Metaphysics Z 17s Ontological Deduction of Form as Prime Substance and Principle of

Substances

A Demonstration of Substance by means of the Analysis of Becoming

Aristotle in Metaphysics Book Zeta develops his general theory of substance, looking
for the principle and cause for substances, and, therefore looks for the primary
substance, aiming to answer the question "What is substance?" In chapter 17 of Zeta,
the Stagirite demonstrates definitively the merits of form () to be the principle of
substances and primary substance, by making, as it were, another fresh start.1 There,
Aristotle makes an ontological analysis of form and elementary component parts of
sensible entities in becoming.

The first step of that demonstration was raising the following question, conceived as the
question looking for the essence and the very principle of substance: why the matter is
something determined2. This question is looking for the principle that determines
sensible substance. And he continues: For example, why are these materials a house?
Because the essence of house is present in them. Why is thisor rather this body in this
statea human? As a result, we seek the cause of why the matter is something (and this
cause is the form -); and this cause is the substance ().3
The research that seeks for the cause of substance, reaches its top in the final part of
chapter 17 of Metaphysics Zeta, where Aristotle uses the examples of the syllable and
flesh:
Syllable is not the elements, nor is BA the same as B and A; nor is flesh fire and
earth.4 The reason for this is that elements exist after corruption and become: because
after the dissolution the compounds, e.g. flesh or the syllable, no longer exist, but the
elements exist, and so do fire and earth.5 From which he concludes: Therefore the
syllable is some particular thing; not merely the letters, vowel and consonant, but
something else besides. And flesh is not merely fire and earth, or hot and cold, but
something else besides.6
Now, what is that entity distinct from the elements of syllable and flesh? Aristotle posits
that such entity is the cause that this thing is flesh and that thing a syllable, and
similarly in other cases,7 i.e. the essence, which is the substance: And this is the
substance of each thing, for it is the primary cause of its existence.8
Aristotle explains that such substance and essence of each thing is nature: And since
all substances are constituted in accordance with and by nature, substance would seem
to be this nature (), which is not an element but a principle ().9 Of course,
this nature () is form (), conceived as primary substance and principle ().

1 ARISTOTLE, Metaphysics , chapter 17, 1041 a 10-11.

2ARISTOTLE, Metaphysics , chapter 17 1041 b 45.
3 ARISTOTLE, Metaphysics , chapter 17, 1041 b 5-9.
4ARISTOTLE, Metaphysics , chapter 17, 1041 b 12-14.
5ARISTOTLE, Metaphysics , chapter 17, 1041 b 14-16.
6ARISTOTLE, Metaphysics , chapter 17, 1041 b 25-27.
7ARISTOTLE, Metaphysics , chapter 17, 1041 b 27-28.
8ARISTOTLE, Metaphysics , chapter 17, 1041 b 28-31.
9ARISTOTLE, Metaphysics , chapter 17, 1041 b 28-31.
Now, form is entelechy act-, which exists besides the elemental parts of a thing. These
parts exist merely as potency present in the whole as its matter.10 According to Zeta 16,
the parts of the animals and elements, i.e. air, fire and earth, preexist before the
generation of a living thing, and exist in actuality after corruption of it, as substances
separated from one another, for this reason: For things that are actually two in this
way are never actually one, although if they are potentially two, they can be one.11
Therefore, form () is the cause or principle of the other entities called substances as
subject, namely, matter () and composite of matter and form (). And form as
primary substance has maximally the essential properties of unity, and non being in
something else, and separateness.

10 ARISTOTLE, Metaphysics , chapter 17, 1041 b 31-33.

11 ARISTOTLE, Metaphysics, , 13, 1039 a 3-14. Or, as Aquinas explains: Because each thing is divided
from others by its own form. THOMAS AQUINAS. Sententia Metaphysicae, lib. 7 l. 13 n. 23.