G.R. No.

106483 May 22, 1995

ERNESTO L. CALLADO, petitioner,

vs.
INTERNATIONAL RICE RESEARCH INSTITUTE, respondent.

Facts: Ernesto Callado, petitioner, was employed as a driver at the IRRI. One day while driving an IRRI
vehicle on an official trip to the NAIA and back to the IRRI, petitioner figured in an accident.

Petitioner was informed of the findings of a preliminary investigation conducted by the IRRI's Human
Resource Development Department Manager. In view of the findings, he was charged with:

(1) Driving an institute vehicle while on official duty under the influence of liquor;

(2) Serious misconduct

(3) Gross and habitual neglect of duties.

Petitioner submitted his answer and defenses to the charges against him. However, IRRI issued a Notice
of Termination to petitioner.

Thereafter, petitioner filed a complaint before the Labor Arbiter for illegal dismissal, illegal suspension
and indemnity pay with moral and exemplary damages and attorney's fees.

IRRI wrote the Labor Arbiter to inform him that the Institute enjoys immunity from legal process by
virtue of Article 3 of Presidential Decree No. 1620, 5 and that it invokes such diplomatic immunity and
privileges as an international organization in the instant case filed by petitioner, not having waived the
same.

While admitting IRRI's defense of immunity, the Labor Arbiter, nonetheless, cited an Order issued by the
Institute to the effect that "in all cases of termination, respondent IRRI waives its immunity," and,
accordingly, considered the defense of immunity no longer a legal obstacle in resolving the case.

The NLRC found merit in private respondent's appeal and, finding that IRRI did not waive its immunity,
ordered the aforesaid decision of the Labor Arbiter set aside and the complaint dismissed.

In this petition petitioner contends that the immunity of the IRRI as an international organization
granted by Article 3 of Presidential Decree No. 1620 may not be invoked in the case at bench inasmuch
as it waived the same by virtue of its Memorandum on "Guidelines on the handling of dismissed
employees in relation to P.D. 1620."

Issue: Did the (IRRI) waive its immunity from suit in this dispute which arose from an employer-
employee relationship?
Ruling: No.

P.D. No. 1620, Article 3 provides:

Art. 3. Immunity from Legal Process. The Institute shall enjoy immunity from any penal, civil and
administrative proceedings, except insofar as that immunity has been expressly waived by the Director-
General of the Institute or his authorized representatives.

The SC upholds the constitutionality of the aforequoted law. There is in this case "a categorical
recognition by the Executive Branch of the Government that IRRI enjoys immunities accorded to
international organizations, which determination has been held to be a political question conclusive
upon the Courts in order not to embarass a political department of Government.

It is a recognized principle of international law and under our system of separation of powers that
diplomatic immunity is essentially a political question and courts should refuse to look beyond a
determination by the executive branch of the government, and where the plea of diplomatic immunity
is recognized and affirmed by the executive branch of the government as in the case at bar, it is then the
duty of the courts to accept the claim of immunity upon appropriate suggestion by the principal law
officer of the government or other officer acting under his direction.

The raison d'etre for these immunities is the assurance of unimpeded performance of their functions by
the agencies concerned.

The grant of immunity to IRRI is clear and unequivocal and an express waiver by its Director-General is
the only way by which it may relinquish or abandon this immunity.

In cases involving dismissed employees, the Institute may waive its immunity, signifying that such waiver
is discretionary on its part.
G.R. No. 104269 November 11, 1993

G.R. No. 104269 November 11, 1993

DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE, petitioner,

vs.
THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, et al., respondents.

Facts:

The DA and Sultan Security Agency entered into a contract for security services, pursuant to the
agreement guards were deployed by Sultan Agency in the various premises of the DA. September 1990,
several guards of Sultan Agency filed a complaint for underpayment of wages, non-payment of 13th
month pay, uniform allowances, night shift differential pay, holiday pay and overtime pay, as well as for
damages before Regional Arbitration Branch of CDO against the DA and Sultan Security Agency.

The executive labor arbiter rendered that DA and Sultan Agency are jointly and severally liable. Sultan
didn't appeal the decision, thus it became final and executory. July 1991, the Labor Arbiter issued a writ
of execution commanding the City Sheriff to enforce the judgment against the property of DA and
Sultan's property.

DA, filed a petition for injunction, prohibition and mandamus, with prayer for preliminary writ of
injunction was filed by the petitioner with the NLRC CDO, saying that the writ issued was affected
without the labor arbiters jurisdiction over the petitioner. DA also pointed out that the attachment or
seizure of its property would hamper and jeopardize petitioner's governmental functions to the
prejudice of the public good.

This petition charges NLRC with grave abuse of discretion for refusing to quash the writ of execution.
The NLRC has disregarded the cardinal rule on the non-suability of the State. NLRC argued on the other
hand that the DA has impliedly waived its immunity from suit by concluding a service contract with
Sultan Agency.

Issue: Whether or not NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion.

Ruling:

Not all contracts entered into by the government operate as a waiver of its non-suability; distinction
must still be made between one which is executed in the exercise of its sovereign function and another
which is done in its proprietary capacity.

In the instant case, the Department of Agriculture has not pretended to have assumed a capacity apart
from its being a governmental entity when it entered into the questioned contract; nor that it could
have, in fact, performed any act proprietary in character.
But, be that as it may, the claims of private respondents, i.e. for underpayment of wages, holiday pay,
overtime pay and similar other items, arising from the Contract for Service, clearly constitute money
claims. Act No. 3083, aforecited, gives the consent of the State to be "sued upon any moneyed claim
involving liability arising from contract, express or implied, .. Pursuant, however, to Commonwealth Act
("C.A.") No. 327, as amended by Presidential Decree ("P.D.") No. 1145, the money claim first be brought
to the Commission on Audit.

We fail to see any substantial conflict or inconsistency between the provisions of C.A. No. 327 and the
Labor Code with respect to money claims against the State. The Labor code, in relation to Act No. 3083,
provides the legal basis for the State liability but the prosecution, enforcement or satisfaction thereof
must still be pursued in accordance with the rules and procedures laid down in C.A. No. 327, as
amended by P.D. 1445.

Wherefore, the petition is granted.

G.R. No. 70853 March 12, 1987

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner-appellee,

vs.
PABLO FELICIANO and INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, respondents-appellants.

Petitioner seeks the review of the decision of the Intermediate Appellate Court dated April 30, 1985
reversing the order of the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur, Branch VI, dated August 21, 1980,
which dismissed the complaint of respondent Pablo Feliciano for recovery of ownership and possession
of a parcel of land on the ground of non-suability of the State.

On January 22, 1970, Feliciano filed a complaint with the then Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur
against the RP, represented by the Land Authority, for the recovery of ownership and possession of a
parcel of land, consisting of four (4) lots with an aggregate area of 1,364.4177 hectares, situated in the
Barrio of Salvacion, Municipality of Tinambac, Camarines Sur. Feliciano alleged that he bought the
property in question from Victor Gardiola by virtue of a Contract of Sale dated May 31, 1952, followed
by a Deed of Absolute Sale on October 30, 1954; that Gardiola had acquired the property by purchase
from the heirs of Francisco Abrazado whose title to the said property was evidenced by an informacion
posesoria that upon his purchase of the property, he took actual possession of the same, introduced
various improvements therein and caused it to be surveyed in July 1952, which survey was approved by
the Director of Lands on October 24, 1954.

On November 1, 1954, President Ramon Magsaysay issued Proclamation No. 90 reserving for settlement
purposes, under the administration of the National Resettlement and Rehabilitation Administration
(NARRA), a tract of land situated in the Municipalities of Tinambac and Siruma, Camarines Sur, after
which the NARRA and its successor agency, the Land Authority, started sub-dividing and distributing the
land to the settlers; that the property in question, while located within the reservation established
under Proclamation No. 90, was the private property of Feliciano and should therefore be excluded
therefrom. Feliciano prayed that he be declared the rightful and true owner of the property in question
consisting of 1,364.4177 hectares; that his title of ownership based on informacion posesoria of his
predecessor-in-interest be declared legal valid and subsisting and that defendant be ordered to cancel
and nullify all awards to the settlers.

ISSUE: WON the State can be sued for recovery and possession of a parcel of land
RULING: NO

A suit against the State, under settled jurisprudence is not permitted, except upon a showing that the
State has consented to be sued, either expressly or by implication through the use of statutory language
too plain to be misinterpreted. It may be invoked by the courts sua sponte at any stage of the
proceedings.

Waiver of immunity, being a derogation of sovereignty, will not be inferred lightly but must be
construed in strictissimi juris (of strictest right). Moreover, the Proclamation is not a legislative act. The
consent of the State to be sued must emanate from statutory authority. Waiver of State immunity can
only be made by an act of the legislative body.

As pointed out by the Solicitor General, that the informacion posesoria registered in the Office of the
Register of Deed of Camarines Sur on September 23, 1952 was a "reconstituted" possessory
information; it was "reconstituted from the duplicate presented to this office (Register of Deeds) by Dr.
Pablo Feliciano," without the submission of proof that the alleged duplicate was authentic or that the
original thereof was lost. Reconstitution can be validly made only in case of loss of the original. These
circumstances raise grave doubts as to the authenticity and validity of the "informacion posesoria"
relied upon by respondent Feliciano. Adding to the dubiousness of said document is the fact that
"possessory information calls for an area of only 100 hectares," whereas the land claimed by respondent
Feliciano comprises 1,364.4177 hectares, later reduced to 701-9064 hectares. Courts should be wary in
accepting "possessory information documents, as well as other purportedly old Spanish titles, as proof
of alleged ownership of lands.