Académique Documents
Professionnel Documents
Culture Documents
1
adultery, which is a private offense that cannot be for a motion to dismiss in civil cases, is determined as of
prosecuted de officio (sic), since the purported the filing of the complaint or petition.
complainant, a foreigner, does not qualify as an offended
spouse having obtained a final divorce decree under his
national law prior to his filing the criminal complaint." 15 The absence of an equivalent explicit rule in the
prosecution of criminal cases does not mean that the
same requirement and rationale would not apply.
On October 21, 1987, this Court issued a temporary Understandably, it may not have been found necessary
restraining order enjoining the respondents from since criminal actions are generally and fundamentally
implementing the aforesaid order of September 8, 1987 commenced by the State, through the People of the
and from further proceeding with Criminal Case No. 87- Philippines, the offended party being merely the
52435. Subsequently, on March 23, 1988 Secretary of complaining witness therein. However, in the so-called
Justice Sedfrey A. Ordoez acted on the aforesaid "private crimes" or those which cannot be prosecuted de
petitions for review and, upholding petitioner's oficio, and the present prosecution for adultery is of such
ratiocinations, issued a resolution directing the genre, the offended spouse assumes a more predominant
respondent city fiscal to move for the dismissal of the role since the right to commence the action, or to refrain
complaints against the petitioner. 16 therefrom, is a matter exclusively within his power and
option.
In the cited Loftus case, the Supreme Court of Iowa held Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is
that no longer the husband of petitioner. He would have no
standing to sue in the case below as petitioner's husband
entitled to exercise control over conjugal assets. ... 25
'No prosecution for adultery can be commenced except
on the complaint of the husband or wife.' Section 4932,
Code. Though Loftus was husband of defendant when the Under the same considerations and rationale, private
offense is said to have been committed, he had ceased to respondent, being no longer the husband of petitioner,
be such when the prosecution was begun; and appellant had no legal standing to commence the adultery case
insists that his status was not such as to entitle him to under the imposture that he was the offended spouse at
make the complaint. We have repeatedly said that the the time he filed suit.
offense is against the unoffending spouse, as well as the
state, in explaining the reason for this provision in the
statute; and we are of the opinion that the unoffending The allegation of private respondent that he could not
spouse must be such when the prosecution is have brought this case before the decree of divorce for
commenced. (Emphasis supplied.) lack of knowledge, even if true, is of no legal significance
or consequence in this case. When said respondent
initiated the divorce proceeding, he obviously knew that
We see no reason why the same doctrinal rule should not there would no longer be a family nor marriage vows to
apply in this case and in our jurisdiction, considering our protect once a dissolution of the marriage is decreed.
statutory law and jural policy on the matter. We are Neither would there be a danger of introducing spurious
convinced that in cases of such nature, the status of the heirs into the family, which is said to be one of the reasons
complainant vis-a-vis the accused must be determined as for the particular formulation of our law on adultery, 26
of the time the complaint was filed. Thus, the person who since there would thenceforth be no spousal relationship
initiates the adultery case must be an offended spouse, to speak of. The severance of the marital bond had the
and by this is meant that he is still married to the accused effect of dissociating the former spouses from each other,
spouse, at the time of the filing of the complaint. hence the actuations of one would not affect or cast
obloquy on the other.
3
Private respondent's invocation of Donio-Teves, et al. vs. March 1, 1987.[4] They lived together as husband and
Vamenta, hereinbefore cited, 27 must suffer the same wife in Australia. On May 18, 1989, [5] a decree of divorce,
fate of inapplicability. A cursory reading of said case purportedly dissolving the marriage, was issued by an
reveals that the offended spouse therein had duly and Australian family court.
seasonably filed a complaint for adultery, although an
issue was raised as to its sufficiency but which was
resolved in favor of the complainant. Said case did not On June 26, 1992, respondent became an Australian
involve a factual situation akin to the one at bar or any citizen, as shown by a Certificate of Australian Citizenship
issue determinative of the controversy herein. issued by the Australian government.[6] Petitioner -- a
Filipina -- and respondent were married on January 12,
1994 in Our Lady of Perpetual Help Church in
WHEREFORE, the questioned order denying petitioner's Cabanatuan City.[7] In their application for a marriage
motion to quash is SET ASIDE and another one entered license, respondent was declared as single and
DISMISSING the complaint in Criminal Case No. 87- Filipino.[8]
52435 for lack of jurisdiction. The temporary restraining
order issued in this case on October 21, 1987 is hereby
made permanent. Starting October 22, 1995, petitioner and respondent lived
separately without prior judicial dissolution of their
marriage. While the two were still in Australia, their
SO ORDERED. conjugal assets were divided on May 16, 1996, in
accordance with their Statutory Declarations secured in
Australia.[9]
GRACE J. GARCIA, a.k.a. GRACE J. GARCIA-RECIO,
petitioner, vs. REDERICK A. RECIO, respondent.
On March 3, 1998, petitioner filed a Complaint for
Declaration of Nullity of Marriage[10] in the court a quo,
on the ground of bigamy -- respondent allegedly had a
A divorce obtained abroad by an alien may be recognized
prior subsisting marriage at the time he married her on
in our jurisdiction, provided such decree is valid according
January 12, 1994. She claimed that she learned of
to the national law of the foreigner. However, the divorce
respondents marriage to Editha Samson only in
decree and the governing personal law of the alien
November, 1997.
spouse who obtained the divorce must be proven. Our
courts do not take judicial notice of foreign laws and
judgments; hence, like any other facts, both the divorce
decree and the national law of the alien must be alleged In his Answer, respondent averred that, as far back as
and proven according to our law on evidence. 1993, he had revealed to petitioner his prior marriage and
its subsequent dissolution.[11] He contended that his first
marriage to an Australian citizen had been validly
dissolved by a divorce decree obtained in Australia in
The Case
1989;[12] thus, he was legally capacitated to marry
petitioner in 1994.
Petitioner submits the following issues for our Petitioner adds that, based on the first paragraph of
consideration: Article 26 of the Family Code, marriages solemnized
abroad are governed by the law of the place where they
were celebrated (the lex loci celebrationis). In effect, the
1 Code requires the presentation of the foreign law to show
the conformity of the marriage in question to the legal
The trial court gravely erred in finding that the divorce requirements of the place where the marriage was
decree obtained in Australia by the respondent ipso facto performed.
terminated his first marriage to Editha Samson thereby
capacitating him to contract a second marriage with the
petitioner. At the outset, we lay the following basic legal principles
2 as the take-off points for our discussion. Philippine law
does not provide for absolute divorce; hence, our courts
The failure of the respondent, who is now a naturalized cannot grant it.[21] A marriage between two Filipinos
Australian, to present a certificate of legal capacity to cannot be dissolved even by a divorce obtained abroad,
marry constitutes absence of a substantial requisite because of Articles 15[22] and 17[23] of the Civil
voiding the petitioners marriage to the respondent Code.[24] In mixed marriages involving a Filipino and a
foreigner, Article 26[25] of the Family Code allows the
3
former to contract a subsequent marriage in case the
The trial court seriously erred in the application of Art. 26 divorce is validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse
of the Family Code in this case. capacitating him or her to remarry.[26] A divorce obtained
abroad by a couple, who are both aliens, may be
4 recognized in the Philippines, provided it is consistent with
their respective national laws.[27]
The trial court patently and grievously erred in
disregarding Arts. 11, 13, 21, 35, 40, 52 and 53 of the
Family Code as the applicable provisions in this case.
A comparison between marriage and divorce, as far as
5 pleading and proof are concerned, can be made. Van
Dorn v. Romillo Jr. decrees that aliens may obtain
The trial court gravely erred in pronouncing that the
divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the
divorce decree obtained by the respondent in Australia
Philippines, provided they are valid according to their
ipso facto capacitated the parties to remarry, without first
national law.[28] Therefore, before a foreign divorce
securing a recognition of the judgment granting the
decree can be recognized by our courts, the party
divorce decree before our courts.[19]
pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact and
The Petition raises five issues, but for purposes of this demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing
Decision, we shall concentrate on two pivotal ones: (1) it.[29] Presentation solely of the divorce decree is
whether the divorce between respondent and Editha insufficient.
Samson was proven, and (2) whether respondent was
proven to be legally capacitated to marry petitioner.
Because of our ruling on these two, there is no more Divorce as a Question of Fact
necessity to take up the rest.
Petitioner insists that before a divorce decree can be
admitted in evidence, it must first comply with the
registration requirements under Articles 11, 13 and 52 of
The Courts Ruling
the Family Code. These articles read as follows:
5
ART. 11. Where a marriage license is required, each of The divorce decree between respondent and Editha
the contracting parties shall file separately a sworn Samson appears to be an authentic one issued by an
application for such license with the proper local civil Australian family court.[35] However, appearance is not
registrar which shall specify the following: sufficient; compliance with the aforementioned rules on
evidence must be demonstrated.
xxxxxxxxx
Fortunately for respondents cause, when the divorce
decree of May 18, 1989 was submitted in evidence,
(5) If previously married, how, when and where the counsel for petitioner objected, not to its admissibility, but
previous marriage was dissolved or annulled; only to the fact that it had not been registered in the Local
Civil Registry of Cabanatuan City.[36] The trial court ruled
that it was admissible, subject to petitioners
qualification.[37] Hence, it was admitted in evidence and
xxxxxxxxx
accorded weight by the judge. Indeed, petitioners failure
to object properly rendered the divorce decree admissible
as a written act of the Family Court of Sydney,
ART. 13. In case either of the contracting parties has been Australia.[38]
previously married, the applicant shall be required to
7
Neither can we grant petitioners prayer to declare her On 7 October 1987 petitioner moved for the immediate
marriage to respondent null and void on the ground of declaration of heirs of the decedent and the distribution of
bigamy. After all, it may turn out that under Australian law, his estate. At the scheduled hearing on 23 October 1987,
he was really capacitated to marry petitioner as a direct private respondent as well as the six (6) Padlan children
result of the divorce decree. Hence, we believe that the and Ruperto failed to appear despite due notice. On the
most judicious course is to remand this case to the trial same day, the trial court required the submission of the
court to receive evidence, if any, which show petitioners records of birth of the Padlan children within ten (10) days
legal capacity to marry petitioner. Failing in that, then the from receipt thereof, after which, with or without the
court a quo may declare a nullity of the parties marriage documents, the issue on the declaration of heirs would be
on the ground of bigamy, there being already in evidence considered submitted for resolution. The prescribed
two existing marriage certificates, which were both period lapsed without the required documents being
obtained in the Philippines, one in Malabon, Metro Manila submitted.
dated March 1, 1987 and the other, in Cabanatuan City
dated January 12, 1994.
The trial court invoking Tenchavez v. Escao[1] which held
that "a foreign divorce between Filipino citizens sought
WHEREFORE, in the interest of orderly procedure and and decreed after the effectivity of the present Civil Code
substantial justice, we REMAND the case to the court a (Rep. Act 386) was not entitled to recognition as valid in
quo for the purpose of receiving evidence which this jurisdiction,"[2] disregarded the divorce between
conclusively show respondents legal capacity to marry petitioner and Arturo. Consequently, it expressed the view
petitioner; and failing in that, of declaring the parties that their marriage subsisted until the death of Arturo in
marriage void on the ground of bigamy, as above 1972. Neither did it consider valid their extrajudicial
discussed. No costs. settlement of conjugal properties due to lack of judicial
approval.[3] On the other hand, it opined that there was
no showing that marriage existed between private
respondent and Arturo, much less was it shown that the
FE D. QUITA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and
alleged Padlan children had been acknowledged by the
BLANDINA DANDAN,* respondents.
deceased as his children with her. As regards Ruperto, it
found that he was a brother of Arturo. On 27 November
1987[4] only petitioner and Ruperto were declared the
FE D. QUITA and Arturo T. Padlan, both Filipinos, were intestate heirs of Arturo. Accordingly, equal adjudication
married in the Philippines on 18 May 1941. They were not of the net hereditary estate was ordered in favor of the two
however blessed with children. Somewhere along the way intestate heirs.[5]
their relationship soured. Eventually Fe sued Arturo for
divorce in San Francisco, California, U.S.A. She
submitted in the divorce proceedings a private writing
On motion for reconsideration, Blandina and the Padlan
dated 19 July 1950 evidencing their agreement to live
children were allowed to present proofs that the
separately from each other and a settlement of their
recognition of the children by the deceased as his
conjugal properties. On 23 July 1954 she obtained a final
legitimate children, except Alexis who was recognized as
judgment of divorce. Three (3) weeks thereafter she
his illegitimate child, had been made in their respective
married a certain Felix Tupaz in the same locality but their
records of birth. Thus on 15 February 1988[6] partial
relationship also ended in a divorce. Still in the U.S.A.,
reconsideration was granted declaring the Padlan
she married for the third time, to a certain Wernimont.
children, with the exception of Alexis, entitled to one-half
of the estate to the exclusion of Ruperto Padlan, and
petitioner to the other half.[7] Private respondent was not
On 16 April 1972 Arturo died. He left no will. On 31 August declared an heir. Although it was stated in the
1972 Lino Javier Inciong filed a petition with the Regional aforementioned records of birth that she and Arturo were
Trial Court of Quezon City for issuance of letters of married on 22 April 1947, their marriage was clearly void
administration concerning the estate of Arturo in favor of since it was celebrated during the existence of his
the Philippine Trust Company. Respondent Blandina previous marriage to petitioner.
Dandan (also referred to as Blandina Padlan), claiming to
be the surviving spouse of Arturo Padlan, and Claro,
Alexis, Ricardo, Emmanuel, Zenaida and Yolanda, all
In their appeal to the Court of Appeals, Blandina and her
surnamed Padlan, named in the petition as surviving
children assigned as one of the errors allegedly
children of Arturo Padlan, opposed the petition and
committed by the trial court the circumstance that the
prayed for the appointment instead of Atty. Leonardo
case was decided without a hearing, in violation of Sec.
Cabasal, which was resolved in favor of the latter. Upon
1, Rule 90, of the Rules of Court, which provides that if
motion of the oppositors themselves, Atty. Cabasal was
there is a controversy before the court as to who are the
later replaced by Higino Castillon. On 30 April 1973 the
lawful heirs of the deceased person or as to the
oppositors (Blandina and the Padlan children) submitted
distributive shares to which each person is entitled under
certified photocopies of the 19 July 1950 private writing
the law, the controversy shall be heard and decided as in
and the final judgment of divorce between petitioner and
ordinary cases.
Arturo. Later Ruperto T. Padlan, claiming to be the sole
surviving brother of the deceased Arturo, intervened.
8
Respondent appellate court found this ground alone
sufficient to sustain the appeal; hence, on 11 September
1995 it declared null and void the 27 November 1987 Then in private respondent's motion to set aside and/or
decision and 15 February 1988 order of the trial court, and reconsider the lower court's decision she stressed that the
directed the remand of the case to the trial court for further citizenship of petitioner was relevant in the light of the
proceedings.[8] On 18 April 1996 it denied ruling in Van Dorn v. Romillo Jr.[13] that aliens may obtain
reconsideration.[9] divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the
Philippines, provided they are valid according to their
national law. She prayed therefore that the case be set for
hearing.[14] Petitioner opposed the motion but failed to
Should this case be remanded to the lower court for squarely address the issue on her citizenship.[15] The
further proceedings? Petitioner insists that there is no trial court did not grant private respondent's prayer for a
need because, first, no legal or factual issue obtains for hearing but proceeded to resolve her motion with the
resolution either as to the heirship of the Padlan children finding that both petitioner and Arturo were "Filipino
or as to their respective shares in the intestate estate of citizens and were married in the Philippines."[16] It
the decedent; and, second, the issue as to who between maintained that their divorce obtained in 1954 in San
petitioner and private respondent is the proper heir of the Francisco, California, U.S.A., was not valid in Philippine
decedent is one of law which can be resolved in the jurisdiction. We deduce that the finding on their citizenship
present petition based on established facts and pertained solely to the time of their marriage as the trial
admissions of the parties. court was not supplied with a basis to determine
petitioner's citizenship at the time of their divorce. The
doubt persisted as to whether she was still a Filipino
We cannot sustain petitioner. The provision relied upon citizen when their divorce was decreed. The trial court
by respondent court is clear: If there is a controversy must have overlooked the materiality of this aspect. Once
before the court as to who are the lawful heirs of the proved that she was no longer a Filipino citizen at the time
deceased person or as to the distributive shares to which of their divorce, Van Dorn would become applicable and
each person is entitled under the law, the controversy petitioner could very well lose her right to inherit from
shall be heard and decided as in ordinary cases. Arturo.
We agree with petitioner that no dispute exists either as Respondent again raised in her appeal the issue on
to the right of the six (6) Padlan children to inherit from the petitioner's citizenship;[17] it did not merit enlightenment
decedent because there are proofs that they have been however from petitioner.[18] In the present proceeding,
duly acknowledged by him and petitioner herself even petitioner's citizenship is brought anew to the fore by
recognizes them as heirs of Arturo Padlan;[10] nor as to private respondent. She even furnishes the Court with the
their respective hereditary shares. But controversy transcript of stenographic notes taken on 5 May 1995
remains as to who is the legitimate surviving spouse of during the hearing for the reconstitution of the original of
Arturo. The trial court, after the parties other than a certain transfer certificate title as well as the issuance of
petitioner failed to appear during the scheduled hearing new owner's duplicate copy thereof before another trial
on 23 October 1987 of the motion for immediate court. When asked whether she was an American citizen
declaration of heirs and distribution of estate, simply petitioner answered that she was since 1954.[19]
issued an order requiring the submission of the records of Significantly, the decree of divorce of petitioner and Arturo
birth of the Padlan children within ten (10) days from was obtained in the same year. Petitioner however did not
receipt thereof, after which, with or without the bother to file a reply memorandum to erase the
documents, the issue on declaration of heirs would be uncertainty about her citizenship at the time of their
deemed submitted for resolution. divorce, a factual issue requiring hearings to be
conducted by the trial court. Consequently, respondent
appellate court did not err in ordering the case returned to
We note that in her comment to petitioner's motion private the trial court for further proceedings.
respondent raised, among others, the issue as to whether
petitioner was still entitled to inherit from the decedent
considering that she had secured a divorce in the U.S.A. We emphasize however that the question to be
and in fact had twice remarried. She also invoked the determined by the trial court should be limited only to the
above quoted procedural rule.[11] To this, petitioner right of petitioner to inherit from Arturo as his surviving
replied that Arturo was a Filipino and as such remained spouse. Private respondent's claim to heirship was
legally married to her in spite of the divorce they already resolved by the trial court. She and Arturo were
obtained.[12] Reading between the lines, the implication married on 22 April 1947 while the prior marriage of
is that petitioner was no longer a Filipino citizen at the time petitioner and Arturo was subsisting thereby resulting in a
of her divorce from Arturo. This should have prompted the bigamous marriage considered void from the beginning
trial court to conduct a hearing to establish her citizenship. under Arts. 80 and 83 of the Civil Code. Consequently,
The purpose of a hearing is to ascertain the truth of the she is not a surviving spouse that can inherit from him as
matters in issue with the aid of documentary and this status presupposes a legitimate relationship.[20]
testimonial evidence as well as the arguments of the
parties either supporting or opposing the evidence.
Instead, the lower court perfunctorily settled her claim in As regards the motion of private respondent for petitioner
her favor by merely applying the ruling in Tenchavez v. and her counsel to be declared in contempt of court and
Escao. that the present petition be dismissed for forum
9
shopping,[21] the same lacks merit. For forum shopping Several years later, the couple encountered marital
to exist the actions must involve the same transactions problems that they decided to separate from each other.
and same essential facts and circumstances. There must Upon advice of a mutual friend, they decided to obtain a
also be identical causes of action, subject matter and divorce from the Dominican Republic. Thus, on April 27,
issue.[22] The present petition deals with declaration of 1984, Tristan and Lily executed a Special Power of
heirship while the subsequent petitions filed before the Attorney addressed to the Judge of the First Civil Court of
three (3) trial courts concern the issuance of new owner's San Cristobal, Dominican Republic, appointing an
duplicate copies of titles of certain properties belonging to attorney-in-fact to institute a divorce action under its
the estate of Arturo. Obviously, there is no reason to laws.6
declare the existence of forum shopping.
vs.
On August 13, 2001, Tristan filed a petition for the
COURT OF APPEALS, Fifth Division, TRISTAN A.
declaration of nullity of his marriage to Lily with the
CATINDIG and LILY GOMEZ-CATINDIG,
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, docketed as Case
Respondents.
No. Q-01-44847.
10
Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied, hence intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication
this petition for certiorari and prohibition filed under Rule of the rights of the original parties, and whether or not the
65 of the Rules of Court. Petitioner contends that the intervenors rights may be fully protected in a separate
Court of Appeals gravely abused its discretion in proceeding.15
disregarding her legal interest in the annulment case
between Tristan and Lily.
The requirements for intervention are: [a] legal interest in
the matter in litigation; and [b] consideration must be
The petition lacks merit. given as to whether the adjudication of the original parties
may be delayed or prejudiced, or whether the intervenors
rights may be protected in a separate proceeding or
Ordinarily, the proper recourse of an aggrieved party from not.16
a decision of the Court of Appeals is a petition for review
on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
However, if the error subject of the recourse is one of Legal interest, which entitles a person to intervene, must
jurisdiction, or the act complained of was granted by a be in the matter in litigation and of such direct and
court with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or immediate character that the intervenor will either gain or
excess of jurisdiction, as alleged in this case, the proper lose by direct legal operation and effect of the
remedy is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the said judgment.17 Such interest must be actual, direct and
Rules.11 This is based on the premise that in issuing the material, and not simply contingent and expectant.18
assailed decision and resolution, the Court of Appeals
acted with grave abuse of discretion, amounting to excess
of lack of jurisdiction and there is no plain, speedy and Petitioner claims that her status as the wife and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. A remedy companion of Tristan for 17 years vests her with the
is considered plain, speedy, and adequate if it will requisite legal interest required of a would-be intervenor
promptly relieve the petitioner from the injurious effect of under the Rules of Court.
the judgment and the acts of the lower court.12
Who may intervene. A person who has a legal interest (1) That a foreign divorce between Filipino citizens,
in the matter in litigation, or in the success of either of the sought and decreed after the effectivity of the present Civil
parties, or an interest against both, or is so situated as to Code (Rep. Act No. 386), is not entitled to recognition as
be adversely affected by a distribution or other disposition valid in this jurisdiction; and neither is the marriage
of property in the custody of the court or of an officer contracted with another party by the divorced consort,
thereof may, with leave of court, be allowed to intervene subsequently to the foreign decree of divorce, entitled to
in the action. The court shall consider whether or not the validity in the country. (Emphasis added)
11
On June 20, 1974, Felicisimo married respondent
Felicidad San Luis, then surnamed Sagalongos, before
Thus, petitioners claim that she is the wife of Tristan even Rev. Fr. William Meyer, Minister of the United
if their marriage was celebrated abroad lacks merit. Thus, Presbyterian at Wilshire Boulevard, Los Angeles,
petitioner never acquired the legal interest as a wife upon California, U.S.A. 7 He had no children with respondent
which her motion for intervention is based. but lived with her for 18 years from the time of their
marriage up to his death on December 18, 1992.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The assailed Respondent alleged that she is the widow of Felicisimo;
Decision dated July 25, 2003 and Resolution dated that, at the time of his death, the decedent was residing
January 23, 2004 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP at 100 San Juanico Street, New Alabang Village,
No. 74456 are AFFIRMED. Alabang, Metro Manila; that the decedents surviving heirs
are respondent as legal spouse, his six children by his first
marriage, and son by his second marriage; that the
No pronouncement as to costs. decedent left real properties, both conjugal and exclusive,
valued at P30,304,178.00 more or less; that the decedent
does not have any unpaid debts. Respondent prayed that
SO ORDERED. the conjugal partnership assets be liquidated and that
letters of administration be issued to her.
EDGAR SAN LUIS, Petitioner,
vs.
On February 4, 1994, petitioner Rodolfo San Luis, one of
FELICIDAD SAN LUIS, Respondent. the children of Felicisimo by his first marriage, filed a
motion to dismiss 9 on the grounds of improper venue and
failure to state a cause of action. Rodolfo claimed that the
Before us are consolidated petitions for review assailing petition for letters of administration should have been filed
the February 4, 1998 Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals in the Province of Laguna because this was Felicisimos
in CA-G.R. CV No. 52647, which reversed and set aside place of residence prior to his death. He further claimed
the September 12, 1995 2 and January 31, 1996 3 that respondent has no legal personality to file the petition
Resolutions of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, because she was only a mistress of Felicisimo since the
Branch 134 in SP. Proc. No. M-3708; and its May 15, latter, at the time of his death, was still legally married to
1998 Resolution 4 denying petitioners motion for Merry Lee.
reconsideration.
12
Thereafter, Linda, Rodolfo and herein petitioner Edgar Respondent moved for reconsideration 26 and for the
San Luis, separately filed motions for reconsideration disqualification 27 of Judge Arcangel but said motions
from the Order denying their motions to dismiss. 15 They were denied. 28
asserted that paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family Code
cannot be given retroactive effect to validate respondents
bigamous marriage with Felicisimo because this would Respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals which
impair vested rights in derogation of Article 256 16 of the reversed and set aside the orders of the trial court in its
Family Code. assailed Decision dated February 4, 1998, the dispositive
portion of which states:
13
is of such nature residence rather than domicile is the
significant factor. Even where the statute uses the word
Edgar, Linda, and Rodolfo filed separate motions for "domicile" still it is construed as meaning residence and
reconsideration 34 which were denied by the Court of not domicile in the technical sense. Some cases make a
Appeals. distinction between the terms "residence" and "domicile"
but as generally used in statutes fixing venue, the terms
are synonymous, and convey the same meaning as the
On July 2, 1998, Edgar appealed to this Court via the term "inhabitant." In other words, "resides" should be
instant petition for review on certiorari. 35 Rodolfo later viewed or understood in its popular sense, meaning, the
filed a manifestation and motion to adopt the said petition personal, actual or physical habitation of a person, actual
which was granted. 36 residence or place of abode. It signifies physical presence
in a place and actual stay thereat. In this popular sense,
the term means merely residence, that is, personal
In the instant consolidated petitions, Edgar and Rodolfo residence, not legal residence or domicile. Residence
insist that the venue of the subject petition for letters of simply requires bodily presence as an inhabitant in a
administration was improperly laid because at the time of given place, while domicile requires bodily presence in
his death, Felicisimo was a resident of Sta. Cruz, Laguna. that place and also an intention to make it ones domicile.
They contend that pursuant to our rulings in Nuval v. No particular length of time of residence is required
Guray 37 and Romualdez v. RTC, Br. 7, Tacloban City, though; however, the residence must be more than
38 "residence" is synonymous with "domicile" which temporary. 41 (Emphasis supplied)
denotes a fixed permanent residence to which when
absent, one intends to return. They claim that a person
can only have one domicile at any given time. Since It is incorrect for petitioners to argue that "residence," for
Felicisimo never changed his domicile, the petition for purposes of fixing the venue of the settlement of the
letters of administration should have been filed in Sta. estate of Felicisimo, is synonymous with "domicile." The
Cruz, Laguna. rulings in Nuval and Romualdez are inapplicable to the
instant case because they involve election cases.
Needless to say, there is a distinction between
Petitioners also contend that respondents marriage to "residence" for purposes of election laws and "residence"
Felicisimo was void and bigamous because it was for purposes of fixing the venue of actions. In election
performed during the subsistence of the latters marriage cases, "residence" and "domicile" are treated as
to Merry Lee. They argue that paragraph 2, Article 26 synonymous terms, that is, the fixed permanent residence
cannot be retroactively applied because it would impair to which when absent, one has the intention of returning.
vested rights and ratify the void bigamous marriage. As 42 However, for purposes of fixing venue under the Rules
such, respondent cannot be considered the surviving wife of Court, the "residence" of a person is his personal,
of Felicisimo; hence, she has no legal capacity to file the actual or physical habitation, or actual residence or place
petition for letters of administration. of abode, which may not necessarily be his legal
residence or domicile provided he resides therein with
continuity and consistency. 43 Hence, it is possible that a
person may have his residence in one place and domicile
The issues for resolution: (1) whether venue was properly
in another.
laid, and (2) whether respondent has legal capacity to file
the subject petition for letters of administration.
14
From the foregoing, we find that Felicisimo was a resident decision he does not repudiate, he is estopped by his own
of Alabang, Muntinlupa for purposes of fixing the venue of representation before said Court from asserting his right
the settlement of his estate. Consequently, the subject over the alleged conjugal property. 53
petition for letters of administration was validly filed in the
Regional Trial Court 50 which has territorial jurisdiction
over Alabang, Muntinlupa. The subject petition was filed As to the effect of the divorce on the Filipino wife, the
on December 17, 1993. At that time, Muntinlupa was still Court ruled that she should no longer be considered
a municipality and the branches of the Regional Trial married to the alien spouse. Further, she should not be
Court of the National Capital Judicial Region which had required to perform her marital duties and obligations. It
territorial jurisdiction over Muntinlupa were then seated in held:
Makati City as per Supreme Court Administrative Order
No. 3. 51 Thus, the subject petition was validly filed before
the Regional Trial Court of Makati City.
To maintain, as private respondent does, that, under our
laws, petitioner has to be considered still married to
private respondent and still subject to a wife's obligations
Anent the issue of respondent Felicidads legal under Article 109, et. seq. of the Civil Code cannot be just.
personality to file the petition for letters of administration, Petitioner should not be obliged to live together with,
we must first resolve the issue of whether a Filipino who observe respect and fidelity, and render support to private
is divorced by his alien spouse abroad may validly respondent. The latter should not continue to be one of
remarry under the Civil Code, considering that Felicidads her heirs with possible rights to conjugal property. She
marriage to Felicisimo was solemnized on June 20, 1974, should not be discriminated against in her own country if
or before the Family Code took effect on August 3, 1988. the ends of justice are to be served. 54 (Emphasis added)
In resolving this issue, we need not retroactively apply the
provisions of the Family Code, particularly Art. 26, par. (2)
considering that there is sufficient jurisprudential basis
This principle was thereafter applied in Pilapil v. Ibay-
allowing us to rule in the affirmative.
Somera 55 where the Court recognized the validity of a
divorce obtained abroad. In the said case, it was held that
the alien spouse is not a proper party in filing the adultery
The case of Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. 52 involved a suit against his Filipino wife. The Court stated that "the
marriage between a foreigner and his Filipino wife, which severance of the marital bond had the effect of
marriage was subsequently dissolved through a divorce dissociating the former spouses from each other, hence
obtained abroad by the latter. Claiming that the divorce the actuations of one would not affect or cast obloquy on
was not valid under Philippine law, the alien spouse the other." 56
alleged that his interest in the properties from their
conjugal partnership should be protected. The Court,
however, recognized the validity of the divorce and held
Likewise, in Quita v. Court of Appeals, 57 the Court stated
that the alien spouse had no interest in the properties
that where a Filipino is divorced by his naturalized foreign
acquired by the Filipino wife after the divorce. Thus:
spouse, the ruling in Van Dorn applies. 58 Although
decided on December 22, 1998, the divorce in the said
case was obtained in 1954 when the Civil Code provisions
In this case, the divorce in Nevada released private were still in effect.
respondent from the marriage from the standards of
American law, under which divorce dissolves the
marriage. As stated by the Federal Supreme Court of the
The significance of the Van Dorn case to the development
United States in Atherton vs. Atherton, 45 L. Ed. 794, 799:
of limited recognition of divorce in the Philippines cannot
be denied. The ruling has long been interpreted as
severing marital ties between parties in a mixed marriage
"The purpose and effect of a decree of divorce from the and capacitating the Filipino spouse to remarry as a
bond of matrimony by a competent jurisdiction are to necessary consequence of upholding the validity of a
change the existing status or domestic relation of divorce obtained abroad by the alien spouse. In his
husband and wife, and to free them both from the bond. treatise, Dr. Arturo M. Tolentino cited Van Dorn stating
The marriage tie, when thus severed as to one party, that "if the foreigner obtains a valid foreign divorce, the
ceases to bind either. A husband without a wife, or a wife Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under
without a husband, is unknown to the law. When the law Philippine law." 59 In Garcia v. Recio, 60 the Court
provides, in the nature of a penalty, that the guilty party likewise cited the aforementioned case in relation to
shall not marry again, that party, as well as the other, is Article 26. 61
still absolutely freed from the bond of the former
marriage."
In the recent case of Republic v. Orbecido III, 62 the
historical background and legislative intent behind
Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family Code were
no longer the husband of petitioner. He would have no discussed, to wit:
standing to sue in the case below as petitioners husband
entitled to exercise control over conjugal assets. As he is
bound by the Decision of his own countrys Court, which
Brief Historical Background
validly exercised jurisdiction over him, and whose
15
codified the law already established through judicial
precedent.1awphi1.net
On July 6, 1987, then President Corazon Aquino signed
into law Executive Order No. 209, otherwise known as the
"Family Code," which took effect on August 3, 1988.
Article 26 thereof states: Indeed, when the object of a marriage is defeated by
rendering its continuance intolerable to one of the parties
and productive of no possible good to the community,
relief in some way should be obtainable. 64 Marriage,
All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in being a mutual and shared commitment between two
accordance with the laws in force in the country where parties, cannot possibly be productive of any good to the
they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also society where one is considered released from the marital
be valid in this country, except those prohibited under bond while the other remains bound to it. Such is the state
Articles 35, 37, and 38. of affairs where the alien spouse obtains a valid divorce
abroad against the Filipino spouse, as in this case.
Even assuming that Felicisimo was not capacitated to The regime of limited co-ownership of property governing
marry respondent in 1974, nevertheless, we find that the the union of parties who are not legally capacitated to
latter has the legal personality to file the subject petition marry each other, but who nonetheless live together as
for letters of administration, as she may be considered the husband and wife, applies to properties acquired during
co-owner of Felicisimo as regards the properties that were said cohabitation in proportion to their respective
acquired through their joint efforts during their contributions. Co-ownership will only be up to the extent
cohabitation. of the proven actual contribution of money, property or
industry. Absent proof of the extent thereof, their
contributions and corresponding shares shall be
Section 6, 74 Rule 78 of the Rules of Court states that presumed to be equal.
letters of administration may be granted to the surviving
spouse of the decedent. However, Section 2, Rule 79
thereof also provides in part: xxxx
17
In the cases of Agapay v. Palang, and Tumlos v. condominium unit, and in the law books of the husband
Fernandez, which involved the issue of co-ownership of acquired during the second marriage.
properties acquired by the parties to a bigamous marriage
and an adulterous relationship, respectively, we ruled that
proof of actual contribution in the acquisition of the Antecedents
property is essential. x x x
18
"JUAN LUCES LUNA, married to Soledad L. Luna
(46/100); MARIO E. ONGKIKO, married to Sonia P.G.
Ongkiko (25/100); GREGORIO R. PURUGANAN, Ruling of the RTC
married to Paz A. Puruganan (17/100); and TERESITA
CRUZ SISON, married to Antonio J.M. Sison (12/100) x x
x" Subsequently, 8/100 share of ATTY. LUNA and 17/100 On August 27, 2001, the RTC rendered its decision after
share of Atty. Gregorio R. Puruganan in the condominium trial upon the aforementioned facts,4 disposing thusly:
unit was sold to Atty. Mario E. Ongkiko, for which a new
CCT No. 21761 was issued on February 7, 1992 in the
following names: WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered as follows:
"JUAN LUCES LUNA, married to Soledad L. Luna (a) The 24/100 pro-indiviso share in the condominium unit
(38/100); MARIO E. ONGKIKO, married to Sonia P.G. located at the SIXTH FLOOR of the KALAW LEDESMA
Ongkiko (50/100); TERESITA CRUZ SISON, married to CONDOMINIUM PROJECT covered by Condominium
Antonio J.M. Sison (12/100) x x x" Certificate of Title No. 21761 consisting of FIVE
HUNDRED SEVENTEEN (517/100) SQUARE METERS
is adjudged to have been acquired by Juan Lucas Luna
Sometime in 1992, LUPSICON was dissolved and the through his sole industry;
condominium unit was partitioned by the partners but the
same was still registered in common under CCT No.
21716. The parties stipulated that the interest of ATTY. (b) Plaintiff has no right as owner or under any other
LUNA over the condominium unit would be 25/100 share. concept over the condominium unit, hence the entry in
ATTY. LUNA thereafter established and headed another Condominium Certificate of Title No. 21761 of the
law firm with Atty. Renato G. Dela Cruzand used a portion Registry of Deeds of Makati with respect to the civil status
of the office condominium unit as their office. The said law of Juan Luces Luna should be changed from "JUAN
firm lasted until the death of ATTY. JUAN on July 12, LUCES LUNA married to Soledad L. Luna" to "JUAN
1997. LUCES LUNA married to Eugenia Zaballero Luna";
After the death of ATTY. JUAN, his share in the (c) Plaintiff is declared to be the owner of the books
condominium unit including the lawbooks, office furniture Corpus Juris, Fletcher on Corporation, American
and equipment found therein were taken over by Gregorio Jurisprudence and Federal Supreme Court Reports found
Z. Luna, ATTY. LUNAs son of the first marriage. Gregorio in the condominium unit and defendants are ordered to
Z. Luna thenleased out the 25/100 portion of the deliver them to the plaintiff as soon as appropriate
condominium unit belonging to his father to Atty. Renato arrangements have been madefor transport and storage.
G. De la Cruz who established his own law firm named
Renato G. De la Cruz & Associates.
No pronouncement as to costs.
19
FOREIGN LAW BOOKS FOUND IN ATTY. LUNAS LAW
OFFICE; and
III. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GIVING
CREDENCE TO PORTIONS OF THE TESTIMONY OF
GREGORIO LUNA, WHO HAS NO ACTUAL
KNOWLEDGE OF THE ACQUISITION OF THE UNIT, III. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT HOLDING
BUT IGNORED OTHER PORTIONS OF HIS THAT, ASSUMING PLAINTIFF PAID FOR THE SAID
TESTIMONY FAVORABLE TO THE PLAINTIFF- FOREIGN LAW BOOKS, THE RIGHT TO RECOVER
APPELLANT; THEM HAD PRESCRIBED AND BARRED BY LACHES
AND ESTOPPEL.8
We affirm the modified decision of the CA. The petitioner insists that the Agreement for Separation
and Property Settlement (Agreement) that the late Atty.
Luna and Eugenia had entered into and executed in
1. Atty. Lunas first marriage with Eugenia connection with the divorce proceedings before the CFI of
Sto. Domingo in the Dominican Republic to dissolve and
subsisted up to the time of his death liquidate their conjugal partnership was enforceable
against Eugenia. Hence, the CA committed reversible
error in decreeing otherwise.
The first marriage between Atty. Luna and Eugenia, both
Filipinos, was solemnized in the Philippines on
September 10, 1947. The law in force at the time of the The insistence of the petitioner was unwarranted.
21
Article 190. In the absence of an express declaration in
the marriage settlements, the separation of property
Considering that Atty. Luna and Eugenia had not entered between spouses during the marriage shall not take place
into any marriage settlement prior to their marriage on save in virtue of a judicial order. (1432a)
September 10, 1947, the system of relative community or
conjugal partnership of gains governed their property
relations. This is because the Spanish Civil Code, the law
then in force at the time of their marriage, did not specify Article 191. The husband or the wife may ask for the
the property regime of the spouses in the event that they separation of property, and it shall be decreed when the
had not entered into any marriage settlement before or at spouse of the petitioner has been sentenced to a penalty
the time of the marriage. Article 119 of the Civil which carries with it civil interdiction, or has been declared
Codeclearly so provides, to wit: absent, or when legal separation has been granted.
Article 175. The conjugal partnership of gains terminates: The query is answered in the negative. There is no
question that the approval took place only as an incident
ofthe action for divorce instituted by Atty. Luna and
Eugenia, for, indeed, the justifications for their execution
(1) Upon the death of either spouse; of the Agreement were identical to the grounds raised in
the action for divorce.21 With the divorce not being itself
valid and enforceable under Philippine law for being
(2) When there is a decree of legal separation; contrary to Philippine public policy and public law, the
approval of the Agreement was not also legally valid and
enforceable under Philippine law. Consequently, the
(3) When the marriage is annulled; conjugal partnership of gains of Atty. Luna and Eugenia
subsisted in the lifetime of their marriage.
The mere execution of the Agreement by Atty. Luna and were governed by the rules on co-ownership
Eugenia did not per sedissolve and liquidate their
conjugal partnership of gains. The approval of the
Agreement by a competent court was still required under What law governed the property relations of the second
Article 190 and Article 191 of the Civil Code, as follows: marriage between Atty. Luna and Soledad?
22
The CA expressly declared that Atty. Lunas subsequent substantiate their allegation that they contributed money
marriage to Soledad on January 12, 1976 was void for in the purchase of the disputed properties. Also in Adriano
being bigamous,22 on the ground that the marriage v. Court of Appeals, we ruled that the fact that the
between Atty. Luna and Eugenia had not been dissolved controverted property was titled in the name of the parties
by the Divorce Decree rendered by the CFI of Sto. to an adulterous relationship is not sufficient proof of
Domingo in the Dominican Republic but had subsisted coownership absent evidence of actual contribution in the
until the death of Atty. Luna on July 12, 1997. acquisition of the property.
The Court concurs with the CA. As in other civil cases, the burden of proof rests upon the
party who, as determined by the pleadings or the nature
of the case, asserts an affirmative issue. Contentions
In the Philippines, marriages that are bigamous, must be proved by competent evidence and reliance must
polygamous, or incestuous are void. Article 71 of the Civil be had on the strength of the partys own evidence and
Codeclearly states: not upon the weakness of the opponents defense. This
applies with more vigor where, as in the instant case, the
plaintiff was allowed to present evidence ex
parte.1wphi1 The plaintiff is not automatically entitled to
Article 71. All marriages performed outside the Philippines
the relief prayed for. The law gives the defendantsome
in accordance with the laws in force in the country where
measure of protection as the plaintiff must still prove the
they were performed, and valid there as such, shall also
allegations in the complaint. Favorable relief can be
be valid in this country, except bigamous, polygamous, or
granted only after the court isconvinced that the facts
incestuous marriages as determined by Philippine law.
proven by the plaintiff warrant such relief. Indeed, the
party alleging a fact has the burden of proving it and a
mereallegation is not evidence.26
Bigamy is an illegal marriage committed by contracting a
second or subsequent marriage before the first marriage
has been legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse
The petitioner asserts herein that she sufficiently proved
has been declared presumptively dead by means of a
her actual contributions in the purchase of the
judgment rendered in the proper proceedings.23 A
condominium unit in the aggregate amount of at least
bigamous marriage is considered void ab initio.24
P306,572.00, consisting in direct contributions of
P159,072.00, and in repaying the loans Atty. Luna had
obtained from Premex Financing and Banco Filipino
Due to the second marriage between Atty. Luna and the totaling P146,825.30;27 and that such aggregate
petitioner being void ab initioby virtue of its being contributions of P306,572.00 corresponded to almost the
bigamous, the properties acquired during the bigamous entire share of Atty. Luna in the purchase of the
marriage were governed by the rules on co-ownership, condominium unit amounting to P362,264.00 of the units
conformably with Article 144 of the Civil Code, viz: purchase price of P1,449,056.00.28 The petitioner further
asserts that the lawbooks were paid for solely out of her
personal funds, proof of which Atty. Luna had even sent
Article 144. When a man and a woman live together as her a "thank you" note;29 that she had the financial
husband and wife, but they are not married, ortheir capacity to make the contributions and purchases; and
marriage is void from the beginning, the property acquired that Atty. Luna could not acquire the properties on his own
by eitheror both of them through their work or industry or due to the meagerness of the income derived from his law
their wages and salaries shall be governed by the rules practice.
on co-ownership.(n)
vs. USA
$3,000
The factual antecedents are as follow:
Noveras, who was born on 4 November 1990 and JenaT. Bank of America Checking Account
Noveras, born on 2 May 1993. David was engaged in
courier service business while Leticia worked as a nurse $8,000
in San Francisco, California.
PHILIPPINES
Retirement, pension, profit-sharing, annuities
PROPERTY FAIR MARKET VALUE
$56,228.00
House and Lot with an area of 150 sq. m. located at 1085
Norma Street, Sampaloc, Manila (Sampaloc property)
P400,000.00
Due to business reverses, David left the USA and
returned to the Philippines in 2001. In December
A parcel of land with an area of 2.5 hectares located at 2002,Leticia executed a Special Power of Attorney (SPA)
Maria Aurora, Aurora authorizing David to sell the Sampaloc property for P2.2
Million. According to Leticia, sometime in September
P490,000.00
2003, David abandoned his family and lived with Estrellita
Martinez in Aurora province. Leticia claimed that David
agreed toand executed a Joint Affidavit with Leticia in the
A parcel of land with an area of 175 sq.m. located at presence of Davids father, Atty. Isaias Noveras, on 3
Sabang Baler, Aurora December 2003 stating that: 1) the P1.1Million proceeds
from the sale of the Sampaloc property shall be paid to
and collected by Leticia; 2) that David shall return and pay
P175,000.00 to Leticia P750,000.00, which is equivalent to half of the
amount of the redemption price of the Sampaloc property;
3-has. coconut plantation in San Joaquin Maria Aurora, and 3) that David shall renounce and forfeit all his rights
Aurora and interest in the conjugal and real properties situated in
P750,000.00 the Philippines.5 David was able to collect P1,790,000.00
25
from the sale of the Sampaloc property, leaving an unpaid 5. How the absolute community properties should be
balance of P410,000.00. distributed.
Upon learning that David had an extra-marital affair, 6. Whether or not the attorneys feesand litigation
Leticia filed a petition for divorce with the Superior Court expenses of the parties were chargeable against their
of California, County of San Mateo, USA. The California conjugal properties.
court granted the divorce on 24 June 2005 and judgment
was duly entered on 29 June 2005.6 The California court
granted to Leticia the custody of her two children, as well Corollary to the aboveis the issue of:
as all the couples properties in the USA.7
26
income from their presumptive legitimes, while petitioner Relying still on the principle of equity, the Court also
Leticia Tacbiana shall take care of their food, clothing, adjudicated the Philippine properties to David, subject to
education and other needs while they are in her custody the payment of the childrens presumptive legitimes. The
in the USA. The monthly allowance due from the trial court held that under Article 89 of the Family Code,
respondent shall be increased in the future as the needs the waiver or renunciation made by David of his property
of the children require and his financial capacity can rights in the Joint Affidavit is void.
afford;
With respect to their property relations, the trial court first 6. Respondent David A. Noveras and petitioner Leticia
classified their property regime as absolute community of Tacbiana (sic) are each ordered to pay the amount
property because they did not execute any marriage ofP520,000.00 to their two children, Jerome and Jena, as
settlement before the solemnization of their marriage their presumptive legitimes from the sale of the Sampaloc
pursuant to Article 75 of the Family Code. Then, the trial property inclusive of the receivables therefrom, which
court ruled that in accordance with the doctrine of shall be deposited to a local bank of Baler, Aurora, under
processual presumption, Philippine law should apply a joint account in the latters names. The payment/deposit
because the court cannot take judicial notice of the US shall be made within a period of thirty (30) days from
law since the parties did not submit any proof of their receipt ofa copy of this Decision and the corresponding
national law. The trial court held that as the instant petition passbook entrusted to the custody ofthe Clerk of Court a
does not fall under the provisions of the law for the grant quowithin the same period, withdrawable only by the
of judicial separation of properties, the absolute children or their attorney-in-fact.
community properties cannot beforfeited in favor of Leticia
and her children. Moreover, the trial court observed that
Leticia failed to prove abandonment and infidelity with A number 8 is hereby added, which shall read as follows:
preponderant evidence.
29
(4) In case of judicial separation of property during the We agree with the appellate court that the Philippine
marriage under Articles 134 to 138. (Emphasis supplied). courts did not acquire jurisdiction over the California
properties of David and Leticia. Indeed, Article 16 of the
Civil Code clearly states that real property as well as
Under Article 102 of the same Code, liquidation follows personal property is subject to the law of the country
the dissolution of the absolute community regime and the where it is situated. Thus, liquidation shall only be limited
following procedure should apply: to the Philippine properties.
Art. 102. Upon dissolution of the absolute community We affirm the modification madeby the Court of Appeals
regime, the following procedure shall apply: with respect to the share of the spouses in the
absolutecommunity properties in the Philippines, as well
as the payment of their childrens presumptive legitimes,
which the appellate court explained in this wise:
(1) An inventory shall be prepared, listing separately all
the properties of the absolute community and the
exclusive properties of each spouse.
Leticia and David shall likewise have an equal share in
the proceeds of the Sampaloc property.1wphi1 While
both claimed to have contributed to the redemption of the
(2) The debts and obligations of the absolute community
Noveras property, absent a clear showing where their
shall be paid out of its assets. In case of insufficiency of
contributions came from, the same is presumed to have
said assets, the spouses shall be solidarily liable for the
come from the community property. Thus, Leticia is not
unpaid balance with their separate properties in
entitled to reimbursement of half of the redemption
accordance with the provisions of the second paragraph
money.
of Article 94.
xxxx
(5) The presumptive legitimes of the common children
shall be delivered upon partition, in accordance with
Article 51.
Under the first paragraph of Article 888 of the Civil Code,
"(t)he legitime of legitimate children and descendants
consists of one-half or the hereditary estate of the father
(6) Unless otherwise agreed upon by the parties, in the and of the mother." The children arc therefore entitled to
partition of the properties, the conjugal dwelling and the half of the share of each spouse in the net assets of the
lot on which it is situated shall be adjudicated tothe absolute community, which shall be annotated on the
spouse with whom the majority of the common children titles/documents covering the same, as well as to their
choose to remain. Children below the age of seven years respective shares in the net proceeds from the sale of the
are deemed to have chosen the mother, unless the court Sampaloc property including the receivables from Sps.
has decided otherwise. In case there is no such majority, Paringit in the amount of P410,000.00. Consequently,
the court shall decide, taking into consideration the best David and Leticia should each pay them the amount of
interests of said children. At the risk of being repetitious, P520,000.00 as their presumptive legitimes therefrom.21
we will not remand the case to the trial court. Instead, we
shall adopt the modifications made by the Court of WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed
Appeals on the trial courts Decision with respect to Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. CV No. 88686
liquidation. is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
30
ORION SAVINGS BANK, Petitioner, Cityland Pioneer. This notwithstanding, Cityland Pioneer,
through Assistant Vice President Rosario D. Perez,
vs. certified that Kang had fully paid the purchase price of
SHIGEKANE SUZUKI, Respondent. Unit. No. 53610 and Parking Slot No. 42.11 CCT No.
18186 representing the title to the condominium unit had
no existing encumbrance, except for anannotation under
Entry No. 73321/C-10186 which provided that any
DECISION
conveyance or encumbrance of CCT No. 18186 shall be
subject to approval by the Philippine Retirement Authority
(PRA). Although CCT No. 18186 contained Entry No.
BRION, J.: 66432/C-10186 dated February 2, 1999 representing a
mortgage in favor of Orion for a P1,000,000.00 loan, that
annotation was subsequently cancelled on June 16, 2000
Before us is the Petition for Review on Certiorari1 filed by by Entry No. 73232/T. No. 10186. Despite the
petitioner Orion Savings Bank (Orion) under Rule 45 of cancellation of the mortgage to Orion, the titles to the
the Rules of Court, assailing the decision2 dated August properties remained in possession of Perez.
23, 2012 and the resolution3 dated January 25, 2013 of
the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 94104.
To protect his interests, Suzuki thenexecuted an Affidavit
of Adverse Claim12 dated September 8, 2003, withthe
The Factual Antecedents Registry of Deeds of Mandaluyong City, annotated as
Entry No. 3292/C-No. 18186 in CCT No. 18186. Suzuki
then demanded the delivery of the titles.13 Orion,
(through Perez), however, refused to surrender the titles,
In the first week of August 2003, respondent Shigekane
and cited the need to consult Orions legal counsel as its
Suzuki (Suzuki), a Japanese national, met with Ms. Helen
reason.
Soneja (Soneja) to inquire about a condominium unit and
a parking slot at Cityland Pioneer, Mandaluyong City,
allegedly owned by Yung Sam Kang (Kang), a Korean
national and a Special Resident Retiree's Visa (SRRV) On October 14, 2003, Suzuki received a letter from
holder. Orions counsel dated October 9, 2003, stating that Kang
obtained another loan in the amount of P1,800,000.00.
When Kang failed to pay, he executed a Dacion en
Pagodated February 2, 2003, in favorof Orion covering
At the meeting, Soneja informed Suzuki that Unit No. 536
Unit No. 536. Orion, however, did not register the Dacion
[covered by Condominium Certificate of Title (CCT) No.
en Pago, until October 15, 2003.
18186]4 and Parking Slot No. 42 [covered by CCT No.
9118]5 were for sale for P3,000,000.00. Soneja likewise
assured Suzuki that the titles to the unit and the parking
slot were clean. After a brief negotiation, the parties On October 28, 2003, Suzuki executed an Affidavit of
agreed to reduce the price to P2,800,000.00. On August Adverse Claim over Parking Slot No. 42 (covered by CCT
5, 2003, Suzuki issued Kang a Bank of the Philippine No. 9118) and this was annotated as Entry No. 4712/C-
Island (BPI) Check No. 833496 for One Hundred No. 9118 in the parking lots title.
Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00) as reservation fee.7 On
August 21, 2003, Suzuki issued Kang another check, BPI
Check No. 83350,8 this time for P2,700,000.00 On January 27, 2004, Suzuki filed a complaint for specific
representing the remaining balance of the purchase price. performance and damages against Kang and Orion. At
Suzuki and Kang then executed a Deed of Absolute Sale the pre-trial, the parties made the following admissions
dated August 26, 20039 covering Unit No. 536 and and stipulations:
Parking Slot No. 42. Soon after, Suzuki took possession
of the condominium unit and parking lot, and commenced
the renovation of the interior of the condominium unit.
1. That as of August 26, 2003, Kang was the registered
owner of Unit No. 536 and Parking Slot No. 42;
31
4. That Orion only paid the appropriate capital gains tax
and the documentary stamp tax for the alleged Dacion en
Pago on October 15, 2003; Orions petition is based on the following
grounds/arguments:15
The RTC further ordered Orion and Kang to jointly and The Courts Ruling
severally pay Suzuki moral damages, exemplary
damages, attorneys fees, appearance fees, expenses for
litigation and cost ofsuit. Orion timely appealed the RTC We deny the petition for lack of merit.
decision with the CA.
On August 23, 2012, the CA partially granted Orions In a Rule 45 petition, the latitude of judicial review
appeal and sustained the RTC insofar as it upheld generally excludes a factual and evidentiary re-
Suzukis right over the properties. The CA further noted evaluation, and the Court ordinarily abides by the uniform
that Entry No. 73321/C-10186 pertaining to the factual conclusions of the trial court and the appellate
withdrawal of investment of an SRRV only serves as a court.18 In the present case, while the courts below both
warning to an SRRV holder about the implications of a arrived at the same conclusion, there appears tobe an
conveyance of a property investment. It deviated from the incongruence in their factual findings and the legal
RTC ruling, however, by deleting the award for moral principle they applied to the attendant factual
damages, exemplary damages, attorneys fees, circumstances. Thus, we are compelled to examine
expenses for litigation and cost of suit. certain factual issues in the exercise of our sound
discretion to correct any mistaken inference that may
have been made.19
Orion sought a reconsideration of the CA decision but the
CA denied the motion in its January 25, 2013 resolution.
Orion then filed a petition for review on certiorariunder Philippine Law governs the transfer of real property
Rule 45 with this Court.
32
raised on appeal to the CA. It is a well-settled principle deputy, and accompanied, if the record is not kept in the
that points of law, theories, issues, and arguments not Philippines, with a certificate that such officer has the
brought to the attention of the trial court cannot be raised custody. If the office in which the record is kept is in a
for the first time on appeal and considered by a reviewing foreign country, the certificate may be made by a
court.20 To consider these belated arguments would secretary of the embassy or legation, consul general,
violate basic principles of fairplay, justice, and due consul, vice consul, or consular agent or by any officer in
process. the foreign service of the Philippines stationed in the
foreign country inwhich the record is kept, and
authenticated by the seal of his office. (Emphasis
Having said these, we shall nonetheless discuss the supplied)
issues Orion belatedly raised, if only to put an end to
lingering doubts on the correctness of the denial of the
present petition. SEC. 25. What attestation ofcopy must state.
Whenever a copy of a document or record is attested for
the purpose of the evidence, the attestation must state, in
It is a universal principle thatreal or immovable property is substance, that the copy is a correct copy of the original,
exclusively subject to the laws of the country or state or a specific part thereof, as the case may be. The
where it is located.21 The reason is found in the very attestation must be under the official seal of the attesting
nature of immovable property its immobility. officer, if there be any, or if he be the clerk of a court
Immovables are part of the country and so closely having a seal, under the seal of such court.
connected to it that all rights over them have their natural
center of gravity there.22
Accordingly, matters concerning the title and disposition
of real property shall be governed by Philippine law while
Thus, all matters concerning the titleand disposition ofreal issues pertaining to the conjugal natureof the property
property are determined by what is known as the lex loci shall be governed by South Korean law, provided it is
rei sitae, which can alone prescribe the mode by which a proven as a fact.
title canpass from one person to another, or by which an
interest therein can be gained or lost.23 This general
principle includes all rules governing the descent, In the present case, Orion, unfortunately failed to prove
alienation and transfer of immovable property and the the South Korean law on the conjugal ownership
validity, effect and construction of wills and other ofproperty. It merely attached a "Certification from the
conveyances.24 Embassy of the Republic of Korea"29 to prove the
existence of Korean Law. This certification, does not
qualify as sufficient proof of the conjugal nature of the
This principle even governs the capacity of the person property for there is no showing that it was properly
making a deed relating to immovable property, no matter authenticated bythe seal of his office, as required under
what its nature may be. Thus, an instrument will be Section 24 of Rule 132.30
ineffective to transfer title to land if the person making it is
incapacitated by the lex loci rei sitae, even though under
the law of his domicile and by the law of the place where Accordingly, the International Law doctrine of presumed-
the instrument is actually made, his capacity is identity approachor processual presumption comes into
undoubted.25 play, i.e., where a foreign law is not pleaded or, evenif
pleaded, is not proven, the presumption is that foreign law
is the same as Philippine Law.31
On the other hand, property relations between spouses
are governed principally by the national law of the
spouses.26 However, the party invoking the application of Under Philippine Law, the phrase "Yung Sam Kang
a foreign law has the burden of proving the foreign law. married to' Hyun Sook Jung" is merely descriptive of the
The foreign law is a question of fact to be properly pleaded civil status of Kang.32 In other words, the import from the
and proved as the judge cannot take judicial notice of a certificates of title is that Kang is the owner of the
foreign law.27 He is presumed to know only domestic or properties as they are registered in his name alone, and
the law of the forum.28 that he is married to Hyun Sook Jung.
To prove a foreign law, the party invoking it must present We are not unmindful that in numerous cases we have
a copy thereof and comply with Sections 24 and 25 of held that registration of the property in the name of only
Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of Court which reads: one spouse does not negate the possibility of it being
conjugal or community property.33 In those cases,
however, there was proof that the properties, though
SEC. 24. Proof of official record. The record of public registered in the name of only one spouse, were indeed
documents referred to in paragraph (a) of Section 19, either conjugal or community properties.34 Accordingly,
when admissible for any purpose, may be evidenced by we see no reason to declare as invalid Kangs
an official publication thereof or by a copy attested by the conveyance in favor of Suzuki for the supposed lack of
officer having the legal custody of the record, or by his spousal consent.
33
Despite the exclusion of its most critical documentary
evidence, Orion failed to make a tender ofexcluded
The petitioner failed to adduce sufficient evidence to evidence, as provided under Section 40, Rule 132 of the
prove the due execution of the Dacion en Pago Rules of Court. For this reason alone, we are prevented
from seriously considering Exhibit "5" and its submarkings
and Exhibit "12" in the present petition.
Article 1544 of the New Civil Codeof the Philippines
provides that:
Moreover, even if we consider Exhibit "5" and its
submarkings and Exhibit "12" in the present petition, the
ART. 1544. If the same thing should have been sold to copious inconsistencies and contradictions in the
different vendees, the ownership shall be transferred to testimonial and documentary evidence of Orion, militate
the person who may have first taken possession thereof against the conclusion that the Dacion en Pagowas duly
in good faith, if it should be movable property. executed. First, there appears to be no due and
demandable obligation when the Dacion en Pago was
executed, contrary to the allegations of Orion. Orions
Should it be immovable property, the ownership shall witness Perez tried to impress upon the RTC that Kang
belong to the person acquiring it who in good faith first was in default in his P1,800,000.00 loan. During his direct
recorded it in the Registry of Property. examination, he stated:
It is not disputed, too, that the Deed of Sale dated August A: We have to secure the money or the investment of the
26, 2003 was consummated. In a contract of sale, the bank through loans and we have executed a dacion en
seller obligates himself to transfer the ownership of the pagobecause Mr. Kang said he has no money. So we just
determinate thing sold, and to deliver the same to the execute[d] the dacion en pago rather than going through
buyer, who obligates himself to pay a price certain to the the Foreclosure proceedings.
seller.38 The execution of the notarized deed of saleand
the actual transfer of possession amounted to delivery
that produced the legal effect of transferring ownership to
Suzuki.39 xxxx
On the other hand, although Orion claims priority in right Q: Can you tell the court when was this executed?
under the principle of prius tempore, potior jure (i.e.,first
in time, stronger in right), it failedto prove the existence
and due execution of the Dacion en Pagoin its favor. A: February 6, 2003, your Honor.41
At the outset, Orion offered the Dacion en Pagoas Exhibit A reading of the supposed promissory note, however,
"5"with submarkings "5-a" to "5-c" to prove the existence shows that there was nodefault to speak of when the
of the February 6, 2003 transaction in its Formal Offer supposed Dacion en Pagowas executed.
dated July 20, 2008. Orion likewise offered in evidence
the supposed promissory note dated September 4, 2002
as Exhibit "12"to prove the existence of the additional Based on the promissory note, Kangs loan obligation
P800,000.00 loan. The RTC, however, denied the wouldmature only on August 27, 2003. Neither can Orion
admission of Exhibits "5" and "12,"among others, in its claim that Kang had been in default in his installment
order dated August 19, 2008 "since the same [were] not payments because the wordings of the promissory note
identified in court by any witness."40 provide that "[t]he principal of this loanand its interest and
other charges shall be paid by me/us in accordance
hereunder: SINGLE PAYMENT LOANS.42 "There was
34
thus no due and demandable loan obligation when the prove this real estate mortgage aside from it being
alleged Dacion en Pago was executed. mentioned in the Dacion en Pago itself.
ATTY. DE CASTRO:
Second, Perez, the supposed person who prepared the Q: Would you know if there is any other document like a
Dacion en Pago,appears to only have a vague idea of the supplement to that Credit Line Agreement referring to this
transaction he supposedly prepared. During his cross- 1.8 million peso loan by Mr. Yung Sam Kang which says
examination, he testified: that there was a subsequent collateralization or security
given by Mr. Yung [Sam]
xxxx
Q: Can you read the Second Whereas Clause, Mr.
Witness? Q: Would you remember what was the subject matter of
that real estate mortgage for that first P1,000,000.00
loan?
A: Whereas the first party failed to pay the said loan to the
A: Its a condominium Unit in Cityland, sir.
second party and as of February 10, 2003, the
outstanding obligation which is due and demandable xxxx
principal and interest and other charges included amounts
to P1,800,000.00 pesos, sir. Q: Would you recall if there was any payment by Mr. Yung
Sam Kang of this P1,000,000.00 loan?
A: None sir.
xxxx
Q: No payments?
A: None sir.
Q: You are now changing your answer[.] [I]t now includes
interest and other charges, based on this document? Q: And from 1999 to 2002, there was no payment, either
by way of payment to the principal, by way ofpayment of
interest, there was no payment by Mr. Yung Sam Kang of
this loan?
A: Yes, based on that document, sir.43
A: Literally, there was no actual cash movement, sir.
35
Q: And yet despite no payment, the bank Orion Savings Pago and the loan documents was challenged in the
Bank still extended an P800,000.00 additional right? proceedings below where their prima facievalidity was
overthrown by the highly questionable circumstances
surrounding their execution.52
A: Yes, sir.47
37
Cebu City, Philippines, February 19, 2010.22 on appeal directly to the Supreme Court without violating
the doctrine of hierarchy of courts, to wit:
38
To determine whether or not a person is criminally liable concludes that being a national of the Netherlands, he is
under R.A. No. 9262, it is imperative that the legal governed by such laws on the matter of provision of and
obligation to support exists. capacity to support.41 While respondent pleaded the laws
of the Netherlands in advancing his position that he is not
obliged to support his son, he never proved the same.
Petitioner invokes Article 19530 of the Family Code,
which provides the parents obligation to support his child.
Petitioner contends that notwithstanding the existence of It is incumbent upon respondent to plead and prove that
a divorce decree issued in relation to Article 26 of the the national law of the Netherlands does not impose upon
Family Code,31 respondent is not excused from the parents the obligation to support their child (either
complying with his obligation to support his minor child before, during or after the issuance of a divorce decree),
with petitioner. because Llorente v. Court of Appeals,42 has already
enunciated that:
xxxx
Section 4, Rule 2 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is
pertinent
(e) Attempting to compel or compelling the woman or her
child to engage in conduct which the woman or her child
has the right to desist from or desist from conduct which
the woman or her child has the right to engage in, or
attempting to restrict or restricting the woman's or her
If two or more suits are instituted on the basis of the same child's freedom of movement or conduct by force or threat
cause of action, the filing of one or a judgment upon the of force, physical or other harm or threat of physical or
merits in any one is available as a ground for the dismissal other harm, or intimidation directed against the woman or
of the others. Moreover, foreign law should not be applied child. This shall include, butnot limited to, the following
when its application would work undeniable injustice to acts committed with the purpose or effect of controlling or
the citizens or residents of the forum. To give justice is the restricting the woman's or her child's movement or
most important function of law; hence, a law, or judgment conduct:
or contract that is obviously unjust negates the
fundamental principles of Conflict of Laws.48
xxxx
40
stipulations." On this score, it is indisputable that the the Rules of Court, assailing the decision2 dated August
alleged continuing acts of respondent in refusing to 23, 2012 and the resolution3 dated January 25, 2013 of
support his child with petitioner is committed here in the the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 94104.
Philippines as all of the parties herein are residents of the
Province of Cebu City. As such, our courts have territorial
jurisdiction over the offense charged against respondent. The Factual Antecedents
It is likewise irrefutable that jurisdiction over the
respondent was acquired upon his arrest.
In the first week of August 2003, respondent Shigekane
Suzuki (Suzuki), a Japanese national, met with Ms. Helen
Finally, we do not agree with respondents argument that Soneja (Soneja) to inquire about a condominium unit and
granting, but not admitting, that there is a legal basis for a parking slot at Cityland Pioneer, Mandaluyong City,
charging violation of R.A. No. 9262 in the instant case, the allegedly owned by Yung Sam Kang (Kang), a Korean
criminal liability has been extinguished on the ground of national and a Special Resident Retiree's Visa (SRRV)
prescription of crime52 under Section 24 of R.A. No. holder.
9262, which provides that:
The CA Ruling
42
3. Knowledge of the PRA restriction under Entry No. It is a universal principle thatreal or immovable property is
73321/C-10186, which prohibits any conveyance or exclusively subject to the laws of the country or state
encumbrance of the property investment, defeats the where it is located.21 The reason is found in the very
alleged claim of good faith by Suzuki; and nature of immovable property its immobility.
Immovables are part of the country and so closely
connected to it that all rights over them have their natural
4. Orion should not be faulted for exercising due diligence. center of gravity there.22
In his Comment,16 Suzuki asserts that the issue on Thus, all matters concerning the titleand disposition ofreal
spousal consent was belatedly raised on appeal. property are determined by what is known as the lex loci
Moreover, proof of acquisition during the marital coverture rei sitae, which can alone prescribe the mode by which a
is a condition sine qua nonfor the operation of the title canpass from one person to another, or by which an
presumption of conjugal ownership.17 Suzuki additionally interest therein can be gained or lost.23 This general
maintains that he is a purchaser in good faith, and is thus principle includes all rules governing the descent,
entitled to the protection of the law. alienation and transfer of immovable property and the
validity, effect and construction of wills and other
conveyances.24
The Courts Ruling
43
substance, that the copy is a correct copy of the original,
or a specific part thereof, as the case may be. The
attestation must be under the official seal of the attesting Should it be immovable property, the ownership shall
officer, if there be any, or if he be the clerk of a court belong to the person acquiring it who in good faith first
having a seal, under the seal of such court. recorded it in the Registry of Property.
Accordingly, matters concerning the title and disposition Should there be no inscription, the ownership shall pertain
of real property shall be governed by Philippine law while to the person who in good faith was first in the possession;
issues pertaining to the conjugal natureof the property and, in the absence thereof, to the person who presents
shall be governed by South Korean law, provided it is the oldest title, provided there is good faith.
proven as a fact.
Under Philippine Law, the phrase "Yung Sam Kang On the other hand, although Orion claims priority in right
married to' Hyun Sook Jung" is merely descriptive of the under the principle of prius tempore, potior jure (i.e.,first
civil status of Kang.32 In other words, the import from the in time, stronger in right), it failedto prove the existence
certificates of title is that Kang is the owner of the and due execution of the Dacion en Pagoin its favor.
properties as they are registered in his name alone, and
that he is married to Hyun Sook Jung.
At the outset, Orion offered the Dacion en Pagoas Exhibit
"5"with submarkings "5-a" to "5-c" to prove the existence
We are not unmindful that in numerous cases we have of the February 6, 2003 transaction in its Formal Offer
held that registration of the property in the name of only dated July 20, 2008. Orion likewise offered in evidence
one spouse does not negate the possibility of it being the supposed promissory note dated September 4, 2002
conjugal or community property.33 In those cases, as Exhibit "12"to prove the existence of the additional
however, there was proof that the properties, though P800,000.00 loan. The RTC, however, denied the
registered in the name of only one spouse, were indeed admission of Exhibits "5" and "12,"among others, in its
either conjugal or community properties.34 Accordingly, order dated August 19, 2008 "since the same [were] not
we see no reason to declare as invalid Kangs identified in court by any witness."40
conveyance in favor of Suzuki for the supposed lack of
spousal consent.
Despite the exclusion of its most critical documentary
evidence, Orion failed to make a tender ofexcluded
The petitioner failed to adduce sufficient evidence to evidence, as provided under Section 40, Rule 132 of the
prove the due execution of the Dacion en Pago Rules of Court. For this reason alone, we are prevented
from seriously considering Exhibit "5" and its submarkings
and Exhibit "12" in the present petition.
44
executed, contrary to the allegations of Orion. Orions
witness Perez tried to impress upon the RTC that Kang
was in default in his P1,800,000.00 loan. During his direct A: Yes, sir. I personally prepared this.
examination, he stated:
xxxx
ATTY. CRUZAT:
A: Well it became past due, there has been delayed A: Its just the principal, sir.
interest payment by Mr. Kangand...
xxxx A: Whereas the first party failed to pay the said loan to the
second party and as of February 10, 2003, the
outstanding obligation which is due and demandable
Q: Can you tell the court when was this executed? principal and interest and other charges included amounts
to P1,800,000.00 pesos, sir.
Based on the promissory note, Kangs loan obligation A: Yes, based on that document, sir.43
wouldmature only on August 27, 2003. Neither can Orion
claim that Kang had been in default in his installment
payments because the wordings of the promissory note Third, the Dacion en Pago,mentioned that the
provide that "[t]he principal of this loanand its interest and P1,800,000.00 loan was secured by a real estate
other charges shall be paid by me/us in accordance mortgage. However, no document was ever presented to
hereunder: SINGLE PAYMENT LOANS.42 "There was prove this real estate mortgage aside from it being
thus no due and demandable loan obligation when the mentioned in the Dacion en Pago itself.
alleged Dacion en Pago was executed.
ATTY. DE CASTRO:
Q: And were you the one who prepared this [dacion en Fourth,the Dacion en Pago was first mentioned only two
pago] Mr. witness? (2) months after Suzuki and Samin demanded the
45
delivery of the titles sometime in August 2003,and after made immediate improvements thereon. If Orion really
Suzuki caused the annotation of his affidavit of adverse purchased the condominium unit on February 2, 2003 and
claim. Records show that it was only on October 9, 2003, claimed to be its true owner, why did it not assert its
when Orion, through its counsel, Cristobal Balbin Mapile ownership immediately after the alleged sale took place?
& Associates first spoke of the Dacion en Pago.45 Not Why did it have to assert its ownership only after Suzuki
even Perez mentioned any Dacion en Pago on October demanded the delivery of the titles? These gaps have
1, 2003, when he personally received a letter demanding remained unanswered and unfilled. FAR EAST BANK v
the delivery of the titles.Instead, Perez refused to accept THEMISTOCLES PACILAN, JR.,
the letter and opted to first consult with his lawyer.46
Q: Would you remember what was the subject matter of The case stemmed from the following undisputed facts:
that real estate mortgage for that first P1,000,000.00
loan?
Respondent Pacilan opened a current account with
A: Its a condominium Unit in Cityland, sir. petitioner banks Bacolod Branch on May 23, 1980. His
xxxx account was denominated as Current Account No. 53208
(0052-00407-4). The respondent had since then issued
Q: Would you recall if there was any payment by Mr. Yung several postdated checks to different payees drawn
Sam Kang of this P1,000,000.00 loan? against the said account. Sometime in March 1988, the
respondent issued Check No. 2434886 in the amount of
A: None sir.
P680.00 and the same was presented for payment to
Q: No payments? petitioner bank on April 4, 1988.
A: None sir.
Q: And from 1999 to 2002, there was no payment, either Upon its presentment on the said date, Check No.
by way of payment to the principal, by way ofpayment of 2434886 was dishonored by petitioner bank. The next
interest, there was no payment by Mr. Yung Sam Kang of day, or on April 5, 1988, the respondent deposited to his
this loan? current account the amount of P800.00. The said amount
was accepted by petitioner bank; hence, increasing the
A: Literally, there was no actual cash movement, sir. balance of the respondents deposit to P1,051.43.
Q: There was no actual cash?
46
had an overdraft of P428.57. As a consequence of the They showed that the respondent had improperly and
overdraft, Check No. 2434886 was dishonored. irregularly handled his current account. For example, in
1986, the respondents account was overdrawn 156 times,
in 1987, 117 times and in 1988, 26 times. In all these
On April 18, 1988, the respondent wrote to petitioner bank instances, the account was overdrawn due to the
complaining that the closure of his account was issuance of checks against insufficient funds. The
unjustified. When he did not receive a reply from petitioner respondent had also signed several checks with a
bank, the respondent filed with the RTC of Negros different signature from the specimen on file for dubious
Occidental, Bacolod City, Branch 54, a complaint for reasons.
damages against petitioner bank and Villadelgado. The
case was docketed as Civil Case No. 4908. The
respondent, as complainant therein, alleged that the When the respondent made the deposit on April 5, 1988,
closure of his current account by petitioner bank was it was obviously to cover for issuances made the previous
unjustified because on the first banking hour of April 5, day against an insufficiently funded account. When his
1988, he already deposited an amount sufficient to fund Check No. 2434886 was presented for payment on April
his checks. The respondent pointed out that Check No. 4, 1988, he had already incurred an overdraft; hence,
2434886, in particular, was delivered to petitioner bank at petitioner bank rightfully dishonored the same for
the close of banking hours on April 4, 1988 and, following insufficiency of funds.
normal banking procedure, it
47
act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe Echoing the reasoning of the court a quo, the CA declared
honesty and good faith and Article 20 thereof which states that even as it may be conceded that petitioner bank had
that [e]very person who, contrary to law, wilfully or reserved the right to close an account for repeated
negligently causes damage to another, shall indemnify overdrafts by the respondent, the exercise of that right
the latter for the same, the court a quo adjudged petitioner must never be despotic or arbitrary. That petitioner bank
bank of acting in bad faith. It held that, under the foregoing chose to close the account outright and return the check,
circumstances, the respondent is entitled to an award of even after accepting a deposit sufficient to cover the said
moral and exemplary damages. check, is contrary to its duty to handle the respondents
account with utmost fidelity. The exercise of the right is
not absolute and good faith, at least, is required. The
The decretal portion of the court a quos decision reads: manner by which petitioner bank closed the account of the
respondent runs afoul of Article 19 of the Civil Code which
enjoins every person, in the exercise of his rights, to give
every one his due, and observe honesty and good faith.
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, judgment is
hereby rendered:
1. Ordering the defendants [petitioner bank and The CA concluded that petitioner banks precipitate and
Villadelgado], jointly and severally, to pay plaintiff [the imprudent closure of the respondents account had
respondent] the sum of P100,000.00 as moral damages; caused him, a respected officer of several civic and
banking associations, serious anxiety and humiliation. It
had, likewise, tainted his credit standing. Consequently,
2. Ordering the defendants, jointly and severally, to pay the award of damages is warranted. The CA, however,
plaintiff the sum of P50,000.00 as exemplary damages reduced the amount of damages awarded by the court a
plus costs and expenses of the suit; and quo as it found the same to be excessive:
3. Dismissing [the] defendants counterclaim for lack of We, however, find excessive the amount of damages
merit. awarded by the RTC. In our view the reduced amount of
P75,000.00 as moral damages and P25,000.00 as
exemplary damages are in order. Awards for damages
are not meant to enrich the plaintiff-appellee [the
SO ORDERED.[4]
respondent] at the expense of defendants-appellants [the
petitioners], but to obviate the moral suffering he has
undergone. The award is aimed at the restoration, within
limits possible, of the status quo ante, and should be
proportionate to the suffering inflicted.[5]
On appeal, the CA rendered the Decision dated August
30, 2002, affirming with modification the decision of the
court a quo.
The dispositive portion of the assailed CA decision reads:
48
regular demand deposit which reserves to the bank the Establishment and Operation of Regular Demand
right to close an account if the depositor frequently draws Deposits:
checks against insufficient funds and/or uncollected
deposits. The same rules and regulations also provide
that the depositor is not entitled, as a matter of right, to 10) The Bank reserves the right to close an account if
overdraw on this deposit and the bank reserves the right the depositor frequently draws checks against insufficient
at any time to return checks of the depositor which are funds and/or uncollected deposits.
drawn against insufficient funds or for any reason.
49
Neither the fact that petitioner bank accepted the deposit 2003 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 36627
made by the respondent the day following the closure of are REVERSED AND SET ASIDE.
his account constitutes bad faith or malice on the part of
petitioner bank. The same could be characterized as
simple negligence by its personnel. Said act, by itself, is
not constitutive of bad faith.
Further, it has not been shown that these acts were done
by petitioner bank with the sole intention of prejudicing
and injuring the respondent. It is conceded that the
respondent may have suffered damages as a result of the
closure of his current account. However, there is a
material distinction between damages and injury. The
Court had the occasion to explain the distinction between
damages and injury in this wise:
50
ERNESTO RAMAS UYPITCHING and RAMAS On February 18, 1991, petitioner Uypitching filed a
UYPITCHING SONS, INC., petitioners, criminal complaint for qualified theft and/or violation of the
Anti-Fencing Law6 against respondent in the Office of the
vs. City Prosecutor of Dumaguete City.7 Respondent moved
ERNESTO QUIAMCO, respondent. for dismissal because the complaint did not charge an
offense as he had neither stolen nor bought the
Honeste vivere, non alterum laedere et jus suum cuique motorcycle. The Office of the City Prosecutor dismissed
tribuere. To live virtuously, not to injure others and to give the complaint8 and denied petitioner Uypitchings
everyone his due. These supreme norms of justice are the subsequent motion for reconsideration.
underlying principles of law and order in society. We
reaffirm them in this petition for review on certiorari
assailing the July 26, 2000 decision1 and October 18, Respondent filed an action for damages against
2000 resolution of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. petitioners in the RTC of Dumaguete City, Negros
CV No. 47571. Oriental, Branch 37.9 He sought to hold the petitioners
liable for the following: (1) unlawful taking of the
motorcycle; (2) utterance of a defamatory remark (that
In 1982, respondent Ernesto C. Quiamco was respondent was a thief) and (3) precipitate filing of a
approached by Juan Davalan,2 Josefino Gabutero and baseless and malicious complaint. These acts humiliated
Raul Generoso to amicably settle the civil aspect of a and embarrassed the respondent and injured his
criminal case for robbery3 filed by Quiamco against them. reputation and integrity.
They surrendered to him a red Honda XL-100 motorcycle
and a photocopy of its certificate of registration.
Respondent asked for the original certificate of On July 30, 1994, the trial court rendered a decision10
registration but the three accused never came to see him finding that petitioner Uypitching was motivated with
again. Meanwhile, the motorcycle was parked in an open malice and ill will when he called respondent a thief, took
space inside respondents business establishment, the motorcycle in an abusive manner and filed a baseless
Avesco-AVNE Enterprises, where it was visible and complaint for qualified theft and/or violation of the Anti-
accessible to the public. Fencing Law. Petitioners acts were found to be contrary
to Articles 1911 and 2012 of the Civil Code. Hence, the
trial court held petitioners liable to respondent for
It turned out that, in October 1981, the motorcycle had P500,000 moral damages, P200,000 exemplary
been sold on installment basis to Gabutero by petitioner damages and P50,000 attorneys fees plus costs.
Ramas Uypitching Sons, Inc., a family-owned corporation
managed by petitioner Atty. Ernesto Ramas Uypitching.
To secure its payment, the motorcycle was mortgaged to Petitioners appealed the RTC decision but the CA
petitioner corporation.4 affirmed the trial courts decision with modification,
reducing the award of moral and exemplary damages to
P300,000 and P100,000, respectively.13 Petitioners
When Gabutero could no longer pay the installments, sought reconsideration but it was denied. Thus, this
Davalan assumed the obligation and continued the petition.
payments. In September 1982, however, Davalan
stopped paying the remaining installments and told
petitioner corporations collector, Wilfredo Verao, that In their petition and memorandum, petitioners submit that
the motorcycle had allegedly been "taken by respondents the sole (allegedly) issue to be resolved here is whether
men." the filing of a complaint for qualified theft and/or violation
of the Anti-Fencing Law in the Office of the City
Prosecutor warranted the award of moral damages,
Nine years later, on January 26, 1991, petitioner exemplary damages, attorneys fees and costs in favor of
Uypitching, accompanied by policemen,5 went to Avesco- respondent.
AVNE Enterprises to recover the motorcycle. The leader
of the police team, P/Lt. Arturo Vendiola, talked to the
clerk in charge and asked for respondent. While P/Lt. Petitioners suggestion is misleading. They were held
Vendiola and the clerk were talking, petitioner Uypitching liable for damages not only for instituting a groundless
paced back and forth inside the establishment uttering complaint against respondent but also for making a
"Quiamco is a thief of a motorcycle." slanderous remark and for taking the motorcycle from
respondents establishment in an abusive manner.
x x x There was malice or ill-will [in filing the complaint Petitioner corporation failed to bring the proper civil action
before the City Prosecutors Office] because Atty. Ernesto necessary to acquire legal possession of the motorcycle.
Ramas Uypitching knew or ought to have known as he is Instead, petitioner Uypitching descended on respondents
a lawyer, that there was no probable cause at all for filing establishment with his policemen and ordered the seizure
a criminal complaint for qualified theft and fencing activity of the motorcycle without a search warrant or court order.
against [respondent]. Atty. Uypitching had no personal Worse, in the course of the illegal seizure of the
knowledge that [respondent] stole the motorcycle in motorcycle, petitioner Uypitching even mouthed a
question. He was merely told by his bill collector ([i.e.] the slanderous statement.
bill collector of Ramas Uypitching Sons, Inc.)[,] Wilfredo
Verao[,] that Juan Dabalan will [no longer] pay the
remaining installment(s) for the motorcycle because the No doubt, petitioner corporation, acting through its co-
motorcycle was taken by the men of [respondent]. It must petitioner Uypitching, blatantly disregarded the lawful
be noted that the term used by Wilfredo Verao in procedure for the enforcement of its right, to the prejudice
informing Atty. Ernesto Ramas Uypitching of the refusal of respondent. Petitioners acts violated the law as well as
of Juan Dabalan to pay for the remaining installment was public morals, and transgressed the proper norms of
[]taken[], not []unlawfully taken[] or stolen. Yet, despite human relations.
the double hearsay, Atty. Ernesto Ramas Uypitching not
only executed the [complaint-affidavit] wherein he named
[respondent] as the suspect of the stolen motorcycle but
The basic principle of human relations, embodied in
also charged [respondent] of qualified theft and fencing
Article 19 of the Civil Code, provides:
activity before the City [Prosecutors] Office of
Dumaguete. The absence of probable cause necessarily
signifies the presence of malice. What is deplorable in all
these is that Juan Dabalan, the owner of the motorcycle, Art. 19. Every person must in the exercise of his rights
did not accuse [respondent] or the latters men of stealing and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give
the motorcycle[,] much less bother[ed] to file a case for every one his due, and observe honesty and good faith.
qualified theft before the authorities. That Atty.
Uypitchings act in charging [respondent] with qualified
theft and fencing activity is tainted with malice is also Article 19, also known as the "principle of abuse of right,"
shown by his answer to the question of Cupid Gonzaga16 prescribes that a person should not use his right unjustly
[during one of their conversations] - "why should you still or contrary to honesty and good faith, otherwise he opens
file a complaint? You have already recovered the himself to liability.19 It seeks to preclude the use of, or the
motorcycle"[:] "Aron motagam ang kawatan ug motor." tendency to use, a legal right (or duty) as a means to
("To teach a lesson to the thief of motorcycle.")17 unjust ends.
Moreover, the existence of malice, ill will or bad faith is a There is an abuse of right when it is exercised solely to
factual matter. As a rule, findings of fact of the trial court, prejudice or injure another.20 The exercise of a right must
when affirmed by the appellate court, are conclusive on be in accordance with the purpose for which it was
this Court. We see no compelling reason to reverse the established and must not be excessive or unduly harsh;
findings of the RTC and the CA. there must be no intention to harm another.21 Otherwise,
liability for damages to the injured party will attach.
SO ORDERED.
53
instruction and over the clerks objection, took the
motorcycle.
ERNESTO RAMAS UYPITCHING and RAMAS
UYPITCHING SONS, INC., petitioners,
54
As they never questioned the findings of the RTC and CA Petitioners claim that they should not be held liable for
that malice and ill will attended not only the public petitioner corporations exercise of its right as seller-
imputation of a crime to respondent14 but also the taking mortgagee to recover the mortgaged vehicle preliminary
of the motorcycle, petitioners were deemed to have to the enforcement of its right to foreclose on the
accepted the correctness of such findings. This alone was mortgage in case of default. They are clearly mistaken.
sufficient to hold petitioners liable for damages to
respondent.
True, a mortgagee may take steps to recover the
mortgaged property to enable it to enforce or protect its
Nevertheless, to address petitioners concern, we also foreclosure right thereon. There is, however, a well-
find that the trial and appellate courts correctly ruled that defined procedure for the recovery of possession of
the filing of the complaint was tainted with malice and bad mortgaged property: if a mortgagee is unable to obtain
faith. Petitioners themselves in fact described their action possession of a mortgaged property for its sale on
as a "precipitate act."15 Petitioners were bent on foreclosure, he must bring a civil action either to recover
portraying respondent as a thief. In this connection, we such possession as a preliminary step to the sale, or to
quote with approval the following findings of the RTC, as obtain judicial foreclosure.18
adopted by the CA:
Petitioners Abused Their Right of Recovery as In this case, the manner by which the motorcycle was
Mortgagee(s) taken at petitioners instance was not only attended by
bad faith but also contrary to the procedure laid down by
law. Considered in conjunction with the defamatory
55
statement, petitioners exercise of the right to recover the
mortgaged vehicle was utterly prejudicial and injurious to
respondent. On the other hand, the precipitate act of filing
an unfounded complaint could not in any way be
considered to be in accordance with the purpose for which
the right to prosecute a crime was established. Thus, the
totality of petitioners actions showed a calculated design
to embarrass, humiliate and publicly ridicule respondent.
Petitioners acted in an excessively harsh fashion to the
prejudice of respondent. Contrary to law, petitioners
willfully caused damage to respondent. Hence, they
should indemnify him.22
SO ORDERED.
56
CALATAGAN GOLF CLUB, INC. v members posted on the clubs bulletin board. On 1
December 1992, Calatagans board of directors adopted
SIXTO CLEMENTE, JR., a resolution authorizing the foreclosure of shares of
Seeking the reversal of the Decision[1] dated 1 June 2004 delinquent members, including Clementes; and the public
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 62331 and the auction of these shares.
reinstatement of the Decision dated 15 November 2000
of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) in
SEC Case No. 04-98-5954, petitioner Calatagan Golf On 7 December 1992, Calatagan sent a third and final
Club, Inc. (Calatagan) filed this Rule 45 petition against letter to Clemente, this time signed by its Corporate
respondent Sixto Clemente, Jr. (Clemente). Secretary, Atty. Benjamin Tanedo, Jr. The letter contains
a warning that unless Clemente settles his outstanding
dues, his share would be included among the delinquent
The key facts are undisputed. shares to be sold at public auction on 15 January 1993.
Again, this letter was sent to Clementes mailing address
that had already been closed.[6]
Clemente applied to purchase one share of stock of
Calatagan, indicating in his application for membership
his mailing address at Phimco Industries, Inc. P.O. Box On 5 January 1993, a notice of auction sale was posted
240, MCC, complete residential address, office and on the Clubs bulletin board, as well as on the clubs
residence telephone numbers, as well as the company premises. The auction sale took place as scheduled on
(Phimco) with which he was connected, Calatagan issued 15 January 1993, and Clementes share sold for
to him Certificate of Stock No. A-01295 on 2 May 1990 P64,000.[7] According to the Certificate of Sale issued by
after paying P120,000.00 for the share.[2] Calatagan after the sale, Clementes share was
purchased by a Nestor A. Virata.[8] At the time of the sale,
Clementes accrued monthly dues amounted to
P5,200.00.[9] A notice of foreclosure of Clementes share
Calatagan charges monthly dues on its members to meet
was published in the 26 May 1993 issue of the Business
expenses for general operations, as well as costs for
World.[10]
upkeep and improvement of the grounds and facilities.
The provision on monthly dues is incorporated in
Calatagans Articles of Incorporation and By-Laws. It is
also reproduced at the back of each certificate of stock.[3] Clemente learned of the sale of his share only in
As reproduced in the dorsal side of Certificate of Stock November of 1997.[11] He filed a claim with the Securities
No. A-01295, the provision reads: and Exchange Commission (SEC) seeking the restoration
of his shareholding in Calatagan with damages.
Hence, the present appeal. Calatagan argues in the alternative that Clementes suit is
barred by Article 1146 of the Civil Code which establishes
four (4) years as the prescriptive period for actions based
Calatagan maintains that the action of Clemente had upon injury to the rights of the plaintiff on the hypothesis
prescribed pursuant to Section 69 of the Corporation that the suit is purely for damages. As a second
Code, and that the requisite notices under both the law alternative still, Calatagan posits that Clementes action is
and the by-laws had been rendered to Clemente. governed by Article 1149 of the Civil Code which sets five
(5) years as the period of prescription for all other actions
whose prescriptive periods are not fixed in the Civil Code
Section 69 of the Code provides that an action to recover or in any other law. Neither article is applicable but Article
delinquent stock sold must be commenced by the filing of 1140 of the Civil Code which provides that an action to
a complaint within six (6) months from the date of sale. As recover movables shall prescribe in eight (8) years.
correctly pointed out by the Court of Appeals, Section 69 Calatagans action is for the recovery of a share of stock,
is part of Title VIII of the Code entitled Stocks and plus damages.
Stockholders and refers specifically to unpaid
subscriptions to capital stock, the sale of which is
governed by the immediately preceding Section 68. Calatagans advertence to the fact that the constitution of
a lien on the members share by virtue of the explicit
provisions in its Articles of Incorporation and By-Laws is
The Court of Appeals debunked both Calatagans and the relevant but ultimately of no help to its cause. Calatagans
SECs reliance on Section 69 by citing another SEC ruling Articles of Incorporation states that the dues, together
in the case of Caram v. Valley Golf. In connection with with all other obligations of members to the club, shall
Section 69, Calatagan raises a peripheral point made in constitute a first lien on the shares, second only to any
the SECs Caram ruling. In Caram, the SEC, using as lien in favor of the national or local government, and in the
take-off Section 6 of the Corporation Code which refers to event of delinquency such shares may be ordered sold by
such rights, privileges or restrictions as may be stated in the Board of Directors in the manner provided in the By-
the articles of incorporation, pointed out that the Articles Laws to satisfy said dues or other obligations of the
of Incorporation of Valley Golf does not impose any lien, stockholders.[14] In turn, there are several provisions in
liability or restriction on the Golf Share [of Caram], but the By-laws that govern the payment of dues, the lapse
only its (Valley Golfs) By-Laws does. Here, Calatagan into delinquency of the member, and the constitution and
stresses that its own Articles of Incorporation does execution on the lien. We quote these provisions:
provide that the monthly dues assessed on owners of
shares of the corporation, along with all other obligations
of the shareholders to the club, shall constitute a first lien ARTICLE XII MEMBERS ACCOUNT
on the shares and in the event of delinquency such shares
may be ordered sold by the Board of Directors in the
manner provided in the By-Laws to satisfy said dues or SEC. 31. (a) Billing Members, Posting of Delinquent
other obligations of the shareholders.[13] With its illative Members The Treasurer shall bill al members monthly. As
but incomprehensible logic, Calatagan concludes that the soon as possible after the end of every month, a
prescriptive period under Section 69 should also apply to
58
statement showing the account of bill of a member for said
month will be prepared and sent to him. If the bill of any
member remains unpaid by the 20th of the month (f) If the proceeds from the sale of the share of stock are
following that in which the bill was incurred, the Treasurer not sufficient to pay in full the indebtedness of the
shall notify him that if his bill is not paid in full by the end member, the member shall continue to be obligated to the
of the succeeding month his name will be posted as Club for the unpaid balance. If the member whose share
delinquent the following day at the Clubhouse bulletin of stock is sold fails or refuse to surrender the stock
board. While posted, a member, the immediate members certificate for cancellation, cancellation shall be effected
of his family, and his guests, may not avail of the facilities in the books of the Club based on a record of the
of the Club. proceedings. Such cancellation shall render the
unsurrendered stock certificate null and void and notice to
this effect shall be duly published.
(b) Members on the delinquent list for more than 60 days It is plain that Calatagan had endeavored to install a
shall be reported to the Board and their shares or the clear and comprehensive procedure to govern the
shares of the juridical entities they represent shall payment of monthly dues, the declaration of a member as
thereafter be ordered sold by the Board at auction to delinquent, and the constitution of a lien on the shares
satisfy the claims of the Club as provided for in Section 32 and its eventual public sale to answer for the members
hereon. A member may pay his overdue account at any debts. Under Section 91 of the Corporation Code,
time before the auction sale. membership in a non-stock corporation shall be
terminated in the manner and for the causes provided in
the articles of incorporation or the by-laws. The By-law
Sec. 32. Lien on Shares; Sale of Share at Auction- The provisions are elaborate in explaining the manner and the
club shall have a first lien on every share of stock to causes for the termination of membership in Calatagan,
secure debts of the members to the Club. This lien shall through the execution on the lien of the share. The Court
be annotated on the certificates of stock and may be is satisfied that the By-Laws, as written, affords due
enforced by the Club in the following manner: protection to the member by assuring that the member
should be notified by the Secretary of the looming
execution sale that would terminate membership in the
club. In addition, the By-Laws guarantees that after the
(a) Within ten (10) days after the Board has ordered the
execution sale, the proceeds of the sale would be
sale at auction of a members share of stock for
returned to the former member after deducting the
indebtedness under Section 31(b) hereof, the Secretary
outstanding obligations. If followed to the letter, the
shall notify the owner thereof, and shall advise the
termination of membership under this procedure outlined
Membership Committee of such fact.
in the By-Laws would accord with substantial justice.
(c) On the date and hour fixed, the Membership In accordance with this provision, Calatagan sent the third
Committee shall proceed with the auction by viva voce and final demand letter to Clemente on December 7,
bidding and award the sale of the share of stock to the 1992. The letter states that if the amount of delinquency
highest bidder. is not paid, the share will be included among the
delinquent shares to be sold at public auction. This letter
was signed by Atty. Benjamin Tanedo, Jr., Calatagan
(d) The purchase price shall be paid by the winning bidder Golfs Corporate Secretary. It was again sent to
to the Club within twenty-four (24) hours after the bidding. Clementes mailing address Phimco Industries Inc., P.O.
The winning bidder or the representative in the case of a Box 240, MCC Makati. As expected, it was returned
juridical entity shall become a Regular Member upon because the post office box had been closed.
payment of the purchase price and issuance of a new
stock certificate in his name or in the name of the juridical
entity he represents. The proceeds of the sale shall be Under the By-Laws, the Corporate Secretary is tasked to
paid by the Club to the selling stockholder after deducting give or cause to be given, all notices required by law or
his obligations to the Club. by these By-Laws. .. and keep a record of the addresses
of all stockholders. As quoted above, Sec. 32 (a) of the
By-Laws further provides that within ten (10) days after
(e) If no bids be received or if the winning bidder fails to the Board has ordered the sale at auction of a members
pay the amount of this bid within twenty-four (24) hours share of stock for indebtedness under Section 31 (b)
after the bidding, the auction procedures may be repeated hereof, the Secretary shall notify the owner thereof and
from time to time at the discretion of the Membership shall advise the Membership Committee of such fact., The
Committee until the share of stock be sold. records do not disclose what report the Corporate
59
Secretary transmitted to the Membership Committee to like pronouncement in Rizal Commercial Banking
comply with Section 32(a). Obviously, the reason for this Corporation v. Court of Appeals[15] that [a] simple
mandatory requirement is to give the Membership telephone call and an ounce of good faith x x x could have
Committee the opportunity to find out, before the share is prevented this present controversy. That memorable
sold, if proper notice has been made to the shareholder observation is quite apt in this case.
member.
61
JOYCE V. ARDIENTE, Petitioner, v. SPOUSES JAVIER months of December 1998, January 1999, and February
AND MA. THERESA PASTORFIDE, CAGAYAN DE ORO 1999. Ma. Theresa argued that the due date of her
WATER DISTRICT AND GASPAR GONZALEZ,* JR., payment was March 18, 1999 yet (T.S.N., October 31,
Respondents. 2000, pp. 11-12). Mrs. Madjos later told her that it was at
the instance of Joyce Ardiente that the water line was cut
off (T.S.N., February 5, 2001, p. 31).
DECISION
62
COWD and Gonzalez filed a petition for review on
certiorari with this Court, which was docketed as G.R. No.
The dispositive portion of the trial court's Decision reads, 161802. However, based on technical grounds and on the
thus: finding that the CA did not commit any reversible error in
its assailed Decision, the petition was denied via a
Resolution10 issued by this Court on March 24, 2004.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby COWD and Gonzalez filed a motion for reconsideration,
rendered ordering defendants [Ardiente, COWD and but the same was denied with finality through this Court's
Gonzalez] to pay jointly and severally plaintiffs, the Resolution11 dated June 28, 2004.
following sums:
(c) 50,000.00 for attorney's fee. 7.1 HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS (ALTHOUGH IT
HAS REDUCED THE LIABILITY INTO HALF) HAS STILL
The cross-claim of Cagayan de Oro Water District and
COMMITTED GRAVE AND SERIOUS ERROR WHEN IT
Engr. Gaspar Gonzales is hereby dismissed. The Court is
UPHELD THE JOINT AND SOLIDARY LIABILITY OF
not swayed that the cutting off of the water supply of
PETITIONER JOYCE V. ARDIENTE WITH CAGAYAN
plaintiffs was because they were influenced by defendant
DE ORO WATER DISTRICT (COWD) AND ENGR.
Joyce Ardiente. They were negligent too for which they
GASPAR D. GONZALES FOR THE LATTER'S FAILURE
should be liable.
TO SERVE NOTICE UPON RESPONDENTS SPOUSES
PASTORFIDE PRIOR TO THE ACTUAL
DISCONNECTION DESPITE EVIDENCE ADDUCED
SO ORDERED.6 DURING TRIAL THAT EVEN WITHOUT PETITIONER'S
REQUEST, COWD WAS ALREADY SET TO EFFECT
DISCONNECTION OF RESPONDENTS' WATER
Petitioner, COWD and Gonzalez filed an appeal with the SUPPLY DUE TO NON-PAYMENT OF ACCOUNT FOR
CA. THREE (3) MONTHS.
On August 28, 2003, the CA promulgated its assailed 7.2 THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
Decision disposing as follows: COMMITTED GRAVE AND SERIOUS ERROR WHEN IT
RULED TOTALLY AGAINST PETITIONER AND FAILED
TO FIND THAT RESPONDENTS ARE GUILTY OF
CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE WHEN THEY FAILED
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the appealed
TO PAY THEIR WATER BILLS FOR THREE MONTHS
decision is AFFIRMED, with the modification that the
AND TO MOVE FOR THE TRANSFER OF THE COWD
awarded damages is reduced to P100,000.00 each for
ACCOUNT IN THEIR NAME, WHICH WAS A
moral and exemplary damages, while attorney's fees is
VIOLATION OF THEIR MEMORANDUM OF
lowered to P25,000.00. Costs against appellants.
AGREEMENT WITH PETITIONER JOYCE V.
ARDIENTE. RESPONDENTS LIKEWISE
DELIBERATELY FAILED TO EXERCISE DILIGENCE
SO ORDERED.7 OF A GOOD FATHER OF THE FAMILY TO MINIMIZE
THE DAMAGE UNDER ART. 2203 OF THE NEW CIVIL
CODE.
The CA ruled, with respect to petitioner, that she has a
legal duty to honor the possession and use of water line
by Ma. Theresa Pastorfide pursuant to their Memorandum 7.3 THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
of Agreement and that when [petitioner] applied for its SERIOUSLY ERRED WHEN IT DISREGARDED THE
disconnection, she acted in bad faith causing prejudice FACT THAT RESPONDENT SPOUSES PASTORFIDE
and [injury to] Ma. Theresa Pastorfide.8 ARE LIKEWISE BOUND TO OBSERVE ARTICLE 19 OF
THE NEW CIVIL CODE, i.e., IN THE EXERCISE OF
THEIR RIGHTS AND IN THE PERFORMANCE OF
As to COWD and Gonzalez, the CA held that they failed THEIR DUTIES TO ACT WITH JUSTICE, GIVE
to give a notice of disconnection and derelicted in EVERYONE HIS DUE AND OBSERVE HONESTY AND
reconnecting the water line despite payment of the unpaid GOOD FAITH.
bills by the [respondent spouses Pastorfide].9
63
At the outset, the Court noticed that COWD and The exercise of a right must be in accordance with the
Gonzalez, who were petitioner's co-defendants before the purpose for which it was established and must not be
RTC and her co-appellants in the CA, were impleaded as excessive or unduly harsh; there must be no intention to
respondents in the instant petition. This cannot be done. harm another.15 Otherwise, liability for damages to the
Being her co-parties before the RTC and the CA, injured party will attach.16 In the present case, intention
petitioner cannot, in the instant petition for review on to harm was evident on the part of petitioner when she
certiorari, make COWD and Gonzalez, adversary parties. requested for the disconnection of respondent spouses
It is a grave mistake on the part of petitioner's counsel to water supply without warning or informing the latter of
treat COWD and Gonzalez as respondents. There is no such request. Petitioner claims that her request for
basis to do so, considering that, in the first place, there is disconnection was based on the advise of COWD
no showing that petitioner filed a cross-claim against personnel and that her intention was just to compel the
COWD and Gonzalez. Under Section 2, Rule 9 of the Spouses Pastorfide to comply with their agreement that
Rules of Court, a cross-claim which is not set up shall be petitioner's account with COWD be transferred in
barred. Thus, for failing to set up a cross-claim against respondent spouses' name. If such was petitioner's only
COWD and Gonzalez before the RTC, petitioner is intention, then she should have advised respondent
already barred from doing so in the present petition. spouses before or immediately after submitting her
request for disconnection, telling them that her request
was simply to force them to comply with their obligation
More importantly, as shown above, COWD and under their Memorandum of Agreement. But she did not.
Gonzalez's petition for review on certiorari filed with this What made matters worse is the fact that COWD
Court was already denied with finality on June 28, 2004, undertook the disconnection also without prior notice and
making the presently assailed CA Decision final and even failed to reconnect the Spouses Pastorfides water
executory insofar as COWD and Gonzalez are supply despite payment of their arrears. There was clearly
concerned. Thus, COWD and Gonzalez are already an abuse of right on the part of petitioner, COWD and
precluded from participating in the present petition. They Gonzalez. They are guilty of bad faith.
cannot resurrect their lost cause by filing pleadings this
time as respondents but, nonetheless, reiterating the
same prayer in their previous pleadings filed with the RTC The principle of abuse of rights as enshrined in Article 19
and the CA. of the Civil Code provides that every person must, in the
exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties,
act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe
As to the merits of the instant petition, the Court likewise honesty and good faith.
noticed that the main issues raised by petitioner are
factual and it is settled that the resolution of factual issues
is the function of lower courts, whose findings on these In this regard, the Court's ruling in Yuchengco v. The
matters are received with respect and considered binding Manila Chronicle Publishing Corporation17 is instructive,
by the Supreme Court subject only to certain exceptions, to wit:
none of which is present in this instant petition.13 This is
especially true when the findings of the RTC have been
affirmed by the CA as in this case.14 xxxx
In any case, a perusal of the records at hand would readily This provision of law sets standards which must be
show that the instant petition lacks merit. observed in the exercise of ones rights as well as in the
performance of its duties, to wit: to act with justice; give
everyone his due; and observe honesty and good faith.
Petitioner insists that she should not be held liable for the
disconnection of respondent spouses' water supply,
because she had no participation in the actual In Globe Mackay Cable and Radio Corporation v. Court
disconnection. However, she admitted in the present of Appeals, it was elucidated that while Article 19 lays
petition that it was she who requested COWD to down a rule of conduct for the government of human
disconnect the Spouses Pastorfide's water supply. This relations and for the maintenance of social order, it does
was confirmed by COWD and Gonzalez in their cross- not provide a remedy for its violation. Generally, an action
claim against petitioner. While it was COWD which for damages under either Article 20 or Article 21 would be
actually discontinued respondent spouses' water supply, proper. The Court said:
it cannot be denied that it was through the instance of
petitioner that the Spouses Pastorfide's water supply was
disconnected in the first place.
One of the more notable innovations of the New Civil
Code is the codification of "some basic principles that are
to be observed for the rightful relationship between
It is true that it is within petitioner's right to ask and even human beings and for the stability of the social order."
require the Spouses Pastorfide to cause the transfer of [REPORT ON THE CODE COMMISSION ON THE
the former's account with COWD to the latter's name PROPOSED CIVIL CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES, p. 39].
pursuant to their Memorandum of Agreement. However, The framers of the Code, seeking to remedy the defect of
the remedy to enforce such right is not to cause the the old Code which merely stated the effects of the law,
disconnection of the respondent spouses' water supply.
64
but failed to draw out its spirit, incorporated certain
fundamental precepts which were "designed to indicate
certain norms that spring from the fountain of good On the basis of the foregoing, the Court finds no cogent
conscience" and which were also meant to serve as reason to depart from the ruling of both the RTC and the
"guides for human conduct [that] should run as golden CA that petitioner, COWD and Gonzalez are solidarily
threads through society, to the end that law may approach liable.
its supreme ideal, which is the sway and dominance of
justice." (Id.) Foremost among these principles is that
pronounced in Article 19 x x x. The Spouses Pastorfide are entitled to moral damages
based on the provisions of Article 2219,19 in connection
with Articles 2020 and 2121 of the Civil Code.
xxxx
65
RAUL H. SESBREO, vs. CA AND VISA YAN Paloma Village, Labangon, Cebu City, including that of
ELECTRIC COMPANY (VECO plaintiff-appellant Sesbreo, for illegal connections, meter
tampering, seals, conduit pipes, jumpers, wiring
connections, and meter installations. After Bebe Baledio,
This case concerns the claim for damages of petitioner plaintiff-appellant Sesbreos maid, unlocked the gate,
Raul H. Sesbreo founded on abuse of rights. Sesbreo they inspected the electric meter and found that it had
accused the violation of contract (VOC) inspection team been turned upside down. Defendant-appellant Arcilla
dispatched by the Visayan Electric Company (VECO) to took photographs of the upturned electric meter. With
check his electric meter with conducting an unreasonable Chuchie Garcia, Peter Sesbreo and one of the maids
search in his residential premises. But the Regional Trial present, they removed said meter and replaced it with a
Court (RTC), Branch 13, in Cebu City rendered judgment new one. At that time, plaintiff-appellant Sesbreo was in
on August 19, 1994 dismissing the claim;1 and the Court his office and no one called to inform him of the
of Appeals (CA) affirmed the dismissal on March 10, inspection. The VOC Team then asked for and received
2003.2 Chuchie Garcias permission to enter the house itself to
examine the kind and number of appliances and light
fixtures in the household and determine its electrical load.
Afterwards, Chuchie Garcia signed the Inspection
Hence, this appeal by Sesbreo.
Division Report, which showed the condition of the
electric meter on May 11, 1989 when the VOC Team
inspected it, with notice that it would be subjected to a
Antecedents laboratory test. She also signed a Load Survey Sheet that
showed the electrical load of plaintiff-appellant Sesbreo.
66
seeing a person being threatened by another in the earlier he claimed had been stolen by members of the
manner he described was simply contrary to human VOC Team. When he was confronted with these facts,
experience. plaintiff-appellant Sesbreo further claimed that the items
allegedly stolen by Chuchie Garcia were part of the loot
taken by defendants-appellees Constantino and Arcilla.
In contrast, the RTC believed the evidence of the Yet not once did plaintiff-appellant Sesbreo or any of his
respondents showing that the VOC inspection team had witnesses mention that a conspiracy existed between
found the electric meter in Sesbreos residence turned these people. Clearly, much like his other allegations, it is
upside down to prevent the accurate registering of the nothing more than an afterthought by plaintiff-appellant
electricity consumption of the household, causing them to Sesbreo.
detach and replace the meter. It held as unbelievable that
the team forcibly entered the house through threats and
intimidation; that they themselves turned the electric All in all, the allegations against defendants-appellees
meter upside down in order to incriminate him for theft of appear to be nothing more than a put-on to save face. For
electricity, because the fact that the team and Sesbreo the simple truth is that the inspection exposed plaintiff-
had not known each other before then rendered it unlikely appellant Sesbreo as a likely cheat and thief.
for the team to fabricate charges against him; and that
Sesbreos non-presentation of Chuchie Garcia left her
allegation of her being forced to sign the two documents xxxx
by the team unsubstantiated.
68
and unreasonable exercise of State power. The Court has when it is abused, especially to the prejudice of others[;]
made this clear in its pronouncements, including that [i]t cannot be said that a person exercises a right when he
made in People v. Marti,17 viz: unnecessarily prejudices another." Article 19 of the Civil
Code23 sets the standards to be observed in the exercise
of ones rights and in the performance of ones duties,
If the search is made upon the request of law enforcers, namely: (a) to act with justice; (b) to give everyone his
a warrant must generally be first secured if it is to pass the due; and (c) to observe honesty and good faith. The law
test of constitutionality. However, if the search is made at thereby recognizes the primordial limitation on all rights
the behest or initiative of the proprietor of a private that in the exercise of the rights, the standards under
establishment for its own and private purposes, as in the Article 19 must be observed.24
case at bar, and without the intervention of police
authorities, the right against unreasonable search and
seizure cannot be invoked for only the act of private Although the act is not illegal, liability for damages may
individual, not the law enforcers, is involved. In sum, the arise should there be an abuse of rights, like when the act
protection against unreasonable searches and seizures is performed without prudence or in bad faith. In order that
cannot be extended to acts committed by private liability may attach under the concept of abuse of rights,
individuals so as to bring it within the ambit of alleged the following elements must be present, to wit: (a) the
unlawful intrusion by the government.18 existence of a legal right or duty, (b) which is exercised in
bad faith, and (c) for the sole intent of prejudicing or
injuring another.25 There is no hard and fast rule that can
It is worth noting that the VOC inspectors decided to enter be applied to ascertain whether or not the principle of
the main premises only after finding the meter of abuse of rights is to be invoked. The resolution of the
Sesbreo turned upside down, hanging and its disc not issue depends on the circumstances of each case.
rotating. Their doing so would enable them to determine
the unbilled electricity consumed by his household. The
circumstances justified their decision, and their inspection Sesbreo asserts that he did not authorize Baledio or
of the main premises was a continuation of the authorized Chuchie Garcia to let anyone enter his residence in his
entry. There was no question then that their ability to absence; and that Baledio herself confirmed that the
determine the unbilled electricity called for them to see for members of the VOC team had intimidated her into letting
themselves the usage of electricity inside. Not being them in.
agents of the State, they did not have to first obtain a
search warrant to do so.
The assertion of Sesbreo is improper for consideration
in this appeal.1wphi1 The RTC and the CA unanimously
Balichas presence participation in the entry did not make found the testimonies of Sesbreos witnesses
the inspection a search by an agent of the State within the implausible because of inconsistencies on material
ambit of the guaranty. As already mentioned, Balicha was points; and even declared that the non-presentation of
part of the team by virtue of his mission order authorizing Garcia as a witness was odd if not suspect. Considering
him to assist and escort the team during its routine that such findings related to the credibility of the witnesses
inspection.19 Consequently, the entry into the main and their testimonies, the Court cannot review and undo
premises of the house by the VOC team did not constitute them now because it is not a trier of facts, and is not also
a violation of the guaranty. tasked to analyze or weigh evidence all over again.26
Verily, a review that may tend to supplant the findings of
the trial court that had the first-hand opportunity to
Our holding could be different had Sesbreo persuasively observe the demeanor of the witnesses themselves
demonstrated the intervention of malice or bad faith on should be undertaken by the Court with prudent
the part of Constantino and Arcilla during their inspection hesitation. Only when Sesbreo could make a clear
of the main premises, or any excessiveness committed by showing of abuse in their appreciation of the evidence and
them in the course of the inspection. But Sesbreo did records by the trial and the appellate courts should the
not. On the other hand, the CA correctly observed that the Court do the unusual review of the factual findings of the
inspection did not zero in on Sesbreos residence trial and appellate courts.27 Alas, that showing was not
because the other houses within the area were similarly made here.
subjected to the routine inspection.20 This, we think,
eliminated any notion of malice or bad faith.
Nor should the Court hold that Sesbreo was denied due
process by the refusal of the trial judge to inhibit from the
Clearly, Sesbreo did not establish his claim for damages case. Although the trial judge had issued an order for his
if the respondents were not guilty of abuse of rights. To voluntary inhibition, he still rendered the judgment in the
stress, the concept of abuse of rights prescribes that a end in compliance with the instruction of the Executive
person should not use his right unjustly or in bad faith; Judge, whose exercise of her administrative authority on
otherwise, he may be liable to another who suffers injury. the matter of the inhibition should be respected.28 In this
The rationale for the concept is to present some basic connection, we find to be apt the following observation of
principles to be followed for the rightful relationship the CA, to wit:
between human beings and the stability of social order.21
Moreover, according to a commentator,22 "the exercise
of right ends when the right disappears, and it disappears
69
x x x. Both Judge Paredes and Judge Priscila Agana
serve the Regional Trial Court and are therefore of co-
equal rank. The latter has no authority to reverse or
modify the orders of Judge Paredes. But in ordering
Judge Paredes to continue hearing the case, Judge
Agana did not violate their co-equal status or unilaterally
increased her jurisdiction. It is merely part of her
administrative responsibilities as Executive Judge of the
Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, of which Judge
Paredes is also a member.29
SO ORDERED.
70
FLORENCIO A. SALADAGA, Complainant,
(1) TCT No. T-662 was already cancelled by TCT No. T- The administrative cases were referred to the Integrated
3211 in the name of Philippine National Bank (PNB) as Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and
early as November 17, 1972 after foreclosure recommendation.14
proceedings;
71
the produce of the land, the total amount would have equitable mortgage. Thus, respondent argues that he still
exceeded P15,000.00. had the legal right to mortgage the subject property to
other persons. Respondent additionally asserts that
complainant should render an accounting of the produce
Report and Recommendation of the Investigating the latter had collected from the said property, which
Commissioner and Resolution of the IBP Board of would already exceed the P15,000.00 consideration
Governors stated in the deed.
In a Report and Recommendation16 dated April 29, 2005, There is no merit in respondents defense.
the Investigating Commissioner of the IBPs Commission
on Bar Discipline found that respondent was in bad faith
when he dealt with complainant and executed the "Deed Regardless of whether the written contract between
of Sale with Right to Repurchase" but later on claimed that respondent and complainant is actually one of sale with
the agreement was one of equitable mortgage. pacto de retroor of equitable mortgage, respondents
Respondent was also guilty of deceit or fraud when he actuations in his transaction with complainant, as well as
represented in the "Deed of Sale with Right to in the present administrative cases, clearly show a
Repurchase" dated December 2, 1981 that the property disregard for the highest standards of legal proficiency,
was covered by TCT No. T-662, even giving complainant morality, honesty, integrity, and fair dealing required from
the owners copy of the said certificate of title, when the lawyers, for which respondent should be held
said TCT had already been cancelled on November 17, administratively liable.
1972 by TCT No. T-3211 in the name of Philippine
National Bank (PNB). Respondent made matters even
worse, when he had TCT No. T-3211 cancelled with the When respondent was admitted to the legal profession,
issuance of TCT No. T-7235 under his and his wifes he took an oath where he undertook to "obey the laws,"
name on January 4,1982 without informing complainant. "do no falsehood," and "conduct [him]self as a lawyer
This was compounded by respondents subsequent according to the best of [his] knowledge and
mortgage of the property to RBAI, which led to the discretion."18 He gravely violated his oath.
acquisition of the property by RBAI and the dispossession
thereof of complainant. Thus, the Investigating
Commissioner recommended that respondent be (1)
The Investigating Commissioner correctly found, and the
suspended from the practice of law for one year, with
IBP Board of Governors rightly agreed, that respondent
warning that a similar misdeed in the future shall be dealt
caused the ambiguity or vagueness in the "Deed of Sale
with more severity, and (2) ordered to return the sum of
with Right to Repurchase" as he was the one who
P15,000.00, the amount he received as consideration for
prepared or drafted the said instrument. Respondent
the pacto de retrosale, with interest at the legal rate.
could have simply denominated the instrument as a deed
of mortgage and referred to himself and complainant as
"mortgagor" and "mortgagee," respectively, rather than as
Considering respondents "commission of unlawful acts, "vendor a retro" and "vendee a retro." If only respondent
especially crimes involving moral turpitude, actsof had been more circumspect and careful in the drafting
dishonesty, grossly immoral conduct and deceit," the IBP and preparation of the deed, then the controversy
Board of Governors adopted and approved the between him and complainant could havebeen avoided
Investigating Commissioners Report and or, at the very least, easily resolved. His imprecise and
Recommendation with modification as follows: misleading wording of the said deed on its face betrayed
respondent is(1) suspended from the practice of law for lack oflegal competence on his part. He thereby fell short
two years, with warning that a similar misdeed in the of his oath to "conduct [him]self as a lawyer according to
future shall be dealt with more severity, and (2) ordered the best of [his] knowledge and discretion."
to return the sum of P15,000.00 received in consideration
of the pacto de retrosale, with legal interest.17
More significantly, respondent transgressed the laws and
the fundamental tenet of human relations asembodied in
The Courts Ruling Article 19 of the Civil Code:
The Court agrees with the recommendation of the IBP Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights
Board of Governors to suspend respondent from the and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give
practice of law for two years, but it refrains from ordering everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.
respondent to return the P15,000.00 consideration, plus
interest.
Respondent, as owner of the property, had the right to
mortgage it to complainant but, as a lawyer, he should
Respondent does not deny executing the "Deed of Sale have seen to it that his agreement with complainant is
with Right to Repurchase" dated December 2, 1981 in embodied in an instrument that clearly expresses the
favor of complainant. However, respondent insists that intent of the contracting parties. A lawyer who drafts a
the deed is not one of sale with pacto de retro, but one of contract must see to it that the agreement faithfully and
72
clearly reflects the intention of the contracting parties. not necessarily imply the element of criminality although
Otherwise, the respective rights and obligations of the the concept is broad enough to include such element.23
contracting parties will be uncertain, which opens the door
to legal disputes between the said parties. Indeed, the
uncertainty caused by respondents poor formulation of To be "dishonest" means the disposition to lie, cheat,
the "Deed of Sale with Right to Repurchase" was a deceive, defraud or betray; be untrustworthy; lacking
significant factor in the legal controversy between inintegrity, honesty, probity, integrity in principle, fairness
respondent and complainant. Such poor formulation and straightforwardness. On the other hand, conduct that
reflects at the very least negatively on the legal is "deceitful" means as follows:
competence of respondent.
xxxx
The Court notes that based on the same factual
antecedents as the present administrative cases,
CANON 12 A lawyer shall exert every effort and complainant instituted a criminal case for estafa against
consider it his duty to assist in the speedy and efficient respondent, docketed as Criminal Case No. 3112-A,
administration of justice. before the MTC. When a criminal action is instituted, the
civil action for the recovery of civil liability arising from the
offense charged shall be deemed instituted with the
criminal action unless the offended party waives the civil
xxxx
action, reserves the right to institute it separately or
institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action.34
Unless the complainant waived the civil action, reserved
Rule 12.03 A lawyer shall not, after obtaining extensions the right to institute it separately, or instituted the civil
of time to file pleadings, memoranda or briefs, let the action prior to the criminal action, then his civil action for
period lapse without submitting the same or offering an the recovery of civil liability arising from the estafa
explanation for his failure to do so. committed by respondent is deemed instituted with
Criminal Case No. 3112-A. The civil liability that
complainant may recover in Criminal Case No. 3112-A
Rule 12.04 A lawyer shall not unduly delay a case, includes restitution; reparation of the damage caused him;
impede the execution of a judgment or misuse court and/or indemnification for consequential damages,35
processes. which may already cover the P15,000.00 consideration
complainant had paid for the subject property.
74
have entered the land and occupied the premises. The
absence of any attempt on the part of Orion to assert its
right of dominion over the property allegedly soldto it is a
clear badge of fraud. That notwithstanding the execution
of the Dacion en Pago, Kang remained in possession of
the disputed condominium unit from the time of the
execution of the Dacion en Pagountil the propertys
subsequent transfer to Suzuki unmistakably
strengthens the fictitious nature of the Dacion en Pago.
conveyance
75