BEATRIZ P.

WASSMER

FACTS: In 1954, Beatriz Wassmer and Francisco Velez arranged their marriage to be held on September 4
of the same year. The bride-to-be has been devoted with all the preparations for their wedding. However,
two days before their marriage, Paking left a note that they must postpone the marriage for his mother
was against it. A day before their wedding, Paking wrote again that the wedding shall push through.
Worse, Paking did not show up on their wedding day causing Wassmer to be publicly humiliated.

The breach of promise to marry made by Velez prompted Wassmer to file a civil suit against the former.
Velez never filed an answer, thus, awarding moral and exemplary damages to Wassmer.

Velez appealed on the court and stated that he failed to attend the wedding day because of fortuitous
events. He also insisted that he cannot be civilly liable for there is no law that acts upon the breach of
promise to marry. He also contested the award of moral and exemplary damages.

ISSUE: Whether or not moral or exemplary damages may be awarded in a breach of promise to marry suit.

HELD: A mere breach of promise to marry is not an actionable wrong. However, Wassmer has already
made preparations for the wedding. Velezs failure to appear on the wedding day is contrary to morals,
good customs and public policy which is embodied on Article 21 of the Civil Code. Under the law, the
injured party is entitled to moral damages as well as to exemplary damages because Velezs acted in
wanton, reckless and oppressive manner (Article 2232) in breaching his promise to marry Wassmer.

BUNAG V. CA

Facts: ConradoBunag, Jr. brought ZenaidaCirilo to a motel where they had sexual intercourse. Later that
evening, said Bunag brought Cirilo to the house of his grandmother in Las Pias, Metro Manila, where
they lived together as husband and wife for 21 days. Soon, Bunag and Cirilo filed their respective
applications for a marriage license with the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Bacoor, Cavite. However,
Bunag left Cirilo and soon filed an affidavit withdrawing his application for a marriage license.

Cirilo claims that she was abducted and raped. One of the cases she filed was a suit for damages based on
a breach of a promise to marry. The trial court decided in her favor. This was affirmed by the CA.

Issue: Should damages be awarded based on a breach of a promise to marry?

Decision: No. In this jurisdiction, we adhere to the time-honored rule that an action for breach of promise
to marry has no standing in the civil law, apart from the right to recover money or property advanced by
the plaintiff upon the faith of such promise. Generally, therefore, a breach of promise to marry per se is
not actionable, except where the plaintiff has actually incurred expenses for the wedding and the
necessary incidents thereof. In this case however, moral damages were awarded based on art. 21 of the
Civil Code which states that any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is
contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for moral damages. As such,
the act of Bunag forcibly abducting Cirilo and having carnal knowledge with her against her will, and
thereafter promising to marry her in order to escape criminal liability, only to thereafter renege on such
promise after cohabiting with her for twenty-one days, irremissibly constitute acts contrary to morals and
good customs. Article 21 was adopted to remedy the countless gaps in the statutes which leave so many
victims of moral wrongs helpless even though they have actually suffered material and moral injury, and
is intended to vouchsafe adequate legal remedy for that untold number of moral wrongs which is
impossible for human foresight to specifically provide for in the statutes. Thus, the damages awarded to
Cirilo were proper.

APOLONIO TANJANCO V. CA and ARACELI SANTOS

FACTS: About December 1997, Apolonio courted Arceli both of adult age. That Apolonio expressed his
undying love affection to Araceli also in due time reciprocated the tender feelings, in consideration of
Apolonio promise of marriage Araceli consented and acceded to Apolonios pleas for carnal knowledge.
Until December 1959, through his protestations of love and promises of marriage, defendant succeeded
in having carnal access to plaintiff, as a result of which the latter conceived a child. Araceli informed
Aplolonio and pleaded with him to make good his promises of marriage but instead of honoring his
promises and righting his wrong, Apolonio stopped and refrained from seeing Araceli since about July
1959 has not visited her and to all intents and purposes has broken their engagement and his promises.

ISSUE: WON man seduced the woman entitling her to the rewards set forth in Art 21.

HELD: No. Plainly there is voluntariness and mutual passion. The facts stand out that for one whole year,
from 1958 to 1959, Araceli, a woman of adult age, maintained intimate sexual relations with Apolonio,
with repeated acts of intercourse. Such conduct is incompatible with the idea of seduction. Hence, the
courts conclude that no case is made under Art. 21 of the Civil Code and no other cause of action being
alleged, no error was committed by the CFI in dismissing the complaint. The decision of CA is reversed and
that of CFI is affirmed.

ART. 21.

Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good
customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.

DE JESUS V SYQUIA

FACTS:

Antonia Loanco, a likely unmarried girl 20 years of age was a cashier in a barber shop owned by the
defendants brother in law Vicente Mendoza. Cesar Syquia, the defendant, 23 years of age and an
unmarried scion of a prominent family in Manila was accustomed to have his haircut in the said barber
shop. He got acquainted with Antonio and had an amorous relationship. As a consequence, Antonia got
pregnant and a baby boy was born on June 17, 1931.

In the early months of Antonias pregnancy, defendant was a constant visitor. On February 1931, he even
wrote a letter to a rev father confirming that the child is his and he wanted his name to be given to the
child. Though he was out of the country, he continuously wrote letters to Antonia reminding her to eat
on time for her and juniors sake. The defendant ask his friend Dr. Talavera to attend at the birth and
hospital arrangements at St. Joseph Hospital in Manila.

After giving birth, Syquia brought Antonia and his child at a House in Camarines Street Manila where they
lived together for about a year. When Antonia showed signs of second pregnancy, defendant suddenly
departed and he was married with another woman at this time.

It should be noted that during the christening of the child, the defendant who was in charge of the
arrangement of the ceremony caused the name Ismael Loanco to be given instead of Cesar Syquia Jr. that
was first planned.

ISSUES:

1. Whether the note to the padre in connection with the other letters written by defendant to Antonia
during her pregnancy proves acknowledgement of paternity.

2. Whether trial court erred in holding that Ismael Loanco had been in the uninterrupted possession of
the status of a natural child, justified by the conduct of the father himself, and that as a consequence, the
defendant in this case should be compelled to acknowledge the said Ismael Loanco.

HELD: The letter written by Syquia to Rev. Father serves as admission of paternity and the other letters
are sufficient to connect the admission with the child carried by Antonia. The mere requirement is that
the writing shall be indubitable.

The law fixes no period during which a child must be in the continuous possession of the status of a
natural child; and the period in this case was long enough to reveal the father's resolution to admit the
status.

Supreme Court held that they agree with the trial court in refusing to provide damages to Antonia Loanco
for supposed breach of promise to marry since action on this has no standing in civil law. Furthermore,
there is no proof upon which a judgment could be based requiring the defendant to recognize the second
baby, Pacita Loanco. Finally, SC found no necessity to modify the judgment as to the amount of
maintenance allowed to Ismael Loanco in the amount of P50 pesos per month. They likewise pointed out
that it is only the trial court who has jurisdiction to modify the order as to the amount of pension.