c




  speculation, surmises or conjectures; 2) when the inference made is manifestly
mistaken, absurd or impossible; 3) where there is a grave abuse of discretion; 4)
    
c  when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; and 5) &  


# ()$ #
$ (&

   
#  
 
As provided for in Section 4 of Rule 129 of the Rules of Court, the general 

 
 
 
#
 
*+
,  -
rule that a judicial admission is conclusive upon the party making it and
. (m
(
  
- The petitioner, however, has not demonstrated the
does not require proof admits of two exceptions: 1) when it is shown that
the admission was made through palpable mistake, and 2) when it is applicability of any of the foregoing exceptions to the case at bar.
shown that no such admission was in fact made. The latter exception
allows one to contradict an admission by denying that he made such an  /0
 !1
admission.
REMEDIAL LAW; RULES ON EVIDENCE; ADMISSIONS; DESCRIPTION OF LAND IN
RESPONDENTS' COMPLAINT BINDS THEM WHERE NO PALPABLE MISTAKE HAS BEEN
For instance, if a party invokes an "admission" by an adverse
party, but cites the admission "out of context," then the one SHOWN. Ͷ "A parcel of residential land with a superficial area of 1120 square
making the admission may show that he made no "such" meters, more or less. Bounded on the North by Saturnino Fernandez; on the East by
admission, or that his admission was taken out of context. Joaquin Mararac; on the South by Camino Vecinal; and on the West by Ciriaco
Manlincon. Its visible limits are earth dikes and bamboo fences on all sides.
This may be interpreted as to mean "not in the sense in which the Declared in the name of Leonardo Mararac under Tax Declaration No. 17620 with
admission is made to appear." That is the reason for the modifier an assessment value of P2,020.00 for the current year. Not registered under Act
"such."21
496 or under the Spanish Mortgage Law." We, therefore, apply Section 2, Rule 129
of the Rules of Court which provides: "Admissions made by the parties in the
In this case, the letter, although part of Estrada͛s Complaint, is not, ipso facto, an
admission of the statements contained therein, especially since the bone of pleadings, or in the course of the trial or proceedings do not require proof and
contention relates to Estrada͛s entitlement to commissions for the sale of health cannot be contradicted unless previously shown to have been made through
plans she claims to have brokered. It is more than obvious from the entirety of the palpable mistake." No such palpable mistake has been shown. Evidence militates
records that Estrada has unequivocally and consistently declared that her against the respondents' contention that the above description does not bind them.
involvement as broker is the proximate cause which consummated the sale The description was merely copied from the deed of sale between the property
between Meralco and Maxicare. original owners and the petitioners when the self-same document was presented
22 by the respondents as their own evidence, marked as Exhibit B, of the petitioner's
Moreover, Section 34, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court requires the purpose for
Declaration of Property for Tax Purposes which contains the assessor's official
which the evidence is offered to be specified. Undeniably, the letter was attached
to the Complaint, and offered in evidence, to demonstrate Maxicare͛s bad faith and finding and classification that the land covered by the declaration is residential.
23
ill will towards Estrada.
2
 0.' !33
Ñ 




   !" 
EVIDENCE; FACTS ALLEGED IN A PARTY'S PLEADING DEEMED ADMISSIONS; HOW
Stated elsewise, the petitioner, in essence and more precisely, wants this Court to PROBATIVE VALUE OF ADMISSIONS DETERMINED. Ͷ The rule that facts alleged in a
overturn the rule that the #
$ 
##



#  party's pleading are deemed admissions of that party and binding upon it is not

 %
&
' 
 (Uy vs. J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc., 31 absolute and inflexible. Every admission is to be taken as an entirety of the fact
SCRA 121 [1970]; Roque vs. Buan, 21 SCRA 642 [1967]). It is true that the foregoing which makes for the one side with the qualifications which limit, modify or destroy
rule admits of certain defined exceptions: "the findings of fact made by the Court of its effect on the other side. The reason is that where part of a statement of a party
Appeals may be set aside: 1) when the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on is used against him as an admission, the court should consider and weigh any other
portion connected with the statement which tends to neutralize or explain the
portion which is against interest. In other words, while the admission is admissible
in evidence, its probative value is to be determined from the whole statement and
others intimately related or connected therewith as an integrated unit, for although
+

 
   $  !4
acts or facts admitted do not require proof and cannot be contradicted, evidence
aliunde can be presented to show that the admission was made through palpable
mistake. (Irlandia vs. Pitargue, 22 Phil., 383.)
2. PLEADING AND PRACTICE; AMENDMENT OF COMPLAINT UPON
PLAINTIFF'S MISTAKEN BELIEF; LIBERAL CONSTRUCTION OF THE RULES. Ͷ From the
pleadings filed by the parties it clearly appears that the cause of action stated in the
original complaint was against the defendants therein for payment of the loans
which they obtained in their individual and personal capacity, as evidenced by the
promissory notes, and not as representatives of their parents, as later alleged in the

.)
 ! "
amended complaint. In filing the amended complaint the plaintiff had acted
through a mistaken belief that the allegation therein, to the effect that the
defendants named in the original complaint were being sued as representatives of
their parents, did not constitute an amendment of its cause of action, and this
matter was made known to the court and the defendants when in its reply to the
motion to dismiss it stated that it "has no document or evidence in its possession to
hold the spouses Matias and Cristeta Granada liable to the payment of the
accounts." The plaintiff honestly relied on the belief that the original defendants
had the necessary evidence to establish the fact. Guided by the provisions of the
Rules of Court to the effect that the rules shall be liberally construed to promote
their object and to assist the parties in obtaining just, speedy and inexpensive
determination of every action and proceeding, the amended complaint may be
treated as stating two or more statements of a claim in a single cause of action,
which is permitted under Section 9, Rule 15, or it may be considered as including
several defendants in the alternative against any of which the plaintiff may be
entitled to seek relief, a course of action sanctioned by Section 13, Rule 3.
  
  !1 questioned. (Cf. 144 U.S., 751; 97 Ala., 491 2; 31 Cyc., 333-337; 6 Encyc. Pl. & Pr.,
PLEADING AND PRACTICE; PARTY CONCLUDED BY ALLEGATIONS AND ADMISSIONS
IN HIS PLEADING. Ͷ S is bound by his own petition and by the court's adjudication
of his claim made in consonance with his prayer. A party can not trifle with a court's
decision or order which he himself sought with full awareness of his rights under
the premises, by taking it or leaving it at pleasure. The allegations, statements, or
admissions contained in a pleading are conclusive as against the pleader. A party
cannot subsequently take a position contradictory of, or inconsistent with, his
pleadings.
c
PLEADING AND PRACTICE; ADMISSION MADE IN PLEADINGS CONCLUSIVE. Ͷ It is a
familiar doctrine that an admission made in the pleadings cannot be controverted
by the party making such admission and are conclusive as to him, and that all proofs
submitted by him contrary thereto or inconsistent with, the same should be
ignored, whether objection is interposed or not (Cunanan vs. Amparo, 80 Phil., 227;
Ramirez vs. Orientalist, 38 Phil., 634; McDaniel vs. Apacible, 44 Phil., 248; see also
section 7, Rule 123, Rules of Court; Francisco, Rules of Court Anno., Vol. VI, p. 195;
Comments on the Rules of Court, Moran, Vol. 2, 57 Ed., p. 66-67).
5. 
A general admission of the truth of the allegations set forth in a pleading is not an
admission of the truth of an impossible conclusion of fact drawn from other facts
set out in the pleading, nor of a wrong conclusion of law based on the allegations of
fact well pleaded, nor of the truth of a general averment of facts contradicted by
more specific averments. Thus, if a pleader alleges that two pesos were borrowed
on one day and two more borrowed on another making five Pin all, a stipulation of
the truth of the allegations in the pleading does not amount to an admission by the
opposing party that twice two make five. Again if a pleader alleges that one
hundred pesos were loaned without interest for one year and had not been paid,
and that the borrower is indebted to the lender in the sum of one hundred and ten
pesos, that being the amount of the capital together with interest for the year for
which the money was loaned, a stipulation as to the truth of the allegation set forth
in the pleadings is not an admission of the truth of the conclusion of law as to the
interest due by the borrower. These elementary principles have been quite fully
developed in a great variety of cases arising on demurrers, and sufficiently dispose
of the attempt of counsel to fix the attention of the court upon this single averment
of the answer, apart from the context and to the exclusion of the specific
allegations of fact, the truth of which, as stipulated by the parties, cannot be
334-338.)
One other contention of counsel for the appellant remains to be considered. It is
that on which his fourth assignment of error is based. Counsel insist that "assuming
that article 1865 is applicable to the transaction in question, the court erred in
holding that the plaintiff did not waive any defect in the private instrument of
pledge by expressly admitting its genuineness and the correctness of its date by
stipulation, and by failure to object to its introduction in evidence."
This contention rests on a misconception of the real purpose and object of the
provisions of article 1865 of the code. This article is not a mere rule of adjective law,
prescribing the mode whereby proof may be made of the date of a contract of
pledge. It is a rule of substantive law, prescribing a condition without which the
execution of a pledge contract cannot affect third person adversely.
+  6'
 
7% 

on a proper showing and under an order of the trial court, an ocular inspection of
the body of the accused is permissible. The proviso is that torture or force shall be
avoided. Whether facts fall within or without the rule with its corollary and proviso
must, of course, be decided as cases arise.
It is a reasonable presumption that in an examination by reputable and
disinterested physicians due care will be taken not to use violence and not to
embarrass the patient any more than is absolutely necessary. Indeed, no objection
to the physical examination being made by the family doctor of the accused or by
doctor of the same sex can be seen.

 c' !3

 5
The strongest evidence against Felicisimo Jara are the extra-judicial confessions of
For one, although there was an absence of external injuries on the body of the his two co-accused. Bernadas and Vergara point to Jara as the one who bludgeoned
the two victims with a hammer and then used a pair of scissors in inflicting the stab
complainant, the clothes worn by her at the time of the offense speak well of the
wounds. He was also alleged to have offered them P1,000.00 each if they would
use of force and the presence of a struggle. As the trial court noted:
help him in the killing of his wife.
"Her T-shirt was torn which corroborates her testimony that it was forcibly
However, since the confessions of Bernadas and Vergara are inadmissible against
removed. It also proves that she offered resistance to the criminal advances of the
them, with more reason can they not be used against Jarahanr
accused. Her shorts, like her panty, had blood stains. Her panty was detached from
her shorts. Her bra was torn, also denoting that it was forcibly removed. These Apart from the above extra-judicial confessions, other circumstantial evidence was

 
 . . . are consistent only with the force and compulsion applied on presented to support a verdict of conviction. Would such evidence in the absence of
her; they prove she offered resistance and her defloration was against her will." the extrajudicial confessions be sufficient to overturn the presumption of innocence
(Rollo, p. 27) in favor of the accused Jara? chanrobles virtual law l

The hammer used in the killing is an instrument with which appellant Jara is
familiar. It was proven during the trial of the case that the hammer with the letter
8#
 '  ' ! "A" on its handle which was one of the instruments used in the perpetration of the
crime belonged to Luisa Jara who had kept it at Aileen's Canteen where her
Torture force shall be avoided. On a proper showing and under an order of the trial husband, appellant Jara helped as cook.
court, an ocular inspection of the body of the accused is permissible.
Rule 133, Section 5 of the Rules of Court provides:
Fully conscious that we are resolving a most extreme case in a sense, which on first
impression is a shock to one's sensibilities, we must nevertheless enforce the uircumstantial evidence, when sufficient. - Circumstantial
constitutional provision in this jurisdiction in accord with the policy and reason evidence is sufficient for conviction if: chanrobles
thereof, undeterred by merely sentimental influences. Once' again we lay down the
rule that the constitutional guaranty, that no person shall be compelled in any (a) There is more than one circumstance; chanrobles
criminal case to be a witness against himself, is limited to a prohibition against
compulsory testimonial self-incrimination. The corollary to the proposition is that,
 (b) The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven;
 + 9
and chanrobles
(c) The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce
a conviction beyond a reasonable doubt. (See People v. Duero,
136 SCRA 515).
Circumstantial evidence, as a basis for conviction of crime, should be acted on and
weighed with great caution, particularly where the crime is heinous and the penalty
is death, as in the instant cases. In determining the sufficiency of circumstantial
evidence to support a conviction, each case is to be determined on its own peculiar
circumstances and all of the facts and circumstances are to be considered together
as a whole, and, when so considered, may be sufficient to support a conviction,
although one or more of the facts taken separately would not be sufficient for this
purpose. (23 CJS p. 555). No general rule has been formulated as to the quantity of
circumstantial evidence which wig suffice for any case, but that matters not. For all
that is required is that the circumstances proved must be consistent with each
other, and at the same time inconsistent with the hypothesis that he is innocent
and with every other rational hypothesis except that of guilt. (People v. Contante,
12 SCRA 653).
:
 

The requirements for circumstantial evidence to sustain a conviction are present in
this case. The aforementioned circumstances constitute an unbroken chain leading
6(. 
+ 
to one fair and reasonable conclusion which points to the guilt of the accused
qqqjara beyond reasonable doubt (See US v. Villos, 6 Phil. 510; People v. Subano, 73
 +
 $  !"4
Phil. 692). Mere denials of the accused as to his participation in the crime are only
self-serving negative evidence which cannot outweigh circumstantial evidence
clearly establishing his active participation in the crime.
The defense of alibi given by the accused Jara is weak. Aside from himself, the only
person who vouched for his presence at some place away from the scene of the
crime was his stepdaughter from whom he had sought abode. Hence, the alibi is
made more dubious considering that no other credible persons were presented
who would, in the natural order of things be best situated to support the tendered
alibi (People v. Cabanit, 139 SCRA 94, citing People v. Brioso, 37 SCRA 336; People v.
Bagasala, 39 SCRA 236; People v. Carino, 55 SCRA 516). More importantly, the
defense of alibi cannot prosper because it is not enough to prove that defendant
was somewhere else when the crime was committed. He must, likewise,
demonstrate that it was physically impossible for him to have been at the scene of
the crime at that time (People v. Alcantara, 33 SCRA 812). Such proof is wanting in
this case. virtu


Jurisprudence is to the effect that, for rape to be consummated, rupture of the
hymen is not necessary, nor is it necessary that the vagina sustained a laceration
(People vs. Lazaro, 249 SCRA 234, 238-239). Besides, vaginal bleeding was never an
element of the crime of rape People vs. Lazaro, supra, p. 241).
"Although the NBI medico-legal officer did admit that the trauma found on the
victim may have been caused by masturbation, the same officer initially said that it
could be caused by sexual intercourse (TSN, January 25, 1995, p. 12). The victim's
testimony coupled with the above-mentioned medical findings plus the
corroborative testimony of Mr. Benigno Dela Cruz who saw the victim running away
from appellant (TSN, November 25, 1994, pp. 25-37 and 39) render such testimony
very credible.
The absence of any external injuries on the victim, therefore, cannot erode her
credibility nor will it weaken her testimony that appellant threatened her with a
screw driver and a gun.
+  6( 
+  6('
;5
15. 2
ometime in the month of November, 1967, defendants, Antonio Lim Tanhu, by
means of fraud deceit and misrepresentations did then and there, induce and
convince the plaintiff to execute a quitclaim of all her rights and interests, in the
assets of the partnership of Glory uommercial uompany, which is null and void,
executed through fraud and without any legal effect. The original of said quitclaim is
in the possession of the adverse party defendant Antonio Lim Tanhu.
efendants maintain in their counterclaim that plaintiff knew of the falsity of said
allegations even before she filed her complaint, for she had in fact admitted her
common-law relationship with said deceased in a document she had jointly
executed with him by way of agreement to terminate their illegitimate relationship,
for which she received P40,000 from the deceased, and with respect to her
pretended share in the capital and profits in the partnership, it is also defendants'
posture that she had already quitclaimed, with the assistance of able counsel,
whatever rights if any she had thereto in November, 1967, for the sum of P25,000
duly receipted by her, which quitclaim was, however, executed, according to
respondent herself in her amended complaint, through fraud. And having filed her
complaint knowing, according to defendants, as she ought to have known, that the
material allegations thereof are false and baseless, she has caused them to suffer
damages. Undoubtedly, with such allegations, defendants' counterclaim is
compulsory, not only because the same evidence to sustain it will also refute the
cause or causes of action alleged in plaintiff's complaint, (Moran, supra p. 352) but
also because from its very nature, it is obvious that the same cannot "remain
pending for independent adjudication by the court." (Section 2, Rule 17.) ch
henever it appears to the court in the course of a proceeding that an indispensable
party has not been joined, it is the duty of the court to stop the trial and to order
the inclusion of such party. (The Revised Rules of Court, Annotated & Commented
by Senator Vicente J. Francisco, Vol. 1, p. 271, 1973 ed. See also Cortez vs. Avila,
101 Phil. 705.) Such an order is unavoidable, for the "general rule with reference to
the making of parties in a civil action requires the joinder of all necessary parties
wherever possible, and the joinder of all indispensable parties under any and all
conditions, the presence of those latter being a sine qua non of the exercise of
judicial power." (Borlasa vs. Polistico, 47 Phil. 345, at p. 347.) It is precisely " when
an indispensable party is not before the court (that) the action should be
dismissed." (People v. Rodriguez, 106 Phil. 325, at p. 327.) The absence of an
indispensable party renders all subsequent actuations of the court null and void, for
want of authority to act, not only as to the absent parties but even as to those
present. In short, what respondent court did here was exactly the reverse of what
the law ordains - it eliminated those who by law should precisely be joined.
The sum and total of all the foregoing disquisitions is that the decision here in
question is legally anomalous. It is predicated on two fatal malactuations of
respondent court namely (1) the dismissal of the complaint against the non-
defaulted defendants Lim and Leonardo and (2) the ex-parte reception of the
evidence of the plaintiff by the clerk of court, the subsequent using of the same as
basis for its judgment and the rendition of such
judgment.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
For at least three reasons which We have already fully discussed above, the order of
dismissal of October 21, 1974 is unworthy of Our sanction: (1) there was no timely
notice of the motion therefor to the non-defaulted defendants, aside from there
being no notice at all to herein petitioners; (2) the common answer of the
defendants, including the non-defaulted, contained a compulsory counterclaim
incapable of being determined in an independent action; and (3) the immediate
effect of such dismissal was the removal of the two non-defaulted defendants as
parties, and inasmuch as they are both indispensable parties in the case, the court
consequently lost the" sine qua non of the exercise of judicial power", per Borlasa
vs. Polistico, supra. This is not to mention anymore the irregular delegation to the
clerk of court of the function of receiving plaintiff's evidence. And as regards the ex-
parte reception of plaintiff's evidence and subsequent rendition of the judgment by
default based thereon, We have seen that it was violative of the right of the
petitioners, under the applicable rules and principles on default, to a common and
single fate with their non-defaulted co-defendants. And We are not yet referring, as
We shall do this anon to the numerous reversible errors in the decision
itself.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
It is to be noted, however, that the above-indicated two fundamental flaws in
respondent court's actuations do not call for a common corrective remedy. We
cannot simply rule that all the impugned proceedings are null and void and should
be set aside, without being faced with the insurmountable obstacle that by so doing
We would be reviewing the case as against the two non-defaulted defendants who
are not before Us not being parties hereto. Upon the other hand, for Us to hold that
the order of dismissal should be allowed to stand, as contended by respondents
themselves who insist that the same is already final, not only because the period for
its finality has long passed but also because allegedly, albeit not very accurately,
said 'non-defaulted defendants unsuccessfully tried to have it set aside by the Court
of Appeals whose decision on their petition is also already final, We would have to
disregard whatever evidence had been presented by the plaintiff against them and,
of course, the findings of respondent court based thereon which, as the assailed
decision shows, are adverse to them. In other words, whichever of the two
apparent remedies the Court chooses, it would necessarily entail some kind of
possible juridical imperfection. Speaking of their respective practical or pragmatic
effects, to annul the dismissal would inevitably prejudice the rights of the non-
defaulted defendants whom We have not heard and who even respondents would
not wish to have anything anymore to do with the case. On the other hand, to
include petitioners in the dismissal would naturally set at naught every effort
private respondent has made to establish or prove her case thru means sanctioned
by respondent court. In short, We are confronted with a legal para-dilemma. But
one thing is certain - this difficult situations has been brought about by none other
than private respondent who has quite cynically resorted to procedural maneuvers
without realizing that the technicalities of the adjective law, even when apparently
accurate from the literal point of view, cannot prevail over the imperatives of the
substantive law and of equity that always underlie them and which have to be
inevitably considered in the construction of the pertinent procedural
rules.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
All things considered, after careful and mature deliberation, the Court has arrived at
the conclusion that as between the two possible alternatives just stated, it would
only be fair, equitable and proper to uphold the position of petitioners. In other
words, We rule that the order of dismissal of October 21, 1974 is in law a dismissal
of the whole case of the plaintiff, including as to petitioners herein. Consequently,
all proceedings held by respondent court subsequent thereto including and
principally its decision of December 20, 1974 are illegal and should be set aside.
The fundamental purpose of pre-trial, aside from affording the parties every
opportunity to compromise or settle their differences, is for the court to be
apprised of the unsettled issues between the parties and of their respective
evidence relative thereto, to the end that it may take corresponding measures that
would abbreviate the trial as much as possible and the judge may be able to
ascertain the facts with the least observance of technical rules. In other words
whatever is said or done by the parties or their counsel at the pre- trial serves to
put the judge on notice of their respective basic positions, in order that in
appropriate cases he may, if necessary in the interest of justice and a more accurate
determination of the facts, make inquiries about or require clarifications of matters
taken up at the pre-trial, before finally resolving any issue of fact or of law. In brief,
the pre-trial constitutes part and parcel of the proceedings, and hence, matters
dealt with therein may not be disregarded in the process of decision making.
Otherwise, the real essence of compulsory pre-trial would be insignificant and
worthless.
Under Article 55 of the Civil Code, the declaration of the contracting parties that
they take each other as husband and wife "shall be set forth in an instrument"
signed by the parties as well as by their witnesses and the person solemnizing the
marriage. Accordingly, the primary evidence of a marriage must be an authentic
copy of the marriage contract. While a marriage may also be proved by other
competent evidence, the absence of the contract must first be satisfactorily
explained. Surely, the certification of the person who allegedly solemnized a
marriage is not admissible evidence of such marriage unless proof of loss of the
contract or of any other satisfactory reason for its non-production is first presented
to the court. In the case at bar, the purported certification issued by a Mons. Jose
M. Recoleto, Bishop, Philippine Independent Church, Cebu City, is not, therefore,
competent evidence, there being absolutely no showing as to unavailability of the
marriage contract and, indeed, as to the authenticity of the signature of said
certifier, the jurat allegedly signed by a second assistant provincial fiscal not being
authorized by law, since it is not part of the functions of his office. Besides,
inasmuch as the bishop did not testify, the same is
hearsay.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
As regards the testimony of plaintiff herself on the same point and that of her
witness Antonio Nuñez, there can be no question that they are both self-serving
and of very little evidentiary value, it having been disclosed at the trial that plaintiff
has already assigned all her rights in this case to said Nuñez, thereby making him
the real party in interest here and, therefore, naturally as biased as herself. Besides,
in the portion of the testimony of Nuñez copied in Annex C of petitioner's
memorandum, it appears admitted that he was born only on March 25, 1942, which
means that he was less than eight years old at the supposed time of the alleged
marriage. If for this reason alone, it is extremely doubtful if he could have been
sufficiently aware of such event as to be competent to testify about
it.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Incidentally, another Annex C of the same memorandum purports to be the
certificate of birth of one Antonio T. Uy supposed to have been born on March 23,
1937 at Centro Misamis, Misamis Occidental, the son of one Uy Bien, father, and
Tan Put, mother. Significantly, respondents have not made any adverse comment
on this document. It is more likely, therefore, that the witness is really the son of
plaintiff by her husband Uy Kim Beng. But she testified she was childless. So which
is which? In any event, if on the strength of this document, Nuñez is actually the
legitimate son of Tan Put and not her adopted son, he would have been but 13
years old in 1949, the year of her alleged marriage to Po Chuan, and even then,
considering such age, his testimony in regard thereto would still be
suspect.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Now, as against such flimsy evidence of plaintiff, the court had before it, two
documents of great weight belying the pretended marriage. We refer to (1) Exhibit
LL, the income tax return of the deceased Tee Hoon Lim Po Chuan indicating that
the name of his wife was Ang Sick Tin and (2) the quitclaim, Annex A of the answer,
wherein plaintiff Tan Put stated that she had been living with the deceased without
benefit of marriage and that she was his "common-law wife". Surely, these two
documents are far more reliable than all the evidence of the plaintiff put
together.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Of course, Exhibit LL is what might be termed as pre-trial evidence. But it is
evidence offered to the judge himself, not to the clerk of court, and should have at
least moved him to ask plaintiff to explain if not rebut it before jumping to the
conclusion regarding her alleged marriage to the deceased, Po Chuan. And in regard
to the quitclaim containing the admission of a common-law relationship only, it is to
be observed that His Honor found that "defendants Lim Tanhu and Ng Sua had the
plaintiff execute a quitclaim on November 29, 1967 (Annex "A", Answer) where
they gave plaintiff the amount of P25,000 as her share in the capital and profits of
the business of Glory Commercial Co. which was engaged in the hardware
business", without making mention of any evidence of fraud and misrepresentation
in its execution, thereby indicating either that no evidence to prove that allegation
of the plaintiff had been presented by her or that whatever evidence was actually
offered did not produce persuasion upon the court. Stated differently, since the
existence of the quitclaim has been duly established without any circumstance to
detract from its legal import, the court should have held that plaintiff was bound by
her admission therein that she was the common-law wife only of Po Chuan and
what is more, that she had already renounced for valuable consideration whatever
claim she might have relative to the partnership Glory Commercial
Co.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
And when it is borne in mind that in addition to all these considerations, there are
mentioned and discussed in the memorandum of petitioners (1) the certification of
the Local Civil Registrar of Cebu City and (2) a similar certification of the Apostolic
Prefect of the Philippine Independent Church, Parish of Sto. Niño, Cebu City, that
their respective official records corresponding to December 1949 to December
1950 do not show any marriage between Tee Hoon Lim Po Chuan and Tan Put,
neither of which certifications have been impugned by respondent until now, it
stands to reason that plaintiff's claim of marriage is really unfounded. Withal, there
is still another document, also mentioned and discussed in the same memorandum
and unimpugned by respondents, a written agreement executed in Chinese, but
purportedly translated into English by the Chinese Consul of Cebu, between Tan Put
and Tee Hoon Lim Po Chuan to the following effect:
CONSULATE OF THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA Cebu City, Philippines
chanrobles virtual law library
T R A N S L A T I O N chanrobles virtual law library
Signed on the 10 day of the 7th month of the 54th year of the
Republic of China (corresponding to the year
1965).chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
(SGD) TAN KI ENG chanrobles virtual law library
Verified from the records. JORGE TABAR (Pp. 283-284, Record.)
Indeed, not only does this document prove that plaintiff's relation to the deceased
was that of a common-law wife but that they had settled their property interests
with the payment to her of P40,000.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary chanrobles virtual
law library
In the light of all these circumstances, We find no alternative but to hold that
plaintiff Tan Put's allegation that she is the widow of Tee Hoon Lim Po Chuan has
not been satisfactorily established and that, on the contrary, the evidence on
record convincingly shows that her relation with said deceased was that of a
common-law wife and furthermore, that all her claims against the company and its
surviving partners as well as those against the estate of the deceased have already
been settled and paid. We take judicial notice of the fact that the respective
counsel who assisted the parties in the quitclaim, Attys. H. Hermosisima and Natalio
Castillo, are members in good standing of the Philippine Bar, with the particularity
that the latter has been a member of the Cabinet and of the House of
Representatives of the Philippines, hence, absent any credible proof that they had
allowed themselves to be parties to a fraudulent document His Honor did right in
recognizing its existence, albeit erring in not giving due legal significance to its
contents.chanroblesvirtu

This is to certify that 1, Miss Tan Ki Eng Alias Tan Put, have lived 

#7$:
 +  6( 
1
with Mr. Lim Po Chuan alias TeeHoon since 1949 but it recently
occurs that we are incompatible with each other and are not in 
 ;
 ( !3
the position to keep living together permanently. With the mutual
concurrence, we decided to terminate the existing relationship of Now, turning to defendant's sole assignment of error, namely, that the Trial Court
common law-marriage and promised not to interfere each other's erred in declaring defendant liable in the amount of P166,867.20 representing the
affairs from now on. The Forty Thousand Pesos (P40,000.00) has amount covered by bills of lading where the originals had been presented.
been given to me by Mr. Lim Po Chuan for my
subsistence.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary chanrobles virtual law With respect to defendant's sole assignment of errors, namely, that Court a quo
library
erred in declaring defendant liable in the amount of P166,867.28 which represents
charges for freight where the originals of the bills of lading were not submitted, We
Witnesses: chanrobles virtual law library
find merit in the contention of plaintiff that the respondent Court correctly held
Mr. Lim Beng Guan Mr. Huang Sing Se chanrobles virtual law defendant liable for said amount because the same actually represented freight
library charges based on the carbon originals of the ship's copy of the bills of lading where
Limson appeared as consignee in the amount of P84,529.42 and those based on the defendant 235,007.85
ship's cargo manifests, where defendant appeared as consignee in the amount of
P81,874.10. Respondent Court admitted in evidence said copies of the bills of lading (3) Freight adjustment 1,138.45
which were not considered by the Commissioner because they are not actually the
(4) Cost of foodstuffs purchased
original copy of the bill of lading. The Commissioner accepted only the originals of
the bills of lading because he did not consider even duplicate originals duly signed from defendant 411,982.35
as originals. The ship's copies of the bills of lading and the cargo manifests were
substantiated by other supporting documents which were found after the report of ͶͶͶͶͶͶ
the Commissioner from among the records salvaged from the San Nicolas bodega
Total P759,419.83
fire or which were found among the records kept on plaintiff's terminal office. Said
documents were presented in lieu of corresponding original of the consignee's copy ==========
of bill of lading which could not be submitted to the Commissioner nor presented as
plaintiff's evidence to the Court because they were lost or destroyed during the would show a balance in favor of defendant of P61,260.69.
remodelling of plaintiff's office building or during the fire at plaintiff's bodega at San
Nicolas where they were brought for safekeeping. All said documents were Presented otherwise, the total freight charges due plaintiff after deducting the
presented as evidence to prove that all the freight charges for the shipments rebate to which defendant is entitled to is P586,867.96. (.698,159.14 minus
evidence thereby were duly earned by plaintiff and were properly debited in P111,291.18).
defendant's charge account. Apparently, the Commissioner rejected plaintiff's
Against said freight charges of P586,867.96 defendant should be credited:
claims which were not actually supported by the original of the bills of lading
notwithstanding the fact that duplicate original of the said documents and other (1) Cash payment P235,007.85
secondary evidence such as the ship cargo manifests have been presented as
evidence. As stated above, witnesses Cabling and Ilagan testified that the practice (2) Freight adjustment 1,138.45
was that when the originals of the bills of lading could not be surrendered because
(3) Cost of foodstuffs P411,982.35
they have not yet been received by the consignee, the delivery of the cargo was
nevertheless authorized and a delivery receipt was prepared on the basis of the ͶͶͶͶͶͶ
ship's cargo manifests or the ship's copy of the bills of lading. This only shows that
the ship's cargo manifests or the ship's copy of the bills of lading can be accepted as Total P648,128.65
evidence of shipments made by defendant since he was allowed to accept delivery
of said shipments even without presenting his copy of the bill of lading. ==========

By way of recapitulation, the total of freight charges due plaintiff based on the giving a balance in favor of defendant of P61,260.69.
freight charges appearing on the face of the bills of lading supporting the statement
 
#$ +  $  !6 
of account attached to the complaint is P698,159.14. Deduct from said amount the
following: The petitioner contends that the exhibits in question are the best evidence of the
libel, the subject matter of the information, and should therefore be admitted;
(1) Rebate P111,291.18
while the respondents maintain that, inasmuch as the libelous articles were not
(2) Cash payments made by quoted in the information, said evidence cannot be admitted without amending the
information. The prosecution asked for an amendment to the information, but the
court denied the petition on the ground that it would impair the rights of the
defendant, holding that the omission of the libelous article in the original was fatal
to the prosecution.
The first question raised here is whether an information charging a libel published
in an unofficial language, without including a copy of the libelous article, but only a
translation into Spanish, is valid or not. It is true that in United States vs. Eguia and
Lozano (38 Phil., 857), it was stated: "The general rule is that the complaint or
information for libel must set out the particular defamatory words as published,
amounts to an abuse of that discretion, which may be controlled by this court by
means of mandamus proceedings. In so far as the jurisdiction of this court is
concerned, we believe the doctrine is applicable which was held in Orient Insurance
Co. vs. Revilla and Teal Motor Co. (54 Phil., 919), namely, that the Supreme Court
has jurisdiction to entertain an application for a writ of mandamus to compel a
Court of First Instance to permit the attorney of a litigant to examine the entire
written communication, when part of the same has been introduced in evidence by
the other party.
and a statement of their substance and effect is usually considered insufficient." But
 5c  !4!
this general rule does not exclude certain exceptions, such as, cases where the libel
is published in a non-official language. "When the defamation has been published in
a foreign tongue, it is proper, and in general, necessary, to set out the
communication as it was originally made, with an exact translation into English; and
if from the translation no cause of action appears, it is immaterial that the foreign
words were actionable. In some jurisdictions, however, under the influence of the
liberality of laws on practice, it is held unnecessary to set out the communication in
the foreign language in which it is alleged to have been published, so long as the
foreign publication is alleged, with an English translation attached." (37 C. J., 27,
sec. 336.)
If the libelous article had been published in one of our official languages, English or
Spanish, it would have been necessary to follow the general rule; but since the
article in question was published in the Pampango dialect, it is sufficient to insert a
Spanish translation in the information. The justice of this exception to the general
rule becomes more evident if we consider a libelous article published, for instance,
in Moro or Chinese, who use characters different from our own.
The second question refers to the admissibility of the aforesaid exhibits. The
general rules regarding the admissibility of evidence are applicable to cases of libel
or slander. The evidence must be relevant, and not hearsay. (37 C.J., 151, sec. 688.)
This being so, the rule of procedure which requires the production of the best
evidence, is applicable to the present case. And certainly the copies of the weekly
where the libelous article was published, and its translation, constitute the best
evidence of the libel charged. The newspaper itself is the best evidence of an article
published in it. (Bond vs. Central Bank of Georgia, 2 Ga., 92.)
The respondent judge undoubtedly has discretion to admit or reject the evidence
offered by the fiscal; but in the instant case his refusal to admit such evidence

EVIDENCE; ADMISSIBILITY OF DUPLICATE ORIGINAL WITHOUT THE PRODUCTION OF
ORIGINAL. Ͷ If the documents or papers to be introduced in evidence were
produced by the use of carbon sheets, and which thereby produced a facsimile of
the originals including the figures and the signatures on the originals, they are
regarded as duplicate originals and may be introduced as such, even without
accounting for the non-production of the other originals.
In Criminal Case No. 36885 of the Court of First Instance of Manila, respondents
Pacita Madrigal-Gonzales and others are charged with the crime of falsification of
public documents, in their capacities as public officials and employees, by having
made it appear that certain relief supplies and/or merchandise were purchased by
Pacita Madrigal-Gonzales for distribution to calamity indigents or sufferers, in such
quantities and at such prices and from such business establishments or persons as
are made to appear in the said public documents, when in fact and in truth, no such
distributions of such relief and supplies as valued and supposedly purchased by said
Pacita Madrigal Gonzalez in the public and official documents had ever been made.
The admissibility of duplicates or triplicates has long been a settled question and we
need not elaborate on the reasons for the rule. This matter has received
consideration from the foremost commentator on the Rules of Court thus:
"When carbon sheets are inserted between two or more sheets of writing paper so
that the writing of a contract upon the outside sheet, including the signature of the
party to be charged thereby, produces facsimile upon the sheets beneath, such
signature being thus reproduced by the same stroke of the pen which made the
surface or exposed impression, all of the sheets so written on are regarded as
duplicate originals and either of them may be introduced in evidence as such
without accounting for the nonproduction of the others.' (Moran, 1952 ed., p. 444.)
It has also been decided in favor of the petitioner by Us in the case of People vs.
Quinones, 44 Off. Gaz., No. 5, 1520, 1525, thus:
"It is argued in the second assignment of error that the confession Exhibit B is not
admissible because it is merely a carbon copy. The said confession Exhibit B, being
carbon copy of the original and bearing as it does the signature of the appellant, is
admissible in evidence and possess all the probative value of the original, and the
same does not require an accounting for the non-production of the original. (Sec.
47, Rule 123, Rules of Court)".
Two principal authors on the law on evidence have sustained the theory of th
admissibility of duplicate originals, as follows:
"SEC. 386. . . . the best evidence rule is that rule which requires the highest
grade of evidence obtainable to prove a disputed fact p. 616. A "duplicate sales slip'
(People vs. Stone, 349 Ill. 52, 181 N. E. 648) has been held to be primary evidence,
p. 616.
"SEC. 420. Duplicate originals. Ͷ Where letters are produced by mechanical
means and, concurrently with the original, duplicate are produced, as by placing
carbon paper between sheets of writing on the exposed surface at the same time,
all are duplicate originals, and any one of them may be introduced in evidence
without accounting for the nonproduction of the other.
"SEC. 100. Carbon copies, however, when made at the same time and on the
same machine as the original, are duplicate originals, and these have been held to
be as much primary evidence as the originals.
We find that the ruling of the court below to the effect that the triplicates formed
by the used of carbon papers are not admissible in evidence, without accounting
first for the loss of the originals is incorrect and must be reversed. The court below
is hereby ordered to proceed in the trial of the case in accordance with this ruling.

  
 c 6( !33 judicial decree of adoption. The thrust of petitioner's evidence is rather to establish
'


(+ 4(3(" an admitted illegitimate child was the very basis of his petition for intervention in
'
+  6('
1
4
;9 
c  !"! hearsay, are admitted on the principle that they are natural expressions of persons
." The certification of the Local Civil Registrar of Manila "(T)hat our pre-war records
relative to decisions of the Court of First Instance were either destroyed or burned
during the Liberation of the City of Manila," does not furnish any legal basis for a
presumption of adoption in favor of petitioner. This is because there was no proof
that petitioner was really adopted in Manila or that an adoption petition was filed
in the Court of First Instance of Manila by the deceased spouses, where, after
hearing, a judgment of approval was rendered by said court. Moreover, if there was
really such adoption, petitioner could have conveniently secured a copy of the
newspaper publication of the adoption as required under Section 4, Rule 99 of the
Rules of Court (formerly Section 4 Rule 100) or a certification of the publishing
house to that effect. Petitioner's failure on this point is another strong indication of
the non-existence of the adoption paper. We also observed that the identity of the
one who gave the written consent to the adoption (Section 3, Rule 99. Rules of
Court), whether the parents or orphanage, does not appear in the trend of
petitioner's evidence. The collation of proof on this point is not so difficult and such
proof must be presented if only to prove the real existence of the adoption. And of
course, if the adoption records were indeed destroyed or burned during the war,
the clear right and duty of petitioner was to duly reconstitute the records as
provided by law.
3. The absence of proof of such order of adoption by the court, as provided
by the statute, cannot be substituted by parol evidence that a child has lived with a
person, not his parent, and has been treated as a child to establish such adoption. 9
Even evidence of declaration of the deceased, made in his lifetime, that he intended
to adopt a child as his heir, and that he had adopted him, and of the fact that the
child resided with the deceased, as a member of his family, from infancy until he
attained his majority, is not sufficient to establish the fact of adoption. 10 Nor does
the fact that the deceased spouses fed, clothed, educated, recognized and referred
to one like petitioner as an adopted child, necessarily establish adoption of the
child. 11 Withal, the attempts of petitioner to prove his adoption by acts and
declarations of the deceased do not discharge the mandatory presentation of the
his status as an admitted illegitimate child, not an adopted child Ͷ which status of
the estate proceedings of the late Dr. Lazatin, as above stated.
We do not discount though that declarations in regard to pedigree, although
who must know the truth. 12 Pedigree testimony is admitted because it is the best
that the nature of the case admits and because greater evil might arise from the
rejection of such proof than from its admission. 13 But, in proving an adoption,
there is a better proof available and it should be produced. The whereabouts of the
child's family and circulation of the jurisdiction in which they resided and
investigation in those courts where adoption are usually granted would surely
produce an adoption order, if indeed there was an order. 14 Besides, since the
point in favor of receiving hearsay evidence upon matters of family history or
pedigree is its reliability, it has been set forth as a condition upon which such
evidence is received that it emanate from a source within the family. Pursuant to
this view, before a declaration of a deceased person can be admitted to prove
pedigree, or ancestry, the relationship of the declarant, by either of blood or affinity
to the family in question, or a branch thereof, must ordinarily be established by
competent evidence. 15 Section 33 of Rule 130 states: "The act or declaration of a
person deceased, or outside of the Philippines, or unable to testify, in respect to the
pedigree of another person related to him by birth or marriage, may be received in
evidence where it occurred before the controversy, and the relationship between
$ 

# : !!1
the two persons is shown by evidence other than such act or declaration . . .."
4. Secondary evidence is nonetheless admissible where the records of
adoption proceedings were actually lost or destroyed. But, prior to the introduction
of such secondary evidence, the proponent must establish the former existence of
the instrument. The correct order of proof is as follows: Existence; execution; loss;
contents; although this order may be changed if necessary in the discretion of the
court. 16 The sufficiency of the proof offered as a predicate for the admission of an
alleged lost deed lies within the judicial discretion of the trial court under all the
circumstances of the particular case. 17 "As earlier pointed out, petitioner failed to
establish the former existence of the adoption paper and its subsequent loss or
destruction. Secondary proof may only be introduced if it has first been established
that such adoption paper really existed and was lost. This is indispensable. 18
Petitioner's supposed adoption was only testified to by him and is allegedly to be
testified to by a brother of the deceased Mariano M. Lazatin or others who have
witnessed that the deceased spouses treated petitioner as their child. If adoption
was really made, the records thereof should have existed and the same presented
at the hearing or subsequent thereto or a reasonable explanation of loss or
destruction thereof, if that be the case, adduced. 19 Assuming the mere fact that
the deceased spouses treated petitioner as their child does not justify the
conclusion that petitioner had been in fact judicially adopted by the spouses nor
does it constitute admissible proof of adoption.
For one to intervene in an estate proceeding, it is a requisite that he has an interest
in the estate, either as one who would be benefited as an heir or one who has a
claim against the estate like a creditor. 20 A child by adoption cannot inherit from
the parent by adoption unless the act of adoption has been done in strict accord
with the statute. Until this is done, no rights are acquired by the child and neither
the supposed adopting parent or adopted child could be bound thereby. 21 The
burden of proof in establishing adoption is upon the person claiming such
relationship. He must prove compliance with the statutes relating to adoption in
the jurisdiction where the adoption occurred. 22 A fortiori, if no hereditary interest
in the estate can be gained by a claimant who failed to submit proof thereof,
whether the will is probated or not, intervention should be denied as it would
merely result in unnecessary complication. 23 To succeed, a child must be
legitimate, legitimated, adopted, acknowledged illegitimate natural child or natural
child by legal fiction or recognized spurious child. 24
7$
Petitioner Ong Ching Po was a Chinese citizen; therefore, he was disqualified from
acquiring and owning real property. Assuming that the genuineness and due
execution of Exhibit "B" has been established, the same is null and void, it being
contrary to law.
On the other end of the legal spectrum, the deed of sale executed by Ong Joi Jong
in favor of private respondent (Exh. "A") is notarized document.
There is no document showing the establishment of an express trust by petitioner
Ong Ching Po as trustor and private respondent as trustee. Not even Exhibit "B" can
be considered as such a document because private respondent, the registered
owner of the property subject of said "deed of sale," was not a party thereto. The
oral testimony to prove the existence of the express trust will not suffice. Under
Article 1443 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, "No express trust concerning an
immovable or any interest therein may be proved by parol evidence."
Undaunted, petitioners argue that if they cannot prove an express trust in writing,
they can prove an implied trust orally. While an implied trust may be proved orally
(Civil Code of the Philippines, Art. 1457), the evidence must be trustworthy and
received by the courts with extreme caution, because such kind of evidence may be
easily fabricated (Salao v. Salao, 70 SCRA 65 [1976]). It cannot be made to rest on
vague and uncertain evidence or on loose, equivocal or indefinite declarations (Cf.
De Leon v. Molo-Peckson, et al., 116 Phil. 1267 [1962]). Petitioners do not claim
that Ong Yee was not in a financial position to acquire the land and to introduce the
improvements thereon. On the other hand, Yu Siok Lian, the wife of petitioner Ong
Ching Po, admitted in her testimony in court that Ong Yee was a stockholder of Lam
Sing Corporation and was engaged in business.
The Court of Appeals did not give any credence to Exhibit "B" and its translation,
Exhibit "C", because these documents had not been properly authenticated.
Under Section 4, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court:
"Secondary Evidence when Original is lost or destroyed. When the original writing
has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, upon proof of its
execution and lost or destruction, or unavailability, its contents may be proved by a


 , 9: ! 4
copy, or by a recital of its contents in some authentic document, or by the
recollection of the witnesses."
Secondary evidence is admissible when the original documents were actually lost or
destroyed. But prior to the introduction of such secondary evidence, the proponent
must establish the former existence of the document. The correct order of proof is
as follows: existence; execution; loss; contents. This order may be changed if
necessary in the discretion of the court (De Vera v. Aguilar, 218 SCRA 602 [1993]).
Petitioners failed to adduce evidence as to the genuineness and due execution of
the deed of sale, "Exhibit "B".
The due execution of the document may be established by the person or persons
who executed it; by the person before whom its execution was acknowledged; or
by any person who was present and saw it executed or who after its execution, saw
it and recognized the signatures; or by a person to whom the parties to the
instrument had previously confessed the execution thereof (De Vera v. Aguilar,
supra).
Petitioner Yu Siok Lian testified that she was present when said document was
executed, but the trial court rejected her claim and held:
"If it is true that she was present, why did she not sign said document, even merely
as a witness? Her oral testimony is easy to concoct or fabricate.
As to the contention of petitioner that all the tax receipts, tax declaration, rental
receipts, deed of sale (Exh. "B") and transfer certificate of title were in their
possession, private respondent explained that she and her husband entrusted said
lot and building to petitioners when they moved to Iloilo.
As observed by the Court of Appeals:
"We find, however, that these acts, even if true, are not necessarily reflective of
dominion, as even a mere administrator or manager may lawfully perform them
pursuant to his appointment or employment" (Rollo, p. 10).
It is markworthy that all the tax receipts were in the name of private respondent
and her husband. The rental receipts were also in the name of her husband.

This is an appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Cebu dismissing
the action after trial on the ground that the plaintiff did not prove facts sufficient to
constitute a cause of action.
We are of the opinion that the judgment must be reversed and a new trial ordered.
The action is based on a sale with a right to repurchase made by Adriano Enriquez
in favor of E. Michael and E. Michael & Co., socieded en comandita, of which
appellant claims to be the successor, by reason of an instrument, duly executed and
delivered by said reason of an instrument, duly executed and delivered by said
companies to appellant, transferring property, business and assets of every kind,
including the land which is the subject of this litigation. It is alleged in the complaint
that the time to repurchase having expired, the title to the property became
absolute in appellant and that it is accordingly the owner of the land described in
said instrument.
The trial court prevented appellant from proving the fact. Appellant also attempted
to prove the fact that the instrument so executed and delivered was lost, it being
his purpose to lay the basis for the introduction of secondary evidence as to its
contents. the trial court also prevented appellant from proving that fact.
Trial courts do well in refusing at all times to permit the introduction of
incompetent evidence and particularly secondary evidence of the contents of
written instruments unless the facts required by the Code of Civil Procedure as the
conditions precedent for such evidence are clearly shown to exist. Section 321 of
the Code provides: "An original writing must be produced and proved, except as
otherwise provided in this Act. If it has been lost, proof of the loss must first be
made before evidence can be given of its contents. Upon such proof being made,
together with proof of the due execution of the writing, its contents may be proved
by a copy or a recital of its contents in some authentic document, or by the
recollection of a witness."
As will be seen from this section, the writing itself must be produced unless it has
been lost or destroyed, in which case, before its contents may be proved by other
evidence, it must be shown by the person offering the secondary evidence (1) that
the document was duly executed and delivered , where delivery is necessary, and
(2) that it has been lost or destroyed. The execution and delivery of the document
may be established by the person or persons who executed it, by the person before
whom its execution was acknowledge, or by any person who was present and saw it
E. Michael & Co., sociedad en comandita, instead of asking him if he knew of the
execution of a document between appellant and his predecessors in interest
transferring the lands in questions, or the property and business of E. Michael &
Co., sociedad en comandita, to appellant. Having obtained an affirmative answer to
the questions indicated counsel could then have shown how the witness came to
know of the execution or existence of the document, and, if such circumstances
disclosed that the witness was sufficiently acquainted with the facts, he would have
been allowed to testify to its execution and delivery. After this had been done the
document might then have been presented for identification and, when identified,
offered in evidence. If its contents showed that it referred to the lands described in
the complaint, its admissibility would have been instantly evident.
executed and delivered or who, after its execution and delivery, saw it and
 ; !3!
recognized the signatures; or by a person to whom the parties to the instrument
had previously confessed the execution thereof. The destruction of the instrument
may be proved by any person knowing the fact. The loss may be shown by any
person who knew the fact of its loss, or by anyone who has made, in the judgment
of the court, a sufficient examination in the place or places where the document or
papers of similar character are usually kept by the person in whose custody the
document lost was, and has been unable to find it; or who has make any other
investigation which is sufficient to satisfy the court that the instrument is indeed
lost. If it appears, on an attempt to prove the loss, that the document is in fact in
existence, then the proof of the loss or destruction fails and secondary evidence is
inadmissible unless section 322 of the Code of Civil Procedure should be applicable.
After proper proof of the due execution and delivery of the instrument and its loss
or destruction, oral evidence may be given of its contents by any person who signed
the document, or who read it, or who heard it read knowing, or it being proved
from the other sources, that the document so read was the one in question. Such
evidence may also be given by any person who was present when the contents of
the document were talked over between the parties thereto to such an extent as to
give him reasonably full information as to its contents; or the contents may be
proved by any person to whom the parties to the instrument have confessed or
stated the contents thereof; or by a copy thereof; or by a recital of its contents in
some authentic document.
Counsel, if he had desired to identify the instrument to which the question referred,
might have done better, perhaps, if he had asked the witness if he knew of the
execution of an instrument between appellant and its predecessor in interest
relating to the lands described in the complaint or to the property and business of

REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE; AUTHENTICATION AND
PROOF; HANDWRITING, HOW PROVED. Ͷ The handwriting of a person may be
proved by any witness who believes it to be the handwriting of such person, and
has seen the person write. Evidence respecting the handwriting may also be given
by comparison, made by the witness or the court, with writings admitted or treated
as genuine by the party against whom the evidence is offered, or proved to be
genuine to the satisfaction of the judge.
COURTS; RECONSTITUTION OF COURT RECORDS; EFFECT OF DOCUMENTS AND
EXHIBITS RECONSTITUTED PURSUANT TO THE LAW. Ͷ Where the reconstitution of
destroyed exhibits was made in accordance with the provisions of Act 3110, which
provides for the procedure in the reconstitution of court records, the reconstituted
exhibits constitute a competent evidence to be considered in arriving at a decision
of the case.
Some of the documents thus seized, and which were presented as evidence, were
in appellant Lava's handwriting, or were signed by him using his alias names. This is
clearly established by the testimony of a handwriting expert that was presented by
the prosecution. The conclusion of the handwriting expert was based on the
specimens of Lava's handwriting which were used as standards in comparing with
the handwriting and/or signature (in alias) of the appellant that appear in the
documents that were presented as evidence against him. It is contended by
appellant's counsel that no genuine specimen of Lava's handwriting was presented
as standard for comparison. We do not see merit in this contention. We find that
the standards for comparison that were used were the documents marked Exhibits
FF-1 and FF-2. 11 Exhibit FF-1 is an application for employment signed by Jose Lava.
The signature thereon was testified to by witness Eduardo Romualdez (now
Secretary of Finance) as looking "like the signature of Jose Lava". Eduardo
Romualdez was acquainted with the handwriting of Jose Lava, having received
reports (Exh. FF), parts of which were in the handwriting of Jose Lava "not less than
three or four times" while Jose Lava was a bank examiner. 12 Exhibit FF-2 is a
cardboard containing a list of books requested by Jose Lava while the latter was
detained in Bilibid Prison. Buenaventura Villanueva, to whom the list was given,
testified that he saw Lava writing the list on the cardboard. What appears on Exhibit
FF-2 is certainly a genuine specimen of Lava's handwriting.
The handwriting of a person may be proved by any witness who believes it to be
the handwriting of such person, and has seen the person write. Evidence respecting
the handwriting may also be given by comparison, made by the witness or the
court, with writings admitted or treated as genuine by the party against whom the
evidence is offered, or proved to be genuine to the satisfaction of the judge. 13 The
handwriting expert who made the comparison in this case positively identified the
handwriting of Jose Lava on the documents presented as evidence against said
appellant, specially the handwritten names of Gregorio Santayana, Gaston, Gaston
Silayan, Gavino and Greg.
Upon petition by the Deputy Chief, Military Intelligence Service (MIS) of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines, this Court, by order of March 7, 1952, appointed the MIS
the custodian of the exhibits and documents that were presented as evidence in
these five criminal cases before the trial court. This step was taken because those
documents and exhibits were needed also as evidence in other courts in the
prosecution of other members of the HMB (Hukbong Mapagpalaya ng Bayan).
Later, by order of April 14, 1955, this Court appointed the Staff Judge, Advocate of
the Philippine Constabulary the custodian of the same documents and exhibits.
Those documents and exhibits were kept at the headquarters of the Philippine
Constabulary at Camp Crame, Quezon City. On September 10, 1958 the
headquarters of the PC was destroyed by fire, and all those documents and exhibits
were burned. Upon a petition for the reconstitution of the said documents and
exhibits, this Court appointed Deputy Clerk of Court Bienvenido Ejercito as
Commissioner to receive evidence for the reconstitution of those documents and
exhibits. The Commissioner after due hearing, submitted his report, dated October
6, 1959, recommending that the documents and exhibits that were burned be
declared reconstituted by the photostatic copies of the originals of those
documents and exhibits. The Commissioner stated in his report that those
photostatic copies were duly identified during the hearings on the reconstitution.
Over the objection of counsels for the defendants-appellants, this Court approved
the report of the Commissioner.
The appellants assail the reconstitution of the exhibits that were destroyed, and
claim that the reconstituted exhibits should not be considered in this appeal. We
have stated at the earlier part of this opinion that the exhibits (documentary and
other articles) were placed in the custody of the Philippine Constabulary because
they had to be presented as evidenced in the trial of rebellion cases pending in
other courts. Most of the originals of the documentary evidence were burned
during the fire that gutted the headquarters of the Philippine Constabulary on
September 10, 1958. The Solicitor General filed a petition for the reconstitution of
the burned exhibits. The petition was given due course by this Court, and the
Deputy Clerk of this Court was commissioned to receive the evidence on the
reconstitution of the burned documents. The list of reconstituted exhibits is Exhibit
C-Reconstitution. In his report, dated October 6, 1959, the Commissioner
recommended the admission of all the reconstituted exhibits.
We find that the reconstitution was made in accordance with the provisions of Act
3110, which provides for the procedure in the reconstitution of court records.
Section 59 of said acts provides that destroyed documentary evidence shall be
reconstituted by means of secondary evidence which maybe presented to any
Justice of the Supreme Court or any other officer commissioned by the Court.
Section 14 of the act provides that the destroyed or lost documentary evidence
shall be replaced by secondary evidence. A photostatic copy of an original
document is admissible as a secondary evidence of the contents of the original.
Photostatic copies are faithful reproductions of the contents of the originals and
they constitute evidence of a satisfactory nature. 7 The record shows that the
photostatic copies of the destroyed exhibits, which were presented before the
Commissioner during the reconstitution proceedings, were taken before the
originals were destroyed by fire. The photostatic copies had been compared with
the originals, properly checked and recorded, by the officer who was the custodian
of the exhibits.
The certified typewritten copies made from the original documents that were hand-
written in ink are also secondary evidence of the contents of the latter. Sgt. Aquilino
Tingco, assigned as assistant to the document officer in charge of the court exhibits
in the rebellion cases, testified that he was the one who furnished the typists the
original documents, and after those originals were copied on the typewriter he
compared the typewritten copies with the originals, proof-read them, stamped
them and had them certified as true copies. This witness further testified that
before the certified copies were presented in court as evidence said copies were
compared with their originals. 8
During the reconstitution proceedings, counsel for appellants objected to the
admission of some of the reconstituted documents upon the ground that they were
not sufficiently identified. The Commissioner, however, admitted all the
reconstituted documents, and We find that the Commissioner rightly did so. We
find that Exhibits R- X-6 to R-P-73-79, the admission of which was objected to, were
properly identified. Captain Enrique L. Reyes of the PC, who was entrusted with the
custody of the documents, had the list of all the exhibits that were burned, which
were inventoried and verified; as well as a list of those exhibits that were presented
in these cases, of which photostatic copies had been taken; and when asked where
the photostatic copies were, Capt. Reyes said that he had the photostatic copies,
and pointed to a bundle of folders containing them. These exhibits were checked
and counter-checked with the record of the present cases in the Supreme Court. 9
Sgt. Aquilino Tingco, who brought the exhibits to the different courts where they
were presented as evidence, and who personally supervised the taking of the
microfilm and the photostatic copies that were presented in the courts in lieu of the
originals, when asked to show to the Commissioner the photostats made of the
documents which were used in the Politburo cases, extracted from a folder a
bundle of papers and presented the list of Exhibits (Exh. C-Reconstitution) along
with photostatic copies of those listed exhibits, and he testified on them. The
witness was asked to consult the list of exhibits (Exhibit C-Reconstitution) and he
pointed to the Commissioner the exhibits to be marked according to the list, which
the Commissioner himself marked. The witness testified that the contents of the
documents thus marked were the same as those of the originals. The Commissioner
considered the documents properly identified and he admitted the documents over
the objection of counsel for the appellants, and he recommended to this Court the
admission of all of them. This Court approved the report of the Commissioner.
We have carefully examined and analyzed these reconstituted exhibits and We
believe that they constitute a competent evidence to be considered in arriving at a
decision in these cases.
 
<
) Ñ
 !""
8+5  7 !3
Exhibits 6 to 19 and Exh. 22, which are photostatic copies of ledger entries and
vouchers showing that Villarama had co-mingled his personal funds and
transactions with those made in the name of the Corporation, are very illuminating
evidence. Villarama has assailed the admissibility of these exhibits, contending that
no evidentiary value whatsoever should be given to them since "they were merely
photostatic copies of the originals, the best evidence being the originals
themselves." According to him, at the time Pantranco offered the said exhibits, it
was the most likely possessor of the originals thereof because they were stolen
from the files of the Corporation and only Pantranco was able to produce the
alleged photostat copies thereof.
Section 5 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provides for the requisites for the
admissibility of secondary evidence when the original is in the custody of the
adverse party, thus: (1) opponent's possession of the original; (2) reasonable notice
to opponent to produce the original; (3) satisfactory proof of its existence; and (4)
failure or refusal of opponent to produce the original in court. 11 Villarama has
practically admitted the second and fourth requisites. 12 As to the third, he
admitted their previous existence in the files of the Corporation and also that he
had seen some of them. 13 Regarding the first element, Villarama's theory is that
since even at the time of the issuance of the subpoena duces tecum, the originals
were already missing, therefore, the Corporation was no longer in possession of the
same. However, it is not necessary for a party seeking to introduce secondary
evidence to show that the original is in the actual possession of his adversary. It is
enough that the circumstances are such as to indicate that the writing is in his
possession or under his control. Neither is it required that the party entitled to the
custody of the instrument should, on being notified to produce it, admit having it in
his possession. 14 Hence, secondary evidence is admissible where he denies having
it in his possession. The party calling for such evidence may introduce a copy
thereof as in the case of loss. For, among the exception to the best evidence rule is
"when the original has been lost, destroyed, or cannot be produced in court. 15 The
originals of the vouchers in question must be deemed to have been lost, as even
the Corporation admits such loss. Viewed upon this light, there can be no doubt as
to the admissibility in evidence of Exhibits 6 to 19 and 22.

We have already stressed that, on the basis of the reports of the two accountants,
the damages claimed by the company, as a matter of simple addition, does not
reach the sum of P450,000 fixed by the trial court. The damages shown in the
accountants' reports and in the statement made by the company's chief clerk (who
did not testify) amount to P349,245.37, or much less than P450,000.
The company argues that the accountants' reports are admissible in evidence
because of the rule that "when the original consists of numerous accounts or other
documents which cannot be examined in court without great loss of time and the
fact sought to be established from them is only the general result of the whole", the
original writings need not be produced (Sec. 2[e], Rule 130, Rules of Court).
That rule cannot be applied in this case because the voluminous character of the
records, on which the accountants' reports were based, was not duly established
(U. S. vs. Razon and Tayag, 37 Phil. 856, 861; 29 Am Jur 2nd 529).
It is also a requisite for the application of the rule that the records and accounts
should be made accessible to the adverse party so that the correctness of the
summary may be tested on cross-examination (29 Am Jur 2nd 517-8; 32A C.J.S.
111).
What applies to this case is the general rule "that an audit made by, or the
testimony of, a private auditor, is inadmissible in evidence as proof of the original
records, books of accounts, reports or the like" (Anno: 52 ALR 1266).
That general rule cannot be relaxed in this case because the company failed to
make a preliminary showing as to the difficulty or impossibility attending the
production of the records in court and their examination and analysis as evidence
by the court (29 Am Jur 2nd 529).
A close scrutiny of the accountants' reports reveals their lack of probative value.
The propriety of allowing the different items of damages is discussed below.
Unrealized freight and passenger revenue for 1954 ascertained by Accountant
Demetrio S. Jayme. Ͷ In his report (Exh. A, pp. 134 to 147, Record on Appeal),
Jayme used the pronouns "we" and "our" and made reference to the examination
made by the "auditors" and his accounting office. He did not disclose the names of
other "auditors" who assisted him in making the examination of the company's
records.
It would not be proper to allow Jayme's estimates as recoverable damages. They
are not supported by reliable evidence. They can hardly be sanctioned by the
"generally accepted auditing standards" alluded to in Jayme's report. The pertinent
records of the company should have been produced in court. The purser and
steward did not testify.
The rule is that the auditor's summary should not include his conclusions or
inferences (29 Am Jur 2d 519). His opinion is not evidence.
Jayme allegedly based his computations on the records of the company which were
not produced in court. The union objected to Jayme's report as inadmissible under
the hearsay rule or as not being the best evidence.
Even if the presentation of the records themselves as exhibits should have been
dispensed with, yet the company, to show good faith and fair dealing, could have
brought the records in court (manifests, bills of lading, receipts for the freights, if
any, etc.) and enabled the court and the union's counsel and its expert accountant
to verify the accuracy of Jayme's summaries.
Photostatic copies of some manifests and bills of lading proving that the company
was not able to collect the stipulated freight on the alleged shutout cargoes should
have been presented in evidence as supporting papers for Jayme's report. No such
exhibits were presented.
The flaw or error in relying merely on Jayme's summaries is that, as pointed out by
witness Mariano LL. Badelles, cargoes might be shutout due to causes other than
the supposed inefficiency of the union.
The said damages were computed in the reports of Miguel J. Siojo, an accountant
who, for two days and nights, March 8 to 10, 1960, or shortly before and during the
trial, allegedly examined the company's record at Iligan City, such as its cash book,
cash vouchers, reports to the head office, shipping manifests, and liquidation
reports. Those records were not produced in court. Their non-production was not
explained. If the accountant was able to summarize the contents of those records in
two days, they could not have been very voluminous. They should have been
offered in evidence.
The alleged expenses in the operation of the forklifts consisted of (a) the wates of
the operators hired by the company and (b) the cost of gasoline and oil and
expenses for repair.
The union contends that Siojo's reports (Exh. E to I) were inadmissible evidence
because they were hearsay, meaning that the original documents, on which the
reports were based, were not presented in evidence and, therefore, appellants'
counsel and the court itself were not able to gauge the correctness of the figures or
data contained in the said reports. The person who had personal knowledge of the
operating expenses was not examined in court.
the private respondent and petitioner is one of contract of loan and not a contract
of lease.
2. Assuming for the sake of argument that exhibits "D" and "I" evidence
separate transactions, the latter document should be disregarded, the same not
having been pleaded as a cause of action.

We are of the opinion that, to avoid fraud or fabrication, the documents evidencing 3. Whether or not the Stipulation of Facts entered into by the parties herein
the alleged expenses should have been presented in evidence. Siojo's reports were relative to their executed transactions during the hearing of their case a quo, are
not the best evidence on the said operating expenses. The explanation of Badelles binding upon them and as well as, upon the public respondent?
with respect to shutout cargoes and our observations on Jayme's summaries are
Rule 130, Sec. 7, of the Revised Rules of Court provides: 1
applicable to accountant Siojo's reports.
Sec. 7. Evidence of Written Agreements. Ͷ When the terms of an agreement
##
#$#


 (+  6( 

have been reduced to writing, it is to be considered as containing all such terms,


+ (+  6('
! and therefore, there can be, between the parties and their successors in interest,
; 
 9 : !!
The trial court erred when it relied on the self-serving testimonies of the defendant
and his witness as against the receipts both parties presented and adopted as their
own exhibits. As said before, Exhibit "I" is very clear in its tenor. And if it is really the
intention of Exhibit "I" to explain the contents of Exhibit "D", such manifestation or
intention is not found in the four corners of the former document.
The respondent court also found that the amounts of P35,000.00, P8,000.00,
P500.00, P3,000.00, P3,750.00 and P4,000.00 were not payments for the "pakyaw"
and sublease agreement but for loans extended by Salonga to Cruz. It also accepted
Salonga's claim that the amount of P28,000.00 was delivered to the petitioner on
May 14, 1982, as payment on the "pakyaw" agreement apart from the P35,000.00
(Exh. D) that was paid on May 4, 1982. However, it agreed that the amount of
P6,000.00 received by the private respondent from the petitioner should be
credited in favor of the latter.
The petitioner is now before this Court, raising the following issues:
1. The public respondent Court of Appeals gravely erred in (1) disregarding
parol evidence to Exhibits "D" and "I" despite the fact that these documents fall
under the exceptions provided for in Sec. 7, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court and
thereby in (2) making a sweeping conclusion that the transaction effected between
no evidence of the terms of the agreement other than the contents of the writing,
except in the following cases:
a) When a mistake or imperfection of the writing or its failure to express the
true intent and agreement of the parties, or the validity of the agreement is put in
issue by the pleadings;
b) When there is an intrinsic ambiguity in the writing. The term "agreement"
includes wills.
The reason for the rule is the presumption that when the parties have reduced their
agreement to writing they have made such writing the only repository and
memorial of the truth, and whatever is not found in the writing must be understood
to have been waived or abandoned. 2
The rule, however, is not applicable in the case at bar, Section 7, Rule 130 is
predicated on the existence of a document embodying the terms of an agreement,
but Exhibit D does not contain such an agreement. It is only a receipt attesting to
the fact that on May 4, 1982, the petitioner received from the private respondent
the amount of P35,000. It is not and could have not been intended by the parties to
be the sole memorial of their agreement. As a matter of fact, Exhibit D does not
even mention the transaction that gave rise to its issuance. At most, Exhibit D can
only be considered a casual memorandum of a transaction between the parties and
an acknowledgment of the receipt of money executed by the petitioner for the
private respondent's satisfaction. A writing of this nature, as Wigmore observed is
not covered by the parol evidence rule.
A receipt Ͷ i.e. a written acknowledgment, handed by one party to the other, of
the manual custody of money or other personality Ͷ will in general fall without the
line of the rule; i.e. it is not intended to be an exclusive memorial, and the facts may
be shown irrespective of the terms of the receipt. This is because usually a receipt is
merely a written admission of a transaction independently existing, and, like other
admissions, is not conclusive. 3
The "pakyaw" was mentioned only in Exhibit I, which also declared the petitioner's
receipt of the amount of P28,000.00 as consideration for the agreement. The
petitioner and his witnesses testified to show when and under what circumstances
the amount of P28,000.00 was received. Their testimonies do not in any way vary or
contradict the terms of Exhibit I. While Exhibit I is dated May 14, 1982, it does not
make any categorical declaration that the amount of P28,000.00 stated therein was
received by the petitioner on that same date. That date may not therefore be
considered conclusive as to when the amount of P28,000.00 was actually received.
A deed is not conclusive evidence of everything it may contain. For instance, it is
not the only evidence of the date of its execution, nor its omission of a
consideration conclusive evidence that none passed, nor is its acknowledgment of a
particular consideration an objection to other proof of other and consistent
considerations; and, by analogy, the acknowledgment in a deed is not conclusive of
the fact. 4
A distinction should be made between a statement of fact expressed in the
instrument and the terms of the contractual act. The former may be varied by parol
evidence but not the latter. 5 Section 7 of Rule 130 clearly refers to the terms of an
agreement and provides that "there can be, between the parties and their
successors in interest, no evidence of the terms of the agreement other than the
contents of the writing."
:+ ;
 c  !3
At the pre-trial of this case, the parties, through counsel, agreed to submit for the
resolution of the Court the question as to whether or not De la Rama is allowed to
present parol evidence to prove his alleged reservation to the war damage benefits
in question. The parties further agreed that should the ruling of the Court be in the
negative, then the Court may render judgment on the pleadings. However, should
the Court rule in favor of admissibility of parol evidence, a hearing on the merits will
be scheduled for the admission of the evidence of both parties.
Under the foregoing circumstances, the Court believes that any evidence tending to
establish the plaintiff's cause of action would be inadmissible under the parol
evidence rule and the provisions of the Statute of Frauds. In the light of the facts
not controverted in the pleading submitted by the parties, the Court finds that the
plaintiff has no cause of action against the defendant." (Record on Appeal, pp. 25-
26.)
From this decision, the plaintiff-appellant appealed.
The only issue crucial to this appeal is whether or not the alleged verbal agreement
of the parties concerning plaintiff's reservation of his right to the balance of the war
damage claim at the time of the sale of his shares to the defendant, can be proven
by parol evidence under the Parol Evidence Rule and the Statute of Frauds.
There is merit in appellee's contention that the alleged oral reservation and the sale
of the shares of stock were made simultaneously and contemporaneously, so that
to allow De la Rama to prove the same would run counter to the Parol Evidence
Rule.
In his brief, appellant alleged that "at the time he sold his shares of stock to the
defendant in 1958 he has reserved to himself the said benefits and to which
defendant agreed." (Brief for Appellant, p. 3). Again, in his third assignment of error
he claims that the lower court erred in holding that the disputed oral reservation,
cannot be proved under the Statute of Frauds and the Parol Evidence." (Ibid., p. ii.)
It is a well accepted principle of law that evidence of a prior or contemporaneous
verbal agreement is generally not admissible to vary, contradict or defeat the
operation of a valid instrument. (American Factors (Phil.) Inc. vs. Murphy Tire
Corporation, et al. (C.A.) 49 O.G. 189.)
While parol evidence is admissible in a variety of ways to explain the meaning of
written contracts, it cannot serve the purpose of incorporating into the contract
additional contemporaneous conditions which are not mentioned at all in the
writing, unless there has been fraud or mistake. (Yu Tek & Co. v. Gonzales, 29 Phil.
384.) Indeed, the exceptions to the rule do not apply in the instant case, there being
no intrinsic ambiguity or fraud, mistake, or failure to express the true agreement of
the parties. If indeed the alleged reservation had been intended, businessmen like
the parties would have placed in writing such an important reservation.
In the case at bar, nowhere in the complaint were the exceptions to the rule alleged
or put in issue. (See Infante v. Cunanan, et al., 93 Phil. 691).
The alleged reservation not being admissible under the Parol Evidence Rule, WE do
not find it necessary to discuss the applicability or non-applicability to the present
case of the Statute of Frauds.
on the alleged condition is inadmissible upon seasonable objection interposed
during the trial by donee's counsel.
4. ACTION; PARTIES, CAPACITY TO BRING ACTION TO BE SPECIFICALLY
PLEADED. Ͷ Where an action for annulment of a donation was brought by the
alleged collateral relatives of the deceased donor, their capacity to bring the action
must be specifically pleaded.
5. ID.; RULINGS ON ADMISSION OF EVIDENCE, REVIEWABLE ON APPEAL;
EXCEPTION. Ͷ While the rulings of a trial judge on the admission of evidence are
0+ /c  !" generally reviewable on appeal and cannot be appealed by means of certiorari, yet
where the petitioner's contention is clearly tenable and the lower court, in
In their complaint for annulment of donation, plaintiffs alleged that the donation
overruling the objection to the evidence, committed a patent mistake amounting to
was subject to conditions, which they claim were not complied with by defendant.
a grave abuse of discretion, the error may be corrected by means of certiorari.
Plaintiffs, however, did not expressly plead that the donation was incomplete or
that the execution was vitiated by mistake or that it did not reflect the intention of Section 7 requires that in order that parol or extrinsic evidence may be admitted to
the donor and the donee. Neither did they attach a copy of the deed of donation to vary the terms of the writing, the mistake or imperfection thereof or its failure to
the complaint. During the trial, defendant objected to plaintiffs' parol evidence to express the true intent and agreement of the parties should be put in issue by the
prove the alleged conditions, but the trial court overruled the objection. pleadings. In the instant case, the plaintiffs did not expressly plead that the deed of
donation was incomplete or that its execution was vitiated by mistake or that it did
The Supreme Court held that the trial court committed a grave abuse of discretion
not reflect the intention of the donor and the donee.
correctable by certiorari, in overruling the objection to the evidence.
The plaintiffs in paragraph four of their complaint merely alleged that the donation
Questioned order reversed and set aside.
was subject to five conditions. Then, they prayed that the donation should be
1. EVIDENCE; WRITTEN AGREEMENTS GENERAL RULE. Ͷ When the terms of annulled or rescinded for non-compliance with those conditions.
an agreement have been reduced to writing, it is to be considered as containing all
At the trial, they tried to prove those conditions by parol evidence. Obviously, they
such terms, and, therefore, there can be, between the parties and their successors
could not introduce parol evidence to vary the terms of the agreement because
in interest, no evidence of the terms of the agreement other than the contents of
they did not plead any of the exceptions mentioned in the parol evidence rule.
the writing.
Their case is covered by the general rule that the contents of the writing constitute
2. ID.; ID.; VARIANCE OF TERMS; PAROL EVIDENCE ADMISSIBLE IF EXPRESSLY the sole repository of the terms of the agreement between the parties.
PLEADED. Ͷ Section 7, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court requires that in order that
Thus, it was held that where there is no allegation in the complaint that there was
parol or extrinsic evidence may be admitted to vary the terms of the writing, the
any mistake or imperfection in the written agreement or that it failed to express the
mistake or imperfections thereof or its failure to express the true intent and
true intent of the parties, parol evidence is inadmissible to vary the terms of the
agreement of the parties should be put in issue by the pleadings either by the
agreement (Villanueva vs. Yulo, 106 Phil. 1170).
plaintiff in his complaint or in the affirmative defense set up by the defendant.
On the other hand, if the defendant set up the affirmative defense that the contract
3. ID.; DEED OF DONATION; FAILURE TO PLEAD TRUE INTENT, EFFECT. Ͷ
mentioned in the complaint does not express the true agreement of the parties,
Where the plaintiff claiming that the donation was conditional failed to plead that
then parol evidence is admissible to prove the true agreement of the parties.
the Deed of Donation did not express the true intent of the parties, parol evidence
But whether the action is for revocation or reformation, it was necessary for the
plaintiffs, in order to prove that the donation was conditional, to plead that the
deed of donation did not express the true intent of the parties. Not having done so,
their parol evidence on the alleged conditions is inadmissible upon seasonable
objection interposed during the trial by the donee's counsel.
The private respondents contend that the rulings of a trial judge on the admission
of evidence are reviewable on appeal and cannot be assailed by means of certiorari
(Philippine Air Lines, Inc. vs. Teodoro, 97 Phil. 461).
That is the general rule. Where, as in this case, petitioner's contention is clearly
tenable and the lower court, in overruling the objection to the evidence, committed
a patent mistake amounting to a grave abuse of discretion, the error may be
corrected by means of certiorari (De Laureano vs. Adil, L-43345, July 29, 1976, 72
SCRA 148, 161).
 that he should be bound as surety and not jointly with the other party.
+9 7 


9' !  It was therefore incumbent upon the corporation, if it desired to

1.p PLEADING; DUE EXECUTION OF CONTRACT; AUTHORITY OF OFFICER
TO BIND CORPORATION. Ͷ Where the name of a corporation is signed
to the document which is the basis of an action. the failure of the
defendant corporation to put in issue, by denial under oath the due
execution of the instrument, as required in section 103 of the Code of
Civil Procedure, operates as an admission of the authority of the
officer to execute the contract, since the authority of the officer to
bind the company is essential to the due execution of its contract.
2.p 2. ID CORPORATIONS; WANT OF AUTHORITY IN AGENT AS SPECIAL
DEFENSE. Ͷ Where a corporation seeks to evade liability on a contract
on the ground of lack of authority on the part of the person who
assumed to act for it, such defense should be specially pleaded.
3.p 3. ID., AMENDMENTS Ͷ While immaterial variances between
allegations in the pleadings and the proof adduced at the hearing may
be disregarded, it is, nevertheless, still true that relief can be granted
only upon matter which is put in issue by the pleadings; and if the
proof varies materially from the allegations, the pleadings may, upon
the application of the party interested, be amended in order to bring
them into conformity with the facts proved.
4.p 4. ID.; ID.; SPECIAL DEFENSE Ͷ The rule above stated applies equally
to a special defense stated in the answer as to the plaintiff's cause of
action.
5.p 7. CONTRACTS; SURETY, PAROL EVIDENCE TO SHOW CHARACTER IN
WHICH PARTY IS BOUND. Ͷ The written contract which was the
subject of this action contained the corporate name signed at the
lower right-hand corner of the contract, in the manner usual with a
party signing in the character of principal obligor. The name of another
individual was signed somewhat below and to the left of the corporate
signature, after the customary manner of those who sign in a
subsidiary capacity; but no words were written to indicate clearly
whether this individual signed as a principal obligor or as surety. Held:
That parol evidence was admissible to show that the intention was
question the authority of Fernandez to bind it, to deny the due
execution of said contracts under oath, as prescribed in section 103 of
the Code of Civil Procedure. Said section, in the part pertinent to the
situation now under consideration, reads as follows:
6.p "When an action is brought upon a written instrument and the
complaint contains or has annexed a copy of such instrument, the
genuineness and due execution of the instrument shall be deemed
admitted, unless specifically denied under oath in the answer."
7.p No sworn answer denying the genuineness and due execution of the
contracts in question or questioning the authority of Ramon J.
Fernandez to bind the Orientalist Company was filed in this case; but
evidence was admitted without objection from the plaintiff, tending to
show that Ramon J. Fernandez had no such authority. This evidence
consisted of extracts from the minutes of the proceedings of the
company's board of directors and also of extracts from the minutes of
the proceedings of the company's stockholders, showing that the
making of this contract had been under consideration in both bodies
and that the authority to make the same had been withheld by the
 stockholders. It therefore becomes necessary for us to consider
whether the admission resulting from the failure of the defendant
company to deny the execution of the contracts under oath is binding
upon it for all purposes of this lawsuit, or whether such failure should
be considered a mere irregularity of procedure which was waived
when the evidence referred to was admitted without objection from
the plaintiff. The proper solution of this problem makes it necessary to
consider carefully the principle underlying the provision above quoted.
8.p If the name of the obligor, in a bond, is subscribed by one in his
presence, and by his direction, the effect is the same as if his name
should be signed with his own hand, and under such circumstances we
do not doubt that the obligor must deny his signature under oath, in
order to put the obligee to proof of the fact. Quit facit per aliam facit
per se, and when the name is signed by one thereunto authorized, it is
as much the signature of the principal as if written with his own hand.
Therefore, if the principal would deny the authority of the agent, as
the validity of the signature is thereby directly attacked, the denial
must be under oath.
9.p "Under the Judiciary Act of 1799, requiring the defendant to deny on
oath an instrument of writing, upon which he is sued, the plea in this
case should have been verified.
10.p If the person who signed this note for the company, and upon which
they are sued, was not authorized to make it, let them say so upon
oath, and the onus is then on the plaintiff to overcome the plea."
11.p "If an action is brought against a corporation upon a contract alleged
to be its contract, if it desires to set up the defense that the contract
was executed by one not authorized as its agent, it must plead non est
factum." (Thompson on Corporations, 1st ed., vol. 6, sec. 7631.)
12.p Again, says the same author:
13.p "A corporation can not avail itself of the defense that it had no power
to enter into the obligation to enforce which the suit is brought, unless
it pleads that defense. This principle applies equally where the
defendant intends to challenge the power of its officer or agent to
execute in its behalf the contract upon which the action is brought and
where it intends to defend on the ground of a total want of power in
the corporation to make such a contract."
14.p We are of the opinion that the failure of the defendant corporation to
make any issue in its answer with regard to the authority of Ramon J.
Fernandez to bind it, and particularly its failure to deny specifically
under oath the genuineness and due execution of the contracts sued
upon, have the effect of eliminating the question of his authority from
the case, considered as a matter of mere pleading The statute (sec.
103) plainly says that if a written instrument, the foundation of the
suit, is not denied upon oath, it shall be deemed to be admitted. It is
familiar doctrine that an admission made in a pleading can not be
controverted by the party making such admission; and all proof
submitted by him contrary thereto or inconsistent therewith should
simply be ignored by the court, whether objection is interposed by the
opposite party or not. We can see no reason why a constructive
admission, created by the express words of the statute, should be
considered to have less effect than any other admission.
15.p As appears upon the face of the contracts, the signature of Fernandez,
in his individual capacity, is not in line with the signature of the
Orientalist Company, but is set off to the left of the company's
signature and somewhat below. Observation teaches that it is
customary for persons who sign contracts in some capacity other than
that of principal obligor to place their signatures to one side; but we
hardly think that this circumstance alone would justify a court in
holding that Fernandez here took upon himself the responsibility of a
guarantor rather than that of a principal obligor. We do, however,
think that the form in which the contract is signed raises a doubt as to
what the real intention was; and we feel justified, in looking to the
evidence to discover that intention. In this connection it is entirely
clear, from the testimony of both Ramirez and Ramon J. Fernandez,
that the responsibility of the latter was intended to be that of a
guarantor. There is, to be sure, a certain difference between these
witnesses as to the nature of this guaranty, inasmuch as Fernandez
would have us believe that his name was signed as a guaranty that the
contract would be approved by the corporation, while Ramirez says
that the name was put on the contract for the purpose of
guaranteeing, not the approval of the contract but its performance.
We are convinced that the latter was the real intention of the
contracting parties.
 16.p We are not unmindful of the force of that rule of law which declares 385; Centenera vs. Garcia Palicio [1915], 29 Phil., 470, Mendezona vs. Philippine
that oral evidence is inadmissible to vary the effect of a written Sugar Estates Development Company and De Garay [1921], 41 Phil., 475.)
contract. But it must be remembered that ambiguities with respect to
the meaning of the language used by the parties may be explained by 4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ADMISSIONS. Ͷ Admissions or declarations to be competent
parol evidence and we see no reason why an ambiguity arising, as in must have been expressed in definite, certain, and unequivocal language.
this case, from the form in which the contract was signed may not be
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; CASE AT BAR. Ͷ On April 26, 1920, the Laguna Coconut Oil Co.
explained in the same way. It is certainly the duty of a court to seek
executed a promissory note for P50,000 in favor of the Philippine Vegetable Oil
the means of giving effect to the intention of the contracting parties
Company, Inc. On May 3, 1920, the Fidelity and Surety Company of the Philippine
rather than to seek pretexts for defeating it.
Islands made a notation on the note reading as follows:
17.p We are of the opinion that where a name is signed ambiguously, parol
evidence is admissible to show the character in which the signature "MANILA, May 3, 1920
was affixed. This conclusion is perhaps supported by the language of
the second paragraph of article 1281 of the Civil Code, which declares "For value received, we hereby obligate ourselves to hold the Laguna Coconut Oil
that if the words of a contract should appear contrary to the evident Co. harmless against loss for having discounted the foregoing note at the value
intention of the parties, the intention shall prevail. But the conclusion stated therein.
reached is, we think, deducible from the general principle that in case
of ambiguity parol evidence is admissible to show the intention of the
contracting parties. "FIDELITY AND SURETY CO. OF THE

./ 

' 7 !" PHILIPPINE ISLANDS

1. CONTRACTS; REFORMATION OF WRITTEN AGREEMENTS; SECTION 285 OF

THE CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE CONSTRUED, GENERAL RULE. Ͷ The courts will
reform a written agreement where, owing to mutual mistake, the language used "By (Sgd.) J. ELMER DELANEY
therein does not fully or accurately express the agreement and intent of the parties.
"Vice-President
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; WHAT NECESSARY TO PROVE. Ͷ To justify the reformation of a
written instrument upon the ground of mistake, the concurrence of three things are "Cedula F-3443, Jan. 2, 1920,
necessary: First, that the mistake should be of a fact; second, that the mistake
Manila, P. I.
should be proved by clear and convincing evidence; and, third, that the mistake
should be common to both parties to the instrument.

3. ID.; ID.; ID.; AMOUNT OF PROOF. Ͷ Relief by way of reformation of a "Attest:

written agreement will not be granted unless the proof of mutual mistake be of the
clearest and most satisfactory character. The amount of evidence necessary to (Sgd.) "A. D. TANNER
sustain a prayer for relief where it is sought to impugn a fact in a document is
"Secretary-Treasurer
always more than a mere preponderance of the evidence. (Philippine Sugar Estates
Development Company vs. Government of the Philippine Islands [1917], 247 U. S., "Cedula F-3447, Jan. 2, 1920
 Manila, P. I."
On May 4, 1920, the Philippine Vegetable Oil Co. endorsed the note in blank and
delivered it to the Bank of the Philippine Islands. It was contended that a mutual
mistake was made in the redaction of the note of guaranty by substituting the
words "Laguna Coconut Oil Co." for "Bank of the Philippine Islands." Held: That the
plaintiff bank has not established a mutual mistake by proof of the clearest and
most satisfactory character constituting more than a preponderance of the
evidence.
According to section 285 of the Code of Civil Procedure, a written agreement is
presumed to contain all the terms of the agreement. The Civil Code has articles to
the same effect. However, the Code of Civil Procedure permits evidence of the
terms of the agreement other than the contents of the writing in the following case:
Where a mistake or imperfection of the writing, or its failure to express the true
intent and agreement of the parties, is put in issue by the pleadings. This provision
of our local law was construed by the United States Supreme Court in the well-
known case of the Philippine Sugar Estates Development Company vs. Government
of the Philippine Islands ([1917], 247 U. S., 385). It was there announced that the
courts of equity will reform a written contract where, owing to mutual mistake, the
language used therein did not fully or accurately express the agreement and intent
of the parties. It was also stated that the relief by way of reformation will not be
granted unless the proof of mutual mistake be "of the clearest and most
satisfactory character." The court finally said that the evidence introduced by the
appellant met these stringent requirements.
Our local decisions have applied the rule that the amount of evidence necessary to
sustain a prayer for relief where it is sought to impugn a fact in a document is
always more than a mere preponderance of the evidence. (Centenera vs. Garcia
Palicio [1915], 29 Phil., 470; Mendezona vs. Philippine Sugar Estates Development
Co. and De Garay [1921], 41 Phil., 475.) Has the plaintiff carried the burden of proof
in this manner and to this extent? That is the question.
c
'  25

: !33 c 
 :
7 !3"
SYLLABUS
1. EVIDENCE; RULE WHERE AN AGREEMENT HAS BEEN REDUCE TO WRITING.
Ͷ When an agreement has been reduced to writing, the parties cannot be
permitted to adduce evidence to prove alleged practices which to all purposes
would alter the terms of the written agreement. Whatever is not found in the
writing must be understood to have been waived and abandoned.
2. ID.; OFFER OF COMPROMISE; RULE ON ITS ADMISSIBILITY. Ͷ An offer of
compromise is admissible in evidence, but where the amount named in the offer to
accept a certain sum in settlement appears to have been arrived at as a fair
estimate of value it is relevant. (El Varadero de Manila vs. Insular Lumber Company,
46 Phil., 176, 178.)
However, as a corollary to this particular assignment of error, defendant argues
that although the crop loan agreement expressly authorized it to sell plaintiff's
sugar without the latter's consent, it had, nevertheless, not availed of such
authority because of its policy to first secure the prior authority or instruction of the
planters before it could sell the sugar.
This contention is untenable. Although defendant presented evidence to show its
alleged practice of first securing its client's permission to sell sugar, the evidence is
inadmissible. The agreement between the parties had been reduced to writing, and
under its terms defendant could sell and was so authorized to sell plaintiff's sugar in
any manner it deemed convenient, provided that the proceeds thereof be credited
to plaintiff's account. Defendant now cannot be permitted to adduce evidence to
prove its alleged practice, which to all purposes, would alter the terms of the
written agreement. Section 22, Rule 123 of the Rules of Court provides: "When the
terms of an agreement have been reduced to writing, it is to be considered as
containing all those terms, and therefore, there can be, between the parties and
their successors in interest, no evidence of the terms of the agreement other than
the contents of the writing, except in the following cases: . . ." Whatever therefore
is not found in the writing must be understood to have been waived and
abandoned (3 MORAN 189). Inasmuch as the case at bar does not fall under any of
the exceptions mentioned in the Rule cited, defendant may not adduce evidence to
show a practice other than that permitted by the terms of the agreement. The
lower court therefore correctly ruled against the admissibility of such evidence.
1. CIVIL LAW; CONTRACTS, INTERPRETATION OF; INTENTION OF THE PARTIES
ASCERTAINED FROM DOCUMENT AS A WHOLE. Ͷ In ascertaining the intention of
the parties to a contract, the contents thereof should not be interpreted piecemeal,
but from an overall view of the document itself; all parts, provisions or terms are to
be considered, not read in isolation; doubtful ones should be given that sense which
may result from all of them, considered as a whole.
2. ID.; ID.; CONVEYANCE OF OWNERSHIP OF REAL PROPERTY. Ͷ Where a
party held himself liable to another for the foreclosure of real property he
borrowed from the other, and which he used as security for an obligation of his
which he failed to fulfill, and he declared in an affidavit, the truth of which was
attested to be true by the other in the same document, that he promised that he
would replace the foreclosed land with another piece of land planted to four
cavanes of seedlings, provided that his children may not be forced to give up the
harvest thereof and that neither may the land which was exchanged be demanded
immediately, the idea is conveyed that naked ownership of the land in substitution
was transferred from him to the other; else, there would be no sense in the proviso
that the fruits and physical possession of the land, rights to which are attributes of
ownership, could not immediately be demanded from his children.
3. ID.; TRUSTS; USUFRUCT; NEMO DAT NON QUOD HABET; EVIDENCE;
DECLARATION AGAINST INTEREST. Ͷ When the transferor divested himself of the
ownership of the land, qualified solely by withholding enjoyment of the fruits and
physical possession which may not be demanded immediately from his children, the
children are usufructuaries for an undetermined length of time, and hold the
property as trustees of the transferee. The transferor cannot transmit ownership to
his children. Nemo dat quod non habet. The declaration of the transferor, now
deceased, in the affidavit is against his own proprietary interests, and is binding
upon his heirs.
4. ID.; ID.; EVIDENCE; NO PARTICULAR WORDS REQUIRED TO CREATE
EXPRESS TRUSTS. Ͷ While the deed did not in definitive words institute the
transferor's children as trustees, a duty is therein imposed upon them, when the
proper time comes, to turn over both the fruits and the possession of the property
to the transferee. By Article 1444 of the Civil Code no particular words are required
for the creation of an express trust, it being sufficient that a trust is clearly
intended, Technical or particular forms of words or phrases such as "trust" or
"trustee", or the absence thereof, are not essential to a determination of the
intention to create a trust, nor whether the trustor knows that the relationship he
intends to create is called a trust, or whether he knows the precise characteristics
of trusts.
5. ID.; ID.; EFFECTIVE IN FAVOR OF BENEFICIARY WHO ACCEPTED IT. Ͷ Trust
is effective against the trustees and in favor of the beneficiary thereof, who
accepted it in the document itself. Article 1446, Civil Code.
6. ID.; ID.; EVIDENCE; IDENTITY OF LAND DETERMINED FROM SETTING OF
WRITINGS; PAROL EVIDENCE ADMISSIBLE TO MAKE CLEAR TERMS OF WRITTEN
TRUST. Ͷ Insofar as the identity of land involved in a trust is concerned, the
writings, in being considered for the purpose of satisfying the statute of frauds, are
to be considered in their setting, and parol evidence is admissible to make clear the
terms of a trust the existence of which is established by a writing.
7. ID.; ID.; MOTION TO DISMISS; STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS NOT A BAR. Ͷ
Given the fiduciary relation which, according to the complaint, is recognized by
defendants who are the trustees they may not invoke the statute of limitations in a
motion to dismiss, as a bar to beneficiary's action for delivery of real property.
8. ID.; PRESCRIPTION; REAL ACTIONS OVER IMMOVABLES PRESCRIBE AFTER
THIRTY YEARS. Ͷ When the action by an alleged owner of real property is aimed at
recover of possession thereof, a mere consequence of ownership, conditioned upon
the fixing of the period therefor, the suit, brought after ten years from the
execution of the document transferring ownership, is not barred by the statute of
limitations, because Article 1141 of the Civil Code provides that real actions over
immovables prescribe after thirty years, the defense of prescription being against
plaintiffs action, not acquisitive prescription.
9. REMEDIAL LAW; MOTION TO DISMISS; PENDENCY OF LAND REGISTRATION
PROCEEDINGS NOT A BAR TO A SUIT FOR DELIVERY; FAILURE TO OBJECT TO
REGISTRATION NOT A RELEASE OR ABANDONMENT. Ͷ A complaint which alleges
an agreement to defer delivery by defendants of real property to plaintiff as owner
thereof, and refusal of defendants to fix the period for such delivery, is not barred
by the pendency of land registration proceedings commenced by defendants.
Plaintiffs failure to object to defendant's regisor abandonment but simply means
that there is no case between the parties in reference thereto. In the event plaintiff
prospers with her complaint, she can require defendants, if they obtain title to the
property in the land registration proceeding, to execute a conveyance thereof in her
favor.
;  ;  7 !"
The contract executed in 1927 by respondents' predecessors stated that they being
in "urgent necessity for money," they "thought of selling" for P225.00 in favor of
petitioners' predecessors, an irrigated riceland, redeemable within ten years for the
"same amount of money"; that during the period of the vendee's "ownership" of
the land, the vendor will be "responsible for all tenancy matters"; and that "this
receipt is made as security." The riceland had an area of 1,269 square meters and
was valued at P1,000.00. In 1948, respondent sought the reconveyance of the land
after petitioners refused to accept their tender of payment. The trial court declared
that the document executed by respondents predecessors was a pacto de retro sale
and held that the respondents lost their right to redeem the land for not having
taken any step within the agreed period of ten years.
The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court, declared the contract an equitable
mortgage, and ordered the petitioners to return the land to the respondents
without paying the loan of P225.00 inasmuch as the same was deemed paid from
the fruits of the property which the former had been receiving for the past thirty-
two years.
The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Court of Appeals.
SYLLABUS
1. CIVIL LAW; CONTRACTS; INTERPRETATION OF; AMBIGUITY. Ͷ It is a basic
fundamental rule in the interpretation of a contract that if the terms thereof are
clear and leave no doubt upon intention of the contracting parties the literal
an equitable mortgage, where it appears that the reason behind the execution of
the contract was that the supposed vendor was in "urgent necessity for money";
that the price of the land was grossly inadequate; that the supposed vendor
remained in possession of the land, took charge of its cultivation and all tenancy
matters; that the supposed vendee never declared the property in his name for
taxation purposes nor did he pay the taxes thereon since the execution of the
document ; and that he failed to take any steps for 32 years since the contract was
executed to consolidate his alleged ownership over the land.
4. ID.; ID.; INTERPRETATION OF; DOUBTS IN ONEROUS CONTRACTS
RESOLVED IN FAVOR OF GREATEST RECIPROCITY OF INTEREST. Ͷ In case of any
doubt concerning the surrounding circumstances in the execution of a contract, the
least transmission of rights and interests shall prevail if the contract is gratuitous,
and, if onerous the doubt is to be settled in favor of the greatest reciprocity of
interests. Thus, in an action to recover a parcel of land where the plaintiff alleged
that he merely mortgaged the land to secure payment of P175.00, and which land
the defendant refused to return to the ground that the latter allegedly bought the
property, the transaction over the property was considered a loan because "such a
contract involves a smaller transmission of rights and interests, and the debtor does
not surrender all rights to his property but simply confers upon the creditor the
right to collect what is owing from the value as security, there existing between the
parties a greater reciprocity of rights and obligations." (Olina vs. Medina, 13, Phil.
379)

 .
#
7 ! 
meaning of the stipulation shall control, but when the words appear to be contrary
to the evident intention of the parties, the latter shall prevail over the former.
2. ID.; ID.; INTENTIONS OF THE PARTIES PREVAIL OVER LITERAL
SIGNIFICATIONS OF THE CONTRACT. Ͷ Where an ambiguity is caused by the
conflicting terminologies in the document, inquiry into the reasons behind the
transaction and other circumstances accompanying it becomes necessary so as to
determine the true intent of the parties. Once the intent becomes clear then it shall
be made to prevail over what on its face the document appears to be. Such case is
to be resolved on the basis of the circumstances attending the transaction.
3. ID.; ID.; CIRCUMSTANCE SHOWING THAT TRANSACTION IS ONE OF THE
EQUITABLE MORTGAGE AND NOT PACTO DE RETRO SALE. Ͷ Although the contract
between the parties upon its face is one of the sale with right to repurchase,
nevertheless, the transaction shall be considered not a sale but a loan secured by

SYLLABUS
1. CONTRACT; GUARANTY; MUTUAL AGREEMENT TO SIGN CONTRACT OF
GUARANTY. Ͷ Where several persons agree to join as guarantors in the execution
of a contract of guaranty, and the obligee is aware that the promise of each to sign
is made in consideration of the agreement of the others also to sign, the guaranty
does not become effective until all have joined in the execution of the instrument.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; CASE AT BAR. Ͷ The plaintiff company, acting as purchasing
agent in the United States for a mercantile company doing business in Manila,
desired security against loss by reason of purchases made for the latter. Thereupon
three directors of the Manila company and one Scott, the Manila agent of the
plaintiff company, and who was also a director in the Manila company, agreed
together that these four should sign a contract personally guaranteeing the plaintiff
company against loss. A contract to this effect was signed by the three and was by
them transmitted to Scott without reservation. The latter kept the document
without signing it himself; and later this action was brought to enforce the
obligation against two of the signatory parties Held: That notwithstanding the
document was complete on its face and the delivery thereof to Scott was
unqualified, the instrument nevertheless failed to express the agreement which had
been made; and as the plaintiff company, by its agent, had notice of the terms of
the original agreement, the action could not be maintained. The failure of said
agent to complete the contract by fixing his own name thereto prevented the
agreement from taking effect.
3. ID.; WRITTEN DOCUMENT; EXTRINSIC EVIDENCE OF STIPULATIONS
PREREQUISITE TO LIABILITY. Ͷ The rule that extrinsic evidence is not admissible to
  /' !!
vary the terms of a written agreement has reference to the terms or obligations
expressed in a contract the existence of which is proved or admitted. This rule does
not prevent the introduction of extrinsic evidence to show that a supposed contract
never became effective be reason of the failure of some collateral condition or
stipulation prerequisite to liability.
;
'
:
3. PLEADINGS AND PRACTICE; FILING OF ACTION NOT PREMATURE WHERE
SUPPOSED AGREEMENT OF EXTENSION COULD HAVE BEEN PROVEN INEFFECTIVE IF
THE TRIAL COURT HAD ADMITTED PAROLE EVIDENCE OF CONDITION PRECEDENT
NOT COMPLIED WITH. Ͷ Had the trial court permitted, as it should, the plaintiff to
prove the condition precedent to the extension of the payment, the said plaintiff
would have been able to show that because the defendants had failed to pay a
substantial down payment, the agreement was breached and the contract
contained in Exhibit "L", never became effective and the extension should be
considered as not having been given at all. So that, although the complaint was filed
on February 20, 1957, three months before the deadline of the extension on May
31, 1957, there would be no premature institution of the case.
):
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; FINDINGS OF FACT OF THE APPELLATE COURT
GENERALLY UPHELD; CASE AT BAR, AN EXCEPTION. Ͷ It was erroneous for the
respondent courts to affirm that the original contract concluded on June 20, 1978,
 2
 !36 continued to regulate the relations of the parties. What it should have held instead
SYLLABUS
1. EVIDENCE; PAROLE EVIDENCE RULE; EXCEPTIONS; WHEN OPERATION OF
CONTRACT DEPENDS ON OCCURRENCE OF AN EVENT WHICH IS A CONDITION
PRECEDENT, SUCH MAY BE ESTABLISHED BY PAROLE EVIDENCE. Ͷ The lower court
should have admitted the parol evidence sought to be introduced to prove the
failure of the document in question to express the true intent and agreement of the
parties. It should not have improvidently and hastily excluded said parol evidence,
knowing that the subject- matter treated therein, was one of the exceptions to the
parol evidence rule. When the operation of the contract is made to depend upon
the occurrence of an event, which, for that reason is a condition precedent, such
may be established by parol evidence.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; CASE AT BAR. Ͷ Where the agreement extending time for
payment of the defendants' accounts to a date subsequent to the filing of the
action to recover the said indebtedness, made reference to a previous agreement,
the trial court should have admitted evidence of surrounding circumstances to
show that the supposed agreement to extend never became effective by reason of
failure of some collateral condition.
was that the first written contract had been cancelled and replaced by the second
verbal contract because of the change in the destination of the cargo. To hold that
the old agreement was still valid and subsisting notwithstanding this substantial
change was to impose upon the petitioner a condition he had not, and would not
have, accepted under the new agreement.
2. CIVIL LAW; OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS; A CONTRACT MAY BE
ENTERED INTO IN WHATEVER FORM. Ͷ "A contract may be entered into in
whatever form except where the law requires a document or other special form as
in the contracts enumerated in Article 1388 of the Civil Code. The general rule,
therefore, is that a contract may be oral or written." (Tong v. Intermediate
Appellate Court, 156 SCRA 726)
3. MERCANTILE LAW; CARRIAGE OF GOODS BY SEA ACT; CONTRACT OF
AFFREIGHTMENT, DEFINED. Ͷ A contract of affreightment. As defined, a contract
of affreightment is a contract with the shipowner to hire his ship or part of it, for
the carriage of goods, and generally takes the form either of a charter party or a bill
of lading.
4. ID.; ID.; CHARTER PARTY; TERMS GOVERNED BY THE BILL OF LADING WHEN
ENTERED INTO VERBALLY. Ͷ Charter party may be oral, in which case the terms
thereof, not having been reduced to writing, shall be those embodied in the bill of
lading. (Articles 652 and 653, Code of Commerce; Compañia Maritima v. Insurance
Company of North America, 12 SCRA 213)

 
5. REMEDIAL LAW; PAROL EVIDENCE; INAPPLICABLE WHERE THE FIRST
AGREEMENT WAS NOT MERELY MODIFIED BUT ACTUALLY REPLACED. Ͷ The parol
evidence rule is clearly inapplicable because that involves the verbal modification Ͷ
usually not allowed Ͷ of a written agreement admittedly still valid and subsisting.
In the case at bar, the first written agreement had not merely been modified but
actually replaced by the second verbal agreement, which is perfectly valid even if
not in writing like the first.
6. MERCANTILE LAW; CODE OF COMMERCE; DEMURRAGE; NOT CARRIED
OVER THE SECOND CONTRACT WHERE THERE IS NO STIPULATION THEREON IN THE
FIRST CONTRACT. Ͷ Regarding the bill of lading, an examination thereof will reveal
that there is no condition or requirement therein for the payment of demurrage
charges. Under the afore-quoted Article 653 of the Code of Commerce, therefore,
there was no reason to read any stipulation for demurrage into the second
contract.
7. ID.; ID.; ID.; ABSENCE OF DELAY IN UNLOADING CARGO, NEGATES
LIABILITY. Ͷ Even assuming that the original agreement for demurrage had been
carried over in the second contract, there is no acceptable evidence of the delay
allegedly incurred by the petitioner in the unloading of its cargo in Roxas City. Uy's
testimony on this matter is self-serving, let alone the fact that he admittedly was
not present at the unloading. His corroboration is hearsay. This consisted merely of
Exhibits B and C, the so-called statement of facts regarding the unloading of the
cargo from the barge, prepared by the barge patron, a certain Ding Julian. This
person was not presented at the trial to testify on his report and could therefore
not be subjected to cross examination.
8. REMEDIAL LAW; SUPREME COURT; IT SHOULD NEVER BE ASSUMED THAT
DECISIONS UNDER REVIEW WILL BE AUTOMATICALLY AFFIRMED. Ͷ It should never
be assumed that when this Court sits to review the decisions of the lower courts, it
will merely and automatically affirm them without further inquiry on the
convenient assumption that they are correct. That may be a presumption, and it is
often valid, but it is never conclusive upon us. Such decisions are always examined
carefully and thoroughly by this Court, in the light of the issues and arguments
raised by the parties before it, and may be modified or even reversed whenever
warranted to give the deserving suitor the appropriate relief. As in this case.
 /
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; PAROL EVIDENCE RULE; CONSTRUED. Ͷ Under
the parol evidence rule, when the terms of an agreement have been reduced into
writing, it is considered as containing all the terms agreed upon, and there can be,
between the parties and their successors-in-interest, no evidence of such terms
other than the contents of the written agreement. However, a party may present
evidence to modify, explain or add to the terms of the written agreement if he puts
in issue in his pleading, the failure of the written agreement to express the true
intent of the parties thereto. HAECID
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ADMISSIBLE WHERE THE RIGHT TO REPURCHASE WAS THE
MOVING CAUSE OR FORMS PART OF THE DEED OF SALE; CASE AT BAR. Ͷ In the
case at bench, the fact which private respondents seek to establish by parol
evidence consists of the agreement or representation made by the NAC that
induced Inez Ouano to execute the deed of sale; that the vendors and their heirs
are given the right of repurchase should the government no longer need the
property. Where a parol contemporaneous agreement was the moving cause of the
written contract, or where the parol agreement forms part of the consideration of
the written contract, and it appears that the written contract was executed on the
faith of the parol contract or representation, such evidence is admissible. It is
recognized that proof is admissible of any collateral parol agreement that is not
inconsistent with the terms of the written contract though it may relate to the same
subject matter. The rule excluding parol evidence to vary or contradict a writing
does not extend so far as to preclude the admission of existing evidence to show
prior or contemporaneous collateral parol agreements between the parties, but
such evidence may be received, regardless of whether or not the written
agreement contains any reference to such collateral agreement, and whether the
action is at law or in equity.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; FAILURE TO OBJECT ADMISSION THEREOF, DEEMED WAIVED.
Ͷ More importantly, no objection was made by petitioner when private
respondents introduced evidence to show the right of repurchase granted by the
NAC to Inez Ouano. It has been repeatedly laid down as a rule of evidence that a
protest or objection against the admission of any evidence must be made at the 3. ID.; ID.; ID.; EFFECT OF FAILURE TO OBJECT. Ͷ When no timely objection
proper time, and if not so made, it will be understood to have been waived. or protest was made against the admission of parol evidence on respect to a
contract relative to real estate, and when the motion to strike out said evidence
4. CIVIL LAW; STATUTE OF FRAUDS; REQUIREMENT SUFFICIENTLY COMPLIED came too late; and if, on the other hand, the party against whom such evidence was
WHERE RIGHT TO REPURCHASE LOT FORMS PART OF THE DEED OF SALE. Ͷ Under presented cross-questioned the witnesses who testified in respect to the contract,
Art. 1403 of the Civil Code, a contract for the sale of real property shall be the said party will be understood to have waived the benefits of the law, and such
unenforceable unless the same or some note or memorandum thereof be in writing parol evidence is competent and admissible.
and subscribed by the party charged or his agent. Evidence of the agreement
cannot be received without the writing, or a secondary evidence of its contents. In 5 

= #


(+  6('

the case at bench, the deed of sale and the verbal agreement allowing the right of
repurchase should be considered as an integral whole. The deed of sale relied upon : , #

by petitioner is in itself the note or memorandum evidencing the contract. Thus, the
/
/ (+  6('
 
requirement of the Statute of Frauds has been sufficiently complied with.
+ 


#

< 
5. ID.; ID.; DOES NOT APPLY TO CONTRACTS PARTIALLY PERFORMED. Ͷ The
principle of the Statute of Frauds only applies to executory contracts and not to : , #

contracts either partially or totally performed, as in this case, where the sale has
been consummated; hence, the same is taken out of the scope of the Statute of +/
 
Frauds. As the deed of sale has been consummated, by virtue of which, petitioner
:
>   (+  6( 
6
accepted some benefits thereunder, it cannot now deny the existence of the
agreement. The Statute of Frauds was enacted for the purpose of preventing fraud. $
 
(+  6( 
1
It should not be made the instrument to further them.
0 '

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SYLLABUS
April 3, 2008 in CuRReNT IsSues
1. TRIAL; RECEPTION OF EVIDENCE; OBJECTIONS AND EXCEPTIONS; TIME FOR 

' 
: 

OBJECTION. Ͷ It has been repeatedly laid down as a rule of evidence that a protest 0 -'

 /
 
or objection against the admission of any evidence must be made at the proper
time, and that if not so made it will be understood to have been waived. The proper ŒN GENERAL:
time to make a protest or objection is when, from the question addressed to the
witness, or from the answer thereto, or from the presentation of the proof the What is the case of Neri vs. Senate Committee?
inadmissibility of the evidence is, or may be, inferred.
This case is about the Senate investigation of anomalies concerning
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; TIME TO MAKE MOTION TO STRIKE OUT. Ͷ A motion to strike the NBN-ZTE project. During the hearings, former NEDA head Romulo
out parol or documentary evidence from the record is useless and ineffective if Neri refused to answer certain questions involving his conversations
made without timely protest, objection, or opposition on the part of the party with President Arroyo on the ground they are covered by executive
against whom it was presented. privilege. When the Senate cited him in contempt and ordered his
arrest, Neri filed a case against the Senate with the Supreme Court.
On March 25, 2008, the Supreme Court ruled in favor of Neri and
upheld the claim of executive privilege.
ühat is ͞executive privilege͟?
It is the right of the President and high-level executive branch
officials to withhold information from Congress, the courts and the
public. It is a privilege of confidentiality which applies to
certain types of information of a sensitive character that would be
against the public interest to disclose. Executive privilege is
based on the constitution because it relates to the President͛s
effective discharge of executive powers. Its ultimate end is to
promote public interest and no other.
Œs executive privilege absolute?
No. Any claim of executive privilege must be weighed against other
interests recognized by the constitution, like the state policy of
full public disclosure of all transactions involving public interest,
the right of the people to information on matters of public concern,
the accountability of public officers, the power of legislative
inquiry, and the judicial power to secure evidence in deciding cases.
Did the revocation by the President of E.O. 464 on March 6, 2008
diminish the concept of executive privilege?
No. Executive privilege may still be invoked despite the President͛s
revocation of E.O. 464 because it is based on the constitution.
ON THE uONTENT OF THE PREME uORT DEuŒ ŒON:
What events led to the filing of the case before the Supreme Court?
On April 21, 2007, the DOTC and Zhing Xing Telecommunications
Equipment (ZTE), a corporation owned by the People͛s Republic of
China, executed a ͞Contract for the Supply of Equipment and Services
for the National Broadband Network Project͟ (NBN-ZTE Contract) worth
US$329,481,290.00 (around PhP 16B). The project sought to provide
landline, cellular and internet services in government offices
nationwide and was to be financed through a loan by China to the
Philippines. President Arroyo witnessed the contract signing in
China.
After its signing, reports of anomalies concerning the project (e.g.,
bribery, ͞overpricing͟ by US$ 130M, ͞kickback commissions͟ involving
top government officials, and loss of the contract) prompted the
Senate, through the Committees on Accountability of Public Officers
and Investigations (Blue Ribbon), Trade and Commerce, and National
Defense and Security, to conduct an inquiry in aid of legislation.
The inquiry was based on a number of Senate resolutions and in
connection with pending bills concerning funding in the procurement
of government projects, contracting of loans as development
assistance, and Senate concurrence to executive agreements.
In one of the hearings held on Sept. 26, 2007, former NEDA Director
General Romulo Neri testified that President Arroyo initially gave
instructions for the project to be undertaken on a Build-Operate-
Transfer (BOT) arrangement so the government would not spend money
for it, but eventually the project was awarded to ZTE with a
government-to-government loan from China. He also said that then
COMELEC Chairman Benjamin Abalos, the alleged broker in the project,
offered him PhP 200M in exchange for NEDA͛s approval of the project.
Neri testified that when he told President Arroyo of the bribe offer,
she told him not to accept it. But Neri refused to answer questions
about what he and the President discussed after that, invoking
executive privilege since they concerned his conversations with the
President. The Senate required him to appear again and testify on
November 20, 2007. On November 15, 2007, Executive Secretary Eduardo
Ermita wrote the Senate Committees and asked that Neri͛s testimony on
November 20, 2007 be dispensed with because he was invoking executive
privilege ͞by Order of the President͟ specifically on the following
questions:
a. Whether the President followed up on the NBN project?
b. Were you dictated to prioritize the ZTE?
c. Whether the President said to go ahead and approve the
project after being told about the alleged bribe?
When Neri failed to appear on November 20, 2007, the Senate required
him to show cause why he should not be cited in contempt. Neri
explained that he thought the only remaining questions were those he
claimed to be covered by executive privilege and that should there be
new matters to be taken up, he asked that he be informed in advance
of what else he needs to clarify so he could prepare himself.
On Dec. 7, 2007, Neri questioned the validity of the Senate͛s show
cause order before the Supreme Court. On January 30, 2008, the
Senate cited Neri in contempt and ordered his arrest for his failure
to appear in the Senate hearings. On February 1, 2008, Neri asked the
Supreme Court to stop the Senate from implementing its contempt
order, which the Court granted on Feb. 5, 2008. The Supreme Court
also required the parties to observe the status quo prevailing before
the issuance of the contempt order.
What reasons were given for the claim of executive privilege?
Executive Secretary Ermita said that ͞the context in which executive
privilege is being invoked is that the information sought to be
disclosed might impair our diplomatic as well as economic relations
with the People͛s Republic of China.͟ Neri further added that
his ͞conversations with the President dealt with delicate and
sensitive national security and diplomatic matters relating to the
impact of the bribery scandal involving high government officials and
the possible loss of confidence of foreign investors and lenders in
the Philippines.͟
ühat issues were considered by the upreme uourt in resolving the
case?
The Supreme Court said there were two crucial questions at the core
of the controversy:
a. Are the communications sought to be elicited by the three
questions covered by executive privilege?
b. Did the Senate Committees commit grave abuse of discretion in
citing Neri in contempt and ordering his arrest?
How did the Supreme Court resolve these issues?
The Supreme Court first recognized the power of Congress to conduct
inquiries in aid of legislation. The Court said that the power
extends even to executive officials and the only way for them to be
exempted is through a valid claim of executive privilege.
On the first question, the Supreme Court said that the communications
sought to be elicited by the three questions are covered by the
presidential communications privilege, which is one type of executive
privilege. Hence, the Senate cannot compel Neri to answer the three
questions.
On the second question, the Supreme Court said that the Senate
Committees committed grave abuse of discretion in citing Neri in
contempt. Hence, the Senate order citing Neri in contempt and
ordering his arrest was not valid.
What are the types of executive privilege?
a. state secrets (regarding military, diplomatic and other
security matters)
b. identity of government informers
c. information related to pending investigations
d. presidential communications
e. deliberative process
In what cases is the claim of executive privilege highly recognized?
The claim of executive privilege is highly recognized in cases where
the subject of inquiry relates to a power textually committed by the
constitution to the President, such as the commander-in-chief,
appointing, pardoning, and diplomatic powers of the President.
Information relating to these powers may enjoy greater
confidentiality than others.
ühat specifically are the executive privileges relating to
deliberations or communications of the President and other government
officials?
These are the presidential communications privilege and the
deliberative process privilege.
How are the presidential communications privilege and the
deliberative process privilege distinguished?
The presidential communications privilege applies to decision-making
of the President. It pertains to ͞communications, documents or other
materials that reflect presidential decision-making and deliberations
and that the President believes should remain confidential͟.
The deliberative process privilege applies to decision-making of
executive officials. It includes ͞advisory opinions, recommendations
and deliberations comprising part of a process by which governmental
decisions and policies are formulated.͟
Unlike the deliberative process privilege, the presidential
communications privilege applies to documents in their entirety, and
covers final and post-decisional materials as well as pre-
deliberative ones.
Moreover, congressional or judicial negation of the presidential
communications privilege is always subject to greater scrutiny than
denial of the deliberative process privilege.
ühat is the type of executive privilege claimed in this case?
The type of executive privilege claimed in this case is the
presidential communications privilege.
Is there a presumption in favor of presidential communications?
Yes. Presidential communications are ͞presumptively privileged͟.
The presumption is based on the President͛s generalized interest in
confidentiality. The privilege is necessary to guarantee the candor
of presidential advisors and to provide the President and those who
assist him with freedom to explore alternatives in the process of
shaping policies and making decisions and to do so in a way many
would be unwilling to express except privately.
The presumption can be overcome only by mere showing of public need
by the branch seeking access to presidential communications.
Who are covered by the presidential communications privilege?
Aside from the President, the presidential communications privilege
covers senior presidential advisors or Malacanang staff who
have ͞operational proximity͟ to direct presidential decision-making.
ühat are the elements of the presidential communications privilege?
The following are the elements of the presidential communications
privilege:
a. The protected communication must relate to a ͞quintessential
and non-delegable presidential power͟.
b. The communication must be authored or ͞solicited and
received͟ by a close advisor of the President or the President
himself. The advisor must be in ͞operational proximity͟ with the
President.
c. The privilege is a qualified privilege that may be overcome
by a showing of adequate or compelling need that would justify the
limitation of the privilege and that the information sought is
unavailable elsewhere by an appropriate investigating agency.
ühat are examples of ͞quintessential and non-delegable presidential
powers͟ which are covered by the presidential communications
privilege?
The privilege covers only those functions which form the core of
presidential authority. These are functions which
involve ͞quintessential and non-delegable presidential powers͟ such
as the powers of the president as commander-in-chief (i.e., to call
out the armed forces to suppress violence, to declare martial law, or
to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus), the power to
appoint officials and remove them, the power to grant pardons and
reprieves, the power to receive ambassadors, and the power to
negotiate treaties and to enter into execute agreements.
Are the elements of the presidential communications privilege present
in this case?
Yes. The communications elicited by the three questions are covered
by the presidential communications privilege because:
a. First, the communications relate to the power of the
President to enter into an executive agreement with other countries.
b. Second, the communications are received by Neri, who as a
Cabinet member can be considered a close advisor of the President.
c. Third, the Senate Committees have not adequately shown a
compelling need for the answers to the three questions in the
enactment of a law and of the unavailability of the information
elsewhere by an appropriate investigating authority.
Does the grant of the claim of executive privilege violate the right
of the people to information on matters of public concern?
No, for the following reasons:
a. Neri appeared before the Senate on Sept. 26, 2007 and was
questioned for 11 hours. He also expressed his willingness to answer
more questions from the Senators, except the three questions.
üas the claim of executive privilege properly invoked by the
President in this case?
Yes. For the claim to be properly invoked, there must be a formal
claim by the President stating the ͞precise and certain reason͟ for
preserving confidentiality. The grounds relied upon by Executive
Secretary Ermita are specific enough, since what is required is only
that an allegation be made ͞whether the information demanded involves
military or diplomatic secrets, closed-door Cabinet meetings, etc.͟
The particular ground must only be specified, and the following
statement of grounds by Executive Secretary Ermita satisfies the
requirement: ͞The context in which executive privilege is being
invoked is that the information sought to be disclosed might impair
our diplomatic as well as economic relations with the People͛s
Republic of China.͟
ühat reasons were given by the upreme uourt in holding that it was
wrong for the enate to cite Neri in contempt and order his arrest?
a. There was a legitimate claim of executive privilege.
b. The Senate͛s invitations to Neri did not include the possible
needed statute which prompted the inquiry, the subject of inquiry,
and the questions to be asked.
c. The contempt order lacked the required number of votes.
d. The Senate͛s rules of procedure on inquiries in aid of
legislation were not duly published.
e. The contempt order is arbitrary and precipitate because the
Senate did not first rule on the claim of executive privilege and
instead dismissed Neri͛s explanation as unsatisfactory.
Œ
ŒŒ 
 

  
 ŒŒ
b. The right to information is subject to limitation, such as
executive privilege. ü
m    
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c. The right of Congress to obtain information in aid of

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legislation cannot be equated with the people͛s right to
information. Congress cannot claim that every legislative inquiry is Executive privilege is in derogation of the search for truth.
an exercise of the people͛s right to information. However, the decision recognized Presidential communications as
presumptively privileged. Hence, the party seeking disclosure of the
information has the burden of overcoming the presumption in favor of
the confidentiality of Presidential communications.
This presumption is inconsistent with the Court͛s earlier statement
in Senate vs. Ermita (April 20, 2006) that ͞the presumption inclines
heavily against executive secrecy and in favor of disclosure͟. It
is also inconsistent with constitutional provisions on transparency
in governance and accountability of public officers, and the right of
the people to information on matters of public concern.

m   m
 
   


   


 ͙ writ of amparo and writ of habeas data. It can also cripple
Yes, the decision expands the coverage of executive privilege in at
least two ways:
a. The decision explained that the presidential communications
privilege covers communications authored or ͞solicited and received͟
by a close advisor of the President or the President himself. This
means that the privilege applies not only to communications that
directly involve the President, but also to communications involving
the President͛s close advisors, i.e., those in ͞operational
proximity͟ with the President. There is no definition
of ͞operational proximity͟, so it is not clear how far down the chain
of command the privilege extends. This expansion of the coverage of
the privilege means that information in many areas of the executive
branch will become ͞sequestered͟ from public view.
b. The decision also stated that the presidential communications
privilege applies to documents in their entirety, and covers final
and post-decisional materials as well as pre-deliberative ones. This
means that the privilege protects not only the deliberative or advice
portions of documents, i.e., communications made in the process of
arriving at presidential decisions, but also factual material or
information concerning decisions already reached by the President.
How will the decision affect other investigations?

The decision makes it easy for the President to invoke executive
privilege, since what is required is only that an allegation be
made ͞whether the information demanded involves military or
diplomatic secrets, closed-door Cabinet meetings, etc.͟ This in
effect will enable the use of executive privilege to hide misconduct
or crime. According to Fr. Bernas, S.J., the implication of the
ruling is that once the ͞presidential communications privilege͟ is
invoked, no evidence is needed to support it even if there are valid
reasons for disclosing the information sought. ͞This would
revolutionize the doctrine in a manner that can affect all other
investigations. This can, for instance, hamper effective use of the
efforts to battle official corruption ͙.͟
In particular, what is the effect of the decision on the Senate͛s
power to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation?
The decision severely limits the Senate͛s power of legislative
inquiry and its ability to investigate government anomalies in aid of
legislation. The decision encroaches upon matters internal to the
Senate as an institution separate from and co-equal to other branches
of government.
The decision, for instance, requires the Senate to give its questions
in advance of its hearings. But this is a requirement applicable
only to the question hour and not to inquiries in aid of
legislation. Moreover, it is impractical, since follow-up questions
of Senators will be difficult to anticipate.
The decision also requires the Senate to publish its rules of
procedure on legislative inquiries every three years. But the
Senate traditionally considered as a continuing body. Senate
committees continue to work even during senatorial elections. By
tradition and practice, the Senate does not re-publish its rules. To
require publication of its rules every three years is unnecessary and
inconsistent with its tradition and practice.
   
 
   mm  

   


 On January 22, 1986, said Regional Trial Court, after considering the petitioner's
motion of November 4, 1985, the respondents' opposition thereto dated January
No. Although the vote is 9 ʹ 6 in favor of upholding the claim of 15, 1986; the petitioner's Reply dated January 16, 1986, and the respondents'
executive privilege, two of the nine Justices concurred merely in the Rejoinder dated January 20, 1986, issued an order directing the respondents herein
result, while one Justice argued not on the basis of executive "to pay all officers and employees of petitioner their back salaries and wages
privilege. Hence, only six out of the nine Justices explained their corresponding to the period from February to August 29, 1985."
votes in favor of the claim of executive privilege. Six out of a
total of 15 Justices do not establish a doctrine. On February 4, 1986, respondents herein filed with this Court an "Appeal from, or
Petition to Set Aside, order to Pay Back Salaries dated 22 January 1986" praying for
    
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 the reversal and setting aside of the aforestated trial court's Order dated January

   22, 1986. This was formally opposed by Petitioner when it filed its "Answer to
Appeal (re: back salaries)" on February 26, 1986. A month later, on March 26, 1986,
The decision does not stop the Senate from continuing with its respondents filed their "Reply to the Answer" which petitioner traversed in a
investigations and from undertaking other inquiries, although the "Rejoinder to the Reply" dated April 2, 1986.
government has already declared that officials will not appear unless
In a normal situation, no controversy would be expected in the matter of the
the Senate rules are first published. Should Neri (and other
payment of said back salaries because in the instant case, the party praying for the
officials) appear, the Senate can ask him questions other than the
same is the employer Bank. The attendant circumstances here present have,
three questions. But Neri may again invoke executive privilege on
however, created a peculiar situation. There is resistance to the claim because the
other questions, which could result in another case before the
management of the assets of the Bank has been transferred to the Respondents'
Supreme Court, and the cycle may be repeated again and again. Such a
Receiver who perceived that the directive to pay back salaries after closure of the
situation, particularly where there appears to be a pattern of
Bank would be dissipation of the bank's assets to the prejudice of its various
concealment in government activities, will ultimately be harmful to
creditors.
public interest.
 There is, however, in this case a significant matter that deserves consideration of
this Court and which must be viewed from the stand-point of equity. What stands
.

 
.

(c  !3
out is that, regardless of whether the employees of Banco Filipino worked or not
RESOLUTION after January 25, 1985, there is the uncontested manifestation found in BF's Answer
to the Appeal, dated February 26, 1986 (Vol. IV of Case Records) that:
On November 4, 1985, Petitioner Bank filed in the instant case, a "Motion to Pay
Back Salaries to All BF Officers and Employees from February to August 29, 1985" in "2. In the fact the receiver/liquidator Carlota Valenzuela had paid Union
connection with its "Opposition to Respondents' Motion for Reconsideration or for employees of petitioner BF back salaries for no work from January 25, 1985 up to
Clarification of the Resolution of the Court En Banc of October 8, 1985." On June, 1985. . ." (Emphasis Supplied)
November 7, 1985, this Court referred said motion to pay back salaries to Branch
All employees, therefore, of petitioner Banco Filipino who have not yet received
136 (Judge Ricardo Francisco, presiding) of the Makati Regional Trial Court, which
their back salaries corresponding to the period from January 25, 1985 up to June,
this Court had earlier directed under our Resolution of October 8, 1985 issued in
1985 manifestly deserve and ought to be similarly paid by the respondent Monetary
G.R. No. 70054, to conduct hearings on the matter of the closure of petitioner Bank
Board. It is but fair that the issue whether or not the employees of petitioner Bank
and its alleged pre-planned liquidation.
had actually worked during said period should now be discounted considering this
voluntary act of respondent Monetary Board which would remove by estoppel any
impediment to the receipt by all bank employees of their back salaries from January
25, 1985 up to June, 1985, assuming that some of them have not yet received the
same.
As the remaining period from June, 1985 to August, 1985, involves but a minimal
period only of two (2) months, and considering the unfortunate plight of the
numerous employees who now invoke the sympathetic concern of this Court, and
inasmuch as the appealed Order for the payment of back salaries is only for a
limited period or up to August, 1985, the appealed order of November 7, 1985 may
be sustained.
Petitioner BF and its stockholders have long put on record their consent to this
payment of back salaries of its separated officers and employees. It is also averred
that BF intends to reopen its bank and branches, and the payment of back salaries
to its employees, no less would help in the preservation of its personnel which is
the bank's most important asset, apart from doing justice to those aggrieved
employees. It is mentioned that the Central Bank Liquidator has now more than a
billion pesos in cash of Banco Filipino since it continued to receive payments from
BF borrowers some P1.5 million a day. It is also said that with the deposits of
petitioner BF with the Bank of PI, there is money sufficient to allow the withdrawal
of the sums needed to pay the salaries of the employees who have been now out of
work for over a year. Apparently, no substantial prejudice will be incurred by the
parties to this case by providing for the payment of the distressed employees of the
bank for only a specified limited period until the other issues in the consolidated
cases are fully resolved.
On the other hand, the said plight of these employees of the Banco Filipino can be
readily realized and indeed, should deserve utmost liberal consideration.
WHEREFORE, ruling that the Order of November 7, 1985 of Judge Ricardo Francisco,
granting salary to the officers and employees of Banco Filipino for the period from
February, 1985 to August 29, 1985, may now be deemed moot and academic
insofar as it relates to the period from January 25, 1985 to June, 1985 and as the
remaining period, which is from June, 1985 up to August, 1985, covers but a
minimal span of two (2) months, the Court RESOLVES, for reasons of equity, to
allow the aforestated Order to remain undisturbed and to DISMISS the appeal
therefrom. This Order is immediately held executory. (Gutierrez, Jr., J., took no
part.)
SYLLABUS
1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED; CONFESSION; EXTRA-
JUDICIAL CONFESSION MADE WITHOUT ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL, INADMISSIBLE.
Ͷ The records are clear to the effect that the extrajudicial confession of Capulong
was made without the assistance of counsel. Therefore, applying our
pronouncements in the case of People v. Benigno Pineda y Dimatulac, (G.R. No.
72400, January 15, 1988), this issue has become academic. We said: "A discussion
of the alleged coercion and intimidation in the first assigned error has become
academic with the change in the Bill of Rights of the 1987 Constitution regarding
the rights of the accused. Article 3, Section 12 of the 1987 Constitution specifically
provides that the rights of the accused, among them the right to counsel, cannot be
waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel. Thus, even if the
confession of the accused is gospel truth, since it was made without assistance of
counsel, it becomes inadmissible in evidence regardless of the absence of coercion
or even if it had been voluntarily given."
2. CRIMINAL LAW; EVIDENCE; FACTUAL FINDINGS OF THE TRIAL COURT
GENERALLY ACCORDED HIGHEST RESPECT. Ͷ On the credibility of the witnesses,
the well-settled rule is that the trial court's findings are accorded the highest degree
of respect, it being in the position to observe the demeanor and manner of
testifying of the witnesses (People v. de Jesus, 145 SCRA 521).
3. ID.; ID.; CREDIBILITY OF WITNESSES; BURDEN OF PROOFS AND
PRESUMPTIONS; LAW ENFORCERS' TESTIMONIES GIVEN CREDENCE; PRESUMPTION
THAT THEY HAVE REGULARLY PERFORMED THEIR OFFICIAL DUTIES ABSENT PROOF
TO THE CONTRARY. Ͷ We give credence to the narration of the incident by the
three officers of the team because they are law enforcers and are, therefore,
presumed to have regularly performed their duty in the absence of proof to the
contrary (People v. Gamayon, 121 SCRA 642; and other cases cited.)
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ABSENCE OF IMPROPER MOTIVE. Ͷ The testimony of the
CANU officers are given credence because the record does not show that these
officers who were responsible for the appellant's entrapment were motivated by
any improper motives other than to accomplish their mission (See People v. de
Jesus, supra.).
5. ID.; ID.; NUMBER OF WITNESSES TO BE PRESENTED, DISCRETIONARY
FUNCTION OF THE PROSECUTION. Ͷ The number of witnesses to be presented and

  
$ the nature of the facts to be established during the examination of those witnesses
is a discretionary function of the prosecution. The non-presentation of Estacio as The procedure in criminal cases in the Philippine islands provides that a defendant
witness is not fatal to the prosecution's case. His testimony would be merely in a criminal proceeding may be a witness in his own behalf. When he avails himself
corroborative and cumulative (See People v. Cerelegia, 147 SCRA 538). of this right, he is subject to a rigid cross-examination and is bound by his
admissions, voluntarily given, in such examination. His admissions are presumed to

 
$   (+  6 
3 be given voluntarily and when thus given on a previous trial, they may be used
against him in a subsequent cause. (State vs. Glass, 50 Wis., 218; People vs. Kelley,
 

#+  47 Cal., 125; People vs. Gibbons, 43 Cal., 557.).chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
chanrobles virtual law library
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With reference to the second assignment of error, to wit, that the trial court erred
in receiving the testimony of the defendant, given in a former cause, as evidence
against him in this cause and basing his conviction thereon, it may be said, again
adopting the statement of the facts of the appellant in his brief, that "it appears
from the record herein (evidence, pp. 20 and 21) that the undersigned attorney (the
attorney for the defendant in both cases) advised the defendant, prior to the trial of
cause no. 7949, that he should testify in said cause that he was the lessee of the
house No. 26 Calle Chica, and that he lived there, and that the opium found on the
upper floor of said house belonged to him and was in his possession and custody;
that such evidence, so far from prejudicing him, should have the effect of freeing
him from the charge therein made against him. We have, therefore, the express
admission of the defendant in cause No. 7949, given in open court, that he was the
owner of the opium with which he is charged of having in his possession in the
present case. The fact that this admission was made by the defendant was clearly
proved during the trial of the present case by witnesses who heard it. No attempt
was made to show that the fact was not exactly as confessed by the
defendant.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
With reference to the admissibility of the admissions and declarations of a
defendant charged with a crime, the rule seems to be that the declarations made
by a defendant or by a third party, by his authority, if relevant, are admissible
against him. If the defendant has made the statements constituting an admission of
the facts charged in the complaint they are admissible against him. (Commonwealth
  
vs. Sanborn, 116 Mass., 61; People vs. Bosworth, 64 Hun (N. Y.), 72; People vs.
Cassidy, 133 N. Y., 612; State vs. Behrman, 114 N. C.,
797.).chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
The foregoing rule is based upon the presumption that no man would declare
anything against himself, unless such declarations were true. A man's acts, conduct,
and declarations, whereever made, provided they be voluntary, a readmissible
against him, for the reason that it is fair to presume that they correspond with the
truth, and it is his fault if they do not. (Truby vs. Seybert, 12 Pa. St.,
101,104.).chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
The rule is well established that a voluntary, unsworn statement of a person
charged with a crime, may be proved against him as a confession. If his voluntary
extrajudicial admissions are admissible against him, there seems to be no good
reason why his admissions made in open court, underoath, should not be accepted
against him.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
In the case of People vs. Kelley (47 Cal., 125) the court said:
If his voluntary, unsworn statements may be proved against him as a
confession, his voluntary testimony, underoath, given in a proceeding in
which he elects and is authorized to testify, ought to stand upon at least as
favorable a footing.
The justice of the foregoing rule seems to be fairly well illustrated in the following
example: Suppose the defendant in the present action making the confession
referred to above, upon some ground or other had secured, on appeal, a new trial,
and on that new trial should give testimony materially different from that which he
gave on the first trial. Could there be any doubt that in case his testimony on the
first trial might be given in evidence on the second, for the purpose of affecting his
credibility and for the purpose of influencing the court with reference to his guilt?
We have been unable to find any authority in jurisdictions where a defendant may
declare in his own behalf jurisprudence supporting the contention of the appellant.
c ? 

The third assignment of error cannot be sustained. In offering in evidence the
testimony given by Mr. Hemady and the Hashims in the earlier case, the defendant-
appellant did not claim that said testimony contained admissions against interest by
the parties to the action or their agents; if such had been the case, the testimony
would have been admissible without the laying of a foundation and without the
witnesses having testified in the case at bar. But the purpose of the offer of the
testimony was evidently to impeach the testimony of the same witnesses in the
present case and if so, a foundation should have been laid by calling the attention
of the witnesses to the former statements so as to give them opportunity to explain
before the statements were offered in evidence.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
chanrobles virtual law library
In discussing their first assignment of error, counsel for the defendant-appellant
insist that, taking into consideration the facts of the case and the circumstances
preceeding the same, it is obvious that the case is "fraudulent and that even if the
indebtedness claimed were over a true indebtedness, either the same had been
paid or payment thereof waived." This contention is not entirely without
foundation and though we cannot fully agree with counsel, we do think that, in
view of the very apparent unreliability of some of the oral evidence presented, the
plaintiff's recovery on its first cause of action should be limited to the amount
shown by its books of account.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary chanrobles virtual law
library
On December 31, 1924, the plaintiff's ledger showed a balance of P12,238.02
against the defendant Hashim, and it does not appear that he has incurred any
further indebtedness to the plaintiff since that date. The plaintiff explains that the
amount claimed in excess of the sum shown by the ledger represents interest at the
rate of 8 per centper annum, but under the circumstances of the case, we cannot
give much weight to this explanation. It clearly appears that the chattel mortgage
debt, upon which the plaintiff's first cause of action is based, is included in the
ledger account and it may properly beconsidered as merged therein. It also appears
that the account was balanced at the end of the years 1920, 1922 and 1924, and
considering the fact that the plaintiff corporation is a well conducted business
organization, it seems rather improbable that, in striking its book balances, it would
have overlooked the important item of interest if any interest on the book account
in question had been agreed upon.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary chanrobles virtual
law library
The judgment appealed from is, therefore, modified by reducing the plaintiff's
recovery to the sum of P12,238.02, with interest at the rate of 6 per cent per
annum from January 13, 1925, the date of the filing of the complaint. In all other
respects said judgment is affirmed without costs in this instance. So ordered.
We do not, however, agree with the trial court's characterization of the appellant's
declaration that she killed her husband as an extrajudicial confession. It is only an
admission. It is clear from Sections 26 and 33, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court that
there is a distinction between an admission and a confession. These sections reads
as follows:
Sec. 26. Admission of a party. - The act, declaration or admission
of a party as to a relevant fact may be given in evidence against
him.
xxx xxx xxx chanrobles virtual law library
Sec. 33. uonfession. - The declaration of an accused
acknowledging his guilt of the offense charged, or of any offense
necessarily included therein, may be given in evidence against
him.
In a confession. there is an acknowledgment of guilt. Admission is usually applied in
criminal cases to statements of fact by the accused which do not directly involve an
acknowledgment of guilt of the accused or of the criminal intent to commit the
offense with which he is charged. 1 Wharton 4 defines confession as follows:
A confession is an acknowledgment in express terms, by a party in
a criminal case, of his guilt of the crime charged, while an
admission is a statement by the accused, direct or implied, of
facts pertinent to the issue, and tending, in connection with proof
of other facts, to prove his guilt. In other words, an admission is
something less than a confession, and is but an acknowledgment
of some fact or circumstance which in itself is insufficient to
authorize a conviction, and which tends only to establish the
ultimate fact of guilt.
Underhill3 distinguishes a confession from an admission as follows:


 


# 

##
-
A confession is defined as an acknowledgment of guilt of the
crime charged or of the facts which constitute the crime; but it is
'+  6 
3
66
an admission and not a confession if the facts acknowledged raise
an inference of guilt only when considered with other facts.
'
  

"

 ;
9
 While Wigmore says:
 A confession is an acknowledgment in express
words, by the accused in a criminal case, of the
truth of the guilty fact charged or of some

essential part of it.
Nevertheless, whether it was a confession or an admission, it was admissible
against the appellant and, having been duly proved, together with the other facts
and circumstances, the burden of the evidence was shifted to the appellant to
disprove, by strong evidence, that she made the admission or, admitting it, to prove
that she was not guilty of killing her husband. As earlier shown, the trial court
characterized her story as "palpably a put-up scenario
. . . . [A] story which runs against the grain of ordinary reality, controverts logic and
assails common sense." The five reasons enumerated by it to support this
conclusion are founded on or are inferred from facts duly established by the
can not be considered admissions that Shinko received the questioned
commissions since neither statements declared categorically that Shinko
did in fact receive the commissions and that these arose from the sale of
CMS's logs.
As correctly stated by the appellate court:
It is a rule that "a statement is not competent as an admission
where it does not, under a reasonable construction, appear to
admit or acknowledge the fact which is sought to be proved by it".
An admission or declaration to be competent must have been
expressed in definite, certain and unequivocal language (Bank of
the Philippine Islands vs. Fidelity & Surety Co., 51 Phil. 57, 64).
prosecution or are otherwise solidly based on common experience, logic, and 
 

common sense.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
At the core of the controversy is Section 20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution, to
The trial court had stated that if indeed the appellant never confessed to Eclipse
which respondent Judge has given a construction that is disputed by the People.
that she killed her husband, she should have protested when Eclipse reported to
The section reads as follows:
the desk officer that she had confessed to the killing of her husband or she should
have attempted to correct the entry in the police blotter containing this inculpatory
report. The appellant demonstrated her penchant for falsehood when, in order to SEC. 20. No person shall be compelled to be a witness against
refute this statement, she asserted in her brief that nothing in the record clearly himself Any person under investigation for the commission of an
shows that she heard Eclipse making the report and that she read the entry in the offense shall have the right to remain silent and to counsel, and to
police blotter. She conveniently forgot that on cross-examination she admitted be informed of such right. No force, violence, threat, intimidation,
having heard Eclipse making the report but claiming that she did not protest or any other means which vitiates the free will shall be used
against him. Any confession obtained in violation of this section
because she was not in her right senses and was in a state of shock at the time.
shall be inadmissible in evidence.
';
$$$ 

# 
It should at once be apparent that there are two (2) rights, or sets of rights, dealt
with in the section, namely:
and that of Atty. V. E. Del Rosario,
1) the right against self-incrimination - i.e., the right of a person
. . . It does not seem proper, therefore, for CMS Logging, Inc., as not to be compelled to be a witness against himself - set out in
principal, to concern itself with, much less question, the right of the first sentence, which is a verbatim reproduction of Section 18,
Shinko Trading Co., Ltd. with which our client debt directly, to Article III of the 1935 Constitution, and is similar to that accorded
whatever benefits it might have derived form the ultimate by the Fifth Amendment of the American Constitution, and


consumer/buyer of these logs, Toyo Menka Kaisha, Ltd. There chanrobles virtual law library
appears to be no justification for your client's contention that
these benefits, whether they can be considered as commissions
2) the rights of a person in custodial interrogation, i.e., the rights
paid by Toyo Menka Kaisha to Shinko Trading, are to be regarded
of every suspect "under investigation for the commission of an
part of the gross sales.
offense."

Parenthetically, the 1987 Constitution indicates much more clearly the individuality
and disparateness of these rights. It has placed the rights in separate sections. The
right against self- incrimination, "No person shall be compelled to be a witness
against himself," is now embodied in Section 17, Article III of the 1987 Constitution.
The lights of a person in custodial interrogation, which have been made more
explicit, are now contained in Section 12 of the same Article III. 6 chanrobles virtual
law library
Right Against Self-Incrimination chanrobles virtual law library
The first right, against self-incrimination, mentioned in Section 20, Article IV of the
1973 Constitution, is accorded to every person who gives evidence, whether
voluntarily or under compulsion of subpoena, in any civil, criminal, or administrative
proceeding. 1The right is NOT to "be compelled to be a witness against himself"
chanrobles virtual law library
The precept set out in that first sentence has a settled meaning. 4It prescribes an
"option of refusal to answer incriminating questions and not a prohibition of
inquiry." 3It simply secures to a witness, whether he be a party or not, the right to
refue to answer any particular incriminatory question, i.e., one the answer to which
has a tendency to incriminate him for some crime. However, the right can be
claimed only when the specific question, incriminatory in character, is actually put
to the witness. It cannot be claimed at any other time. It does not give a witness the
right to disregard a subpoena, to decline to appear before the court at the time
appointed, or to refuse to testify altogether. The witness receiving a subpoena must
obey it, appear as required, take the stand, be sworn and answer questions. It is
only when a particular question is addressed to him, the answer to which may
incriminate him for some offense, that he may refuse to answer on the strength of
the constitutional guaranty.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary chanrobles virtual law
library
That first sentence of Section 20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution does not
impose on the judge, or other officer presiding over a trial, hearing or investigation,
any affirmative obligation to advise a witness of his right against self-incrimination.
It is a right that a witness knows or should know, in accordance with the well known
axiom that every one is presumed to know the law, that ignorance of the law
excuses no one. Furthermore, in the very nature of things, neither the judge nor the
witness can be expected to know in advance the character or effect of a question to
be put to the latter. " chanrobles virtual law library
The right against self-incrimination is not self- executing or automatically
operational. It must be claimed. If not claimed by or in behalf of the witness, the
protection does not come into play. It follows that the right may be waived,
expressly, or impliedly, as by a failure to claim it at the appropriate time.
chanrobles virtual law library
Rights in Custodial Interrogation chanrobles virtual law library
Section 20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution also treats of a second right, or better
said, group of rights. These rights apply to persons "under investigation for the
commission of an offense," i.e., "suspects" under investigation by police authorities;
and this is what makes these rights different from that embodied in the first
sentence, that against self-incrimination which, as aforestated, indiscriminately
applies to any person testifying in any proceeding, civil, criminal, or
administrative.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
This provision granting explicit rights to persons under investigation for an offense
was not in the 1935 Constitution. It is avowedly derived from the decision of the
U.S. Supreme Court in Miranda v. Arizona, ! a decision described as an "earthquake

in the world of law enforcement." chanrobles virtual law library
Section 20 states that whenever any person is "under investigation for the
commission of an offense"--
1) he shall have the right to remain silent and to counsel, and to
be informed of such right,  
2) nor force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means

which vitiates the free will shall be used against him; and
chanrobles virtual law library
3) any confession obtained in violation of x x (these rights shall be
6
inadmissible in evidence. chanrobles virtual law library
In Miranda, Chief Justice Warren summarized the procedural safeguards laid down
for a person in police custody, "in-custody interrogation" being regarded as the
commencement of an adversary proceeding against the suspect. 1 chanrobles
virtual law library
He must be warned prior to any questioning that he has the right to remain silent,
that anything he says can be used against him in a court of law, that he has the right
to the presence of an attorney, and that if he cannot afford an attorney one will be
appointed for him prior to any questioning if he so desires. Opportunity to exercise
those rights must be afforded to him throughout the interrogation. After such
warnings have been given, such opportunity afforded him, the individual may
knowingly and intelligently waive these rights and agree to answer or make a
statement. But unless and until such warnings and waivers are demonstrated by the
prosecution at the trial, no evidence obtained as a result of interrogation can be
used against him.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
The objective is to prohibit "incommunicado interrogation of individuals in a police-
dominated atmosphere, resulting in self-incriminating statement without full
warnings of constitutional rights." 4 chanrobles virtual law library
The rights above specified, to repeat, exist only in "custodial interrogations," or "in-
3
custody interrogation of accused persons." And, as this Court has already stated,
by custodial interrogation is meant "questioning initiated by law enforcement
officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his
freedom of action in any significant way." " The situation contemplated has also
been more precisely described by this Court."  occasion to speak of his right while under "custodial interrogation" laid down by the
.. . After a person is arrested and his custodial investigation begins
a confrontation arises which at best may be tanned unequal. The
detainee is brought to an army camp or police headquarters and
there questioned and "cross-examined" not only by one but as
many investigators as may be necessary to break down his
morale. He finds himself in strange and unfamiliar surroundings,
and every person he meets he considers hostile to him. The
investigators are well-trained and seasoned in their work. They
employ all the methods and means that experience and study
have taught them to extract the truth, or what may pass for it, out
of the detainee. Most detainees are unlettered and are not aware
of their constitutional rights. And even if they were, the
intimidating and coercive presence of the officers of the law in
such an atmosphere overwhelms them into silence. Section 20 of
the Bill of Rights seeks to remedy this imbalance.
Not every statement made to the police by a person involved in some crime is
within the scope of the constitutional protection. If not made "under custodial
interrogation," or "under investigation for the commission of an offense," the
!
statement is not protected. Thus, in one case, where a person went to a police
precinct and before any sort of investigation could be initiated, declared that he
was giving himself up for the killing of an old woman because she was threatening
to kill him by barang, or witchcraft, this Court ruled that such a statement was
admissible, compliance with the constitutional procedure on custodial interrogation
not being exigible under the circumstances.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary chanrobles
virtual law library
Rights of Defendant in Criminal Case chanrobles virtual law library
As Regards Giving of Testimony chanrobles virtual law library
It is pertinent at this point to inquire whether the rights just discussed, i.e., (1) that
against self-incrimination and (2) those during custodial interrogation apply to
persons under preliminary investigation or already charged in court for a
crime.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
It seems quite evident that a defendant on trial or under preliminary investigation is
not under custodial interrogation. His interrogation by the police, if any there had
been would already have been ended at the time of the filing of the criminal case in
court (or the public prosecutors' office). Hence, with respect to a defendant in a
criminal case already pending in court (or the public prosecutor's office), there is no
second and subsequent sentences of Section 20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution,
for the obvious reason that he is no longer under "custodial interrogation."
chanrobles virtual law library
But unquestionably, the accused in court (or undergoing preliminary investigation
before the public prosecutor), in common with all other persons, possesses the
right against self- incrimination set out in the first sentence of Section 20 Article IV
of the 1973 Constitution, i.e., the right to refuse to answer a specific incriminatory
question at the time that it is put to him. 6 chanrobles virtual law library
Additionally, the accused in a criminal case in court has other rights in the matter of
giving testimony or refusing to do so. An accused "occupies a different tier of
protection from an ordinary witness." Under the Rules of Court, in all criminal
prosecutions the defendant is entitled among others- chanrobles virtual law library
1) to be exempt from being a witness against himself, 6 and 2) to testify as witness
in his own behalf; but if he offers himself as a witness he may be cross-examined as
any other witness; however, his neglect or refusal to be a witness shall not in any
6
manner prejudice or be used against him. chanrobles virtual law library
The right of the defendant in a criminal case "to be exempt from being a witness
against himself' signifies that he cannot be compelled to testify or produce evidence
in the criminal case in which he is the accused, or one of the accused. He cannot be
compelled to do so even by subpoena or other process or order of the Court. He
cannot be required to be a witness either for the prosecution, or for a co-accused,
66
or even for himself. In other words - unlike an ordinary witness (or a party in a
civil action) who may be compelled to testify by subpoena, having only the right to
refuse to answer a particular incriminatory question at the time it is put to him-the
defendant in a criminal action can refuse to testify altogether. He can refuse to take
the witness stand, be sworn, answer any question. 61 And, as the law categorically
states, "his neglect or refusal to be a witness shall not in any manner prejudice or
64
be used against him." chanrobles virtual law library
If he should wish to testify in his own behalf, however, he may do so. This is his
right. But if he does testify, then he "may be cross- examined as any other witness."
He may be cross-examined as to any matters stated in his direct examination, or
connected therewith . 63He may not on cross-examination refuse to answer any
question on the ground that the answer that he will give, or the evidence he will
produce, would have a tendency to incriminate him for the crime with which he is
charged.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
It must however be made clear that if the defendant in a criminal action be asked a
question which might incriminate him, not for the crime with which he is charged,
but for some other crime, distinct from that of which he is accused, he may decline
to answer that specific question, on the strength of the right against self-
incrimination granted by the first sentence of Section 20, Article IV of the 1973
Constitution (now Section 17 of the 1987 Constitution). Thus, assuming that in a
prosecution for murder, the accused should testify in his behalf, he may not on
cross-examination refuse to answer any question on the ground that he might be
implicated in that crime of murder; but he may decline to answer any particular
question which might implicate him for a different and distinct offense, say,
estafa.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
In fine, a person suspected of having committed a crime and subsequently charged
with its commission in court, has the following rights in the matter of his testifying
or producing evidence, to wit:
1) BEFORE THE CASE IS FILED IN COURT (or with the public
prosecutor, for preliminary investigation), but after having been
taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his liberty in some
significant way, and on being interrogated by the police: the
continuing right to remain silent and to counsel, and to be
informed thereof, not to be subjected to force, violence, threat,
intimidation or any other means which vitiates the free will; and
to have evidence obtained in violation of these rights rejected;
and chanrobles virtual law library
2) AFTER THE CASE IS FILED IN COURT -
6"
a) to refuse to be a witness; chanrobles virtual
law library
b) not to have any prejudice whatsoever result
to him by such refusal; chanrobles virtual law
library
c) to testify in his own behalf, subject to cross-
examination by the prosecution; chanrobles
virtual law library
d) WHILE TESTIFYING, to refuse to answer a
specific question which tends to incriminate him
for some crime other than that for which he is
then prosecuted.
It suffices to draw attention to the specific and peremptory requirement of the law
that disciplinary sanctions may not be imposed on any employee by his employer
until and unless the employee has been accorded due process, by which is meant
that the latter must be informed of the offenses ascribed to him and afforded
adequate time and opportunity to explain his side. The requirement entails the
making of statements, oral or written, by the employee under such administrative
investigation in his defense, with opportunity to solicit the assistance of counsel, or
his colleagues and friends. The employee may, of course, refuse to submit any
statement at the investigation, that is his privilege. But if he should opt to do so, in
his defense to the accusation against him, it would be absurd to reject his
statements, whether at the administrative investigation, or at a subsequent
criminal action brought against him, because he had not been accorded, prior to his
making and presenting them, his "Miranda rights" (to silence and to counsel and to
be informed thereof, etc.) which, to repeat, are relevant only in custodial
investigations. Indeed, it is self-evident that the employee's statements, whether
called "position paper," "answer," etc., are submitted by him precisely so that they
may be admitted and duly considered by the investigating officer or committee, in
negation or mitigation of his liability.
Of course the possibility cannot be discounted that in certain instances the judge's
expressed apprehensions may be realized, that violence or intimidation, undue
pressure or influence be brought to bear on an employee under investigation - or
for that matter, on a person being interrogated by another whom he has
supposedly offended. In such an event, any admission or confession wrung from the
person under interrogation would be inadmissible in evidence, on proof of the vice
or defect vitiating consent, not because of a violation of Section 20, Article IV of the
1973 Constitution, but simply on the general, incontestable proposition that
involuntary or coerced statements may not in justice be received against the Indeed, enactments of the type of section 49 were precisely aimed at the
makers thereof, and really should not be accorded any evidentiary value at all.c hearsay rule, for the rejection of hearsay evidence, often of strong
probative value, was one of the grievances of working people against the
: $ 

#


$  ( +  6'
6 procedure of the old employer's liability law.! Not that hearsay evidence is

adequate to support an award for compensation, but that as aptly


# #@ $
 observed: chanrobles virtual law library

0: <
)> 
 
 [A] compensation board which wants to avoid reversal on admissibility-of-
evidence grounds can beat do so by admitting everything and excluding
The right of a party to be present and give evidence as provided in section 49 would nothing. It can be presumed to apply the appropriate discount to various
be meaningless if it did not include the right to testify in his own behalf. Indeed, the kinds of hearsay, but it cannot be presumed to have reached a right result
Rules of Court enjoins that "neither parties nor other, persons interested in the if some important piece of evidence which have swayed the result has
outcome of a case shall be excluded."1 For while a party's interest may to some been erroneously excluded on technical grounds.
extent affect his credibility,4 his interest alone is not a ground for disregarding his
3 Here, aside from the evidence objected to, there is some other substantial evidence
testimony. The argument that the testimony of an interested party is self-serving
supporting the award. Aside from respondent's testimony, there is in the record the
and therefore is inadmissible in evidence misses the essential nature of self-serving testimony of Bienvenido Dizon, a former co-employee of Luis Raymundo. There is
evidence and the ground for its exclusion. Self-serving evidence is evidence made likewise evidence of the payment of gratuity to Raymundo on account of his
by a party out of court at one time; it does not include a party's testimony as a illness.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
witness in court. It is excluded on the same ground as any hearsay evidence, that is
the lack of opportunity for cross-examination by the adverse party, and on the In addition, there is a presumption created by section 44 that Raymundo's illness
consideration that its admission would open the door to fraud and to fabrication of was aggravated by the nature of his employment and that Dr. Vito Cruz' affidavit
testimony." On the other hand, a party's testimony in court is sworn and affords the that he treated Raymundo for tuberculosis is correct. This presumption is intended
to reverse the burden of proof and make it the duty of petitioner, as employer, to
other party the opportunity for cross-examination.
establish by substantial evidence, that the illness was not in fact aggravated by the
nature of the job. 12 Petitioner has failed to overcome the evidence and
Nor is there merit in the claim that Exhibits "E", "F" and "G" were erroneously presumptions in favor of respondent. It has chosen merely to rest its case on the
admitted in evidence. While they may be hearsay by common law rules of evidence, statement of its medical officer that the deceased employee never met an accident
they are nevertheless admissible under section 49 of the Act. Section 49 is while in its employment.
patterned after similar legislation in the United States, especially New York, where
the widespread adoption of Workmen's Compensation statutes was accompanied 
 
by a demand for a more simple and summary method of procedure and proof than
those given by the common law. As noted in a leading article. 5 
+ 


Legislatures needed the deep sense of injustice felt by workers that the  
 
burden of proof rested always on them and that probative evidence was
often kept out because it was hearsay. A growing distrust of our court 
 



system had thus grown up among working men and it was essential to the
successful operation of the acts that workmen feel they were treated fairly 
 '

 9
while at the same time duly protecting the interests of industry and the
community's interest in economy.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary chanrobles admission of guilt of said conspirator and the two accused and appellants in this
virtual law library case. (United States vs. Torres, 34 Phil., 994.) chanrobles virtual law library
The accused, by pretending that they were officers of the law and by employing
threats and intimidation to obtain, as they did, from the offended party the amount
of P200, are guilty of the crime of robbery. ( ee United States vs. Smith, 3 Phil., 20;
United States vs. Dedulo, 31 Phil., 298-301.) chanrobles virtual law library
It is not well founded to consider that the offense committed by the accused
have denounced them to the authorities because, generally, those who bribe do
not denounce such act for the reason that they do not want to object thereto, in
this case the alleged contraband, to be further disclosed to or discovered by others.
Such is not the case here, because it was the offended party herself who
denounced the commission of the offenses to the authorities.
appears to be bribery. It seems true that the offended witness was imputed to be 
 7

carrying a bundle which might have contained contraband, and for fear of discovery
of that contraband the husband of the offended party run away from the scene and Judging from her age at the time she witnessed the crime on February 8, 1987 until
did not come back. There exists, however, no evidence regarding said contraband she sat on the witness stand three months thereafter, Mary Jane's timidity to relay
other than the testimony of the accused themselves, which is not positive and what she saw is thus understandable for a fifteen-year old teenager who could not
convincing. Moreover, it should not escape our attention that said testimony, be expected to act like a matured woman. Withal, her inability to speak out her
coming as it does from the accused who naturally want to exculpate themselves, mind then was sufficiently clarified and her delay in informing others of what she
cannot be regarded as a free from a bias and a desire to so intensify the details knew about a criminal offense will not impair her credibility (People vs. Martinada,
thereof as to suit their case. Regarding the disappearance of the husband of the 194 SCRA 36 [1991]). Verily, Mary Jane's procrastination was brought about by the
offended party, we believe that nothing unfavorable to the case of the prosecution natural reticence and abhorrence of most individuals to get involved in a criminal
can be attributed thereby. For all we know, he might have gone to look for a case (People vs. Punzalan, 153 SCRA 1 [1987]).chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
policeman or any other agent of the law to report or make a complaint of what had chanrobles virtual law library
happened; and, as if to lend support to this view, it has been established in this case
that the offended party reported the occurrence to the police and was
At any rate, it is a longstanding rule consistently adhered to by this Court that
subsequently investigated by the prosecuting attorney's office which was the one
findings of fact of the judge who tried the case and heard the witnesses are not to
that filed the robbery charges against the accused. It was not the offended party
be disturbed on appeal unless there are substantial facts and circumstances which,
who determined what charges to be filed; neither did she have control of the case.
if properly considered, might affect the result of the case (People vs. Brioso, 37
What is clear and uncontradicted by the facts of this case is that it was the
SCRA 336 [1971]). Where the issues raised on appeal hinge on the credibility of
prosecuting attorney's office that took charge of the investigation and filing of the
witnesses, as in the case at bar, the appellate tribunals will accord due respect to
charges for robbery, and nothing like having so framed her accusation as to make
the assessment of facts made by the trial court, said court having had the
the crime committed by the accused appear to the robbery instead of bribery could
opportunity, not only of receiving the evidence, but also of observing the conduct
be attributed to the offended party. It is very logical that the prosecuting attorney,
and demeanor of the witnesses while testifying (People vs. Sales, 44 SCRA 489
being the one charged with the prosecution of offenses, should be determine the
[1972]).chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
information to be filed and cannot be controlled by the offended
party.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
A sedulous examination of the record fails to disclose the presence of facts or
circumstances of sufficient weight which would justify setting aside the findings of
After considering all the facts and circumstances in this case, we are of the opinion
fact of the trial court. The inconsistencies in the testimony of the prosecution
that the prosecuting attorney's office was right in filing the charge for robbery, it
witnesses pointed out by accused-appellant are so minor and trivial and thus do not
having been clearly proven that the one of the accused threatened the offended
impair the probative value of said testimony.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary chanrobles
party with a revolver while another was sticking something hard, possibly a revolver
virtual law library
also, against her back at that because of the intimidation employed by the accused
since the beginning she was prevailed upon to give them
To the query of whether or not the identity of accused-appellant was adequately
P200.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
established, there seems to be a variance between Mary Jane's declaration vis-a-vis
Jerry Lorenzo's own statement on which accused-appellant rests his plea for
Another circumstance with should not escape our attention is that, if true that
exculpation. While the sister of the victim was categorical enough to utter that
there was a bundle in the rig and that the offended party gave said sum to the
Evelyn was killed by Fernando Ocampo (TSN, May 14, 1987, p. 14), the cousin, who
accused as a bribe in view of the supposed contraband that she had, she would not
was then accidentally present, testified that he heard Mary Jane shouting that her
sister was dead without anything said about the identity of the culprit (TSN, May
20, 1987, p. 19; p. 22; p. 27; p. 31; p. 33). Notwithstanding such discrepancy, it has
been stressed that when the testimony of two witnesses contradict each other, the
court is not precluded from adopting the testimony which it believes to be true, as
in this case where the trial court relied on the positive testimony of the victim's
sister in support of its finding of accused-appellant's culpability (U. S. vs. Lasada, 18
Phil. 90 [1910];
2 Regalado, Remedial Law Compendium, Fifth Rev. Ed., 1988, p.553; ibal and
alazar, Jr., Compendium on Evidence, Second Ed., 1988, p. 393). In practical terms,
accused-appellant is engaged in a subtle experiment to impeach, nay, assail Mary
Jane's credibility - which issue, to repeat, should not now be reviewed in the light of
the well entrenched axiom in law that the faculty of assigning values to declarations
at the witness stand is primarily and almost exclusively conferred upon a trial judge
who, unlike appellate magistrates, is distinctly and advantageously positioned to
properly evaluate such testimony (People vs. Magallanes, et al., 650. G. 19216; 2
Regalado, supra, at p. 552)
1. PRIVATE DOCUMENT; LEGAL RECOGNITION. Ͷ The expression "legally
recognized," as used of a private document in article 1225 of the Civil Code, has
reference to the recognition of the validity of the instrument by the parties to its
execution when it is signed and delivered.
2. ID.; PRIVIES OF PARTIES SIGNING. Ͷ The word "privies," as used in article
1225 of the Civil Code, denotes not only the idea of succession in right of heirship or
testamentary legacy, but also succession by virtue of acts inter vivos, as by
assignment, subrogation, or purchase Ͷ in fact any act whereby the successor is
substituted in the place of the predecessor in interest. The purchaser at an
execution sale is, therefore, a privy of the execution debtor.
3. ID.; THIRD PARTIES. Ͷ The expression "third parties," as used in article
1227 of the Civil Code, means, simply, persons who have not intervened in the
execution of the instrument either as principals or witnesses


 


 4. ID., DATE OF EXECUTION OF INSTRUMENT. Ͷ Article 1227 of the Civil Code
does not operate to prohibit the introduction of evidence to show that an
'
 

instrument was executed as a private document on the date shown on its face. On

 
'= 
 8
 +  6( 
6 the contrary, such evidence is admissible; and the instrument will be given effect
from the true and proven date of its execution, as against those who signed it and


  (+  6( 
" their privies, with all the force of a public instrument The effect of article 1227 is to
create a presumption when no evidence other than the recitals of the document
+ /




itself is adduced to show the true date of its execution. In other words, the recital of
.
  (+  6('
 a private document as to the date of its execution is not accepted as legal proof;
and if the date is not proved by other competent evidence, the instrument can have

 
 
 effect only from the date of the acts specified in article 1227.

8

 
  5. FRAUD; CONVEYANCE IN FRAUD OF CREDITORS; BADGES OF FRAUD. Ͷ
The coexistence of numerous badges of fraud in a conveyance of property, made by
$ 
  a person against whom an action to recover a large sum of money was pending, is
held in this case to create a presumption of fraud sufficiently strong to justify

@
 
 
declaring the sale void, the court not being impressed with the proof submitted by

 
 (+  6 
6  the purchaser tending to show that the sale was made in good faith.

 
 9 6. ID.; ID.; ID.; CASE AT BAR. Ͷ A creditor who, after long litigation, had
recovered judgment for a considerable sum of money against his debtor, levied
SYLLABUS execution upon certain parcels of property as property of the latter. A son-in-law of
the latter then intervened and claimed the land by purchase made by contract of
sale with pacto de retro while the litigation was pending but before final judgment
in either instance. The land in question included substantially all of the debtor's
property; and the consideration alleged to have been given was less than half its
value. This sale is held to be void, as the suspicious circumstances attending the
alleged transaction raised a presumption of fraud, even apart from the presumption
expressed in article 1297 of the Civil Code, and the purchaser did not satisfactorily
prove that he was a purchaser in good faith. The secrecy of the purported sale and
the relation of kinship existing between the parties are noted as circumstances
indicative of collusion.

# :+

 Again, Lorenzo del Rosario signed the first document before he acquired from
SYLLABUS
1. ACTION; DISMISSAL; ERROR. Ͷ The defendant is entitled to have the case
dismissed where the plaintiff fails to establish the allegations in the complaint; and
an order overruling such motion is erroneous.
2. REALTY; POSSESSION; EVIDENCE. Ͷ Where one derives title to real estate
from another, the declaration act, or omission of the latter to the property is
evidence against the former only when made while the latter holds the title. (Sec.
278, Code of Civil Procedure.)
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; REGISTRATION; PRESUMPTION OF OWNERSHIP. Ͷ A
possessory information recorded in the property register is prima facie evidence of
the fact that the person who instituted the proceedings holds the property as
owner; and the presumption, under article 448 of the Civil Code, is that his title is
good unless the contrary is shown.
The third witness, Juan Villegas, testified that the land in question was formerly
included in the Gran Divisoria, and that all the land included in it belonged to the
city. In this particular his testimony is at variance with that of the precediing
to universal reputation. The testimony of this witness is not sufficient to establish
the presumption referred to.
Furthermore, this witness stated that the land in Calle Azcarraga had been
partitioned between the municipality and the Central Government, share and share
alike, and that the Central Government (not the city) retained Calles Gabriel de
Rivera and Barcelona, which are precisely the streets on which the property abuts
(bill of exceptions, pp. 15 and 16).
Cipriano Roco y Vera the ownership of the land referred to therein, the second
document being signed after he had transferred the land to the defendant Jacinto
del Rosario, who took possession of the same and had it registered, as the plaintiff
admits (par. 2 of the complaint), on the 23d of February, 1893. If this is so,
whatever statements Lorenzo del Rosario might have made in the documents
mentioned, they are not binding upon the defendant, because, under section 278 of
the Code of Civil Procedure, "where one derives title to real property from another,
the declaration, act, or omission of the latter, in relation to the property, is
evidence against the former only when made while the latter holds the title."
The plaintiff also introduced in evidence a map of the city of Manila. This map is not
before us. It is sufficient to say, in order to show that it has no value as evidence,
that the reliability of the map was not proven at the trial. The only witness
examined with regard to it was the city attorney. He was unable to say who made it
or who caused it to be made, or when it was made. He said only that he believed
the map had been drawn in the month of July, 1880, or prior to May, 1893. Neither
this nor his statement that the map was found among the archives of the city of
Manila is of itself sufficient to show that the map is authentic. No one appears to
certify as to its correctness.
.
'
+  6( 
61(
64
witness, who testified that the land belonged to the Central Government. Villega's
testimony was merely hearsay. It consisted of what he had learned from some of '


+ (+  6( 
 1
the oldest residents in that section of the city. His testimony was introduced by the
plaintiff apparently for the purpose of proving that the city was generally 
 
considered the owner of the land, drawing from this fact the presumption of actual
ownership under paragraph 11, section 334, of the Code of Civil Procedure. Such $ '
$
testimony, however, does not constitute the "common reputation" referred to in
SYLLABUS
the section mentioned. "common reputation," as used in that section, is equivalent
1. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; INTENT OR HABIT ESTABLISHED, IN CASE AT
BAR. Ͷ While it may be that pursuant to Section 48, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court
"evidence that one did or omitted to do a certain thing at one time is not admissible
to prove that he did or omitted to do the same or similar thing at another time," the
same Rule also provides that "it may be received to prove a specific intent or
knowledge, identity, plan, system, scheme, habit, custom or usage and the like."
Emiliana Gerona's credible testimony regarding the amounts petitioners received
from the Matictic project sufficiently establishes petitioners "intent" and/or "habit"
of demanding and receiving money from the contractor-complainant, such that the
latter, in exasperation, felt that enough was enough, to the prejudice of his future
contracts.
2. ID.; FINDINGS OF FACT OF THE TRIAL COURT GENERALLY UPHELD ON
APPEAL. Ͷ Appellate Courts will generally not disturb the findings of the Trial Court,
considering that it is in a better position to decide the question, having heard the
witnesses themselves and observed their deportment and manner of testifying
during the trial, unless it has plainly overlooked certain facts of substance and
value, that if considered, might affect the result of the case (People vs. Garcia, 89
SCRA 440).
While it may be that pursuant to Section 48, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court
"evidence that one did or omitted to do a certain thing at one time is not admissible
to prove that he did or omitted to do the same or similar thing at another time," the
same Rule also provides that "it may be received to prove a specific intent or
knowledge, identity, plan, system, scheme, habit, custom or usage and the like."
Emiliana Gerona's credible testimony regarding the amounts petitioners received
from the Matictic project sufficiently establishes petitioners "intent" and/or "habit"
of demanding and receiving money from the contractor-complainant, such that the
latter, in exasperation, felt that enough was enough, to the prejudice of his future
contracts. LLphil
In the final analysis, the errors assigned center on the issue of credibility of
witnesses in respect of which we have consistently held that Appellate Courts will
generally not disturb the findings of the Trial Court, considering that it is in a better
position to decide the question, having heard the witnesses themselves and
observed their deportment and manner of testifying during the trial, unless it has
plainly overlooked certain facts of substance and value, that if considered, might
affect the result of the case (People vs. Garcia, 89 SCRA 440). As the Sandiganbayan
had concluded:
"We have carefully examined in detail the evidence adduced by both parties in the
trial of the case under consideration, but WE failed to uncover any valid and cogent
reason to suspect that the institution of this case has been improperly motivated.
While it is true that the accused endeavored to question the sincerity and honesty
of the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, the reason ventured by the
accused in an effort to cast serious doubts on the credibility of said witnesses, is
insufficient to overcome the probable value or weight of their testimonies which
are properly confirmed by the documentary and circumstantial evidence adduced
by the prosecution in this case. It is hard to believe that the complainant who is a
contractor would jeopardize and prejudice his business interests and risk being
blacklisted in government infrastructure projects, knowing that with the institution
of the case, he may find it no longer advisable nor profitable to continue in his
construction ventures. It is hardly probable that the complainant would weave out
of the blue a serious accusation just to retaliate and take revenge on the accused.
xxx xxx xxx
"It can be gainsaid, therefore, that a proper appreciation and reasonable
consideration of the aforesaid testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, properly
confirmed and sustained by documentary and circumstantial evidence flatly reject a
favorable consideration of the claim of accused that the evidence presented against
them were fabricated."
All told, the testimonial, documentary and circumstantial evidence point to the guilt
of petitioners-accused beyond reasonable doubt.

+ 46
AN ACT TO EXEMPT THE PUBLISHER, EDITOR OR REPORTER OF ANY PUBLICATION
FROM REVEALING THE SOURCE OF PUBLISHED NEWS OR INFORMATION OBTAINED
IN CONFIDENCE
Section 1. The publisher, editor or duly accredited reporter of any newspaper,
magazine or periodical of general circulation cannot be compelled to reveal the
source of any news-report or information appearing in said publication which was
related in confidence to such publisher, editor or reporter, unless the court or a
House or committee of Congress finds that such revelation is demanded by the
interest of the State.
chan robles virtual law library
 correccional in its minimum period, temporary special disqualification and a fine
Sec. 2. All provisions of law or rules of court inconsistent with this Act are hereby not exceeding 50 pesos shall be imposed.
repealed or modified accordingly.
chan robles virtual law library Art. 230. Public officer revealing secrets of private individual. Ͷ Any public officer to
whom the secrets of any private individual shall become known by reason of his
Sec. 3. This Act shall take effect upon its approval. office who shall reveal such secrets, shall suffer the penalties of arresto mayor and
a fine not exceeding 1,000 pesos. chan robles virtual law library
chan robles virtual law library
Approved: October 5, 1946 5 
$(+  6('
4
+  1""
5 
)
&
$
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 1477 - AN ACT AMENDING SECTION ONE OF REPUBLIC ACT 
NUMBERED FIFTY-THREE, ENTITLED "AN ACT TO EXEMPT THE PUBLISHER, EDITOR, /$(  6 
63
COLUMNIST OR REPORTER OF ANY PUBLICATION FROM REVEALING THE SOURCE 
OF PUBLISHED NEWS OR INFORMATION OBTAINED IN CONFIDENCE"  
2

(2-+-0
-"134- "( !!( "'+31!

Section 1. Section one of Republic Act Numbered Fifty- three is amended to read
That the testimony of Guzman on appellant's oral confession is competent evidence
as follows:
finds support in People v. Tawat [G.R. No. L-62871, May 25, 1984, 129 SCRA 4311
which upheld the trial court's reliance on an extrajudicial confession given, not to a
"Section 1. Without prejudice to his liability under the civil and criminal laws, the
police officer during custodial interrogation, but to an ordinary farmer as the basis
publisher, editor, columnist or duly accredited reporter of any newspaper,
for conviction. The Court's pronouncements in the aforesaid case find relevance in
magazine or periodical of general circulation cannot be compelled to reveal the
the instant case:
source of any news-report or information appearing in said publication which was
related in confidence to such publisher, editor or reporter unless the court or a
House or committee of Congress finds that such revelation is demanded by the The declaration of an accused expressly acknowledging his guilt of
security of the State." the offense charged, may be given in evidence against him' (Sec.
29 Rule 130, Rules of Court). What Felicito told Ogalesco may in a
sense be also regarded as part of the res gestae.
Section 2. This Act shall take effect upon its approval.
The Rule is that "any person, otherwise competent as a witness,
Approved: June 15, 1956 who heard the confession, is competent to testify as to the
substance of what he heard if he heard and understood all of it.
+ 


 An oral confession need not be repeated verbatim, but in such
case it must be given in its substance." (23 C.J.S. 196.)
Section Three. Ͷ Revelation of secrets
Proof of the contents of an oral extrajudicial confession may be
Art. 229. Revelation of secrets by an officer. Ͷ Any public officer who shall reveal
made by the testimony of a person who testifies that he was
any secret known to him by reason of his official capacity, or shall wrongfully deliver
present, heard, understood, and remembers the substance of the
papers or copies of papers of which he may have charge and which should not be
conversation or statement made by the accused [citing Underhill's
published, shall suffer the penalties of prision correccional in its medium and
Criminal Evidence, 4th Ed., Niblack, Sec. 278, p. 551.) [at pp. 436-
maximum periods, perpetual special disqualification and a fine not exceeding 2,000
437; Emphasis supplied.]
pesos if the revelation of such secrets or the delivery of such papers shall have
caused serious damage to the public interest; otherwise, the penalties of prision
As heretofore stated, not a single eyewitness to the stabbing
incident had been presented by the prosecution. Thus, the record
 is totally bereft of any evidence as to the means or method rule against appellant as the evidence on record is ample to sustain the judgment of
resorted to by appellant in attacking the victim. It is needless to
conviction independent from his plea of guilty.
add that treachery cannot be deduced from mere presumption,
much less from sheer speculation. The same degree of proof to
dispel reasonable doubt is required before any conclusion may be Based on this rule, when a plea of guilty to a capital offense is entered, there
reached respecting the attendance of alevosia [People v. Duero,
G.R No. 65555, May 22, 1985, 136 SCRA 515, 519-520; Emphasis are three (3) conditions that the trial court must observe to obviate an improvident
supplied. ] plea of guilty by the accused: (1) it must conduct a searching inquiry into the
voluntariness and full comprehension by the accused of the consequences of his

$.(2-+- 1346( 6(3
plea; (2) it must require the prosecution to present evidence to prove the guilt of
Thus, while it is true that the testimony of a witness regarding a statement made by the accused and the precise degree of his culpability; and (3) it must ask the
another person, if intended to establish the truth of the fact asserted in the
statement, is clearly hearsay evidence, it is otherwise if the purpose of placing the accused whether he desires to present evidence on his behalf, and allow him to do
statement in the record is merely to establish the fact that the statement was made so if he so desires.
or the tenor of such statement. Regardless of the truth or falsity of a statement,
when the fact that it has been made is relevant, the hearsay rule does not apply and
the statement may be shown. As a matter of fact, evidence as to the making of the Such procedure falls short of the exacting guidelines in the conduct of a ͞searching
statement is not secondary but primary, for the statement itself may constitute a
16 inquiry,͟ as follows:
fact in issue, or be circumstantially relevant as to the existence of such a fact. For
this reason, the statement attributed to Dominga regarding the source of the funds
used to purchase the subject property related to the court by Margarita is
admissible if only to establish the fact that such statement was made and the tenor
thereof.
(1) Ascertain from the accused himself (a) how he was
Besides, the testimony of Margarita is not the main basis for the RTC͛s decision. In brought into the custody of the law; (b) whether he had the
fact, her testimony is not indispensable. It merely serves to corroborate the assistance of a competent counsel during the custodial and
testimonies of the respondents on the source of the funds used in purchasing the preliminary investigations; and (c) under what conditions he was
subject property. The testimonies of all three witnesses for the plaintiffs were detained and interrogated during the investigations. This is
found to be convincing and credible by the RTC. This Court will not alter the findings intended to rule out the possibility that the accused has been
of the RTC on the credibility of witnesses, principally because trial courts have vastly coerced or placed under a state of duress either by actual threats
superior advantages in ascertaining the truth and in detecting falsehood as they of physical harm coming from malevolent quarters or simply
have the opportunity to observe the manner and demeanor of witnesses while because of the judge͛s intimidating robes.
testifying.
 (2) Ask the defense counsel a series of questions as to
 
2 (2-+- "143("("
It must be conceded at the outset that the trial court failed in its duty to conduct
the prescribed ͞searching inquiry͟ into the voluntariness of appellant͛s plea of
guilty and full comprehension thereof. Consequently, appellant͛s plea of guilty was
made improvidently and it is rendered inefficacious. Nevertheless, the Court must
whether he had conferred with, and completely explained to, the
accused the meaning and consequences of a plea of guilty.
(3) Elicit information about the personality profile of the
accused, such as his age, socio-economic status, and educational
background, which may serve as a trustworthy index of his
capacity to give a free and informed plea of guilty.
 (4) Inform the accused of the exact length of imprisonment the judge to ensure that the accused does not labor under these
or nature of the penalty under the law and the certainty that he mistaken impressions because a plea of guilty carries with it not
will serve such sentence. For not infrequently, an accused pleads only the admission of authorship of the crime proper but also of
guilty in the hope of a lenient treatment or upon bad advice or the aggravating circumstances attending it, that increase
because of promises of the authorities or parties of a lighter punishment.
penalty should he admit guilt or express remorse. It is the duty of
the judge to ensure that the accused does not labor under these
mistaken impressions because a plea of guilty carries with it not
only the admission of authorship of the crime proper but also of
the aggravating circumstances attending it, that increase
punishment.

Such procedure falls short of the exacting guidelines in the conduct of a ͞searching
inquiry,͟ as follows:

(1) Ascertain from the accused himself (a) how he was

brought into the custody of the law; (b) whether he had the
assistance of a competent counsel during the custodial and
preliminary investigations; and (c) under what conditions he was
detained and interrogated during the investigations. This is
intended to rule out the possibility that the accused has been
coerced or placed under a state of duress either by actual threats
of physical harm coming from malevolent quarters or simply
because of the judge͛s intimidating robes.

(2) Ask the defense counsel a series of questions as to

whether he had conferred with, and completely explained to, the
accused the meaning and consequences of a plea of guilty.

(3) Elicit information about the personality profile of the

accused, such as his age, socio-economic status, and educational
background, which may serve as a trustworthy index of his
capacity to give a free and informed plea of guilty.

(4) Inform the accused of the exact length of imprisonment

or nature of the penalty under the law and the certainty that he
will serve such sentence. For not infrequently, an accused pleads
guilty in the hope of a lenient treatment or upon bad advice or
because of promises of the authorities or parties of a lighter
penalty should he admit guilt or express remorse. It is the duty of
 Moreover, where, as in the case at bar, there is no evidence to show any
(5) Inquire if the accused knows the crime with which he is
dubious reason or improper motive for a prosecution witness to bear false
charged and to fully explain to him the elements of the crime
which is the basis of his indictment. Failure of the court to do so testimony against the accused or falsely implicate him in a crime, his or her
would constitute a violation of his fundamental right to be
testimony should be given full faith and credit.
informed of the precise nature of the accusation against him and
a denial of his right to due process.

 

  
(6) All questions posed to the accused should be in a 
language known and understood by the latter. 
$

(  6 6"

(7) The trial judge must satisfy himself that the accused, in   Ñ'2(2-+-0
-1"1(3( !!( 6
41!
pleading guilty, is truly guilty. The accused must be required to
narrate the tragedy or reenact the crime or furnish its missing
details.
Appellant challenges the testimonies of the witnesses Magallano and Arañas
on what appellant had confessed to or told them for being hearsay. The challenge
fails. The testimonies, it should be conceded, cannot serve as a proof of
extrajudicial confession for an extrajudicial confession has to be in writing, among
others, to be admissible in evidence. That is why the testimonies are of use in the
case as corroborative evidence only. Such utility, however, cannot be defeated by
the hearsay rule. The testimonies covered are independently relevant statements
which are not barred by the hearsay rule.
Under the doctrine of independently relevant statements, only the fact that
such statements were made is relevant, and the truth or falsity thereof is
immaterial. The hearsay rule does not apply. The statements are admissible as
evidence. Evidence as to the making of such statement is not secondary but
primary, for the statement itself may constitute a fact in issue or be circumstantially
relevant as to the existence of such a fact.
The American authors of the Philippine Bill and of General Orders, No. 58, must be
presumed to have borrowed the provisions of the Constitution of the United States
securing to accused persons the right of confrontation and cross-examination of the
witnesses against them, subject to the well-established exceptions which have
always been recognized under the rule as laid down by the Constitution of the
United States, and it is clear that these provisions were not intended to render
inadmissible dying declarations in criminal cases touching the circumstances leading
up to the death for which the prosecution is instituted, for such declarations have
always been regarded as an exception to the general rule rejecting hearsay
evidence, on the general principle, as laid down by Lord Baron Eyre, "That they are
declarations made in extremity, when the party is at that point of death, and when
every hope of this world is gone; when every motive to falsehood is silenced and
the mind is induced by the most powerful considerations to speak the truth. A
situation so solemn and so awful as to be considered by the law as creating an
obligation equal to that which is imposed by a positive oath in a court of justice."
The rule is the same as the rule of the Roman Civil Law, "Morti proximum, sive
moribundum, non praesumendum est mentiri, nec esse immemorem saluties
aeternae; licet non praesumatur semper dicere verum." (Mascard, De Probat.
Concl., 1080; U. S. vs. Montes, 6 Phil. Rep., 443.)
It has been suggested, however, that since a specific exception is found in General
Orders, No. 58, to the rule touching the confrontation of witnesses, as therein laid
down, the expression of this exception should be taken to exclude all other
exceptions. The exception relied upon is as follows:
Where the testimony of a witness for the prosecution has previously been
taken down by question and answer, in the presence of the accused or his
counsel, the defense having had an opportunity to cross-examine the
witness, the deposition of the latter may be read, upon satisfactory proof
 to the court that he is dead or insane, or can not with due diligence be
found in the Islands.
It is very clear, however, that this express provision for an exception to the general
rule, which has not been universally recognized in those jurisdictions where it has
not been provided for by express legislation, can by no means be regarded as
intended to exclude the various general exceptions to the hearsay rule which have
always been recognized despite the existence of the constitutional provisions
securing the rights of accused persons to be confronted by, and to cross-examine
the witnesses for the prosecution.
That the declarant was conscious of his impending death, and that he spoke with
the prospect of "almost immediate dissolution" confronting him; that he
understood the meaning and effect of his statement; and that he knew he was
addressing the law officers of the town and province wherein he lived, and
informing them as to the circumstances which led up to his death, are facts which
we think are sufficiently established by the evidence of record: and the admissibility
of the dying declaration, resting, as it does, exclusively on the ground that the
declarant was "in extremis" at the time it was made, is in nowise affected by the
failure of the law officers to secure no more formal and detailed statement
contemplated in the above-cited provision of General Orders, No. 58, which they
might perhaps have been able to obtain had they not been misled by the opinion of
the attending surgeons that the wounded man would probably recover.
An expert has been defined to be one possessing, in regard to a particular subject
or department of human activity, knowledge not usually acquired by other persons
(12 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law, 2d Ed., 424); and under this definition we think that
Captain Gearhardt and perhaps Captain Lewis may fairly be classed as experts, as to
questions touching the course and effect of bullets shot from small arms at
moderate ranges, their long experience in the use of such arms, with the
their knowledge and to their capacity to answer every question propounded to
them by opposing counsel:
It follows that there are no fixed classes of expert persons, in one of which
a witness finds himself and remains permanently. A person may be
sufficiently skilled for one question, and totally unqualified for the next. He
may be competent to say whether the deceased had gray hair, and
incompetent to say what killed him; competent to say whether the
deceased was asphyxiated by gas, and incompetent to distinguish between
coal gas and water gas; competent to say whether a hatchet was sharp,
and incompetent to tell whether a stain upon it was of human blood. The
witness may from question to question enter or leave the class of persons
fitted to answer. It is desirable to appreciate that expert capacity is a
matter wholly relative to the subject of the particular question; that
therefore the existence of the capacity arises in theory as a new inquiry
from question to question; and that a particular person is not to be
thought of as objectively or absolutely an expert, in the sense that he is
absolutely a german or a negro or six feet high. (Greenleaf on Evidence, 1st
vol., 16th ed., par. 430 (a), p. 523.)
But whatever may be the value which should be given to the expert opinions
expressed by these witnesses, and even were we to disregard these opinions
altogether, the trajectory of the bullet to which they testified must be taken to have
been established to the satisfaction of the trial judge and to ours (so far as it was
proper for him to rely upon his own opinion of expert witnesses) by the ocular
examination of the scene of the tragedy made by him at the request of the counsel
for defense, the facts upon which the experts based their opinions having been
submitted to him on that occasion in such manner as to afford him full opportunity
to draw his own conclusions without regard to the opinion of the witnesses.
professional obligation imposed upon them to study and familiarize themselves   
'
(2-+-0
-;@3 !6(c "( ! ( '+ 
with their use and manipulation as the tools of their trade, having, presumably, The admission of dying declarations has always been strictly limited to criminal
4
given to them a knowledge in such matters not usually acquired by civilians. It is prosecutions for homicide or murder as evidence of the cause and surrounding
true that the frank admissions by these witnesses of their inability to solve a circumstances of death.
number of hypothetical problems of a technical nature in the science of ballistics 
(problems which in the present status of human knowledge on that subject may of
'
(2-+-0
-;@ 43!(( !!3
may not be capable of satisfactory solution) would indicate that, unlike many more
pretentious expert witnesses, there are limitations to the extent of the knowledge
they claim to posses; but we think that, under the principles laid down in the
following extract from Greenleaf, their capacity as expert witnesses to answer the
questions propounded to them as to the probable trajectory of the bullet found in
the wall of the office was not affected by such confessed limitations to the extent of
  
Appellant likewise argues that the declaration made by the victim before the purok
leader can not be considered as a dying declaration because it was not made by the
deceased "under the consciousness of an impending death." As earlier narrated, at
the time the deceased made the declaration he was in great pain. He expressed a
belief on his imminent death and the hope that his declaration could be used as
evidence regarding the circumstances thereof. A person would not say so if he
believes he would recover and be able to testify against his assailants. At all events,     
(2-+-0
- 36 "( (3
assuming that declaration is not admissible as a dying declaration, it is still To be sure, ex parte affidavits are usually incomplete, as these are frequently
27
admissible as part of the res gestae, since it was made shortly after the startling prepared by administering officers and cast in their language and understanding of
incident and, under the circumstances, the victim had no opportunity to contrive. what affiants have said.31 Almost always, the latter would simply sign the
documents after being read to them. Basic is the rule that, taken ex parte, affidavits
 are considered incomplete and often inaccurate. They are products sometimes of
  
.  (2--0
- "34(c  ( !!! partial suggestions and at other times of want of suggestions and inquiries, without
In fact, in her sworn statement, she admitted having seen appellant shoot her
husband. Thus:
06. T Ͷ Papaano ninyo nalaman na si Poldo
Bautista ang pumatay sa inyong asawa?
S Ͷ Nakita (sic) ko po nang barilin ni Poldo
Bautista ang aking asawa, sir.
1 corroborated by another witness, Lito Santos, who testified on the events
While her statement that she saw Poldo Bautista shoot her husband may be
interpreted loosely as that she was present when her husband was shot but not
necessarily that she saw the actual shooting incident nevertheless, the seeming
inconsistency cannot but engender doubt in our minds as to what actually
transpired during that fateful evening. At the very least, Leticia Bandarlipe's
testimony does not inspire belief that she was telling the truth as to the identity of
appellant as the felon.
It is also worthy to note that whereas Leticia initially denied having talked to the
local officials who accompanied her to the hospital she subsequently admitted that
Barangay Captain Solis, et al. went to her house the day after the incident and
talked to her about filing a case in connection with her husband's murder, which
she refused to do.
If it is true that Leticia Bandarlipe actually saw her husband being shot by appellant,
or that her dying husband told her that it was appellant who shot him, why did she
not report what she saw and heard to the two barangay tanods, Gagaza and de
Leon, who responded to her shouts for help; and, why was she reluctant to file a
complaint against the gunman whom she allegedly saw shoot her husband. Her acts
are contrary to the natural tendency of a witness closely related to the victim, to
report a crime and describe the malefactor at the earliest possible opportunity.
1
In fact, it was not until about ten (10) months later that Leticia executed a sworn
statement pointing to appellant as the assailant of her husband Cipriano.
the aid of which witnesses may be unable to recall t
the connected circumstances necessary for accurate recollection.
Statements Uttered Contemporaneous with the Crime
Ernita positively testified that immediately after the shooting, she had heard her
husband say, "Help me p͛re, I was shot by the captain." This statement was
immediately preceding and subsequent to the shooting.
It should be clear that Santos never testified that petitioner was the one who had
actually shot the victim. Still, the testimony of this witness is valuable, because it
validates the statements made by Ernita. He confirms that after hearing the
gunshot, he saw the victim and heard the latter cry out those same words.
Rule 130, Section 37 of the Rules of Court, provides:
"The declaration of a dying person, made under the consciousness of impending
death, may be received in any case wherein his death is the subject of inquiry, as
evidence of the cause and surrounding circumstances of such death."
Generally, witnesses can testify only to those facts derived from their own
perception. A recognized exception, though, is a report in open court of a dying
person͛s declaration made under the consciousness of an impending death that is
the subject of inquiry in the case.37
Statements identifying the assailant, if uttered by a victim on the verge of death,
are entitled to the highest degree of credence and respect.38 Persons aware of an
impending death have been known to be genuinely truthful in their words and
extremely scrupulous in their accusations.39 The dying declaration is given credence,
on the premise that no one who knows of one͛s impending death will make a
careless and false accusation.40 Hence, not infrequently, pronouncements of guilt
have been allowed to rest solely on the dying declaration of the deceased victim.41
To be admissible, a dying declaration must 1) refer to the cause and circumstances
surrounding the declarant͛s death; 2) be made under the consciousness of an
impending death; 3) be made freely and voluntarily without coercion or suggestions
of improper influence; 4) be offered in a criminal case, in which the death of the
declarant is the subject of inquiry; and 5) have been made by a declarant
competent to testify as a witness, had that person been called upon to testify.42
The statement of the deceased certainly concerned the cause and circumstances
surrounding his death. He pointed to the person who had shot him. As established
by the prosecution, petitioner was the only person referred to as kapitan in their
place.43 It was also established that the declarant, at the time he had given the
dying declaration, was under a consciousness of his impending death.
True, he made no express statement showing that he was conscious of his
impending death. The law, however, does not require the declarant to state
explicitly a perception of the inevitability of death.44 The perception may be
established from surrounding circumstances, such as the nature of the declarant͛s
injury and conduct that would justify a conclusion that there was a consciousness of
impending death.45 Even if the declarant did not make an explicit statement of that
realization, the degree and seriousness of the words and the fact that death
occurred shortly afterwards may be considered as sufficient evidence that the
declaration was made by the victim with full consciousness of being in a dying
condition.46
Also, the statement was made freely and voluntarily, without coercion or
suggestion, and was offered as evidence in a criminal case for homicide. In this case,
the declarant was the victim who, at the time he uttered the dying declaration, was
competent as a witness.
As found by the CA, the dying declaration of the victim was complete, as it was "a
full expression of all that he intended to say as conveying his meaning. It [was]
47
complete and [was] not merely fragmentary." Testified to by his wife and
neighbor, his dying declaration was not only admissible in evidence as an exception
to the hearsay rule, but was also a weighty and telling piece of evidence.
Res Gestae
The fact that the victim͛s statement constituted a dying declaration does not
preclude it from being admitted as part of the res gestae, if the elements of both
48
are present.
Section 42 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provides:
"Part of the res gestae. -- Statements made by a person while a startling occurrence
is taking place or immediately prior or subsequent thereto with respect to the
circumstances thereof, may be given in evidence as part of the res gestae. So, also,
statements accompanying an equivocal act material to the issue, and giving it a
legal significance, may be received as part of the res gestae."
Res gestae refers to statements made by the participants or the victims of, or the
49
spectators to, a crime immediately before, during, or after its commission. These
statements are a spontaneous reaction or utterance inspired by the excitement of
the occasion, without any opportunity for the declarant to fabricate a false
statement.50 An important consideration is whether there intervened, between the
occurrence and the statement, any circumstance calculated to divert the mind and
thus restore the mental balance of the declarant; and afford an opportunity for
deliberation.51
A declaration is deemed part of the res gestae and admissible in evidence as an
exception to the hearsay rule, when the following requisites concur: 1) the principal
act, the res gestae, is a startling occurrence; 2) the statements were made before
the declarant had time to contrive or devise; and 3) the statements concerned the
occurrence in question and its immediately attending circumstances.52
All these requisites are present in this case. The principal act, the shooting, was a
startling occurrence. Immediately after, while he was still under the exciting
influence of the startling occurrence, the victim made the declaration without any
prior opportunity to contrive a story implicating petitioner. Also, the declaration
concerned the one who shot the victim. Thus, the latter͛s statement was correctly
appreciated as part of the res gestae.
The totality of the evidence presented by the prosecution is sufficient to sustain the
conviction of petitioner. The dying declaration made by the victim immediately
prior to his death constitutes evidence of the highest order as to the cause of his
53
death and of the identity of the assailant. This damning evidence, coupled with
the proven facts presented by the prosecution, leads to the logical conclusion that
petitioner is guilty of the crime charged.
The following circumstances proven by the prosecution produce a conviction
beyond reasonable doubt:
First. Santos testified that he had heard a gunshot; and seen smoke coming
from the muzzle of a gun, as well as the victim staggering backwards while
shouting, "Help me p͛re, I was shot by the captain." This statement was
duly established, and the testimony of Santos confirmed the events that
had occurred. It should be understandable that "p͛re" referred to Santos,
 considering that he and the victim were conversing just before the 
shooting took place. It was also established that the two called each other   
5


(2-+-0
-344( $ 3( !(4 
-4
"p͛re," because Santos was the godfather of the victim͛s child.54
Second. Ernita testified that she had heard a gunshot and her husband͛s
utterance, "Help me p͛re, I was shot by the captain," then saw petitioner in
a black jacket and camouflage pants running away from the crime scene
while carrying a firearm.
Third. Ernita͛s statement, "Captain, why did you shoot my husband?" was
established as part of the res gestae.
Fourth. The version of the events given by petitioner is simply implausible.
As the incumbent barangay captain, it should have been his responsibility
to go immediately to the crime scene and investigate the shooting.
Instead, he avers that when he went to the situs of the crime, the wife of
the victim was already shouting and accusing him of being the assailant, so
he just left. This reaction was very unlikely of an innocent barangay
captain, who would simply want to investigate a crime. Often have we
ruled that the first impulse of innocent persons when accused of
wrongdoing is to express their innocence at the first opportune time.55
Fifth. The prosecution was able to establish motive on the part of
petitioner. The victim͛s wife positively testified that prior to the shooting,
her husband was trying to close a real estate transaction which petitioner
tried to block. This showed petitioner͛s antagonism towards the victim.56
These pieces of evidence indubitably lead to the conclusion that it was petitioner
who shot and killed the victim. This Court has consistently held that, where an
eyewitness saw the accused with a gun seconds after the gunshot and the victim͛s
fall, the reasonable conclusion is that the accused had killed the victim.57 Further
establishing petitioner͛s guilt was the definitive statement of the victim that he had
been shot by the barangay captain.
"[Corpus delicti] is the fact of the commission of the crime that may be proved by
the testimony of eyewitnesses. In its legal sense, corpus delicti does not necessarily
refer to the body of the person murdered, to the firearms in the crime of homicide
with the use of unlicensed firearms, to the ransom money in the crime of
kidnapping for ransom, or x x x to the seized contraband cigarettes."65


$  (  6( 
6
Hearsay evidence, with a few well recognized exceptions, it has been said on high
authority, is excluded by courts in the United States that adhere to the principles of
the common law. One universally recognized exception concerns the admission of
dying declarations. Another exception permits the reception, under certain
circumstances, of declarations of third parties made contrary to their own
pecuniary or proprietary interest. But the general rule is stated to be that the
declarations of a person other than accused confessing or tending to show that he
committed the crime are not competent for accused on account of the hearsay
doctrine.
Professor Wigmore, one of the greatest living authorities on the law of evidence,
has attempted to demonstrate the false premises on which the arbitrary limitation
to the hearsay rule rests. He shows that the limitation is inconsistent with the
language originally employed in stating the principle and is unjustified on grounds
of policy. Professor Wigmore in turn has been answered by no less a body than the
Supreme Court of Mississippi in the case of Brown vs. State of Mississippi ([1910],
37 L. R. A., New Series, 345). The editor of the Mississippi case in L. R. A., however,
comes to the support of Professor Wigmore saying the unanimity of the decisions
"is as complete as the shock which they give the general sense of justice." The
question has likewise in recent years gained attention by the Supreme Court of the
United States in the case of Donnelly vs. United States ([1913], 228 U. S., 243).
There it was held that the court below properly excluded hearsay evidence relating
to the confession of a third party, then deceased, of guilt of the crime with which
defendant was charged. Mr. Justice Pitney, delivering the opinion of the court, said:
"In this country there is a great and practically unanimous weight of authority in the
estate courts against admitting evidence of confessions of third parties, made out
of court, and tending to exonerate the accused." Mr. Justice Van Devanter
concurred in the result while Mr. Justice Holmes, with whom concurred Mr. Justice
Lurton and Mr. Justice Hughes, dissented. Mr. Justice Holmes said:
. . . The rues of evidence in the main are based on experience, logic, and
common sense, less hampered by history than some parts of the
substantive law. There is no decision by this court against the admissibility
of such a confession; the English cases since the separation of the two
countries do not bind us; the exception to the hearsay rule in the case of
declarations against interest is well known; no other statement is so much
against interest as a confession of murder; it is far more calculated to
convince than dying declarations, which would be let in to hang a man
(Mattox vs. United States, 146 U. S., 140; 36 Law. ed., 917; 13 Sup. Ct. Rep.,
50); and when we surround the accused with so many safeguards, some of
 which seem to me excessive; I think we ought to give him the benefit of a
fact that, if proved, commonly would have such weight. The history of the
law and the arguments against the English doctrine are so well and fully
stated by Mr. Wigmore that there is no need to set them forth at greater
length. (2 Wigmore, Evidence, pars. 1476, 1477.)
In the Philippine jurisdiction, we have never felt bound to follow blindly the
principles of the common law. A reexamination of some of those principles
discloses anomalies.
A dying declaration is admitted of necessity in order, as the Supreme Court of
Mississippi states, "to reach those man slayers who perpetrate their crimes when
there are no other eyewitnesses." But the person accused of a crime, under the
same principle of necessity, is not permitted to free himself by offering in evidence
the admission of another under oath that this other committed the crime. Again
admissions are receivable against either a pecuniary or a proprietary interest, but
not against a penal interest. We fail to see why it can be believed that a man will be
presumed to tell the truth in the one instance but will not be presumed to tell the
truth in the other instance. Again the exhibit would have been admitted against its
maker at his trial, if he had not died. But the document is held inadmissible to
exonerate another. Yet the truth of the exhibit is not different in the first case that
in the second.
We cannot bring this decision to a conclusion without quoting the well considered
language of Professor Wigmore on the subject, the pertinent part of a decision
coming from a court which has gained respect particularly in criminal cases, and an
editorial note. Professor Wigmore has said:
PAR. 1476. History of the Exception; tatement of Fact against Penal
Œnterest, excluded; uonfessions of urime by a Third Person. Ͷ It is today
commonly said, and has been expressly laid down by many judges, that the
interest prejudiced by the facts stated must be either a pecuniary or a
proprietary interest, and not a penal interest. What ground in authority
there is for this limitation may be found by examining the history of the
execution at large.
The exception appears to have taken its rise chiefly in two separate rivulets
of rulings, starting independently as a matter of practice, but afterwards
united as parts of a general principle. . . .
These lines of precedent proceeded independently till about the beginning
of the 1800s, when a unity of principle for some of them came gradually to
be perceived and argued for. This unity lay in the circumstance that all
such statements, in that they concerned matters prejudicial to the
declarant's self-interest, were fairly trustworthy and might therefore (if he
were deceased) be treated as forming an exception to the hearsay rule.
This broad principle made its way slowly. There was some uncertainty
about its scope; but it was an uncertainty in the direction of breadth; for it
was sometimes put in the broad form that any statement by a person
"having no interest to deceive" would be admissible. This broad form
never came to prevail (post, par. 1576). But acceptance was gained, after
two decades, for the principle that all declarations of facts against interest
(by deceased persons) were to be received. What is to be noted, then, is
that from 1800 to about 1830 this was fully understood as the broad scope
of the principle. It was thus stated without other qualifications; and
frequent passages show the development of the principle to this point.
The rulings already in our books cannot be thought to involve a settled and
universal acceptance of this limitation. In the first place, in almost all of the
rulings the declarant was not shown to be deceased or otherwise
unavailable as a witness, and therefore the declaration would have been
inadmissible in any view of the present exception (ante, par. 1456).
Secondly, in some of the rulings (for example, in North Carolina) the
independent doctrine (ante, pars. 139-141) was applicable that, in order to
prove the accused's non-commission of the offense by showing
commission by another person, not merely one casual piece of evidence
suffices but a "prima facie" case resting on several concurring pieces of
evidence must be made out. Finally, most of the early rulings had in view,
not the present exception to the hearsay rule, but the doctrine of
admissions (ante, pars. 1076, 1079) that the admissions of one who is not a
co-conspirator cannot affect others jointly charged.
It is therefore not too late to retrace our steps, and to discard this
barbarous doctrine, which would refuse to let an innocent accused
vindicate himself even by producing to the tribunal a perfectly
authenticated written confession, made on the very gallows, by the rule
culprit now beyond the reach of justice. Those who watched (in 1899) with
self-righteous indignation the course of proceedings in Captain Dreyfus'
trial should remember that, if that trial had occurred in our own courts, the
spectacle would have been no less shameful if we, following our own
supposed precedents, had refused to admit what the French court never
for a moment hesitated to admit, Ͷ the authenticated confession of the
escaped Major Esterhazy, avowing himself the guilty author of the treason
there charged. (3 Wigmore on Evidence, 2d ed., secs. 1476, 1477.)
 Lest we be misunderstood, the Court is always for the admission of evidence that
    (2-+-0
- 3!( !( !!3(46'+16 would let an innocent declaration of guilt by the real culprit. But this can be open to
 !!3 abuse, as when the extrajudicial statement is not even authenticated thus
increasing the probability of its fabrication; it is made to persons who have every
One of the recognized exceptions to the hearsay rule is that pertaining to reason to lie and falsify; and it is not altogether clear that the declarant himself is
declarations made against interest. Sec. 38 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court unable to testify. Thus, for this case at least, exclusion is the prudent recourse as
provides that "(t)he declaration made by a person deceased, or unable to testify, explained in Toledo -
against the interest of the declarant, if the fact asserted in the declaration was at
the time it was made so far contrary to declarant's own interest, that a reasonable The purpose of all evidence is to get at the truth. The reason for the
man in his position would not have made the declaration unless he believed it to be hearsay rule is that the extrajudicial and unsworn statement of another is
true, may be received in evidence against himself or his successors in interest and not the best method of serving this purpose. In other words, the great
against third persons." The admissibility in evidence of such declaration is grounded possibility of the fabrication of falsehoods, and the inability to prove their
11 15
on necessity and trustworthiness. untruth, requires that the doors be closed to such evidence.

There are three (3) essential requisites for the admissibility of a declaration against 
interest: (a) the declarant must not be available to testify; (b) the declaration must
.(2-+-0
- 634(c  !( !!"("1'+ !"
concern a fact cognizable by the declarant; and (c) the circumstances must render it
improbable that a motive to falsify existed.
For all its attempt to demonstrate the arbitrariness behind the rejection in certain
cases of declarations against penal interest, the Toledo case cannot be applied in
the instant case which is remarkably different. Consider this factual scenario: the
alleged declarant Zoilo Fuentes Jr., a cousin of accused-appellant, verbally admitted
to the latter, and later to their common uncle Felicisimo Fuentes, that he (Zoilo)
killed the victim because of a grudge, after which he disappeared. One striking
feature that militates against the acceptance of such a statement is its patent
untrustworthiness. Zoilo who is related to accused-appellant had every motive to
prevaricate. The same can be said of accused-appellant and his uncle Felicisimo.
Secondly, we need not resort to legal rhetorics to find that the admission of such a
statement may likewise be, according to Wigmore, "shocking to the sense of
13
justice." Let us assume that the trial court did admit the statement of Zoilo and
on that basis acquitted accused-appellant. Let us assume further that Zoilo was
subsequently captured and upon being confronted with his admission of guilt
readily repudiated the same. There is nothing, absolutely nothing, that can bind
Zoilo legally to that statement.
But more importantly, the far weightier reason why the admission against penal
interest cannot be accepted in the instant case is that the declarant is not "unable
to testify." There is no showing that Zoilo is either dead, mentally incapacitated or
physically incompetent which Sec. 38 obviously contemplates. His mere absence
from the jurisdiction does not make him ipso facto unavailable under this rule
  
Motive is generally irrelevant, unless it is utilized in establishing the identity of the
perpetrator. Coupled with enough circumstantial evidence of facts from which it
may be reasonably inferred that the accused was the malefactor, motive may be
sufficient to support a conviction.  Openda, Jr.'s revelation to Enriquez regarding
his illicit relationship with Bernal's wife is admissible in evidence, pursuant to
Section 38, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules on Evidence, viz.:
Sec. 38. Declaration against interest. Ͷ The declaration made by a person
deceased, or unable to testify, against the interest of the declarant, if the
fact asserted in the declaration was at the time it was made so far contrary
to declarant's own interest, that a reasonable man in his position would
not have made the declaration unless he believed it to be true, may be
received in evidence against himself or his successors-in-interest and
against third persons.
With the deletion of the phrase "pecuniary or moral interest" from the present
provision, it is safe to assume that "declaration against interest" has been expanded
to include all kinds of interest, that is, pecuniary, proprietary, moral or even penal.

A statement may be admissible when it complies with the following requisites, to
wit: "(1) that the declarant is dead or unable to testify; (2) that it relates to a fact
against the interest of the declarant; (3) that at the time he made said declaration
the declarant was aware that the same was contrary to his aforesaid interest; and
(4) that the declarant had no motive to falsify and believed such declaration to be
 
true."
 However, in assessing the probative value of Gen. Menzi͛s supposed
  
 (2-+-0
- 631( !(3
Jurisprudence instructs that evidence of statement made or a testimony is
hearsay if offered against a party who has no opportunity to cross-examine the
witness. Hearsay evidence is excluded precisely because the party against whom it
is presented is deprived of or is bereft of opportunity to cross-examine the persons
to whom the statements or writings are attributed.[15] And there can be no
quibbling that because death has supervened, the late Gen Menzi, like the other
purported Marcos subalterns, Messrs. Baizas and De Vega, cannot cross-examine
the Locsins for the threatening statements allegedly made by them for the late
President.
Like the Court of Appeals, we are not unmindful of the exception to the
hearsay rule provided in Section 38, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, which reads:
SEC. 38. Declaration against interest. ʹ The declaration
made by a person deceased or unable to testify, against the
interest of the declarant, if the fact asserted in the declaration
was at the time it was made so far contrary to the declarant's own
interest, that a reasonable man in his position would not have
made the declaration unless he believed it to be true, may be
received in evidence against himself or his successors-in-interest
declaration against interest, i.e., that he was acting for the late President Marcos
when he purportedly coerced Mr. Locsin, Sr. to sell the Free Press property, we are
loathed to give it the evidentiary weight petitioner endeavors to impress upon us.
For, the Locsins can hardly be considered as disinterested witnesses. They are likely
to gain the most from the annulment of the subject contracts. Moreover,
allegations of duress or coercion should, like fraud, be viewed with utmost caution.
They should not be laid lightly at the door of men whose lips had been sealed by
death.
 Francisco explains why:
[I]t has been said that ͞of all evidence, the narration of a witness
of his conversation with a dead person is esteemed in justice the
weakest.͛͟ One reason for its unreliability is that the alleged
declarant can not recall to the witness the circumstances under
which his statement were made. The temptation and opportunity
for fraud in such cases also operate against the testimony.
Testimony to statements of a deceased person, at least where
proof of them will prejudice his estate, is regarded as an unsafe
foundation for judicial action except in so far as such evidence is
borne out by what is natural and probable under the
circumstances taken in connection with actual known facts. And a
court should be very slow to act upon the statement of one of the
parties to a supposed agreement after the death of the other
party; such corroborative evidence should be adduced as to
satisfy the court of the truth of the story which is to benefit
materially the person telling it. [17]

and against third persons.   

(2-+-0
- 13443( !(3

Section 38 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provides:

SEC. 38. Declaration against interest. ʹ The declaration made by a person deceased,
or unable to testify, against the interest of the declarant, if the fact asserted in the
declaration was at the time it was made so far contrary to the declarant's own
interest, that a reasonable man in his position would not have made the declaration
unless he believed it to be true, may be received in evidence against himself or his
successors-in-interest and against third persons.
The theory under which declarations against interest are received in evidence
notwithstanding they are hearsay is that the necessity of the occasion renders the
reception of such evidence advisable and, further that the reliability of such
declaration asserts facts which are against his own pecuniary or moral interest.9
The affiant, Florentino, who died in 1989 was petitioner͛s father and had adequate
knowledge with respect to the subject covered by his statement. In said affidavit,
Florentino categorically declared that while he is the occupant of the residential
building, he is not the owner of the same as it is owned by respondent who is
residing in Quezon City. It is safe to presume that he would not have made such
declaration unless he believed it to be true, as it is prejudicial to himself as well as
to his children͛s interests as his heirs.10 A declaration against interest is the best
11
evidence which affords the greatest certainty of the facts in dispute. Notably,
during Florentino͛s lifetime, from 1973, the year he executed said affidavit until
1989, the year of his death, there is no showing that he had revoked such affidavit
even when a criminal complaint for trespass to dwelling had been filed by
respondent against him (Florentino) and petitioner in 1988 regarding the subject
house which the trial court dismissed due to the absence of evidence showing that
petitioner entered the house against the latter͛s will and held that the remedy of
respondent was to file an action for ejectment;12 and even when a complaint for
unlawful detainer was filed against petitioner and his wife also in 1988 which was
subsequently dismissed on the ground that respondent͛s action should be an accion
13
publiciana which is beyond the jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Court.
We agree with the CA that while tax receipts and declarations are not
incontrovertible evidence of ownership, they constitute at least proof that the
17
holder has a claim of title over the property. The house which petitioner claims to
be co-owned by his late father had been consistently declared for taxation purposes
in the name of respondent, and this fact, taken with the other circumstances
above-mentioned, inexorably lead to the conclusion that respondent is the sole
owner of the house subject matter of the litigation.
In this case, the records show that although petitioner͛s counsel asked that he be
allowed to offer his documentary evidence in writing, he, however, did not file the
6!
same.20 Thus, the CA did not consider the documentary evidence presented by
petitioner. Section 34 of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court provides:
$
('+"1 !3"
Section 34. Offer of evidence. ʹ The court shall consider no evidence which has not
been formally offered. The purpose for which the evidence is offered must be
specified.
A formal offer is necessary because it is the duty of a judge to rest his findings of
facts and his judgment only and strictly upon the evidence offered by the parties to
the suit.21 It is a settled rule that the mere fact that a particular document is
identified and marked as an exhibit does not mean that it has thereby already been
offered as part of the evidence of a party.22
Petitioner insists that although his documentary evidence were not formally
offered, the same were marked during the presentation of the testimonial
23
evidence, thus it can properly be taken cognizance of relying in Bravo, Jr. v. Borja.
Such reliance is misplaced. In Bravo Jr., we allowed evidence on minority by
admitting the certified true copy of the birth certificate attached to a motion for
bail even if it was not formally offered in evidence. This was due to the fact that the
birth certificate was properly filed in support of a motion for bail to prove
petitioner͛s minority which was never challenged by the prosecution and it already
formed part of the records of the case. The rule referred to in the Bravo case was
Section 7 of Rule 133 of the Rules of Court which provides:
Section 7. Evidence on motion.- When a motion is based on facts not appearing of
record, the court may hear the matter on affidavits or depositions presented by the
respective parties, but the court may direct that the matter be heard wholly or
partly on oral testimony or depositions.
and not Section 34 of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court which is the one applicable to
the present case.
Even assuming arguendo that the documentary evidence of petitioner should be
considered in his favor, the evidence showing that respondent had filed civil and
criminal cases against petitioner which were dismissed as well as the alleged Special
Power of Attorney of petitioner͛s parents whereby they authorized petitioner to
stay in the ground floor of the house, did not establish co-ownership of Florentino
and respondent of the subject house.
 
$(  6 

  2

It is our considered view that the lower court correctly relied upon the post-war
records, for three cogent reasons.
In the first place, as Moran states, although a person can have no personal
knowledge of the date of his birth, he may testify as to his age as he had learned it
from his parents and relatives and his testimony in such case is an assertion of a
family tradition.9 Indeed, even in is application for back pay which he filed with the
Department of Finance, through the Office of the Superintendent of Schools, on
October 7, 1948, the petitioner stated that the date of his birth is December 11,
1901. He repeated the same assertion in 1956 and again in 1960 when he asked the
Government Service Insurance System and the Civil Service Commission to correct
the date of his birth to December 11, 1901.
In the second place, the import of the declaration of the petitioner's brother,
contained in a verified pleading in a cadastral case way back in 1924, to the effect
that the petitioner was then 23 years old, can not be ignored. Made ante litem
motam by a deceased relative, this statement is at once a declaration regarding
pedigree within the intendment and meaning of section 33 of Rule 130 of the Rules
of Court.
Thus, December 11, 1901 is established as the date of birth of the petitioner not
only by evidence of family tradition but also by the declaration ante litem motam of
a deceased relative.1äwphï1.ñët
Finally, the patties are agreed that the petitioner has a brother, Constantino, who
was born on June 10, 1898 and who retired on June 10, 1963 with full retirement
pay. The petitioner then could not have been born earlier than Constantino, say in
1897 as pre-war records indicate, because Constantino is admittedly older than
he.10
Still it is argued that the petitioner's action was prematurely brought because he
had not availed of all administrative remedies. This argument is without merit. Suit
for quo warranto to recover a public office must be brought within one year.11
Before filing this case the petitioner waited for eight months for the school officials
to act on his protest. To require him to tarry a little more would obviously be unfair
to him since on April 13, 1965, when this case was filed, he had only four months
left within which to bring the case to court. There was neither manner nor form of
assurance that the decision of the Director of Public Schools would be forthcoming.
The rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies does not apply where insistence
12
on its observance would result in the nullification of the claim being asserted.
 by the husband or his heirs and within the periods fixed in the
  5
("3'+4 !!" present articles.
There are two points for consideration before us: first is the issue on petitioner's
legitimacy, and second is the question regarding their filiation with Teodora
Dezoller Guerrero.
I. It is not debatable that the documentary evidence adduced by petitioners, taken
separately and independently of each other, are not per se sufficient proof of
legitimacy nor even of pedigree. It is important to note, however, that the rulings of
both lower courts in the case are basically premised on the erroneous assumption
that, in the first place, the issue of legitimacy may be validly controverted in an
action for reconveyance, and, in the second place, that herein petitioners have the
onus probandi to prove their legitimacy and, corollarily, their filiation. We disagree
on both counts.
It seems that both the court a quo and respondent appellate court have regrettably
overlooked the universally recognized presumption on legitimacy. There is no
presumption of the law more firmly established and founded on sounder morality
and more convincing reason than the presumption that children born in wedlock
are legitimate. And well settled is the rule that the issue of legitimacy cannot be
attacked collaterally.
The rationale for these rules has been explained in this wise:
The presumption of legitimacy in the Family Code . . . actually
fixes a civil status for the child born in wedlock, and that civil
status cannot be attacked collaterally. The legitimacy of the child
can be impugned only in a direct action brought for that purpose,
by the proper parties, and within the period limited by law.
The legitimacy of the child cannot be contested by way of defense
or as a collateral issue in another action for a different purpose.
The necessity of an independent action directly impugning the
legitimacy is more clearly expressed in the Mexican Code (Article
335) which provides: "The contest of the legitimacy of a child by
the husband or his heirs must be made by proper complaint
before the competent court; any contest made in any other way is
void." This principle applies under our Family Code. Articles 170
and 171 of the code confirm this view, because they refer to "the
action to impugn the legitimacy." This action can be brought only
Upon the expiration of the periods provided in Article 170, the
action to impugn the legitimacy of a child can no longer be
 brought. The status conferred by the presumption, therefore,
becomes fixed, and can no longer be questioned. The obvious
intention of the law is to prevent the status of a child born in
wedlock from being in a state of uncertainty for a long time. It
also aims to force early action to settle any doubt as to the
paternity of such child, so that the evidence material to the
matter, which must necessarily be facts occurring during the
period of the conception of the child, may still be easily available.
xxx xxx xxx
Only the husband can contest the legitimacy of a child born to his
wife. He is the one directly confronted with the scandal and
ridicule which the infidelity of his wife produces; and he should
decide whether to conceal that infidelity or expose it, in view of
the moral and economic interest involved. It is only in exceptional
cases that his heir are allowed to contest such legitimacy. Outside
of these cases, none Ͷ even his heirs Ͷ can impugn legitimacy;
!
that would amount to an insult to his memory.
The issue, therefore, as to whether petitioners are the legitimate children of
Hermogenes Dezoller cannot be properly controverted in the present action for
reconveyance. This is aside, of course, from the further consideration that private
respondent is not the proper party to impugn the legitimacy of herein petitioners.
The presumption consequently continues to operate in favor of petitioners unless
and until it is rebutted.
Even assuming that the issue is allowed to be resolved in this case, the burden of
proof rests not on herein petitioners who have the benefit of the presumption in
their favor, but on private respondent who is disputing the same. This fact alone
should have been sufficient cause for the trial court to exercise appropriate caution
before acting, as it did, on the demurrer to evidence. It would have delimited the
issues for resolution, as well as the time and effort necessitated thereby.
Ordinarily, when a fact is presumed, it implies that the party in whose favor the
presumption exists does not have to introduce evidence to establish that fact, and
in any litigation where that fact is put in issue, the party denying it must bear the
burden of proof to overthrow the presumption. The presumption of legitimacy is
so strong that it is clear that its effect is to shift the burden of persuasion to the
party claiming illegitimacy. And in order to destroy the presumption, the party
against whom it operates must adduce substantial and credible evidence to the
contrary. 
Where there is an entire lack of competent evidence to the contrary, 6 and unless
or until it is rebutted, it has been held that a presumption may stand in lieu of
1
evidence and support a finding or decision. Perforce, a presumption must be
followed if it is uncontroverted. This is based on the theory that a presumption is
prima facie proof of the fact presumed, and unless the fact thus established prima
facie by the legal presumption of its truth is disproved, it must stand as proved. 4
Indubitably, when private respondent opted not to present countervailing evidence
to overcome the presumption, by merely filing a demurrer to evidence instead, she
in effect impliedly admitted the truth of such fact. Indeed, she overlooked or
disregarded the evidential rule that presumptions like judicial notice and
admissions, relieve the proponent from presenting evidence on the facts he alleged
and such facts are thereby considered as duly proved.
The primary proof to be considered in ascertaining the relationship between the
parties concerned is the testimony of Corazon Dezoller Tison to the effect that
Teodora Dezoller Guerrero in her lifetime, or sometime in 1946, categorically
declared that the former is Teodora's niece. 3 Such a statement is considered a
declaration about pedigree which is admissible, as an exception to the hearsay rule,
under Section 39, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, subject to the following
conditions: (1) that the declarant is dead or unable to testify; (2) that the declarant
be related to the person whose pedigree is the subject of inquiry; (3) that such
relationship be shown by evidence other than the declaration; and (4) that the
declaration was made ante litem motam, that is, not only before the
commencement of the suit involving the subject matter of the declaration, but
before any controversy has arisen thereon.
There is no dispute with respect to the first, second and fourth elements. What
remains for analysis is the third element, that is, whether or not the other
documents offered in evidence sufficiently corroborated the declaration made by
Teodora Dezoller Guerrero in her lifetime regarding the pedigree of petitioner
Corazon Dezoller Tison or, if at all, it is necessary to present evidence other than
such declaration.
American jurisdiction has it that a distinction must be made as to when the
relationship of the declarant may be proved by the very declaration itself, or by
other declarations of said declarant, and when it must be supported by evidence
aliunde. The rule is stated thus:
One situation to be noted is that where one seeks to set up a
claim through, but not from, the declarant and to establish the
admissibility of a declaration regarding claimant's pedigree, he
may not do by declarant's own statements as to declarant's
 relationship to the particular family. The reason is that declarant's
;
 (2-+-0
- 13"6"(: ( 
declaration of his own relationship is of a self-serving nature.
Accordingly there must be precedent proof from other sources
that declarant is what he claimed to be, namely, a member of the
particular family; otherwise the requirement to admissibility that
declarant's relationship to the common family must appear is not
met. But when the party claiming seeks to establish relationship in
order to claim directly from the declarant or the declarant's
estate, the situation and the policy of the law applicable are quite
different. Œn such case the declaration of the decedent, whose
estate is in controversy, that he was related to the one who claims
his estate, is admissible without other proof of the fact of
relationship. While the nature of the declaration is then
disserving, that is not the real ground for its admission. Such
declarations do not derive their evidential value from that
consideration, although it is a useful, if not an artificial, aid in
determining the class to which the declarations belong. The
distinction we have note is sufficiently apparent; in the one case
the declarations are self-serving, in the other they are competent
from reasons of necessity. " (Emphasis ours.)
The general rule, therefore, is that where the party claiming seeks recovery against
a relative common to both claimant and declarant, but not from the declarant
himself or the declarant's estate, the relationship of the declarant to the common
relative may not be proved by the declaration itself. There must be some
independent proof of this fact. As an exception, the requirement that there be
other proof than the declarations of the declarant as to the relationship, does not
apply where it is sought to reach the estate of the declarant himself and not merely
to establish a right through his declarations to the property of some other member
!
of the family.
We are sufficiently convinced, and so hold, that the present case is one instance
where the general requirement on evidence aliunde may be relaxed. Petitioners are
claiming a right to part of the estate of the declarant herself. Conformably, the
declaration made by Teodora Dezoller Guerrero that petitioner Corazon is her
niece, is admissible and constitutes sufficient proof of such relationship,
notwithstanding the fact that there was no other preliminary evidence thereof, the
reason being such declaration is rendered competent by virtue of the necessity of
receiving such evidence to avoid a failure of justice.  More importantly, there is in
the present case an absolute failure by all and sundry to refute that declaration
made by the decedent.
 However, birth certificate offers only prima facie evidence of filiation and may be
  '

"The filiation of illegitimate children, like legitimate children, is established
by (1) the record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment;
or (2) an admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private
handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned. In the
absence thereof, filiation shall be proved by (1) the open and continuous
possession of the status of a legitimate child; or (2) any other means
allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws. The due recognition of an
illegitimate child in a record of birth, a will, a statement before a court of
record, or in any authentic writing is, in itself, a consummated act of
acknowledgment of the child, and no further court action is required. In
fact, any authentic writing is treated not just a ground for compulsory
recognition; it is in itself a voluntary recognition that does not require a
separate action for judicial approval. Where, instead, a claim for
recognition is predicated on other evidence merely tending to prove
paternity, i.e., outside of a record of birth, a will, a statement before a
court of record or an authentic writing, judicial action within the applicable
statute of limitations is essential in order to establish the child's
acknowledgment."12 (Emphasis ours)
In this connection, we echo this Court's pronouncement in Roces vs. Local uivil
Registrar16 that:
"Section 5 of Act No. 3753 and Article 280 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines . . . explicitly prohibit, not only the naming of the father of the
child born out of wedlock, when the birth certificate, or the recognition, is
not filed or made by him, but also, the statement of any information or
circumstances by which he could be identified. Accordingly, the Local Civil
Registrar had no authority to make or record the paternity of an
illegitimate child upon the information of a third person and the certificate
of birth of an illegitimate child, when signed only by the mother of the
latter, is incompetent evidence of fathership of said child." (Emphasis ours)
The Roces ruling regarding illegitimate filiation is further elucidated in Fernandez vs.
uourt of Appeals17 where this Court said that "a birth certificate not signed by the
alleged father (who had no hand in its preparation) is not competent evidence of
paternity."
A birth certificate is a formidable piece of evidence prescribed by both the Civil
Code and Article 172 of the Family Code for purposes of recognition and filiation.
refuted by contrary evidence.18 Its evidentiary worth cannot be sustained where
there exists strong, complete and conclusive proof of its falsity or nullity. In this
case, respondent's Certificate of Live Birth No. 477 entered in the records of the
Local Civil Registry (from which Exhibit "D" was machine copied) has all the badges
of nullity. Without doubt, the authentic copy on file in that office was removed and
substituted with a falsified Certificate of Live Birth.
At this point, it bears stressing the provision of Section 23, Rule 132 of the Revised
Rules of Court that "(d)ocuments consisting of entries in public records made in the
performance of a duty by a public officer are prima facie evidence of the facts
therein stated." In this case, the glaring discrepancies between the two Certificates
of Live Birth (Exhibits "D" and "8") have overturned the genuineness of Exhibit "D"
entered in the Local Civil Registry. What is authentic is Exhibit "8" recorded in the
Civil Registry General.
 The death certificate of Lorenzo Pou would indicate that he died on 11 September
  5
7;(2-+- 3 161(
6(1 1954, at the age of 84 years, in San Carlos, Pangasinan. It could thus be assumed
 that Lorenzo Pou was born sometime in the year 1870 when the Philippines was
The birth certificate of FPJ was marked Exhibit "A" for petitioner and Exhibit "3" for
respondent. The marriage certificate of Allan F. Poe to Bessie Kelley was submitted
as Exhibit "21" for respondent. The death certificate of Lorenzo Pou was submitted
by respondent as his Exhibit "5." While the last two documents were submitted in
evidence for respondent, the admissibility thereof, particularly in reference to the
facts which they purported to show, i.e., the marriage certificate in relation to the
date of marriage of Allan F. Poe to Bessie Kelley and the death certificate relative to
the death of Lorenzo Pou on 11 September 1954 in San Carlos, Pangasinan, were all
admitted by petitioner, who had utilized those material statements in his argument.
All three documents were certified true copies of the originals.
prima facie proof of their contents. Section 44, Rule 130, of the Rules of Court
provides:
"Entries in official records. Entries in official records made in the
performance of his duty by a public officer of the Philippines, or by a
person in the performance of a duty specially enjoined by law, are prima
facie evidence of the facts therein stated."
The trustworthiness of public documents and the value given to the entries made
therein could be grounded on 1) the sense of official duty in the preparation of the
statement made, 2) the penalty which is usually affixed to a breach of that duty, 3)
the routine and disinterested origin of most such statements, and 4) the publicity of
record which makes more likely the prior exposure of such errors as might have
31
occurred.
still a colony of Spain. Petitioner would argue that Lorenzo Pou was not in the
Philippines during the crucial period of from 1898 to 1902 considering that there
was no existing record about such fact in the Records Management and Archives
Office. Petitioner, however, likewise failed to show that Lorenzo Pou was at any
other place during the same period. In his death certificate, the residence of
Lorenzo Pou was stated to be San Carlos, Pangasinan. In the absence of any
evidence to the contrary, it should be sound to conclude, or at least to presume,
that the place of residence of a person at the time of his death was also his
residence before death. It would be extremely doubtful if the Records Management
and Archives Office would have had complete records of all residents of the
Philippines from 1898 to 1902.

Section 3, Rule 130, Rules of Court states that - 

#
#

"Original document must be produced; exceptions. - When the subject of
inquiry is the contents of a document, no evidence shall be admissible
other than the original document itself, except in the following cases:
"x x x xxx xxx
"(d) When the original is a public record in the custody of a public office or
is recorded in a public office."
Being public documents, the death certificate of Lorenzo Pou, the marriage
certificate of Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelly, and the birth certificate of FPJ, constitute
Ñ
;&-
Petitioner submits, in any case, that in establishing filiation (relationship or civil
status of the child to the father [or mother]) or paternity (relationship or civil status
of the father to the child) of an illegitimate child, FPJ evidently being an illegitimate
son according to petitioner, the mandatory rules under civil law must be used.
Under the Civil Code of Spain, which was in force in the Philippines from 08
December 1889 up until the day prior to 30 August 1950 when the Civil Code of the
Philippines took effect, acknowledgment was required to establish filiation or
paternity. Acknowledgment was either judicial (compulsory) or voluntary. Judicial
or compulsory acknowledgment was possible only if done during the lifetime of the
putative parent; voluntary acknowledgment could only be had in a record of birth, a
32
will, or a public document. Complementary to the new code was Act No. 3753 or
the Civil Registry Law expressing in Section 5 thereof, that -
"In case of an illegitimate child, the birth certificate shall be signed and
sworn to jointly by the parents of the infant or only by the mother if the
father refuses. In the latter case, it shall not be permissible to state or
reveal in the document the name of the father who refuses to
acknowledge the child, or to give therein any information by which such
father could be identified."
In order that the birth certificate could then be utilized to prove voluntary
acknowledgment of filiation or paternity, the certificate was required to be signed
or sworn to by the father. The failure of such requirement rendered the same
useless as being an authoritative document of recognition.33 In Mendoza vs.
Mella,34 the Court ruled -
"Since Rodolfo was born in 1935, after the registry law was enacted, the
question here really is whether or not his birth certificate (Exhibit 1), which
is merely a certified copy of the registry record, may be relied upon as
sufficient proof of his having been voluntarily recognized. No such reliance,
in our judgment, may be placed upon it. While it contains the names of
both parents, there is no showing that they signed the original, let alone
swore to its contents as required in Section 5 of Act No. 3753. For all that
might have happened, it was not even they or either of them who
furnished the data to be entered in the civil register. Petitioners say that in
any event the birth certificate is in the nature of a public document
wherein voluntary recognition of a natural child may also be made,
according to the same Article 131. True enough, but in such a case, there
must be a clear statement in the document that the parent recognizes the
child as his or her own."
In the birth certificate of respondent FPJ, presented by both parties, nowhere in the
document was the signature of Allan F. Poe found. There being no will apparently
executed, or at least shown to have been executed, by decedent Allan F. Poe, the
only other proof of voluntary recognition remained to be "some other public
35
document." In Pareja vs. Pareja, this Court defined what could constitute such a
document as proof of voluntary acknowledgment:
"Under the Spanish Civil Code there are two classes of public documents,
those executed by private individuals which must be authenticated by
notaries, and those issued by competent public officials by reason of their
office. The public document pointed out in Article 131 as one of the means
by which recognition may be made belongs to the first class."
Let us leave it at that for the moment.
The 1950 Civil Code categorized the acknowledgment or recognition of illegitimate
children into voluntary, legal or compulsory. Voluntary recognition was required to
be expressedly made in a record of birth, a will, a statement before a court of
record or in any authentic writing. Legal acknowledgment took place in favor of full
blood brothers and sisters of an illegitimate child who was recognized or judicially
declared as natural. Compulsory acknowledgment could be demanded generally in
cases when the child had in his favor any evidence to prove filiation. Unlike an
action to claim legitimacy which would last during the lifetime of the child, and
might pass exceptionally to the heirs of the child, an action to claim
acknowledgment, however, could only be brought during the lifetime of the
presumed parent.
Amicus Curiae Ruben F. Balane defined, during the oral argument, "authentic
writing," so as to be an authentic writing for purposes of voluntary recognition,
simply as being a genuine or indubitable writing of the father. The term would
include a public instrument (one duly acknowledged before a notary public or other
competent official) or a private writing admitted by the father to be his.
The Family Code has further liberalized the rules; Article 172, Article 173, and
Article 175 provide:
"Art. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the
following:
"(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment;
or
"(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private
handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned.
"In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be
proved by:
"(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child;
or
"(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.
 "Art. 173. The action to claim legitimacy may be brought by the child
during his or her lifetime and shall be transmitted to the heirs should the
child die during minority or in a state of insanity. In these cases, the heirs
shall have a period of five years within which to institute the action.
"The action already commenced by the child shall survive notwithstanding
the death of either or both of the parties.
"x x x xxx x x x.
"Art. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in
the same way and on the same, evidence as legitimate children.
"The action must be brought within the same period specified in Article
173, except when the action is based on the second paragraph of Article
172, in which case the action may be brought during the lifetime of the
alleged parent."
The provisions of the Family Code are retroactively applied; Article 256 of the code
reads:
"Art. 256. This Code shall have retroactive effect insofar as it does not
prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil
Code or other laws."
Thus, in Vda. de Sy-Quia vs. Court of Appeals,36 the Court has ruled:
"We hold that whether Jose was a voluntarily recognized natural child
should be decided under Article 278 of the Civil Code of the Philippines.
Article 2260 of that Code provides that 'the voluntary recognition of a
natural child shall take place according to this Code, even if the child was
born before the effectivity of this body of laws' or before August 30, 1950.
Hence, Article 278 may be given retroactive effect."
It should be apparent that the growing trend to liberalize the acknowledgment or
recognition of illegitimate children is an attempt to break away from the traditional
idea of keeping well apart legitimate and non-legitimate relationships within the
family in favor of the greater interest and welfare of the child. The provisions are
intended to merely govern the private and personal affairs of the family. There is
little, if any, to indicate that the legitimate or illegitimate civil status of the
individual would also affect his political rights or, in general, his relationship to the
State. While, indeed, provisions on "citizenship" could be found in the Civil Code,
such provisions must be taken in the context of private relations, the domain of civil
law; particularly -
"Civil Law is that branch of law which has for its double purpose the
organization of the family and the regulation of property. It has thus [been]
defined as the mass of precepts which determine and regulate the
relations of assistance, authority and obedience among members of a
family, and those which exist among members of a society for the
protection of private interests."37
In Ëañez de Barnuevo vs. Fuster,38 the Court has held:
"In accordance with Article 9 of the Civil Code of Spain, x x x the laws
relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal
capacity of persons, govern Spaniards although they reside in a foreign
country; that, in consequence, 'all questions of a civil nature, such as those
dealing with the validity or nullity of the matrimonial bond, the domicile of
the husband and wife, their support, as between them, the separation of
their properties, the rules governing property, marital authority, division of
conjugal property, the classification of their property, legal causes for
divorce, the extent of the latter, the authority to decree it, and, in general,
the civil effects of marriage and divorce upon the persons and properties
of the spouses, are questions that are governed exclusively by the national
law of the husband and wife."
The proof of filiation or paternity for purposes of determining his citizenship status
should thus be deemed independent from and not inextricably tied up with that
prescribed for civil law purposes. The Civil Code or Family Code provisions on proof
of filiation or paternity, although good law, do not have preclusive effects on
matters alien to personal and family relations. The ordinary rules on evidence could
well and should govern. For instance, the matter about pedigree is not necessarily
precluded from being applicable by the Civil Code or Family Code provisions.
Section 39, Rule 130, of the Rules of Court provides -
"Act or Declaration about pedigree. The act or declaration of a person
deceased, or unable to testify, in respect to the pedigree of another person
related to him by birth or marriage, may be received in evidence where it
occurred before the controversy, and the relationship between the two
persons is shown by evidence other than such act or declaration. The word
`pedigree͛ includes relationship, family genealogy, birth, marriage, death,
the dates when and the places where these facts occurred, and the names
 of the relatives. It embraces also facts of family history intimately recognition of his right to the inheritance claimed by him and the delivery to him of
connected with pedigree." his share as fixed by law.

For the above rule to apply, it would be necessary that (a) the declarant is already 6. ID.; ID.; PRESCRIPTION. Ͷ Both actions are different from each other and
dead or unable to testify, (b) the pedigree of a person must be at issue, (c) the have already prescribed in accordance with the old legislation as well as with the
declarant must be a relative of the person whose pedigree is in question, (d) provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure.
declaration must be made before the controversy has occurred, and (e) the
relationship between the declarant and the person whose pedigree is in question 
must be shown by evidence other than such act or declaration.   /(4!'+14


 #

(  6( 
1 In the basic case uhannie Tan vs. Republic, ante, this Court ruled as
 follows:1äwphï1.ñët
  
?
 (6
-!4 ! 
1. NATURAL CHILDREN; LEGITIMATE FILIATION; PRESUMPTION. Ͷ The
legitimate filiation of a person presupposes the existence of a marriage contracted
by the presumed parents in accordance with law and, consequently, a child can not
be declared a legitimate daughter of her mother without at the same time
presuming that said child was born during the marriage of her supposed parents.
2. ID.; ID.; BIRTH OF A CHILD FIFTEEN YEARS AFTER DEATH OF ALLEGED
FATHER. Ͷ A child born 15 years after the death of the alleged father can not
physically and legally be a legitimate daughter of such alleged father.
3. ID.; RIGHTS TO INHERIT FROM THEIR NATURAL MOTHER PRIOR TO
PROMULGATION OF CIVIL CODE. Ͷ Rights arising under the legislation prior to the
Civil Code shall only be recognized and given effect in accordance with the new
legislation, provided they do not prejudice other acquired rights having the same
origin, and according to this principle, natural children have no right to inherit from
their natural mother who has subsequently married and who, on her death, left
some legitimate children whose rights can not be prejudiced.
4. PARTITION; ACTION; PRESUMPTION. Ͷ He who brings an action for the
partition of an hereditary estate or property in common is presumed to be a coheir
and to have an undisputed right to the property claimed or to be a coowner of the
same property possessed in common.
5. ID.; ID.; OBJECT. Ͷ He who claims a right to a part of the inheritance of a
deceased person and who alleges that he is a relative of the latter and that he has a
right of testate or intestate succession thereto, has for his principal object the

 
(  6( 
1 
Under our laws, there can be no action or proceeding for the judicial
declaration of the citizenship of an individual. Courts of justice exist for the
settlement of justiciable controversies, which imply a given right, legally
demandable and enforceable, an act or omission violative of said right, and
a remedy granted or sanctioned by law, for said breach of right. As an
incident only of the adjudication of the rights of the parties to a
controversy, the court may pass upon, and make a pronouncement
relative to, their status. Otherwise, such a pronouncement is beyond
judicial power. Thus, for instance, no action or proceeding may be
instituted for a declaration to the effect that plaintiff or petitioner is
married, or single, or a legitimate child, although a finding thereon may be
made as a necessary premise to justify a given relief available only to one
enjoying said status. At times, the law permits the acquisition of a given
status, such as naturalization, by judicial decree. But, there is no similar
legislation authorizing the institution of a judicial proceeding to declare
that a given person is part of our citizenry. (Tan vs. Republic, G.R. No. L-
14159, April 18, 1960, reiterated in G.R. No. L-15775, April 29, 1961).
3
The said judicial declaration was merely an incident to the adjudication of the
rights of the parties to the controversy over land ownership. Their citizenship was
not the thing adjudicated in the judgment and the declaration that they are
Filipinos was but a necessary premise for the court to arrive at a conclusion that the
sale of the realty was valid as between the parties. Not being the thing directly
adjudicated, their declared citizenship is not res judicata, and cannot become
conclusive.

 

  
#:+

(4
-" !4@  The extrajudicial confession of Tolentino cannot be used against appellant under
 the principle of res inter alios acta unless accused is discharge from the information
  $ (  6 
1 and made a state witness.
 
  
 (2-+-0
-;@661!(0
!( !"3("1'+   
5 $(2-+-0
-;@33(c ( !3
66 


0&
)(2-+-0
- 1"6!(c "(
We hold that the trial court did not err in characterizing Panimdim's statement as a
part of the res gestae and as proving beyond reasonable doubt that Putian inflicted
upon him the stab wound that caused his death five days later in the hospital.
The res gestae rule embraces (a) spontaneous exclamations and (b) verbal acts (5
Moran's Comments on the Rules of Court, 1970 Ed., p. 362). The trial court
admitted Panimdim's statement as a spontaneous statement made after the
commission of a felony (People vs. Talledo and Timbreza, 85 Phil. 533).
  :.+

3

A witness can testify only to those facts which he knows of his personal knowledge,
19
which means those facts which are derived from his perception. A witness may
not testify as to what he merely learned from others either because he was told or
read or heard the same. Such testimony is considered hearsay and may not be
received as proof of the truth of what he has learned. The hearsay rule is based
upon serious concerns about the trustworthiness and reliability of hearsay evidence
  
; $(2-+-0
-31443-c  ( !( 3'+  inasmuch as such evidence are not given under oath or solemn affirmation and,
more importantly, have not been subjected to cross-examination by opposing
counsel to test the perception, memory, veracity and articulateness of the out-of-
Complainant was a widow, 52 years of age. She had been married three times. She
court declarant or actor upon whose reliability on which the worth of the out-of-
was not that innocent about the world. When appellant invited her at 10:00 P.M. to
court statement depends.20
step out of her house, she should have declined. Going out alone with a man late in
the evening is not in good taste nor safe even if the one who invited her was the
barrio captain. Instead, she should have suggested that the appellant invite some Res gestae, as an exception to the hearsay rule, refers to those exclamations and
other person for the purpose. statements made by either the participants, victims, or spectators to a crime
immediately before, during, or after the commission of the crime, when the
circumstances are such that the statements were made as a spontaneous reaction

or utterance inspired by the excitement of the occasion and there was no
  
5

(2-+-0
-"4- ( !!6( '+
opportunity for the declarant to deliberate and to fabricate a false statement. The
66"
rule in res gestae applies when the declarant himself did not testify and provided
that the testimony of the witness who heard the declarant complies with the
following requisites: (1) that the principal act, the res gestae, be a startling
The trial court had correctly applied the principle of res gestae, namely: (1) that the occurrence; (2) the statements were made before the declarant had the time to
principal act, the res gestae, be a startling occurrence; (2) that the statements were contrive or devise a falsehood; and (3) that the statements must concern the
made before the declarant had time to contrive or devise; and (3) that the 21
occurrence in question and its immediate attending circumstances.
statements made must concern the occurrence in question and its immediately
attending circumstances which are all present in the case at bar as Geraldine had
The Court is not convinced to accept the declarations as part of res gestae. While it
named accused-appellant as one of the perpetrators in the commission of the crime
may concede that these statements were made by the bystanders during a startling
immediately after the occurrence of the stabbing incident.
occurrence, it cannot be said however, that these utterances were made


 by the bystanders and #








Accused-appellant Carlito Tala also contends that the trial court erred in considering
 # 

. Both SFO III Rochar and Lt. Col. Torres received the bystanders͛
the extrajudicial confession of accused Manolito Tolentino implicating him in the statements while they were making their investigations during and after the fire. It
crime charged in the face of the subsequent admission by Manolito Tolentino that is reasonable to assume that when these statements were noted down, the
he was alone when he committed said crime. bystanders already had enough time and opportunity to mill around, talk to one
another and exchange information, not to mention theories and speculations, as is (b) by evidence that other appropriate security procedures or devices as
the usual experience in disquieting situations where hysteria is likely to take place. may be authorized by the Supreme Court or by law for authentication of
It cannot therefore be ascertained whether these utterances were the products of electronic documents were applied to the document; or
truth. That the utterances may be mere idle talk is not remote.
(c) by other evidence showing its integrity and reliability to the satisfaction
 of the judge.
   
 
#  (  6( 
1
 Aznar next invokes Section 43 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, which pertains to
  9)(2-+-0
- 31"6( " entries in the course of business, to support Exh. "G". Said provision reads:

Sec. 43. Entries in the course of business. ʹ Entries made at, or near the time of the
Aznar puts much weight on the ON-LINE AUTHORIZATION FOREIGN ACCOUNT transactions to which they refer, by a person deceased or unable to testify, who
ACTIVITY REPORT, a computer print-out handed to Aznar by Ingtan Agency, marked was in a position to know the facts therein stated, may be received as prima facie
as Exh. "G", to prove that his Mastercard was dishonored for being blacklisted. On evidence, if such person made the entries in his professional capacity or in the
said print-out appears the words "DECL OVERLIMIT" opposite Account No. 5423- performance of duty and in the ordinary or regular course of business or duty.
3920-0786-7012.
Under this rule, however, the following conditions are required:
As correctly pointed out by the RTC and the CA, however, such exhibit cannot be
considered admissible as its authenticity and due execution were not sufficiently 1. the person who made the entry must be dead, or unable to testify;
established by petitioner.
2. the entries were made at or near the time of the transactions to which
The prevailing rule at the time of the promulgation of the RTC Decision is Section 20 they refer;
of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court. It provides that whenever any private document
offered as authentic is received in evidence, its due execution and authenticity must
3. the entrant was in a position to know the facts stated in the entries;
be proved either by (a) anyone who saw the document executed or written; or (b)
by evidence of the genuineness of the signature or handwriting of the maker.
4. the entries were made in his professional capacity or in the performance
of a duty, whether legal, contractual, moral or religious; and
Aznar, who testified on the authenticity of Exh. "G," did not actually see the
document executed or written, neither was he able to provide evidence on the
genuineness of the signature or handwriting of Nubi, who handed to him said 5. the entries were made in the ordinary or regular course of business or
47
computer print-out. Indeed, all he was able to allege in his testimony are the duty.
following:
As correctly pointed out by the RTC in its May 29, 1998 Decision, there appears on
Section 1. Burden of proving authenticity. ʹ The person seeking to introduce an the computer print-out the name of a certain "Victrina Elnado Nubi" and a signature
electronic document in any legal proceeding has the burden of proving its purportedly belonging to her, and at the left dorsal side were handwritten the
words " orry for the delay since the records had to be retrieved. Regards. Darryl
authenticity in the manner provided in this Rule.
Mario." It is not clear therefore if it was Nubi who encoded the information stated
in the print-out and was the one who printed the same. The handwritten
Section 2. Manner of authentication. ʹ Before any private electronic document
annotation signed by a certain Darryl Mario even suggests that it was Mario who
offered as authentic is received in evidence, its authenticity must be proved by any
printed the same and only handed the print-out to Nubi. The identity of the
of the following means:
entrant, required by the provision above mentioned, was therefore not established.
Neither did petitioner establish in what professional capacity did Mario or Nubi
(a) by evidence that it had been digitally signed by the person purported to
have signed the same;
make the entries, or whether the entries were made in the performance of their 
duty in the ordinary or regular course of business or duty.   0   ?'
 (2-+-0
- 4"(4(3

And even if Exh. "G" is admitted as evidence, it only shows that the use of the credit
card of petitioner was denied because it was already over the limit. There is no
allegation in the Complaint or evidence to show that there was gross negligence on
the part of Citibank in declaring that the credit card has been used over the limit.
The Court is also perplexed that stated on Exh. "G" is the amount of "6,289,195.10"
opposite petitioner's account number, which data, petitioner did not clarify.48 As
plaintiff in this case, it was incumbent on him to prove that he did not actually incur
the said amount which is above his credit limit. As it is, the Court cannot see how
Exh. "G" could help petitioner's claim for damages.
Entries in the course of business. Ͷ Entries made at, or near the time of the
transactions to which they refer, by a person deceased, or unable to testify, who
was in a position to know the facts therein stated, may be received as prima facie
evidence, if such person made the entries in his professional capacity or in the
performance of duty and in the ordinary or regular course of business or
duty.1avvphil.net
Petitioner͛s contention has no merit.
The provision does not apply to this case because it does not involve entries made
in the course of business. Rayos testified on a statement of account she prepared


A on the basis of invoices and delivery orders which she, however, knew nothing
about. She had no personal knowledge of the facts on which the accounts were
26 based since, admittedly, she was not involved in the delivery of goods and was
Section 2. Manner of authentication. - Before any private electronic
document offered as authentic is received in evidence, its authenticity merely in charge of the records and documents of all accounts receivable as part of
must be proved by any of the following means: her duties as credit and collection manager.15 She thus knew nothing of the truth or
falsity of the facts stated in the invoices and delivery orders, i.e., whether such
(a) by evidence that it had been digitally signed by the person deliveries were in fact made in the amounts and on the dates stated, or whether
purported to have signed the same; they were actually received by respondent. She was not even the credit and
16
collection manager during the period the agreement was in effect. This can only
mean that she merely obtained these documents from another without any
(b) by evidence that other appropriate security procedures or
personal knowledge of their contents.
devices as may be authorized by the Supreme Court or by law for
authentication of electronic documents were applied to the
document; or The foregoing shows that Rayos was incompetent to testify on whether or not the
invoices and delivery orders turned over to her correctly reflected the details of the
deliveries made. Thus, the CA correctly disregarded her testimony.
(c) by other evidence showing its integrity and reliability to the
satisfaction of the judge.
Furthermore, the invoices and delivery orders presented by petitioner were self-
27 serving. Having generated these documents, petitioner could have easily fabricated
Sec. 20. Proof of private document. - Before any private document
them. Petitioner͛s failure to present any competent witness to identify the
offered as authentic is received in evidence, its due execution and
signatures and other information in those invoices and delivery orders cast doubt
authenticity must be proved either:
on their veracity.
(a) By anyone who saw the document executed or written; or

  ' .)
5 
2(2-+-0
- 4131(c "(3
(b) By evidence of the genuineness of the signature or
handwriting of the maker.

Any other private document need only be identified as that which

it is claimed to be.
 Neither can we accept petitioner͛s argument that the entries made by
Mercado in the ledger were competent evidence to prove how and when the
negative balance was incurred. Petitioner invokes Section 43 of Rule 130:
Entries in the course of business. ʹ Entries made at, or
near the time of the transactions to which they refer, by a
person deceased, or unable to testify, who was in a position to
know the facts therein stated, may be received as prima facie
evidence, if such person made the entries in his professional
capacity or in the performance of duty and in the ordinary or
regular course of business or duty.
Under this exception to the hearsay rule, the admission in evidence of
entries in corporate books required the satisfaction of the following conditions:
1. the person who made the entry must be dead, or unable to testify;
2. the entries were made at or near the time of the transactions to which
they refer;
3. the entrant was in a position to know the facts stated in the entries;
4. the entries were made in his professional capacity or in the
performance of a duty, whether legal, contractual, moral or
religious; and
5. the entries were made in the ordinary or regular course of business
or duty.
The ledger entries did not meet the first and third requisites.
The plaintiff submits that the ledger cards constituted
the best evidence of the transactions made by the defendant with
the bank relative to his account, pursuant to Section 43 of Rule
130 of the Revised Rules on Evidence. There is no question that
the entries in the ledgers were made by one whose duty it was to
record transactions in the ordinary or regular course of the
business. But for the entries to be prima facie evidence of the
facts recorded, the Rule interpose[s] a very important condition,
one which we think is truly indispensable to the probative worth
of the entries as an exception to the hearsay rule, and that is that
the entrant must be ͞in a position to know the facts therein
stated.͟ Undeniably, Mr. Mercado was in a position to know the
facts of the check deposits and withdrawals. But the transfers of
funds through the debit memos in question?

There is good reason why evidence of this nature is incorrigibly
hearsay. Entries in business records which spring from the duty of
other employees to communicate facts occurring in the ordinary
course of business are prima facie admissible, the duty to
communicate being itself a badge of trustworthiness of the
entries, but not when they purport to record what were
independent agreements arrived at by some bank officials and a
client. In this case, the entries become mere casual or voluntary
 reports of the official concerned. To permit the ledgers, prepared recollection of all that pertain to the subject. It is understandable that the
testimony during the trial would be more lengthy and detailed than the matters
7
by the bank at its own instance, to substitute the contract as stated in the police blotter Significantly, the Advance Œnformation heet was never
formally offered by the defense during the proceedings in the court below. Hence
proof of the agreements with third parties, is to set a dangerous any reliance by the accused on the document must fail since the court cannot
consider any evidence which has not been formally offered.8
precedent. Business entries are allowed as an exception to the
Parenthetically, the Advance Œnformation heet was prepared by the police officer
hearsay rule only under certain conditions specified in Section 43, only after interviewing Camba, an alleged eyewitness. The accused then could have
compelled the attendance of Camba as a witness. The failure to exert the slightest
which must be scrupulously observed to prevent them from being effort to present Camba on the part of the accused should militate against his
cause.
used as a source of undue advantage for the party preparing
Entries in official records made in the performance of his duty by a public officer or
them. (citations omitted) by a person in the performance of a duty specially enjoined by law are prima facie
evidence of the facts therein stated.9 But to be admissible in evidence three (3)
 requisites must concur: (a) The entry was made by a police officer or by another

##

(  6( 
11 person specially enjoined by law to do so; (b) It was made by the public officer in
 the performance of his duties or by such other person in the performance of a duty
  
;
 (2-+-0
-;@1""-'6( !( " specially enjoined by law; and, (c) The public officer or other person had sufficient
'+6 knowledge of the facts by him stated, which must have been acquired by him
The written entries in the clinical case record, Exh. "2", showing the date of her personally or through official information.
10

admission in the hospital on April 22, 1973, her complaint of vaginal bleeding and
the diagnosis of "Healing lacerated wide at 2 o'clock and 10 o'clock hymen" are
5

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prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated, the said entries having been made
 (
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in official records by a public officer of the Philippines in the performance of his
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duty especially enjoined by law, which is that of a physician in a government

 

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hospital. (Rule 130, See. 38, Rules of Court). In the case at bar, Dr. Antonino Estioco
$
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was the admitting physician but unfortunately, he was not presented as a witness

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for the government.
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  <0;+(2-+- 166(36'+ "1(
The accused leans heavily on the Advance Œnformation heet6 prepared by Pat.

Steve Casimiro which did not mention him at all and named only "Ramon Doe" as
the principal suspect. Unfortunately this cannot defeat the positive and candid
We agree with petitioners that the ship captain's logbook is a vital
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses. Entries in official records, as in the case of
a police blotter, are only prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated. They are evidence as Article 612 of the Code of Commerce requires him to keep a
not conclusive. The entry in the police blotter is not necessarily entitled to full credit record of the decisions he had adopted as the vessel's head. Thus, in
Haverton hipping Ltd. v. NLRu,  the Court held that a copy of an official
for it could be incomplete and inaccurate, sometimes from either partial
suggestions or for want of suggestions or inquiries, without the aid of which the entry in the logbook is legally binding and serves as an exception to the
witness may be unable to recall the connected collateral circumstances necessary hearsay rule.
for the correction of the first suggestion of his memory and for his accurate
 However, the Haverton hipping ruling does not find unqualified
application in the case at bar. In said case, an investigation of the incident
which led to the seaman's dismissal was conducted before he was
dismissed. Consequently, the facts appearing in the logbook were
supported by the facts gathered at the investigation. In this case, because
no investigation was conducted by the ship captain before repatriating
private respondent, the contents of the logbook have to be duly identified
and authenticated lest an injustice result from a blind adoption of such
contents which merely serve as prima facie evidence of the incident in
 
question.
Moreover, what was presented in the Haverton hipping case was a copy
of the official entry from the logbook itself. In this case, petitioners did not
submit as evidence to the POEA the logbook itself, or even authenticated
copies of pertinent pages thereof, which could have been easily xeroxed or
photocopied considering the present technology on reproduction of
 6
documents. What was offered in evidence was merely a typewritten
 1
collation of excerpts from what could be the logbook because by their
format, they could have been lifted from other records kept in the vessel in
accordance with Article 612 of the Code of Commerce. 4
H ence, as the typewritten excerpts from the "logbook" were the only
pieces of evidence presented by petitioners to support the dismissal of
private respondent, have no probative value at all, petitioners' cause must
fail. Their failure to discharge the onus probandi properly may have no
other result than a finding that the dismissal of private respondent is

unjustified.
 Court͛s pronouncement in Africa v. Caltex (Phil.), Inc., where it has been held that
  .

 

#/+ (2-+- 4"3 ( an entrant must have personal knowledge of the facts stated by him or such facts
 $ "(3
Jurisprudence is replete with cases holding that if the taxpayer denies ever having
received an assessment from the BIR, it is incumbent upon the latter to prove by
competent evidence that such notice was indeed received by the addressee. The
onus probandi was shifted to respondent to prove by contrary evidence that the
Petitioner received the assessment in the due course of mail. The Supreme Court
has consistently held that while a mailed letter is deemed received by the
addressee in the course of mail, this is merely a disputable presumption subject to
controversion and a direct denial thereof shifts the burden to the party favored by
the presumption to prove that the mailed letter was indeed received by the
addressee (Republic vs. Court of Appeals, 149 SCRA 351). Thus as held by the
Supreme Court in Gonzalo P. Nava vs. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 13 SCRA
104, January 30, 1965:
"The facts to be proved to raise this presumption are (a) that the letter was
properly addressed with postage prepaid, and (b) that it was mailed. Once these
facts are proved, the presumption is that the letter was received by the addressee
as soon as it could have been transmitted to him in the ordinary course of the mail.
But if one of the said facts fails to appear, the presumption does not lie. (VI, Moran,
Comments on the Rules of Court, 1963 ed, 56-57 citing Enriquez vs. Sunlife
Assurance of Canada, 41 Phil 269)."
In the present case, petitioner denies receiving the assessment notice, and the
respondent was unable to present substantial evidence that such notice was,
indeed, mailed or sent by the respondent before the BIR͛s right to assess had
prescribed and that said notice was received by the petitioner. The respondent
presented the BIR record book where the name of the taxpayer, the kind of tax
assessed, the registry receipt number and the date of mailing were noted. The BIR
records custodian, Ingrid Versola, also testified that she made the entries therein.
Respondent offered the entry in the BIR record book and the testimony of its record
custodian as entries in official records in accordance with Section 44, Rule 130 of
the Rules of Court, 24 which states that:
Section 44. Entries in official records. - Entries in official records made in the
performance of his duty by a public officer of the Philippines, or by a person in the
performance of a duty specially enjoined by law, are prima facie evidence of the
facts therein stated.
The foregoing rule on evidence, however, must be read in accordance with this
25
were acquired by him from reports made by persons under a legal duty to submit
the same.
There are three requisites for admissibility under the rule just mentioned: (a) that
the entry was made by a public officer, or by another person specially enjoined by
law to do so; (b) that it was made by the public officer in the performance of his
duties, or by such other person in the performance of a duty specially enjoined by
law; and (c) that the public officer or other person had sufficient knowledge of the
facts by him stated, which must have been acquired by him personally or through
official information x x x.
In this case, the entries made by Ingrid Versola were not based on her personal
knowledge as she did not attest to the fact that she personally prepared and mailed
the assessment notice. Nor was it stated in the transcript of stenographic notes 26 Notwithstanding the fact that petitioner PRBLI was not a party in said criminal case,
how and from whom she obtained the pertinent information. Moreover, she did the testimonies of the three witnesses are still admissible on the ground that
not attest to the fact that she acquired the reports from persons under a legal duty petitioner PRBLI failed to object on their admissibility.
to submit the same. Hence, Rule 130, Section 44 finds no application in the present
case. Thus, the evidence offered by respondent does not qualify as an exception to It is elementary that an objection shall be made at the time when an alleged
the rule against hearsay evidence. inadmissible document is offered in evidence; otherwise, the objection shall be
treated as waived, since the right to object is merely a privilege which the party
Furthermore, independent evidence, such as the registry receipt of the assessment may waive. Thus, a failure to except to the evidence because it does not conform to
notice, or a certification from the Bureau of Posts, could have easily been obtained. the statute is a waiver of the provisions of the law. Even assuming ex gratia
Yet respondent failed to present such evidence. argumenti that these documents are inadmissible for being hearsay, but on account
of failure to object thereto, the same may be admitted and considered as sufficient
24
   to prove the facts therein asserted. Hearsay evidence alone may be insufficient to
 
  (  6( 
14 establish a fact in a suit but, when no objection is made thereto, it is, like any other
 evidence, to be considered and given the importance it deserves.25
 
  (  6 
13
 In the case at bar, petitioner PRBLI did not object to the TSNs containing the
 
 
(  6( 
1" testimonies of respondent Calaunan, Marcelo Mendoza and Fernando Ramos in the
 criminal case when the same were offered in evidence in the trial court. In fact, the
  5('+41 !3" TSNs of the testimonies of Calaunan and Mendoza were admitted by both
26
   (2-+-0
- 4 4"(4(" petitioners. Moreover, petitioner PRBLI even offered in evidence the TSN
containing the testimony of Donato Ganiban in the criminal case. If petitioner PRBLI
On the first assigned error, petitioners argue that the TSNs containing the argues that the TSNs of the testimonies of plaintiff͛s witnesses in the criminal case
18 19 20 should not be admitted in the instant case, why then did it offer the TSN of the
testimonies of respondent Calaunan, Marcelo Mendoza and Fernando Ramos
should not be admitted in evidence for failure of respondent to comply with the testimony of Ganiban which was given in the criminal case? It appears that
requisites of Section 47, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. petitioner PRBLI wants to have its cake and eat it too. It cannot argue that the TSNs
of the testimonies of the witnesses of the adverse party in the criminal case should
For Section 47, Rule 13021 to apply, the following requisites must be satisfied: (a) not be admitted and at the same time insist that the TSN of the testimony of the
the witness is dead or unable to testify; (b) his testimony or deposition was given in witness for the accused be admitted in its favor. To disallow admission in evidence
a former case or proceeding, judicial or administrative, between the same parties or of the TSNs of the testimonies of Calaunan, Marcelo Mendoza and Fernando Ramos
those representing the same interests; (c) the former case involved the same in the criminal case and to admit the TSN of the testimony of Ganiban would be
subject as that in the present case, although on different causes of action; (d) the unfair.
issue testified to by the witness in the former trial is the same issue involved in the
present case; and (e) the adverse party had an opportunity to cross-examine the We do not subscribe to petitioner PRBLI͛s argument that it will be denied due
22 process when the TSNs of the testimonies of Calaunan, Marcelo Mendoza and
witness in the former case.
Fernando Ramos in the criminal case are to be admitted in the civil case. It is too
Admittedly, respondent failed to show the concurrence of all the requisites set late for petitioner PRBLI to raise denial of due process in relation to Section 47, Rule
forth by the Rules for a testimony given in a former case or proceeding to be 130 of the Rules of Court, as a ground for objecting to the admissibility of the TSNs.
admissible as an exception to the hearsay rule. Petitioner PRBLI, not being a party in For failure to object at the proper time, it waived its right to object that the TSNs
Criminal Case No. 684-M-89, had no opportunity to cross-examine the three did not comply with Section 47.
witnesses in said case. The criminal case was filed exclusively against petitioner
27
Manliclic, petitioner PRBLI͛s employee. The cases dealing with the subsidiary In Mangio v. uourt of Appeals, this Court, through Associate Justice Reynato S.
liability of employers uniformly declare that, strictly speaking, they are not parties Puno,28 admitted in evidence a TSN of the testimony of a witness in another case
23 despite therein petitioner͛s assertion that he would be denied due process. In
to the criminal cases instituted against their employees.
admitting the TSN, the Court ruled that the raising of denial of due process in
relation to Section 47, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, as a ground for objecting to
the admissibility of the TSN was belatedly done. In so doing, therein petitioner
waived his right to object based on said ground.
blindness can be determined through common knowledge and by anyone with
sufficient familiarity of such fact. In this case, Avelina, then alive during the trial of
the case, categorically testified and attested to her own blindness, a fact which
even the trial court noted
 : :
&
  ( 6'--"3 !!6
 

7
+ (  6 
 1
4 The District Court granted respondent's motion for summary judgment. The court
 stated that scientific evidence is admissible only if the principle upon which it is
 



(2-+-0
- 3 !3@!"(c 6( !!!(6!'+  based is " `sufficiently established to have general acceptance in the field to which it
The failure of a witness to reveal at once the identity of the accused as one of the
perpetrators of the crime does not affect, much less, impair his credibility as a

witness. The general or common rule is that witnesses react to a crime in
different ways. 6There is no standard form of human behavioral response to a
strange, startling and frightful event, and there is no standard rule by which
1
witnesses to a crime must react.

A polygraph is an electromechanical instrument that simultaneously measures and
records certain physiological changes in the human body that are believed to be
involuntarily caused by an examinee's conscious attempt to deceive the questioner.
6
The theory behind a polygraph or lie detector test is that a person who lie
deliberately will have rising blood pressure and a subconscious block in breathing,
which will be recorded on the graph. 6 However, American courts almost uniformly
reject the results of polygraphs tests when offered in evidence for the purposes of
establishing the guilt or innocence of one accused of a crime, whether the accused
or the prosecution seeks its introduction, for the reason that polygraph has not as
yet attained scientific acceptance as a reliable and ascertaining truth or deception.
6
The rule is no different in this jurisdiction. Thus, in People v. Daniel, 66 stating that
much faith and credit should not be vested upon a lie detector test as it is not
conclusive. Appellant, in this case, has not advanced any reason why this rule
should not apply to him.
 causal link between the drug and birth defects, were ruled to be inadmissible
 
.)$

# (2-+-07- 44!!(c 1(" because they had not been published or subjected to peer review. Œbid.

The rule of evidence requiring the opinion of expert witnesses applies only to such
matters clearly within the domain of medical science, and not to matters that are
within the common knowledge of mankind which may be testified to by anyone
familiar with the facts. Thus, to prove whether one is blind, it is not necessary to
submit a medical certificate attesting to the blindness or to require an expert
witness, such as an ophthalmologist, to testify to such fact, since the fact of
belongs.' " 727 F. Supp. 570, 572 (SD Cal. 1989), quoting nited tates v. Kilgus, 571
F. 2d 508, 510 (CA9 1978). The court concluded that petitioners' evidence did not
meet this standard. Given the vast body of epidemiological data concerning
Bendectin, the court held, expert opinion which is not based on epidemiological
evidence is not admissible to establish causation. 727 F. Supp., at 575. Thus, the
animal cell studies, live animal studies, and chemical structure analyses on which
petitioners had relied could not raise by themselves a reasonably disputable jury
issue regarding causation. Œbid. Petitioners' epidemiological analyses, based as they
were on recalculations of data in previously published studies that had found no
causal link between the drug and birth defects, were ruled to be inadmissible
because they had not been published or subjected to peer review. Œbid.
The District Court granted respondent's motion for summary judgment. The court
stated that scientific evidence is admissible only if the principle upon which it is
based is " `sufficiently established to have general acceptance in the field to which it
belongs.' " 727 F. Supp. 570, 572 (SD Cal. 1989), quoting nited tates v. Kilgus, 571
F. 2d 508, 510 (CA9 1978). The court concluded that petitioners' evidence did not
meet this standard. Given the vast body of epidemiological data concerning
Bendectin, the court held, expert opinion which is not based on epidemiological
evidence is not admissible to establish causation. 727 F. Supp., at 575. Thus, the
animal cell studies, live animal studies, and chemical structure analyses on which
petitioners had relied could not raise by themselves a reasonably disputable jury
issue regarding causation. Œbid. Petitioners' epidemiological analyses, based as they
were on recalculations of data in previously published studies that had found no
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed. 951 F.2d 1128
(1991). Citing Frye v. nited tates, 54 App. D.C. 46, 47, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (1923),
the court stated that expert opinion based on a scientific technique is inadmissible
unless the technique is "generally accepted" as reliable in the relevant scientific
community. 951 F. 2d, at 1129-1130. The court declared that expert opinion based
on a methodology that diverges "significantly from the procedures accepted by
recognized authorities in the field . . . cannot be shown to be `generally accepted as
a reliable technique.' " Œd., at 1130, quoting nited tates v. olomon, 753 F. 2d
1522, 1526 (CA9 1985).
In the 70 years since its formulation in the Frye case, the "general acceptance" test
has been the dominant standard for determining the admissibility of novel scientific
evidence at trial. See E. Green & C. Nesson, Problems, Cases, and Materials on
Evidence 649 (1983). Although under increasing attack of late, the rule continues to
be followed by a majority of courts, including the Ninth Circuit. [n.3]
The merits of the Frye test have been much debated, and scholarship on its proper
scope and application is legion.
[n.4]
Petitioners' primary attack, however, is not
onthe content but on the continuing authority of the rule. They contend that the
Frye test was superseded by the adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence. [n.5] We
agree.
Frye, of course, predated the Rules by half a century. In nited tates v. Abel, 469
U.S. 45 (1984), we considered the pertinence of background common law in
interpreting the Rules of Evidence. We noted that the Rules occupy the field, id., at
49, but, quoting Professor Cleary, the Reporter, explained that the common law
nevertheless could serve as an aid to their application:
"In principle, under the Federal Rules no common law of evidence remains. `All
relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise provided . . . .' In reality, of
course, the body of common law knowledge continues to exist, though in the
somewhat altered form of a source of guidance in the exercise of delegated
powers." Œd., at 51-52.
testimony,provides:
"If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to
understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an
expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in
the form of an opinion or otherwise."
Nothing in the text of this Rule establishes "general acceptance" as an absolute
prerequisite to admissibility. Nor does respondent present any clear indication that
Rule 702 or the Rules as a whole were intended to incorporate a "general
acceptance" standard. The drafting history makes no mention of Frye, and a rigid
"general acceptance" requirement would be at odds with the "liberal thrust" of the
Federal Rules and their "general approach of relaxing the traditional barriers to
`opinion' testimony." Beech Aircraft uorp. v. Rainey, 488 U. S., at 169 (citing Rules
701 to 705). See also Weinstein, Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence is Sound;
It Should Not Be Amended, 138 F.R.D. 631, 631 (1991) ("The Rules were designed to
depend primarily upon lawyer adversaries and sensible triers of fact to evaluate
conflicts"). Given the Rules' permissive backdrop and their inclusion of a specific
rule on expert testimony that does not mention "general acceptance," the assertion
that the Rules somehow assimilated Frye is unconvincing. Frye made `general
acceptance' the exclusive test for admitting expert scientific testimony. That
austere standard, absent from and incompatible with the Federal Rules of Evidence,
should not be applied in federal trials. [n.6]
That the Frye test was displaced by the Rules of Evidence does not mean, however,
that the Rules themselves place no limits on the admissibility of purportedly
scientific evidence. [n.7] Nor is the trial judge disabled from screening such evidence.
To the contrary, under the Rules the trial judge must ensure that any and all
scientific testimony or evidence admitted is not only relevant, but reliable.
The primary locus of this obligation is Rule 702, which clearly contemplates some
degree of regulation of the subjects and theories about which an expert may testify.
"Œf scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to
understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue" an expert "may testify
thereto." The subject of an expert's testimony must be "scientific . . . knowledge."
[n.8]
The adjective "scientific" implies a grounding in the methods and procedures of
science. Similarly, the word "knowledge" connotes more than subjective belief or
unsupported speculation. The term "applies to any body of known facts or to any
body of ideas inferred from such facts or accepted as truths on good grounds."
Webster's Third New International Dictionary 1252 (1986). Of course, it would be
unreasonable to conclude that the subject of scientific testimony must be "known"
to a certainty; arguably, there are no certainties in science.

Rule 702 further requires that the evidence or testimony "assist the trier of fact to
understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue." This condition goes
primarilyto relevance. "Expert testimony which does not relate to any issue in the
case is not relevant and, ergo, non helpful."
That these requirements are embodied in Rule 702 is not surprising. Unlike an
ordinary witness, see Rule 701, an expert is permitted wide latitude to offer
opinions, including those that are not based on first hand knowledge or
observation. See Rules 702 and 703. Presumably, this relaxation of the usual
requirement of first hand knowledge--a rule which represents "a `most pervasive
manifestation' of the common law insistence upon `the most reliable sources of
information,' " Advisory Committee's Notes on Fed. Rule Evid. 602 (citation
omitted)--is premised on an assumption that the expert'sopinion will have a reliable
basis in the knowledge and experience of his discipline.
Faced with a proffer of expert scientific testimony, then, the trial judge must
determine at the outset, pursuant to Rule 104(a), [n.10] whether the expert is
proposing to testify to (1) scientific knowledge that (2) will assist the trier of fact to
understand or determine a fact in issue. [n.11] This entails a preliminary assessment
of whether the reasoning or methodology underlying the testimony is scientifically
valid and of whether that reasoning or methodology properly can be applied to the
facts in issue. We are confident that federal judges possess the capacity to
undertake this review. Many factors will bear on the inquiry, and we do not


presume to set out a definitive checklist or test. But some general observations are
appropriate.
4 
Another pertinent consideration is whether the theory or technique has been
subjected to peer review and publication. Publication (which is but one element of
peer review) is not a sine qua non of admissibility; it does not necessarily correlate
with reliability, see S. Jasanoff, The Fifth Branch: Science Advisors as Policymakers
61-76 (1990), and in some instances well grounded but innovative theories will not
have been published, see Horrobin, The Philosophical Basis of Peer Review and the
Suppression of Innovation, 263 J. Am. Med. Assn. 1438 (1990). Some propositions,
moreover, are too particular, too new, or of too limited interest to be published.
But submission to the scrutiny of the scientific community is a component of "good
science," in part because it increases the likelihood that substantive flaws in
methodology will be detected. See J. Ziman, Reliable Knowledge: An Exploration of
the Grounds for Belief in Science 130-133 (1978); Relman and Angell, How Good Is
Peer Review?, 321 New Eng. J. Med. 827 (1989). The fact of publication (or lack
thereof) in a peer reviewed journal thus will be a relevant, though not dispositive,
consideration in assessing the scientific validity of a particular technique or
methodology on which an opinion is premised.
proffer of expert scientific testimony under Rule 702 should also be mindful of
other applicable rules. Rule 703 provides that expert opinions based on otherwise
inadmissible hearsay are to be admitted only if the facts or data are "of a type
reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field in forming opinions or
inferences upon the subject." Rule 706 allows the court at its discretion to procure
the assistance of an expert of its own choosing. Finally, Rule 403 permits the
exclusion of relevant evidence "if its probative value is substantially outweighed by
the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury . . . ."
Judge Weinstein has explained: "Expert evidence can be both powerful and quite
misleading because of the difficulty in evaluating it. Because of this risk, the judge in
weighing possible prejudice against probative force under Rule 403 of the present
rules exercises more control over experts than over lay witnesses." Weinstein, 138
F.R.D., at 632.
  6( 
 1
To summarize: "general acceptance" is not a necessary precondition to the
admissibility of scientific evidence under the Federal Rules of Evidence, but the
Rules of Evidence--especially Rule 702--do assign to the trial judge the task of
ensuring that an expert's testimony both rests on a reliable foundation and is
relevant to the task at hand. Pertinent evidence based on scientifically valid
principles will satisfy those demands.


/$(  6( 

What the appellant is here relying on is the maxim res inter alios acta. As a general
rule, the evidence of other offenses committed by a defendant is inadmissible. But
appellant has confused this maxim and this rule with certain exceptions thereto.
The effort is not to convict the accused of a second offense. Nor is there an attempt
to draw the mind away from the point at issue and thus to prejudice defendant's
case. The purpose is to ascertain defendant's knowledge and intent, and to fix his
negligence. If the defendant has on more than one occasion performed similar acts,
accident in good faith is possibly excluded, negligence is intensified, and fraudulent
intent may even be established. It has been said that there is no better evidence of
negligence than the frequency of accidents. (See 10 R. C. L., pp. 938, 940.) The
United States Supreme Court has held that:
On the trial of a criminal case the question relates to the tendency of
certain testimony to throw light upon a particular fact, or to explain the
conduct of a particular person, there is a certain discretion on the part of
the trial judge which a court of errors will not interfere with, unless it
manifestly appear that the testimony has no legitimate bearing upon the
question at issue, and is calculated to prejudice the accused.
Whenever the necessity arises for a resort to circumstantial evidence,
either from the nature of the inquiry or the failure of direct proof,
objections to the testimony on the ground of irrelevancy are not favored.
Evidence is admissible in a criminal action which tends to show motive,
although it tends to prove the commission of another offense by the
defendant. (Moore vs. U. S. [1893], 150 U. S., 57.)



 Ñ'
(2-+-0
-;@ 4(c ( ! (6"
-14"
 delivery of her money and jewelry, having recognized him later to be the herein
accused-appellant. While evidence of another crime is, as a rule, not admissible in a
Four assignments of error are made. The first is that the lower court erred in prosecution for robbery, it is admissible when it is otherwise relevant, as where it
admitting the testimony of the chemist Pena and Darjuan as to their purchase of tends to identify defendant as the perpetrator of the robbery charged, or tends to
potassium chlorate at the drug store of the accused, which substance proved on show his presence at the scene or in the vicinity of the crime at the time charged, or
analysis to be barium chlorate. What the appellant is here relying on is the maxim when it is evidence of a circumstance connected with the crime (16, C. J., 610, 611,
res inter alios acta. As a general rule, the evidence of other offenses committed by a sec. 1196).
defendant is inadmissible. But appellant has confused this maxim and this rule with
certain exceptions thereto. The effort is not to convict the accused of a second
offense. Nor is there an attempt to draw the mind away from the point at issue and 
thus to prejudice defendant's case. The purpose is to ascertain defendant's
knowledge and intent, and to fix his negligence. If the defendant has on more than 
one occasion performed similar acts, accident in good faith is possibly excluded,
negligence is intensified, and fraudulent intent may even be established. It has been
said that there is no better evidence of negligence than the frequency of accidents.
(See 10 R. C. L., pp. 938, 940.) The United States Supreme Court has held that:

On the trial of a criminal case the question relates to the tendency of

certain testimony to throw light upon a particular fact, or to explain the
conduct of a particular person, there is a certain discretion on the part of
the trial judge which a court of errors will not interfere with, unless it
manifestly appear that the testimony has no legitimate bearing upon the
question at issue, and is calculated to prejudice the accused.

Whenever the necessity arises for a resort to circumstantial evidence,

either from the nature of the inquiry or the failure of direct proof,
objections to the testimony on the ground of irrelevancy are not favored.

Evidence is admissible in a criminal action which tends to show motive,

although it tends to prove the commission of another offense by the
defendant. (Moore vs. U. S. [1893], 150 U. S., 57.)


 
/$(2-+-0
-14 "!( 6( !6"(31 -4

The testimony of Juana de la Cruz to the effect that her house, situated only about
one hundred meters from that of Perfecto Melocotones, was assaulted that same
night by some malefactors with white stripes upon their faces, and that one of
them, with pockmarks on his face and a scar on his left eyelid and dressed in a
maong-colored suit, who later turned out to be the herein accused-appellant,
opened her box, indirectly corroborates Maximiniana Vicente's testimony that the
man of the same description was the open who went to her house and demanded