1.

Estrada v Arroyo GR 146738 March 2, 2001

Facts: In the May 11, 1998 elections, petitioner Joseph Estrada was elected President while respondent
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo was elected Vice-President. From the beginning of his term, however,
petitioner was plagued by problems that slowly eroded his popularity. On October 4, 2000, Ilocos Sur
Governor Chavit Singson, a longtime friend of the petitioner, accused the petitioner, his family and
friends of receiving millions of pesos from jueteng lords. The expose immediately ignited reactions of
rage. On November 13, 2000, House Speaker Villar transmitted the Articles of Impeachment signed by
115 representatives or more than 1/3 of all the members of the House of Representatives to the Senate.
On November 20, 2000, the Senate formally opened the impeachment trial of the petitioner. On January
16, 2001, by a vote of 11-10, the senator-judges ruled against the opening of the second envelope which
allegedly contained evidence showing that petitioner held P3.3 billion in a secret bank account under
the name Jose Velarde. The ruling was met by a spontaneous outburst of anger that hit the streets of
the metropolis. Thereafter, the Armed Forces and the PNP withdrew their support to the Estrada
government. Some Cabinet secretaries, undersecretaries, assistant secretaries and bureau chiefs
resigned from their posts.

On January 20, 2001, at about 12 noon, Chief Justice Davide administered the oath to respondent
Arroyo as President of the Philippines. On the same day, petitioner issued a press statement that he was
leaving Malacanang Palace for the sake of peace and in order to begin the healing process of the nation.
It also appeared that on the same day, he signed a letter stating that he was transmitting a declaration
that he was unable to exercise the powers and duties of his office and that by operation of law and the
Constitution, the Vice-President shall be the Acting President. A copy of the letter was sent to Speaker
Fuentebella and Senate President Pimentel on the same day.

After his fall from the power, the petitioners legal problems appeared in clusters. Several cases
previously filed against him in the Office of the Ombudsman were set in motion.

Issues:
(1) Whether or not the petitioner resigned as President
(2) Whether or not the petitioner is only temporarily unable to act as President

Held: Petitioner denies he resigned as President or that he suffers from a permanent disability.

Resignation is a factual question. In order to have a valid resignation, there must be an intent to resign
and the intent must be coupled by acts of relinquishment. The validity of a resignation is not governed
by any formal requirement as to form. It can be oral. It can be written. It can be express. It can be
implied. As long as the resignation is clear, it must be given legal effect. In the cases at bar, the facts
show that petitioner did not write any formal letter of resignation before leaving Malacanang Palace.
Consequently, whether or not petitioner resigned has to be determined from his acts and omissions
before, during and after Jan. 20, 2001 or by the totality of prior, contemporaneous and posterior facts
and circumstantial evidence bearing a material relevance on the issue. The Court had an authoritative
window on the state of mind of the petitioner provided by the diary of Executive Sec. Angara serialized
in the Phil. Daily Inquirer. During the first stage of negotiation between Estrada and the opposition, the
topic was already about a peaceful and orderly transfer of power. The resignation of the petitioner was
implied. During the second round of negotiation, the resignation of the petitioner was again treated as a
given fact. The only unsettled points at that time were the measures to be undertaken by the parties
during and after the transition period. The Court held that the resignation of the petitioner cannot be
doubted. It was confirmed by his leaving Malacanang. In the press release containing his final statement,
(1) he acknowledged the oath-taking of the respondent as President of the Republic, but with the
reservation about its legality; (2) he emphasized he was leaving the Palace, the seat of the presidency,
for the sake of peace and in order to begin the healing process of the nation. He did not say he was
leaving the Palace due to any kind of inability and that he was going to reassume the presidency as soon
as the disability disappears; (3) he expressed his gratitude to the people for the opportunity to serve
them; (4) he assured that he will not shirk from any future challenge that may come ahead in the same
service of the country; and (5) he called on his supporters to join him in the promotion of a constructive
national spirit of reconciliation and solidarity.

The Court also tackled the contention of the petitioner that he is merely temporarily unable to perform
the powers and duties of the presidency, and hence is a President on leave. The inability claim is
contained in the Jan. 20, 2001 letter of petitioner sent to Senate Pres. Pimentel and Speaker
Fuentebella. Despite said letter, the House of Representatives passed a resolution supporting the
assumption into office by Arroyo as President. The Senate also passed a resolution confirming the
nomination of Guingona as Vice-President. Both houses of Congress have recognized respondent Arroyo
as the President. Implicitly clear in that recognition is the premise that the inability of petitioner Estrada
is no longer temporary. Congress has clearly rejected petitioners claim of inability. The Court cannot
pass upon petitioners claim of inability to discharge the powers and duties of the presidency. The
question is political in nature and addressed solely to Congress by constitutional fiat. It is a political issue
which cannot be decided by the Court without transgressing the principle of separation of powers

2. Defensor-Santiago v COMELEC GR 127325 March 19, 1997

CASE DIGEST: G.R No. 127325, March 19, 1997

Constitutional Law, People's Initiative, Political Law

FACTS:
On December 6, 1996, Atty. Jesus S. Delfin, founding member of the Movement for People's Initiative,
filed with the COMELEC a "Petition to Amend the Constitution, to Lift Term Limits of Elective Officials, by
People's Initiative" citing Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution. Acting on the petition, the COMELEC
set the case for hearing and directed Delfin to have the petition published. After the hearing the
arguments between petitioners and opposing parties, the COMELEC directed Delfin and the oppositors
to file their "memoranda and/or oppositions/memoranda" within five days. On December 18, 1996,
Senator Miriam Defensor Santiago, Alexander Padilla, and Maria Isabel Ongpin filed a special civil action
for prohibition under Rule 65 raising the following arguments, among others:

1.) That the Constitution can only be amended by peoples initiative if there is an enabling law passed by
Congress, to which no such law has yet been passed; and

2.) That R.A. 6735 does not suffice as an enabling law on peoples initiative on the Constitution, unlike in
the other modes of initiative.

ISSUE:
Is R.A. No. 6735 sufficient to enable amendment of the Constitution by peoples initiative?
HELD:

NO. R.A. 6735 is inadequate to cover the system of initiative on amendments to the Constitution.

Under the said law, initiative on the Constitution is confined only to proposals to AMEND. The people
are not accorded the power to "directly propose, enact, approve, or reject, in whole or in part, the
Constitution" through the system of initiative. They can only do so with respect to "laws, ordinances, or
resolutions." The use of the clause "proposed laws sought to be enacted, approved or rejected,
amended or repealed" denotes that R.A. No. 6735 excludes initiative on amendments to the
Constitution.

Also, while the law provides subtitles for National Initiative and Referendum and for Local Initiative and
Referendum, no subtitle is provided for initiative on the Constitution. This means that the main thrust of
the law is initiative and referendum on national and local laws. If R.A. No. 6735 were intended to fully
provide for the implementation of the initiative on amendments to the Constitution, it could have
provided for a subtitle therefor, considering that in the order of things, the primacy of interest, or
hierarchy of values, the right of the people to directly propose amendments to the Constitution is far
more important than the initiative on national and local laws.

While R.A. No. 6735 specially detailed the process in implementing initiative and referendum on
national and local laws, it intentionally did not do so on the system of initiative on amendments to the
Constitution.

WHEREFORE, petition is GRANTED.

3. Tolentino v COMELEC GR L-34150 October 16, 1971 41SCRA702

FACTS:
The 1971 Constitutional Convention came into being by virtue of two resolutions of the Congress
approved in its capacity as a constituent assembly convened for the purpose of calling a convention to
propose amendments to the Constitution. After election of delegates held on November 10, 1970, the
Convention held its inaugural session on June 1, 1971. In the morning of September 28, 1970, the
Convention approved Organic Resolution No. 1 which is entitled as, "A RESOLUTION AMENDING
SECTION 1 OF ARTICLE V OF THE CONSTITUTION SO AS TO LOWER THE VOTING AGE TO 18." On
September 30, 1971, the COMELEC "resolved" to follow the mandate of the Convention, that it will hold
the said plebiscite together with the senatorial elections on November 8, 1971 .

Petitioner, Arturo Tolentino, filed a petition for prohibition, its main thrust being that Organic Resolution
No. 1 and the necessary implementing resolutions subsequently approved have no force and effect as
laws in so far as they provide for the holding of a plebiscite co-incident with the senatorial elections, on
the ground that the calling and holding of such a plebiscite is, by the Constitution, a power lodged
exclusively in Congress as a legislative body and may not be exercised by the Convention, and that,
under Article XV Section 1 of the 1935 Constitution, the proposed amendment in question cannot be
presented to the people for ratification separately from each and all other amendments to be drafted
and proposed by the Constitution.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Organic Resolution No. 1 of the 1971 Constitutional Convention violative to the
Constitution.

HELD:
NO. All the amendments to be proposed by the same Convention must be submitted to the people in a
single "election" or plebiscite. In order that a plebiscite for the ratification of a Constitutional
amendment may be validly held, it must provide the voter not only sufficient time but ample basis for an
intelligent appraisal of the nature of the amendment per se but as well as its relation to the other parts
of the Constitution with which it has to form a harmonious whole. In the present context, where the
Convention has hardly started considering the merits, if not thousands, of proposals to amend the
existing Constitution, to present to the people any single proposal or a few of them cannot comply with
this requirement.

4. Defensor-Santiago v Guingona GR 134577 November 18, 1998

DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO vs. COMELEC

(G.R. No. 127325 - March 19, 1997)

Facts:
Private respondent Atty. Jesus Delfin, president of Peoples Initiative for Reforms, Modernization and
Action (PIRMA), filed with COMELEC a petition to amend the constitution to lift the term limits of
elective officials, through Peoples Initiative. He based this petition on Article XVII, Sec. 2 of the 1987
Constitution, which provides for the right of the people to exercise the power to directly propose
amendments to the Constitution. Subsequently the COMELEC issued an order directing the publication
of the petition and of the notice of hearing and thereafter set the case for hearing. At thehearing,
Senator Roco, the IBP, Demokrasya-Ipagtanggol ang Konstitusyon, Public Interest Law Center, and Laban
ng Demokratikong Pilipino appeared as intervenors-oppositors. Senator Roco filed a motion to dismiss
the Delfin petition on the ground that one which is cognizable by the COMELEC. The petitioners herein
Senator Santiago, Alexander Padilla, and Isabel Ongpin filed this civil action for prohibition under Rule 65
of the Rules of Court against COMELEC and the Delfin petition rising the several arguments, such as the
following: (1) The constitutional provision on peoples initiative to amend the constitution can only be
implemented by law to be passed by Congress. No such law has been passed; (2) The peoples initiative
is limited to amendments to the Constitution, not to revision thereof. Lifting of the term limits
constitutes a revision, therefore it is outside the power of peoples initiative. The Supreme Court
granted the Motions for Intervention.

Issues:
(1) Whether or not Sec. 2, Art. XVII of the 1987 Constitution is a self-executing provision.
(2) Whether or not COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 regarding the conduct of initiative on amendments to
the Constitution is valid, considering the absence in the law of specific provisions on the conduct of such
initiative.
(3) Whether the lifting of term limits of elective officials would constitute a revision or an amendment of
the Constitution.
Held:
Sec. 2, Art XVII of the Constitution is not self executory, thus, without implementing legislation the same
cannot operate. Although the Constitution has recognized or granted the right, the people cannot
exercise it if Congress does not provide for its implementation.

The portion of COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 which prescribes rules and regulations on the conduct of
initiative on amendments to the Constitution, is void. It has been an established rule that what has been
delegated, cannot be delegated (potestas delegata non delegari potest). The delegation of the power to
the COMELEC being invalid, the latter cannot validly promulgate rules and regulations to implement the
exercise of the right to peoples initiative.

The lifting of the term limits was held to be that of a revision, as it would affect other provisions of the
Constitution such as the synchronization of elections, the constitutional guarantee of equal access to
opportunities for public service, and prohibiting political dynasties. A revision cannot be done by
initiative. However, considering the Courts decision in the above Issue, the issue of whether or not the
petition is a revision or amendment has become academic.

5. Brillantes v Concepcion GR 163193 June 15, 2004

Brillantes vs. Comelec and Concepcion, GR 163193, June 15, 2004

PROVISION: Art. VI Sec. 29 (1) No money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an
appropriation made by law.
(2) No public money or property shall be appropriated, applied, paid, or employed, directly or indirectly,
for the use, benefit, or support of any sect, church, denomination, sectarian institution, or system of
religion, or of any priest, preacher, minister, or other religious teacher, or dignitary as such, except when
such priest, preacher, minister, or dignitary is assigned to the armed forces, or to any penal institution,
or government orphanage or leprosarium.
(3) All money collected on any tax levied for a special purpose shall be treated as a special fund and paid
out for such purpose only. If the purpose for which a special fund was created has been fulfilled or
abandoned, the balance, if any, shall be transferred to the general funds of the Government.

FACTS: Congress enacted RA 8436 authorizing COMELEC to use an automated election system for the
process of voting, counting of votes and canvassing/consolidation the results of national and local
elections. COMELEC subsequently approved Resolution 6712 adopting the policy that the precinct
election results of each city and municipality shall be immediately transmitted electronically in advance
to the COMELEC in Manila.
Petitioners in this case questioned, among others, the Constitutionality of the quickcount as being pre-
emptive of the authority vested in Congress to canvass the votes for the President and Vice-President
under Article VII, Section 4 of the 1987 Constitution.

ISSUE: Can the COMELEC conduct unofficial tabulation of presidential election results based on a copy
of the election returns?

RULING: No. The assailed resolution usurps, under the guise of an unofficial tabulation of election
results based on a copy of the election returns, the sole and exclusive authority of Congress to canvass
the votes for the election of President and Vice-President.
The contention of the COMELEC that its tabulation of votes is not prohibited by the Constitution and
Rep. Act No. 8436 as such tabulation is unofficial, is puerile and totally unacceptable. If the COMELEC
is proscribed from conducting an official canvass of the votes cast for the President and Vice-President,
the COMELEC is, with more reason, prohibited from making an unofficial canvass of said votes

6. Fernandez v Torres 215SCRA489

FERNANDEZ VS. TORRES
G.R. No. 102940 November 6 1992, 215 SCRA 489

FACTS:
Petitioners seek certiorari and prohibition to prohibit and restrain the Secretary of the Department of
Labor and Employment ("DOLE") and the Administrator of the Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration ("POEA") from enforcing and implementing Item No. 1 of DOLE Circular No. 01-91
entitled "Prescribing Additional Requirements, Conditions and Procedures for the Deployment of
Performing Artists."

The promulgation of DOLE Circular No. 01-91 was preceded by public agitation for a total ban on
deployment of Filipino entertainers abroad, in response to the growing number of documented reports
and complaints from entertainers and their relatives about the exploitative working conditions,
harassment, forcible detention, physical injuries, rape and even death suffered by female performing
artists and entertainers abroad. The First National Tripartite Conference for the Protection of Overseas
Entertainers was convened on 18 November 1991 to evaluate a Government proposal for a complete
interdiction of overseas deployment of Philippine entertainers and performing artists. At the end of the
Conference, the consensus among the management and labor representatives which emerged was that
Government should adopt a policy of selective (rather than comprehensive) prohibition of deployment
abroad of Philippine entertainers, to avoid the adverse effects which complete prohibition would
impose on the country's manpower export program. The labor representative recommended that the
minimum age for performing artists seeking overseas deployment be raised from eighteen (18) years to
twenty-three (23) years.

Through counsel, they challenge the constitutional validity of Item No. 1 of DOLE Circular No. 01-91.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioners have an actual cause or controversy to challenge the constitutionality of
the DOLE Circular.

HELD:
The Court finds that the petition does not present a justiciable controversy. In actions involving
constitutional issues, the firmly settled rule is that a constitutional question will not be heard and
resolved by the courts unless the following requirements of judicial inquiry are met:
(1) the existence of an actual case or controversy;(2) the party raising the constitutional issue must have
a personal and substantial interest in the resolution thereof;(3) the controversy must be raised at the
earliest reasonable opportunity; and(4) that the resolution of the constitutional issue must be
indispensable for the final determination of the controversy.
In the first place, Item No. 1 of the challenged DOLE Circular does not establish an absolute and
comprehensive prohibition of deployment abroad of entertainers below twenty-three (23) years of age.
Item No. 1 itself provides that "the Secretary of Labor and Employment may, for justifiable reasons,
exempt from performing artists from coverage hereof." The discretionary authority here asserted by the
DOLE Secretary does not purport to be unlimited and arbitrary in nature. To the contrary, fairly explicit
and precisely drawn grounds for exempting particular performing artists from the coverage of Item No.
1 are set out in a set of "Administrative Guidelines Implementing Department Circular No. 01-91."

Secondly, petitioners have failed to allege or have refrained from alleging, that they had previously
applied to public respondent officials for exemption from the minimum age restriction imposed by Item
No. 1 of DOLE Circular No. 01-91. Necessarily, therefore, petitioners also do not allege that public
respondent officials have arbitrarily denied their applications for exemption from the minimum age
requirement or from any other requirement establishment by Item No. 1. Neither have petitioners
alleged that public respondents have continually threatened to deny all and sundry applications for
exemption, so as to create a reasonable expectation that their applications would be immediately and
arbitrarily denied, should they in fact file them. Petitioners do assert that the exemption clause of DOLE
Circular No. 01-91 is "practically useless and [constitutes] empty verbiage." They have not, however,
attempted to support this assertion.

The Court is not compelled to indulge in speculation that public respondent would deny any and all
applications for exemption from coverage of DOLE Circular No. 01-91. Two (2) important presumptions
are here applicable. The first is that administrative orders and regulations are entitled to the
presumption of constitutionality. The second is that official duty has been or will be regularly
performed.

7. City of Los Angeles v Lyons 461US95

Adolph Lyons (Lyons) was pulled over by a Los Angeles police officer for a traffic violation. He offered no
resistance, and without provocation, the police officer seized Lyons and placed him in a chokehold,
rendering Lyons unconscious.

Synopsis of Rule of Law. A plaintiff who wants to invoke the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court must
allege an actual case or controversy. Further, the injury complained of by plaintiff must be immediate.
Past exposure to illegal conduct does not, by itself, show a present case or controversy.

Facts. In 1976, Lyons was pulled over by a Los Angeles police officer for a traffic violation. Although
Lyons offered no resistance, the officer asked him to step out of the car, and proceeded to place Lyons
in a chokehold, rendering Lyons unconscious. Lyons sued the municipality and sought damages and
injunctive relief in District Court for the Central District of California. He asked the court to issue an
injunction preventing the police department from using chokeholds in the future unless circumstances
were to result in death or serious bodily injury if force was withheld. The District Court entered such an
injunction. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed. The municipality appealed to the
Supreme Court.

Issue. Does this case present an actual case or controversy that can be determined by the Supreme
Court?
If so, does Lyons have standing to seek injunctive relief against the municipality of Los Angeles?

Held. This case does not present an actual case or controversy as required in the Constitution under
Article III. Past illegal conduct, by itself, is insufficient to establish an actual case or controversy for
injunctive relief. Even though Lyons was injured by the police in the past, this act alone does not
establish that Lyons is threatened with immediate injury or that he will be pulled over and placed in a
chokehold again.
Lyons did not have standing to bring this case to the Supreme Court. In order to have standing, a
plaintiff must show 1) an actual or likely injury in fact, 2) that the injury is sufficiently concrete and
individually affects the plaintiff, 3) that the challenged action is the cause in fact of the injury, and 4)
that the Court will be able to redress the injury by its decision. In this case, injunctive relief against the
municipality may or may not address the injury suffered by Lyons. He could seek damages for any
injuries he sustained from the chokehold (i.e. hospital bills, etc.), but he did not have standing to enforce
an injunction where it was not clear if others would be placed in a chokehold in the future. Furthermore,
it was speculative, at best, that Lyons himself would be placed in a chokehold in the future, and
therefore injunctive relief would not clearly redress any potential injury.

Dissent. Lyons did have standing to bring a claim for injunctive relief against the municipality because he
did present an actual case or controversy and had suffered damages relating to the chokehold. Standing
has always depended on whether a plaintiff has a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy.
The Dissent explained that Lyons request for injunctive relief was coupled with his claim for damages
based on past injury. Because he has an actual claim for damages, he need not rely solely on the threat
of future injury to establish his personal stake in the outcome of the controversy.

8. David v Macapagal-Arroyo GR 171396 May 3, 2006

RANDOLF DAVID, ET AL. VS. GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, ET AL.

G.R. No. 171396, 171409, 171485, 171483, 171400, 171489 & 171424
May 3, 2006

Facts:
On February 24, 2006, as the nation celebrated the 20th Anniversary of the Edsa People Power I,
President Arroyo issued PP 1017 declaring a state of national emergency and call upon the Armed
Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and the Philippine National Police (PNP), to prevent and suppress acts of
terrorism and lawless violence in the country. The Office of the President announced the cancellation of
all programs and activities related to the 20th anniversary celebration of Edsa People Power I; and
revoked the permits to hold rallies issued earlier by the local governments and dispersal of the rallyists
along EDSA. The police arrested (without warrant) petitioner Randolf S. David, a professor at the
University of the Philippines and newspaper columnist. Also arrested was his companion, Ronald Llamas,
president of party-list Akbayan.

In the early morning of February 25, 2006, operatives of the Criminal Investigation and Detection Group
(CIDG) of the PNP, on the basis of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5, raided the Daily Tribune offices in Manila and
attempt to arrest was made against representatives of ANAKPAWIS, GABRIELA and BAYAN MUNA whom
suspected of inciting to sedition and rebellion. On March 3, 2006, President Arroyo issued PP 1021
declaring that the state of national emergency has ceased to exist. Petitioners filed seven (7) certiorari
with the Supreme Court and three (3) of those petitions impleaded President Arroyo as respondent
questioning the legality of the proclamation, alleging that it encroaches the emergency powers of
Congress and it violates the constitutional guarantees of freedom of the press, of speech and assembly.
Issue:

1.) Whether or not Presidential Proclamation No. 1017 is unconstitutional?

2.) Whether or not the warantless arrest of Randolf S. David and Ronald Llamas and the dispersal of
KMU and NAFLU-KMU members during rallies were valid?

3.) Whether or not proper to implead President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo as respondent in the petitions?

4.) Whether or not the petitioners have a legal standing in questioning the constitutionality of the
proclamation?

5.) Whether or not the concurrence of Congress is necessary whenever the alarming powers incident to
Martial Law are used?

Ruling:
1.) The Court finds and so holds that PP 1017 is constitutional insofar as it constitutes a call by the
President for the AFP to prevent or suppress lawless violence whenever becomes necessary as prescribe
under Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution. However, there were extraneous provisions giving the
President express or implied power

(A) To issue decrees; (" Legislative power is peculiarly within the province of the Legislature. Section 1,
Article VI categorically states that "[t]he legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the
Philippines which shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives.")

(B) To direct the AFP to enforce obedience to all laws even those not related to lawless violence as well
as decrees promulgated by the President[The absence of a law defining "acts of terrorism" may result in
abuse and oppression on the part of the police or military]; and

(C) To impose standards on media or any form of prior restraint on the press, are ultra vires and
unconstitutional. The Court also rules that under Section 17, Article XII of the Constitution, the
President, in the absence of legislative legislation, cannot take over privately-owned public utility and
private business affected with public interest. Therefore, the PP No. 1017 is only partly unconstitutional.

2.) The warrantless arrest of Randolf S. David and Ronald Llamas; the dispersal and warrantless arrest of
the KMU and NAFLU-KMU members during their rallies are illegal, in the absence of proof that these
petitioners were committing acts constituting lawless violence, invasion or rebellion and violating BP
880; the imposition of standards on media or any form of prior restraint on the press, as well as the
warrantless search of the Tribune offices and whimsical seizure of its articles for publication and other
materials, are declared unconstitutional because there was no clear and present danger of a substantive
evil that the state has a right to prevent.

3.) It is not proper to implead President Arroyo as respondent. Settled is the doctrine that the President,
during his tenure of office or actual incumbency, may not be sued in any civil or criminal case, and there
is no need to provide for it in the Constitution or law.

4.) This Court adopted the direct injury test in our jurisdiction. In People v. Vera, it held that the
person who impugns the validity of a statute must have a personal and substantial interest in the case
such that he has sustained, or will sustain direct injury as a result. Therefore, the court ruled that the
petitioners have a locus standi, for they suffered direct injury resulting from illegal arrest and
unlawful search committed by police operatives pursuant to PP 1017.

5.) Under Article XII Section 17 of the 1987 Philippine Constitution, in times of national emergency,
when the public interest so requires, the President may temporarily take over a privately owned public
utility or business affected with public interest only if there is congressional authority or approval. There
must enactment of appropriate legislation prescribing the terms and conditions under which the
President may exercise the powers that will serves as the best assurance that due process of law would
be observed.

9. In Re Vicente Ching BAR Matter No. 914 October 1, 1999

In 1998, Vicente Ching finished his law degree at the Saint Louis University in Baguio City. He eventually
passed the bar but he was advised that he needs to show proof that he is a Filipino citizen before he be
allowed to take his oath. Apparently, Chings father was a Chinese citizen but his mother was a Filipino
citizen. His parents were married before he was born in 1963. Under the 1935 Constitution, a legitimate
child, whose one parent is a foreigner, acquires the foreign citizenship of the foreign parent. Ching
maintained that he has always considered himself as a Filipino; that he is a certified public accountant a
profession reserved for Filipinos; that he even served as a councilor in a municipality in La Union.

The Solicitor-General commented on the case by saying that as a legitimate child of a Chinese and a
Filipino, Ching should have elected Filipino citizenship upon reaching the age of majority; that under
prevailing jurisprudence, upon reaching the age of majority is construed as within 7 years after reaching
the age of majority (in his case 21 years old because he was born in 1964 while the 1935 Constitution was
in place).

Ching did elect Filipino citizenship but he only did so when he was preparing for the bar in 1998 or 14
years after reaching the age of majority. Nevertheless, the Solicitor-General recommended that the rule
be relaxed due to the special circumstance of Ching.

ISSUE: Whether or not Ching should be allowed to take the lawyers oath.

HELD: No. Unfortunately, he belatedly elected Filipino citizenship. The Supreme Court cannot agree with
the recommendation of the Solicitor-General. Fourteen years had lapsed and its way beyond the
allowable 7 year period. The Supreme Court even noted that the period is originally 3 years but it was
extended to 7 years. (It seems it cant be extended any further). Chings special circumstances cant be
considered. It is not enough that he considered all his life that he is a Filipino; that he is a professional and
a public officer (was) serving this country. The rules for citizenship are in place. Further, Ching didnt give
any explanation why he belatedly chose to elect Filipino citizenship (but I guess its simply because he
never thought hes Chinese not until he applied to take the bar). The prescribed procedure in electing
Philippine citizenship is certainly not a tedious and painstaking process. All that is required of the elector
is to execute an affidavit of election of Philippine citizenship and, thereafter, file the same with the nearest
civil registry. Chings unreasonable and unexplained delay in making his election cannot be simply glossed
over.

10. Mercado v Manzano GR 135083 May 26, 1999

MERCADO vs. MANZANO

G.R. No. 135083. May 26, 1999

FACTS:
Ernesto Mamaril filed a disqualification case against vice-mayoralty candidate Manzano on the ground
that he is not a citizen of the Philippines but of the United States. In its resolution, the second division of
the COMELEC granted the petition of Mamaril and ordered the cancellation of the certificate of
candidacy of Manzano on the ground that he is a dual citizen and, under Section 40(d) of the Local
Government Code and the Makati charter, persons with dual citizenship are disqualified from running
for any elective position. The Commission found out that Manzano was born in 1955, of a Filipino father
and a Filipino mother, in San Francisco, California, in the United States. Hence, he is an American citizen,
following the jus soli rule, and at the same time, a Filipino citizen for being born of Filipino parents.

Manzano filed a motion for reconsideration. Pending such motion, the 1998 elections was held and
Manzano garnered the highest number of votes for vice-mayor in the city of Makati. His proclamation
was suspended, pending resolution of the case. Petitioner Mercado, who garnered the second highest
number of votes to Manzano, intervened in the disqualification case. Without resolving Manzano's
motion, the COMELEC en banc reversed the ruling of the COMELEC second division and declared
Manzano qualified to run for vice-mayor. Hence, Mercado filed a petition for certiorari to the Supreme
Court seeking to set aside the resolution of the COMELEC en banc.

ISSUES/HELD:
1. Whether the petitioner has personality to bring this suit considering that he was not the original party
in the disqualification case.

Yes. Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646, otherwise known as the Electoral Reforms Law of 1987 provides:

Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the
votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment
before an election to be disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning number of votes in
such election, the Court or Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry, or
protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order
the suspension of the proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence of guilt is strong.

Under this provision, intervention may be allowed in proceedings for disqualification even after election
if there has yet been no final judgment rendered.

2. Whether or not dual citizenship is a ground for disqualification.

No. To begin with, dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance. The former arises when, as a result
of the concurrent application of the different laws of two or more states, a person is simultaneously
considered a national by the said states. For instance, such a situation may arise when a person whose
parents are citizens of a state which adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis is born in a state which
follows the doctrine of jus soli. Such a person, ipso facto and without any voluntary act on his part, is
concurrently considered a citizen of both states. Considering the citizenship clause (Art. IV) of our
Constitution, it is possible for the following classes of citizens of the Philippines to possess dual
citizenship:

(1) Those born of Filipino fathers and/or mothers in foreign countries which follow the principle of jus
soli;

(2) Those born in the Philippines of Filipino mothers and alien fathers if by the laws of their fathers
country such children are citizens of that country;

(3) Those who marry aliens if by the laws of the latters country the former are considered citizens,
unless by their act or omission they are deemed to have renounced Philippine citizenship.

There may be other situations in which a citizen of the Philippines may, without performing any act, be
also a citizen of another state; but the above cases are clearly possible given the constitutional
provisions on citizenship.

Dual allegiance, on the other hand, refers to the situation in which a person simultaneously owes, by
some positive act, loyalty to two or more states. While dual citizenship is involuntary, dual allegiance is
the result of an individuals volition.

In including 5 in Article IV on citizenship, the concern of the Constitutional Commission was not with
dual citizens per se but with naturalized citizens who maintain their allegiance to their countries of
origin even after their naturalization. Hence, the phrase dual citizenship in R.A. No. 7160, 40(d) and
in R.A. No. 7854, 20 must be understood as referring to dual allegiance. Consequently, persons with
mere dual citizenship do not fall under this disqualification. Unlike those with dual allegiance, who
must, therefore, be subject to strict process with respect to the termination of their status, for
candidates with dual citizenship, it should suffice if, upon the filing of their certificates of candidacy,
they elect Philippine citizenship to terminate their status as persons with dual citizenship considering
that their condition is the unavoidable consequence of conflicting laws of different states.

3. Whether or not Manzano is disqualified to run

No. By filing a certificate of candidacy when he ran for his present post, private respondent elected
Philippine citizenship and in effect renounced his American citizenship. The filing of such certificate of
candidacy sufficed to renounce his American citizenship, effectively removing any disqualification he
might have as a dual citizen.

By declaring in his certificate of candidacy that he is a Filipino citizen; that he is not a permanent
resident or immigrant of another country; that he will defend and support the Constitution of the
Philippines and bear true faith and allegiance thereto and that he does so without mental reservation,
private respondent has, as far as the laws of this country are concerned, effectively repudiated his
American citizenship and anything which he may have said before as a dual citizen. On the other hand,
private respondents oath of allegiance to the Philippine, when considered with the fact that he has
spent his youth and adulthood, received his education, practiced his profession as an artist, and taken
part in past elections in this country, leaves no doubt of his election of Philippine citizenship.

11. Frivaldo v COMELEC 174SCRA245

174 SCRA 245
G.R. No. 87193
June 23, 1989

Facts: Petitioner Juan G. Frivaldo was proclaimed governor-elect and assume office in due time. The
League of Municipalities filed with the COMELEC a petition for annulment of Frivaldos election and
proclamation on the ground that he was not a Filipino citizen, having been naturalized in the United
States. Frivaldo admitted the allegation but pleaded the special and affirmative defenses that his
naturalization was merely forced upon himself as a means of survival against the unrelenting
prosecution by the Martial Law Dictators agent abroad.

Issue: Whether or not Frivaldo was a citizen of the Philippines at the time of his election.

Held: No. Section 117 of the Omnibus Election Code provides that a qualified voter must be, among
other qualifications, a citizen of the Philippines, this being an indispensable requirement for suffrage
under Article V, Section 1, of the Constitution.

Even if he did lose his naturalized American citizenship, such forfeiture did not and could not have the
effect of automatically restoring his citizenship in the Philippines that he had earlier renounced.

Qualifications for public office are continuing requirements and must be possessed not only at the time
of appointment or election or assumption of office but during the officers entire tenure.

Frivaldo declared not a citizen of the Philippines and therefore disqualified from serving as a Governor
of the Province of Sorsogon

12. Republic v Feliciano 148SCRA424

Facts:
Petitioner seeks the review of the decision of the Intermediate Appellate Court dated April 30, 1985
reversing the order of the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur, Branch VI, dated August 21, 1980,
which dismissed the complaint of respondent Pablo Feliciano for recovery of ownership and possession
of a parcel of land on the ground of non-suability of the State. On January 22, 1970, Feliciano filed a
complaint with the then Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur against the RP, represented by the
Land Authority, for the recovery of ownership and possession of a parcel of land, consisting of four
(4)lots with an aggregate area of 1,364.4177 hectares, situated in the Barrio of Salvacion, Municipality of
Tinambac, Camarines Sur. Feliciano alleged that he bought the property in question from Victor Gardiola
by virtue of a Contract of Sale dated May 31, 1952, followed by a Deed of Absolute Sale on October 30,
1954; that Gardiola had acquired the property by purchase from the heirs of Francisco Abrazado whose
title to the said property was evidenced by an informacion posesoria that upon his purchase of the
property, he took actual possession of the same, introduced various improvements therein and caused
it to be surveyed in July 1952, which survey was approved by the Director of Lands on October 24,
1954.On November 1, 1954, President Ramon Magsaysay issued Proclamation No. 90 reserving for
settlement purposes, under the administration of the National Resettlement and Rehabilitation
Administration (NARRA), a tract of land situated in the Municipalities of Tinambac and Siruma,
Camarines Sur, after which the NARRA and its successor agency, the Land Authority, started sub-dividing
and distributing the land to the settlers; that the property in question, while located within the
reservation established under Proclamation No. 90, was the private property of Feliciano and should
therefore be excluded therefrom. Feliciano prayed that he be declared the rightful and true owner of
the property in question consisting of 1,364.4177 hectares; that his title of ownership based on
informacion posesoria of his predecessor-in-interest be declared legal valid and subsisting and that
defendant be ordered to cancel and nullify all awards to the settlers.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the State can be sued for recovery and possession of a parcel of land

RULING:
NO

RATIONALE:

A suit against the State, under settled jurisprudence is not permitted, except upon a showing that the
State has consented to be sued, either expressly or by implication through the use of statutory language
too plain to be misinterpreted. It may be invoked by the courts sua sponte
at any stage of the proceedings. Waiver of immunity, being a derogation of sovereignty, will not be
inferred lightly. but must be construed in strictissimi juris (of strictest right). Moreover, the
Proclamation is not a legislative act. The consent of the State to be sued must emanate from statutory
authority. Waiver of State immunity can only be made by an act of the legislative body.

Addtl:
Worthy of note is the fact, as pointed out by the Solicitor General, that the
informacion posesoria registered in the Office of the Register of Deed of Camarines Sur on September
23, 1952 was a "reconstituted" possessory information; it was "reconstituted from the duplicate
presented to this office (Register of Deeds) by Dr. Pablo Feliciano," without the submission of proof that
the alleged duplicate was authentic or that the original thereof was lost. Reconstitution can be validly
made only in case of loss of the original. These circumstances raise grave doubts as to the authenticity
and validity of the "informacion posesoria" relied upon by respondent Feliciano. Adding to the
dubiousness of said document is the fact that "possessory information calls for an area of only 100
hectares," whereas the land claimed by respondent Feliciano comprises 1,364.4177 hectares, later
reduced to 701-9064 hectares. Courts should be wary in accepting" possessory information documents,
as well as other purportedly old Spanish titles, as proof of alleged ownership of lands.
13. Froilan v Pan Oriental Shipping September 30, 1954

Froilan vs. Pan Oriental Shipping Co.

September 30, 1954
103 PHIL. 473PARAS, J.:
Nature of the Case: Appeal from an Order of the CFI of Manila.

FACTS
Defendant Pan Oriental took possession of the vessel in question after it had been repossessed by the
Shipping Administration and title thereto reacquired by theg overnment, following the original
purchaser, Fernando Froilans, default in his payment of the unpaid balance and insurance premiums for
the said vessel. Pan Oriental chartered said vessel and operated the same after it had repaired the
vessel and paid the stipulated initial payment, thereby exercising its option to purchase, pursuant to a
bareboat charter contract entered between said company and the Shipping Corporation. The Cabinet
resolved to restore Froilan to his rights under the original contract of sale on condition that he shall pay
a sum of money upon delivery of the vessel to him, that he shall continue paying the remaining
installments due, and that he shall assume the expenses incurred for the repair and by docking of the
vessel. Pan Oriental protested to this restoration of Froilans rights under the contract of sale, for the
reason that when the vessel was delivered to it, the Shipping Administration had authority to dispose of
said authority to the property, Froilan having already relinquished whatever rights he may have thereon.
Froilan paid the required cash of P10,000.00 and as Pan Oriental refused to surrender possession of the
vessel, he filed an action for in the CFI of Manila to recover possession thereof and have him declared
the rightful owner of said property. The Republic of the Philippines was allowed to intervene in said civil
case praying for the possession of the in order that the chattel mortgage constituted there on may be
foreclosed.

ISSUE
Whether or not the governments motion to dismiss Pan Oriental counterclaims may prosper.

HELD:
Under the circumstances already had voted to, Pan Oriental cannot be considered a possessor in bad
faith until after the institution of the instant case. However, since it is not disputed that said appellant is
entitled to the refund of such expenses with the right to retain the vessel until he has been reimbursed
therefore. As it is by the corrected acts of defendant and intervene or Republic of the Philippines that
the appellant ha a lien far his expenses, appellees Froilan, Compania Maratma, and the Republic of the
Philippines are declared liable for the reimbursement to appellant of its legitimate expenses, as allowed
by law, with legal interest from the time of disbursement.

14. USA v Ruiz 136SCRA487

Brief Fact Summary. When Ruizs sentence was vacated because she refused to waive her rights to
impeachment evidence, the government brought appeal on the grounds that its plea bargaining process
was not unconstitutional.

Synopsis of Rule of Law. While the Fifth and Sixth Amendments require that a defendant receive
exculpatory evidence at trial, a defendant may waive their right to this information in a plea agreement.
Facts.
Federal prosecutors offered respondent, Angela Ruiz, a fast track plea bargain, after 30kg of marijuana
was found in her luggage by immigration agents. Per the terms of the bargain, the respondent would
have gotten a reduced sentence recommendation, in exchange for waiving the right to receive
impeachment information relating to any informants or other witnesses, as well as to information
supporting any affirmative defense she may raise if she were to go to trial. Ruiz rejected the waiver of
her rights, the offer was withdrawn and she was indicted for unlawful drug possession. At sentencing,
Ruiz asked the judge to grant her the sentence she would have gotten, had she taken the plea bargain,
on the grounds that it was in violation of her Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights to a fair trial. The Court
of Appeals ruled for the respondent, and vacated the sentence, and the government brought appeal.

Issue.
Whether, before entering into a plea agreement, the Fifth and Sixth Amendments require federal
prosecutors to disclose impeachment information relating to informants or other witnesses.

Held.
Justice Breyer, for the Court, held that although the Fifth and Sixth Amendments do provide that a
defendant be given exculpatory impeachment evidence from prosecutors, a guilty plea under a plea
agreement, with a waiver of rights, can be accepted as knowing and voluntary.
Concurrence. Justice Thomas concurs, noting that the purpose of requiring exculpatory evidence is so
there be no unfair trial to the accused, which does not apply at the plea bargaining stage.

15. Municipality of Makati v Court of Appeals 190SCRA206

Facts

An expropriation proceeding was filed by the Municipality of Makati, herein petitioner, against the
private property of Arceli Jo. In compliance to PD 42, the petitioner opened an account under its name
at PNB depositing an amount of P417,510.00. The court fixed the appraised value of the expropriated
property at P5,291,666.00 and an advanced payment was made in the amount of P338,160 leaving a
balance of P4,953,506. After the decision becomes final and executory, the private respondent moved
for the issuance of a writ of execution. A notice of garnishment was thereafter issued by the court to the
PNB account. A manifestation was filed by the petitioner informing the court that the private
respondent was no longer the true owner of the expropriated property. The court consolidated the
ownership of the property to PSB as a mortgagee/purchaser. The private respondent and PSB agreed to
divide the compensation due from the expropriation proceeding. The judge ordered PNB to immediately
release to them the sum of P4,953.506 corresponding to the balance of the appraised value of the
expropriated property. The PNB bank manager refused as he is waiting for the approval of their head
office. The Municipality of Makati contends that its fund with DBP could neither be be garnished or
levied upon execution for to do so would result to the disbursement of public funds without the proper
appropriation required under the law. The lower court denied the motion for reconsideration of the
petitioner ruling that the account with DBP of the petitioner was an account specifically opened for the
expropriation proceeding. Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari to the Court of Appeals which affirmed
the lower courts decision. A petition for review with a prayer for preliminary injunction was filed to the
S.C. A temporary restraining order was issued by the S.C.
Issue
Whether or not the PNB funds may be levied in the expropriation proceeding ?

Held
The petitioner belatedly informed the court that there are two existing accounts with PNB. Account A
was the one intended for the expropriation proceeding and account B is primarily intended for financing
governmental functions and activities. Because account A has a fund that is insufficient to meet the
remaining amount of its balance for the expropriation proceeding, it is unlawful to get the remaining
balance from Account B without an ordinance appropriating said funds for expropriation purpose. Thus
the court ruled that account A maybe levied but not account B. The respondents are without recourse
however should the petitioner refuse to pay its remaining obligation. Where a municipality refuses
without justifiable reason to effect payment of a final money judgment rendered against it, the claimant
may avail the remedy of mandamus in order to compel the enactment and approval of the necessary
appropriation ordinance and the corresponding disbursement of municipal funds for such purpose.

16. Senate v Ermita GR 169777

FACTS:
This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition proffer that the President has abused power by issuing
E.O. 464 Ensuring Observance of the Principles of Separation of Powers, Adherence to the Rule on
Executive Privilege and Respect for the Rights of Public Officials Appearing in Legislative Inquiries in Aid
of Legislation Under the Constitution, and for Other Purposes. Petitioners pray for its declaration as
null and void for being unconstitutional.
In the exercise of its legislative power, the Senate of the Philippines, through its various Senate
Committees, conducts inquiries or investigations in aid of legislation which call for, inter alia, the
attendance of officials and employees of the executive department, bureaus, and offices including those
employed in Government Owned and Controlled Corporations, the Armed Forces of the Philippines
(AFP), and the Philippine National Police (PNP).
The Committee of the Senate issued invitations to various officials of the Executive Department for
them to appear as resource speakers in a public hearing on the railway project, others on the issues of
massive election fraud in the Philippine elections, wire tapping, and the role of military in the so-called
Gloriagate Scandal.
Said officials were not able to attend due to lack of consent from the President as provided by E.O. 464,
Section 3 which requires all the public officials enumerated in Section 2(b) to secure the consent of the
President prior to appearing before either house of Congress.

ISSUE:
Is Section 3 of E.O. 464, which requires all the public officials, enumerated in Section 2(b) to secure the
consent of the President prior to appearing before either house of Congress, valid and constitutional?

RULING:
No. The enumeration in Section 2 (b) of E.O. 464 is broad and is covered by the executive privilege. The
doctrine of executive privilege is premised on the fact that certain information must, as a matter of
necessity, be kept confidential in pursuit of the public interest. The privilege being, by definition, an
exemption from the obligation to disclose information, in this case to Congress, the necessity must be of
such high degree as to outweigh the public interest in enforcing that obligation in a particular case.
Congress undoubtedly has a right to information from the executive branch whenever it is sought in aid
of legislation. If the executive branch withholds such information on the ground that it is privileged, it
must so assert it and state the reason therefor and why it must be respected.
The infirm provisions of E.O. 464, however, allow the executive branch to evade congressional requests
for information without need of clearly asserting a right to do so and/or proffering its reasons therefor.
By the mere expedient of invoking said provisions, the power of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of
legislation is frustrated.

17. Ynot v Intermediate Apellate Court 148SCRA659

Restituto Ynot vs. Intermediate Appellate Court148 SCRA 659 (1987)

Facts: Petitioner challenges the constitutionality of EO 626-A which orders the prohibition of the
interprovincial movement of carabaos and carabeef, as amendment to EO 626, which prohibited the
unlawful slaughter of carabaos. The carabao or carabeef transported in violation shall be subject to
confiscation and forfeiture by the government. Petitioner transported 6 carabaos from Masbate to Iloilo
when they were confiscated by the Police Station Commander of Barotac Nuevo, Iloilo for violation of
EO 626-A. Petitioner sued for recovery and filed a bond. The RTC of Iloilo City ustained the confiscation
of the carabaos and the bond, since the latter could no longer be produced. The court also declined to
rule on the constitutionality of the executive order for lack of authority and for its presumed validity. On
appeal, the Intermediate Appellate Court upheld the trial court. Petitioner contends that the executive
order is unconstitutional as it authorizes outrightc onfiscation of the carabao or carabeef being
transported across provincial boundaries. He claims that the penalty is invalid because it is imposed
without according the owner a right to be heard before a competent and impartial court as guaranteed
by due process.

Issues: Whether or not the RTC of Iloilo has jurisdiction to rule on the constitutionality of EO626-A.

Held: RTC of Iloilo has jurisdiction to rule on the constitutionality of EO 626-Reasoning. Lower courts are
not prevented from resolving constitutional questions whenever warranted, subject only to review by
the highest tribunal (SC). Resolution of such cases may be made in the first instance by the lower court.

18. Calalang v Williams 70 Phil. Reports 726

CALALANG v. WILLIAMS, 70 PHIL 726, GR No. 47800, December 2, 1940

FACTS: The National Traffic Commission resolved that animal-drawn vehicles be prohibited from passing
along some major streets such a Rizal Ave. in Manila for a period of one year from the date of the
opening of the Colgante Bridge to traffic. The Secretary of Public Works approved the resolution on
August 10,1940. The Mayor of Manila and the Acting Chief of Police of Manila have enforced the rules
and regulation. As a consequence, all animal-drawn vehicles are not allowed to pass and pick up
passengers in the places above mentioned to the detriment not only of their owners but of the riding
public as well.

ISSUE: Does the rule infringe upon the constitutional precept regarding the promotion of social justice?
What is Social Justice?
HELD: No. The regulation aims to promote safe transit and avoid obstructions on national roads in the
interest and convenience of the public. Persons and property may be subject to all kinds of restraints
and burdens in order to secure the general comfort, health, and prosperity of the State. To this
fundamental aims of the government, the rights of the individual are subordinated.
Social justice is neither communism, nor despotism, nor atomism, nor anarchy, but the humanization
of laws and the equalization of social and economic forces by the State so that justice in its rational and
objectively secular conception may at least be approximated. Social justice means the promotion of the
welfare of all the people, the adoption by the Government of measures calculated to insure economic
stability of all the competent elements of society, through the maintenance of a proper economic and
social equilibrium in the interrelations of the members of the community, constitutionally, through the
adoption of measures legally justifiable, or extra-constitutionally, through the exercise of powers
underlying the existence of all governments on the time-honored principles of Salus Populi est Suprema
Lex.(Justice Laurel)

19. Cruz v DENR Secretary GR135385 December 6, 2000

Isagani Cruz vs DENR

Land Titles and Deeds IPRA Law vis a vis Regalian Doctrine

Cruz, a noted constitutionalist, assailed the validity of the RA 8371 or the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act
on the ground that the law amount to an unlawful deprivation of the States ownership over lands of the
public domain as well as minerals and other natural resources therein, in violation of the regalian
doctrine embodied in Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution. The IPRA law basically enumerates the
rights of the indigenous peoples over ancestral domains which may include natural resources. Cruz et al
contend that, by providing for an all-encompassing definition of ancestral domains and ancestral
lands which might even include private lands found within said areas, Sections 3(a) and 3(b) of said law
violate the rights of private landowners.

ISSUE: Whether or not the IPRA law is unconstitutional.

HELD: The SC deliberated upon the matter. After deliberation they voted and reached a 7-7 vote. They
deliberated again and the same result transpired. Since there was no majority vote, Cruzs petition was
dismissed and the IPRA law was sustained. Hence, ancestral domains may include public domain
somehow against the regalian doctrine.

20. Chavez v Pia N. Amari GR 133250 November 11, 2008

Chavez vs Public Estates Authority and AMARI Corporation
Land Titles and Deeds Lands of the Public Domain

The Public Estates Authority is the central implementing agency tasked to undertake reclamation
projects nationwide. It took over the leasing and selling functions of the DENR insofar as reclaimed or
about to be reclaimed foreshore lands are concerned.

PEA sought the transfer to AMARI, a private corporation, of the ownership of 77.34 hectares of the
Freedom Islands. PEA also sought to have 290.156 hectares of submerged areas of Manila Bay to AMARI.

ISSUE: Whether or not the transfer is valid.

HELD: No. To allow vast areas of reclaimed lands of the public domain to be transferred to PEA as
private lands will sanction a gross violation of the constitutional ban on private corporations from
acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain.

The Supreme Court affirmed that the 157.84 hectares of reclaimed lands comprising the Freedom
Islands, now covered by certificates of title in the name of PEA, are alienable lands of the public domain.
The 592.15 hectares of submerged areas of Manila Bay remain inalienable natural resources of the
public domain. Since the Amended JVA seeks to transfer to AMARI, a private corporation, ownership of
77.34 hectares of the Freedom Islands, such transfer is void for being contrary to Section 3, Article XII of
the 1987 Constitution which prohibits private corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of
the public domain. Furthermore, since the Amended JVA also seeks to transfer to AMARI ownership of
290.156 hectares of still submerged areas of Manila Bay, such transfer is void for being contrary to
Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which prohibits the alienation of natural resources other
than agricultural lands of the public domain.