

(6) REVERSE the Resolution dated June 30, 1999 of this Court approving the Amicable Settlement dated May 18, 1999
executed between the Office of the Solicitor General and Florencia Garcia Diaz[;]

(7) ANNUL and SET ASIDE the Amicable Settlement dated May 18, 1999 executed between the Office of the Solicitor General
and Florencia Garcia Diaz; the said Amicable Settlement is hereby DECLARED to be without force and effect;

(8) GRANT the Motion for Reconsideration filed by the Office of the Solicitor General and, consequently, SET ASIDE the
Resolution dated January 12, 2000 which ordered, among other matters, that a certificate of title be issued in the
name of plaintiff-appellee Florencia Garcia Diaz over the portion of the subject property in consonance with the
Amicable Settlement dated May 18, 1999 approved by the Court in its Resolution dated June 30, 1999;
 16

(9) SET ASIDE the Resolution dated June 30, 1999 approving the May 18, 1999 Amicable Settlement and the Resolution
dated September 20, 1999 amending the aforesaid June 30, 1999 Resolution; and

(10) REINSTATE the Decision dated February 26, 1992 dismissing applicant-appellee Diaz' registration herein.

SO ORDERED.

(Emphasis supplied) DHIaTS

Petitioner moved for reconsideration. For the first time, she assailed the validity of the Mendoza decision the February 26, 1992
decision adverted to in the CA's amended resolution. She alleged that Justice Mendoza was the assistant solicitor general during the initial
stages of the land registration proceedings in the trial court and therefore should have inhibited himself when the case reached the CA. His
failure to do so, she laments, worked an injustice against her constitutional right to due process. Thus, the Mendoza decision should be
declared null and void. The motion was denied. 14
Thereafter, petitioner filed a petition for review on certiorari 15 in this Court. It was denied for raising factual issues. 16 She moved
for reconsideration. 17 This motion was denied with finality on the ground that there was no substantial argument warranting a modification
of the Court's resolution. The Court then ordered that no further pleadings would be entertained. Accordingly, we ordered entry of judgment
to be made in due course. 18
Petitioner, however, insisted on filing a motion to lift entry of judgment and motion for leave to file a second motion for
reconsideration and to refer the case to the Supreme Court en banc. 19 The Court denied 20 it considering that a second motion for
reconsideration is a prohibited pleading. 21 Furthermore, the motion to refer the case to the banc was likewise denied as the banc is not an
appellate court to which decisions or resolutions of the divisions may be appealed. 22 We reiterated our directive that no further pleadings
would be entertained and that entry of judgment be made in due course.
Not one to be easily deterred, petitioner wrote identical letters, first addressed to Justice Leonardo A. Quisumbing (then Acting
Chief Justice) and then to Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno himself. 23 The body of the letter, undoubtedly in the nature of a third motion for
reconsideration, is hereby reproduced in its entirety:
This is in response to your call for "Moral Forces" in order to "redirect the destiny of our country which is suffering from
moral decadence," that to your mind, is the problem which confronts us. (Inquirer, January 15, 2009, page 1)[.]

I recently lost my case with the Supreme Court, G.R. N[o]. 181502, and my lawyer has done all that is humanly possible to
convince the court to take a second look at the miscarriage of justice that will result from the implementation of the
DISMISSAL in a MINUTE RESOLUTION of our Petition for Review.

Pending before your Division (First Division) is a last plea for justice so that the case may be elevated to the Supreme
Court en banc. I hope the Court exercises utmost prudence in resolving the last plea. For ready reference, a copy of the
Motion is hereto attached as Annex "A".

The issue that was brought before the Honorable Supreme Court involves the Decision of then Justice Vicente Mendoza of
the Court of Appeals, which is NULL and VOID, ab initio. EHTSCD

It is null and void because destiny placed Hon. Justice Vicente Mendoza in a position in which it became possible for him to
discharge the minimum requirement of due process, [i.e.] the ability of the court to render "impartial justice," because Mr.
Justice Mendoza became the ponente of the Court of Appeals Decision, reversing the findings of the trial court,
notwithstanding the fact that he, as Assistant Solicitor General, was the very person who appeared on behalf of the Republic,
as the oppositor in the very same land registration proceedings in which he lost.

In other words, he discharged the duties of prosecutor and judge in the very same case.

In the case of the "Alabang Boys[,]" the public was outraged by the actions of Atty. Verano who admitted having prepared a
simple resolution to be signed by the Secretary of Justice.

In my case, the act complained of is the worst kind of violation of my constitutional right. It is simply immoral, illegal and
unconstitutional, for the prosecutor to eventually act as the judge, and reverse the very decision in which he had lost.

If leaked to the tri-media[,] my case will certainly evoke even greater spite from the public, and put the Supreme Court in
bad light. I must confess that I was tempted to pursue such course of action. I however believe that such an action will do
more harm than good, and even destroy the good name of Hon. Justice Mendoza.

I fully support your call for "moral force" that will slowly and eventually lead our country to redirect its destiny and escape
from this moral decadence, in which we all find ourselves.

I am content with the fact that at least, the Chief Justice continues to fight the dark forces that surround us everyday.

I only ask that the Supreme Court endeavor to ensure that cases such as mine do not happen again, so that the next person
who seeks justice will not experience the pain and frustration that I suffered under our judicial system.

Thank you, and more power to you, SIR. (Emphasis in the original).

The language of petitioner's letter/motion is unmistakable. It is a thinly veiled threat precisely worded and calculated to intimidate
this Court into giving in to her demands to honor an otherwise legally infirm compromise agreement, at the risk of being vilified in the media
and by the public.
This Court will not be cowed into submission. We deny petitioner's letter/third motion for reconsideration. SHCaEA
APPLICABILITY
OF REYES
The Court agrees with the Republic's position that Reyes is applicable to this case.
 17

To constitute res judicata, the following elements must concur:

(1) the former judgment or order must be final;

(2) the judgment or order must be on the merits;

(3) it must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and parties; and

(4) there must be between the first and second actions, identity of parties, of subject matter, and of causes of action. 24

The first three requisites have undoubtedly been complied with. However, petitioner takes exception to the fourth requisite,
particularly on the issue of identity of parties. In her petition for review filed in this Court, she contends that since the applicants in the two
cases are different, the merits of the two cases should, accordingly, be determined independently of each other. 25
This contention is erroneous.
The facts obtaining in this case closely resemble those in Aquino v. Director of Lands. 26 In that case, Quintin Taedo endeavored to
secure title to a considerable tract of land by virtue of his possession thereof under CA 141. When the case eventually reached this Court, we
affirmed the trial court's decision to dismiss the proceedings as the property in question was part of the public domain. Quintin's successor-in-
interest, Florencia Taedo, who despite knowledge of the proceedings did not participate therein, thereafter sold the same property to
Benigno S. Aquino. The latter sought to have it registered in his name. The question in that case, as well as in this one, was whether our
decision in the case in which another person was the applicant constituted res judicata as against his successors-in-interest.
We ruled there, and we so rule now, that in registration cases filed under the provisions of the Public Land Act for the judicial
confirmation of an incomplete and imperfect title, an order dismissing an application for registration and declaring the land as part of the
public domain constitutes res judicata, not only against the adverse claimant, but also against all persons. 27
We also declared in Aquino that:
From another point of view, the decision in the first action has become the "law of the case" or at least falls within the rule
of stare decisis. That adjudication should be followed unless manifestly erroneous. It was taken and should be taken as the
authoritative view of the highest tribunal in the Philippines. It is indispensable to the due administration of justice especially
by a court of last resort that a question once deliberately examined and decided should be considered as settled and closed
to further argument. . . . 28 aIcCTA

Be that as it may, the fact is that, even before the CFI came out with its decision in favor of petitioner on July 1, 1981, this Court,
in Reyes, already made an earlier ruling on November 28, 1975 that the disputed realty was inalienable as it formed part of a military
reservation. Thus, petitioner's argument that the findings of fact of the trial court on her registrable title are binding on us on the principle
that findings of fact of lower courts are accorded great respect and bind even this Court is untenable. Rather, it was incumbent upon the
court a quo to respect this Court's ruling in Reyes, and not the other way around.
However, despite having been apprised of the Court's findings in Reyes (which should have been a matter of judicial notice in the
first place), the trial court still insisted on its divergent finding and disregarded the Court's decision in Reyes, declaring the subject land as
forming part of a military reservation, and thus outside the commerce of man.
By not applying our ruling in Reyes, the trial judge virtually nullified the decision of this Court and therefore acted with grave abuse
of discretion. 29 Notably, a judgment rendered with grave abuse of discretion is void and does not exist in legal contemplation. 30
All lower courts, especially the trial court concerned in this case, ought to be reminded that it is their duty to obey the decisions of
the Supreme Court. A conduct becoming of inferior courts demands a conscious awareness of the position they occupy in the interrelation
and operation of our judicial system. As eloquently declared by Justice J.B. L. Reyes, "There is only one Supreme Court from whose decision all
other courts should take their bearings." 31
ACQUISITION OF
PRIVATE RIGHTS
Petitioner, however, argues that Proclamation 237 itself recognizes that its effectivity is "subject to private rights, if any there be."
By way of a background, we recognized in Reyes that the property where the military reservation is situated is forest land. Thus:
Before the military reservation was established, the evidence is inconclusive as to possession, for it is shown by the evidence
that the land involved is largely mountainous and forested. As a matter of fact, at the time of the hearing, it was conceded
that approximately 13,957 hectares of said land consist of public forest. . . . (Emphasis supplied) 32

Concomitantly, we stated therein, and we remind petitioner now, that forest lands are not registrable under CA 141.
[E]ven more important, Section 48[b] of CA No. 141, as amended, applies exclusively to public agricultural land. Forest lands
or area covered with forest are excluded.It is well-settled that forest land is incapable of registration; and its inclusion in a
title, whether such title be one issued using the Spanish sovereignty or under the present Torrens system of registration,
nullifies the title. (Emphasis supplied). 33

However, it is true that forest lands may be registered when they have been reclassified as alienable by the President in a clear and
categorical manner (upon the recommendation of the proper department head who has the authority to classify the lands of the public
domain into alienable or disposable, timber and mineral lands) 34coupled with possession by the claimant as well as that of her predecessors-
in-interest. Unfortunately for petitioner, she was not able to produce such evidence. Accordingly, her occupation thereof, and that of her
predecessors-in-interest, could not have ripened into ownership of the subject land. This is because prior to the conversion of forest land as
alienable land, any occupation or possession thereof cannot be counted in reckoning compliance with the thirty-year possession requirement
under Commonwealth Act 141 (CA 141) or the Public Land Act. 35 This was our ruling in Almeda v. CA. 36 The rules on the confirmation of
imperfect titles do not apply unless and until the land classified as forest land is released through an official proclamation to that effect. Then
and only then will it form part of the disposable agricultural lands of the public domain. 37 HDTSIE
 18

Coming now to petitioner's contention that her "private rights" to the property, meaning her and her predecessors' possession
thereof prior to the establishment of the FMMR, must be respected, the same is untenable. As earlier stated, we had already recognized the
same land to be public forest even before the FMMR was established. To reiterate:
Before the military reservation was established, the evidence is inconclusive as to possession, for it is shown by the evidence
that the land involved is largely mountainous and forested. As a matter of fact, at the time of the hearing, it was conceded
that approximately 13,957 hectares of said land consist of public forest. . . .

Therefore, even if possession was for more than 30 years, it could never ripen to ownership.
But even assuming that the land in question was alienable land before it was established as a military reservation, there was
nevertheless still a dearth of evidence with respect to its occupation by petitioner and her predecessors-in-interest for more than 30 years.
In Reyes, we noted:
Evidently, Melecio Padilla, having died on February 9, 1900, barely five (5) years after the inscription of the informacion
possessoria, could not have converted the same into a record of ownership twenty (20) years after such inscription, pursuant
to Article 393 of the Spanish Mortgage Law.

xxx xxx xxx

During the lifetime of Melecio Padilla, only a small portion thereof was cleared and cultivated under the 'kaingin' system,
while some portions were used as grazing land. After his death, his daughter, Maria Padilla, caused the planting of
vegetables and had about forty (40) tenants for the purpose. During the Japanese occupation, Maria Padilla died. . . .

xxx xxx xxx

A mere casual cultivation of portions of the land by the claimant, and the raising thereon of cattle, do not constitute
possession under claim of ownership. In that sense, possession is not exclusive and notorious as to give rise to a presumptive
grant from the State. While grazing livestock over land is of course to be considered with other acts of dominion to show
possession, the mere occupancy of land by grazing livestock upon it, without substantial inclosures, or other permanent
improvements, is not sufficient to support a claim of title thru acquisitive prescription. The possession of public land,
however long the period may have extended, never confers title thereto upon the possessor because the statute of
limitations with regard to public land does not operate against the State unless the occupant can prove possession and
occupation of the same under claim of ownership for the required number of years to constitute a grant from the
State. 38 TcCEDS

xxx xxx xxx

Furthermore, the fact that the possessory information title on which petitioner also bases her claim of ownership was found to be
inexistent in Reyes, 39 thus rendering its probative value suspect, further militates against granting her application for registration.
NULLITY OF COMPROMISE
AGREEMENT
On the compromise agreement between the parties, we agree with the CA that the same was null and void.
An amicable settlement or a compromise agreement is in the nature of a contract and must necessarily comply with the provisions
of Article 1318 of the New Civil Code which provides:
Art. 1318. There is no contract unless the following requisites concur:

(1) Consent of the contracting parties;

(2) Object certain which is the subject matter of the contract;

(3) Cause of the obligation which is established.

Petitioner was not able to provide any proof that the consent of the Republic, through the appropriate government
agencies, i.e., the Department of Environment and Natural Resources, Land Management Bureau, Land Registration Authority, and the Office
of the President, was secured by the OSG when it executed the agreement with her. 40 The lack of authority on the part of the OSG rendered
the compromise agreement between the parties null and void because although it is the duty of the OSG to represent the State in cases
involving land registration proceedings, it must do so only within the scope of the authority granted to it by its principal, the Republic of the
Philippines. 41
In this case, although the OSG was authorized to appear as counsel for respondent, it was never given the specific or special
authority to enter into a compromise agreement with petitioner. This is in violation of the provisions of Rule 138 Section 23, of the Rules of
Court which requires "special authority" for attorneys to bind their clients.
Section 23. Authority of attorneys to bind clients. Attorneys have authority to bind their clients in any case by any
agreement in relation thereto made in writing, and in taking appeals, and in all matters of ordinary judicial procedure. But
they cannot, without special authority, compromise their client's litigation, or receive anything in discharge of a client's
claim but the full amount in cash. (Emphasis supplied). ECaITc

Moreover, the land in question could not have been a valid subject matter of a contract because, being forest land, it was
inalienable. Article 1347 of the Civil Code provides:
Art. 1347. All things which are not outside the commerce of men, including future things, may be the object of a contract.
All rights which are not intransmissible may also be the object of contracts.

No contract may be entered into upon future inheritance except in cases expressly authorized by law.

All services which are not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy may likewise be the object of a
contract. (Emphasis supplied)
 19

Finally, the Court finds the cause or consideration of the obligation contrary to law and against public policy. The agreement
provided that, in consideration of petitioner's withdrawal of her application for registration of title from that portion of the property located
within the military reservation, respondent was withdrawing its claim on that part of the land situated outside said reservation. The Republic
could not validly enter into such undertaking as the subject matter of the agreement was outside the commerce of man.
PETITIONER'S CONTEMPT
OF COURT
This Court, being the very institution that dispenses justice, cannot reasonably be expected to just sit by and do nothing when it
comes under attack.
That petitioner's letter-motion constitutes an attack against the integrity of this Court cannot be denied. Petitioner started her letter
innocently enough by stating:
This is in response to your call for "Moral Forces" in order to "redirect the destiny of our country which is suffering from
moral decadence," that to your mind, is the problem which confronts us. (Inquirer, January 15, 2009, page 1)[.]

It, however, quickly progressed into a barely concealed resentment for what she perceived as this Court's failure to exercise "utmost
prudence" in rendering "impartial justice" in deciding her case. Petitioner recounted:
I recently lost my case with the Supreme Court, G.R. N[o]. 181502, and my lawyer has done all that is humanly possible to
convince the court to take a second look at the miscarriage of justice that will result from the implementation of the
DISMISSAL in a MINUTE RESOLUTION of our Petition for Review.

Pending before your Division (First Division) is a last plea for justice so that the case may be elevated to the Supreme
Court en banc. I hope the Court exercises utmost prudence in resolving the last plea. For ready reference, a copy of the
Motion is hereto attached as Annex "A". DcaCSE

The issue that was brought before the Honorable Supreme Court involves the Decision of then Justice Vicente Mendoza of
the Court of Appeals, which is NULL and VOID, ab initio.

It is null and void because destiny placed Hon. Justice Vicente Mendoza in a position in which it became possible for him to
discharge the minimum requirement of due process, [i.e.,] the ability of the court to render "impartial justice," because Mr.
Justice Mendoza became the ponente of the Court of Appeals Decision, reversing the findings of the trial court,
notwithstanding the fact that he, as Assistant Solicitor General, was the very person who appeared on behalf of the Republic,
as the oppositor in the very same land registration proceedings in which he lost. (Emphasis supplied).

Petitioner then indirectly hints that, when push comes to shove, she has no choice but to expose the irregularity concerning the
Mendoza decision to the media. This is evident in her arrogant declaration that:
If leaked to the tri-media[,] my case will certainly evoke even greater spite from the public, and put the Supreme Court in
bad light.

But she hastens to add in the same breath that:

I must confess that I was tempted to pursue such course of action. I however believe that such an action will do more harm
than good, and even destroy the good name of Hon. Justice Mendoza.

Petitioner ends her letter by taking this Court to task:

. . . endeavor to ensure that cases such as mine do not happen again, so that the next person who seeks justice will not
experience the pain and frustration that I suffered under our judicial system.

When required to show cause why she should not be cited for contempt for her baseless charges and veiled threats, petitioner
answered:
xxx xxx xxx

The Letter of January 26, 2009 is not a "veiled threat[.] It was written in response to the call of the Chief Justice for a moral
revolution. Juxtaposed against the factual backdrop of the "Alabang Boys" case and the Meralco [c]ase, involving Mr. Justice
Jose L. Sabio which also enjoyed wide publicity over the tri-media, petitioner felt that the facts of the said cases pale in
comparison to the facts of her case where the lawyer of her opponent eventually became justice of the appellate court and
ended up reversing the very decision in which he lost, in clear violation of her [c]onstitutional [r]ight to fundamental fair play
for no contestant in any litigation can ever serve as a judge without transgression of the due process clause. This is basic.

Petitioner confesses that she may have been emotional in the delivery of her piece, because correctly or incorrectly[,] she
believes they are irrefutable. If in the course of that emotional delivery, she has offended your honors' sensibilities, she is
ready for the punishment, and only prays that his Court temper its strike with compassion as her letter to the Chief Justice
was never written with a view of threatening the Court. HEaCcD

xxx xxx xxx

Petitioner wrote the Chief Justice in order to obtain redress and correction of the inequity bestowed upon her by destiny. It
was never meant as a threat.

The Court now puts an end to petitioner's irresponsible insinuations and threats of "going public" with this case. We are not blind to
petitioner's clever and foxy interplay of threats alternating with false concern for the reputation of this Court.
It is well to remind petitioner that the Court has consistently rendered justice with neither fear nor favor. The disposition in this case
was arrived at after a careful and thorough deliberation of the facts of this case and all the matters pertaining thereto. The records of the
case, in fact, show that all the pertinent issues raised by petitioner were passed upon and sufficiently addressed by the appellate court and
this Court in their respective resolutions.
 20

As to petitioner's complaint regarding this Court's denial of her petition through a mere minute resolution (which allegedly deprived
her of due process as the Court did not issue a full-blown decision stating the facts and applicable jurisprudence), suffice it to say that the
Court is not duty-bound to issue decisions or resolutions signed by the justices all the time. It has ample discretion to
formulate ponencias, extended resolutions or even minute resolutions issued by or upon its authority, depending on its evaluation of a case,
as long as a legal basis exists. When a minute resolution (signed by the Clerk of Court upon orders of the Court) denies or dismisses a petition
or motion for reconsideration for lack of merit, it is understood that the assailed decision or order, together with all its findings of fact and
legal conclusions, are deemed sustained. 42
Furthermore, petitioner has doggedly pursued her case in this Court by filing three successive motions for reconsideration, including
the letter-motion subject of this resolution. This, despite our repeated warnings that "no further pleadings shall be entertained in this case."
Her unreasonable persistence constitutes utter defiance of this Court's orders and an abuse of the rules of procedure. This, alongside her
thinly veiled threats to leak her case to the media to gain public sympathy although the tone of petitioner's compliance with our show-
cause resolution was decidedly subdued compared to her earlier letters constitutes contempt of court.
In Republic v. Unimex, 43 we held:
A statement of this Court that no further pleadings would be entertained is a declaration that the Court has already
considered all issues presented by the parties and that it has adjudicated the case with finality. It is a directive to the parties
to desist from filing any further pleadings or motions. Like all orders of this Court, it must be strictly observed by the parties.
It should not be circumvented by filing motions ill-disguised as requests for clarification.

A FEW OBSERVATIONS
If petitioner was, as she adamantly insists, only guarding her constitutional right to due process, then why did she question the
validity of the Mendoza decision late in the proceedings, that is, only after her motion for reconsideration in the CA (for its subsequent
annulment of the compromise agreement) was denied? It is obvious that it was only when her case became hopeless that her present counsel
frantically searched for some ground, any ground to resuscitate his client's lost cause, subsequently raising the issue. This is evident from a
statement in her petition to this Court that: CAIaDT
It is this fresh discovery by the undersigned counsel of the nullity of the proceedings of the Court of Appeals that places in
doubt the entire proceedings it previously conducted, which led to the rendition of the February 26, 1992 Decision, a fact
that escaped the scrutiny of applicant for registration Flora L. Garcia, as well as her lawyer, Atty. Cayetano Dante Diaz,
who died in 1993, and the late Justice Fernando A. Santiago, who stood as counsel for Flora L. Garcia's successor-in-
interest, herein petitioner, Florencia G. Garcia. 44 (Emphasis supplied).

The above cited statement does not help petitioner's cause at all. If anything, it only proves how desperate the case has become for
petitioner and her counsel.
WHEREFORE, the letter-motion dated January 26, 2009 of petitioner is NOTED and is hereby treated as a third motion for
reconsideration. The motion is DENIEDconsidering that a third motion for reconsideration is a prohibited pleading and the plea utterly lacks
merit.
Petitioner is found GUILTY of contempt of court. Accordingly, a FINE of Five Thousand Pesos is hereby imposed on her, payable
within ten days from receipt of this resolution. She is hereby WARNED that any repetition hereof shall be dealt with more severely.
Treble costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

Carpio, * Velasco, Jr., Nachura and Peralta, JJ., concur.

||| (Diaz v. Republic, G.R. No. 181502 (Resolution), [February 2, 2010], 625 PHIL 243-268)
 21

SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 173423. March 5, 2014.]
SPS. ANTONIO FORTUNA and ERLINDA FORTUNA, petitioners, vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

BRION, J p:

Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari 1 filed by the petitioners, spouses Antonio and Erlinda Fortuna, assailing the decision dated
May 16, 2005 2 and the resolution dated June 27, 2006 3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 71143. The CA reversed and set aside the
decision dated May 7, 2001 4 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of San Fernando, La Union, Branch 66, in Land Registration Case (LRC) No. 2372.

THE BACKGROUND FACTS

In December 1994, the spouses Fortuna filed an application for registration of a 2,597-square meter land identified as Lot No. 4457, situated in
Bo. Canaoay, San Fernando, La Union. The application was filed with the RTC and docketed as LRC No. 2372.

The spouses Fortuna stated that Lot No. 4457 was originally owned by Pastora Vendiola, upon whose death was succeeded by her children,
Clemente and Emeteria Nones. Through an affidavit of adjudication dated August 3, 1972, Emeteria renounced all her interest in Lot No. 4457 in
favor of Clemente. Clemente later sold the lot in favor of Rodolfo Cuenca on May 23, 1975. Rodolfo sold the same lot to the spouses Fortuna
through a deed of absolute sale dated May 4, 1984.

The spouses Fortuna claimed that they, through themselves and their predecessors-in-interest, have been in quiet, peaceful, adverse and
uninterrupted possession of Lot No. 4457 for more than 50 years, and submitted as evidence the lot's survey plan, technical description, and
certificate of assessment. cSEAHa

Although the respondent, Republic of the Philippines (Republic), opposed the application, 5 it did not present any evidence in support of its
opposition. Since no private opposition to the registration was filed, the RTC issued an order of general default on November 11, 1996 against the
whole world, except the Republic. 6

In its Decision dated May 7, 2001, 7 the RTC granted the application for registration in favor of the spouses Fortuna. The RTC declared that "[the
spouses Fortuna] have established [their] possession, including that of their predecessors-in-interest of the land sought to be registered, has been
open, continuous, peaceful, adverse against the whole world and in the concept of an owner since 1948, or for a period of over fifty (50) years." 8

The Republic appealed the RTC decision with the CA, arguing that the spouses Fortuna did not present an official proclamation from the
government that the lot has been classified as alienable and disposable agricultural land. It also claimed that the spouses Fortuna's evidence Tax
Declaration No. 8366 showed that possession over the lot dates back only to 1948, thus, failing to meet the June 12, 1945 cut-off period
provided under Section 14 (1) of Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1529 or the Property Registration Decree (PRD).

In its decision dated May 16, 2005, 9 the CA reversed and set aside the RTC decision. Although it found that the spouses Fortuna were able to
establish the alienable and disposable nature of the land, 10 they failed to show that they complied with the length of possession that the law
requires, i.e., since June 12, 1945. It agreed with the Republic's argument that Tax Declaration No. 8366 only showed that the spouses Fortuna's
predecessor-in-interest, Pastora, proved that she had been in possession of the land only since 1948.

The CA denied the spouses Fortuna's motion for reconsideration of its decision in its resolution dated June 27, 2006. 11

THE PARTIES' ARGUMENTS

Through the present petition, the spouses Fortuna seek a review of the CA rulings.

They contend that the applicable law is Section 48 (b) of Commonwealth Act No. 141 or the Public Land Act (PLA), as amended by Republic
Act (RA) No. 1942. RA No. 1942amended the PLA by requiring 30 years of open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession to acquire
imperfect title over an agricultural land of the public domain.This 30-year period, however, was removed by PD No. 1073 and instead required
that the possession should be since June 12, 1945. The amendment introduced byPD No. 1073 was carried in Section 14 (1) of the PRD. 12

The spouses Fortuna point out that PD No. 1073 was issued on January 25, 1977 and published on May 9, 1977; and the PRD was issued on June
11, 1978 and published on January 2, 1979. On the basis of the Court's ruling in Taada, et al. v. Hon. Tuvera, etc., et al., 13 they allege that PD No.
1073 and the PRD should be deemed effective only on May 24, 1977 and January 17, 1979, respectively. By these dates, they claim to have already
satisfied the 30-year requirement under the RA No. 1942 amendment because Pastora's possession dates back, at the latest, to 1947.

They allege that although Tax Declaration No. 8366 was made in 1948, this does not contradict that fact that Pastora possessed Lot No.
4457 before 1948. The failure to present documentary evidence proving possession earlier than 1948 was explained by Filma Salazar, Records
Officer of the Provincial Assessor's Office, who testified that the records were lost beyond recovery due to the outbreak of World War II. IcESaA

Notwithstanding the absence of documents executed earlier than 1948, the spouses Fortuna contend that evidence exists indicating that Pastora
possessed the lot even before 1948. First, Tax Declaration No. 8366 does not contain a statement that it is a new tax declaration. Second, the
annotation found at the back of Tax Declaration No. 8366 states that "this declaration cancels Tax Nos. 10543[.]" 14 Since Tax Declaration No. 8366
was issued in 1948, the cancelled Tax Declaration No. 10543 was issued, at the latest, in 1947, indicating that there was already an owner and
possessor of the lot before 1948. Third, they rely on the testimony of one Macaria Flores in LRC No. 2373. LRC No. 2373 was also commenced by
the spouses Fortuna to register Lot Nos. 4462, 27066, and 27098, 15 which were also originally owned by Pastora and are adjacent to the subject
Lot No. 4457. Macaria testified that she was born in 1926 and resided in a place a few meters from the three lots. She stated that she regularly
passed by these lots on her way to school since 1938. She knew the property was owned by Pastora because the latter's family had constructed a
house and planted fruit-bearing trees thereon; they also cleaned the area. On the basis of Macaria's testimony and the other evidence presented
in LRC No. 2373, the RTC granted the spouses Fortuna's application for registration of Lot Nos. 4462, 27066, and 27098 in its decision of January 3,
2005. 16 The RTC's decision has lapsed into finality unappealed.

The spouses Fortuna claim that Macaria's testimony in LRC No. 2373 should be considered to prove Pastora's possession prior to 1948. Although
LRC No. 2373 is a separate registration proceeding, it pertained to lots adjacent to the subject property, Lot No. 4457, and belonged to the same
predecessor-in-interest. Explaining their failure to present Macaria in the proceedings before the RTC in LRC No. 2372, the spouses Fortuna said "it
was only after the reception of evidence . . . that [they] were able to trace and establish the identity and competency of Macaria[.]" 17
 22

Commenting on the spouses Fortuna's petition, the Republic relied mostly on the CA's ruling which denied the registration of title and prayed for
the dismissal of the petition.DEScaT

THE COURT'S RULING

We deny the petition for failure of the spouses Fortuna to sufficiently prove their compliance with the requisites for the acquisition of title to
alienable lands of the public domain.

The nature of Lot No. 4457 as alienable and

disposable public land has not been sufficiently
established
The Constitution declares that all lands of the public domain are owned by the State. 18 Of the four classes of public land, i.e., agricultural lands,
forest or timber lands, mineral lands, and national parks, only agricultural lands may be alienated. 19 Public land that has not been classified as
alienable agricultural land remains part of the inalienable public domain. Thus, it is essential for any applicant for registration of title to land
derived through a public grant to establish foremost the alienable and disposable nature of the land. The PLA provisions on the grant and
disposition of alienable public lands, specifically, Sections 11 and 48 (b), will find application only from the time that a public land has been
classified as agricultural and declared as alienable and disposable.

Under Section 6 of the PLA, 20 the classification and the reclassification of public lands are the prerogative of the Executive Department. The
President, through a presidential proclamation or executive order, can classify or reclassify a land to be included or excluded from the public
domain. The Department of Environment and Natural Resources(DENR) Secretary is likewise empowered by law to approve a land classification
and declare such land as alienable and disposable. 21 Accordingly, jurisprudence has required that an applicant for registration of title acquired
through a public land grant must present incontrovertible evidence that the land subject of the application is alienable or disposable by establishing
the existence of a positive act of the government, such as a presidential proclamation or an executive order; an administrative action; investigation
reports of Bureau of Lands investigators; and a legislative act or a statute.

In this case, the CA declared that the alienable nature of the land was established by the notation in the survey plan, 22 which states:

This survey is inside alienable and disposable area as per Project No. 13 L.C. Map No. 1395 certified August 7, 1940. It is
outside any civil or military reservation. 23

It also relied on the Certification dated July 19, 1999 from the DENR Community Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO) that
"there is, per record, neither any public land application filed nor title previously issued for the subject parcel[.]"24 However, we find
that neither of the above documents is evidence of a positive act from the government reclassifying the lot as alienable and disposable
agricultural land of the public domain.
Mere notations appearing in survey plans are inadequate proof of the covered properties' alienable and disposable character. 25 These
notations, at the very least, only establish that the land subject of the application for registration falls within the approved alienable and disposable
area per verification through survey by the proper government office. The applicant, however, must also present a copy of the original
classification of the land into alienable and disposable land, as declared by the DENR Secretary or as proclaimed by the President. 26 In Republic
v. Heirs of Juan Fabio, 27 the Court ruled that

[t]he applicant for land registration must prove that the DENR Secretary had approved the land classification and released
the land of the public domain as alienable and disposable, and that the land subject of the application for registration falls
within the approved area per verification through survey by the PENRO 28or CENRO. In addition, the applicant must
present a copy of the original classification of the land into alienable and disposable, as declared by the DENR Secretary,
or as proclaimed by the President.

The survey plan and the DENR-CENRO certification are not proof that the President or the DENR Secretary has reclassified and released the
public land as alienable and disposable. The offices that prepared these documents are not the official repositories or legal custodian of the
issuances of the President or the DENR Secretary declaring the public land as alienable and disposable. 29
For failure to present incontrovertible evidence that Lot No. 4457 has been reclassified as alienable and disposable land of the public domain
though a positive act of the Executive Department, the spouses Fortuna's claim of title through a public land grant under the PLA should be denied.

In judicial confirmation of imperfect

or incomplete title, the period of
possession should commence, at the
latest, as of May 9, 1947
Although the above finding that the spouses Fortuna failed to establish the alienable and disposable character of Lot No. 4457 serves as sufficient
ground to deny the petition and terminate the case, we deem it proper to continue to address the other important legal issues raised in the
petition. caIEAD

As mentioned, the PLA is the law that governs the grant and disposition of alienable agricultural lands. Under Section 11 of the PLA, alienable lands
of the public domain may be disposed of, among others, by judicial confirmation of imperfect or incomplete title. This mode of acquisition of title
is governed by Section 48 (b) of the PLA, the original version of which states:

Sec. 48. The following-described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public domain or claiming to own any
such lands or an interest therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First
Instance of the province where the land is located for confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate of title
therefor, under the Land Registration Act, to wit:

xxx xxx xxx

(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and
notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition or
ownership, except as against the Government, since July twenty-sixth, eighteen hundred and ninety-four, except when
prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a
government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter. [emphasis supplied]
 23

On June 22, 1957, the cut-off date of July 26, 1894 was replaced by a 30-year period of possession under RA No. 1942. Section 48 (b) of the PLA, as
amended by RA No. 1942, read:

(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of
ownership, for at least thirty years, immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title, except
when prevented by war or force majeure. [emphasis and underscore ours]

On January 25, 1977, PD No. 1073 replaced the 30-year period of possession by requiring possession since June 12, 1945. Section 4 of PD No.
1073 reads:

SEC. 4. The provisions of Section 48(b) and Section 48(c), Chapter VIII of the Public Land Act are hereby amended in the
sense that these provisions shall apply only to alienable and disposable lands of the public domain which have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation by the applicant himself or thru his predecessor-in-interest,
under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945. [emphasis supplied]

Under the PD No. 1073 amendment, possession of at least 32 years from 1945 up to its enactment in 1977 is required. This effectively
impairs the vested rights of applicants who had complied with the 30-year possession required under the RA No. 1942 amendment, but whose
possession commenced only after the cut-off date of June 12, 1945 was established by the PD No. 1073 amendment. To remedy this, the Court
ruled in Abejaron v. Nabasa 30 that "Filipino citizens who by themselves or their predecessors-in-interest have been, prior to the effectivity of P.D.
1073 on January 25, 1977, in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain,
under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, for at least 30 years, or at least since January 24, 1947 may apply for judicial confirmation of
their imperfect or incomplete title under Sec. 48 (b) of the [PLA]." January 24, 1947 was considered as the cut-off date as this was exactly 30
years counted backward from January 25, 1977 the effectivity date of PD No. 1073. cdll

It appears, however, that January 25, 1977 was the date PD No. 1073 was enacted; based on the certification from the National Printing
Office, 31 PD No. 1073 waspublished in Vol. 73, No. 19 of the Official Gazette, months later than its enactment or on May 9, 1977. This
uncontroverted fact materially affects the cut-off date for applications for judicial confirmation of incomplete title under Section 48 (b) of the PLA.

Although Section 6 of PD No. 1073 states that "[the] Decree shall take effect upon its promulgation," the Court has declared in Taada, et al. v.
Hon. Tuvera, etc., et al. 32 that the publication of laws is an indispensable requirement for its effectivity. "[A]ll statutes, including those of local
application and private laws, shall be published as a condition for their effectivity, which shall begin fifteen days after publication unless a different
effectivity date is fixed by the legislature." 33 Accordingly, Section 6 of PD No. 1073 should be understood to mean that the decree took effect only
upon its publication, or on May 9, 1977. This, therefore, moves the cut-off date for applications for judicial confirmation of imperfect or
incomplete title under Section 48 (b) of the PLA to May 8, 1947. In other words, applicants must prove that they have been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of
ownership, for at least 30 years, or at least since May 8, 1947.

The spouses Fortuna were unable to prove

that they possessed Lot No. 4457 since May
8, 1947
Even if the Court assumes that Lot No. 4457 is an alienable and disposable agricultural land of the public domain, the spouses Fortuna's application
for registration of title would still not prosper for failure to sufficiently prove that they possessed the land since May 8, 1947.

The spouses Fortuna's allegation that: (1) the absence of a notation that Tax Declaration No. 8366 was a new tax declaration and (2) the notation
stating that Tax Declaration No. 8366 cancels the earlier Tax Declaration No. 10543 both indicate that Pastora possessed the land prior to 1948 or,
at the earliest, in 1947. We also observe that Tax Declaration No. 8366 contains a sworn statement of the owner that was subscribed on October
23, 1947. 34 While these circumstances may indeed indicate possession as of 1947, none proves that it commenced as of the cut-off date of May 8,
1947. Even if the tax declaration indicates possession since 1947, it does not show the nature of Pastora's possession. Notably, Section 48 (b) of
the PLA speaks of possession and occupation. "Since these words are separated by the conjunction and, the clear intention of the law is not to
make one synonymous with the other. Possession is broader than occupation because it includes constructive possession. When, therefore, the
law adds the word occupation, it seeks to delimit the all encompassing effect of constructive possession. Taken together with the words open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious, the wordoccupation serves to highlight the fact that for an applicant to qualify, his possession must not be a
mere fiction." 35 Nothing in Tax Declaration No. 8366 shows that Pastora exercised acts of possession and occupation such as cultivation of or
fencing off the land. Indeed, the lot was described as "cogonal." 36

The spouses Fortuna seeks to remedy the defects of Tax Declaration No. 8366 by relying on Macaria's testimony in a separate land registration
proceeding, LRC No. 2373. Macaria alleged that she passed by Pastora's lots on her way to school, and she saw Pastora's family construct a house,
plant fruit-bearing trees, and clean the area. However, the Court is not convinced that Macaria's testimony constituted as the "well-nigh
incontrovertible evidence" required in cases of this nature.

The records disclose that the spouses Fortuna acquired adjoining parcels of land, all of which are claimed to have previously belonged to Pastora.
These parcels of land were covered by three separate applications for registration, to wit: ScAIaT

a. LRC No. N-1278, involving Lot Nos. 1 and 2, with a total area of 2,961 sq.m., commenced by Emeteria;

b. LRC No. 2373, involving Lot Nos. 4462, 27066, and 27098, with a total area of 4,006 sq.m., commenced by the spouses
Fortuna; and

c. LRC No. 2372 (the subject case), involving Lot No. 4457, with a total area of 2,597 sq.m.

As these cases involved different but adjoining lots that belonged to the same predecessor-in-interest, the spouses Fortuna alleged that the
final rulings in LRC Nos. N-1278 and 2373, 37 upholding Pastora's ownership, be taken into account in resolving the present case.
Notably, the total land area of the adjoining lots that are claimed to have previously belonged to Pastora is 9,564 sq.m. This is too big an area for
the Court to consider that Pastora's claimed acts of possession and occupation (as testified to by Macaria) encompassed the entirety of the lots.
Given the size of the lots, it is unlikely that Macaria (age 21 in 1947) could competently assess and declare that its entirety belonged to Pastora
because she saw acts of possession and occupation in what must have been but a limited area. As mentioned, Tax Declaration No. 8366 described
 24

Lot No. 4457 as "cogonal," thus, Macaria could not have also been referring to Lot No. 4457 when she said that Pastora planted fruit-bearing trees
on her properties.

The lower courts' final rulings in LRC Nos. N-1278 and 2373, upholding Pastora's possession, do not tie this Court's hands into ruling in favor of the
spouses Fortuna. Much to our dismay, the rulings in LRC Nos. N-1278 and 2373 do not even show that the lots have been officially reclassified as
alienable lands of the public domain or that the nature and duration of Pastora's occupation met the requirements of the PLA, thus, failing to
convince us to either disregard the rules of evidence or consider their merits. In this regard, we reiterate our directive in Santiago v. De los
Santos: 38

Both under the 1935 and the present Constitutions, the conservation no less than the utilization of the natural resources is
ordained. There would be a failure to abide by its command if the judiciary does not scrutinize with care applications to
private ownership of real estate. To be granted, they must be grounded in well-nigh incontrovertible evidence. Where,
as in this case, no such proof would be forthcoming, there is no justification for viewing such claim with favor. It is a basic
assumption of our polity that lands of whatever classification belong to the state. Unless alienated in accordance with law,
it retains its rights over the same asdominus.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The decision dated May 16, 2005 and the resolution dated June 27, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CV No. 71143 are AFFIRMEDinsofar as these dismissed the spouses Antonio and Erlinda Fortuna's application of registration of title on the basis of
the grounds discussed above. Costs against the spouses Fortuna. LLpr

SO ORDERED.

Carpio, Del Castillo, Perez and Perlas-Bernabe, JJ., concur.

||| (Spouses Fortuna v. Republic, G.R. No. 173423, [March 5, 2014])